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WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VI

June, 1967

Number 1

LATIN AMERICAN
STATESMEN, SCHOLARS AND SCOUNDRELS

Published By

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia
CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

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WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VI June, 1967 Number 1

LATIN AMERICAN
STATESMEN, SCHOLARS AND SCOUNDRELS

CONTENTS

Page
The Image of an American Imperialist:

Colombian views of Teddy Roosevelt

By Joseph L. Arbena 3

Castro : Some Economic Benefits for Latin America

By Alfonzo Gonzalez 21

La Huelga de la Costa Norte: The 1954 Strike

Against the United Fruit Company

By Richard A. LaBarge 40

Comments

By John R. Hildebrand 54

Cortes: A Comment

By Robert W '. Page 57

Vidaurri and States Rights

By Edward H. Moseley 69

Comonfort: The Misunderstood Reformer

By Ray Broussard 81

Comments ' '

By Stanley Ross 93

Farquhar: Economic Statesman in Amazonia
and South Brazil

By Charles A. Gauld 98

Ruy Barbosa, A Great Brazilian

By Florene J. Dunstan 110

A. P. Figueiredo

By T. Lynn Smith 119

Comment

By Thomas L. Page 127

Lincoln's Scholarly Diplomat in Ecuador:

Friedrich Hassaurek
By C. Harvey Gardiner 134

FOREWORD

This publication is part of a continuing cooperative effort by West
Georgia College and the Sears-Roebuck Foundation to make available
to an everexpanding reading public articles of importance in the Social
Sciences. It was felt that the college's increasing emphasis on Latin
American specialities, its new two-quarter History of the Americas
course, its federal grant to bring a Latin American curriculum specialist
to the campus for a year, Georgia's proximity and generally increasing
awareness of our neighbors to the South, prompted this review. The
publication was made possible by a grant from Sears.

The papers herein were delivered at the XIV Annual Meeting
of the Southeastern Conference on Latin American Studies (SECOLAS)
in Atlanta on April 14, 15, 1967, Alfred B. Thomas, Emeritus, Depart-
ment of History, University of Alabama, 1966-1967 president. The
sessions of three papers each were followed by a criticism. The first,
session, "Economics and the Carribean," was presided over by Jack D.
L. Holmes, College of General Studies, University of Alabama in Bir-
mingham. Some liberty was taken in the personification of the United
Fruit company. The second grouping on "Mexico's Enigmatic Caudil-
los," was chaired by J. Leon Helguera, Graduate Center for Latin
American Studies, Vanderbilt University. The third meeting, conducted
by S. Herbert Cockburn, Director, Latin American Studies Program,
Campbell College, was on "Brazil: Some Forceful Figures." The article
on Hassaurek was the luncheon address and the dinner address was a
slide lecture on the "Development of the Amazon Basin" by State Sena-
tor McKinley Conway of Conway Research, Inc., of Atlanta. A paper
on Victoriano Huerta by William Coker, University of Southern Missis-
sippi, was not included in this publication at his request.

Appreciation is given especially to the authors for their papers
and permission to publish as well as to the members of the Division
of Social Sciences. Particular thanks go to Dean John M. Martin,
Clyde D. Ware of the Sears Foundation, Melvin Ecke for local arrange-
ments, lone S. Wright as President-elect of SECOLAS, and Gail Adams
and Joan Johnston as secretaries.

Eugene R. Huck, Chairman
Division of Social Sciences
1967 SECOLAS Program Chairman

THE IMAGE OF AN AMERICAN

IMPERIALIST:

COLOMBIAN VIEWS OF

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

By Joseph L. Arbena*

The permanent loss of a portion of national territory as potentially
significant as the Isthmus of Panama was to Colombia 1 could conceiv-
ably contribute directly to later important historical developments. At
best, the separation of Panama might have stimulated in Colombia a
rejuvenation of nationalistic dedication, a spirit of bi-partisan unity
overriding the suicidal conflicts which had caused such bloodshed and
destruction throughout the nineteenth century. At worst it might have
accelerated the disruptive forces of party and section to the extent of
complete national disintegration. At the least, one might justifiably
have expected either a serious effort to displace the incumbent Conserva-
tive administration in Bogota, or an attempt by that administration to
employ the current crisis as a means to strengthen and perpetuate its
position; and, in either case, we might have predicted the beginning
of a lengthy period of popular and official hostility toward the United
States.

Yet, an examination of events since November, 1903 shows the
above assumptions to be generally inaccurate and raises some major
questions for the student of Colombian history. Why, for example, did
Columbia fail to break diplomatic relations with the United States
when the latter refused to satisfy even the most limited Colombian de-
mands for settlement? More important, why has Colombia continued
to be one of the most consistent friends of the United States in Latin
America, despite the fact that, with the possible exception of Mexico,
she has suffered as much at the hands of the Northern Colossus as any

*Department of History, Clemson University.

i For Colombian views of the value of Panama to Colombia see Felipe Perez,
Jeografia fi'sica i politica del Estado de Panama (Bogota, 1862), p. 78; Lorenzo
Marroquin, El Canal (Bogota, 1903), pp. 115-116; and, Eduardo Posada,
Discursos y conjerencias (Paris, 1908), p. 135.

of her Latin neighbors? Third, why was there in Colombia neither a
revolutionary or reactionary movement which might be viewed as a
consequence of the loss of Panama? And, last, considering the manner
in which the previous questions are framed, what impact, if any, did
the Panama affair really have on Colombian national politics and
character?

These questions are clearly too broad to be treated adequately in
this paper. One must, however, consider some tentative answers in these
areas in order to provide a framework for examining a more specific
aspect of the Panama question: that is, Colombian views of the role
of Theodore Roosevelt in the Isthmian independence revolution.

The end of the Guerra de los Mil Dias in late 1902 found the
Colombian nation physically and spiritually exhausted. The estimates
of material . and human destruction 2 do not reflect the pessimistic
spirit which gripped Colombians for many months after that conflict.
Death and other horrors of war were topics of frequent discussion, 3 and
"peace at any cost" was a popular slogan in many circles. 4 News of the
loss of Panama, fatalistically accepted as permanent surprisingly early, 5
did not obliterate the memories of the Mil Dias. Rather, the events of
November, 1903 intensified the sense of fatigue and depression. 6

2 Jorge Holguin, Desde cerca (Paris, 1908), pp. 112, 148-150; Jorge Sanchez
Camacho, El General Ospina (Bogota, I960), p. 96; Rafael Granados, Historia
de Colombia (Bogota, I960), pp. 265-267.

3 Max Grillo, Emociones de la guerra (Bogota, 1903), pp. 9, 24-25; Correo
del Sur (Manizales), 23 May 1903, p. 4; El Conservador (Cali), 18 Nov. 1903.
p. 8; La Gruta (Bogota), 29 Aug. 1903, pp. 92, 94; Ibid., 7 Nov. 1903, p. 183.

4 El Esfuerzo (Zipaquira), 13 Apr. 1902, p. 1; El Reporter (Barranquilla).
12 Mar. 1903, p. 2; El Dia (Honda), 14 Aug. 1903, p. 6; El Combeimu
(Ibague), 7 Nov. 1903, p. 1; El Conservador, 11 Nov. 1903, p. 2.

s El Trabajo (San Jose de Cucuta), 14 May 1904, p. 3; Eduardo Lemaitre.
Reyes (Bogota, 1952), p. 211; Raimundo Rivas, Historia diplomatica de
Colombia (Bogota, 1961), p. 610.

6 El Conservador, 11 Nov. 1903, p. 1; La Gruta, 28 Nov. 1903, p. 227; Ibid..
8 Feb. 1904, pp. 301-302; La Organization (Medellfn), 3 Dec. 1903,' p. 3;
Ibid., 9 Feb. 1904, p. 2; El Trabajo, 12 Dec. 1903, p. 3; El Adalid Catolico
(Pasto), 18 Feb. 1904, p. 167; Jorge Holqufn to Rufino Jose Cuervo
24 Aug. 1904, Jorge Holguin MSS, Correspondencia Oficial, 1904-1908, Aca-
demia Colombiana de Historia (hereinafter referred to as Holguin MSS).

Another war, even a holy one, made fine talk, but poor policy. 7 Both
the government and the citizenry knew the consequences of pushing
for another war.

Reports from Panama failed not only to rejuvenate Colombian
spirits; they failed likewise to overcome the forces of disunity which
had for so long hindered national development. 3 Despite a superficial
closing of ranks, partisan and regional strife continued to prevent con-
certed, vigorous action. Colombians blamed each other for their coun-
try's compounded ills. 9 Only a few were willing to suggest that perhaps
the entire nation was at fault. 10 General criticism of the treasonous be-
havior of the Isthmians" and of the immoral and illegal actions of the
United States 12 failed to suppress the dissention.

Also detracting from any forceful response was the fear of further
national disintegration. 13 Rumors ran rampant that leaders in other
discontented regions, not satisfied with criticizing or obstructing gov-

7 Enrique Cortes to Jose Manuel Marroquin, 13 Nov. 1903, Belosario Palacios
to Marroquin, 1 Jan. 1904, B. Porras to Marroquin, 12 Jan. 1904, Jose Manuel
Marroquin MSS, Archivo: Indices, II, 1903-1904, Academia Colombiana de
Historia (hereinafter referred to as Marroquin MSS); El Oriente (Barran-
quilla), 16 July 1904, p. 2; La P atria (Medellin), 15 Nov. 1904, p. 1828.

8 For summaries of the internal conflicts in nineteenth-century Colombia see
Jesus Maria Henao and Gerardo Arrubla, History of Colombia, trans. J. Fred
Rippy (Chapel Hill, 1938) and Antonio Perez Aguirre, 25 Anos de historia
colombiana, 1853 a 1878 (Bogota, 1959).

9 El Adalid Catolico, 19 Nov. 1903, p. 115; La Gruta, 28 Nov. 1903, p. 229;
Grillo, Emociones, p. 12; Raul Perez, "The Treacherous Treaty: A Colombian
Plea," North American Review, CLXXVII (Dec. 1903), 936-937; La Organiza-
tion, 22 Jan. 1904, p. 2; Ibid., 5 Feb. 1904, p. 2; Juan B. Perez y Soto, INRI
(Habana, 1905), p. 5.

io El Conservator, 6 Jan. 1904, p. 34; El Cauca (Cali,) 7 Aug. 1904, pp. 198-
199.

!i Luciano Herrera, Independencia de Panama (Pasto, 1903), p. 7; Marroquin
to Francisco Ramirez, 12 Nov. 1903, quoted in Daniel Ortiz and Rafael Galvis,
Los Estados Unidos y su robo de Panama. T rat ado de 1846: anticedentes
y consecuentes (Bogota, 1920), p. 71; Pedro Valez R. to Sr. Director del El
Porvenir, 8 Nov. 1903, printed in Pedro Velez R., Asuntos de Panama (Bogota,
1909), p. 13; Diario Comercial (Barranquilla), 20 Nov. 1903, p. 2; El Adalid
Catolico, 10 Dec. 1903, p. 129; Ibid., 24 Dec. 1903, p. 137; Boletin Militar de
Colombia (Bogota), 1 Jan. 1904, p. 14.

12 See text and notes below.

'3 General references to the separatist threat appear in La Organization, 3 Dec.

1903, p. 5; El Adalid Catolico, 18 Feb. 1904, p. 169; El Combeima, 25 Feb.

1904, p. 2; El Zig-zag (Buga), 26 June 1904, p. 55.

eminent programs, were planning to imitate the Isthmian pattern. u
Later developments suggest that these plots, if they ever existed, gained
only minimum support. Nevertheless, the fear of potential splintering,
a reflection of the continued particularism referred to above, diverted
attention and energies away from Panama and led many Colombians
to argue that domestic political and constitutional reforms must pre-
cede any prolonged effort to regain Panama or retaliate for the loss. 15

Of course, the administration of Jose Manuel Marroquin' 6 did go
through the motions of rallying popular support,' 7 organizing a military-
force for reconquest, l8 and authorizing diplomatic missions charged
with making the best of a bad situation. 19 But, the government worked
to limit overt expressions of popular enthusiasm, 20 never gave full

14 References to specific separatist movements appear in Martin Restrepo
Mejia to Marroquin, 31 Dec. 1903, Marroquin MSS; El Boyacense (Tunja).
5 Jan. 1904, p. 4; El Conservator, 13 Jan. 1904, p. 40; Ibid., 16 Mar. 1904,
p. 75; Perez y Soto, INRI, p. 97. An open expression of separatist sentiment
is found in La Organization, 3 Dec. 1903, p. 4.

15 La Gruta, 5 Dec. 1903, p. 238; Jose Manuel Marroquin, Mensaje que el

Vicepresidente . . . dirige al Congreso National . . . de 1904 (Bogota, 1904).
pp. 28-29; La Organization. 22 Jan. 1904, p. 2; El Conservador. 9 Mar. 1904.
p. 70.

16 Marroquin was elected Vicepresident in 1898. He assumed the responsibili-
ties of Chief Executive following a coup of July 31, 1900, which removed the
legitimate President, Manuel Antonio Sanclemente; see Luis Martinez Delgado.
Historia de un cambio de gobierno (Bogota, 1958).

17 "Message from the Colombian National Cabinet to the Public," 6 Nov. 1903.
Archivo Historico de Luis Martinez Delgado, 1901-1910, Academia Colombiana
de Historia (hereinafter referred to as AH de LMD); Esteban Jaramillo, Mini-
stro de Gobierno, to Gobernadores, 8 Nov. 1903, printed in El Trabajo.
14 Nov. 1903, p. 2; La Gruta, 14 Nov. 1903, pp. 204-205.

'8 "Message from the Colombian National Cabinet to the Public," 6 Nov. 1903,
AH de LMD; Ortiz and Galvis, Estados Unidos, pp. 70-71; Decree No. 2 of
Rafael Reyes, 15 Nov. 1903, printed in Rafael Reyes, Mision diplomdtica y milt-
tar, 1903-1904 (Bogota, 1904), pp. 38-39; La Gruta. 5 Dec. 1903, pp. 241-242.

19 Reyes, Mision, p. 3.

20 El Adalid Catolico, 26 Nov. 1903, p. 119; La Organization, 12 Jan. 1904,
p. 1; Perez y Soto, INRI, pp. 106-107; Juan Ignacio Galvez, Conferencias (Bo-
gota, 1912), p. 6.

backing to the ragged, volunteer armies, 21 and instructed its ministers
to publicize the Colombian view of Panamanian affairs but not to risk
alienating world opinion by severing normal ties. 22 This cautious posi-
tion was justified by the realistic argument that any war with the United
States would be costly and futile 23 and that a break in diplomatic rela-
tions would restrict Colombia in her campaign to win recognition of
her own honorable behavior and legitimate claims. 24 In fact, over the
years Colombians have generally shown more interest in proving their
own pure and innocent role in the "rape of Panama" 25 than in collect-
ing compensation for the irreparable loss of their supposed international
virtue. 26 (When paid, however, such indemnity apparently helped to
ease both pain and shame. ) 27 But whatever the goal, moral or financial,
Marroquin felt that more could be accomplished by reasoning with the
attacker than by snubbing him.

21 Marroquin, Mensaje, pp. 102-103, 108; Carlos Uribe, Colombia (asuntos
internacionales), (Medellin, 1913), p. 53; Milton Puentes, Historia del Partido
Liberal Colombiano (Bogota, 1961), p. 556.

22 Enrique Cortes to Marroquin, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquin MCC; La Gruta,
14 Nov. 1903, p. 204; Ibid., 5 Dec. 1903, p. 242; Holguin to Marroquin, 17 Dec.
1903, Holguin MSS.

23 Diario Comercial, 16 Dec. 1903, p. 2; Holguin to Marroquin, 13 Nov. 1903,
Holguin MSS; Pedro Velez R. to Sr. Director del El Porvenir, 8 Nov. 1903,
printed in Velez R., Asuntos, p. 22; El Combeima, 17 Dec. 1903, p. 3; El Tra-
bajo, 14 May 1904, p. 3; Anales del Senado (Bogota), 5 Aug. 1904, p. 2.

24 Enrique Cortes to Marroquin, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquin MSS; Rafael Reyes
to Marroquin, 2 Jan. 1904, Marroquin MSS.

25 Quoted in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., The Caribbean Area (Washington, 1934),
p. 579.

26 Perez y Soto, INRI, pp. 14-15; Baldomero Sanin Cano, Administration
Reyes, 1904-1909 (Lausana, 1909), p. 19; "Junius," Notas publicadas en El
Republicano . . . (Bogota, 1911), p. 59; Jorge Martinez L., ed. La feria del
crimen: el mayor "chantage" de todos los siglos (Bogota, 1912), pp. ix-x.

27 For comments on the significance of the $25 million payment see Ortiz and
Galvis, Estados Unidos, pp. 16, 33, 42; Luis Enrique Osorio, Vision de Ameri-
ca (Bogota, 1961), p. 215; Guillermo Torres Garcia, Miguel Antonio Caro:
su personalidad politica (Madrid, 1956), pp. 217-218, 220.

No doubt a major force in shaping Colombia policy after Novem-
ber 3, 1903, was the ideas and personality of General Rafael Reyes. 28
The desire for peace, the search for unity and national survival, and
the recent lack of vigorous national direction 29 combined with the Co-
lombian caudillo tradition 30 to make welcome the appearance of a
forceful leader who could guide the country through the recognized
crisis. This was Reyes, a self -expressed admirer of Porfirio Diaz, 31 who
dominated the closing months of the Marroquin administration and
initiated his own in August 1904. 32 Reyes believed, above all, that Co-
lombian progress depended on the continuance of domestic stability, 33
the maintenance of peaceful relations with the United States, 34 and
the opening of the Panama Canal on terms favorable to Colombia. 35

28 A brief sketch in English of Reyes' life is in J. Fred Rippy, "The Dictators
of Colombia and Venezuela," in A. Curtis Wilgus, ed., South American Dic-
tators (Washington, 1937), pp. 384-390. The best full-length biography of
Reyes is Lemaitre, Reyes.

29 Criticisms of Marroquin and his frequent lack of decisiveness are found
in Luis Martinez Silva to Pedro Nel Ospina, 11 May 1904, AH de LMD;
El Trahajo, 28 May 1904, p. 2; La Organization. 3 Dec. 1903, p. 3; Perez y
Soto, INRI, pp. 9-10.

30 See Rippy, "Dictators," pp. 367-383.

31 Tulio Enrique Tascon, Historia del derecho constitutional colombiano (Bo-
gota, 1953), p. 222; Reyes, Mision, p. 30.

32 In the election of 1904 the Conservatives split between Reyes and Joaquin
F. Velez, the former winning by a small margin in the electoral assembly.
The Liberals officially boycotted the election, but may have cast a number of
votes for Reyes. See Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia, p. 522; and,
Puentes, Historia del Partido Liberal, p. 557.

33 Reyes, Mision, pp. 30-31; Reyes to Gobierno and Gobernadores, 1 Feb. 1904,
AH de LMD; Reyes to Archbishop of Bogota, 24 Dec. 1904, printed in El
Boyacense, 30 Dec. 1904, pp. 506-507; "Mensaje presidencial de Rafael Reyes,"
13 Dec. 1904, printed in Republica de Colombia, Documentos oficiales y mani-
fest aciones (Bogota, 1904), p. 11.

34 Reyes to Marroquin, 16 Nov. 1903, Marroquin MSS; Reyes to Ministro de
Gobierno, 23 Nov. 1903, and Reyes to Luis Carlos Rica, 24 Dec. 1903, in Mini-
sterio de Relaciones Exteriores, Libro Azul: Documentos diplomaticos sobre el
canal y la rebellion del istmo de Panama (Bogota, 1904), pp. 377, 413.

35 Reyes, Mision, pp. 28-29; Rafael Reyes, Por Colombia, por Ibero-America
(London, 1912), pp. 15, 29, 30-34, 55; Reyes to Jose Domingo de Obaldia,
13 July 1904, printed in Ernesto J. Castillero R., "Panama y Colombia: historio
de su reconciliation," (unpublished manuscript, Panama, 1938), p. 69n.

His task was made easier in that on one or more of these points Reyes
had the support of the majority of Colombians. His ultimate mistake
was a failure to realize that pursuit of such goals, however commenda-
ble and popular, must be confined to certain limits. 36 But in June 1909,
Reyes could leave quietly for Europe, having inaugurated a lengthy
period of domestic "orden y progreso" 37 and an even longer period
of improving relations between Colombia and the United States and
Colombia and the Republic of Panama.

The various factors outlined above provide a useful beginning in
explaining the failure of Colombians to act decisively in response to
the separation of Panama. But, an attempt to answer more fully the
broad questions posed at the outset of this paper requires an examina-
tion of both Colombian views of the United States in general and of
Colombian interpretations of the specific yanqui role in the Isthmian
debacle. While such views were probably not the major element in
determining overall Colombian policy, or lack of said, certainly they
have given a special tone to Colombian-United States relations and
to the historiography of the entire Panama question.

That the United States had an active part in the Panamanian in-
dependence movement few Colombians have doubted. Since the mo-
ment news of the Isthmian revolt first reached Colombia proper, com-
mentators have agreed that United States policy violated the accepted
standards of international law and morality. 38 By encouraging, perhaps
even financing, the revolution the United States improperly interfered
in Colombian domestic affairs and promoted a treasonous act which

36 For a brief discussion of the factors, domestic and foreign, which led to
Reyes' resignation see Henao and Arrubla, History of Colombia, pp. 523-527;
Lemaitre, Reyes, pp. 309-320; and E. Taylor Parkes, Colombia and the United
States, 1765-1934 (Durham, 1935), pp. 435-436.

37 A summary of the generally peaceful and orderly political pattern from
the fall of Reyes until the chaos of the 1940's is found in Vernon Lee Fluharty,
Dance of the Millions, (Pittsburgh, 1957), Chapters III-V.

38 A representative statement of this view is found in F. de P. Borda, Derecho
international (Bogota, 1905).

10

did not correspond to the desires of the majority of Isthmians. 39 By
preventing Colombian forces from attempting to suppress the revolt, 40
the United States violated the terms of the Mallarino-Bidlack Treaty
of 1846. 41 By recognizing the independence of Panama before that
presumptuous republic had demonstrated its ability to maintain such
independence, 42 Washington rejected the same principles of interna-
tional law which it had previously defended during its own Civil War. 43
In addition, Colombians have criticized the United States for failing
to re-open negotiations after the defeat of the Hay-Herran Treaty, 44 for
refusing to submit the Panama question to arbitration, 45 and for per-
suading (i.e., forcing) other nations to recognize Panamanian inde-
pendence. 46

39 Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Protesta de Colombia contra el tratado
entre Panama y los Est ados Unidos, (Bogota, 1904), p. 31; Herrera, Indepen-
dence de Panama, pp. 8-11; Holguin to Marroquin, 13 Nov. 1903, Marroquin
MSS; Carlos Gutierrez Navarro, El Canal de America (Bogota, 1951), p. 145.

40 Pedro Velez R. to William N. Cromwell, 30 Nov. 1903, printed in Velez R.,
Asuntos, pp. 28-29; El Combeima, 9 Jan. 1904, p. 2; Abelardo Aldana, et. al..
The Panama Canal Question: A Plea for Colombia (New York, 1904), p. 60;
Rafael Uribe Uribe, Por la America del Sur, II (Bogota, 1955), pp. 83-84.

4i Marroquin to Pueblo Americano, Nov. 1903, printed in Lorezo Marroquin,
Historias de Panama (Bogota, 1912), p. 31; Ministerio de RR. EE., Protesta.
PP- 4, 39; Marco Fidel Suarez, Doctrinas internacionales (Bogota, 1955), pp.
147-149.

42 Ministerio de RR. EE., Protesta, pp. 38-39; Herrera, lndependencia de Pana-
md, pp. 8, 11, 17; Luis Alfredo Otero, Panama (Bogota, 1926), pp. 56, 58.

43 Luis Carlos Rico to Colombian Minister in Washington, 2 Dec. 1903, and
Jose Pablo Uribe to French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28 Dec. 1903, Mini-
sterio de RR. EE., Libro Azul, pp. 381, 519; Carlos Lozano y Lozano, La cues-
tion de Panama, el arbitraje y el eauilibrio en America (Bogota, 1924), p. 30.

4* Andes del Senado, 17 Nov. 1903, pp. 363-364; Uribe Uribe, Por la America
del Sur, I, p. 124.

45 Climaco Calderon to Holguin, 8 Mar. 1909, printed in Diego Mendoza, La-
bor privada del ex-minis tro de Colombia en Washington (Valencia, 1909), p. 8.

46 El Trabajo, 9 Jan. 1904, p. 3; Uribe Uribe, Por la America del Sur, I, p. 94;
Pablo Emilio Escobar R., Panama en el derecho international (Bogota, 1918)
pp. 17, 23-24; Otero, Panama, p. 46.

11

In evaluating the broad sources of United States policy, Colom-
bians have suggested three possible explanations: 1) the belief that the
United States had been, was, and always would be an imperialistic na-
tion and thus constituted a permanent threat to Latin American integ-
rity; 47 2) the belief that the United States had once been a source of
liberalism and morality but by 1900 was sidetracked in an expansionist
program; 48 and, 3) the belief that Americans in general were still loyal
to their great traditions and sympathetic with the Colombian desire
for justice but that a minority of government leaders, in particular
President Theodore Roosevelt, had abused their power and distorted
American policy contrary to the wishes of the populace. 49 The latter
position seems to have been overwhelmingly the dominant one and
thereby significant in the shaping of post- 190 3 Colombian attitudes
toward the United States.

In analyzing this view in depth one notes that Colombians had
long shown great respect for American ideals and traditions 50 and the
events of 1903 did not totally destroy this feeling. In an open letter
to the people of the United States, President Marroquin referred to "la
bandera estrellada," always beloved by all republicans in the Americas. 51
An editor in Barranquilla affirmed his admiration for the United
States, "destined by its institutions and by its exuberant elements of
civilization and life to be the greatest nation on the earth." 52 Raul Perez,
appealing in the United States press for sympathy for his country's
position, promised that

47 El Espectador (Medellin), 2 Jan. 1904, pp. 248-249; El Conservador, 9 Dec.
1903, p. 18; Ibid., 6 Jan. 1904, p. 34; Carlos Uribe, Colombia, p. 16; Reyes,
Por Colombia, pp. 35-36; Raimundo Rivas, Relaciones internacionales entre
Colombia y los Estados Unidos. 1810-1850 (Bogota, 1915), p. 169; Osorio,
Vision de America, p. 213.

48 Antonio Jose Uribe, La reforma administrativa en Colombia (Bogota, 1917),
pp. 23, 318-319; El Dia, 24 Dec. 1903, p. 1; El Combeima, 24 Dec. 1903, p. 1;
Reyes, Mision, p. 23; Borda, Derecho international, pp. 50, 53, 69; Antonio
Jose Uribe, Cuestiones internacionales, economicas, politicas y sociales (Bogota,
1925), p. 4.

49 See text and notes below.

so Ernesto Murillo, Estudio sobre la historia de la diplomacia en Colombia
(Bogota, 1910) p. 18; A. J. Uribe, La reforma, pp. 341-342.

51 Printed in Lorezo Marroquin, Historias. p. 32.

52 Diario Comercial, 7 Dec. 1903, p. 2.

12

notwithstanding the incalculable wrong done to Co-
lombia . . . there has been no ill-feeling in our hearts. We
have continued to love our great sister republic and to wish
that we could imitate her in many ways, because we attributed
her mistakes in her dealings with us to ignorance of true
conditions. 53

And, in most eloquent fashion, Rafael Uribe Uribe, leader of the
oft- persecuted Liberal Party, proclaimed the following:

As men, as republicans, and as Americans we are all
proud of your nation, because she honors humanity, because
she supports free institutions, and because the very existence
of the great republic to the north of our continent is by itself
such a colossal geographical and political fact that, even with-
out such a controversial doctrine as Monroe's, it infuses re-
spect and fear into a world that awakens so many antipathies
and misgivings. 54

Since the ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, 55 Colombians
have been more generous in speaking favorably of the United States.
Even such critics of the events of 1903 as Luis Alfredo Otero and
Alvaro Rebolledo commented respectively on the "tie of sincere and
loyal friendship" which bound Colombia to "la potencia del Norte" 56
and the lack of Machiavellian techniques in American diplomacy. 57
Other observors have labeled the United States the spiritual and mili-
tary leader in the fight for liberty 58 and "the country which has acquired

53 Perez, "The Treacherous Treaty," p. 944.

54 Por la America del Sur, I, pp. 136-137.

55 For a summary of negotiations and debate surrounding this treaty see Rivas,
Historia diplomatic a, pp. 617-621, 661-662; German Cavelier, La politica in-
ternational de Columbia (Bogota, 1959), III, pp. 85-106.

56 Otero, Panama, p. 112.

57 Alvaro Rebolledo, Resena historico-politica de la comunicacion inter-ocednica
(San Francisco, 1930), p. 325.

58 Antonio Jose Uribe Portocarrero, En torno de los Estados Unidos de America
(Bogota, 1944), pp. 61-62.

13

today the highest level of civic culture." 59 In September 1964, President
Leon Valencia summed up what is apparently the conviction of many
of his countrymen:

Colombia has always maintained optimum relations with
the great northern democracy. These relations have been
cut by only one deplorable and iniquitous act, the wound from
which has left on us an unforgettable impression. But we
bear no grudge, because the Americans found a satisfactory
way to make amends, not by the exiguous indemnification
they offered us but rather by the rectitude and honesty of
their conduct. Later, the natural and fruitful power of the
United States . . . put in their hands, and their hands alone . . .
the enslaving and incontrastable power of the atomic bond. 60

But, Valencia recalled, the United States remained loyal to its tradi-
tional principles and did not use this tool for world conquest. It put
that force instead to the use of right; for this behavior it deserves
the gratitude of all men of good will.

More indicative of the continued Colombian faith in American
concepts of justice in the wake of the events of 1903 were the fre-
quent expressions of confidence in the ability of the American people
to understand Colombia's grievances and to take steps to rectify the
obvious wrong. Private citizens and government officials alike, having
no hope for cooperation from the Roosevelt administration, 61 saw
". . . no other course left but to appeal to the people of the United
States and to their undoubted sense of honesty." 62 The Colombian
people were certain, wrote Marroquin, that the American people,
possessing "sentiments of equity and justice" would never permit "the
violation of treaties and the rejection of glorious traditions." 63 These
same Americans, declared Juan Perez y Soto, president of the patriotic

59 Jesus Maria Yepes, Una politica international para Colombia (Bogota,
1956), p. 16.

60 El Tiempo (Bogota), 23 Sept. 1964, p. 24.

6i La Gruta, 5 Dec. 1903, pp. 241-242; Reyes to Holguin, 23 Dec. 1903, AH
de LMD; Reyes to Rico, 8 Jan. 1904, Ministerio de RR. EE., Libro Azul, p. 480.
w Perez, "The Treacherous Treaty," p. 946.
63 Lorenzo Marroquin, Historias, pp. 31-32.

14

society, Integridad Colombiana, would soon become "our ally" to pre-
vent the spoliation of "our territory." 64

In light of these statements it is not surprising that the Marroquin
government placed more emphasis on the propagandist activities of
its diplomats in the United States than on any efforts at an immediate
negotiated settlement. The members of the Reyes Commission, 65 which
arrived in Washington in late November 1903, received instructions to
conduct an active campaign for the sympathies of the American public
and the support of anti-administration politicians. 66 Through the press,
public meetings, and private conferences, the Colombian representatives
struggled to arouse criticism of United States policy. 67 And in this
struggle they found sufficient favorable response to keep their hopes
alive. Any condemnation of Roosevelt, however slight, served the
anxious Colombians as justification of their position. 68

The fact that the bulk of the anti-Roosevelt feeling in the United
States was concentrated in the Democratic Party led Colombians, in
turn, to look at the American presidential election of 1904 with great
expectations, seeing in the desired election of that "alta figura," Judge
Alton B. Parker, the "recovery of the rights and privileges of the South
American nations." 69 (One optimistic observor gave Parker a 909v-
chance of winning.) 70

The Republican victory in 1904 did not permanently destroy
Colombian hopes that the American people would eventually elect an
administration which would treat justly and honorably with an agrieved

64 Perez y Soto, 1NRI, p. 100.

65 For details and initial instructions see Ministerio de RR. EE., Libro Azul.
pp. 372-373.

66 Ibid.. Marroquin to Colombian Consul in New York, 23 Nov. 1903, and
Rico to Reyes, 7 Dec. 1903, in Ibid., pp. 377, 392; Reyes, Mision, p. 11.

67 Holguin to Marroquin, 18 Dec. 1903, Holguin MSS; Reyes to Rico. 25 Dec.

1903, and Reyes to Gobierno, 2 Feb. 1904, Ministerio de RR. EE., Libro Azul
pp. 415, 538.

68 Arturo de Brigard to Rico, 14 Nov. 1903, and Reyes and Holguin to Rico
4 Dec. 1903, Ibid., pp. 375, 389; El Adalid Catolico, 24 Dec. 1903, pp. 136-137^
Holguin to Marroquin, 17 Dec. 1903, Holguin MSS.

69 El Trabajo, 5 Nov. 1904, pp. 2-3; Holguin to Ministro de Hacienda 5 Apr

1904, Holguin MSS.

70 Boletin Militar, 1 Jan. 1904, p. 30.

15

friend 71 nor deter efforts to exploit all signs of pro-Colombian senti-
ment in the United States. 72 Particularly pleasing were the Rainey Reso-
lution and the Congressional investigations which followed it and the
continued publication of books critical of Roosevelt's behavior. 73 The
election of Woodrow Wilson and the signing of the Thomson-Urrutia
Treaty, despite its limitations, 7 " convinced many Colombians that their
faith had not been misplaced. 75 Any chance that wide-spread, perma-
nent bitterness might develop toward the United States apparently
died with the ratification of that pact. 76

Why did many Colombians from 1903 to 1921 continue to dis-
play considerable respect for the "people" of the United States and to
look to them for an acceptable settlement of the Panama question?
And, why did most of these same Colombians find the implicit apology
of the final Treaty of 1921, with its "exiguous" indemnification, suf-
ficient compensation for the loss of the invaluable Isthmus? That
they could do nothing about the situation, an incontrovertible fact, is
an incomplete explanation. This continuing strain of optimism and
qualified friendship was the product of the frequently expressed belief,
noted above, that the role of the United States in the Panamanian inde-

7i Perez y Soto, INRI, p. 13; Murillo, Estudio, p. 11; Pedro Nel Ospina to
Carlos E. Restrepo, 17 Aug. 1911, printed in Emlico Robledo, La vida del
general Pedro Nel Ospina (Medellin, 1959), p. 237.

72 Ospina to Restrepo, 17 Aug. 1911, and Ospina to Enrique Olaya Herrera,
1 Nov. 1911, in Ibid., pp. 237, 259.

73 See assorted correspondence from Ospina, Ibid., pp. 233, 251, 254, 256-257;
Martinez L. La feria del crimen, p. v; Lorenzo Marroquin, Historias, pp. 34, 39;
Ortiz and Galvis, Estados Unidos, pp. 114, 118.

74 For various views on the pros and cons of that treaty see tratado de 6 de
Abril, 1914 (Bogota, 1914); Suarez, Doctrinas internacionales, pp. 157-191;
Carlos Jose Espinosa, Inconstitucionalidad del tratado del 6 del abril de 1914
(Bogota, 1914), pp. vi-xx.

75 Escobar R., Panama, p. 28; Nicolas Aristizabal Llano, Dos tests y un canal
(Bogota, 1914), p. 58; Antonio Jose Uribe, Las modificaciones al tratado entre
Colombia y los Estados Unidos (Bogota, 1921), pp. 24, 30, 32, 77-78, 85, 98;
Lozano y Lozano, La cuestion de Panama, p. 49; Otero, Panama, p. 91; Luis
Eduardo Nieto Caballero, Por que soy liberal (Bogota, 1931), p. 210.

76 Luis Martinez Delgado, A pro posit o del Dr. Carlos Martinez Silva (Bogota,
1930), p. 457; A. J. Uribe P., En torno, p. 16; Torres Garcia, Miguel Antonio
Caro, p. 217; Robledo, Vida, p. 92.

16

pendence movement was the work primarily of Theodore Roosevelt
and other top administration leaders. 77

The earliest Colombian descriptions and analyses of Isthmian de-
velopments placed special emphasis on the personal part played by
Roosevelt. Perez y Soto, himself an Isthmian, argued that the criminals
who led the November revolt proceeded in agreement with Roosevelt
who "helped and sustained them." 78 La Gruta, leading literary journal
of the day, asserted that ". . . it was Mr. Roosevelt and not the Ameri-
can people who hastened to treat with Panama as an independent re-
public . . ," 79 Abelardo Aldana, writing for an American audience, held
that "... the good faith pledged by the United States, the most power-
ful nation of the earth, was dragged in the mire by the actions of a
President to whom fifteen centuries of moral advancement in the respect
of treaties are of no importance." 80 Jorge Holquin, a member of the
Reyes Commission and later special agent in Paris, accused Roosevelt
of using the Panama situation to strengthen his political position. 81
Other contemporary commentators included such phrases as the follow-
ing: "... Roosevelt's offence is the bloodiest abuse [burla] of con-
science, the Monroe Doctrine and the Law of Nations;" 82 "the insanity
of the 'victimario' 83 Theodore Roosevelt has dug for us with his (sic)
own hands a formidable hell;" 84 "the cupidity of Roosevelt and his
lieutenants is insaciable;" 85 and, "Mr. Roosevelt has turned his back
upon the Americanism of Lincoln and Seward, and has by his deeds
shown the world that his true motto, stripped of cant and verbiage, is
the 'I will it' of the middle ages." 86 Pedro Velez R. of Cartagena, a

77 Other United States officials chosen for special attack included Secretary of
State John Hay and Assistant Secretary Francis B. Loomis.

78 INRI, pp. 98-99.

79 La Gruta, 21 Nov. 1903, p. 214.

80 Panama Canal Question, pp. 54-55.

si Holguin to Marroquin, 17 Dec. 1903, Holguin MSS.

82 El Adalid Catolko, 21 Jan. 1904, p. 151.

83 Servant who attends the sacrificing priest.

84 El Trabajo, 19 Mar. 1904, p. 7.

85 Ibid., 5 Nov. 1904, p. 2.

86 Aldana, Panama Canal Question, p. 50.

17

prolific contributor to the bibliography of Isthmiania, summarized this
interpretation in an open letter to Roosevelt himself:

It appears to the world that you . . . have fomented, created,
and made the revolution of Panama; and once this horrid
affair is brought to the light, it will be known that the only
revolutionary, the chief of the mutiny, the instigator of the
crime of treason that was committed in the Isthmus was
you. 87

Later Colombian writers have been no less emphatic in their
declaration that Roosevelt himself deserves to bear the blame for the
separation of Panama, having acted contrary to American traditions
and general public opinion. It was Roosevelt, the "godfather" 88 of
Panama, who "composed and decreed the act of separation," and, in
so doing, wrote Marco Fidel Suarez, "set himself in contrast to his
illustrious predecessors, heroes of wisdom, honor, and patriotism, such
as Adams, Lincoln, Seward, Garfield, and Blaine." 89 Over the years
Roosevelt personally has been accused of "contriving," "inspiring,"
"fomenting," "sponsoring," and "commanding" the revolution. 90 H/
is reported to have "usurped" Panama; "ferociously offended a weak
nation;" pursued a "Hitleristic" and "savage" international policy,
labeled "palo grande" or "gran garrote;" extended over Panama his
"pirates claws;" and, "looked upon the little countries of Latin America
as mice." 91 Colombians have classified him "the hunter of nations,"

87 Printed in Velez R., Asuntos, pp. 32-33.

88 Enrique Perez, Causa y efecto (Bogota, 1910), p. 42.

89 Doctrinas internacionales, pp. 149, 151.

90-9A El Combeima, 24 Dec. 1903, p. 2; Aristizabal, Dos tests, pp. 3, 53; Ortiz
and Galvis, Estados Unidos, p. 41; Lozano y Lozano, La cuestion de Panama,
p. 36; Otero, Panama, pp. 13, 36, 38, 43; Martinez D., A proposito, pp. 454-
455; Nieto C, Por que, pp. 177-178; Rivas, Historia diplomdtica, pp. 580-597,
passim.; Puentes, Historia del Partido Liberal, p. 556; Victor M. Salazar,
Memorias de la guerra, 1899-1902 (Bogota, 1943), pp. 8, 344, 391-393; Ger-
man Arciniegas, Biografia del Caribe (Buenos Aires, 1959), pp. 508-509; Justo
Ramon, Historia de Colombia (6 ed., Bogota, 1954), p. 353; Jorge Sanchez
Camacho, Marco Fidel Suarez (Bucaramanga, 1955), p. 124n; Robledo, Vida,
p. 88; Jesus Arango Cano, Estados Unidos, mito y realidad (Bogota, 1959),
p. 137; Sanchez C, General O spina, p. 94; Granados, Historia, p. 267; German
Arciniegas, Colombia (Washington, 1962), p. 14; Eduardo Santa, Rafael Uribe
Uribe: Un hombre y una epoca (Bogota, 1962), pp. 400-402.

18

"the symbol of Caesarism," "the soul of the plot" against Colombia,
and, "the founder of yankee imperialism." 92 Descriptions of his charac-
ter and personality have included such adjectives as immoral, vainglori-
ous, bigoted, arbitrary, unscrupulous, and atrabilious. 93 His crime
against Colombia has been likened to the German violation of Belgian
neutrality in 1914, the partitions of Poland, and Judas' betrayal of
Christ. 9 " All this, of course, is in addition to the aforementioned and
unquestioned belief that Roosevelt, with or without American popular
sanction, violated international law and morality.

Especially galling to the Colombians was Roosevelt's condescend-
ing and insulting attitude toward their "defenseless" fatherland. Alvaro
Rebolledo summarized resentment of such treatment in these sharp
words: After the events of November, 1903, there followed "... a
campaign of injuries and diatribes against the Colombian government
and people, which Mr. Roosevelt undertook without even a token of
justice or gentlemanliness. His hatred of them became an obsession in
his agitated mind. He never lost an opportunity to defame them with
the vilest words of his rude and expressive speech." 95

This persistent preoccupation with the actions of Roosevelt alone
resulted, we have noted thus far, from three major impulses: 1) Colom-
bian respect for American traditions and ideals; 2) considerable evi-
dence in the United States of displeasure over Roosevelt's policy; and,
3) the eventual admission by the American government, in treaty
form, that Colombia was due some compensation for the loss of Pana-
ma. But, the supreme confirmation of the Colombian position came
from the lips of Roosevelt himself, in a speech of March 23, 1911,
when he boasted that "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress de-
bate." 96 One can easily lose count of the Colombian writers who quoted
this "shameless," "proud," "unmuffled" confession as the final word
on Roosevelt's role in the revolt. 97 But, had the other factors not

95 Resena, p. 255. For additional comments on the same topic see Holquin to
Marroquin, 23 Jan. 1904, Holguin MSS, Ministerio de RR. EE., Protesta, p. 16;
Julio Holguin Arboleda, Mucho en serio y algo en broma (Bogota, 1959)
p. 238.

96 Quoted in George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York
1962), p. 154.

97 Rivas, Historia diplomdtica, p. 597; Ramon, Historia. p. 353; Santa, Uribe
Uribe, p. 402.

19

created a receptive attitude, Colombians undoubtedly would have given
far less credence to Roosevelt's claim.

Admittedly, not all Colombians have appeared so determined
to restrict the blame to Roosevelt. Some, as suggested above, have
skirted the problem by referring impersonally to "the Americans," "the
United States," or "the American government." Only a restricted few,
however, have specifically linked Roosevelt's policy to the will of the
American majority. Daniel Ortiz and Rafael Galvis, writing in 1920
before the ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, noted that those
Colombians who sought to label Roosevelt the exclusive planner and
perpetrator of the "crimen monstruoso" overlooked the fact that later
administrations, despite the efforts of a few honest diplomats, had
not made reparation and therefore had aligned themselves with Roose-
velt, "before God and History," in the completed robbery. 98 Alavaro
Rebolledo and Raimundo Rivas both conceded that some Americans
continued "to raise eloquent voices in defense of justice," 99 but like-
wise observed that the American people had given Roosevelt "a vote
of confidence" by returning him to the Presidency. 100

In contrast, I have found only one Colombian, an anonymous
editor in Manizales, who has attempted to see Roosevelt in any context
other than that of the narrow story of Panama or in the almost as
narrow history of American imperialism. Commenting on Roosevelt's
success at Portsmouth in ending the Russo-Japanese War, this lonely
soul wrote:

How strange are the vicissitudes of destiny! Never did I
imagine that he who humiliated my country would one day
awaken in me a spirit of admiration and respect. Never did I
imagine that I would one day consider among the greatest
benefactors of humanity a name I once hated. Now, I make
my own the eloquent words of the German Emperor . . .
"Roosevelt has made himself worthy of the gratitude of all
men and in each heart we should raise up to him an altar." 101

98 Estados Unidos, pp. 103-104, 108.

99 Rebolledo, Resena, p. 261.

ioo Rivas, Historia diplomdtica, p. 598.

id i El Mensajero (Manizales), 18 Nov. 1905, p. 1.

20

Such a paucity of balanced interpretations of Roosevelt in Colombian
writings reflects not only the peculiarities of the Panama problem, but
also both the common Latin American tendency to personalize con-
flicts and a poor appreciation of the standards of modern historical
methodology.

However much we as scholars may vocally lament this lack of
historical accuracy, as citizens of the United States and professed friends
of Latin America, at times we may secretly be thankful that Roosevelt-
ian braggadocio and Colombian myopia have protected us from more
intense condemnation and resentment. It is not that the Colombians
have failed to react vigorously toward the United States because they
have believed that Roosevelt was totally guilty and all other Americans
totally innocent of complicity in the "rape of the Isthmus." Traditional
sympathy for American ideals, institutions, and achievements, has
weighed heavily against the incongruous behavior of an American
administration which, Colombians have argued, did not represent the
American people. Rather, it seems, that the embodiment of Colombian
frustrations in the personage of Theodore Roosevelt has permitted
past and present generations to vent their hostilities toward the United
States without taking up arms or displaying open bitterness and has
provided them, at the same time, with an implicit explanation for the
lack of just such a vigorous anti-American policy a lack which, if
allowed to go unexplained, would represent a blot on Colombian na-
tional character and honor.

A clearer understanding of the true' extent of American support
for Roosevelt might have created greater tensions in United States-
Colombian relations for a while. One doubts that this would have
mattered much in the long run. In fact, a judicious appraisal of
Roosevelt as scholar and statesman, as well as scoundrel, might have
generated some appreciation among Colombians for the American point
of view. Of more importance is a wide-spread, realistic awareness of
those domestic factors, discussed in the opening paragraphs, which
hampered effective, concerted action. If understood they might have
united Colombians and stirred them to more selfless, constructive
efforts at national progress. It still might!

21

CASTRO: SOME ECONOMIC
BENEFITS FOR LATIN AMERICA

By Alfonso Gonzalez*

Fidel Castro has had a more profound effect upon the course of
Latin American affairs than any other individual in recent times.
Castro's socio-economic revolution combined with his political opposi-
tion to the United States and his charismatic personality have all contrib-
uted to granting him a historical importance of the first magnitude
within Latin America. Castroism (or Fidelismo to the Latin Americans)
embodied much that was longed for by the frustrated Latin American
intellectuals and masses. There is no doubt that the impact of Castro
has lessened notably since the 1959-60 period but there is also no doubt
that he has significantly contributed to the fundamental altering of poli-
cies in Latin America and he remains a force that must be reckoned
with.

Castro's policies have produced both advantageous and unfavorable
effects and reactions within Latin America. Some of the developments
that have occurred in Latin America since the rise of Castro are rather
readily traceable to Castroism, but in others the relationship is more
tenuous and perhaps the trend or development would have occurred
regardless of Castro but his presence has served as a catalyst to ac-
celerate the particular process.

Despite the fact that Castro has had some fundamentally adverse
effects on the economies of the Latin American countries, his programs
and policies, and the reactions that they have engendered, have con-
tributed substantially to the amelioration of certain socio-economic con-
ditions in the region. The beneficial effects: (1) greatly augmented
United States assistance and interest in Latin America, (2) increased
attention to social services and attempts at socio-economic reforms,
( 3 ) revision of the United States sugar quota and some expansion as an
export market, and (4) increased tourism.

*Chairman, Department of Geography, University of Calgary,
Alberta, Canada.

22

United States Assistance & Interest in Latin America. In the post-
World War II period the United States became actively involved in
the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan in the late 1940's
and this was followed by the Korean conflict and the organization of
military alliances. For about the first decade and a half of the post-war
period the economic and military resources of the United States were
directed to the Eurasian region with scant interest given to Latin Ameri-
ca. This was a notable letdown to the latter region because of the atten-
tion it had received in the pre-war and war periods. As a result of
post-war circumstances, Latin America received a gradually declining
share of both United States foreign trade and foreign investments. In
the 1945-52 period less than 2 percent of foreign assistance was devoted
to Latin America and nearly a fifth of this aid was military (Table 1).

During the Eisenhower Administration (1953-60) total assistance
to Latin America increased to more than 6 percent of the world total
but the proportion of military grants remained about the same high
level as during the Truman Administration (1945-52). Until relatively
recently the United States government placed the emphasis for economic
development in Latin America on private capital and private business
efforts. Stress was placed on establishing stability and a favorable in-
vestment climate, even to the degree of supporting military and dicta-
torial regimes. In the realm of socio-economic development little leader-
ship was provided in helping Latin America alleviate its fundamental
problems and little attention was given (e.g., at the 1954 Caracas
conference) to these pressing problems. The United States, in turn,
was more interested in the hemisphere problems of stability, security
and anti-communism.

The deteriorating political and economic conditions of the 1950s
combined with United States policy in Latin America also exacerbated
social conditions. The degree of alienation from the Latin American
masses was dramatically illuminated with the attacks on Vice-President
Nixon in Lima and Caracas in May, 1958. In the remaining two and
a half years the Eisenhower Administration moved (apparently reluct-
antly in view of its attitude toward economic development and com-
mitments to other world regions) toward a greater involvement and
contribution to Latin American affairs. Although immediate significant

23

outlays of funds were not made available, the United States finally ac-
cepted the concept of the Inter- American Development Bank and was
also prepared to provide loans for social development programs. Latin
America had long favored the establishment of a regional development
bank and had pressured the United States government to provide assist-
ance for necessary social development projects. Because of the urgent
demands for capital and the difficulties encountered in loan repayment,
Latin America (along with other underdeveloped regions) favored the
establishment of "soft" loans and fewer restrictions on where loan ex-
penditures could be made. To satisfy the demands for "soft" loans
and less conventional terms for loans to underdeveloped regions, the
United States established the Development Loan, Fund in 1958. In 1961
an international institution, the International Development Association
which was affiliated with the World Bank was founded. However,
United States loans have become increasingly more tied to purchases
within the higher-priced United States market due to United States
balance-of-payments difficulties and Congressional reluctance to pro-
vide more liberalized aid conditions.

A few months before Castro gained control of Cuba, President
Juscelino Kubitschek promised (August 1958) a grandiose long-range
plan "Operation Pan America" that proposed to rapidly increase both
private and public investment and stimulate economic development of
the region. This idea was received with some United States interest but
Castro's proposal in April 1959 at Buenos Aires that Latin American
development be underwritten by $30-40 billion over a decade was
rejected by the United States delegation.

By the time Castro assumed power, the United States had liberal-
ized its attitude somewhat regarding assistance to Latin America and
had made some concessions in the direction that they favored. With
the rise of Castro the pressure for socio-economic reforms and develop-
ment became considerably greater and as the Cuban revolution assumed
an ever-more radical posture the threat of similar revolutions erupting
in Latin America became a paramount consideration in Latin American
policy. By the Act of Bogota in September I960 the United States was
formally committed to contribute to Latin America's social progress
and Latin America, in turn, promised to undertake basic socio-economic

24

reforms. In March 1961, President Kennedy announced the Alliance
for Progress and the program was formally inaugurated at the Punta
del Este conference that August.

In the 1961-65 period the amount of net United States foreign
assistance to Latin America amounted to $3.4 billion and slightly exceed-
ed all aid given by the United States in the post-war period through
I960 (Table 1). The proportion of the total world assistance by the
United States that Latin America received doubled to more than 14 per-
cent from the Eisenhower period. Latin America was receiving under
the Alliance more than $350 million annually above the level received
under President Eisenhower and military grants to Latin America ex-
cept for the 1960-62 period were no greater than those received during
the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration. Despite this increased
assistance, Latin America still does not reecive as much non-military
assistance as the Middle East to say nothing of the Orient (Table 2).

Private business was to contribute approximately $300 million
annually (of the United States' $1 billion annual share of the Alliance
for Progress total annual investment of $10 billion) in investment in
Latin America. 1 However, the net capital outflow from the United
States of direct investments in Latin America in the 1961-65 period
averaged only about $100 million annually or one-third of the private
investment projected as necessary (Table 3). This reluctance to invest
in Latin America in the early 1960s stems in large part from the in-
stability generated by Castroism. The nationalization of nearly one
billion dollars of United States investments in Cuba (one-ninth of
Latin American total) was a potent factor in discouraging capital flow
into the region. Although gradually, with State Department encourage-
ment and stimulus, net private capital outflow to Latin America gradu-
ally increased from 1962 onward so that by 1965 about half of the

1 Simon G. Hanson, "The Alliance for Progress: The Fourth Year." Inter-
American Economic Affairs. Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 1966), p. 71; J. War-
ren Nystorm and Nathan A. Haverstock, The Alliance for Progress. (New
Jersey, 1966), pp. 22-23.

25

projected target investment of the Alliance was achieved. More than
ever, United States investors in Latin America in recent years have been
relying on undistributed subsidiary earnings (i.e., reinvestment of
profits) rather than on net capital inflow (i.e., investment of new capi-
tal). Furthermore, in the 1954-59 period about one-tenth of all United
States net capital outflow to Latin America for direct investments was
destined for Cuba ($40 million) and as a result of Castro this capital
can now be diverted to other countries. During the 1950's overall,
the average annual net inflow of all foreign capital into Cuba was more
than $70 million ( less than 7 percent of the total entering Latin Ameri-
ca), so that Cuba no longer competes for a significant portion of foreign
capital that would be invested in Latin America.

Clearly the greatest beneficiaries of United States non-military
assistance under the Alliance for Progress have been Brazil and Chile
which have accounted for one-half of all United States net assistance
to Latin America ( Table 2 ) . A second group, including Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Argentina, has received
nearly one-third of United States assistance in the 1961-65 period.
Mexico, which is frequently cited as a model for development and an
example for the remainder of Latin America, has received very little
United States assistance indeed under the Alliance.

Another side effect perhaps of Castroism is that in Latin America
there is increasing national participation in the control of foreign in-
dustries. Probably the most significant example of this is the current
process of the "Chileanization" of the copper industry under the Chris-
tian Democratic President Eduardo Frei Montalva.

Socio-Economic Reforms & Social Services. One of the fundamen-
tal cornerstones of both Castroism and the Alliance for Progress is the
formulation of basic socio-economic reforms. Relatively little attention
was given to these basic necessities of modernization until the Cuban
Revolution centered upon radical measures to change the structure of
both society and the economy. The need for basic change was recog-
nized in the Alliance and by early 1966 fairly extensive agrarian reform
programs, all initiated prior to the Alliance, had been implemented in
Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela and nine other Latin American coun-

26

tries had undertaken initial measures in this direction, 2 However, even
the more established programs are not comprehensive enough and are
seriously lacking in capital and technical assistance. The best they have
been able to do so far is prevent the rural situation from deteriorating
as rapidly as it had been in the past. For example, Venezuela in more
than seven years (1958-65) has only distributed 6.25 million acres
(less than a tenth of the farmland) to about 114,000 families (less
than a third of all rural families). 3 The near futility of these endeavors,
in view of the very rapid population growth, can be viewed in the
perspective that during the above period the number of rural families
in Venezuela probably increased by about sixty thousand. In Mexico,
where a significant and profound land program was implemented
( at least that appears to be a belief widely held in the United States ) ,
less than 2 percent of the landholdings account for more than three-
quarters of the total farmland in I960. 4

At least nine Latin American countries had adopted tax reform
legislation by early 1966 in order to establish a more equitable fiscal
system. Apparently this has resulted in improved tax structures and
significantly increased collected governmental revenues. 5 Virtually all
of the countries for which central government budget accounts are
available (excludes Nicaragua, Cuba, Paraguay, and Uruguay), indi-
cate a generally greater reliance on taxes on income and wealth ( except
Argentina, Ecuador, and Brazil) in the mid-1960s than during the
previous decade. 6 The inequities in the fiscal structure of Latin Ameri-
ca generally are of a large magnitude. It was estimated in late 1965
that the top 5 percent income group in Latin America overall accounted
for two-fifths of the total income and although this group should con-

2 Agency for International Development, Proposed Economic Assistance Pro-
grams: FY 1967: Summary Presentation to the Congress. (Washington, 1966),
p. 69.

3 Pan American Union, Alliance for Progress Weekly Newsletter. Vol. IV,
No. 13, (Washington, 1966).

* Inter-American Institute of Statistics of the Pan American Union, America en

Cifras 1965. Situacion Economica: 1. Agriculture, Ganaderia. Silvicultura, Caza

y Pesca. Table 311-04, (Washington, 1966).

s AID, Proposed Economic Assistance Programs: FY 1967.

6 United Nations, Statistical Yearbook: 1965. Table 192, (New York, 1966).

27

tribute three-fifths of the tax revenue it was only paying about one-
third of the total. 7

Many governments have been granting a larger share of the budget
to the social services in order to ameliorate the generally deplorable
conditions in education and health that exist over much of Latin
America (Table 4). Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela have exhibited the
most marked increases devoted to the social services and these have
joined Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica as the only countries of the
region that contribute more than one-third of the central governmental
budget to the social services. In all of the above countries the budget
for education alone exceeds that of the military and the same holds
true for El Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile, and probably Guatemala.
Only two countries, Colombia and Haiti, during the 1960s moved in
the direction of further sacrificing social services for greater military
expenditures.

United States Sugar Quota & Trade. One of the major steps in
the escalation of the United States-Cuban conflict that had important
economic repercussions for Latin America was the suspension of the
Cuban sugar quota in July I960 by President Eisenhower. Cuba, by
far the world leading sugar exporter, had been providing slightly more
than a third (35.3 percent in the 1955-59 period) of all the sugar
consumed in the United States. 6 The seven other Latin American coun-
tries exporting sugar to the United States prior to I960 (Table 5)
contributed less than a tenth of the Cuban tonnage. This sugar entered
the highly preferred market at a price ("quota premium") approxi-
mately 2c more per pound than the world market price. This is in
reality a subsidy to all sugar producers selling under the United States
quota, although it was intended to protect domestic producers. This
extra premium payment in 1959 to Cuba amounted to $153 million

7 " 'Social Development' and 'Social Planning': A Survey of Conceptual and
Practical Problems in Latin America" in Economic Bulletin for Latin America.
Economic Commisson for Latin America. Vol. IX, No. 1 (April 1966), pp. 62-
63, (Washington, 1966).

s United States Dept. of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics: 1966, Table 131,
(Washington, 1966).

28

and to the remainder of Latin America only $12.8 million. 9 The sus-
pension of the Cuban quota in mid- 1960 resulted in the reassignment
of Cuba's quota to other countries with about three-fifths designated
to other Latin American countries. As a result of this action against
Cuba the United States domestic (high cost) producers have gradually
increased their share of the total United States market from approxi-
mately half in the late 1950's to three-fifths in 1964-65 (Table 5).

The Latin American countries have benefited significantly from
the suspension of the Cuban quota and have contributed between one-
fifth and one-quarter of the United States total supply in 1961-63
but in the following years this proportion was reduced to less than
one-fifth. Obviously, Latin America was not the only region to benefit
from this largesse because the Philippines increased its large quota and
new countries were added, notably the European West Indies, Austra-
lia, South Africa, India, and Taiwan.

The permit to enter the United States sugar market presented
Latin America with a nearby and relatively stable market for its third
most valuable export (after petroleum and coffee). The market is
especially lucrative if the sugar enters under the special sugar quota
(generally 2-4c per pound above world market price, except in 1963),
rather than the "global" quota (special import fee absorbs the differ-
ential between the United States and world market prices). This latter
was used in the 1962-65 period for the suspended Cuban quota
(which by then had been reduced from approximately 3.1 million to
1.6 million tons). The Latin American countries, the main beneficiaries
of the reassigned Cuban quota, complained (and lobbyied persistently)
and the "global" quota was eliminated from the Sugar Act of 1965.

The Dominican Republic, despite an augmented quota due to the
reassignment of Cuba's quota, had to pay the special import duty in
late I960 and in 1961 because the United States severed relations with
the Dominican Republic in August I960 in accordance with the OAS
resolution that same month condemning her for involvement in the

9 Congressional Quarterly Service, Inc., Congressional Quarterly Almanac-
1962. (Washington, 1963), p. 130.

29

political affairs of Venezuela. Relations were not restored until Janu-
ary 1962.

The greatest beneficiaries, in Latin America, of the suspension of
the Cuban sugar quota have been the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
Peru, and Brazil. These four countries generally provide four-fifths of
the Latin American sugar shipped to the United States (Table 5) which
will be the case under the 1965 quota system, until it expires in 1971.
The relatively stable New York wholesale price has remained between
6c and 7c per pound while the world sugar price was less than 3c per
pound in 1966. As a result the "quota premium" was between $60-70
per ton and the quota for Latin America exceeded 1.6 million tons
annually. This subsidy to Latin America probably is on the order of
$100-115 million annually but, of course, will fluctuate with the
price differential. Not all of these payments go to foreign purses be-
cause American interests control significant segments of the sugar in-
dustry in at least three Latin American countries with quotas:

% of milling capacity oumed by United States interests 10

Dominican Republic 30

Peru 25

Haiti (small quota) 84

Cuba (up to 1959) 36

The cessation of trade between Cuba and the United States also
provided the opportunity, although a relatively small one, for other
Latin American countries to substitute other commodities for those for-
merly supplied by Cuba. However, since four-fifths of Cuba's export
trade consisted of sugar, other export commodities from Cuba were
relatively of minor importance. However, for some other products
that Cuba supplied to the United States probably some of the other
Latin American countries have been able to benefit to some degree by
now exporting increasing amounts of these commodities to the United
States. The more significant of these commodities would be tobacco
(Cuba's second export), and some strategic minerals, e.g., nickel, cop-
per, manganese, chromium, and iron ore.

10 ibid., p. 130.

30

Tourism. Travel expenditures by Americans was a significant
source of income for the Cuban economy in the pre-Castro period. In
the 1956-58 period, a quarter of a million American tourists annually
visited Cuba and their total yearly expenditures on the island amounted
to nearly $40 million. ' ' There apparently was a decline of American
tourism in Cuba during 1959 and it ceased in I960. It would be diffi-
cult to ascertain as to where Cuba-destined tourists would now visit.
In comparing the immediate post-Castro period ( 1960-62) with that of
the late 1950's, the number and expenditures of American travelers to
the West Indies increased by one-half. During the 1950's and early
1960's the average expenditure per traveler was on the increase so that
it seems fairly safe to assume that the isolation of Cuba permitted an
addition of at least $40-50 million to be spent by tourists in Middle
America. The Bahamas and, especially, Puerto Rico seemed to have had
the most marked increase in tourists following the rise of Castro 12
There was a relatively slight increase in the tourist trade in Barbados,
Jamaica, and Trinidad. It is also very possible that Mexico may have
also benefited in this way also. Haiti and the Dominican Republic
have apparently not benefited significantly from the diversion of the
tourist trade from Cuba because of the political nature of the regimes
and their instability. They have had difficulty or have not been able to
maintain their earlier levels of tourism.

Conclusion & Prospects

Precisely how much effect Fidel Castro and his policies have had
on the economies of the Latin American countries is difficult to gauge.
That he has basically altered or helped modify economic conditions in
the region appears to be abundantly clear. Notable changes in foreign

ii Survey of Current Business. United States Dept. of Commerce. Office of
Business Economics. 1956-66. Article dealing with tourism and travel appears in
the June issue. Author was Frances P. Sasscer from 1956-59 and joined by
Elizabeth M. Outten in 1961. Author not stated in I960. Beginning with 1962
the author has been Etienne H. Miller.

"2 Statistical Yearbook: 1965, Table 161; America en Cifras: 1965, Situacion
Economica: 3. Comercio, Transporte. Communicaciones y Turismo. Table 335-
11, 335-12.

31

investment and assistance, domestic capital outflow, central governmen-
tal budgetary expenditures, and expanded trade and tourism have
occurred since the 1950's. During this period of change Castro is
largely responsible, or at least a major contributary factor, for some of
those changes. Some incipient changes, notably in the flight of United
States capital and assistance were visible during the 1950's but the
impact of Castroism clearly delineates the early 1960's.

In comparing these periods perhaps as much as two-thirds of a
billion dollars more in domestic capital outflow occurred annually
from Latin America and private foreign investments in the region
amounted to at least a quarter million dollars less annually. This con-
stituted a considerable drain on the region's resources combined with
increasing demands for greater military expenditures and assistance
in order to preserve stability and counteract "communism" (i.e., almost
any movement advocating fundamental change and threatening the
status quo, especially if an authoritarian regime is in power). On the
credit side, one must consider the significant increase in United States
foreign assistance (more than a third of a billion dollars more an-
nually), despite the fact that one-ninth of all net assistance consists of
military grants. The reallocation of the sugar quota provides Latin
America with a quota premium of at least $100 million in addition to
receiving the world market price for the sugar and diversion of United
States tourism from Cuba probably adds about half again that amount.

There already was an evolving growth and commitment of United
States assistance to Latin America during the last stage of the Eisen-
hower Administration and probably under President Kennedy this
trend would have accelerated. How willing Congress would have been
to appropriate large sums to Latin America without the threat of Castro
is questionable. In the spring of 1967, despite the waning of the
threat of Castro, the Johnson Administration is willing to allocate
considerably larger sums for Latin America, but Congress does not
concur. In recent years appropriations to Latin America have increased
slightly but the augmenting pressures of the Vietnam conflict, balance-
of-payments difficulties, and increasing Congressional disquietude
regarding the efficacy of foreign economic assistance is certainly not
encouraging from the Latin American perspective.

32

The philosophy of the Alliance for Progress has deviated from its
original conception in two important respects. The multilateral leader-
ship, such as it was, has in practice been notably restricted during the
Johnson Administration. The resignation in April 1966 of the Panel
of Nine which reviewed national development plans and provided ad-
visory planning assistance was a result of the apparent approach of the
Johnson Administration and the prevailing Congressional attitude that
favored greater United States assertion in the hemisphere. The other
founding and more important concept that has been relegated to a
secondary role in recent years is that of fundamental socio-economic
reforms. Undoubtedly, given the socio-economic structure of Latin
America, basic reforms of this nature are extremely difficult to im-
plement, although numerous reform acts have passed many of the
national legislatures. The current emphasis for the solution or im-
provement of Latin American problems is that of a common market.
This approach was strongly advocated at Punta del Este (April 1967)
because of augmented trade among five small Central American coun-
tries. However, the Latin American Free Trade Association has en-
countered considerable difficulties of both a political and economic
nature.

Despite the renewed interest in Latin America the region continues
to receive a declining share of United States foreign trade and invest-
ment. Latin America, through the Alliance for Progress and other pro-
grams, now receives a larger share of United States foreign assistance
but like many other programs may be subject to reductions and re-
strictions should the Vietnam War continue and escalate. Although
Latin America has sought United States economic assistance, in the
form of the long-term, low-interest, "soft" loans, one of Latin Ameri-
ca's most pressing and persistent requests has been for the price stabili-
zation of primary commodities the United States has been reluctant or
unable to provide. Price fluctuations of these commodities combined
with the general downward trend since 1954 and the general upward
trend of prices of industrial goods has produced a severe strain on Latin
America. If in 1964 the price levels of 1954 had prevailed for Latin
America's exports and imports, the additional regional income would

33

have amounted to $2.2 billion. 13 In contrast, in 1964 total net United
States capital outflow for direct investments and economic and military
assistance to Latin America was approximately $800 million. The loss,
therefore, to Latin America because of fluctuations in commodity
prices is prodigious, especially in view of the importance of the foreign
trade sector to underdeveloped regions as a potential source of securing
capital.

Cuba has no chance of securing a sugar quota or receiving Ameri-
can tourists until the relations between the two countries improves.
However, the benefits accruing to Latin America from the United
States sugar quota may not last indefinitely. Although it will be a
long time before Cuba regains its former sugar quota the increasing
opposition to the present sugar quota system due to expire in 1971 and
the defeat of Representative Harold D. Cooley (D, NC, longtime
Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee) in the spring 1966
primary, may lead to the revamping of the quota system. Perhaps
the largesse will not be passed on to foreign producers and prices to
the United States consumers will decrease.

Pressure in many parts of Latin America continues to increase as
the population growth is relentless and the rate of increase will proba-
bly be augmented still further before meaningful fertility control can
be implemented. The very rapid urban influx, without corresponding
economic opportunities, creates a serious social and political problem
that will erupt sporadically and may actually produce more profound
upheavals such as occurred in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Cuba.
The rate of economic development is inadequate in many countries,
especially (among the larger countries) Brazil and Colombia, and
several small countries (viz., Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Paraguay). The race between food and
population is even more crucial and more immediate. Here the problem
is most critical in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia,

is Economic Survey of Latin America: 1964. Economic Commission for Latin
America. 1966. Based on data from Table 224. Primary commodity prices (ex-
ports from Latin America) were slightly higher in 1963 and 1964 than in pre-
ceding years.

34

Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru. Inflation is a serious problem in Brazil,
Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, while balance-of-payments problems
especially plague Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Uru-
guay, Costa Rica, and Haiti. The hope is that United States assistance
combined with the programs of the more democratic and popularly
supported regimes in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Uru-
guay, and Costa Rica, will be sufficient to restrain the radical and
reactionary extremist elements. There is apparently guerilla and terrorist
activity in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and the
Dominican Republic but other countries are always vulnerable. Perhaps
the next charismatic leader with a radical program will convince the
Latin American elite and the United States of the dire necessity of
fundamental reforms so that for the Latin American upper classes to
have things remain the way they are they must change.

35

TABLE 1
UNITED STATES NET FOREIGN ASSISTANCE (1945-65)*

($m)

World Lat. America Lat. Amer. Total
Total Total Military Grants Other Annual Average

1945-52 38 020 657 124 533 88b

1953-60 39 938 2 584 440 2 144 323

1961-65 23 864 3 426 388 3 038 685

a Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1960-66 editions. Dept. of Commerce.
b Period begins with 1 July 1945.

36

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10

LA HUELGA DE LA COSTA

NORTE: AN ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS OF THE 1954 STRIKE

AGAINST THE UNITED FRUIT

COMPANY IN HONDURAS

By Richard A. LaBarge*

Random shocks the unexpected and disruptive occurrence or'
wars, revolutions, plagues, earthquakes, and other great upheavals
of society or nature often are the bases for explaining departures
from the predictions of economic models. Alternatively, such forces
may be instrumental as the impetus which triggers subsequent action.
But in spite of the great improvements in growth, decay, and cycle
models which have resulted from inclusion of random shocks through
the application of probability theory, we know little about such shocks
themselves. An understanding of the nature and magnitude of shock
forces can be obtained only from case analysis provided by these
events themselves.

This paper records almost entirely from primary sources' the
shock forces and their aftermath from "the North Coast Strike" which
took place in 1954 against operations of the United Fruit Company in
Honduras. In that country the events of this year are remembered as
catastrophes which underlay the subsequent development of serious
bottlenecks in supply, temporary inflation, and a lack of investment

*Professor and Chairman, Department of Economics and Finance, Louisiana
State University in New Orleans.

' The author is indebted to the Social Science Research Council for fellow-
ship support which allowed for field work in the affected zones of Honduras
during the summer of 1957. This grant made possible the collection of testi-
mony and of the many unpublished documents available only at the source.

41

capital inflow. 2 The last of these results brought structural disequili-
brium to the international balance of payments and a severe threat of
devaluation so strong that the pressure was removed only by large in-
flows of investment on public account resulting from the various aid
programs sponsored since 1961 under the Alliance for Progress. 3

Background

The first provisions on labor to appear in Honduran legislation
took the form of a section on work and the family which was incorpor-
ated into the Constitution of 1936. This section specified eight hours
as a normal work day and six such days as a normal work week. Women
and children were excluded from unhealthful and dangerous work
(although definitive standards for "unhealthful" and "dangerous"
were not provided) and from night work. Children under twelve years
of age were forbidden to work, and those between the ages of twelve
and sixteen years were limited to working not more than six hours
per day. In order to curtail the practice of paying in kind or in script
redeemable only at the commissaries owned and operated by the em-
ployer, payment of all wages in the national currency was required. A
final article specified that large industrial enterprises were obligated
to establish hospitals at the site of their operations in order
to care for workers who became ill or who met with accidents. No pro-
visions were included for a supervisory agency to enforce these articles,

2 Banco Central de Honduras, Memoria, 1954 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central
de Honduras, 1955), especially pp. 5-10 and 22-23, and the following report,
Banco Central de Honduras, Memoria, 1955-1956 . . . , pp. 7, 16, 18-24, and
30-32.

3 See Richard A. LaBarge and Frank Falero, Jr., "Central Banking and Mone-
tary Policy in the Open Economy of Honduras, 1950-1965" (Tallahassee: Flori-
da State University, mimeo., 1966), pp. 46-47, summarizing more detailed ana-
lysis in earlier portions of the paper. This paper is a multiple regression step-
wise iteration analysis of the monthly monetary stock of Honduras which was
presented in honor of Dr. Emanuele Tosco at the 36th Annual Meeting of the
Southern Economic Association in Atlanta, Georgia, on November 12, 1966.
Interested persons may obtain the mimeograph version of this paper prior to
publication by writing to the authors.

12

and they were honored more in breech than in observance. 4 However,
the large concerns (especially those of foreign ownership), whose pub-
lic visibility made attempts at compliance a matter of business prudence,
clearly had a better record on this account than smaller firms which
were correspondingly less in the public eye.

Further significant labor legislation did not appear until March,
1949, when the Congreso National passed Decree Number 96. This
decree provided that holiday workers would receive double time pay.
During 1952 two new labor laws were added which further defined
working conditions for women and children (Ley de Trabajo de Men-
ores y Mujeres) and which provided indemnization for certain occu-
pational hazards and for accidents resulting from the negligence of em-
ployers (Ley de Acrid entes de Trabajo). Separate legislation estab-
lished the Direction General de Trabajo y Prevision Social, which spent
most of its early years hearing workmen's compensation cases.

In spite of these enactments the Honduran labor market remained
largely laissez-faire. Prior to 1955 unions had no legal standing, and
government officials sided strongly with management. In the banana
zones the United Fruit Company's Honduran subsidiary, the Tela
Railroad Company, conducted its labor relations entirely through the
supervisors directly in charge of each job. There was almost no senior
supervision from management as long as output of the appropriate
quality arrived on schedule. Grievances were settled by the immediate
superior of the complaining worker. Most issues never even reached the
ears of higher administrators because the workers feared, not without
reason, that going over the heads of immediate supervisors eventually
might cost them their jobs.

Indeed, the management compounded its problems by sending
some of its tactless foreign employees to the Honduran Division, where

4 Jorge Fidel Duron, A Statement of the Laws of Honduras in Matters Af-
fecting Business in Its Various Aspects and Activities (Washington: Inter-
American Development Commission, 1947), p. 49; Praxedes Martines Sifva.,
"El problema economico del trabajo en Honduras," Tesis de grado, Univer-
sidad de Honduras, agosto de 1955, p. 63, citing [Honduras], Constitution
Politica y Leyes Constitutivas (Tegucigalpa: Talleres Tipograficos Nacionales,
1936), pp. 32-33, "Titulo XII Del Trabajo y de la Familia."

43

courteous treatment of the common worker appeared to be unnecessary.
In Company circles it was said that if a man were thrown out of Guate-
mala, Costa Rica, or Panama, he always could be given a job in Hon-
duras. To their credit most of the managerial personnel of the Tela
Railroad Company were willing by 1957 to admit the deficiencies of
their labor policy (or lack of one) prior to May, 1954. As one of the
superintendents put it: "I can't blame these people. We were just ask-
ing for a strike, but none of us really thought they could do it!"

The Strike

When the author visited the Tela Railroad Company during May
and June, 1957, Company officials still spoke with awe of the efficiency
with which the strike had been organized three years before. The dispute
began early in April, 1954, when wharf workers at Puerto Cortes ad-
vanced the claim that the double time holiday pay provided by Decree
Number 96 of March, 1949, applied also to Sunday work. Company
officials rejected this claim and dismissed one of the workers who had
been most active in pressing it. In protest the workers left their jobs.
The Company's response was an attempt to re-route its foreign trade
through the nearby port of Tela, but the longshoremen and stevedores
at Tela struck in sympathy with those at Puerto Cortes. At this juncture
the government intervened with a promise to settle the question satis-
factorily within fifteen days. The workers returned to their jobs, but
after a lapse of fifteen days no solution was in evidence.

In the meanwhile separate dissatisfactions were brewing among
workers in the Company hospital at Tela. These workers left their
jobs over a grievance with the medical superintendent. Again the gov-
ernment intervened with the promise of a solution in fifteen days. This
time there was opposition to the proposal, and those who were unwill-
ing to accept it were imprisoned.

Toward the end of the month workers in other departments joined
in protesting their working conditions, and several letters were dis-
patched to the manager's office requesting wage and salary increases,

44

free hospital care, and numerous other fringe benefits. None of these
letters received a reply. Workers in the construction and engineering de-
partments at Progreso then sent a joint petition to the manager in which
they indicated that relations would be worsened greatly if they were
not given the courtesy of a reply to their previous demands. An oblique
reply appeared on April 28, when the manager's office issued a state-
ment that further work in the construction and engineering depart-
ments would be purchased by the piece, not by the hour or by the
month as previously. The next day workers in those departments dis-
patched notes to their respective superintendents saying that they would
not work under the new system.

On May 1 Honduras' first celebration of Labor Day was held in
Progreso's Parque Ramon Rosa. It began as a small, informal gathering.
By afternoon it was a massive crowd which marched through the city's
streets singing patriotic songs and chanting anti-American slogans. One
glowering group surrounded a Protestant mission on the outskirts of
the city. When the minister protested that he had nothing to do with
the Company, their sullen answer was: "Yes, but you speak their lang-
uage!"

The next day the construction and engineering workers agreed
to amplify their demands and to stop work. The strike began on Mon-
day, May 3. By May 6 only the railroad workers remained on the job in
Progreso. Large numbers of farm laborers began to migrate into the
city to join the strikers, and by May 9 an estimated 13,000 persons had
been added to Progreso's normal population of 5,000. The railway
workers joined the strike, and the movement generali2ed rapidly to the
other Company centers at La Lima, Bataan, Tela, and Puerto Cortes.
Once again the government offered to settle all strike issues within fif-
teen days. The offer went unheeded.

By this time the strikers were highly organized. Workers in each
department had met to select their strike committees {Comites de
Huelga) , and these representatives in turn had met at Progreso to elect
a Comite Central de Huelga. The speed and efficiency with which the
organization progressed led some observers to believe that the strikers

45

were receiving assistance from labor leaders in Guatemala. 5 Timing
contributed to their suspicions, for during this same period the forces
of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas were massing in northwestern Hon-
duras for their June invasion of Guatemala. To have paralyzed any
part of the area in which they were concentrating would certainly have
benefited the Arbenz regime.

However, the available evidence is all circumstantial. The author
was unable to find anyone who could give specific names, dates, and
places for the supposed aid from Guatemala. Honduran labor leaders
categorically deny that there ever was any. They attribute the efficiency
of the strike organization to the presence of many semi-skilled and
skilled workers in its leadership. Regardless of the truth, it is known
that the Honduran government feared the possibility of a revolution
stemming from the strike, and the administration of President Juan
Manuel Galvez acted rapidly to create a mediatory commission to meet
with the parties to the dispute. The talks were held in San Pedro Sula.

On May 11 the strikers made known their specific demands in a
petition addressed to the manager of the Tela Railroad Company. This
petition contained thirty separate points, of which the most important
were respect for the right to organize and bargain collectively, a pledge
that no reprisals would be taken against the strike leaders, and claims
for wage, salary, and piece work increases ranging from 30 per cent
to 300 per cent of existing levels. 6

Company officials indicated that they were unprepared to discuss
these demands without thorough study. Instead, they opened the talks
at San Pedro Sula by negotiating for the re-opening of certain essential

s "Banana Battle in Honduras," Business Week (May 22, 1954), p. 166;
"General Strike in Honduras," Time LXIII (May 24, 1954), p. 40. Note espec-
ially the comments of Mr. John Foster Dulles as reported in the latter refer-
ence: "There is at least an interesting coincidence in the fact that the strikes
have occurred principally in an area to whch the Guatemalan government re-
cently sent three consuls who have subsequently been declared persona non grata
by the government of Honduras because of their activities."
6 [Honduras], "Aspectos fundamentales de la mediacion en el conflicto obrero-
patronal entre la Tela Railroad Company y los trabajadores de la empresa,"
Primera parte: "Pliego de peticiones de los trabajadores" (Tegucigalpa: mimeo,
junio de 1955).

46

services which had been terminated by the strike. The strike committee
viewed this as a move to disrupt worker solidarity. For public health
reasons they agreed, after lengthy debate, to re-open sewage disposal
plants at the major centers, but the commissaries, electric plants, and
hospitals remained closed except when operated by administrative per-
sonnel. With this reaction the management claimed that the strike
committee could not possibly be representative of the strikers at large.
To prove the contrary the committee voluntarily disbanded itself, held
new elections among the strikers, and returned to the conference table
with a fresh mandate from the rank-and-file. The services remained
closed.

On June 13, after the lapse of more than a month, the manage-
ment issued a formal reply to the demands of May 11. It was a brief
statement which denied the abuses alleged by the strikers and asserted
the financial impossibility of meeting their demands. The management
then offered a counterproposal of expanded fringe benefits and limited
wage increases which amounted to the additional annual expenditure
of L 5,172,200 ($2,586,100 at the foreign exchange rate of two lemp-
iras for one U. S. dollar). On June 17 the strike committee rejected this
offer.

Four days later the government mediators offered their own so-
lution. With painstaking care the mediation commission had added
up the cost of providing each of the benefits contained in the strikers'
original demands. Their total came to L 59,859,400, which, the medi-
ators dryly noted, amounted to 228.2 per cent of the average annual
profits reported by the Tela Railroad Company for the period 1946-
1952. By comparison the Company offer had amounted to 19.7 per cent
of that average. The government's compromise involved increased
wages and benefits totaling 49.6 per cent of the profit average, or
L 13, 009,500. 7 In the strikers' eyes this was a reasonable concession.
Company officials did not agree, and on that note the talks at San
Pedro Sula ended. Further negotiations continued by means of written
communiques.

As June waned, so did the enthusiasm of the strikers. In the earlier

7 [Honduras], "Aspectos fundamentales .

47

days of the strike the workers had lived from their meager savings,
those who had more sharing with the less fortunate. When the strikers
ran out of funds, local shopkeepers either gave them what they needed
or sold it on credit until bankruptcy threatened. Almost everyone who
was not in the administration of the Company contributed to the strik-
ers' cause, but after eight weeks their combined resources showed signs
of exhaustion. Hunger took its toll, and the old battle cry, "!Que se
siga la huelga!" evoked weakening responses. As June became July, men
began to falter and drop in the streets. It was clear to all observers that
the workers could not hold out much longer. During the first week
of July the mediation commission suggested a new agreement to end
the strike, and with minor modifications this agreement was formalized
on July 9. The bitter 69-day conflict had come to an end. 8

By comparison with the goals which had been established at the
outset of the strike, workers throughout the division felt that little had
been gained by their sacrifices. Nevertheless, the concessions which
they won in the contract of July 9, 1954, were surprising for a lost
cause. Rates on all piece work were raised by fifteen per cent. The long-
shoremen and stevedores obtained wage increases of L 0.10 per hour,
while other hourly workers received pay boosts on a sliding scale from
L 0.05 to L 0.09. Even the monthly employees found their paychecks in-
creased by amounts ranging from L 8.00 to L 20.00. The Company also
agreed to pay time and one-half for work required beyond the eight
hour day. In addition, the contract contained two important concessions
on fringe benefits. The first of these concessions established free in-
come insurance for workers in case of illness. Those with more than
three continuous months of service received the right to daily payments
of L 2.00 or L 3.00 whenever they were incapacitated for more than
three days. The second concession established annual vacations of two
weeks with pay for any worker whose wage or salary averaged L 150.00
per month or more. There was one other major provision of a somewhat
unusual nature. In view of the personal hardship wrought by prolonged
unemployment during the strike period, the Company agreed to make

s For detailed reference on this history of the North Coast Strike, see Praxedes
Martines Silva, "El problema economico . . . ," pp. 70-75, and Antonia Suazo
B., "Los sindicatos y su importancia frente al derecho laboral hondurena," Tesis
de grado, Universidad de Honduras, 1956, pp. 33-44.

48

lump sum rehabilitation payments of L 40.00 to all workers whose
normal remuneration was less than L 200.00 per month. Those few
who earned more than L 200.00 per month were entitled to a rehabili-
tation payment of L 100.00. No reprisals were to be taken against any
of the strikers. 9

The Aftermath

Unfortunately, it is not possible to isolate the income and employ-
ment effects of these concessions alone, for in less than three months a
second shock a natural catastrophe of major proportions intervened
to reinforce them. At the end of September, 1954, a severe hurricane
struck the banana zones on the North Coast of Honduras, and wide-
spread heavy rains in the aftermath of the storm continued well into
October. The Ulua and Chamelecon rivers rose to unprecenteded lev-
els, breaking the stoutest levees, carrying away dams and pumping sta-
tions, and flooding almost the entire length of their joint basin.

Some banana farms were submerged to depths of fifteen to twenty
feet, and 75 per cent of the Tela Railroad Company's banana planta-
tions were damaged in one way or another. 10 Thirty-one per cent of
Company banana acreage was forced out of production altogether, re-
quiring a minimum twelve-month lag for replanting and maturing. At
the end of 1954 only 31,784 acres of bananas remained in cultivation
by the Tela Railroad Company compared with a post-war peak of
45,944 acres at the close of 1953."

The cultivations never recovered. During 1955 much of the
ruined banana area was replanted, but the flood waters had spread the
fusarza of Panama Disease throughout large tracts in which the infirmity

9 "Convenio celebrado entre la Tela Railroad Company y los trabajadores de
dicha empresa, 9 de julio de 1954" (Tegucigalpa: typescript, 1954).

io [Tela Railroad Company], "Plan a desarrollar por la Tela Railroad Com-
pany a consequencia de las inundaciones," Comizahualt (Tegucigalpa) Navidad
de 1954 Afio Nuevo de 1955, p. 49.

1 1 For complete detail of land use by the Tela Railroad Company see Decem-
ber 31 acreage figures for each year from 1946 through 1956 in Richard A.
LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations in Isthmian America,
1946-1956" (Ann Arbor: University Microfilm Service, 1959), pp. 172-174.

49

previously had not appeared. Although effective flood-fallowing tech-
niques were known to purge the infection from the land, expensive in-
vestment for construction and control of artificial lakes was necessary
for implementation. In view of the increased labor tension which pre-
vailed following the 1954 strike there was little management incentive
to make such a commitment. Subsequent information shows that the
pre- 1954 cultivations have not been replaced despite the lapse of more
than a decade. 12

From 1946 through 1953 the sizeable net sum of $41.8 million
had been invested in plant, equipment, and working inventory of the
Tela Railroad Company. In terms of the percentage of net profits re-
invested the amounts returned to Honduras for capital formation in
this period averaged forty cents per dollar earned. The conditions under
which the Company operated in Honduras prior to 1954 were viewed
by the management as the most favorable in Isthmian America. Favor-
able expectations are borne out by the results, for the annual net profits
of the Tela Railroad Company during that period ranged from $8.2 mil-
lion (1952) to $18.3 million (1947) with a cumulative total of
$104.5 million for the eight year span. 13

This picture was altered radically by the catastrophes of 1954.
Within two years the Company lost $15.3 million on current operations
with a net disinvestment of $2.2 million. A much reduced profit of
$3.8 million reappeared in 1956, but this was not accompanied by the
reinvestment burst which one might have expected had only the natural
disaster occurred. 14

12 William S. Stokes, "Honduras: Problems and Prospects," Current History
L (January, 1966), p. 24 reports that ". . . by 1965 the United Fruit Company
and associated producers had about 30,000 acres under cultivation" in other
words just about the amount remaining after the 1954 catastrophes, and this
after inauguration in 1963 of a $15 million five year re-investment program!

13 Richard A. LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations
p. 128.

i* Profit and investment figures for Tela Railroad Company operations are not
available for the years following 1956, but it is known that no sizeable invest-
ment was initiated by the Company until 1963. See Banco Central de Honduras,
Memoria, 1963 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central de Honduras, 1964), pp. 9, 19,
and 28-29; Richard A. LaBarge and Frank Falero, Jr., "Central Banking
p. 36; and William S. Stokes, "Honduras . . . ," p. 24.

^0

These developments brought with them a general contraction of
the scale of Company operations with reduced demand for labor. The
initial extensive layoffs continued until the end of February, 1955. 15
Those who had been the most active in leading the strike appeared
early on the termination rolls, while those who always had worked
hard without complaints were the last to be dismissed. As one assistant
superintendent put it: "It was possible to be somewhat selective, I'll
admit that. During the strike they used to greet us with "lOue se si go.
la huelga!' Well, our answer to that was ''.Que se siga el rebajo!' " Of
course, this result was a foregone conclusion. It certainly would have
been unusual had the Company dismissed those who cost it least in favor
of retaining those who had cost it most.

Yet Company officials were well aware of the socio-economic dif-
ficulties involved in throwing large numbers of workers back into the
Honduran labor market, and efforts were made to cooperate with the
government and with labor leaders in finding other employments for
these persons. On November 16, 1954, the Tela Railroad Company
issued a five point program which had resulted from talks with govern-
ment and labor leaders : 1 ) The Company had turned over to the state
38,174 acres located between Tela and La Ceiba and another 24,317
acres located in the Department of Choluteca. Displaced Company
workers were to be given first priority in settling on these lands.
2) The Company had agreed to lend or rent certain other lands to
the government for six months, so that those lands might serve as
temporary relocation centers while more permanent arrangements were
being made. 3) All dismissals had been delayed for at least a month
in order to give the government's special Comision de Rehabilitation
time to expand public works projects. This commission had informed
the Company that some 1,000 persons were employed in such work
and that 1,100 new jobs would be made available shortly. 4) The
Company had agreed to dismiss fewer workers than at first planned.
And 5) the Company had agreed to pay a small separation to each

15 Praxedes Martinez Silva, "El problema economico ...,'' p. 55.

51

dismissed worker in order to assist him in covering his relocation ex-
penses. 16

Even so, labor like the Company was hard hit. From 1946
through 1956 a mean of some 22,000 workers of all types was em-
ployed by the Tela Railroad Company. But the highest employment fig-
ures occurred prior to the strike, hurricane, and flood damages of 1954,
and peak employment (during 1952) had approached 29,000 workers.
The lowest employment, less than 16,000 workers occurred at the end
of 1954 and during 1955. December 31 employment data supplied by
the Comptroller's Office of the United Fruit Company indicate that
net dismissals by the Tela Railroad Company during 1954 totaled
10,555 employees, most of whom were unskilled or only semi-skilled. 17

Comparison of these figures with the existing estimates for Hon-
duras' total labor force during this period 18 indicates that the Tela Rail-
road Company employed 4 to 5 per cent of that total from 1946 to
1954 and about 2 per cent of that total during 1955 and 1956. A simi-
lar comparison shows that 12 to 14 per cent of Honduras' wage earners
(the monetized labor market) were employed by the Tela Railroad
prior to 1954, while some 8 per cent remained in the Company work
force immediately following the 1954-1955 layoffs. The enormous task
of finding alternative employment for 4 to 6 per cent of the wage earn-
ing work force of an underdeveloped country cannot be minimized.
Government projects and net private investment in construction and
light industry provided some relief, 19 albeit not at comparable wage

16 [Tela Railroad Company], "Plan a desarrollar . . . ," Comizahualt (Teguci-
galpa) . . . , p. 49. This is a reprint of a handbill entitled, "A Nuestros Traba-
jadores," which the Company distributed to its workers on November 16, 1954.
See also, Tela Railroad Company, Departamento de Relaciones Publicas, "EI
Presidente de la United Fruit Company revisa personalmente danos de recientes
inundaciones," Comizahualt (Tegucigalpa) Navidad de 1954 Afio Nuevo de
1955, p. 50.

17 Richard A. LaBarge, "A Study of United Fruit Company Operations . . . ,"
p. 242.

'8 Honduras, Ministerio de Gobernacion, Direccion General de Censos y Esta-
disticas, Anuario estadistico, 1955 (Tegucigalpa: agosto de 1956), p. 34.
19 Banco Central de Honduras, Situation economica durante el primer trimestre
y el mes de abril de 1955 (Tegucigalpa: Banco Central de Honduras, mayo de
1955), p. 3.

S2

levels. There are no figures on the numbers for whom alternative em-
ployment was available only in the slash and burn of migratory sub-
sistence agriculture. Even in the summer of 1957 the sign "No Hay
Plazos" was posted visibly on every major Company installation, and
several of the workers with whom the author talked sought his inter-
cession to obtain jobs for themselves or for relatives.

Conclusions

From the standpoint of welfare economics there is little problem
in assessing the combined results of strike and storm on the North
Coast of Honduras. In this case there was no trade-off of gains by one
group at the expense of another to provoke the neo-classical question
of whose gains and whose losses were worth the most to society at
large. Everybody lost. Land, capital, and labor all suffered immediate
reduction in employment, and output and incomes fell. Some of these
factors of production still are employed to their disadvantage in altern-
ative economic activities which have proved to be far less remunerative
than the production and sale of bananas.

Of course, it may be alleged on non-economic grounds that other
"social advantages" derived from the contraction of Tela Railroad
Company operations were tangible enough to justify the economic loss-
es involved. But such propositions usually have been advanced either
with the support of defective economic argument 20 or without proper
scientific measurement available from the other disciplines of behavioral
science.

Let it suffice to point out as Stokes has done 21 that the Liberal
Party government in power in Honduras from 1957 to 1963 considered
the prospect of expropriating Tela Railroad Company properties and
backed away from it, though not from any love of United Fruit Com-

20 A leading case is presented in Richard A. LaBarge, "The Imputation of
Values to Intra-Company Exports: The Case of Bananas," Social and Economic
Studies (Jamaica) X (June, 1961), passim. Note especially footnote 5, p. 185,
which exposes an outright case of lying by major officials in the Arbenzista
government of Guatemala.

21 William S. Stokes, "Honduras . . . , " pp. 23-24.

53

pany interests. And earlier, when the Supreme Court in neighboring
Guatemala under the Arbenzista government scheduled United Fruit's
subsidiary Compania Agricola de Guatemala for sale in 1952 to satisfy
claims brought against the Company by its workers, the union itself
withdrew the claims in favor of a separate settlement out of court. 22
Both actions said very clearly that the people actually involved were
somewhat uncertain about the nebulous "social advantages" to be de-
rived from such action.

Verily it is written that Man does not live by bread alone. But in
the underdeveloped economies of Latin America there is a justifiable
and prudent concern for bread. That concern is shared by the develop-
ment economist. At the risk of great academic storm, one is tempted
to suggest in this case that what was bad for the Tela Railroad Com-
pany was bad for Honduras.

22 For detail see Richard A. LaBarge, Impact of the United Fruit Company
on the Economic Development of Guatemala, 1946-1954 (New Orleans: Middle
American Research Institute, Tulane University, I960), p. 50 and the primary
documents cited there.

54

COMMENTS ON MANUSCRIPTS

BY LABARGE & ARBENA

GONZALES

By John R. Hildebrand*

I suppose I should fulfill my responsibility by asserting that these
three papers present a fascinating opportunity for a critic. As a vigorous
critic once said at the beginning of his remarks, "I feel like a mosquito
in a nudist colony. I don't know where to begin with so many challeng-
ing opportunities." Seriously, these are three excellent papers. I have
no devastating criticisms only a few viewpoints that might lead to
worthwhile extensions of these papers.

Viewing from the vantage point of the Inter-American Confer-
ence of Presidents going on at Punta Del Este this week (April, 1967),
it is clear that U.S. policy has in a real sense made a 180 degree turn
since President Teddy Roosevelt supported the separation of Panama
from Colombia. Today, President Johnson and the other heads of
state recognize that the current subdivision of Latin America is a
mistake. We are now officially trying to put Latin America back to-
gether in a more productive relationship that fits modern technology.
Economic and political integration is the order of the day. The hope is
to tie together the various countries of the Latin American Free Trade
Association and of the Central American Common Market in a more
vigorous common market patterned after the successful common
market of Europe.

With respect to Castro's Cuba it seems to me the issue for the
U.S. has not really been one of communism, or fascism, or economic
development, or welfare per se, but rather the question of the inter-
national balance of military power. The United States does not seem
to ask whether a country has a communist, fascist, capitalist, dictatorial
or democratic regime. It seems only to ask which direction are you apt

* Professor of Economics, Texas Technological College, Lubbock, Texas

55

to point your guns today. As Senator Paul Douglas was reported to
have responded some years ago to a critical question about several
billion dollars of aid to Tito's communist Yugoslavia and Franco's
Spain, "They may be SOB's but damn it they're our SOB's."

I suspect a resolution of these kinds of military balance of power
difficulties must await, to some extent, the replacement of international
anarchy with the rule of law. Fortunately, we are moving in this di-
rection on regional and global levels with new and strengthened inter-
national institutions.

As was reported, Castro claims some credit for the Alliance for
Progress. It does seem reasonable that someone ought to help the poor
in Latin America catch up with the rich in Western Europe who were
given over 12 billion dollars under the Marshall Plan. I am reminded
of a big placard I saw in the Havana airport in October I960 just be-
fore commercial flights to Cuba were terminated. The placard read,
"Jesus Christ was for the poor. Fidel Castro is for the poor. Why
aren't you for the poor?"

In regard to LaBarge's paper, I am placed in a difficult situation
because his work concerning the United Fruit Company and its Hon-
duran subsidiary, the Tela Railroad Company, is largely a descriptive
study involving facts that I have neither the time nor the sources to
check. Consequently, may I suggest that he might appropriately have
allowed more space for drawing implications from the facts concern-
ing the 1954 "North Coast Strike" against the United Fruit Company
in Honduras. As facts do not speak for themselves, I would suggest
more interpretation and prescription even if one then faces the risk
of being controversial and "unscientific" the last word in quotation
marks, of course. Much of the value of a study is lost if it does not go
beyond description and the presentation of facts.

The controversial subjective areas of ends, goals, values, and
policy measures, being of crucial importance to the survival and
quality of life on this planet, should not be neglected. Economists
ought not to be narrow like the physicist who said, "I just discover
the facts surrounding hydrogen bombs; I don't care how bombs are
used."

56

In Latin America the contest is clearly between peaceful evolution-
ary reform or change through violence. What then becomes the role
of major firms like the United Fruit Company? What then becomes the
role of organized labor in Latin America? Can organized labor play
the role of a responsible agent for peaceful social reform as has gener-
ally occurred in the United States and elsewhere in the world? What
are the responsibilities of an enlightened business management? What
are the prospects in Latin America for the American Institute For Free
Labor Development for which we find an amazing amount of support
among enlightened business firms, labor unions, and governments?
How significant is this cooperative effort to establish labor unions as
responsible institutions for peaceful reform? Human relations and so-
cial justice can not be ignored in this troubled world. I suggest the role
of labor unions in Latin America, as a major force in developing a
brighter tomorrow, merits study.

The United Fruit Company and organized labor are both emotion-
charged symbols in Central America. Like any human institution both
suffer the usual weaknesses of the human species. Both are a mixed
blessing, a double-edged sword, and "good" as well as "bad." Thus
I could not subscribe unconditionally to the manuscript's final sugges-
tion or inference that "what was bad for the Tela Railroad Company-
was bad for Honduras." Surely in the long run a more sophisticated la-
bor and management leadership growing out of the strike could be a
sound basis for more rapid economic, political, and social development
that would easily offset the obvious short-term loss.

Finally, in all modesty may we admit that the eyes of yesterday,
today, and tomorrow peer at the world through tinted glasses of dif-
ferent hues. The pattern seems to be that future generations often view
the earlier generations as crude barbarians. Perhaps I should add a note
of charity recognizing that LaBarge may have drawn from the descrip-
tive facts interpretations and policy recommendations had he been
alloted another half hour.

Perhaps I should close with a general comment concerning Teddy
Roosevelt, Fidel Castro, and the United Fruit Company. For those of
you with some interest in the humanities, think of the richness of the
literature, the art, and the cartoons that we would not possess without
these individuals, organizations, and events.

57

CORTES: A COMMENT

By Robert W. Page, Jr.*

Preface

Few men enjoy a life the reality of which reached beyond their
wildest dreams. Cortes was one of these few.

Who is to give him all of his name Don Fernando Cortes,
Marques del Valle de Oaxaca and Captain General of New Spain and
the South Sea? Whether latter day writers or the chroniclers of his
own day are consulted, the answer would seem to be: he is a shadow;
nothing more. This is a pity. Somewhere between the legends and
the facts and there are more legends than facts Cortes had his
being. For a short span of time he strode the world in god-like grandeur
in point of wondering fact to some he was a god and changed
forever a part of the world. But he was a man. He ran his course and
then was no more. Other men in others days tried to deny or to ignore
him.

This essay will visit briefly with writers both new and old in an
attempt to strengthen the shadowy lines of Fernando Cortes. If in the
process the idea should be evidenced that the essayist is somewhat partial
to Don Fernando, rest assured that he is. At great hazard Cortes dared
to cross over the rim of the western world to stand at last and to look
down upon an unknown civilization and to know that he was one
of a few hundreds and they were counted in their hundreds of thous-
ands. Yet he went on. Cortes was cruel and avaricious and bigoted and
many things beside that we do not admire in men. But he was brave to
a haunting degree. This essayist admires brave men.

Cortes and the Latter Day Writers

Cortes has scant popular recall. In trying to unravel the reason
for this lack of historical appreciation, contradictory opinions of every
hue are found.

*Colonel, U.S. Army

58

Perhaps the unkindest cut was to be recalled as a lesser man. In
his poem, "On First Looking Into Chapman's Homer," Keats has
"stout Cortes . . . with eagle eye . . . silent upon a peak in Darien." 1
As we all know, it was Balboa who first stood on a peak in Darien
to find a new ocean and a new horizon. Known by checking the cur-
rencies of the Latin American world is this fact: of all the conquista-
dores, only Balboa is recalled in a truly popular sense as the unit on
currency (Panama). There are those who with a sniff would note that
Panama as a country has a dangerous "Made in U.S.A." label on its
birthright. Perhaps the homage of Balboa is as synthetic as Panama's
coming to nationhood.

Another account of Cortes says that he has no "monuments . . .
in Mexico, yet the very land breathes of him." 2 The sense of this
article, written at the turn of the century, would indicate that the
history of Mexico was one with Cortes. Nothing could be farther from
the truth. This account, it should be noted, rested largely on Cortes'
letters to the Spanish crown, letters that bore a strong resemblance to
Caesar's Commentaries. The turn of the century comment said of Cortes'
letters that they did not come "from the secluded library of the must)'
historian, but from the open-air workshop of the tumultous warrior." 3
(One cannot help wondering in passing: is this, as it appears, rather
artless and superficial or is it veiled criticism of Prescott? Prescott is
not musty, but his library was secluded in a very special sense. The
blind and the near blind need little light in their libraries so long as
their inner lights, as did Prescott's, burn well to light the way of the
unwary. )

Perhaps the most recent commentary (1961) on Cortes moves
him from the status of warrior to that of symbol, "of the ruthless
foreigner, the exploiter. " Curiously, however, it could almost be said

1 Harry Buxton Forman (ed.), The Poetical Works and Other Writings of
John Keats (London: Reeves and Turner, 1883), I, p. 79.

2 G. F. Paul, "Hernando Cortes, the Central Figure in Mexican History," New
England Magazine, Vol. XXXV (Jan., 1907), p. 515.

3 Ibid.

William Weber Johnson and the Editors of Life, Life World Library: Mexico
(New York: Time Inc., 1961), p. 43.

59

that this latest comment went in search of a symbol. For example, the
name of Cortes' interpreter-mistress Dona Marina to the Spaniards,
Malinche to the Aztecs is cited as the source for "malinchista . . .
one who sells out country or friends, who consorts with foreigners and
bestows favors on them at the expense of his countrymen." 5

Granted that such an opinion can be set forth, it cannot be sup-
ported. In two Mexican books which attempt to establish that "the
history of Mexico City . . . has much relationship with the names of
her streets, some historical and others legendary." 6 Dona Marina fares
very well. After noting that her "Mexicanized" name was "Malintzin"
which the Spaniards corrupted to "Malinche," the author says that
"Dona Marina ... is quite celebrated in our history, has been the
protagonist of popular legends and traditions and her name . . .
has been given perpetually to our tall mountains or crystaline pools." 7
This is hardly the heavy breathing indictment of a traitor. (Assuming
that the more cautious might consider this last author as something of
a gallant, it should be noted that in three tomes no remotely concerned
with gallantry, malinche is variously defined. In one it is a "mountain
more properly called Martintzi or Matlalcueyalt, situated in the State
of Tlaxacala (Mexico) of 4,107 meters of altitude." 8 In another, ma-
linche is defined "in Costa Rio and Nicaragua (as) the common name
of a plant that in Mexico is called tabachin." 9 And to carry a minor
matter to its ultimate absurdity in yet another place malinche is de-
fined as "the unique woman" ("la unica mujer") who "performs
reverences and ceremonies ... in the steps (danzas) . . . traditional

5 Ibid., p. 44.

6 Luis Gonzalez Obregon, Las Calles de Mexico: Leyendas y Sucedidos (Mexico:
Ediciones Botas, 1936), pp. 1-2.

7 Luis Gonzalez Obregon, Las Calles de Mexico: Vidas y Costumbres de Otros
Tl tempos (Mexico, Ediciones Botas, 1936), p. 29.

a Elias Zerdo and others, Diccionario Enciclopedico de la Lengua Castellana
(Paris: Gamier Hermanos, Libreros-Editores, 1898), Vol. II, p. 247.

9 Francisco J. Santamaria, Diccionario General de Americanismos (Mejico.
D. F.: Editor al Pedro Robredo, 1942), Vol. II, p. 221.

60

with ancient Mexican dances." 10 A certain degree of consistency, how-
ever is maintained. This last also adds a secondary explanation that
malinche is "in Central America the name given to tabachin." 11 Moun-
tain, tree, or dance step is malinche but not traitor.)

If absurdity be carried to a high degree by stretching malinche to
meaning no reputable authority will support, how much more absurd
are some of the things done with Fernando Cortes. Perhaps a water-
shed of sorts was crossed in a small volume that is little better than a
curiosity wherein nineteen pages are devoted to the "Historical Part
of Mexico." Being a history written as of 1876 this "historical part"
concerns itself only with the migrations of tribes into Mexico from
the north. The historical survey ends with a chronology of Aztec kings
from 1352 to 1521. Apparently neither the Spaniards nor Cortes ever
existed! 12

Cortes did exist. A traveler from the United States toward the
end of the nineteenth century noted that "no statue, or enduring effigy
of Cortes ... is said to be ... in the republic, such has been the intense
bitterness of the people toward the conqueror of Mexico." 13 Apparently
this bitterness was then abating. At least our traveler learned that in the
Paseo de la Reforma then a building in Mexico City, six circular spaces
were being created to provide for statues of prominent men. Columbus
occupied one niche. "In the second space the foundation" was "laid
for a statue of Guatemotzin, 14 the last Aztec Emperor, and in the third"
was "proposed to place that of Cortes." 15 Such planning, our traveler
noted, furnished proof that Mexico was "becoming civilized" and was
no longer capable of enduring Humboldt's reproach "that we nowhere

io Francisco J(avier) Santamaria, Diccionario de Mejicanismos (Mejico;
Editorial Porra, S. A., 1959), p. 634.

ii Ibid.

'2 Antonio Garcia Cubas, The Republic of Mexico in 1876, trans. George F.
Henderson (Mexico: "La Ensenanza" Printing Office, 1876).

'3 Federick A. Ober, Travels in Mexico and Life Among the Mexicans (Boston:
Estes and Lauriot, 1888), p. 350.

14 One of several spellings beginning variously with C, G, or Q.

15 Ober, Travels in Mexico and Life Among the Mexicans, p. 350.

61

in the Spanish colonies meet with a national monument erected by
the public gratitude to the glory of Christopher Columbus and Hernan
Cortes." 16

Columbus has been redressed in effigy in countless places. His
name in lower case even enters everyday usage as the unit of currency
in El Salvador and Costa Rica. But Fernando Cortes still waits a suitable
memorial. 17 Had our late nineteenth century traveler been able to pro-
ject himself forward half a century, he doubtless would have reconsid-
ered his stand that Mexico was becoming civilized. (Perhaps it should
be hastily noted that any opinion concerning the relative degree of
civilization is suspect. Like morality, the opinion is rooted in standards
not everywhere the same and not everywhere capable of being the
same. )

Near mid-twentieth century apparently well documented sources
led to the discovery of the last remains of Fernando Cortes. At the
moment of discovery Cortes had been dead four hundred years less
a year and a month. The discovery raised prickly questions that, finally
had to be answered by the President of Mexico himself. "The remains
of Conqueror Cortes, he decided, would be buried again, for the
eighth time, in the ancient church where they had been discovered, and
the church would be made a national monument." 16

Before that was done, another voice offered his opinion. "Vincente
Lombardo Toledano, head of the General Confederation of Labor (of
Mexico) declared . . . that the bones should be 'buried with those
of Franco.' " I9 Whether the caudillo of Spain was to be immured
alive or dead was not noted in the popular press. Clearly expressed
was hatred for caudillos if not for Spain itself. (Naturally a good labor
leader can find no praise for the management of labor by Spain's
Franco. )

i<> Ibid.

7 John Edwin Fagg, Latin America: A General History (New York, 1963),
p. 128.

!8 "Mexicans Find the Lost Bones of Cortes," Life, Dec. 16, 1946, p. 43.

>"? New York Times, Nov. 29, 1946, p. 17.

62

By turns this hatred of Spain can be called a national expression.
At least no other sensible meaning can be given to this continuing
hatred for a man dead four centuries. This was amply demonstrated in
1951 when the latest painting by Diego Rivera incorporating Fernando
Cortes showed him "a cross-eyed, hunch-backed, bowlegged cretin." 20
Despite four previous portraits in which Cortes was shown "as a
handsome, broad-shouldered hero," the artist defended his changed out-
look by saying: "I have been a victim of history." 21 Perhaps. The
journalistic notice concluded by observing that the "low-browed Cortes"
fitted "current Mexican Nationalistic versions." 22

Nationalism aside, there are moments when Cortes seems still
filled with vibrant, demanding life. In following his trail from Vera
Cruz to Mexico City in 1940, a National Geographic Magazine author
chatted with the municipal president of Ixhaucan. Recounting the
arrival of Cortes at the same place over four hundred years earlier the
president said that Cortes was uncertain of his reception. To resolve
some of the uncertainty, he had "two shots (fired) from one of his
bronze cannon. While the echos still crashed . . . , our leaders hastened
out to assure the Spaniards they would be well treated." 23 Calling
them our leaders gave an immediacy to the telling that belied the age
of the four centuries old trail.

As can be readily appreciated, Cortes is dead yet he lives. He
was a man yet now his manly shape is twisted beyond recognition. He
was (to quote a most curious conclusion) so "active ... in the en-
couragement of this practice, . . . barragana ... a kind of recognized
concubine ... he might be termed the grandfather and/or godfather
of mestizo Mexico." 24 This conclusion is not only tasteless; it seemingly

20 "Cross-Eyed Conqueror,"' Time. Nov. 19, 1951, p. 86.
2i Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Luis Marden, "On the Cortes Trail," National Geographic Magazine,
LXXVIII (Sept., 1940), p. 344.

21 C. A. Hauberg, "Cortes: Conquistador," Current History. XXVI
(Mar. 1954), pp. 141-42.

63

ignores Cortes' other companions who had nothing to do with fathering
mestizos. The point, however, is that Cortes in no wise is a father
figure to Mexico. He is an alien, a stranger. No wonder that Mexicans
and lovers of Mexico pay him such scant heed.

To meet Cortes it is necessary with one singular exception to
go back in time to the chroniclers of his own day. That exception,
William H. Prescott, is a "modernist" who sets at naught all of the
lesser men who attempt to tell the story of Fernando Cortes. His great
work, The Conquest of Mexico, is preface dated October 1, 1843.

In writing of the conquest, Prescott noted that his work was not
truly chronological. He said that it had "somewhat the character of a
philosophic theme, . . . (a) conclusion . . . strictly biographical,
"both an indifferent" match . . . with the main body, or historical
portion of the work." 25 His endeavor was to surround the reader "with
the spirit of the times. . . to make him ... a contemporary of the
sixteenth century."' 26

What sort of conqueror emerged from the manuscript its author
could not read? According to Prescott, Cortes was "the instrument
selected by Providence to scatter terror among the barbarian monarchs
of the Western World, and lay their empires in the dust." 27 He it was
who called upon his men to give up their part of the treasure they
gathered to send off to the Spanish crown as "worthy of the monarch
for whom it was intended . . . Another example of the extraordinary
power obtained by Cortes over these repacious spirits, who, at his call,
surrendered up the very treasures which had been the great object of
their hazardous enterprise!"^ 8

At the end, in summing up, Prescott wrote:

The History of the Conquest, as I have already had
occasion to remark, is necessarily that of Cortes, who is, if I

25 William H. Prescott, History of the Conquest of Mexico (New York,
n. d.), p. 7.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 143.

28 Ibid., p. 196.

64

may say so, not merely the soul, but the body, of the enter-
prise ... He was a knight-errant, in the literal sense of the
word. Of all the band of adventurous cavaliers, whom Spain,
in the sixteenth century, sent forth on the career of discovery
and conquest, there was none more deeply filled with the
spirit of romantic enterprise than Hernando Cortes.P 9

Allowing for one small caveat these cavaliers went forth; they
could hardly have been sent this last is fitting summation as to who
was Don Fernando Cortes, Marques del Valle de Oaxaca and Captain
General of New Spain and the South Sea. Let us now visit briefly
with the men of his own day. This is not to say that they were writers
with greater vision or more accurate perception. But they belonged
to their time. A part of their wonder and pride, clear and undimmed,
comes through the long years from then to now.

Cortes and the Chroniclers of His Own Time

In attempting to describe Cortes as his contemporaries saw him,
it will help to remember that one writer of the time was Cortes him-
self. Whether Don Fernando wrote for the ages consciously is hard
to say. He wrote to vindicate his actions. When, early in 1519, he
sailed west to follow up the explorations of Grijalva in what is today
the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico, Cortes was acting in the name of
Diego Velasquez, governor of Cuba. The matter of personality aside,
Cortes' first loyalty was to the governor. Yet no sooner was Cortes
arrived in the vicinity of what is today the city of Vera Cruz in Mexico
than this simple relationship was radically altered.

How simple it all was. The land was good and obviously there
was a large quantity of gold.

For these reasons, it seemed to us that it was not advanta-
geous for Your Majesties' service to do as Diego Velasquez
had ordered the said Captain Fernando Cortes to do which
was to trade for all the gold we could, and, having obtained
it, to return to the island of Fernandina (Cuba), in order that

29 ibid., p. 681.

65

the said Diego Velasquez, and the said Captain might profit
exclusively by it.) 30

That was the starting point sometime in May or June 1519 where-
in a limited exploration for the governor of Cuba was changed to the
matchless conquest of a land that in time became New Spain. And
who was to be trusted with the change? A man "whom we could all
respect, "one" moreover very zealous in the service" of the Spanish
crown in short, Fernando Cortes. 31

There was, however, nothing spontaneous in this. As one of the
participants said, "Cortes agreed . . . although he pretended to need
much begging, as the saying goes: 'You are very pressing, and I want to
do it.' " 32

Another account written later but in all probability with Cortes'
full knowledge (if not in fact, at his dictation) noted that this change
whereby Cortes would be the leader in a new venture was done as
being customary in the villages and towns of Castile. The feeling was
freely expressed that with Cortes in command, "God and the King
would be well served. Cortes' followers seemed satisfied with the
knowledge that he would govern them with justice, treat them with
humility, and lead them with diligence and boldness." 33

However we may regard this change in relationship, it was in
fact a bold gamble on the part of Cortes, a gamble that paid hand-
somely. The fact that the very first telling of his changed loyalty
(July 10, 1519) was accompanied by all of the treasure that had then
been obtained may have had some useful result in the eventual recog-

30 Francis Augustus Mac Nutt, Letters of Cortes: The Five Letters of Relation
from Fernando Cortes to the Emperor Charles V (New York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1908), I, p. 133. Hereafter, Cortes, Letters.

3i Ibid., p. 159.

32 Bernal Diaz del Castillo, The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico 1517-1521,
trans. A. P. Maudslay (New York, 1956), p. 82.

33 Francisco Lopez de Gomara, Cortes: The Life of the Conqueror by His
Secretary, trans, Lesley Byrd Simpson (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 67-68.

66

nition of Cortes as the leader in New Spain. As one of his companions,
the doughty Bernal Diaz put it (in relation to another matter), "pres-
ents of gold" were "that solvent of hardness." 34

Yet it would be a sad mistake to believe that only gold or other
treasure drew Cortes and his little band on. When describing the
natives, Cortes also described their customs of human sacrifice as "the
most terrible and frightful thing to behold that has ever been seen." 35
The strong belief comes through the centuries

that it is not without cause that God, Our Lord, has permitted
that these parts should be discovered in the name of Your
Royal Highnesses (Queen Dona Juana and Emperor Don
Carlos V), so that this fruit and merit before God should be
enjoyed by Your Majesties, of having instructed these bar-
barian people, and brought them through your commands
to the True Faith. 36

In point of fact, loyalty to God and to King appeared to be the
dominant reality in Cortes' life those and incessant fighting. In the
growing and nearly successful Aztec uprising in June- July 1520 Cortes
very nearly lost. "With the help of God, and His Glorious Mother
... we reached the top." 37 goes one account. Following the retreat
from the Aztec capitol at the cost of "over one hundred and fifty-
Spaniards . . . killed . . . forty-five mares and horses and more than
two thousand of the Indians who had aided the Spaniards" the
dwindling band found safety when "Our Lord was pleased to show
us a tower and good lodging place on a hill." 38 The loss of the horses,
apropos, is better understood in a later revelation: "After God, our
only security was the horses." 39

God did get suitable mention and so did Cortes. Near the end

34 Diaz, Discovery and Conquest, p. 85.

35 Cortes, Letters, I. p. 164.

36 Ibid., pp. 164-65.

37 Ibid., p. 292.

38 Ibid., pp. 298-299.

39 Ibid., p. 301.

67

when loss and disaster would have turned aside a lesser man, Cortes
wrote:

I . . . remembered that Fortune is always on the side of the
daring, and that we were Christians, confiding in the very
great mercy of God, who would never permit us to perish;
and I considered them to abandon us . . . Disregarding all
difficulty and danger which might offer, I said that I would
not abandon this country; for besides its being disgraceful to
me and very dangerous to all, we would act treasonably
towards Your Majesty (Emperor Don Carlos V). 40

Bernal Diaz gave credit to God too. Of Cortes he said simply (in
connection with the near disastrous flight in June- July 1520), he
"showed himself very much of a man, as he always was." 41 Another
contemporary chronicler avers that "never had there been a more
notable feat of arms in the Indies . . . and all the Spaniards who that
day saw Hernan Cortes in action swear that never did man fight as
he did . . . and that he alone in his own person saved them all." 4 - 2

Cortes was brave, audacious, even presumptous. What else was
he? The records of his own time add conquest on conquest, the en-
largement both of New Spain and Cortes' part in the growing empire.
Withal, Cortes the person seems lost behind the events.

When the great adventure in Mexico was finished, Cortes wrote
his King asking for a place at court.

I assure Your Sacred Majesty that my service there will
not be of less importance, for my advice may help to preserve
this land, and advance the conversion of the natives to our
Catholic Faith, and increase Your Majesty's revenues in these
parts ... If I have exposed myself to so many fatigues and
dangers, and have suffered such hardships, it was to gain the
renown of being a servant of Your Majesty . . . and not from
covetousness of treasures. 43

40 Ibid., pp. 305-306.

* Diaz, Discovery and Conquest, p. 307.

42 Gomara, Cortes, p. 4.

43 Cortes, Letters, II, pp. 346-47.

68

One can only read and marvel. When that wish was expressed
(in a letter dated September 3, 1526), Cortes was forty-one years old.
Twenty-one years later when his old companion, Death, was near
on a visit that would not be denied Cortes in his will wrote that he
had spent "large sums of money" in the conquest of New Spain and
in explorations to the Molucca Island and to Honduras. He directed
"that this account be made and presented to His Majesty, since he was
pleased to order payment to me." 44

It can be fairly assumed that Fernando Cortes wanted both place
and possessions. At the end, when he was dead, the chroniclers of his
own times wrote about the great days then gone. Bernal Diaz said
that "an eloquence and rhetoric far beyond my powers" would be
needed to tell the tale of "the Conquest of New Spain ... in the com-
pany of that valiant and doughty Captain, Don Hernando Cortes." A5
Francisco Lopez de Gomara (in dedicating his work to Cortes' son)
wrote: "Long live, then, the name and memory of him who con-
quered so vast a land, converted such a multitude of men, cast down
so many idols, and put an end to so much sacrifice and the eating of
human flesh!" 46

Perhaps another way of putting it would be to note that Fernando
Cortes was a man of action. He was not given to introspection. Such
men do not make good models for grave eyed statues in heroic poses.
In Mexico today there is no monument to Cortes; at least no monument
that dullards can read about in lack luster guide books. But Cortes
does have a monument. It is found in the harsh lights and shadows
hard by Popocatepetl's snow-capped awe where Cortes and his band
breasted the last pass on their way to the central valley of Mexico.

If you go that way, stop awhile and look and listen. Cortes'
monument is a shadow in the high pass; a shout in the wind; the faint
cry echoing down the long years, "Santiago y a ellos!"

44 Ibid., I, pp. 90-91.

45 Diaz, Discovery and Conquest, p. xxxiii.

46 Gomara, Cortes, p. 4.

69

SANTIAGO VIDAURRI,
CHAMPION OF STATES' RIGHTS:
1855-1857

By Edward H. Moseley*

Possibly the most irrational concepts involved in United States
politics are those relative to states within our federal system. Champions
of states' rights identify their cause with individual rights and basic
freedoms, and associate the central government with tyranny which
usurps every liberty of the common man. A parallel situation can be
found in Latin American politics where in the nineteenth century liberal
factions advocated federalism as a part of their attempt to overthrow
various centralized dictatorships. Latin American historians have often
constructed an oversimplified equation in which they identify liberalism
with federalism and conservatism with centralism. This thesis is far
too simple to be accurate. In Latin American politics, as in our own,
parties or factions which find themselves in the minority or out of
power, find a convenient tool in the doctrine of states' rights.

Another very important ingredient further complicates the study
of states' rights. This is the role of the caudillo or ambitious politician.
It is this aspect of states' rights which is the topic of this study. It
seems fitting for an Alabamian to discuss before an Atlanta audience
the topic of states' rights and caudillhmo. It is politic for him to draw
his theme from the history of Mexico rather than from more obvious
examples.

The career of Santiago Vidaurri in the history of Mexico is over-
shadowed by the charge of treason. During the French intervention he
broke with the government of Benito Juarez, and later joined the
Empire of Maximilian. ' The caudillo was branded as a traitor, captured

* Assistant Professor of History, University of Alabama

i The conditions which led to this break are themselves involved in the question
of states' rights within the liberal government of Benito Juarez. Basic events
can be found in Santiago Roel (ed.) Correspondencia Particular de D. Santiago
Vidaurri, Tomo Primero: Juarez- Vidaurri, (Monterey, 1946).

-()

after the fall of Mexico City and executed by order of General Porfirio
Diaz. Influenced by these events, most Mexican historians dismiss
Vidaurri as a strong man, interested only in personal power. Whereas
there is validity in this opinion it has tended to obscure the career of
one of the nation's most powerful regional leaders. An examination
of the early career of Santiago Vidaurri provides an interesting case
study in the use of the doctrine of state sovereignty by an astute
politician.

The Plan of Ayutla of March 1, 1854, was primarily a negative
pronouncement against the dictatorship of Antonio Lopez de Santa
Anna^ 2 A year later (May 11, 1855) Santiago Vidaurri denounced
the dictator, and issued his own Plan of Monterrey. 3 In less than two
weeks he was in control of most of the state of Nuevo Leon. 4 One of
the first things the new caudillo did upon coming to power was to
appeal to the pride of the people of the state. He assured them that
they were not like the "miserable Indians" of the interior states of
Mexico, and promised that he would return the rightful sovereignty
to their hands. 5 At the same time, he accused Santa Anna of acting
against the national interest in selling part of the nation's territory to
the United States. In return the dictator hurled charges at Vidaurri,
asserting that he was trying to establish a separate nation, "The Repub-
lic of Sierra Madre." The caudillo naturally rejected these as false
charges which were intended to cover up Santa Anna's own crimes. 6

2 Mario de la Cueva (ed. ) Plan de Ayulta, Conmemoracion de su primer
Centenario, Prologo, (Mexico: Ediciones de la Facultad de Derecho, 1954).;
Richard A. Johnson, The Mexican Revolution of Ayulta, 1854-1855: An Analysis
of the Evolution and Destruction of Santa Anna's Last Dictatorship, (Rock
Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library, 1939)., p. 38.

3 Periodico Oficial del Gobierno del Departamento de Nuevo Leon, May 17,
1855. The revolt actually began in the little village of Lampazos with the
assistance of Colonel Juan Zuazua.

* El Restaurador de la Liber tad, June 4, 1855. (This is a semi-official news-
paper of the Vidaurri regime, bearing the title of the movement which the
caudillo had launched in Lampazos and is hereinafter cited as El Restaurador).

s El Restaurador, May 28, June 4, 1855.

6 El Restaurador, June 23, 1855.

71

The movement which triumphed in Nuevo Leon gained support
throughout the northeast. A force of over one thousand men was raised
and equipped, being christened the "Ejercito del Norte." 7 Vidaurri
then made plans to extend his movement, inviting the people of
Tamaulipas to join the revolt against centralized distatorship. Though
he made it clear that he was the commander of the military effort, the
strong man promised the citizens of Tamaulipas that he would promote
their right to organize a civil government for a sovereign and inde-
pendent state. During July 1856 several municipalities in western
Tamaulipas announced their acceptance of the Plan of Monterey.
Success seemed assured, and plans were formulated to march against
the federal garrison which occupied the important Gulf port of
Matamoros. 8

Events in the west, however, forced the abandonment of plans
to sieze the port city. A federal army in Saltillo threatened to assault
Monterey, and citizens of that city were filled with panic. 9 Governor
Vidaurri made a forced march with the Army of the North, announcing
to the people of Nuevo Leon that they could rest assured that he would
protect them from the forces which threatened the state. 10 As the army
arrived in Monterey the federal force which had reached outskirts of
the city went scurrying back up the road to Saltillo. ' '

Saltillo had a reputation for conservatism, and the presence of
pro-Santa Anna elements there posed a serious threat to the revolution-
ary government which had come to power in Nuevo Leon. Leaving
Juan Jose de la Garza to guard the Tamaulipas flank, General Vidaurri
began operations against the capital of Coahuila. Although it was a
strong position, the defenders became demoralized upon hearing of the

7 El Restaurador, July 14, 1855.

a Statement of Vidaurri (Issued in Mier, Tamaulipas July 8, 1855), El Res-
taurador, July 14, 1855.; Juan Jose de la Garza, an important political figure
in Tamaulipas, accepted the plan and became the second in command of the
"Ejercito del Norte," and director of the forces of Tamaulipas.
9 Boletin (of the government of Nuevo Leon), July 29, 1855.; El Restaurador,
June 30, 1855; July 14, 1855.

io Vidaurri to Secretario de Gobierno, July 13, 1855, Boletin, July 14, 1855.
". . . primero es salvar a Nuevo Leon que ha puesto en mis manos su suerte."
' Boletin Extraordinario, July 17, 1855.

72

approach of the Army of the North. 12 On July 23, 1855, after only
one day of seige, the city surrendered, and the Ayuntamiento voted to
give Vidaurri both political and military command of the state of
Coahuila until a governor could be elected. 13 Other municipalities fol-
lowed the example of the capital city, and by early August the caudillo
from Nuevo Leon had almost complete control in Coahuila. 14 He re-
turned to Monterey with the laurels of victory. Citizens filled his
pathway with flowers, shouted and shot fireworks, rifles and cannon. 15

At the same time Vidaurri was winning control of Coahuila, other
enemies of Santa Anna were having success in the central region of
the nation. The dictator fled into exile August 13, 1855. I6 The actions
of Vidaurri had helped to bring about this collapse of the central gov-
ernment, and the revolutionary leaders of the interior were aware
of the political and military strength which the caudillo enjoyed in
the northeast. 17 He had never accepted the Plan of Ayutla, but had
insisted that his was an independent movement for the restoration of
liberties of the people and sovereignty of the states. Vidaurri asserted
that each of the departments which had revolted against Santa Anna
had resumed its interior sovereignty as a free and independent state.

12 Bucheli to Esparza, July 20, 1885, El Restaurador, August 18, 1855. (This
letter was captured after the fall of Saltillo, and illustrates the fear which
spread throughout the city concerning the army from Monterrey.

!3 Vidaurri to Secretario del Gobierno de Nuevo Leon, July 23, 1855, Boletin
July 24, 1855.; "Acta del pronunciamiento de la Ciudad del Saltillo," July 26,
1855, El Restaurador, August 4, 1855.

"A Boletin, August 7, 1855.

'(5 "Entrada Triunfante del Exmo. Sr. Gobernador del Estado y las Tropas
de su Mando a Esta Capital," El Restaurador, August 11, 1855.

16 Johnson, The Mexican Revolution of Ayutla, 61-62; Tomas Sanchez Hernan-
dez, "Las operaciones Militares como consecuencia de la proclamacion del Plan
de Ayutla Hasta el Triunfo de la Revolucion Liberal," Plan de Ayutla (Mario
de la Cueva director), pp. 163-164.

'7 Eulalio Degollado to Manuel Doblado, August 25, 1855, Documentos Ineditos
o muy raros para la historia de Mexico publicados por Genaro Garcia y Carlos
Pereyra, Tomo XXVI, "La Revolucion de Ayutla segun el archivo del General
Doblado," (Mexico, 1909).

73

As such they had the right to conduct their own affairs and to control
their own militia until a new federal constitution could be drawn up
by a convention of these free states. 15

Opinions throughout Mexico varied concerning the northern strong
man. The conservative press quite naturally denounced him as a threat
to ". . . property and to the virtue of the wives and daughters of
Mexico," and "to the sacred religion . . ," 19 Some liberals too expressed
concern over the possibility that Vidaurri might have connections with
the "yankees." 20 As early as May, 1855, however, various puros or ultra-
liberals came to consider Vidaurri to be a member of their ranks. They
realized that the caudillo from the north would be an important figure
in the movements to restore a national government following the
overthrow of the dictator J 21

The Revolution of Ayutla was followed by a period of political
turmoil. The old revolutionary leader Juan Alvarez filled the office
of provisional president for a short time, but then turned it over to
Ignacio Comonfort. Considered to be a moderado, the new official
attempted to bring various hostile factions into a temporary government
while a new constitution was being written. He accepted some of the
old supporters of the dictator back into the national family. Many
puros denounced this as being contrary to the aims of the revolt which
had succeeded. In May of 1856 Benito Juarez denounced Comonfort
for actions contrary to the aims of the Revolution. 22 The provisional
president, however, stressed the need for a workable government which

ie El Restaurador, June 11, 1855; June 30, 1855.

19 El Universal, July 26, 1855.

20 M. Siliceo to Doblado, September 3, 1855, Documentos Ineditos, XXVI,
". . . me temo que ese Vidaurri sea la avanzada yankee . . ."; W.E.M. Radley
to Vidaurri, July 31, 1855, Correspondence Particular de Santiago Vidaurri
(Located in the state archives of Nuevo Leon in Monterrey. Hereinafter cited
as Corr. Par.)

2i Guillermo Prieto to Manuel Doblado (n.d.), Documentos Ineditos, XXVI.
"Pero puedo asegurar a V. que en el partido exaltado tiene un lugar eminente
las doctrinas de Vidaurri."

2,2 Francisco Zarco, Historia del Congreso Estraordinario Constituyente de 1856
y 1857, Estracto de todas sus sesiones y documentos parlamentarios de la epoca,
(2 volumes), Mexico, Imprenta de Ignacio Cumplido, 1857, 1861), I, pp. 79-81.;
Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, Documentos Ineditos,
XXVI.

74

would extend its administrative powers throughout the national terri-
tory in order to bring an end to chaotic conditions. 23

Santiago Vidaurri became one of the most severe critics of Ignacio
Comonfortj 24 Early in 1856 he came forth in righteous indignation to
denounce the provisional president for subverting the purposes of the
revolution, and for allowing the supporters of the dictatorship to re-
enter the national fold. Among the most serious of crimes laid at the
feet of the chief executive, however, was that he was attempting to
usurp the rights of the sovereign states/ 25 This gained the caudillo a
new position of popularity with the puros, and they even mentioned
his name as a possible candidate for the presidency. 26 Vidaurri, how-
ever, was primarily concerned with affairs in his own domain. In fact,
to understand the real motives for his opposition to the provisional
government it is necessary to consider conditions on the northern
frontier.

As has been stated, the Governor considered the movement which
he led to be independent of that in Central Mexico. He informed
President Comonfort that he was willing to recognize the provisional
government in Mexico City, but made it quite clear that he considered
himself to be the rightful political and military leader on the north-
eastern frontier, 27 His plans for the frontier included the unification

23 J. M. Lafragua (Comonfort's Minister of Gobernacion) to Manuel Doblado,
December 15, 1855, Documentos Ineditos, XXVI. ". . . que no puede haber
unidad nacional si no hay un gobierno que organice los ramos todos de la ad-
ministration publica."

24 Vidaurri to Ignacio Comonfort, September 28, 1855, Boletin, September 29,
1855. This letter, coming prior to Comonfort's taking charge of the provisional
government, involved the problem of granting a truce to certain military leaders
who had supported Santa Anna.

25 Vidaurri to Juan Alvarez, April 27, 1856, Corr. Par. (There are many other
letters in the caudillo' s private correspondence relating to this matter.)

26 Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, Documentos Ineditos.
XXVI.; Gabino Montemayor to Vidaurri, March 28, 1856, Corr. Par.

27 Vidaurri to Comonfort, September 28, 1855, Boletin, September 29, 1855
"... estoy dispuesto a sostener al nuevo Gobierno si no se falsea el plan de
Ayutla . . . ;" "Verdadero Objeto, Caracter y Tendencias del Plan Politico de
Nuevo Leon," El Restaurador, August 11, 1855.

75

of the states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila under a single administra-
tion, with himself as chief executive. 28 It was this desire to incorporate
Coahuila into a permanent union with Nuevo Leon which led to a
direct conflict with the provisional president.

Governor Vidaurri preferred to have the movement for union
with Nuevo Leon to originate in Coahuila, and privately took steps to
assure such a movement. Francisco Vidaurri, a resident of Muzquiz,
Coahuila and a brother of the caudillo, proved to be a great assistance,
as did other relatives and friends in that area of northern Coahuila. 29
In Monclova and surrounding villages there was rather widespread
approval of the idea, especially after Vidaurri promised to send expedi-
tions to crush hostile Indian bands. 30 The newspapers in Monterey
published accounts of the growing demands throughout Coahuila for
a permanent union with Nuevo Leon. 31 Opponents of the scheme,
centered primarily in Saltillo, were identified with Santa Anna, and
branded as enemies of liberty. 32 Expressing confidence that all of the
good and honest people of Coahuila desired union, Vidaurri issued a
decree on February 19, 1856, which accomplished just that. He pro-
claimed that henceforth the region would be a single political unit,
the State of Nuevo Leon y Coahuila. 33

President Comonfort considered Vidaurri's action to be a threat

28 Vidaurri to Francisco Vidaurri y Borrego and D. Santiago del Valle, Sep-
tember 28, 1855, Corr. Par.

09 Francisco Vidaurri to Vidaurri, September 22, 1855, Corr. Par.; Marcial
Vidaurri to Vidaurri, December 19, 1855, Corr. Par. (Marcial Vidaurri is a
nephew of Santiago Vidaurri.)

30 Juan Long to Vidaurri, January 16, 1856, Corr. Par. (Long was also related
to Vidaurri by marriage.)

3i Boletin, October 1, 1855.

32 Marcial Vidaurri to Vidaurri, December 19, 1855, Corr. Par. (There was
some validity to the charge it was primarily a power struggle for the seat of
government.)

33 "Proclama del Gobernador del Estado de Nuevo Leon y Coahuila, Santiago
Vidaurri," Coleccion de Docnmentos para la Historia de Mexico, VII (de la
Segunda Serie.).

76

to the authority of the provisional government. 34 He rejected the decree
of unification, but attempted to maintain peaceful relations with the
caudillo. The President pointed out that the Plan of Ayutla recognized
Coahuila as a separate state, and affirmed that neither Vidaurri nor
the federal government could violate its sovereignty. He appealed to
the Governor to withdraw the decree. 35

Vidaurri, the champion of states' rights, did not intend to have
his own doctrine used against his scheme. He stated that his decree
had merely been in answer to the demands of the people of Coahuila.
The central question was not that of the size of a state or the seat of
its government, but the will of the people. 36 The Governor indicated
that the central authorities, in opposing his decree, stood as enemies
of liberty and the sacred right of the people of a state to choose their
own government. 37

By early May, 1856 the situation on the northern frontier was
tense. Political leaders in Saltillo who opposed unification took steps
to prevent its completion. Governor Vidaurri 's relatives in Coahuila
warned that hostilities with President Comonfort might bring defeat
for the caudillo in their state, and possibly in Nuevo Leon. 38 The
governor was aware of the dangers involved, and sent a delegation to
Mexico City to work out a peaceful settlement with the national au-
thorities. 39 The attempt at compromise, however, was unsuccessful, and

34 Joaquin Lopez Hermosa to Doblado, December 8, 1855, Documentor Ined'itos.
XXXI. (This document indicates that were still fears that Vidaurri might
establish the "Republic of Sierra Madre.")

35 D. Anselmo de la Portilla, Mejico en 1856 y 1857, Gob'ierno del General
Comonfort (New York: S. Hallet, 1858), 49.

36 Vidaurri to Juan Alvarez, April 27, 1856, Con. Par.

37 Vidaurri to Juan Jose de la Garza, May 28, 1856, Con. Par.

38 Francisco Vidaurri to Vidaurri, May 1, 1856, Con. Par. ". . . yo te
suplico a pesar del gran interes qe. tengo en la agregacion a Monterrey qe. no
Comprometas tu persona, ni tu reputacion pr. el negocido de anexacion, Sino
qe. no mas empleas su influyo pa. con tus amigos y qe. conserves siempre la
buenos relaciones de amistad qe. llevas con el Presidente de la Republica.";
Marcial Vidaurri to Vidaurri, May 2, 1856, Corr. Par.

39 Vidaurri to Encarnacion Alvarez, May 28, 1856, Con. Par.

77

by June open conflict seemed imminent. Vidaurri had no intention of
surrendering to the demands of Mexico City, but set about to prepare
for an attack. Additional military units were formed and equipped,
especially among the loyal towns of northern Coahuila. 40 At the same
time the governor increased his political attacks on the central govern-
ment, denouncing the federal taxes as a return to the policies of Santa
Anna, and a violation of the rights of sovereign states. 41

In June J. M. Lafragua, federal minister of war, declared that
Governor Vidaurri was in direct opposition to the policies and actions
of the nation. 42 He ordered that all arms and ammunitions be prevented
from entering the states of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. This order
brought an open break, for Vidaurri demanded the removal of Comon-
fort from his position as provisional president. The Governor charged
that national officials were attempting to force the people of Nuevo
Leon and Coahuila to serve as slaves in return for aid against hostile
Indians. 43 In response to these charges, Comonfort declared Vidaurri to
be in rebellion, and ordered him to resign from his position as governor
of both Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. 44 As might be expected, Vidaurri
refused, and expressed confidence that the armies of the frontier were
fully capable of resisting federal aggression. He was determined to
protect the liberties of the people and the rights of the sovereign
states. 45

In October, General Rosas Landa marched with a federal army
from San Luis Potosi to Saltillo. 46 At the same time, Juan Jose de la
Garza of Tamaulipas announced that he would support President Com-

to Juan Long to Vidaurri, July 21, 1856, Corr. Par.

A| Statement of Vidaurri, quoted in Necito de Zamacois, La historia de Mejico,

XIV, p. 263-

42 Lafragua to Vidaurri, July 5, 1856, Documentos que manifiestan los princi-
palis sucesos que precedieron el desconocimiento que el Sr. General D. Santiago
Vidaurri hizo, de la autoridad del Gobierno de la Republica, 1856.

43 "Proclama del Governador del Estado de Nuevo Leon y Coahuila, Santiago
Vidaurri Monterey Julio 12 de 1856," Coleccion de Documentos para la
Historia de Mexico, Vll (de la Segunda Serie).

44 Zamacois, La Historia de Mejico, XIV, p. 342.

45 Vidaurri to Juan Alvarez, July 3, 1856, and August 17, 1856, Corr. Par.

46 Vidaurri to Jose S. Aramberri, September 27, 1856, Corr. Par.; Aramberri to
Garza Gonzales and Garcia Rejon, October 26, 1856, Corr. Par.

"8

onfort in his confrontation with Vidaurri. 47 This placed hostile elements
on two of the flanks of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila. The Army of the
North, commanded by Colonel Juan Zuazua, moved to block the ad-
vance of Rosas Landa. At the same time a force from Tamaulipas struck
against Monterey, defeating a small outpost under the command of a
young officer named Mariano Escobedo. De la Garza placed Monterey
under siege, demanding its surrender by authority of the national gov-
ernment. Colonel Zuazua, however, marched back to the city and ex-
pelled the attacking force. 48 Fortunately for Vidaurri, the forces of
Rosas Landa had not coordinated their attack with those from Tam-
aulipas.

Monterey was still threatened by the federal army, moving down
from Saltillo. Rather than await attack in his own capital, Vidaurri
dispatched the Army of the North to intercept the enemy. Colonel
Zuazua encountered the federal army about mid- way between Monterey
and Saltillo, at a place called la Cuesta de los Muertos. A showdown
seemed imminent, but on November 18, 1856, Governor Vidaurri
signed a truce with the federal commander. The caudillo agreed to rec-
ognize the authority of President Comonfort, and to turn over the ad-
ministration of Nuevo Leon and Coahuila to a council of state until an
open election for governor could be held. He also agreed to submit the
question of annexation to a popular vote in Coahuila. In return, Rosas
Landa promised that the national government would grant a sum of
eight thousand pesos each month to the region for the renewal of cam-
paigns against the hostile Indians. The people of Monterey received
news of the peace with open rejoicing. In Mexico City Comonfort
gave his approval gladly, and the threat of war between the moderado
president and the northern caudillo seemed to have been averted. 49 On
the surface it seemed that Vidaurri was surrendering to the demands of
the central authority in exchange for federal aid. Other factors, how-

" Hermenegildo Davila, Biografia del Sr. General Don Juan Zuazua (Monter-
rey, 1892), 41.

*s Ibid., pp. 41-43.

49 Ibid., p. 43.

79

ever, explain why the strong man was so willing to accept this compro-
mise settlement.

Before open hostility between Comonfort and Vidaurri had raged
on the northern frontier delegates from all of the states of Mexico
gathered to frame a new national constitution. Puros tended to domi-
nate the convention, and viewed the Comonfort government with suspi-
cion. They were also advocates of a relatively weak central government,
with virtually independent states. 50 Vidaurri enjoyed a high prestige
among many of these delegates, and continually worked to convince
them that the question of Coahuila reflected the larger issue of liberal-
ism and rights of the individual states. 51 Needless to say, these argu-
ments also had an appeal to the many local and regional caudillos
throughout the nation who wished to preserve their positions. 32

During the fall of 1856 the constituent congress continued its de-
bates. Many delegates tended to favor the position of Vidaurri, and
to be quite critical of President Comonfort. On September 15, 1856,
the assembly voted sixty to twenty-four in favor of joining Coahuila
with Nuevo Leon. 53 This action by the assembly in Queretaro helps to
explain the willingness of Vidaurri to sign the truce with General
Rosas Landa two months later. Then, in January of 1857 the people of
Coahuila voted overwhelmingly in favor of joining with Nuevo Leon. 54
When the new national constitution was promulgated February 5, 1857,
one of the states listed by that fundamental law was that of Nuevo
Leon y Coahuila. 55

The combined state was firmly under the control of Santiago
Vidaurri. 56 In the name of liberalism and states' rights he had defied
the national government and had emerged triumphant. For the next
eight years he was to remain the most powerful individual on the nor-
thern frontier, and an untiring advocate of state sovereignty.

so Daniel Moreno, Los Hombres de la Reforma (Mexico, D. F., Ediciones Libro-
Mex., 1956), 49-53, 61.; Frank A. Knapp, Jr., "Parliamentary Government and
the Mexican Constitution of 1857: A Forgotten Phase of Mexican Political
History," Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol 33 (February, 1953),
65-80.; Walter V. Scholes, "El Liberalismo Reformista," Historia Mexicana,
II (Julio, 1952 - Junio, 1953), 342-352.; Zarco, Historia del Congreso Estraor-
dinario, I, 31.

so

si Vidaurri to Juan Alvarez, July 3, 1856, Corr. Par.; Zarco, Historia del Con-
greso Estraordinario, 273-278, 344-345, 353-354, 508.

52 Antonio Aguado to Manuel Doblado, May 21, 1856, Documentos Ineditos,
XXXI.

53 Zarco, Historia del Congreso Estraordinario, II, pp. 310-311.

s* El Restaurador de la Libertad, January 23, 1857. (The vote was 4056 for an-
nexation and only 260 against.)

55 Zarco, Historia del Congreso Estraordinario, II, p. 910, p. 1001.

56 El Restaurador, March 13, 1857. (His popularity was demonstrated Decem-
ber 27, 1856, when he was voted back into office by a substantial majority.
Future elections were to sustain his power.)

81

COMONFORT:
MISUNDERSTOOD REFORMER

By Ray F. Broussard*

Ignacio Comonfort, President of Mexico during the early years
of the Mexican Reform, first achieved national prominence as one of
the leaders of the Revolution of Ayutla, which overthrew Antonio
Lopez de Santa Anna and exiled him from Mexico for the last time.
Although second in command under General Juan Alvarez, the old
hero of the War of Independence, Comonfort was really guiding force
behind the military strategy and was generally accepted as the author
of the Plan de Ayutla.^

While relatively unknown to the general public before this time,
Comonfort had developed a reputation in government circles for per-
sonal integrity and for able progressive administration. He was associ-
ated with the moderate wing of the Liberal Party, which had admini-
stered the country in the interval between the end of the Mexican War
and the dictatorship of Santa Anna. 2

Of particular importance to Comonfort's and Mexico's political
future was his almost uncanny ability as a mediator and concilator. If
there is any central factor in his character, it is this optimistic faith
that he could settle almost any conflict which might arise. He believed
that in the final analysis all men had his own unswerving partiotism
and would be willing to compromise for the good of the country.

The question was whether a sufficient number of men of good
will would be prepared to sacrifice their vested interests, particularly

-Department of History, The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia

i Felipe Tena Ramirez, "Comonfort, los moderados y la Revolucion de Ayutla,"
in Mario de la Cueva et. ah, Plan de Ayutla (Mexico City: Facultad de Derecho,
Universidad Nacional Autonomo Mexicano, 1954), pp. 298-299.

2 Ray F. Broussard, "Mocedades de Comonfort," in Historia Mexicana, XIII,
pp. 386-390.

82

since it was not at ail clear in anyone's mind exactly what was good
for the country. Was the status quo of the conservatives, or the com-
pletely new order demanded by the doctrinaire liberals better? Comon-
fort could get along with either, but really wished for a little of both.
Progress yes, but slow evolutionary progress as typified by the slogan
of the moderados, "libertad y orden." 3

Comonfort's political manifesto written after he had left the presi-
dency catches his spirit of moderation. Writing of public opinion at the
end of the Revolution of Ayutla, he stated, "The country wished for
order, but not despotism; liberty, not license; reform, but not de-
struction; progress but not violence . . ."*

It must not be assumed, however, that Comonfort had no firm
political opinions of his own and was willing to adopt whatever stand
he believed the majority desired. There is inserted in the preamble of
the Plan d Ayutla the statement that "Liberal institutions were the
only ones which were suitable to the nation." 5 Such an indefinite state-
ment could easily be misinterpreted, but it is evident from his subse-
quent actions while president that Comonfort intended to put into effect
traditional liberal reforms such as guarantees of personal lib-
erty, economic freedom for individuals, and limitation of the size of
the army as well as the power of the clergy. 6

Once the revolution had triumphed and the dictatorship was over-
thrown there was a rush to fill the political vacuum. Conservatives
were confident that they would be able to dominate any situation and
were eager to preserve the status quo, while on the other hand exiles
such as Melchor Ocampo, Ponciano Arriaga and Benito Juarez hurried
home to guide the course of the revolution and to insure that it would

3 Ignacio Comonfort, Politica del General Comonfort in Anselmo de Portilla,
Mejico en 1856 y 1857 (New York: Hallet & Co., 1858), p. 373; Cueva (ed.)
Plan de Ayutla, pp. 290-291.

t Comonfort, Politica del General Comonfort, pp. 373-375.

5 Plan de Ayutla in Francisco Zarco, Historia del Congreso Constttuyente. 1856-
1857 (Mexico City: Colegio de Mexico, 1956), pp. 7-12.

*> Vicente Riva Palacio (ed) Mexico, a traves de los siglos, V. pp. 78-79.

83

become a genuine liberal movement. 7 If Comonfort's philosophy of
government were to work he would have to steer a middle course be-
tween these two extremes. That his intentions were sincere is evident,
but that his political skill was not up to the task is also lamentably
apparent. Yet one cannot wonder if under the same circumstances whe-
ther any other leader could have succeeded where Comonfort failed.

Limitation of time and space will make it necessary to confine
this paper to one or two examples of Comonfort's policy which serve
to illustrate the manner in which his moderate method of rule succeeded
or failed under differing sets of circumstances. The first example
concerns the position of the military in the new Post-Ayutla revolution-
ary society. To the conservative, the army with all of its traditional
privileges was the very foundation upon which an orderly society
could be built. Any attack against the military or its privileges was an
attack against the very fibre of society.

On the other hand, the liberals believed that the military estab-
lishment was exactly what was wrong with the old order, therefore it
had to be eliminated before any other basic reforms could take place.
The security of the nation could then be protected by citizen-soldier
National Guard units which would be under the control of the state
governors.

Comonfort's position was somewhere between the two ideas here
presented. He was a reserve officer, a member of the military estab-
lishment and believed that some type of force was necessary to pre-
serve order. On the other hand, as a moderate liberal, he was just as
firmly convinced that the old regime of special privilege had to go.
As he put it, he wished to preserve what was good in the old order by
reforming it. When he arrived in Mexico City in October of 1855 and
took command of the army he addressed its members in the following
manner,

I have come ... to begin the difficult task of reforming
the abuses which resulted from the indiscreet attempts to glori-

7 Jorge Tamayo (ed.) Benito Juarez: Documentos, discursos y correspondencia
(2 vols., Mexico City: Secretaria de Patromino Nacional) I, pp. 183-185.

84

fy the army and which have stained your good name and
dishonored the institution. The soldiers of a republic are
not, nor could not, be the praetorian guards of a despot.
Citizens: like other sons of the Mexican family, you have
rights to exercise, and duties to perform and you can neither
give up the one nor forget the other. 8

The clash came early during the Administration of President
Alvarez. The puros or extreme liberals, led by Melchor Ocampo domi-
nated the cabinet of the revolutionary administration, except for Com-
onfort who served as Minister of War. 9 Ocampo and the liberals im-
mediately drew up plans to dismantle the army.

Comonfort, who had in effect commenced a moderate program
of reform by drastically reducing the size of the army by ordering
the organization of locally controlled National Guard units was
alarmed. 10 To eliminate the standing army at one stroke, was too much
for him. He objected vigorously and precipitated a cabinet crisis. The
argument was over methods, not objectives. Both sides wished to
reform the army, but Comonfort wished a gradual reform while the
puros felt that it should be done all at once if it would ever be accomp-
lished. But Comonfort had the power, and by the time the affair was
settled, Ocampo had resigned and Comonfort had his way, the army
was to be subject to gradual reforms but was not to be dismantled. 1

Comonfort' s defense of the military against the attacks of the
puros brought him to the attention of the conservatives. They had at
first believed him to be a liberal, particuarly after his initial reforms.

3 Riva Palacio (ed.) Mexico a traves de los siglos, V. pp. 79.

9 Clyde Bushnell, "The Military and Political Career of Juan Alvarez, 1790-
1867," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1958), p. 295.

10 Manuel Dublin and Jose Maria Lozano, Legislation mexicano o colecion com-
pleta de las disposiciones expedias desde la independencia de la republica.
(Mexico: Imprenta del Comercio de Dublan y Chavez, 1877), VII, pp. 568-573,
585, 586.

' Bushnell, "Juan Alvarez," 297; Melchor Ocampo, Obras Completas (3 vols.,
Mexico: F. Velasquez, 1900-1901), II, p. 102; Melchor Ocampo to Valentin
Gomez Farias, November 3, 1855, Gomez Farias Papers, folder 58 Latin Ameri-
can Collection, University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas.

85

but when he came out publicly in defense of the army he become
their knight in shining armor. He would save them by tilting with the
potential despoilers of their wealth and prestige. They so misread the
actions of Comonfort that they even began to demand that the Minister
of War overthrow Provisional President Alvarez and establish a con-
servative dictatorship. 12

Meanwhile, Minister of Justice Benito Juarez issued his famous
Ley ]uarez, an edict which would eliminate the fueros or special privi-
leges of the clergy and the military. 13 The conservatives, looking to
Comonfort for support, attacked the measure and renewed their de-
mands that he overthrow the presidency. They were to be disappointed,
however, for Comonfort refused to follow their advice. IA

Their expectations rose, nevertheless, when Alvarez retired and
named Comonfort to replace him as Substitute President on Decem-
ber 11, 1 8 5 5 . ' 5 Once again, the conservatives were not to realize their
dreams, however, for one of the first acts of the new President was to
issue the edict which put the Ley Juarez into effect. 116

Disconcerted and chagrined, the conservatives belatedly realized
that they had misunderstood Comonfort's defense of the army against
the attacks of the puros. His promulgation of the Ley ]uarez proved
he was a liberal who favored reform and for this the conservatives
never forgave him. While they had clamored for him to replace Alva-
rez the previous November, they now began to plot to overthrow his
government by force and continued as his inflexible enemies until he
was finally toppled from power.

Another cardinal principle of the doctrinaire liberals was their
anticlericalism. In their estimation, the backwardness of Mexico was

13 La Sociedad. December 1, 2, 3, 1855.

13 Ley Juarez, in Tamayo (ed.) Juarez, documentos, II, pp. 98-115.

i* L. Ghilardi to Ignacio Comonfort, Mexico, November 11, 1855, Comonfort
Papers, folder 23B. University of Texas Library, Austin, Texas.

is Lucas de Palacio y Margola to Ignacio Comonfort, Mexico, December 10,
1855; Juan Alvarez to Lucas de Palacio y Magarola, Mexico, December 8, 1855,
both letters located in Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

I* Dublan and Lozano, Legislation mexicana, VIII, p. 10.

86

caused by the dominance of the Catholic Church over politics, econo-
mics, and society in general. For progress to take place, they reasoned,
the political and economic power of the Church had to be broken.

On the other hand, Comonfort was no anticlerical. While pro-
fessing to be a liberal, he had a genuine trust and admiration for the
position of the Church and enjoyed the personal friendship of many
high ranking clergymen. He could understand better than most liberals
the important part the Church had played in the past. Yet, he was
also of the opinion that certain reforms were necessary. 17

Once again, his ideas are best expressed in his own words.

That the influence of the clergy in politics was a ne-
cessity in other times, and a good thing for society; that the
history of the Catholic clergy is the history of civilization and
that Mexico owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the Mexi-
can clergy are facts which history cannot deny . . . But that
times have changed, and with them the nature of this in-
fluence, and that equal changes have taken place in public
opinion on this question is also a fact which cannot be hidden
from anyone who studies the development of ideas in our
country or the character of Mexican revolutions. The influence
of the clergy is [now] considered pernicious both for religion
and for society; and their riches and privileges are the occasion
of great alarm, of formidable temptations and even the reason
for deep hatreds. ,te

Gradually, in spite of his reluctance to offend the Church, the
President was forced by circumstances to take a harsher stand against
it. Each act of his was met by greater defiance on the part of the clergy
until he was virtually forced into anticlericalism. The process began
with the promulgation of the Ley Juarez early in 1856. This led to a
large-scale rebellion in Puebla. In the process of putting down this
counter-revolution, Comonfort discovered that members of the clergy

17 Tamayo (ed.) Juarez, documentos, I, pp. 205-206, II, p. 143; Riva Palacio
(ed.) Mexico a traves de los siglos, V. p. 108.

!8 Comonfort, Politica del General Comonfort, pp. 376-377.

87

in Puebla had contributed Church funds to it. 19 As punishment, the
President levied an indemnity against the income-producing properties
of the diocese of Puebla. 20 When Bishop Pelagio Antonio de Labastida
y Davalos objected and when his objections continued the President
ordered him exiled from the country.?" Yet, while he was engaged
in this controversy there was still warm and friendly relations between
President Comonfort and Archbishop Lazaro de la Garza of Mexico
City. This apparently close friendship between the President and the
Archbishop disturbed the extreme liberals who could not understand
how a man could be anticlerical with the Bishop of Puebla and pro-
clerical with the Archbishop of Mexico City. In essence, Comonfort
earned the hatred of the conservatives for his punishment of the
Puebla clergy while at the same time he was the object of growing
mistrust by the liberals who misunderstood his relationship with the
Archbishop.

Other reforms followed rapidly. Comonfort issued an edict which
refused the protection of civil law for the enforcement of monastic
vows and then allowed the Congress to expell the Jesuits. 2 ' 2 But the
bombshell was the Ley Lerdo, drafted by Minister of Finance Miguel
Lerdo de Tejada. The edict provided that all ecclesiastical property not
being used for religious purposes was to be placed on sale. 1 ? 3 The mea-
sure was expected to increase the amount of taxable property and also
to make it possible for landless farmers to acquire agricultural holdings.
However well intentioned it may have been it did not achieve its desired

19 Ignacio Comonfort to Santiago Vidaurri, Mexico, January 6, 1856, Vidaurri
Correspondence in Archivo General del Estado, Monterrey, N.L.

20 Sigh XIX, April 2, 1856.

2i J. de Portilla, Episodio historico del gobierno dictatorial de Sr. Ignacio Com-
onfort en la Republica mexicana, anos, de 1856-1857 (Mexico: I. Cumplido,
1861), p. 57, p. 60n; Portilla, Mejico en 1856 y 1857.

22 La Sociedad, March 4, 1856; Dublan and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana,
VIII, p. 190.

23 Dublin and Lozano, Legislacion mexicana, VIII, 197-201; Manuel Siliceo
to Manuel Doblado, Mexico, June 25, 1856, in Genaro Garcia (ed.) Docu-
mentos ineditos o muy raros para la historio de Mexico, XXXI, pp. 210-211;
Walter V. Scoles, "A Revolution Falters," Hispanic American Historical Review,
XXXII (February, 1952), p. 2.

88

results because the property sold generally went to increase the holdings
of already wealthy landlords.

The promulgation of the Ley her do, June 25, 1856, coming at
a time when the President was engaged in a fierce struggle with the
members of the Constituent Congress, was a great help to Comonfort.
Suddenly the atmosphere changed. Liberal members of Congress who
only days before had been calling for his impeachment now cheered
him with enthusiasm.

The conservative reaction to the Ley Lerdo was vigorous indeed.
An alliance was forged between members of the military furious over
the Ley ]uarez and the clergy, angry over the Ley Lerdo. Plots and
conspiracies increased in number. One such plot was discovered in the
San Francisco monastery right in the center of Mexico City. A surprise
raid by police caught several friars and military officials red handed.
Comonfort ordered the officers exiled and the monastery suppressed.
Then he ordered that a street be cut through the monaster} 7 grounds. 24

Thus it would seem that by the summer of 1856, Comonfort had
earned his spurs as an anticlerical. His frequent visits to the Archbishop
were discontinued, particularly after that venerable churchman openly
attacked the Ley Lerdo. 25 Yet, at the same time that he was cutting
streets through monastery grounds, expelling Jesuits, exiling bishops
and forcing the sale of Church property, he was leading an attack in
the Constituent Congress against the proposed Article 1 5 of the Consti-
tution which would have allowed religious toleration. The President
was convinced that this was contrary to the wishes of the majority of
the people. After a strenuous fight, the article was defeated and the
final version of the Constitution of 1857 did not contain it. 26

Once again, however, his intentions were misunderstood by the
liberals. Quick to jump to conclusions, the liberals who had cheered

24 Riva Palacio (ed.) Mexico a (raves de los siglos, V. p. 184.

25 Ibid., pp. 159-160; Comonfort to Joaquin M
1856, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

26 Zarco, Congreso Cortstituyente, pp. 548-689.

25 Ibid., pp. 159-160; Comonfort to Joaquin Moreno, Tacubaya, September 26,
1856, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.

89

him for the promulgation of the Ley Lerdo now condemned him for
his opposition to Article 15.

The reformist policies of Comonfort with regard to the military
and the Church were successful. In spite of opposition from both
extremes he managed to put his policies into effect, and eventually both
of these reforms were incorporated into the Constitution of 1857. It
was this very constitution, however, and Comonfort's attitude toward it,
which was to be the cause of the failure of his policy of middle-of-the-
road moderate reform.

The new constitution was completed and published early in 1857. 27
It was considered a terrible blow by conservatives. The Church threw
its weight into the fight and declared that any Catholic swearing allegi-
ance to the document would be excommunicated. 28 In spite of such
opposition, however, the constitution was put into effect and Comon-
fort was elected president under its provisions in September of 1857. 29

While serving as Provisional President, Comonfort had enjoyed
full emergency powers as authorized by the Plan de Ayutla. Using these
powers to best advantage, he had held off conservative attacks while
Congress drafted the constitution which had been promised the country
by the Plan de Ayutla. In addition to this he also used his position to
begin a progressive program for the reconstruction of the country. Now
as constitutional president he found the traditional liberal restrictions
upon a strong executive tended to make it impossible for him to cope
with the underlying element of instability during his administration.
That element was the constantly recurring military uprisings. 30

27 Ignacio Comonfort to Joaquin Moreno, Mexico, February 18, 1857, Comon-
fort Papers, folder 17.

28 Riva Palacio (ed.) Mexico a traves de los sighs, V, 228; Wilfred H. Call-
cott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford, Calfornia, 1931), pp. 4-12.

29 Certification of the election of Ignacio Comonfort, Comonfort Papers, folder
17; Sigh XIX, September 17, 1857.

so Niceto de Zamacois, Historio de Mejico, desde sus tiempos mas remotos
hasta nuestros dias ... (23 vols., Mexico: F. J. Farres, 1878-1902), XIV,
493-494; Sigh XIX, August 29, 1857; Raymond C. Wheat, Francisco Zarco,
portavoz de la Rejorma (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1957), pp. 180-181.

90

Realizing this problem, Comonfort asked Congress for emergency
powers in order to combat the conservative rebellions which had in-
creased in number since the constitution had gone into effect. The
powers were granted, though reluctantly, by liberal deputies who had
used the occasion to heap abuse and criticism upon the President. 31

In November of 1857, a group of his closest friends representing
the moderate wing of the Liberal Party advised the President to stage
a golpe de estado and carry on his program of moderate, progressive
reform as a provisional president once more. Comonfort, however, re-
jected their advice and insisted on working to save the country by con-
stitutional methods. 3 - 2

Attempting to salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation, Comon-
fort prepared a list of amendments to the constitution which would
strengthen his position. When these were presented to Congress the lib-
eral outcry against him was tremendous. By their attitude and actions the
extreme liberals implied that Comonfort was rejecting the constitution
and had no wish to abide by it. 33 Once again they were misinterpreting
the President's motives.

Then with terrifying swiftness the rug was virtually jerked out
from under Comonfort. His most loyal supporters, the Zuoaga Bri-
gade, the force which formed the nucleus for the defense of Mexico
City, pronounced against the constitution with the Vlan de Tacubaya
on December 17, 1857. 3A

The President was now forced to examine his position carefully.
The conservatives had opposed him since Leyes Juarez and Lerdo of the
previous year. At the same time there was vociferous opposition by
the extreme liberals in the Congress who could not stomach Comon-

3i Dublin and Lozano, Legislation mexicana, VIII, pp. 644-645; Portilla
Mejico en 1856 y 1857, pp. 274-279, 285; Comonfort, Politica del General Com-
onfort, p. 386.

32 Manuel Payno, Memoria sobre la revolution de diclembre de 1857 y enero
de 1858 (Mexico: I. Cumplido, I860), pp. 8-26, 59-62.

33 Felipe Buenrostro, Historia del primer Congreso Constitutional de la Re-
publica mexicana que junciono en el ano de 1857 (2 vols. Mexico: I. Cumplido,
1874), I, 235-236.

34 Siglo XIX, December 17, 1857.

91

fort's moderate policies. Now, the President's main group of supporters,
the moderados, apparently had deserted him for the Plan de Tacubaya
and were urging him to join them in overthrowing the Constitution of
1857. Thus, Comonfort made the fateful decision to join what appeared
to be a moderate coup. He felt that with the continued support of the
moderates he might be able to crush the counter-revolution of the con-
servatives and still carry forward his program for the progress of the
country. He signed the document with the bitter words, "I have changed
the title of President for that of a miserable revolutionary." 35

All was not as it seemed, however. The supposedly moderate
Tacubaya coup was merely a facade for a conservative movement. Once
again the conservatives had misunderstood Comonfort. They had
assumed that if he sided with the Zuloaga Brigade against the Consti-
tution of 1857 he must in essence be repudiating his ideas of liberal
reform and would soon repeal the Ley Juarez and the Ley Lerdo. To
compound the confusion, their cheers of triumph at having won over
Comonfort to their side were loud enough to convince many moderates
that this was exactly what had happened. For this reason the moderates
misunderstood Comonfort's motives in supporting the Plan de Tacubaya
and refused to support his provisional government. Instead they joined
ranks with the extreme liberals in support of the Constitution.

It was soon evident to the conservatives that Comonfort had no
intention of abandoning his program of moderate reform. On Janu-
ary 11, 1858, the Mexico City garrison staged another coup and de-
clared against the provisional government of Comonfort. 36

The end came swiftly. Comonfort's dwindling forces were soon
defeated by the conservatives, and the Hero of Ayutla, who had tri-
umphantly entered Mexico City the head of a victorious revolution
against reaction and dictatorship, now left the same city two years later
defeated by that same reaction. As he departed he was a target for

35 Manifesto of Comonfort to the Nation, Comonfort Papers, folder 17.; Com-
onfort, Politka del General Comonfort, pp. 387-388; Payno, Memoria, pp. 83-84.

36 Payno, Memona, pp. 89-96, 100-104; Comonfort, Politica del General Com-
onfort, pp. 387-389; Portilla, Mejico en 1856 y 1857, pp. 292-293, 297, 300-303.
306.

92

abusive and bitter criticism hurled at him by the very people he had
striven so earnestly to serve. 37

With the flight of the moderating force which had held them at
bay now, the forces of liberalism now united under the banner of the
Constitution of 1857, and the conservatives with their cry of "religion
y fueros" (religion and privileges) could now begin Mexico's inevitable
conflict. The blood bath known as the War of the Reform, which would
settle which of the two political philosophies would soon decide the
course of Mexico's destiny.

37 Payno, Memoria, 107-113; Description of events of January 20, 1858, Com-
onfort Papers, folder 17; Melchor Alvarez, Historia documentada de la vida
del Gral. Jose Justo Alvarez; o la verdad sobre algumos acontecimientos de im-
portanc'ta de la Guerra de Rejorma, (Mexico: El Tiempo. 1905), 67, 70-74;
Siglo XIX, January 21, 1858.

93

COMMENTARY ON MEXICO'S
ENIGMATIC CAUDILLOS

By Stanley R. Ross*

Although some of my colleagues might differ with me, I have
and continue to believe quite strongly that the "biographical" approach
in the sense of a study of key personalities and their relationship
to their times and events affords a very useful insight to historical
development. This method seems particularly appropriate in Latin
American history in which the role of the individual leader and the
highly personalized following he attracts has loomed so large and
influential. The very concept of the "caudillo" makes consideration
of the character, motives and action of the individual leader of the
utmost importance.

With variations of degree, our authors have focused on three indi-
vidual leaders. We may all discover on reflection that we have been
operating under false colors. This session was entitled "Mexico's
Enigmatic Caudillos." Cortes, Vidaurri and Comonfort have been
described and evaluated from a variety of points of view. They have
not been regarded, by defenders or critics, as puzzling or perplexing.
And our authors have sought to refine, revise or add dimension and
understanding to our view of their subjects.

For the investigator to develop some feeling toward his biographi-
cal subject hopefully after investigation is to be anticipated. In
most instances, this feeling tends to be one of partiality and sympathy,
although occasionally a subject may be viewed unsympathetically. All
of our essayists demonstrate a degree of partiality for their subject from
mild admiration to the fullsome praise of the indomitable Cortes pre-
sented by Colonel Page.

Our first author emphasized Cortes' bravery, courage and determi-
nation. I only regret that he did not give as much attention to the
conqueror's constructive labors for Cortes was a builder as well as a

*Dean, State University of New York at Stony Brook

94

conqueror. Our speaker's story of the finding of Cortes' remains,
while accurate, leaves the impression of happenstance. Actually, it was
in the 19th Century that the distinguished historian and leading con-
servative, Lucas Alaman, noted in the introduction of his multi- volume
history, the general location of the conqueror's remains. However, it
was at the time that Eulalia Guzman was creating a considerable stir
with the recovery of what were purported to be the remains of Cuauh-
temoc that conservative elements balanced the scales with the "dis-
covery" of Cortes' resting place.

Colonel Page is quite correct when he relates that Cortes has not
persisted as a father image and this in a land where the father image
is vital. Who can forget General Guadalupe Sanchez' telegram to
Carranza as the latter prepared to flee from Mexico City in the fateful
month of May, 1920: "President and Father If there is but one who
is loyal to you, I am that man." There are compelling reasons why,
as Colonel Page notes, Cortes remains an alien, the stranger. For much
of its history, Mexico has been struggling to liquidate the institutional
and other remains of the conquest and this has been particularly
true of the Revolution beginning in 1910. Under these circumstances,
the fate of the key Spanish conqueror was inevitable. In this spirit, one
must view Diego Rivera's portrait of the malformed Cortes which he
argued was based on medical examination and scientific measurements
of the remains. The late Erna Fergusson told me of standing and
watching a Mexican army colonel studying intently the new Cortes
painted on the wall overlooking a patio of the National Palace. When
she asked the Mexican officer what he thought of the new Cortes, he
replied: "I wouldn't send that bobo into the barrios to handle the
cbamacos."

Several other matters discussed by Colonel Page are worthy of
mention and some comment. He refers to Cortes' first loyalty being
that to the Governor of Cuba at least until the landing on the coast
of Veracruz. However, the relationship had been altered earlier when
Governor Velazquez endeavored to stop Cortes from sailing and to
remove him from command of the expedition and Cortes hastened to
sail before the Governor's change of heart could be translated into
action.

95

In his discussion of sources, Colonel Page gives due importance
to Cortes' own letters and Bernal Diaz del Castillo's "True History"
(the true version of which has only been available in this century)
which was intended as an answer to Gomara's writings. The former,
our author correctly appraises as an effort to impress the Spanish rulers
and to vindicate his conduct. While the strong religious sense noted
certainly was part of the spirit of the conqueror, this, too, represented
Cortes' shrewd sense in his appeal to their Catholic Majesties as well
as a reflection of his appreciation of the role of religion as an effective
element in the process of conquest and subjugation.

I regret that Colonel Page did not bring into his balance sheet the
views of more modern biographers of Cortes H. M. Robinson and
H. D. Sedgwick writers on the Spanish conquerors generally I. B.
Richmond and J. Descola and that chronicler and defender of the
rise of the Spanish Empire Salvador de Madariaga. And for a view
of the conqueror and the conquest from an entirely different perspective,
reference might be made to Miguel Leon Portilla's The Broken Spears
the Aztec account of the conquest of Mexico.

Turning to Dr. Moseley's paper on Santiago Vidaurri, I realize that
there may be some who would question the appropriateness of a "damn
Yankee" from New York presuming to evaluate what an Alabaman has
said about states' rights in front of an Atlanta audience even if the
states' rights in question refer to nineteenth century Mexico. While
conceding that there is basis to the view of Vidaurri as a strong man
interested in power, our speaker feels that this oversimplifies the case
and tends to obscure the career of a powerful regional leader.

Before turning to the major thesis, I should comment on a few
details involved in this paper which is well buttressed in contemporary
documentary materials. It is true that the Revolt of Ayutla was primarily
an assault against a dictatorship, but the liberal leaders did use the
effort to overthrow Santa Anna as a stalking horse for the Reform
movement. While one can argue as Dr. Moseley does that Vidaurri's
victories in the north helped bring about Santa Anna's collapse, it
might be equally convincingly advanced that Santa Anna's preoccupa-
tion elsewhere facilitated Vidaurri's ability to gain control in his state.

96

In the text of his paper, our author identifies the Saltillo opponents
of the Nuevo Leon and Coahuila merger as associated with Santa Anna,
but in his note he clarifies this by noting that labeling could reflect the
jaundiced view of the source a Vidaurri adherent and relative. His
revisionist explanation of the reasons behind Vidaurri's acceptance of
a truce with the central government in November, 1856 is very con-
vincing.

In many ways, Vidaurri is the epitome of the regional caudillo
with strong local support and persuasive principles to justfy his conduct,
our speaker clearly recognizes the self-serving nature of Vidaurri's pro-
claimed principles and rallying cries will of the people, liberty, self-
determination of local government and states' sovereignty. However, if
Vidaurri is to stand as more than a regional caudillo even conceding
a man of certain principles, then one must ask where did he stand on
the liberal concepts of the day other than states' rights? What were his
relations with the liberal theorists on these issues? Under the circum-
stances, I find tantalizing the concluding sentence describing Vidaurri
as remaining during the succeeding eight years as "the most powerful
individual on the northern frontier and an untiring advocate of state
sovereignty." While it is beyond the defined limits of the paper pre-
sented, I would wonder whether our author would consider Vidaurri's
support of Maximilian as consistent with his past and his principles. I
hope it will not be considered impolitic to reiterate that with the col-
lapse of the Second Empire, Vidaurri was executed for treason.

In another well-documented paper, Professor Broussard views
Ignacio Comonfort as a moderate, conciliatory man of good will, guided
or misguided by an optimistic view of other men's natures. Our
author is sympathetic, but confesses that his subject's political skill was
not up to his sincerity as he endeavored to steer a middle course through
contemporary extremes. I do not question the course Comonfort en-
deavored to steer amid extremist shoals nor that he had the best of
intentions. However, it is at best hazardous to rely too heavily on a
subject's own protestations and public avowals of high ideals.

For me it is difficult to reconcile Comonfort's adherence to the
preamble of the Plan of Ayutla with its commitment to liberal institu-
tions with the author's correct appraisal that his subject could get along

97

with either the status quo of the conservatives or the new order de-
manded by the liberals, but preferred a little of both. It is equally diffi-
cult to reconcile his issuance of or association with key liberal edicts
and his act of joining the efforts of the signers of the Plan of Tacubaya
to overthrow the liberal Constitution of 1857 a terrible miscalculation
of both the the character of the movement and the consequences of his
action.

It does seem that Professor Broussard is correct in noting that
many of Comonfort's positions and actions were forced by circumstances
and a reflection of the pressure of others. Or, perhaps, it might be
better expressed in another way. Comonfort, a moderate, was out of
tune with the dominant extremisms of his times. His efforts, granted
Mexico's past history and the irreconcilable positions of the contending
forces, could only serve as flimsy, delaying restraint as the Mexican
body politic rushed to a bloody resolution of its differences. Under
such circumstances, the consequences were predictable as the apostle
of moderation successively disenchanted both extremes and failed in his
fundamental purpose.

These papers are important from two points of view. They repre-
sent serious scholar efforts which have placed the men and events
studied in new light and have given us new understanding. As such,
they represent important pieces in our efforts to recreate and compre-
hend the history of our neighbor to the south. They also help to explain
the continued vitality and importance of the Southeast Conference on
Latin American Studies. I have very much enjoyed being here to hear
and comment I hope constructively on their efforts.

98

FARQUHAR: ECONOMIC

STATESMAN IN AMAZONIA

AND SOUTH BRAZIL

By Charles A. Gauld*

Percival Farquhar (1864-1953), a magnetic Pennsylvania Quaker,
was by far the most forceful titan of development in Brazil from 1905
until 1952. At the height of his power in 1912, after investing
$175,000,000 of private European capital, he was feared in Rio de
Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Montevideo as a new Cecil Rhodes, an im-
perialistic octopus menacing national sovereignty. Again from 1920
to 1939 rabidly nationalistic foes, whom he considered to be "semi-
Moorish," attacked Farquhar's $80,000,000 Itabira iron ore export
project as a threat to the sovereignty of Brazil. By 1949, his fortune
and influence gone, Farquhar was decorated by Brazil as an economic
elder statesman whose plans the government was trying belatedly to
execute.

The last of a titan breed, Farquhar was better educated and
trained than such self-made tycoons as Vanderbilt, Carnegie, Ford and
Rockefeller. Farquhar obtained a degree in engineering at Yale in
1884. In 1887 he was admitted to the bar in New York City after
reading law in the offices of the father of John Dos Passos, author
of several recent books on vast, varied Brazil. In 1898-1904, Farquhar
got his start by promoting the electrification of the horsecars of Havana
and constructing the Cuba Railroad that opened the eastern half of
Cuba to development. He negotiated with President Manuel Estrada
Cabrera of Guatemala for completion of the Guatemala Railway and
obtained a grant of 50,000 acres of future banana lands for Minor C.
Keith of United Fruit.

In 1904 Farquhar persuaded Fred S. Pearson, genius of the electric
and transit systems of New York, Havana and Mexico City, and Pear-
son's Canadian financial associates to raise $3,000,000. Farquhar and

-Department of History and Geography, Miami-Dade Junior College

99

his Wall Street associates raised $2,000,000. Together with Sir Alex-
ander Mackenzie, manager for Canadian capitalists of the new (1899)
Sao Paulo Tramway, Light Power Co., Farquhar formed the Rio de
Janeiro Tramway, Light & Power Co. Farquhar had to frighten his
and Pearson's reluctant backers into action by telling them that Rio's
rich young Guinle brothers were about to act. Guilherme Guinle brashly
told Farquhar in Rio in 1905 that he would suffer severely for having
decided to make Brazil his oyster. As the decades passed, the prophecy
proved correct. Ronald Hilton has written that the spirit of Gotter-
dammerung hangs over the epic of the last great American entrepreneur
in Latin America. 1

The life of Farquhar is virtually a cross-section of the history of
Brazil in the first half of the twentieth Century. 2 There he met every
president, countless cabinet ministers, directors of the National De-
partments of Transport and Public Works, and leaders in law, geology,
engineering and politics. It was easy for Farquhar's representatives
to bribe a sizable percentage of the tiny oligarchy. Without generous
bribery, nothing important can be accomplished in tropical lands. This
has apparently been the experience of all major foreign enterprises in
the incurably corrupt Latin lands, according to the former associates
of Farquhar whom the writer has interviewed. As a Quaker, Farquhar
avoided direct contact with bribery.

Farquhar first saw Brazil in 1905 from a liner bearing him from
Europe. In his pocket were titles to all the public utilities of Rio. From
far out at sea he saw Rio's granite guardians Sugar Loaf, Corcovado
and in the mountains behind Rio the reclining figure of a giant. Every
year since 1905, Farquhar quipped in 1952, some visiting writer has
enthusiastically asserted that Giant Brazil has finally awakened. But
the Giant regularly resumes his siesta. To his surprise, Farquhar saw
that Rio, whose population then was about 720,000, lacked docks. In
1911 he used French capital to acquire all he beheld in Rio's emerging

1 Ronald Hilton in the book review section of Hispanic American Report, Stan-
ford University, March 1964, p. 92.

2 Charles A. Gauld, The Last Titan: Percival Farquhar, American Entrepreneur
in Latin America. (Stanford, Calif., Institute of Hispanic American & Luso-
Brazilian Studies, 1964.) 427 pp.

100

port district where British contractors were making a fill, seawall and
warehouses such as Farquhar was to complete in 1912 in Belem. Rio in
1905 was a city with possibly 120 automobiles and 250 Americans. The
2,000 Britons were the preeminent foreigners until Britain was bled
white in World War 1.3

Among Farquhar's first acts with Mackenzie was to reorganize
the crude little telephone company he had acquired in Berlin. He re-
placed the undependable male operators with young women after con-
vincing their parents that they would not lose their virtue and chance
to marry. Then he had the phone book list subscribers by last names
instead of in the manner of Portugal, by first names. Early in 1906
the telephone building burned. Farquhar bought the only United
States emergency switchboard. The day after it left New York for Rio
on a freighter, San Francisco tried to get it after its fire.

In 1906 Farquhar was told by Rio's foremost editor, Jose Carlos
Rodrigues, who had spent the 1870's in journalism in New York and
had become a Protestant, that it might take Brazil centuries to over-
come its ignorance, superstition and defects of character. 4 The suc-
cessor to Rodrigues as Brazil's best-known editor, Assis Chateaubriand,
regularly in his column in his score of dailies derided "Brazilian politi-
cal and economic stupidity" such as the xenophobic attitudes toward
national development through mutually beneficial cooperation with
foreign investments and technology which Farquhar proposed. Chateau-
briand constantly lauded Farquhar for his great contributions to Brazil's
progress despite the opposition of rabidly nationalistic Brazilians of
limited vision like Presidents Vargas (1930-1944) and Artur Bernades
(1922-26).

Let us return to Farquhar's role in Rio in 1905-06. He participated
in the city's spectacular transformation under the progressive but typi-
cally corrupt regime of President Francisco Rodrigues Alves and his

3 Alan K. Manchester. British Preeminence in Brazil; its Rise and Decline.
(Chapel Hill, 1933.) 371 pp.

* Charles A. Gauld. "Jose Carlos Rodrigues; o Patriarca da Imprensa Carioca,"
Revista da Historia (Sao Paulo), ano 4, n 16, Oct.-Dec. 1953, pp. 427-38.

101

appointed mayor, the fierce Francisco Pereira Passos 5 . The powerful
utilites enterprise which Farquhar launched, since called the "Rio
Light," supplied gas and electric illumination to make Rio's wide
new Avenida Rio-Branco for years the world's best-lit boulevard. Rio
journalists bought by the jealous Guinles branded the Rio Light "an oc-
topus of Yankee imperialism" and called Brazilian officials "vassals of
Yankee gold" brought by Farquhar.

As in Havana, Farquhar fearlessly risked death from dread yellow
fever until his friend Dr. Osvaldo Cruz used methods pioneered in
Havana by Dr. Walter Reed to eliminate mosquitos. In 1910 Farquhar
sent Dr. Cruz to Belem and Porto Velho to eradicate malaria and
yellow fever.

Farquhar failed to make the Rio Light an American company.
He had found Wall Street uninterested and making too much money
in Mexico. The company passed to Canadian control making the Rio
and Sao Paulo Lights together the largest Canadian company abroad. 6

In 1906 Farquhar formed the ill-fated Bahia Tramway, Light
& Power Co. in picturesquely backward Salvador, Bahia, the biggest
African city in the New World (pop. now 800,000). There his
foes, the Guinles, though venal journalists and politicos in October
1909 incited a riot that damaged much of its property during an over-
heated political campaign. Mackenzie and American Ambassador
Irving Dudley vainly tried to induce the biggest Bahiano in Rio, presi-
dential candidate Rui Barbosa, to cable the do-nothing governor to
protect Farquhar's property. Also vain were their efforts to get Presi-
dent Nilo Pecanha, a quadroon, to order federal troops in Bahia to act.

In his old age, Farquhar told the writer in many interviews that
the Bahianos were "notoriously adroit and tricky, being almost Moorish
in their venality, rascality and ability to sabotage." Farquhar was finally

s Farquhar recalled that elderly Mayor Pereira Passos of Rio retired, announc-
ing plans to write his memoirs in Paris. But on the liner he had such a heavy
affair with a lady that the strain killed both him and the planned memoirs.

6 Frederick Mulqueen. "A Canadian Enterprise Abroad," Canadian Banker
(Toronto), winter, 1952, pp. 34-55. The Canadian typically slighted the roles
of Americans in the Rio and Sao Paulo Light Companies.

102

able to sell his Bahia Light without too great a loss, but only after years
of bedevilment by Guinle-bribed Bahianos who refused to respect his
concession rights. In selling out, he used the services of the octoroon
son of a Portugese priest, Geraldo Rocha (who once threatened the
writer's life). Rocha was probably the most astutely corrupt Bahiano
in recent Brazilian history. In the 1920s he stole millions from Far-
quhar's former Brazil Railway enterprises. Rocha acquired farms, news-
papers and in 1929 erected Rio's first skyscraper, the Edificio "A
Noite," on Praca Maua.

During the Panic of 1907, which paralyzed banks in New York
and London, Farquhar discovered the money market in booming Paris
was unaffected. There he raised millions for the Rio Light to complete
its first dam, then the largest in South America, and to launch his
own new Brazil Railway, which he capitalized at $50,000,000.

Farquhar's first venture as president of the Brazil Railway was to
launch the Port of Para in Belem. Always incurably optimistic, he be-
lieved the Eldorado myth of Amazonia's allegedly fertile soil being able
to feed 900,000,000 people. He was fascinated by the boom in wild
rubber for the new electrical and automobile industries and the fact
that Belem had no docks. Farquhar failed to hire veteran Dutch or
British rubber planters and construction men with experience in South-
east Asia in his growing offices in London and Paris. Brazil's great
nineteenth-century development genius, Viscount Maua, had died in
1889. There was no Brazilian economic statesman to advise him and to
urge common-sense on impractical Brazilian officials and speculators
who induced Farquhar to sign onerous development concessions on
terms later ruinous to his shareholders.

In 1907-12 Farquhar invested $35,000,000 in the Port of Para
and in a fleet of new river vessels built in Holland. He poured
$33,000,000 of European capital and Brazilian Government money into
the tragic Madeira-Mamore Railway. He envisioned a golden chain of
profits starting at his docks in Belem and ascending the Amazon and
Madeira on his river boats and railroad to the supposedly inexhaustible
rubber forests and cattle plains of northern Mato Grosso and Bolivia.
Farquher failed to learn in time of the rising threat to the world price

103

of rubber by the plantations of Malaya and Sumatra. 7

In investing $175,000,000 in South America, Farquhar's biggest
gamble was in tackling the "impossible" Madeira-Mamore Railway in
the fever-ridden and annually flooded forest on the frontier of Brazil
with barbarous Bolivia. The Treaty of Petropolis of 1903, in which
the brilliant Foreign Minister Rio-Branco avoided a boundary war,
obliged Brazil to build the line. It would permit Bolivians to ship
fine rubber from millions of scattered wild rubber trees around 366
kilometers of river made perilous by 19 falls and rapids. Rio-Branco
backed Farquhar and let him form his own police force under Brazilians
in the violent region ruled "by the law of the rifle." The concession,
which Farquhar avidly acquired from a notoriously corrupt Brazilian
speculator, did not carry Brazil's customary guarantee of interest and
payments per kilometer completed. Farquhar hoped to finish the line-
in only two years by using U. S. health and engineering methods per-
fected on the Panama Canal. He then planned to use the achievement
as his "calling card" in Rio and European financial capitals.

In 1907 he sent his first party of engineers recruited in New York
to a clearing at the head of navigation of the mile-wide Madeira
500 miles upstream. There he ordered them to lay out a company town
which became Porto Velho, now a city of over 40,000 and capital of
Rondonia Territory, which is the size of Oregon.

Farquhar threw more than 800 American engineers and technicians
into the battle against the swamps and fevers of the silent, deadly
selva. They were the officers of an army that came to total 30,000
laborers from Spain, Crete and many other lands, sent in batches of
several thousands every few months. The men soon sickened; some
3,600 of them died; thousands were shipped out after three bouts of
malignant malaria. As soon as he could, Farquhar opened a 300-bed
hospital in Porto Velho, the best in savage Amazonia, with a dozen
American doctors, plus nurses and excellent food by the shipload to
keep his men going.

7 Charles E. Akers. Report on the Amazon Valley, its Rubber Industry and
Other Resources. London, Waterlow, 1912. 190 pp.

104

The three American contractors, who had built the Cuba and
Guatemala railroads for Farquhar, worked on a cost-be-damned basis.
Farquhar was determined to make the Madeira-Mamore the world's
greatest tropical achievement after the Panama Canal. It took until early
1913 to complete the line, one of the world's costliest per kilometer.
Famed British author H. M. Tomlinson in The Sea and the Jungle
described his visit in 1910 to Porto Velho and the unfinished line.
He wrote of an Unknown Somebody in Wall Street and London re-
cruiting thousands of men who would help build a section of line in
the timeless forest and then die, impersonal pawns of progress. Porto
Velho, an oasis of civilization in the largest rainforest on earth, has
an Avenida Farquhar, with the tycoon's name misspelled. The visit
there by this author in 1953 just after Farquhar died in New York in-
fluenced the territorial governor and the manager of the railroad, which
became Brazilian in 1931, to hold a memorial service for the old Quaker
in the Catholic cathedral. Such ecumenical gestures have long been
common in religiously indifferent Brazil. Tribute was paid to Farquhar's
vision and services to the region in Assis Chateaubriand's daily in
Porto Velho. The rails are now scheduled to be removed and the road-
bed paved as part of a highway to connect Brasilia and Lima. In 1938-
53 Farquhar was honorary president of the Madeira-Mamore Associa-
tion formed by its U. S. survivors. 8

Farquhar was once called "the uncrowned king of the Amazon."
The late historian William Lytle Schurz, who as a diplomat in Brazil
in the 1920s knew Farquhar, wrote in 1961 in his splendid Brazil.
the Infinite Country,

"Generations of little men have nibbled, like mice, at
the edges of Amazonia . . . Those who would solve the prob-
lem of its development must be possessed of superhuman
imagination and boldness . . . They must be willing to forget
much that is familiar and start anew as if on another planet.
The man who came nearest to measuring up to these require-
ments of vision and daring was Percival Farquhar."

e Frank Kravigny. The Jungle Route. New York, 1940. 297 pp. On how-
Americans bossed construction of the Madeira-Mamore.

105

Retired historian J. Fred Rippy of Durham, North Carolina, com-
mented in 1944 in his Latin America in the Industrial Age on Farqu-
har's "railroad to Eldorado." Rippy wrote that Amazonia would remain
a myth until new men, techniques and products such as DDT com-
bined to dominate the tantalizing Amazon Basin. What a tragedy for
Farquhar and Brazil that he was not steered in 1907-12 away from
the useless Madeira-Mamore and into developing the port and railroad
to export millions of tons of rich Itabira iron ore, his project between
world wars. Itabira was another gigantic case of Farquhar' s being the
victim of bad timing, bad luck and bad Brazilians. Farquhar hoped after
1920 to give Brazil an export to take the place of rubber, namely iron
ore. Farquhar was not surprised after World War II when feudal-
minded Congressman Artur Bernardes, who had killed his Itabira
project as President in 1922-26 and as a congressman in 1934-37, de-
nounced UNESCO's Hylean Amazonian Plan for international coopera-
tion to develop the stagnant Amazon Basin. Bernardes branded it a
menace to Brazilian sovereignty. This was also the cry in 1965 of able
historian turned governor of the tw ice-Texas -size state of Amazonas
in Manaus, Arthur C. Ferreira Reis. 9

During his years of efforts in Amazonia, Farquhar was simultane-
ously making an even more titantic attempt to develop the southern
half of Brazil and Mato Grosso. In 1907-12 he led there a dance of
the millions. By 1912 he had in Paris a paper fortune of $25,000,000
in watered stock of his Brazil Railway. Sadly he did not then donate
some sizable parks to Rio and Sao Paulo to counteract the press cam-
paign against him as boss of 14,000,000 acres in land grants and im-
mense cattle ranches plus key segments of the nation's transportation.

9 Artur C. Ferreira Reis. A Amazonia e a Cobica International. Sao Paulo,
Editora Nacional, I960. 258 pp. Historian Ferreira Reis as governor of Ama-
zonas published in Manaus in 1964-66 a series of valuable studies on Amazonas
history and development. Assis Chateaubriand, especially in 1965, opposed the
ultranationalism about Amazonia of Governor Ferreira Reis. Chateaubriand
in doing so in his column in his chain of dailies recalled Farquhar's epic achieve-
ments in the Amazon Basin. Chateaubriand plans to have his Edicoes O Cruzeiro
in Rio publish my biography of Farquhar in Portugese with a foreword by
the press lord. His chain of dailies, radio and television stations and magazines
is described in the U.S. Army Handbook for Brazil (Washington, 1964),
pp. 343-52.

106

Those cities were already beginning to spawn sprawling, unplanned,
ugly industrial suburbs without parks or U. S.-type model public schools
with big playgrounds. Farquhar thereby lost one of his great opportuni-
ties. Another was his failure to invest in industries more than a tiny part
of the $100,000,000 of European capital he poured into South Bra2il.
Had he done so, he could have become by the 1940's richer than the
Matarazzos with their scores of factories in Sao Paulo. '

Farquhar felt challenged to open large areas of the southern plateau
in Brazil's generally empty interior. He accepted the myth of great fer-
tility. He thought that by extending rails inland he could induce mil-
lions of land-hungry European peasants to pour into South Brazil as land
was becoming expensive in Argentina and the United States. Farquhar
was sure he could overcome the political and geographical barriers to
developing huge, adolescent Brazil where others had failed. He saw
the time ripe for Brazil to advance inland as had the USA in the
mid-nineteenth century. But he underestimated the obstruction offered
by Brazil's graft-hungry and unpatriotic elite. He discovered that a
tired old Mediterranean culture and a semi-feudal, technically weak
oligarchy dominated the enormous "new" land.

Farquhar learned the harsh lesson experienced by other Nordic
would-be Gullivers among the Latin American Lilliputians that
new foreigners succeed in making fortunes in competition with shrewd,
unscrupulous nationals. He was further handicapped by his unappreci-
ated Quaker scruples and his visionary economic statesmanship. He
could not get apathetic bureaucrats to change the archaic, graft-encour-
aging railroad subsidy law to permit him to avoid heavy losses by con-
structing shorter, solidly-built lines. Farquhar did so anyway for a
while, until his French financial backers insisted on returning to the
former practices of bribing Brazilian officials to approve outrageously
padded kilometrage of jerry-built lines. His solid line in the Rio Peixe

ib Historian Richard M. Morse's brilliant 1958 book on Sao Paulo (University
of Florida Press) is scheduled for publication soon in that overgrown, problem-
filled metropolis. Morse wrote that its unplanned growth resulted from weak
leaders badly bungling for decades. This is true of all major cities of Latin
America, tragically lacking in sizable parks.

107

valley in Santa Catarina did not impress the delightful but exasperating
Brazilians. On it he lost heavily for his idealism. Brazil foolishly per-
mitted railroads of five gauges, as did progressive, Nordic Australia.
Farquhar observed that Australia with its low birth-rate, high-quality
population has attracted superior immigration and ample foreign capi-
tal. Australia has become a prosperous and powerful country with re-
sources inferior to those of badly-governed Brazil.

Farquhar liked to explain how great a geographical obstacle to
railroad construction was Brazil's Great Escarpment, 1500 miles long
and generally rising steeply from a narrow coastal plain. He agreed with
his friend geographer Preston E. James during visits in Rio that "there
is no natural focus of routes", no Chicago or Buenos Aires in South
Brazil. ' '

Farquhar was told that only the sickly, badly-built, unfinished Sao
Paulo-Rio Grande Railroad traversed empty areas of good climate, pine
forests and reportedly good soils and had large land grants. These
totaled 6,000,000 acres. Without ordering surveys of soils and other
resources, the land-hungry Farquhar hastily bought the line. He paid
far too much of a speculator already rich from milking his country
with the aid of corrupt Transport Ministry officials. Before Farquhar
could rebuild several atrocious sections of that railroad, his empire
crashed in 1914. Every president of Brazil has urged reconstruction of
these sections plus broad-gauging of the entire line from Porto Alegre
to Brasilia. Generally bankrupt, Brazil has yet to do so. Getting in-
volved with the worthless SP-RG Railroad prevented Farquhar from
expanding further inland across southern Sao Paulo and stumbling onto
the really fertile "Norte do Parana." There Lord Lovat and his Scot-
tish aides laid out Londrina and other boom towns in the 1930's and
rode one of the world's great land rushes.

In promising South Brazil, which has long made the rest of the
nation its colony, Farquhar completed and improved many railroads,

1 i Preston E. James. Latin America. New York, Odyssey, 1959. Farquhar ad-
mired this monumental work by the top U. S. specialist on the fascinating
geography of Brazil.

108

along with the jetties and port of Rio Grande do Sul. He projected
a transcontinental line like the Canadian Pacific from ports south of
Santos to Antofagasta, Chile, via Asuncion (where he controlled the
utilities and the railroad to Buenos Aires), northern Argentina and his
oil concession in eastern Bolivia. Then he hurriedly and expensively
used unlimited and uncritical French capital to buy control of poor
French-built lines in Uruguay and northeastern Argentina, hoping to
unify, standardize and link them with his lines in South Brazil. Over
them he carried touring ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, en route
in 1913 to an Amazon trek on which the latter nearly died of hunger
and an injury.

To make traffic for his transportation empire, Farquhar formed
30 subsidiaries, including Brazil's first meat-packing plant and biggest
sawmill and for a few years the world's largest land and cattle com-
pany, all run by Americans. He imported a thousand fine Texas
bulls to upbreed the 200,000 bony cattle on his 8,000,000 acres of
ranches in Mato Grosso. In his old age, he realized that Texas is far
more favored geographically than is Brazil.

In 1912-14 depression and then war caused Farquhars empire in
Brazil, with its tentacles into neighboring nations, to collapse into
receivership under Boston millionaire W. Cameron Forbes, who had
large tropical experience as Taft's governor in the Philippines. Brazil
benefited greatly from Farquhar's vast investments, but the European
investors lost heavily. With five more years of peace and further huge
injections of European money, he might have succeeded brilliantly.

After being strenuously useful to Forbes in Brazil and New York
in 1914-15, Farquhar resigned as president of the ill-fated Brazil Rail-
way group of companies. In 1919 he accepted the invitation of Presi-
dent Epitacio Pessoa, visiting New York, to return to Brazil and attempt
with presidential backing to develop the mountains of rich iron ore at
Itabira. Farquhar was promised the backing in Wall Street of Clarence
Dillon to finance his $80,000,000 Itabira port and ore railroad. From
1920 until early 1942, Farquhar failed despite amazing determination
to overcome nationalistic opposition, especially in populous Minas
Gerais State. The railroad was to use the unique Rio Doce waterlevel

109

route through the Great Escarpment. Economically blind leaders rejected
his plan to export ore and transform the empty Dio Doce Valley into
the Ruhr of South America, which it finally became after an enormous
loss to Brazil in time and money.

In 1942 Brazil took the Itabira project from Farquhar with the
backing of the U. S. and British Governments. But only after 1961 did
Brazil fully adopt his plan and start exporting over 7,000,000 tons
a year of its inexhaustible iron ore. At 80 Farquhar boldly organized
with Brazilians the Acesita special steels mill near Itabira, earning at
least Brazilian admiration as the grand old man of the mountains of
iron. He was saddened by the failure of Vargas 12 and himself to win
approval of Brazil's powerful military to seize a unique chance between
world wars to give Brazil a major role in world iron ore exports. Farqu-
har wondered what would happen to Brazil if coffee goes the way of
rubber, and whether the population explosion dooms Brazil to be anoth-
er India. That is still the greatest unanswered question about Brazil.

'2 John W. F. Dulles, historian of the University of Texas, is the author of a
work just published there, Vargas of Brazil, a Political Biography.

Farquhar would have enjoyed an Argentine scholar bluntly blaming his
nation's mess on bad leadership Tomas Fillol, Social Factors in Economic De-
velopment; the Argentine Case. MIT Press, 1961. 118 pp. Farquhar would
have smiled at the statement in Schurz's 1961 book that the Brazilians are
the world's most promising people, just as he would have applauded historian
Watt Stewart's recent biography of his associate in Guatemala in 1903-04,
banana king Minor C. Keith.

See Henry Reuss, chairman, House Subcommittee on International Finance.
Food for Progress in Latin America. Washington, GPO, 1967. 255 pp., for a
study which throws light on U. S. -Brazilian efforts to prevent Brazil from
becoming another India.

110

RUY BARBOSA-A GREAT
BRAZILIAN

By Mrs. Florene J. Dunstan*

"Brazil has lost one of her greatest citizens, Dr. Ruy Barbosa,
jurist, diplomat, and man of letters," editorialized the New York Times
at the time of his death in 1923. The greatness of Ruy Barbosa cannot
be defined in any one aspect of his life and personality, but the scope
of his activities, his myriad-mindedness, and the different phases of his
work can be seen in his contributions to the social, cultural, political,
and juridical life of Brazil.

Ruy Barbosa belongs to that small aristocracy of fame who are
known throughout Brazil by the first name, says Dr. Charles W. Turner
in his biography entitled, Ruy Barbosa, and during "fifty years the
short but significant name of 'Ruy' electrified audiences, scintillated
upon the pages of Brazilian history, and projected the rays throughout
the hemisphere and over to the shores of the Old World." ' Dr. William
Rex Crawford, in A Century of Latin American Thought, 1961, says,
"Ruy Barbosa . . . was a world in himself, and amazed his disciples, as
loyal and lyrical as those attracted by any Latin American thinker: for
them he was the greatest writer, the greatest orator, the greatest linguist,
and the greatest lawyer of his time." 2 Ruy's fame has grown since his
death; some twenty different titles of his works have been published
since 1940, including his Obras Competas in 1942; his name now ap-
pears in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Enciclopedie LaRousse, and En-
cyclopedia Italiana. Volume 14 of Pensamiento de America (American
Thought), published in Mexico in 1944, is devoted entirely to selec-
tions from his published work, with a prologue by the Brazilian Renato
de Mendonca, in which Ruy is discussed as a writer and literary critic.

"^Chairman, Department of Spanish, Agnes Scott College

i Charles W. Turner, Ruy Barbosa, (New York, 1945), p. 173.
2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), p. 190.

Ill

Ruy Barbosa was born in 1849, and in 1949 a grateful nation
observed the centennial year with great pomp and ceremony. It was
also the year of birth of Joaquim Nabuco, who, with Ruy and the Baron
Rio Branco, formed the triumviate who contributed so much to their
country in the latter part of the Empire and the first years of the Re-
public. The official celebration of the centenary of the birth of these
two illustrious men began with a lecture by the person who was the
equivalent of our Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This function
took place in Itamaraty, the beautiful building which at that time
housed all the offices dealing with Brazil's foreign affairs, with Dr.
Raul Fernandez, Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the host. 3 The lecture
was attended by many of the leading writers and professional men and
by the President Dutra of Brazil.

November 5th, Ruy's birthday, was declared a national holiday.
A special monument was erected to him and streets in various cities
were named for him.

During his lifetime Ruy Barbosa had his critics as well as his ad-
mirers. His insight into the basic principles of life and relationships
and his outspoken courage in attacking any conditions which he con-
sidered an evil against society often represented unfamiliar concepts
to those who would keep the status quo. His enemies accused him of
being out of step with his generation. Ruy's lifework constituted an
inescapable challenge to patriotism and his ideals included both the
good of his own country and that of the world at large. Fernando Nery,
in his book, Ruy Barbosa, stated that Ruy "was the man most defied
and most slandered by his contemporaries. " 4 His critics still exist. In
1964 Raimundo Magalhaes published his book, Rui Barbosa, o Homen
e o Mito (Ruy Barbosa, The Man and The Myth) in which he attempt-
ed to debunk practically everything favorable previously written about
Ruy, pointing up his weaknesses and overlooking his virtues. The pur-
pose in writing this paper is to study Ruy Barbosa in the light of histori-
cal perspective and to suggest that his contribution to his country
was substantial.

3 My sister and I attended as guests of Joaquim Nabuco's daughter, Carolina.

4 Quoted by Turner, p. 58.

112

The life and accomplishments of Ruy Barbosa run parallel with the
history of his country. Every reform, every attempt at any worthwhile
reform, and the history of every forward movement, particularly in
education, in Brazil during his lifetime must, if correctly related, be
connected with his name. His literary activity was a reflection of his
life and he used his literary talent, as did many other great figures, to
lend force and efficacy to his efforts in his numerous crusades. He
influenced profoundly other literary figures and greatly enriched his
country's language and literature.

Ruy Barbosa "was a man of amazing erudition . . . steeped in
the classics, the sciences, history, philosophy, and ancient and modern
languages. Books were his tools, and through them he made friends
with the ages." 5 A visit to the Casa Barbosa, today a national museum
with the desk, books, and other furnishings owned by Ruy, reveals his
extensive collection of over 40,000 volumes and gives an idea of the
breadth of his intellectual grasp and the vast scope of his erudition.
His library was his sanctuary, and he knew the exact position of every
book as well as its contents. Rare is the book on those shelves that
does not have annotations by him in the language in which the book
was written. He wrote and spoke fluently English, French, Italian, and
Spanish, and made idiomatic translations from German, Greek, and
Latin. Brazilian schoolboys delight to remind their English visitors that
Ruy Barbosa, when he was living in self-imposed exile in England, had
a sign printed which read, "English Taught by a Brazilian." 6

During this period of exile in England he became interested in
the Dreyfus case from a legal standpoint, and was convinced of the
lack of proof of guilt. Ruy had contracted with the fornal do Com-
merc'to to write a series of letters giving his impressions and observa-
tions. The first of these Cartas de lnglaterra was a minute study of
the charges against Dreyfus, with arguments pro and con. He made
an urgent plea for justice in behalf of Dreyfus, a victim of hate and
illegality. It was after his article that Emile Zola produced his for-
midable y Accuse and forced the French government to restudy the

s Ibid, pp. 41-42.

6 O Tempo, Special Edition, January 15, 1924, p. 57.

113

case which led to the vindication of Dreyfus. Portuguese diplomat,
Alberto Oliveira, declared that he had been in Geneva with Dreyfus
and had heard him say that the first voice raised in his behalf was
that of a Brazilian, Ruy Barbosa. 7

Throughout his entire life Ruy was a crusader for freedom. "His
idea of liberty was inclusive, all-embracing, for the whole man and all
his relationships. He was the exponent of total human liberty, of all
the freedoms which are meant to enrich the life of man and society.
Civil liberty, religious liberty and political liberty, in all their fullness,
complete the trilogy of the drama of his life's work." 8 Ruy Barbosa
worked assiduously, along with Souza Dantas, Joaquim Nabuco, Castro
Alves, and others for the abolition of slavery. Joaquim Nabuco is con-
sidered the outstanding symbol of the abolition movement, but Ruy
Barbosa was the impassioned young writer and orator who contributed
effectively to channeling popular thought into the new current by
his impressive delivery and wealth of ideas. 9

While still a law student in Sao Paulo, in 1868 at 19 he proposed
that freedom should be granted to all slave offspring. He, along with
Joaquim Nabuco and others, contributed articles to many newspapers
and, on September 28, 1871, to satisfy public opinion, the government,
headed by the Viscount of Rio Branco, promulgated the law of the
Ventre Livre. This law, which promised freedom to all born after that
date, was called the Rio Branco Law, although Ruy contributed greatly
toward its passage. Further intensive efforts followed and in 1884
he drafted the abolitionist bill which called for the freeing of all slaves
over sixty years of age. Unfortunately this bill was not passed, but the
spirit of freedom was gaining supporters and when a new conservative
ministry took office on March 10, 1888, they realized that public
opinion would soon demand abolition. Total victory was gained by
those working so diligently for abolition when the Emancipation
Proclamation was signed on May 13, 1888. It was signed, not by the

i Ibid, p. 27.
s Turner, p. 82.
*> Ibid, p. 74.

114

Emperor, but by his daughter Princess Isabel, who was acting regent
while her father, seriously ill, was in Europe for medical treatment.

Many Brazilians had contributed their best efforts in the struggle
for emancipation of the slaves, but Dr. Turner states that it is to the
eloquence and patriotism of Ruy Barbosa that the Negro race owes its
greatest debt and he quotes Mo2art Monteiro in O Tempo when he
writes, "The abolition narrative is the fairest page in our history, and
on that page shines the immortal name of Ruy Barbosa." 10

Although the Emperor claimed to have a representative govern-
ment in the Assembly, in the system the votes went through several
hands before being counted, making many opportunities for corruption.
Suffrage was based on property, and Ruy Barbosa contended that each
person who could read and write should be allowed to place his vote
in the ballot box with his own hands. He made forceful speeches in
favor of direct election and was asked by Souza Dantas and Saraiva,
two of the liberal leaders, to draft a bill for direct election which they
wished to submit to the Emperor. Finally in 1881 the decree for direct
elections was signed and Ruy was elected to represent a district of Bahia
in the national assembly.

One of Ruy's chief concerns was the problem of education in
Brazil. Realizing the seemingly insurmountable difficulties in a country
such as Brazil, where population was sparsely scattered he repeatedly
emphasized the need for adequate public education. In 1882, as na-
tional deputy from Bahia, he headed the Committee on Public Instruc-
tion appointed by the Chamber of Deputies. Two of his reports, "Proj-
ect of Reform for Secondary and Higher Education" and "Reform for
Primary Education" are particularly significant as an expression of his
philosophy of education, and received favorable comment by English
and French critics who hailed these works as an outstanding contribution
to educational methods. As a result of these reports, the normal-school
system was later established in Brazil.

At this time the separation of church and state became a burning
issue and Ruy Barbosa, a deeply religious man, was found taking the

'o ibid, p. 79.

115

lead in this struggle. His devotion to freedom of conscience and reli-
gious liberty bore fruit when, at the time of proclamation of the
Republic, he penned the separation decree. He was also appointed to
draft the first constitution for the Brazilian Republic and chose the
constitution of the United States as a model, although he favored
some aspects of England's parliamentary system. In addition, he also
designed the Brazilian flag and coat-of-arms.

In 1907, Baron Rio Branco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
invited Barbosa to accept the appointment of chief in his country's dele-
gation to the Second Hague Peace Conference. From the beginning of
the Conference Barbosa stood out personally. The entire European press
was unanimous in speaking of the brilliant Brazilian leader as one of
the forceful personalities of the Conference. ! ' For the first time repre-
sentatives of the Latin American republics were present at a worldwide
international round table, but the predominant feeling was that rights,
as such, belonged to the great powers, "and the smaller nations should
be content to act as their satellites." 12 Ruy's speech on "The Equality
of Sovereign States" was declared by the editor of The Independent to
be the most notable document issuing from the Conference, so memora-
ble that it has a place in history.

William T. Stead, a distinguished British journalist, whom, inci-
dentally, Megalhaes in his volume debunking Ruy called a second rate
journalist and whom Megelhaes translated incorrectly, wrote several
articles on Ruy Barbosa. Mr. Stead, an authority on European affairs
and an eyewitness at both the Hague conferences, wrote that it was
the crusade of Barbosa at the Hague "which brought in its train the
recognition by the powers of the legal equality of sovereign nations." 13
He stated that this distinctly Brazilian thesis was here for the first time
given its permanent place in the records of international law.

Mr. Stead thought that the two greatest personal forces in the
Conference were Baron Marshall von Bieberstein of Germany and Dr.

1 1 O Tempo, p. 21.

12 Turner, p. 137.
'3 Ibid, p. 144.

116

Ruy Barbosa of Brazil. Behind Baron Marschall was the whole armed
might of the German Empire, which was close at hand and constantly
present before the eyes of all the delegates. "Behind Dr. Barbosa there
was an unknown distant republic, incapable of taking any military action
and with a fleet which had not yet left the stocks. Nevertheless, of the
two men, Dr. Barbosa counted for more than Baron Marschall when
the Conference ended." 14

The Republic of Brazil was barely twenty years old when personal
rivalries and factional ambitions brought a threat of a military regime
which would mean the the triumph of might, even violence, over the
civil rights of the people. Ruy Barbosa became once more the spokes-
man for law and order, civil rights, and justice. Concerning his cam-
paign as a candidate for the presidency, it was said that "Never before
or since has Brazil been thrilled from north to south and from the
seaboard to the western limits of the hinterland by the words of a
man as it was by the words and concepts of Ruy Barbosa during this
intense crusade." '^ Singlehandedly Barbosa created a nation-wide civic
consciousness. This remarkable electoral campaign goes down as one
of the most notable periods in Brazil's history. For the first time an
effort was made to have the vote of the people decide who would be
president. It was carried out in true North American style, with speech-
es, electioneering visits to many parts of the country, and with enthusi-
astic meetings everywhere. So general was the enthusiasm that, as the
time for the election arrived, it seemed clear that the cw'dista candidate
(Barbosa) rather than the Army candidate, would secure an over-
whelming majority. However, the political machine had evinced alarm
at the nation-wide welcome accorded Ruy Barbosa and had made sure
of the loyalty of the majority of state officials. "So while civiUsmo
won decisively in the streets, it lost in the ballot boxes." 16 Marshall
Hermes da Fonseca was declared president at least five days before the
count of the votes had been completed.

i" William Stead, Brazil at the Hague, p. 12, quoted by Turner, p. 145.
is Turner, p. 150.
16 Ibid, p. 154.

n;

Disappointed, dismayed, but not discouraged, Ruy continued his
unwearying defense of justice and liberty and was an implacable enemy
of tyranny and violence. When, in 1915, Germany announced to the
world that international commitments pertaining to warfare were no
more than scraps of paper, Ruy denounced Germany and led in urging
Brazil to revoke its neutrality. Following the lead of her friend, the
United States, Brazil revoked her neutrality and on October 26, 1917,
declared that a state of war existed between herself and Germany. Brazil
aided the Allies in many ways.

In these later years Ruy Barbosa became president of the Brazilian
Senate, the Brazilian National Library, and the Brazilian Academy of
Letters. In 1921 he was named one of the eleven judges on the Perma-
nent Court for International Justice.

In attempting to summarize the life and accomplishments of Ruy
Barbosa perhaps the tribute paid him by the New York Times
(March 3, 1923), will shed some light on the effectiveness of his en-
deavors.

Brazil has lost one of her greatest citizens in Dr. Ruy Barbosa,
jurist, diplomat, and man of letters. Versatility such as his
is more frequently met with in Latin America than among us,
but talents such as his are rare in any land. Mathematics,
science, even medicine were among his subsidiary interests;
finance, the law and diplomacy absorbed most of his attention.
He was never President of Brazil . . . But he had been Presi-
dent of the Senate, President of the Academy of Letters,
and delegate to the second Hague Conference; and he ended
his life as one of the judges of the new Permanent Court at
the Hague.

In the Civilista Party, organized to fight the military clique
which controlled Brazil in the 90's and was still strong enough
to make an unsuccessful attempt to seize the government last
June [1922], he was one of the leaders and contributed
largely to the establishment of constitutional government in
his country. But his greatest service was rendered in the war,
and it was due chiefly to him that Brazil led the American

118

Powers in the formation of the final coalition against Ger-
many, and thereby found a way open to a larger part in world
affairs than any Latin-American Power had played before. He
founded the Brazilian League for the Allies in 1915, and in
his subsequent service as Ambassador (to the Argentine
celebration of the centenary of Argentine independence) his
fiery eloquence did much to strengthen the pro- Ally party in
that country as well as in Brazil. He was a Wilsonian, in the
1918 sense, at least two years earlier than Wilson. 17

In the light of historical perspective it may be seen that with his
powerful intellect, devotion to principle, and his patriotism and ideal-
ism, Ruy Barbosa "accomplished a creative and abiding work in na-
tional and international affairs, a work such as few men in the Western
Hemisphere have handed down to posterity." 18

17 O Tempo, p. 83.
is Turner, p. 170.

119

SOME NOTES ON THE LIFE &
WORK OF A. P. FIGUEIREDO

By T. Lynn Smith*

It may appear a bit ironical to all of us that a sociologist should
be writing on this topic. Sociologists in general and myself in particular
are not noted for their contributions in the field of biography. In what
probably was an unguarded moment, however, Dr. Huck invited me to
appear on this program to talk about the life and work of some Latin
American I greatly admired, such as A. P. Figueiredo of Recife, Pernam-
buco, Brazil or Salvador Camacho Roldan of Columbia 1 ; and perhaps
somewhat irresponsibly I accepted the invitation. As Dr. Huck's plans
for the program developed it seemed preferable to him that I speak
about Figueiredo, and so you are "stuck" with the results. I trust, how-
ever, that you will bear with me for a few moments.

I first became acquainted with some of the ideas of Antonio Pedro
de Figueiredo in 1942 when I read Gilberto Freyre's Nordeste 2 , then
only five years off the press. The Master of Apipucos identified Figuei-
redo as a "mulatto free-thinker of Recife," a person who had been
associated with "the Lyceu of Pernambuco," as editor-in-chief of the
review O Progresso, and as an important figure whose career belonged
mostly to the first half of the nineteenth century but extended into the
second half as well. Freyre indicated at the age of twenty Figueiredo
had translated a work on philosophy by Victor Cousin from French to
Portuguese and that he (Figueiredo) also had been strongly influenced
by the thinking of socialists such as Robert Owen, Fourier, and espec-
ially Saint-Simon.

*Research Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Florida

I. Earlier I had dedicated my small volume on Agrarian Reform in Latin Ameri-
ca, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965, to the memory of Figueiredo and
Camacho Roldan.

2 (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Jose Olympio Editora, 1937), pp. 150-156.

120

Since I was working upon the chapter dealing with "Size of Hold-
ings" for the first edition of my Brazil: People and Institutions' 1 at the
time, I was able to draw upon the materials reprinted by Freyre and to
translate and use two short paragraphs of Figueiredo's writings in the
analysis and description of the effects of the large landed estate in
Brazil. To Freyre I also gave credit for the reproduction of the original
text of a lengthy extract on the same subject from the newspaper article
by Abdulah-el-Kratif which I also translated and used in my own book. 4
Freyre gave no indication in Nordeste that he knew that Abdulah-el-
Kratif was Figueiredo's pen name, and I myself learned that fact only
in 1953 when I received through the graciousness of Sr. Amaro Quintas
a copy of the re-issue of O Progresso he had published, a volume in
which he had included as a preface a comprehensive biography of
Figueiredo. Freyre did indicate, however, that he was familiar with
the cognomen of Cousin Fusco (apparently meaning dark or sad
Cousin) that frequently was applied to Figueiredo, and Quintas makes
it abundantly clear that the author of Casa Grande e Senzala was the
one who first called his own attention to the importance of studying
the life and work of Figueiredo. 5

Biographical Data

That relatively little is known with respect to the origins and early
life of Figueiredo is not strange. On the contrary, it would be quite
remarkable if in any society characterized by the "monoculture, lati-
fundismo, slavocracy and even monosexuality" which Freyre attributes
to Recife and its environs in the nineteenth century, 6 much would be
known about the early life of any young mulatto who early left his
rural home to seek a better life in the capital. It seems, however, that
he was born in Iguarassu, a village some 30 miles north of Recife. Henry
Koster, whose descriptions of social organization in the plantation dis-
tricts of northeastern Brazil are second to none, indicates that the vil-

3 (Baton Rouge: 1946), p. 492.

4 Ibid., pp. 492-94.

s See his "Prefacio" to the re-issue of O Progresso: Revista Social, Litteraria
e Sctentifica, (Recife: Impressa Oficial, 1950,) pp. II-III.
6 Freyre, Nordeste. p. 11.

121

lage was in a decadent condition and had only about 800 inhabitants
when he visited it repeatedly in 1809 and 18 10. 7 Quintas disposes of
matters respecting Figueiredo's origins and birthplace with the follow-
ing succinct statements:

His origins are obscure. About all we know is that they
were humble. The small news sheets of the time mention a
mulatto Basilio as being his father. This is what O Volcao of
August 30, 1847, says: "... the ridiculous Cousin jusco, son
of the mulatto "Brazilio there in Iguarassu, where he always
lived by cleaning the saddle shop of his father, and by catch-
ing crabs and junk fish \bodioes~]." B

Even the date of Figueiredo's birth is not known, although it
seems firmly established that he died of a cerebral hemorrhage on Au-
gust 22, 1859. Quintas indicates that Pereira da Costa, in the Dicionario
Biografico de Pernambucanos Celebres, p. 145, gives the date of birth
as being May 22, 1822, a datum that he (Quintas) finds unacceptable.
Rather, reasoning from the information given in the obituaries pub-
lished in Recife's newspapers following Figueiredo's death, which
state that he was 45 years old when he died, Quintas places the year of
birth as 1814. 9

Like so many of his fellows, in his early youth Figueiredo sought
to better his lot by moving to Recife. Apparently he was disappointed
in the amount of assistance given him by a friend, on whom he had
counted for food and shelter, and eventually he took up his abode with
the friars in the Monastery of Carmo. There he certainly found the
books on which he feasted and possibly unusually fine instruction as
well. Eventually he came to be a teacher in the Ginasio Pernambucano
and one of the editors of a small paper called A Carteira; and, in the
pattern that has been general among Brazilian intellectuals from
those days to the present, he wrote copiously for the various other news-
papers published in Recife.

Sometime early in his career Figueiredo came to know and to be

7 Travels in Brazil, (Philadelphia, 1817), Vol. I, pp. 32-35, 62-64.
s Quintas, p. iv.
9 Ibid., p. iii.

122

strongly influenced by a French Engineer, Louis Vautier, who was
largely responsible for the introduction into Brazil of the works and
ideas of European socialists and of an interest in the pragmatic study
of social and economic questions. 10

Figueiredo as a Forerunner of Brazilian Sociology

From the sociological standpoint much of Figueiredo's work must
be evaluated as among the more important intellectual productions
made in Brazil, or in all of Latin America for that matter, in the course
of the nineteenth century. As also is true of his early twentieth-century
successors in Brazil, such as Euclydes de Cunha, Oliveira Vianna, Gil-
berto Freyre, A. Carneiro Leao, and Fernando de Azevedo, ''' and in
sharp contrast with the preoccupations of Spanish Americans who de-
veloped a concern about social matters, Figueiredo chose to avoid fiction
as the medium in which his thoughts were to be expressed. Therefore,
one can make use of his works for purposes of documentation without
being handicapped by the possibility that the more incisive paragraphs
in his writings represent the figments of his imagination and not his
endeavor to portray realities.

The bulk of the sociological materials produced by Figueiredo
that have been uncovered and made available to those not privileged
to have access to files of the newspapers published in Recife over a
century ago, are those contained in the re-issue of O Progresso. He pub-
lished the first number of this review in July, 1846, and continued
it until September, 1848, for a total of 920 pages richly stocked with
an assortment of literary, political, and sociological matters from his
own pen and that of his contemporaries. It is evident that some of the
more significant analyses of social structures, social systems, and social
problems first had been presented as political speeches, then redone as
articles in the local newspapers, and finally republished in O Progresso.

io Gilberto Freyre, Urn Engenheiro Frances no Bras/l. (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria
Jose Olympio Editora, 1940), pp. 147-148.

11 For brief comments about those who pioneered in the sociological study of
rural society in Brazil, who also for the most part represent the early begin-
nings of sociology in general in that huge half-continent, see T. Lynn Smith,
Sociologia Rural, Maracaibo, Venezuela: Universidad del Zulia, Facultad de
Agronomia, 1963, pp. 33-36.

123

The world is especially fortunate that Figueiredo's socialistic orien-
tation and challenge to observe and analyze the social system prevailing
in the sugar-cane plantation area of Pernambuco during the first half
of the nineteenth century came before Karl Marx had become the patron
saint of those who style themselves as socialists. After Marx, with his
abysmal ignorance of everything rural and agricultural, had generated
the foggy ideas that still becloud much of mankind's thinking about
rural social and economic organization, it probably would have been
impossible for any socialist to have determined precisely and set forth
clearly the nature of Pernambuco's difficulties. Certainly one of them
could not have isolated and described concisely the causes of the basic
problems; and it is unlikely that none of them would have suggested
the use of the power to tax as a means of correcting the ills from which
the province was suffering.

My own high regard for Figueiredo's writings is based chiefly
upon the penetrating analyses he has given us of the over-all social
system which dominated Pernambuco, and most other parts of Brazil
as well, a century ago. ' 2

For this reason I drew upon his cogent analyses when I was pre-
paring one of the chapters for my book on Brazil, and I found his
materials all the more significant, and indeed in a class of their own,
when I was searching for any early writing by Latin Americans that
would throw light on the backgrounds of agrarian reform movements
in Brazil and Spanish America. Those familiar with my little volume
on this subject, and to which reference is made above, will have noted
that I translated and used extensive extracts from Figueiredo's works

ip This social system has by no means been eliminated by the urban patterns
of social organization that have developed largely since 1940 nor by the emerg-
ence in a few areas of a system in which substantial, highly-commercialized
family-sized farms play a role somewhat comparable to that which they have
in the Midwestern part of the United States and some parts of Western Europe.
For an analysis and description of the two sharply-contrasting rural and social
systems, one based upon large establishments, such as those Figueiredo found
enmeshing society in Pernambuco, and the other receiving its integration and
energy from family-sized farms typical of Iowa and her neighbors, see T. Lynn
Smith, Sociological Studies of Rural Development in Latin America, University
of Florida Social Sciences Monograph No. 33, Gainesville: University of Flori-
da Press, 1967, Chapter II.

124

in connection with each of the three major subdivisions of the subject,
namely, indicators of the need for agrarian reform, the objectives of
agrarian reform, and the methods or techniques to be used in effecting
agrarian reform. His statements pertaining to these I evaluated at the
time, as I do now, in the following words: "This man's analyses and
proposals were fully 100 years ahead of his time, and they dealt with
the situation in northeastern Brazil, which continues to be the greatest
problem area in Brazil and possibly in all of Latin America." 13 It
seems fitting that we repeat here a few sentences drawn from the
extracts we have translated and used.

We should take note of the fact that he sets the stage in an em-
pirical and pragmatic manner by depicting the extent to which the chil-
dren of couples in humble circumstances abandoned the country districts
and flocked into Recife where life was a severe struggle for all of them.
All this, of course, was highly autobiographical. Then he pointed to
the scarcity of inhabitants in large areas that were richly endowed with
fertile soil and which were favorably located with respect to the sea-
coast and the capital: "In our coastal plains, in the areas about our
great population centers, there are vast expanses of land, most of it
fertile, of which only a tenth, and frequently a hundredth, is culti-
vated." Next come some of the most incisive inquestions. Why don't
the offspring of the least-favored families, those of whom "the tur-
bulent class of our population was formed," make use of these extensive
areas of excellent soil? "Why don't they become agriculturists? Why,
unless they are forced to do so, don't the inhabitants of the forested
zones cultivate the soil? Why do their children seek out the towns? For
all of these questions there is only one answer, and unfortunately it is
fully complete." This answer given in 1846 is the same as it was a
century later in 1946, and even today, in 1967: "Agriculture and
commerce, and especially agriculture, are encircled by a barrier that
cannot be surmounted by a man of slight means . . . And what is that
barrier? It is the large landed estate." "But the owners refuse to sell
these lands [the extensive areas of rich, unused soil], or even to rent
them. If one is wealthy he can buy an engenho; but if his means are

13 Agrarian Reform, p. 65.

125

slight and he wishes to buy or rent a few acres of land, he will not
find them. This is what creates the unproductive population of the
cities."

Measures to correct the situation should not be based on the thesis
that individual large landowners are to blame. They are merely "obey-
ing the law of necessity." "In order for one senhor de engenho to be
able, without endangering himself, to sell or rent a part of his lands
and in this way to diminish the number of his vassals, it is necessary
that his neighbors do the same. Because of this, gentlemen, it is essen-
tial that all of them simultaneously be exposed to a superior force. This
force, gentlemen, is not to be found except in the direct imposition,
promised by our Constitution, of the tax upon the land. The establish-
ment of this tax in proportion to the area possessed, and if necessary
by making it weigh more heavily upon unused lands than upon those
that are cultivated, will force the large landowners to sell or lease
those immense tracts of fertile land which today are lost to agriculture
and give work to only a small number of hands ..." "Our popula-
tion will find abundant means of existence and we will not be forced
to say, as we are today, [i.e., in 1846] that Brazil is over-populated."

Finally, in addition to his highly perceptive analyses of the nature,
defects, and needed reform of the great rural social system that is
generated by and energized by the large landed estate, the pages of
O Progresso supply many other advanced ideas with respect to the true
sociological study of society. For example, in setting forth the editorial
policies of the review in its first number he specifically indicates that
it will follow no "line" except that of the freedom of expression
(p. 3), and that "For us, then, the policy is that the science of social
organization is the only way of achieving the happiness of individuals;
and . . . for our country of Brazil at present the policy should be princi-
pally economic and industrial and above all should follow the path
of material progress." (p. 7) Observations relating to social organiza-
tion and reform proposals in France, England, Switzerland, and the
United States (pp. 335 ff.) are of more than passing interest, and
many could read with interest and profit what he reports upon German
communism in Europe and America (pp. 339 ff.). Some of the diffi-
culties connected with unwise alienation of land in the United States

126

are summarized, and note is taken of the formation of the Agrarian
League in 1844. Among the proposals it made, of course, is that which
led eventually to the Homestead Act: "Any man, or any head of a
family, who did not already own land should have a right to a farm
of 160 acres, provided he himself or his children cultivate and make
use of it" (p. 409). Not the least interesting and challenging of his
strictly sociological ideas are the thoughts that administrative sub-di-
visions should constitute what in effect are genuine communities, and
that since rivers unite while mountain crests divide, only the latter
should be employed as boundaries for political subdivisions (p. 424).

127

NOTES ON THE STUDY OF
BRAZILIAN ELITES

i

The disclaimer voiced by Professor Smith prior to his treatment
of the life and work of A. P. Figueiredo must also apply to myself.
Consequently, I have decided to analy2e the three papers indirectly, by
indicating how a political scientist would utilize political biographies.
The relevance of political biographies to the development of political
system models is that political scientists must generate, on the basis of
empirical data, political types who are actors in the political system.
The conceptualization and definition of political role types are the
result of aggregate analysis of political biography. I have worked out
a preliminary model of the Brazilian political system for the years
1946-1964. In developing the outlines of such a model I have drawn
heavily on the work of, Scott, Lucas and Lucas, Simulation and Nation-
al Development, and A. F. K. Organski The Stages of Political Devel-
opments In the latter work Organski describes four general classes of
political system models: (1) the Politics of Unification, (2) the
Politics of Industrialization, and (3) the Politics of National Welfare,
and (4) the Politics of Abundance. Brazil, moreover, is clearly a case
of the politics of industrialization. Brazil's industrial achievements
since 1930 need not be recounted here. I will briefly describe the
model, and as I do, I think that the relevance of the study of political
elites and political recruitment, or aggregate biography, will become ap-
parent.

i Andrew M. Scott, William A. Lucas and Trudi M. Lucas, Simulation and
National Development (New York, 1966), Chapters iii & iv; A. F. K. Organski,
The Stages of Political Development (New York, 1965).

128

II

THE "DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEM MODEL, 1946-1966."
I. Structure of the System.

A. Elites. (Tentative Observations)

1. The political elite system is differentiated from the non-
elite culture at both the levels of (1) personality and (2) so-
cial structure. The political elite culture has as its boundaries
the lowest strata of the middle class. This elite culture is
very narrow, then, in relation to the total population.

2. Populist leaders tend to be recruited from the rural sectors
of the political elite.

3. Liberal-cosmopolitan leaders tend to be of the elite culture
of the more developed regions.

4. Developmentalist intellectuals in government and industry
tend to be of the same areas of the elite subculture as the
liberal-cosmopolitans.

5. The educational system tends to maintain the relative small
political elite subculture.

B. Regime Structure.

1. Governing coalitions of the period tend to be coalitions of
the various national public authorities, e.g.: the executive in-
cluding the ministries, the military, and the state executives;
all in combination with certain advanced sectors of industry
and agriculture.

2. Congress is only important as its members are attached
to the governing coalition.

3. The only significant observation to be made about the
formal party system is that the governing coalition usually,
but not always, overlaps with the PTB-PSD, and the UDN
tends to represent the liberal-cosmopolitans of the more in-

129

dustrialized regions. The PTB is the only party with the po-
tential to be a mass based political movement.

C. The main conflict cleavage is between the populist-develop-
mentalists and the liberal-traditionalists. Within the rules of the
system outlined below, the populist-developmentalists usually
form the government.

D. Political cleavages are manifest by positions taken on the
following issues.

1. Land reform.

2. Industrialization.

3. Political mobilization of the population.

4. Foreign policy.

E. So long as the internal and external system rules are main-
tained, the populist-developmentalist policy position is the position
of the government.

II. Rules of the Game of Politics.
A. Internal System Rules.

1. Changes in governments and policy is usually accomplished
through constitutional means.

2. Populist leaders to be effective must have military support.

3. Labor organizations must function through regime channels.

4. The agrarian elite's power position must not be changed
rapidly.

5. The military must be allocated a disproportionate share of
the budget.

6. Illiterates must not be politically mobilized.

130

7. Agitation among the agrarian proletariat should be kept
at a minimum.

8. The lower military ranks are not political.

9. Credit through the public banks must be expanded at a
constant rate proportionate with the growth of the monetary
economy and the demands of industry.

10. The government is expected to provide jobs and subsidies
to both individuals and groups.

B. External System Rules.

1. To minimize tension and maximize development, a favor-
able balance of payments must be maintained. Therefore, re-
lations with the U. S. must be "good."

2. Alignment with revolutionary regimes would conflict with
rule number la above.

3. It is at all times necessary to negotiate for favorable terms
of trade.

Ill

To further elaborate such a model as I have outlined above, the
study of political elites and elite recruitment is essential. An American
political scientist, Robert A. Packenham, has reviewed the status of
political science research in Brazil. With reference to the problem of
political recruitment, he concludes that: "for all practical purposes,
systematic studies of the social antecedents of national politicians do
not exist . . . " 2 Research undertaken so far deals principally with the
occupational backgrounds of state and local politicians. Such studies
are few in number and little attention is given to the relationship of
empirical generalization and general political theory. Perhaps the diffi-

2 Robert A. Packenham, "A Pesquisa Politica no Brasil: Ponto de Vista de um
Norte-Americano," Revista de Direito Publico e Ciencia Politica, VIII (Janu-
ary-April, 1965), p. 17.

131

culties encountered in survey research projects accounts in part for the
lack of interest in political recruitment research.

As a step in the direction of describing the composition of political
elites and the structures performing the political recruitment function
in Brazil, I plan to start a data file organized by categories of elites
with subject codes for each category. I see such a project as a long term
concern and one that would ultimately provide the data base for
generalization concerning the representation of various social and eco-
nomic types within the Brazilian political system. Many untapped
sources of reliable data exist. These data sources, while certainly not
as useful as certain classes of survey data, could serve as the data base
f or : ( 1 ) the development of elite profiles, ( 2 ) identification of chang-
es in elite composition through time, and (3) provide some insight
into the groups involved in the process of political recruitment or the
"real" party system.

The first step would be to specify the relevant elite categories.
One might well begin with civil and military elites. Civilian elites
could then be classified as governmental and nongovernmental. Civil-
governmental elites could then be subclassified by position, level,
and branch of government or party. This would be followed by develop-
ing a series of subject codes around the categories of: (1) social and
economic background, (2) education, (3) place of birth, (4) age,
(5) group membership, (6) civil/military career, (7) political career,
(8) party and faction affiliation, and (9) policy orientation when
known.

In order to further conceptualize the elite structure of Brazil, I
have developed a conspectus of Brazilian political elites and masses
that may be of some interest to those present at this meeting.

Data sources for the study of Brazilian political elites include:
(1) published biographies and autobiographies, (2) biographical di-
rectories, (3) official documents, and (4) newspapers. Biographies
and autobiographies are perhaps the most valuable source of political
recruitment data. There are many biographical directories available in
Brazil. In a two volume work entitled Brasil e Brasilehos de Hoje, are
some 7,000 subject entries listing biographical data for politicians, ad-

132

ministrators, industrialists, military leaders, intellectuals, and others.
The five volume work, Enciclopedia da Industria Brasileira, contains a
number of biographical entries. Candidates for public office in Brazil
must supply their age, place of birth, and profession when registering
as a candidate. Candidate registration petitions and party directorate
registrations are preserved in the files of the Regional Electoral Courts
and at the Supreme Electoral Court in Brasilia. While in Brazil, several
years ago, I was allowed to examine candidate petitions at the Regional
Electoral Court of Guanabara. With reference to the "Old Republic,"
the following sources contain much valuable data:

Augusto Tavares de Lyra, "O Senado da Republica, de 1890,
a 1930," Revista do lnstituto Historico e Geographico Brasileiro,
N. 2 10 (January-March, 1951), pp.3-102.

Joao Dunshee de Abranches Moura, Governos e Congressos da Re-
publica: 1889-1917. Rio: 1918.

Once coded and run onto computer tapes, such aggregate biographical
data could be used to generate hypotheses concerning the representation
of social and economic groups in the political system an aspect of
political recruitment that is usually treated in an impressionistic fash-
ion. By comparing the distribution of social and economic types within
governing elites it may be possible to predict the direction of future
system change.

133

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134

LINCOLN'S SCHOLARLY

DIPLOMAT IN ECUADOR:

FRIEDRICH HASSAUREK

By C. Harvey Gardiner

I must confess that as soon as I heard of the three-way theme for
this meeting, I thought in terms of going for the jackpot. You have
all heard of that irresistible triple-decker that found the author maxi-
mizing his reader appeal by writing about Lincoln's doctor's dog or
should I, in this geographic setting, compound the irresistible of
Robert E. Lee's horse's doctor? At any rate, I have gone all out for a
a man who is simultaneously scoundrel, statesman and scholar. That
person is Friedrich Hassaurek 1 whose wife labeled him scoundrel as
she pinned an adultery charge on him in a divorce action; whose
superior, Secretary of State Seward, heaped encomium upon him for
his demonstrated diplomatic skill; and whose book regarding his
South American experience is, I say without fear of contradiction, the
finest appraisal of nineteenth-century Ecuador by a foreigner. So.
briefly put, Friedrich Hassaurek is all of those things scoundrel,
statesman and scholar. But who, I almost hear you ask, was Friedrich
Hassaurek?

Journalist, politician, and diplomat, as well as "Cincinnati's lead-
ing forty-eighter," as Carl Wittke aptly labels him, 2 Friedrich Hassaurek
was born in Vienna, Austria, on October 9, 1832. His father, a mer-
chant-banker-writer, another personality split three-ways, died im-
poverished when young Friedrich was but four years of age. However,
a step-father provided the boy with a proper education. Sixteen years
of age, and editing a school publication when the revolution broke in

^Research Professor of History, Southern Illionis University, Carbondale, Illinois

1 This paper is closely related to the Introduction in the forthcoming volume
Four Years Among the Ecuadorians (Carbondale, 1967).

2 Carl Wittke, "Friedrich Hassaurek: Cincinnati's Leading Forty-Eighter,"
The Ohio Historical Quarterly, LXVIII (January, 1959), pp. 1-17.

135

1848, Friedrich responded to its radical ideas by joining the Student
Legion of the University of Vienna. Involved in skirmishes with the
imperial troops in and about the capital, he suffered slight wounds
on two occasions. Upon the reimposition of imperial authority, young
Hassaurek fled his homeland, heading for Cincinnati and reunion with
his mother who, once again, was a widow.

Less than seventeen years old at the time of his arrival in the
Ohio city in April, 1849, Friedrich immediately entered upon a career
in journalism. Some of his earliest German-language articles, discuss-
ions of recent events in Vienna, attracted considerable attention. His
challenge to earlier and more conservative leaders of Cincinnati's
sizable German element focused attention upon him. Simultaneously
Hassaurek quickly advanced from a $3.50-per-week translator and
assistant editor of the Ohio Slant szeitung to owner-editor of the weekly
Hochicackter.

In the columns of that "organ for intellectual enlightenment and
social reform," Hassaurek's advocacy of socialism and anti-clericalism
angered many of the older Germans of Cincinnati. Quickly becoming
bilingual, Hassaurek did not limit the expression of his ideas to the
German printed word, but soon became widely known as a vigorous
public speaker in his adopted English. In 1852 he was party to "a
week of public debates on the morality and rationality of Christianity."
The following year he lashed out most violently at a visitor to Cincin-
nati, the papal nuncio, because of that churchman's identification with
conservative elements in Austria and Italy. Before this episode sub-
sided, Hassaurek was arrested for inciting a riot which had resulted in
gunfire and death. On another occasion the rabid Austrian's feud with
a competitor promised a duel until a restraining order provided a
much-needed cooling-off period.

Among the constructive programs that helped catapult Hassaurek
into municipal politics were his part in helping to found a German
theater in Cincinnati and his unceasing campaign against those pro-
moters and agencies that routinely swindled German immigrants. In
1855, as an independent, he won a seat on the Cincinnati City Council.
But even the Queen City and journalism could not absorb all his ener-
gies.

136

Well known for his lectures to German-Americans throughout the
Midwest in support of the Republican nominees of 1856, Hassaurek
simultaneously was studying law and winning admission to the Ohio
bar. In 1857 he sold the Hocbivachter and in the course of putting
journalism aside, he also shed some of his radical outlook.

Inclined, in part, to the philosophy of the young Republican Party
because of his abolitionist stands, Hassaurek was one of that party's
founding fathers in Cincinnati. During the closing years of the 1850's
his service on the Cincinnati City Council continued and his popularity
with his fellow German- Americans resulted in a highly remunerative
law practice. His orations not only deepened his identification with the
party, they also increased the number of German-Americans in Repub-
lican ranks. A delegate to the Chicago convention that nominated Lin-
coln, Hassaurek spoke throughout Ohio in behalf of Lincoln's candidacy.
The 28-year-old Cincinnatian, politically intimate with Chase, Wade,
Cox, Sherman and other prominent Ohioans, had his claims upon the
victorious party and rightly expected some significant reward.

Because of his European background and command of languages,
Hassaurek hoped to be named American minister to Switzerland. To
support his bid for that post, the Ohio legislature sent petitions to
Washington. Additional support, a petition signed by governor and
legislators, came out of Indiana. A number of Ohio newspapermen
also backed Hassaurek. He failed, however, to win the Swiss assign-
ment and, urged to consider a South American post, he next indicated
a desire to go to Chile. In the course of exchanges between Secretary
of Treasury Salmon P. Chase and Secretary of State William H. Seward,
a further shift developed and Hassaurek was offered and accepted the
"highest" office in South America, his legation at Quito being situated
some 9,300 feet above sea-level.

Late in April, 1861, Hassaurek, his thin face sporting moustache
and goatee, and his wavy hair parted on the right, proceeded to Wash-
ington for instructions. Sixty-eight days after his departure from that
place, he arrived in Quito, where, on July 15, he presented his creden-
tials to President Gabriel Garcia Moreno. 3

3 Friedrich Hassaurek to William H. Seward, Quito, July 19, 1861, in National
Archives, Records of the Department of State, (hereafter NADS), Diplomatic
Despatches, Ecuador.

137

In many respects the tall Ecuadorian with the wide forehead and
penetrating eyes was the antithesis of the liberal, democratic republican
Hassaurek. Born in Guayaquil and educated in Quito, Garcia Moreno,
having witnessed the revolutions of '48 that confirmed Hassaurek's
liberalism, returned to Ecuador an arch-conservative. Positive that he
and Catholicism would be the salvation of Ecuador, Garcia Moreno
was busy consolidating the authority he had seized in I860, the authority
he would wield for full fifteen years. In 1861 the new strongman
dictated a constitution for his country. Two years later he would pro-
claim a concordat with the Papacy that created, in Ecuador, the most
theocratic state in American history, one which gave the Church powers
and privileges it had never exercised previously beyond the Atlantic.

In time Garcia Moreno came to advocate improved agricultural
methods and inaugurate a long-term program of road construction. He
fought regional caudillos and enlarged the measure of internal security.
He desired an efficient treasury, currency reform, foreign investment
and other innovations. Schools, under church control, mushroomed
throughout much of Ecudor. Brooking no opposition, the iron-willed
civilian perpetuated his authority by eliminating the prospective freedom
of speech and freedom of the press and assembly an I the meaningful
congressional activity that his enemies, the Liberals, espoused. It was
this man, whose personality and administration were so pregnant with
long-term significance for Ecuador, 4 that Friedrich Hassaurek had to
fathom.

Not unex ectedly a thoughtful portrait of Garcia Moreno was
penned in the earliest years of that unusual dictatorship by the American
minister. On January 4, 1862, in a dispatch to Secretary of State Seward,
Hassaurek wrote, "Notwithstanding his impulsiveness and violent and
arbitrary disposition, the President is a man of a great deal of public
spirit and extraordinary energy. He is anxious to promote the material
welfare, and to develop the internal resources of the country, and labors
incessantly in pursuit of these objects. He is honest, a quality which
cannot be said to be very general ... He is very ambitious, and as
intolerant in religious matters as vindictive against political opponents."

4 For a detailed appraisal, see Richard Pattee, Gabriel Garcia Moreno y el
Ecuador de su Tiempo (Quito, 1941).

138

Hassaurek stamped Garcia Moreno "a mixture of strange elements;" a
man who "wants to do right in his own way . . . looking on the mem-
bers of his cabinet as on his clerks, not his constitutional advisers."
Thirty months later, in mid-1864 Hassaurek told Seward, "his [Gar-
cia Moreno's] unpopularity notwithstanding, he is the only man in the
country who can maintain domestic order and tranquility." 5

Meanwhile, immediately upon arrival, Hassaurek had plunged
into the sea of diplomacy with characteristic exuberance and energy.
For one thing and his quickly attained fluency in Spanish helped him
immeasurably he wanted to study public opinion and the probable
position of Ecuador in regard to the Confederacy. After repeated con-
versations with Foreign Minister Carvajal, to whom he explained
"the entire causelessness of the southern rebellion," Hassaurek was able
to inform Seward that "The position of Ecuador . . . will henceforward
be what it has always been, one of cordial friendship with the United
States." 6

Proof that this is not mere bombast from the facile pen of a journ-
alist-turned-diplomat is evident in one of Seward's communications to
Hassaurek. "The President," wrote the American secretary of state, "is
favorably impressed with the ability, sagacity and patriotism which
your correspondence displays in the conduct of your mission." 7 Indeed,
as a writer of diplomatic dispatches, Hassaurek was systematic and
logical in his consideration of problems the rumored annexation of
Ecuador to France, 8 the theatened outbreak of hostilities between Ecua-
dor and Peru, or any other issue.

s Friedrich Hassaurek to William H. Seward, Quito, January 4, 1862, and
Quito, July 1, 1864, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

6 Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, August 1, 1861, ibid.

7 Seward to Hassaurek, Washington, September 16, 1861, NADS, Diplomatic
Instructions, Ecuador.

8 For Garcia Moreno's orientation toward Europe, see G. F. Howe, "Garcia
Moreno's Efforts to Unite Ecuador and France," Hispanic American Historical
Review, XVI (May, 1936), pp. 257-262 and W. S. Robertson, "Garcia Mo-
reno's Dream of a European Protectorate," Contribuciones para el Estudio de la
Historia de America. Homenaje al Dr. Emilio Ravignam (Buenos Aires, 1941),
pp. 125-143.

139

In addition to encouraging Ecuador's benevolent neutrality toward
the Lincoln government during our Civil War, Hassaurek faced and
handled a succession of other issues. Indeed the first instruction re-
ceived from his superiors in Washington informed the new minister
that he had inherited a file of claims by United States citizens against
Ecuador, some of which had been pending, so Seward told him, "for
an unreasonably long time." 9 In line with this unfinished business was
the most important thing accomplished by Hassaurek, the creation
and operation of a mixed commission to handle Ecuadorian and Ameri-
can claims. As early as mid-1862 he began to press this matter. In due
time a convention was drawn up, the ratifications of it exchanged, and
the commission established, with Hassaurek the first American mem-
ber. 10

But all matters to which the diplomat turned his hand were not
long-term ones, nor were they productive of significant precedents. In
the autumn of 1862 the threatened invasion by expresident Urbina
from a Peruvian base hurried Hassaurek down from Quito to Guayaquil,
"for the purpose," he informed Seward, "of preventing, by my personal
presence and influence, any depredations that might otherwise be com-
mitted on American property there." 11 When the invasion fizzled and
all alarms had subsided, Hassaurek made the wearying trip back to the
capital.

A Peruvian land owner, in search of a better-disciplined labor force
for his plantations, initiated a suggestion which was more interesting
than successful. Senor Malo's request for free Negroes from the United
States, led Hassaurek to introduce the issue into his correspondence
with Secretary Seward. When the latter referred the matter to the Presi-
dent Lincoln indicated that nothing would be done unless the govern-
ment of Ecuador officially endorsed the idea of admitting numbers

9 Seward to Hassaurek, Washington, April 30, 1861, NADS, Diplomatic
Instructions, Ecuador.

10 For Hassaurek's labors regarding the mixed commission, see his despatches
# 30, 37, 47, 49, 134, 140, 142, 145, 149, 178 which, dated variously between
July 18, 1862, and August 18, 1865, from both Quito and Guayaquil, are in
NADS, Diplomatic Despatches, Ecuador.

1 1 Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, November 12, 1862, NADS, Diplomatic
Despatches, Ecuador.

140

of American Negroes as colonists. Next Hassaurek Mimed to Ecuadorian
authorities for official reaction. That official attitude was crisp and
negative when Garcia Moreno issued a decree which prohibited the
landing of such immigrants. 12 Accordingly what had started out as the
private proposal of one Ecuadorian citizen never became a significant
piece of official business for Minister Hassaurek.

One suggestion from Seward, namely that he try to conclude a
postal convention with Ecuador, never challenged Hassaurek's en-
thusiasm and energy. On the other hand, the young diplomat became
deeply interested in something on which he had no instructions, namely
asylum. The prospect of Hassaurek's playing host to the families of
prominent politicians during a revolutionary flurry in 1864 encouraged
him to write, "I take the liberty of suggesting that it would perhaps
save many an embarrassment or trouble, if the Department were to
send instructions to our Ministers in the Spanish-American states on the
subject of granting asylum." 13 Hassaurek was a party to what has be-
come commonplace. Today we all know that the question of asylum has
produced a mass of international law and episodes too numerous to
relate regarding Latin America.

Between July 1861 and January 1866, with time out for a trip
to the United States in 1864 when he tried to win the release of a
half-brother from a Confederate prison camp and when also he cam-
paigned in behalf of Lincoln's reelection, Hassaurek had ably represent-
ed the United States in the west coast South American country. Old
issues, such as claims, moved toward resolutions and new problems
born of the Civil War were settled satisfactorily. At the end of his
diplomatic tour, as had been the case early in it, Hacsaurek deserved
commendation from his superiors.

Meanwhile, in his private life, that moment that labels him
scoundrel had arrived. In June, 1862, Mrs. Hassaurek and her daughter
by a previous marriage left Ecuador for Cincinnati. There she instituted

12 For the position of the U. S. government on this issue, see the instructions
# 23, 32, 66, 71 and 73 from Seward to Hassaurek in 1863-64, NADS, Diplo-
matic Instructions, Ecuador.

'3 Hassaurek to Seward, Quito, July 20, 1864, NADS, Diplomatic Despatches,
Ecuador.

141

divorce proceedings, charging the diplomat with adultery. He countered
that it was she who had been adulterous. The resultant court action
might well have been the news sensation of early 1863 in straigl.t-lace I
Cincinnati had not Hassaurek's friend Judge W. M. Dickson, with
whom he had read law, quieted the matter in newspaper circles. 14 Mrs.
Hassaurek won her divorce; and the Minister won the measure of con-
sideration that spared him the necessity of resigning his diplomatic
post.

Even before his return to the States early in 1866, the writer,
in Hassaurek's nature, began to eclipse the diplomat. His interest in
Andean history led him, in 1865, to publish an artic' entitled "Tupac
Amaru, the Indian Martyr of Peru." 15

Immediately upon his return to Cincinnati, Hassaurek plunged
into the book-length statement of his own experience in Ecuador. Then,
as now, Ecuador was neither a burning political theme nor a popular
literary subject with the American public. Accordingly the eager author
found it necessary to subsidi2e, to the extent of $500, the 1867 edition,
the first printing of the book Four Years Among Spanish-Americans.
The blow-by-blow account of the unseemly hasle that developed be-
tween Hassaurek and his New York publisher, like the colorful divorce
action to which he had been a party, can be found in the Hassaurek
Papers in The Ohio Historical Society.

Four Years Among Spanish- Americans, which more accurately
could have been titled Four Years Among the Ecuadorians, is the basis
of Hassaurek's claim to a reputation as a scholar. For many reasons,
only a few of which I shall attempt to develop for you now, the book
is peculiarly interesting. In point of time it coincides with the opening
years of a significant era in Ecuadorian life. In point of subject-matter
it exhibits remarkable balance between the land and the people, be-
tween trifles of the moment and imperishable fundamentals. On at
least three counts certain portions of the book are predictable on the
basis of the author's nature. The ex-Austrian's love of mountains is

4 Hassaurek to [Judge W. M. Dickson], Quito, March 6, 1863, Friedrich
Hassaurek Papers, The Ohio Historical Society offers a candid and full state-
ment of the marital troubles of the Hassaureks.
15 Gazlay's Pan fie Monthly, II No. 1 (July, 1865), pp. 9-19.

142

lavished on Chimborazo, Cotopaxi, Antisana and scores of lesser peaks.
His love of the United States manifests itself when he compares the
two countries politically and economically. The civilian and journalist
in him shines through when he deplores the shortage of printing
presses and the abundance of military barracks. The ardent democrat in
his nature caused Hassaurek to shake his head disapprovingly at the
Ecuadorian emphasis on personalities at the expense of principles.

Because he liked people and also because he noted that most
previous writers had concentrated on the landscape of Ecuador, Hassau-
rek focused on "the character, the social and domestic life, the politi-
cal institutions and troubles of the inhabitants." 16 With the lot of the
Indian, he sympathized. "The Indian does more work than all the
other races together," Hassaurek insisted, "but his position in the social
scale is in an inverse proportion to his usefulness . . . The word Indian
is a term of contempt, even among Indians themselves . . ," 17

At times Hassaurek's writing is simple narrative, as when he de-
scribes the colorful Otavalo Indians or the pesky fleas. On other occa-
sions he introduces his reader to complex and interlocking issues, as
when he wrote, "In the lowlands, the great and almost insurmountable
drawback is the want of laborers, owing to the thinness of the popu-
lation, the enervating effects of the climate, the system of peonage
and the unsettled state of the country with continual revolutions and
impressments." 18

All in all, Hassaurek's Four Years Among Spanish- Americans is a
happy combination of observation and reflection, of the general and
the specific, of the land and the people, of the social, the economic
and the political. Its thematic construction attests considerable labor
on the author's part. As though to compensate for the occasional tedious-
ly long sentence possibly telltale evidence of his Austrian origins
Hassaurek's writing reeks with colorful adjectives and precise planning.
The book is, I submit, easily the best travel assessment of nineteenth-
century Ecuador by a citizen of the United States. Today, 100 years

16 F. Hassaurek, Four Years Among Spanish-Americans (New York, 1867), iii.
I? Ibid., p. 188.
is Ibid., pp. 16-17.

143

after its initial publication, Hassaurek's volume offers help to the stu-
dent of Ecuadorian life, whether his interest be geography, government,
society, history, economics or literature.

While in South America, Hassaurek had nosed about in more
than one Ecuadorian archive, hoping that the materials he rounded up
would support the writing of several significant historical studies. On
one occasion, unsuccessfully, he asked Secretary of State Seward to
shift him from the post in Quito to that in Lima, because he had
sifted the Ecuadorian archives and wanted access to those of Peru. 19
However, Hassaurek's plans to produce a history of the Spanish colonial
system and a biography of Simon Bolivar never materialized. Two of
the insurmountable obstacles that beset his onetime enthusiasm for those
major projects were the following: the less than enthusiastic reception
accorded the volume of his own experiences, which, you will recall,
had been attended by prolonged bickering with his publisher, and,
secondly, Hassaurek's reimmersion in the task of supporting himself,
which meant a return to journalism. Still, though, the man who had
known a memorable South American experience could not dismiss that
region completely from his thinking. Accordingly a third by-product
of his stay in Ecuador emerged in 1879, in the form of a romance,
when he published the The Secret of the Andes. 20

Meanwhile, reestablished in Cincinnati and publishing another
German-language newspaper, Hassaurek became a bitter critic of Re-
publican Reconstruction policies. While on a honeymoon trip to
Europe, with his third wife, in 1885, he died in Paris.

Living on, down to this moment, for you and me, is the fact
that Hassaurek the diplomat was a linguistically able man, a culturally
tolerant person, a man interested in building meaningful bridges of
cooperation between Latin and Anglo-America. Hassaurek the scholar,
casting light into the corners of abysmal ignorance which beset his
fellow- Americans on the subject of Spanish America, made a meaning-
ful contribution toward hemispheric understanding. For these reasons,
I have submitted these remarks about Friedrich Hassaurek to you on
this day, April 14, Pan American Day.

19 Hassaurek to Seward, Guayaquil, May 1, 1865, NADS, Diplomatic Des-
patches, Ecuador.

20 The setting for this tedious and sentimental work, which ran to 466 pages,
was Quito, 1592.

GtO^GtO

tS^ *'

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VII

June, 1969

Number 1

Published By

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VII June, 1969 Number 1

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS SPEAK

ON

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

CONTENTS

Page

Harry E. Frank

Community Development in West Georgia:

An Introductory Note - 3

J. Mark Miller

A Rationale for Community Development 8

L. Doyle Mathis

The Role of Government in Community Development 13

James W. Adams

The Role of Economics in Community Development 21

Warren A. Walker

Does the Businessman have a Vested Interest

in Community Development .31

Jack L. Jewell

Practical Contribution of Geography to Local Planning 38

Tom J. Ljghtsey

The Role of Education in Community Development 43

Fred Parsons

The Community as a Social System 49

Kenneth R. Whittemore

The Local Community and Mental Health. _ 55

Theodore B. Fitz-Simons

History's Relation to Sociology and

Community Development - , _ 60

FOREWORD

This volume marks the seventh year of a cooperative program
started by the late Professor J. Carson Pritchard of West Georgia
College and Mr. Clyde D. Ware of the Sears-Roebuck Foundation.
The purpose of the project is to make available recent thoughts, plans
and information about the Social Sciences to a concerned public.

The circumstances surrounding the papers contained herein are
explained in the first article by Harry Frank of the Department of
Adult Education. The conception and execution of the sessions which
took several social scientists to ten counties in western Georgia was done
by Professor Collus O. Johnson, Department of Adult Education, West
Georgia College.

A special note of appreciation is due to the Sears-Roebuck Foun-
dation for their encouragement, the members of the West Georgia
College faculty who contributed articles and efforts and to Gail Adams,
Division Secretary, for her editorial assistance.

Copyright 1968, Division of Social Sciences
West Georgia College

FIRST PRINTING

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-625241
Printed in the United States of America Price $1.25

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

IN WEST GEORGIA:

AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

By Harry E. Frank*

An innovative approach to community development in the West
Georgia area was initiated last year by the Department of Continuing
Education, West Georgia College. 1 This program was carried out by
utilizing West Georgia College faculty who visited various communities
in an adjoining ten-county area. Follow-up courses emphasizing county
and community problems were instituted as a second phase of com-
munity development. The lectures delivered form the base for this
bulletin.

The community development program was directed toward assist-
ing local citizens to look at the overall picture of the various activities
in the community. As a result it was expected that the citizenry would
become more aware of their local problems and possible solutions. It
was assumed that any progress made in community development would
depend upon individual action in groups with common beliefs, values
and goals. Furthermore, it was recognized at the outset that the indivi-
duals participating would have different perceptions of community
situations. The course was structured so that the varying knowledge of
local persons could be utilized to supplement the theoretical concepts
and generalizations brought to the group by the college consultants.

Some degree of continuity was maintained by persons from the
Department of Continuing Education at West Georgia College. These
persons attempted to orient the audience for each meeting by relating
some of the previous meeting activities and by developing an adult
atmosphere conducive to investigation of the problems relating to their
community. These specialists also acted as moderators in panel dis-
cussions.

*Assistant Professor of Adult Education.

Financed in part under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965, the funds
of which were administered by the University of Georgia.

The course in each community consisted of an initial session on
understanding the broad implications of community development. Other
sessions focused on the study of physical features, history, economy,
government, education, social conditions and community organization.

Following these sessions, one meeting was devoted to "bringing
about a better community." This meeting consisted of a symposium of
local persons knowledgeable in subject areas already discussed in
previous meetings. Following the symposium, the participants were
given the opportunity to express their perceptions of a number of items
relating to community development in terms of favorable and un-
favorable aspects existing in the community. They registered these
opinions on a five-point continuum in each direction to indicate percep-
tions which were then combined for a consensus of perceptions relating
to the items considered. The specific community development items
considered in several community courses were: safety, human develop-
ment, health, housing, human relations, business development, trans-
portation, employment, education, recreation, religion, industrial devel-
opment, community organization and coorporation, natural resources,
services and government. The participants also listed what they con-
sidered to be major problem areas and possible solutions.

The disparities between the favorable and unfavorable aspects of
each item considered as being important to community development
and the relative frequency of major problem areas did provide an order
of priorities. The results of the self-evaluation by the community parti-
cipants assisted in designing programs for community improvement,
recognizing that many of the problems mentioned by the participants
were beyond the scope of immediate action. Preliminary steps that
might lead to desirable change in the community were considered and
some steps were taken toward initiating activities toward solving the
most pressing problems.

The problem-solving approach to community development was
used throughout these courses. The particular problem area to be con-
sidered in the session was carefully phrased, clearly defined and located
in the community context. The situation was then analyzed in terms of
symptoms, history, causes and trends in general and specific cases.
Solutions were usually suggested and evaluated. Finally, plans for

implementation of programs to bring about the solution were discussed
by the group.

A basic concept underlying the community development program
was that behavior in a task situation is related to the perceptions of the
task by the members involved. Many social scientists agree that percep-
tual differences are the result of the interaction of both environment and
personal influences. Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey support this
contention by stating that each person has an individualized image as a
product of his physical and social environment, his physiological struc-
tures, his wants and goals and past experiences. Each person, therefore,
has an individualized image or map of the worlds Hilgard stated:
"Certainly one of the factors (influencing perception) and indeed an
important one, is the variation in previous life experiences." 3 Bonner
mentioned the importance of past experiences on perception with the
following statement: "Although experience is not the sole determinent
of perception, it appears valid to assume that what a person perceives
is significantly influenced by his previous life experiences." 4

The community development program was designed to be an
experience for the individuals who participated. It might be considered
logical that this similar experience would influence the perceptions of
the individuals on the conditions that exist and therefore provide a
basis for common effort to solve community problems. Krech, Crutch-
field, and Ballachey give a basis for expecting similar perception from
persons classified in similar experience groups by the following quota-
tion:

Although no two persons have precisely the same conception
of the world there are many common features in the world
images of all people. This is true because they have similar
nervous systems, share common wants, and cope with common
problems. The cognitive worlds of the members of the certain

2 David Krech, Richard Crutchfield, and Egerton Ballachey, Individual in
Society (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1962), p. 17.

3 Earnest R. Hilgard, Introduction to Psychology (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1957), p. 587.

* Herbert Bonner, Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Approach (New
York: American Book Company, 1953), p. 96.

culture group are similar to an even greater degree because of
the great similarity of their wants and goals in the physical
and social environment to which they are exposed and in their
learning experiences. 5

The learning experiences in this course were designed to encourage
perceptual change by providing additional information and supporting
interaction of participants in a favorable learning climate. This change
was desired to bring about improvements in the community through the
development of similar perceptions, wants, goals and desires. The
direction and degree of attitude change are often deciding factors in
the success of action programs to bring about community improvements.
Such changes may be induced by additional information and group
interaction under proper learning conditions.

Based upon group learning principles a number of conditions were
fulfilled. The situational factors, source, medium and content were
directed toward making cognitive information more acceptable to the
participants. The advantages, therefore, of having group meetings under
the auspicies of the college could be justified on the basis of recognized
expertise. This expertise was extended to the local situation by involve-
ment of locally accepted experts who served as reaction panel members
and group discussion participants. Community group meetings were
conducted in order to capitalize on the additional influence of additu-
dinal development in groups. 6 It has been accepted by leading authori-
ties that attitudes developed in groups tend to agree with group
attitudes. 7 Commitments by individuals in the group also tend to fix
the attitudes of that individual so that he is resistant to change. The
group meetings also allowed more face-to-face presentation of infor-
mation which has been found to be of more importance in bringing
about perceptual change than mass media presentations.

s Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey, Individual in Society, p. 18.

6 Floyd L. Ruch, Psychology and Life, (Glenville, Illinois: Scott Foresman and
Company, 1967), p. 558.

7 Muzofer Sherif, "Group Influences on the Formation of Norms and Attitudes"
in Joseph F. Perez, Richard C. Sprinthall, George S. Grosser and Paul J.
Anderson (eds.), Selected Readings in General Psychology (Princeton, New
Jersey: Van Nostrand, Inc., 1967) pp. 391-393.

The form and content of the information provided at these meet-
ings by the college consultants was well organized and the content was
related to a particular geographic area and a particular group of citizens.
This style therefore made the information more acceptable to partici-
pants and more conducive to perceptual change.

Participants utilized as resource persons and participants entering
the discussion developed some degree of responsibility toward the
group as a semi-official of that group. This assumption of a leadership
position tended to increase the acceptance of the group perceptions by
these individuals and therefore increased the effectiveness of the group
in instituting community development activities based upon consensus.

In summary, it seems that the programs were effective in bringing
to the attention of persons in the community various prospects of
community development. This was accomplished through a presentation
of generalization by the consultants from West Georgia College and
then focusing upon local situations that were brought to the attention of
the group by knowledgeable individuals in the community. The prestige
of the faculty members and knowledgeable persons in the community
assisted in the acceptance of the information presented. The content
presented and procedures followed seem to help solidify perceptions of
problems of importance in the community. Specific problem areas that
needed attention in community development were identified and priority
ratings of the items to be worked upon determined. The entire program
seemed to bring about a change in the perceptions of the major prob-
lems relating to community development by the citizens in the area.
This course has been followed by development activities such as Group
Leadership Training and the formation of the local study groups. These
activities have developed to further investigate problem items and make
plans for future programs to bring about community improvement.
Although a series of eight two-hour meetings could not be expected
to bring about great changes in community development, the purpose of
stimulating inquiry into the local community, the development of
skills in bringing about effective local participation and an understand-
ing of the overall view of the processes of community development
seemed to have been accomplished.

A RATIONALE FOR
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By J. Mark Miller*

For the past decade there has been a great deal of talk about
and some action taken on community development. However, before
a discussion and action can begin, one needs an understanding of
what is meant by community development.

Since words, things, and objects take on a meaning only as a
person attaches meaning from his own experiences and his own frame of
reference, people view things differently. Thus, several "definitions"
of community development seem appropriate. According to one writer
community development includes, "any action taken by an agency and
primarily designed to benefit the community." 1 Others have said that,
"community development is a social process by which human beings can
become more competent to live with and gain some control over local
aspects of a frustrating and changing world." 2 Community development
can also be considered as a process or as "a planned and organized
effort to assist individuals to acquire the attitudes, skills, and concepts
required for their democratic participation in the effective solution of as
wide a range of community improvement problems as possible. . ." 3
A somewhat similar definition is that community development is "... a
movement designed to promote better living for the whole community
with the active participation and the initiative of the community." 4

*Chairman, Division of Business and Economic Studies.

1 T. R. Batten, Communities and Their Development, (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1957), p. 2.

2 William W. and Toureide Biddle, The Community Development Process,
The Rediscovery of Local Initiative, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1965), p. 78.

3 J. D. Mezirow, "Community Development as an Educational Process,"
Community Development (Washington: National Training Laboratories, 1961),
p. 16.

* A Study Conference at Hartwell House, Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, England,
September, 1957, Community Development (London: Her Majesty's Stationary
Office, 1958), p. 2.

Although the foregoing definitions are quite comprehensive, they
do not seem to emphasize one main point. That point is the totality
of community development. Thus, a more comprehensive definition ap-
pears desirable. From the point of view of this paper, community devel-
opment is a continual social process through which the total resources
are developed, utilized and maintained for the betterment of the com-
munity. From this definition it can be seen that the process calls for
continuous plans, programs, and action involving the human, natural,
physical, and capital resources. This definition should emphasize that
the development must be continuous.

Although community development begins with an understanding
of its meaning, the community will never develop unless it starts with
people people interacting for the good of the community. Regardless
of the abundance of the mineral resources and natural resources or of
the physical and capital resources, no community can begin to develop
unless there are people. Thus, the greatest resource in the world is
people. For effective community development, people must get involved.
They must study, discuss, and work together. 5

For the past several years many may have felt that in certain areas
of development, the world has been going backward rather than moving
ahead. Many have lost touch in participating in community affairs.
This becomes especially true as government grows larger. Yet, most
believe in democracy and would do anything to keep free government by
the people. It may even be true that democracy is suffering because
many people in their own communities have not taken the opportunity
to practice it. Some who have had the opportunity have abdicated their
responsibility. They need to regain the sense of working together.

Consider the man who has read a great deal about golf. He would
like to play and he thinks he could. He also knows that all the books
about golf will not make him a golfer. Talking with golfers will not
make him one. He has to get some clubs and balls and a course on
which to play. He also needs to match up with other men and play the

s The main ideas here are from Hartwell Daley, Gateways to Growth: A
Study Course on Community and Area Resources Development, Division of
Research Department of Industry and Natural Resources, (Charlottetown,
Prince Edward Isle, Canada, n.d.), pp. 1-8.

10

game. Only then will he have the real satisfaction of clouting the ball.
Many people today seem to be ready to make democracy more than
high-sounding phrases about freedom. They are ready to get the feeling
of playing the game.

Some time ago a citizen said to one of his neighbors, This is an
awful thing to say, but I wish the war might be continued.' Of course
the neighbor thought the citizen was kidding. But the citizen went on
to say, 'During the war my neighbors and I got together several even-
ings a week to learn to be wardens, fire fighters, first-aid people and air-
plane spotters. We got to know each other for the first time and we
learned to work together. True, the war hung over us like a black
cloud. But for the first time most of us felt really useful.' 6 These people
got the feel of working together for a common cause. They felt useful
and they were useful. One way in which people can work together
to be useful is through community development. They can put democ-
racy to work at their own community level.

Looking back into history, one holds the forefathers in awe as he
thinks about frontiers that had to be conquered. There must have been
something romantic about conquering early frontiers. For many, it
seems that the frontiers have vanished. There are those that feel that
adventure went out with the frontier. In some ways this might be true,
in other ways it is not. Each individual has a frontier all his own. There
are new possibilities about which to learn. Every community has
frontiers of its own. It can create new programs, add new responsibili-
ties and develop new resources. To venture into community develop-
ment is to journey into new adventures and new frontiers. Today's
frontiers are just as exciting and rewarding as those of yesteryear.

Although the place to start community development is with people
many people will not do much unless they see a need for action. Before
looking for a need, it would be well if some commonplace notions were
dispelled. One such notion is that some communities do not need to be
improved. Most would admit that Utopias are rare. Those who feel that
their communities are good enough use this as an excuse for inaction.
There are few communities that cannot stand toning up.

6 Ibid., p. 2.

11

Secondly, some people might say that even if a community needs
improving, there is nothing that can be done about it. There is no
truth in the statement that communities cannot change. There are
hundreds of visible examples. To begin programs of community devel-
opment individuals can assure themselves that communities can be
improved. Consider the following case history. 7

McCleary is a small town in the state of Washington. It was "on
the way out" as a place to live and work. In 1955, the people of Mc-
Cleary decided to see if anything could be done. A large group of people
studied the town and discussed its problems. Objectives were set, com-
mittees were organized and plans were developed. At the end of the
first year the Seattle Times noted that McCleary had collected enough
money to finish the Mark E. Reed Hospital. The town cemetery had
been cleared and fenced by volunteers. An old hotel had been trans-
formed into modern apartments. A new supermarket was being built and
dozens of homes had been painted and otherwise improved.

In the next few years the town completed an addition to a school
building, replaced the town hall shack with a $90,000 structure, erected
a new Veterans of Foreign Wars hall where an old warehouse had been
torn down and created new jobs at a new woodworking mill. All of
this in a short period of time in a community which the Seattle Times
called "The Town that Wouldn't be Buried." At the end of the first
year one of McCleary's local leaders, Ellsworth Curran, chairman of
the community development group, stated,

We have rejuvenated the basic principles of democracy. We
have learned by joining together in sharing our thinking and
our own efforts we are able to take our destiny into our own
hands and mold it ourselves. We have learned that each of us,
regardless of age, wealth, religion, or station in life, is
an important part of his community. No longer is it necessary
to sit idly by hoping for some outside force to create the
changes we would have now we can do them for ourselves. 8

7 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

8 Ibid., p. 8.

12

The moral to prove, if it indeed needed to be proved, is that the
greatest need in any community is for people who believe that the
thoughts and the efforts of local people are the best instruments for
starting change for the better. The people who live and work in an
area or community have within their power to make the kind of com-
munity they want. Of course, this does not mean that experts and
specialists from the outside cannot be helpful and necessary. They can
and may be. It does mean, however, that there is not one who will bene-
fit more from improvements than the people who live and work in a
community. There is none who has greater interest. And there is none
who more thoroughly understands the strengths and weaknesses of the
community.

Experience has shown that the greatest community need is for
people who are concerned enough to work with other people to bring
about improvements. Communities are going to change. Whether the
change is for better depends upon concerned people working together
to bring about the development, utilization, and maintenance of the
total resources.

13

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By Doyle Mathis*

Whether community development is to be attempted, and to what
extent, are matters for the citizens of each community to decide. How-
ever, whatever the problems or whatever the goals concerning commun-
ity development, it is very likely that government either local, state,
or national will play a big part in any successful action undertaken.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss matters concerning government
that usually assist in community development, if development is desired
by the citizens of the community.

Americans expect and even demand much from government, and
if these expectations and demands are not met by local governments
the people then look to state and national governments for action.
"The ever increasing urbanization of our Nation, and the constant
demand for more and better governmental services have placed new
and heavy burdens on all governments, but especially on local govern-
ments." 1 Many problems are carried to Washington simply because
lower levels of government have failed to take effective measures. 2
Local governments should be able to solve many community problems
but they are often too weak to accomplish much.

If local governments are to be really effective in community
development they must be strengthened extensively. Senator Edmund S.
Muskie of Maine states, "If federalism, as we know it, is to continue,
it is essential that we have strong, active State and local governments." 3
The Chamber of Commerce of the United States contends that, "Unless
local government is revitalized, our political and economic systems, as

* Associate Professor and Head, Department of Political Science.

' Congressional Record, 90 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 113, No. 152 (Sept. 26, 1967).

2 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan America:
Challenge to federalism (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966),
pp. 117-18; V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), p. 311.

3 Congressional Record, 90 Cong., 1 Sess., Vol. 113, No. 209 (Jan. 2, 1968).

14

we now know them, will have little chance to solve public problems
effectively. Governments of yesteryear must be remodeled to fit not
only today's, but also tomorrow's needs. " A

The Chamber suggests that the effectiveness of local political
systems should be measured by considering the following questions:

1. Are local governments large enough in area and population
to act effectively on community problems and opportunities?

2. Are they willing and able to raise sufficient revenue equitably?

3. Are they willing and able to adjust boundaries to meet chang-
ing conditions?

4. Are they organized to handle effectively a variety of functions?

5. Are they accessible to and controllable by the people they
serve?

6. Are they able to attract qualified public servants?

"NO" answers to these questions can mean serious governmental
problems. In that case, action is needed. 5

If Americans really believe in local control of essentially local
activities, local governments must be strengthened. The best way to
bring about centralization of governmental activities at the state and
national level is to allow local governments to remain weak. On the
other hand, the best way to prevent centralization of governmental
activities is to strengthen local governments and show more interest in
local political affairs. Voter turnout for local elections is quite low in
relation to state and especially presidential elections. 6 If local govern-
ments are to be strengthened there needs to be a marked increase in
citizen interest and support.

Some may say that our local governments have served "satisfac-
torily" for a long time but who is to say that we could not have done
better. It now appears very likely that what has been "good enough"
in the past will not be nearly adequate for the future, or even at present.

* Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Modernizing Local Government
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 9.

<> V. O. Key, Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 579-80.

15

in this fast changing world. The world is unlikely to slow down to
allow us to keep up. Therefore, we must be ready to move with the
times, while the opportunities are available. Three possible ways to
strengthen local governments for more efficient and effective handling
of problems are through political unification, consolidation of functions,
and administrative reforms.

First, political unification needs to be accomplished. A major
problem throughout most of the United States is an excessive number
of small, weak local governments. In Georgia much of the problem
rests on the large number of counties, second only to Texas, and the fact
that so many activities and services are established along county bound-
daries. Many of the 159 counties have so few people and so few
resources, and therefore are so weak, that they are able to accomplish
very little for their citizens.

One of the best ways to strengthen local governments is to de-
crease the number of local governmental units consolidate. Large
areas often have the same or similar problems and goals. There seems
to be little reason why the several local governments of these areas can
not be brought together as a single political unit.

A second way of strengthening local governments is through the
consolidation of certain activities and services. This is not to form
a larger political unit but is a milder form of unification. Already in
Georgia regional health centers and regional libraries have been estab-
lished. Provision has been made for the possible consolidation of
school systems across county lines with voter approval. Consolidation
of functions among local governments could well be used in numerous
other areas, such as streets and highways, water, fire protection, police
protection, zoning, industrial parks, and renewal.

Either type of consolidation should help to develop more workable
programs, obtain more qualified personnel, and achieve better results.
Political unification is probably the better method but functional
consolidation might be more acceptable to the citizens.

A third way by which local governments could be much strength-
ened from within is through administrative reforms. Often, there is no
single individual to provide unity no chief executive or chief adminis-

16

trator. This is especially true in most county governments and in
commission form municipal governments. There is often no unity
among different officers or departments. It may not be clearly known
who is responsible for certain activities. Local government records are
usually scattered in several locations rather than having a central record
center where newer technology and procedures could be utilized. What
if businesses were run this way?

In a democracy, the chief policy-making or law-making body
should be elected by and responsible to the electorate. Then, there
should be a chief executive either elected by the people or appointed by
and responsible to the policy-making body. In the case of a city or
county manager, the policy-making body should be able to employ and
dismiss the administrator. The legislative body elected by the people
should establish policies only and leave administration, the responsi-
bility of carrying out the policies, to the administrator.

The activities and services of the local governments should be
divided into departments, and most, if not all, current officers and
activities should be placed in regular departments. Most employees
should be chosen through a merit system, ordinarily in competition with
others. They should then be assigned to the departments and placed
under the supervision of a single department head, who in turn would
be responsible to the chief administrator.

Through this line of authority all ultimately would be responsible
to the people. The electorate would choose the policy-making body,
this group or the electorate would choose the chief executive, and other
employees would be responsible to that administrator. This line of
authority, resting on the people, places all citizens in a very important
position. Because of this important position the citizenry should be
well informed on political matters and should participate in political
activities such as discussing issues, voting, campaigning and running for
office.

To have efficient and effective work, employees should be of
high caliber, paid well, and given reason to be well satisfied and proud
of their positions. Police departments could bring prestige for their
positions through recruitment of good men and the taking of pride in
doing an outstanding job. Good pay and excellent training are essential

17

for good police departments today. Law enforcement officials must
become familiar with new techniques of crime prevention and detection
and also new legal requirements placed on them by the courts, as the
courts attempt to insure the individual rights of those accused of crime.

Once our local governments have been improved by some of the
ways mentioned they should be given the authority to act decisively on
the problems at hand. Even when local governments are ready to meet
a problem we often find that they do not have the resources or the
legal authority to act. They must then go to the state for support or
authority, even to the point of making many amendments to the state
constitution. In general, local governments should be given home rule
to take actions not in violation of specific provisions of the state con-
stitution or state law. There is a special need to provide local govern-
ments with greater financial resources.

Strong local government, responsive to the needs of its citi-
zens, is the foundation of an enduring federal form of
government; and . . . sound and adequate finances are an
essential ingredient of governmental strength. Since states
create local governments and determine their share of the
governing role, they must see to it that local governments
possess financial resources to match their responsibilities. 7

Strong local governments should be able to meet many of the
problems which hamper communities throughout the nation. Among
the problems faced are the deterioration of homes and businesses and
the haphazard spread of homes, businesses, and industry into suburban
and rural areas. Slum houses, vacant stores, offices, and factories are
not only eye-sores and result in losses to the property owners but they
also mean losses in taxes for the support of local governments. Local
government planning and action can do much to alleviate these con-
ditions through building codes, zoning, renewal, and meeting traffic
and parking problems. As homes, businesses, and industries begin to
locate in suburban and former rural areas, planning, zoning, and build-
ing codes should be developed by counties or larger areas.

* Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966 State Legislative
Program (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 1.

IS

One of the problems causing the deterioration of towns and cities
is the relocation of middle class families outside city limits. In most
cases, this problem could and should be settled by the expansion of
the city limits. It is not fair to allow people to work and shop in the
cities using city streets and services and pay so little for the upkeep
of the city. There could be a city sales tax, payroll tax, or other charges
levied on such persons but city expansion seems to be a practical
solution. If the largest city or town in an area deteriorates the entire
area may be ruined.

An accompanying problem of some areas is the ownership of
slums by rather wealthy persons. Stricter housing codes should be able
to solve much of this problem.

In many areas, some local persons do not want to develop their
communities. They do not seem to realize that development will ordi-
narily improve conditions for them rather than crowd them out through
competition providing these persons are meeting satisfactory standards.
If they are not meeting satisfactory standards it will be to the advantage
of the community for them to be forced by competition to change.

It is expected that local governments will provide numerous ser-
vices in the communities. In order to grow or even to maintain
population, to bring in business and industry, or to bring people to
fill positions, many services are desirable. Where these services are
already provided in towns and cities there may be a need to extend them
into suburban and rural areas. Among the services that may be needed
are: adequate educational opportunities, streets, highways, and parking
areas, police protection, fire protection, water, garbage collection, parks
and recreation facilities, public transportation systems and industrial
parks.

Businesses, industries, and people looking for new homes are often
interested in the services and activities of local governments. However,
some of the better companies do not want a lot for nothing and it is
sometimes risky and imprudent to grant extensive tax exemptions or
free services to attract industry. In any case, businesses and industries
should be required to meet at least minimum health and safety standards.
Local governments could make the desirable services available and help

19

create a climate suitable for the properous growth and development of
both new and old businesses and industries.

The services expected of local governments are often quite expen-
sive. Therefore, one of the big problems of these governments is to find
and tap the financial resources necessary to pay for the desired activities.
Tax equalization and re-evaluation are two desired sources. Many
communities may not be able to afford all the services they would like
to have their local governments provide. In this case, they will need to
consider what they are willing to pay and then choose those activities
they want most. Although good services cost much they often pay off in
time. For example, a good school system is usually considered well
worth the expense.

In summary, nine steps that might be taken to modernize local
governments have been recommended.

1. The number of local governments in the United States, now
about 80,000, should be reduced by at least 80 per cent.

2. The number of overlapping layers of local government found
in most states should be severely curtailed.

3. Popular election should be confined to members of the policy-
making body, and to the chief executive in those governments
where the "strong mayor" form is preferred to the "council-
manager" plan.

4. Each local unit should have a single chief executive, either
elected by the people or appointed by the local legislative
body, with all administrative agencies and personnel fully
responsible to him; election of department heads should be
halted.

5. Personnel practices based on merit and professional compe-
tence should replace the personal or partisan "spoils" systems
found in most countries and local units.

6. County modernization should be pressed with special vigor,
since counties everywhere except in New England have
high but undeveloped potential for solving the problems of
rural, urban, and most metropolitan communities.

7. Once modernized, local governments should be entrusted with
broad legal powers permitting them to plan, finance, and

20

execute programs suited to the special needs, interests, and
desires of their citizens.

8. The 50 state constitutions should be revamped either by
legislative amendment or through constitutional conventions
concentrating on local government modernization to provide
for boundary revisions, extensions of legal authority, and
elimination of needless overlapping layers.

9. The terms and conditions of federal and state grants-in-aid
should be revised to encourage the changes recommended in
this statement. 6

Many people tend to complain when government takes on ad-
ditional activities, but then government often is blamed when things
seem to go wrong even though no government may have been given
the authority or support to act. If given sufficient support, the govern-
ment can do much for a community, but we should not expect govern-
ment to successfully meet all of our problems.

e Committee for Economic Development. Modernizing Local Government
(New York, 1966), pp. 17-19.

21

THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS
IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By James W. Adams*

The development of the local economy represents a major facet of
the overall task of community development. Many of the problems and
decisions encountered in community development activity revolve around
considerations of costs and benefits and thus address themselves, either
in part or in entirety, to economics. Economics is a tool to be applied
in the solution of community development problems and its role is vital.

The treatment here can not be exhaustive by any means. Many
considerations important to the problem of community development
have been omitted or were treated quite briefly in an attempt to adapt
the subject material to the scope and objective of this particular presen-
tation. Some fundamental considerations and principles of general
applicability in the economic problem of community development have
been dealt with here. Only in the case of industrial development is a
particular type of resource development given special treatment. This
seems warranted because of the overwhelming emphasis upon industrial
development generally in the overall economic development effort. In
all other cases even that of tourism, which is receiving increasing
attention because of its community development potential the specifics
of resource development are subsumed under the treatment of resource
development in general.

In an attempt to treat the economic problems in community devel-
opment one begins by gathering relevant facts concerning the economy.
The Committee for Economic Development has pointed out: "The
first step toward meeting the public problems of an area is detailed
knowledge of its economic base. Knowledge about the economic base
is essential to sound public decisions . . ."' Since the task of economic
development of the community is largely that of achieving the most

*Assistant Professor of Economics

1 Charles M. Tiebout, The Community Economic Base Study, Supplementary
Paper No. 16 (Washington: Committee for Economic Development, Decem-
ber, 1962), p. 11.

22

efficient utilization of the community's resources, a study of the
community economy is necessary to determine what its resources are
and how they are being utilized. Such a study is commonly called an
economic base study.

A community's economic base may be described as consisting of
those activities which result from the utilization of the community's
resources, from which are derived the basic unemployment and income
upon which the rest of the local economy depends. 2 The primary
objective of an economic base study is to develop information which
can be used by the community in solving local problems and in making
better decisions about matters which will improve the welfare of the
community's citizens and enhance their economic opportunities. The
base study must attempt to identify basic sources of employment and
income and provide an understanding of the source and level of all
employment and income in the community. This entails, of course,
the identification of the community's resources and an evaluation of
the efficiency of their utilization.

The relevant economic factors deserving study and evaluation of
any community or area development effort fall basically into those
which are quantitative and those which are largely qualitative. The
quantitative factors describe the level of economic activity within an
area; the qualitative factors describe the structure and quality of the
area's economic base. To provide a well-balanced perspective of a
community's economic base, no study can afford to over-emphasize
one of these two categories to the neglect of the other.

The former has reference to those factors which are measurable.
These are economic indicators or statistical indices of the economic
behavior of an area. Examples are figures such as per capita income,
total wages and salaries, employment level, retail sales, local tax
revenues, expenditures, bank time and demand deposits, agricultural
production, industrial production, measurable volumes of certain re-
sources such as timber, land, ores (if known) and electrical power
capacity. Periodic study of these quantitative measures is vital to the

2 Ibid., p. 9.

23

understanding of community needs and problems because they describe
the economic well-being (welfare) of the citizens and the volume of
economic activity which indicates the economic health of the business
community.

The qualitative factors in the community's economic base can not
be measured but are, nonetheless, important economic factors which
must be appraised or assessed. Examples are adequacy of labor supply
other than quantity, character of leadership, transportation services,
proximity to metropolitan or urban areas, prevailing political climate,
climatic conditions, character or adequacy of certain of the quantifiable
factors (for example, fertility of soil, type of timber, etc.) and avail-
able social overhead capital in the form of community services and
facilities such as adequacy of sewage systems, water systems, streets and
roads, police and fire protection, extent and adequacy of educational
facilities and services.

While the economic problems of a community often appear to be
couched in terms of employment and income, these are merely symptoms
of more fundamental problems. Generally, the problems of community
development may be traced to the quantity and quality of resources
available for the community's use and to certain long-prevailing con-
ditions such as the composition of the economic activities in the com-
munity. Thus the economic development of the community is concerned
primarily with efficient resource utilization in the community.

If one is to improve resource utilizaton he must understand that
the resource base of the community economy may be divided into three
categories : ( 1 ) physical resources, ( 2 ) human resources, and ( 3 ) cap-
ital resources. These correspond roughly to the traditional division of
resources in economics, namely, land, labor, and capital.

The employment of these resources tends to be determined by our
system of markets and prices. They will be employed in those uses where
their owners receive the greatest reward. This tendency, the result of
fundamental economic forces, suggests what is frequently the basis of
the community's economic problem, that is, the "most profitable em-
ployment" of the community's resources is often outside the community.
This explains why many communities are losing their best-trained,
most promising young people, as well as other valuable resources.

24

Their employment in the community is simply not as rewarding as it is
somewhere else outside of the community. As long as this situation
prevails, the community can only expect to lose these resources. Al-
though this resource exodus might be construed as favorable and eco-
nomically justifiable from the perspective of overall economic activity
on an interregional level, it contributes to the slow death of a particular
small community. Why should these resources not move elsewhere
seeking a higher return when the alternative offered by the community
is nothing more than unemployment or underemployment?

An unemployed resource is one which is lying idle. An under-
employed resource is one which, while being used in productive
employment, is not being used to the full extent of its productive
potential. For example, a college-trained accountant wishing to remain
in his home community finds he must accept a clerical job in the payroll
office of the local lumber company. If he were willing to move away
he would have an opportunity to make full use of his skill and training
and earn a much higher return. This represents a gross underutilization
of resources, but one not at all uncommon to communities where the
potential for full resource employment does not exist.

In the process of production, resources have a complementary
relationship. Virtually no product is the result of a single resource used
in the production process. For example, we cannot use our timber in
production without using labor and capital, and vice-versa. Recognition
of this complementary relationship suggests a possible approach to the
solution of the resource unemployment-underemployment delemma. If
a community possesses competent and trained labor, efforts should be
concentrated upon the development of other resources, heretofore idle.
Joint use might permit an employment of the labor at least as profitable
as competing employment outside the community.

Here, then, is established a basic case for seeking new industry
and thus concern with the whole field of activity termed industrial
development. By seeking and obtaining new industry, a community
may bring in highly essential capital resources which may now result
in a much more efficient utilization of heretofore unutilized or under-
utilized human and physical resources in the community. Community
leaders might concentrate on capital resources to implement the sound
investment ideas which will enhance economic development.

25

Setting the stage for this better utilization of resources might
entail the encouragement of more diversity in economic activity among
product lines or among industrial operations in general. Also, the im-
provement of transportation systems and facilities will greatly enhance
resource use. Certainly improvements in the public sector are obviously
in the interest of better resource use. Some of these are public services
such as schools, libraries, fire and police protection, improved streets,
sewage and water systems and administration of available funds. A
community which undertakes to increase its stock of such social overhead
capital can expect to realize a much greater return on the other resources
employed.

The economic standard of efficiency may be applied in establishing
orders or priorities among the types of community improvements pos-
sible to improve its social overhead capital. Obviously, that improvement
which would provide the greatest benefit to the community should be
undertaken first and continued as long as the project will yield more
benefit to the community than the next most beneficial project. Theoreti-
cally, maximum benefit, efficiency and equilibrium is reached when an
"ounce of effort" yields no more on any one project than it does on any
other, that is, the benefit to effort ratio of each category of improve-
ment is equal to each other one. 3

For example, community leaders may feel that the most beneficial
community improvement project would be water and sewage projects.
But, there is a point beyond which additional efforts spent in improving
water and sewage systems will yield less benefit for the community
than the same effort would yield when spent in some other type of
improvement such as, say, a recreational facility.

Generally speaking, the greater the use of local resources in local
business activities, the greater the benefit to the community through a
larger volume of income flow providing the same services can not be
purchased outside the area at a lower price. For example, if the capital
to build a new factory is provided from outside the area, then payments
to the owners of that capital will flow outside the area and, therefore,

3 Gene A. Bramlett, "The Community Economy," A paper presented to the
Community Development Workshop (University of Georgia Center for Contin-
uing Education, Athens.Georgia, September 5-15, 1967).

26

not be available for local consumption, saving, or investment. The
more services and products the community affords locally for purchase
with the payments from the resources used locally, the greater will be
the income flow and the healthier the community economy.

The simple mechanics of the development of the community
economy may be shown by adapting Charles M. Tiebout's simple model
illustrating the "local multiplier" effect. 4 Assume a hypothetical town,
Minetown. Obviously, before Minetown existed, the income stream is
zero. Then someone discovers a copper vein, and Minetown has its
economic origins. At first, ore is exported and receipts are used to
import mining equipment and consumer goods. Dollars gained in
production are lost to purchase necessary imports. Eventually the grocer,
the hardware merchant, the barber, the tavern keeper, and other local
service enterprises arrive. Now both the size and destination of the
income flow are affected. Whereas dollars previously flowed out of
Minetown, they now go to local merchants. As more dollars change
hands, the income stream swells somewhat but does not expand by the
total amount of the purchases made locally. In turn, there is an outflow
of many of the sales dollars taken in by merchants to pay for the goods
sold. Significantly enough, however, the income stream has risen. This
rise in the income stream is generated by the multiplier effect. For
example, suppose $.50 of the local income dollar is spent in Minetown.
All of this $.50 will not be retained, however, since merchants and
others who receive it will also spend some of it outside; say they keep
$.40. This means that $.50 x .40 = $.20 will ultimately remain in
Minetown and $.80 of each dollar will ultimately flow out. The ratio
of the income dollar ultimately lost to that ultimately retained is $.80
to $.20 or 4 to 1. A 4 to 1 ratio means that for each four dollars
entering the local income stream, a one-dollar net increase will result;
or for each one dollar, 25 cents will be added. Now, in the true sense
of the word, a community economy exists. "To the extent that local
services are provided in production thereby providing income to resi-
dents, and goods and services are available locally to spend the income,
it is to that extent that there will be a community economy." 5

* Tiebout, pp. 27-28.

5 Bramlett, "The Economic Community."

27

While economic development in its broader sense concerns itself
with all phases of the community's economic activity, it is true that the
overwhelming emphasis in economic development is increasingly upon
industrial development activity. The promotion of regional economic
growth or development is concerned with efforts to get new manufac-
turing or processing plants established or with encouragement for
expansion of existing plants.

Why should this be true when many communities have long been
characterized by agrarian. Should such communities continue to be
concentrating their economic development efforts on agriculture and
related activities rather than on industrial development? Industrial
development is preferred because a given expenditure in this type of
economic activity will tend to result in a greater contribution to the
income stream than would be the case if expended in agricultural
development. Also, it permits a diversification in the local economy
and removes some of the vulnerability resulting from dependence upon
a single type of economic activity.

Sampson and Farris, in discussing aspects of economic development
in Domestic Transportation, observe:

This emphasis on industrialization, which has almost
made industrialization synonomous with growth or develop-
ment, apparently is based on two assumptions. One, relative
demand factors or terms of trade are such that more value is
added by manufacturing than by agriculture or extractive
enterprises, thus more manufacturing means more regional
income. Two, more economic diversification means regional
stability or less susceptibility to cyclical economic fluctuations
or the impacts of particular declining industries. 6

With its acceleration, industrial development activity in recent
years has very rapidly become highly technical. No longer can local
communities expect to compete for new industry on a "catch as catch
can" basis. Effecting a wedding between a community's offer and an
industry's needs is both an art and a science, requiring professional

* Roy J. Sampson and Martin T. Farris, Domestic Transportation: Practice
Theory and Policy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 212.

28

expertise. More and more communities are employing professionals in
this area or using the services and technical staff of some outside
industrial development group.

In the existing competitive struggle for new industry community
leaders can ill afford not to use professional assistance. The cost of
ineptitude can be high. One industry lost because of the lack of expertise
in selling the prospect on the potential location can be extremely costly
to the community in potential employment and income. Unless they
possess skill and experience in this particular activity, community
development leaders tend to insist on selling the thing about the com-
munity which they like best rather than what the industrialists want.
In the words of one professional industrial developer, "the industrialist
buys with his eyes rather than with his ears," 7 and thus is no easy prey
to a community's sales pitch.

Failure to take advantage of professional assistance in attempting
to locate new industry is hardly excusable. Liberal assistance in con-
sulting in providing contacts with prospective industrialists as well
as in development planning can be readily obtained. Such organizations
as the State Chamber of Commerce and, in Georgia, the Department of
Industry and Trade, the several University System-maintained com-
munity and industrial development organizations, and the various area
planning and development commissions are available for aid. Public
utility companies, railroads, and some large banks maintain staffs of
specialists in industrial development whose services can be utilized for
local assistance.

W. Paul Brann, Vice-President, First Arkansas Development Cor-
poration, a recognized expert in economic development, suggests three
criteria of primary concern to industrialists seeking plant locations. The
first must measure the quality of a community and includes schools,
government stability, taxes, planning and zoning, housing, community
facilities and services, character of community as reflected by leadership
organization and aggressiveness. The second is concerned with strategic
advantage. This relates to available buildings, sites, resources, markets.

7 Penn Worden, "Industrial Development in Georgia," A paper presented to
the Community Development Workshop (University of Georgia Center for
Continuing Education, Athens, Georgia, September 5-15, 1967).

29

and labor. The third criteria concerns negotiating ability or bargaining
power. Examples of such factors are financing, taxation, sites, buildings,
to be provided by the community as an inducement for location, or
research.

When community developers have gotten, to their satisfaction, a
clear-cut idea concerning what industry is seeking in terms of location
on the one hand and what their community has to offer on the other
hand, they must realistically face up to a decision concerning whether
industry-seeking would be a worthwhile endeavor. In the light of the
current race to bring in industry, the consideration of such a question
might appear somewhat unorthodox but, if an objective evaluation
reveals that the community is currently in no position to meet the needs
of additional industry, to continue exerting effort in this direction is a
mere waste of energy and resources. The effort might best be diverted
to changing the conditions which seem to limit further industry expan-
sion.

In addition to the discouraging effect of inadequate community
services and public facilities, a less recognizable, but no less important,
hindrance to successful industrial development activity is poor rapport
between community leaders and leaders of existing industry. To be more
specific, many communities spend too much time and money seeking
new industry and too little time and money nourishing the industry
they already have. The result is that new industrial prospects may be
discouraged from locating in the community by talking to existing
industrialists who have been neglected or taken for granted by the
community leaders in their race to locate new ones. Other evidence
of a lack of rapport between these two elements is the existence of a
notable gap between what the community leadership say that their
community offers industry and what existing industries say that it offers.
Until the views of the two groups can become reasonably compatible,
there is little justification for seeking new industry.

Mr. Penn Worden of the Georgia State Chamber of Commerce
has presented what he terms a "pattern of action" for local industrial
development. 8 It consists of the following actions:

e Penn Worden, "Industrial Development in Georgia."

30

1. Determine that the community wants industry.

2. Organize a hard-core action team.

3. Gather community facts and keep them up to date.

4. Seek expert assistance.

5. Take action to remedy weaknesses and capitalize on assets.

6. Put all assets in saleable condition.

7. Analyze the area economy.

8. Have the package ready for the industrial prospect.

This appears to be a sound and workable procedure for undertaking
industrial development. It should merit serious consideration for pos-
sible adoption by community development leaders seeking to avoid the
pitfalls of inexperience and achieve success in industrial development
efforts.

31

DOES THE BUSINESSMAN HAVE

A VESTED INTEREST IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS?

By Warren A. Walker*

The question is often raised whether in fact the businessman does
have a vested interest in community developments.

What does the word businessman mean? Is he merely the retail
merchant or should the concept be broadened to encompass wholesale
distributors and anyone who provides services to the community in-
cluding the professional doctor, dentist, or attorney.

I submit to you that the term businessman refers to every man or
woman who draws his livelihood from the activities of a particular
community. Using this concept it becomes clear that the term business-
man really embraces virtually everyone even the very young and the
very old who draw all or part of their livelihood from the local com-
munity, either directly or indirectly.

The dictionary tells us that the word vested means anything that
is settled or secured in the possession of a person or persons as a com-
plete right. This interest is sometimes possessory, sometimes in the
future, but it has substance because of its relative certainty. Here are
some examples of vested interest.

In the case of the merchandiser or manufacturer, he has actual
monetary investments. Sometimes these investments represent quite
substantial amounts particularly in relation to his personal assets. This
is true because regardless of the amount in dollars and cents, it is
typically a substantial percentage of his total assets.

In the case of those who provide services, at whatever level, rights
have become settled and hopefully secured by the development of ones
reputation within the community. Even though he might move his
personal equipment elsewhere, his reputation, that is to say this person
to person identification, would be left behind.

* Assistant Professor of Business Administration

32

In the case of the very young, it is true that their livelihood
derives indirectly from the community through their parents or
guardians. It is none the less true that even the very young achieve a
localized identification through their schoolmates, through their church-
school activities, athletic events, and with those for whom they do odd
jobs.

One of the definitions of interest is regard for ones own advan-
tage or self interest. It should be noted that even the very root of this
word "inter" means between, among, mutually, reciprocally, or together.
From this we can see that essentially the word interest does mean
regard for one's own advantage alone, but from the standpoint of his
relationship between himself and others.

In regard to the term community, in the usual sense it means a
social group of any size whose members reside in a specific geographic
locality. A less familiar definition is that it also means joint possession,
enjoyment, and liability. Essentially to develop means to bring out
capabilities or possibilities, or to bring to a more advanced or efficient
state or to cause to grow or expand. This brings us to the inescapable
conclusion that the businessman does have a vested interest in com-
munity development.

There are those who would prefer to remain in the quiet back
waters of the tide of progress. There was a time when our national
economy was more agrarian in character that this objective remained
largely possible. One has only to look at some of the older homes and
partially abandoned facilities to recapture the mood of this period in
history. Agriculture is no longer the sun about which the economy
moves. The economic frontier moves on broad fronts and in many
directions. The community today must move with the march of progress
or be crushed by it.

All of us have heard of the ghost town of the west, but did you
know that there are ghost towns all over the United States, some less
than an hour's drive from one's home. Some have been completely
abandoned; some still have a few remaining people. Some of these
towns have died because they were mining towns and the veins ran out.
Some have died because of the changing patterns of agriculture. Some
for any of a dozen reasons. The important thing is that all these towns

33

and all of these reasons have a common thread. The economic reason
for the town's existence ceased to be. All could have survived had they
changed with the changing times.

It would be hard to tell one of the former businessmen that his
interest was not vested. His problem now, to use two accounting terms,
is that his investment has not only become "sunk" but "written-off" as
well. I suggest that whenever your interest in community development
wanes you visit an abandoned community. It will be a very sobering
experience. You will suddenly be overwhelmed with the conception of
how really vested your interests are.

At this point we have examined the question we asked initially.
We have accepted the conclusion that we must answer the question
in the affirmative. Another question which naturally arises is: What
does the businessman do about his vested interest? The simple answer
to this question is that he feels an obligation to preserve his vested in-
terests. There is no easy answer as to the manner in which to preserve
these vested interests but there is a systematic way in which an effort
can be made. About all it involves is a modest amount of effort, and
some straight, constructive thinking on the part of those most immedi-
ately involved.

The question as to how to preserve these vested interests and the
manner in which to further community development divides itself
rather easily into three component parts. The solution is additionally
facilitated by the fact that either can be worked on independently or
together. The three questions which naturally present themselves in
turn are: what resources do I now have, under what circumstances did
I come to have these resources, and what can now be done to expand
these resources?

It is a fact well known to those who have worked with community
development that virtually every community has many resources and
assets that they have never regarded in the light of resources at all. The
task of those concerned with community development is to seek out
data on these assets that the community already has and to begin to
develop from this point.

Of these, perhaps the most useful starting point resembles a
community inventory. This includes such questions as: How many

34

people have what level of education? How many people have particular
types of labor skills? Actually much of this material does not have to be
researched directly, but is available either from the census reports or
from the labor department. Unfortunately, the census figures have the
characteristic that the older they are, the less useful they become, since
the census comes every ten years (1950, I960, etc.) and the utility
of these figures is somewhat diminished by the end of the decade.
Relatively current figures are usually available either locally or from
the state capital.

If you seek community development through the channels of selling
your town to new industries, then of course, the perfectly general ap-
proach is valueless. Industrialists are not interested in pretty pictures
in the usual sense of the word. They are interested in specific things
necessary for the conduct of their business. Such things as the quantity
of natural gas available, and under what conditions? What capacity
of electricity is available? How much fresh water is available? What
convenient facilities are there available for the disposal of industrial
waste? These related with our earlier two questions all tie in with what
the potential industrialist in your area wants to know.

Whatever the composition of your eventual plans for community
development may take, the avenue of expanded industrial activity
cannot be ignored because it possesses obviously inherent advantages.
By its very nature it provides increased tax revenues, it balances local
seasonal industries with new ones which complement them. It diversi-
fies the community's economic base, and within limits, it provides job
opportunities for the unemployed. Obviously too great a dependence on
only one company, or even type of industry, makes for an unstable
economic base.

Looking at the other side of the coin, it must be recognized that
while new industry offers many advantages, it also brings with it
associated problems. One of these is the burden of the community
providing for increased school enrollment, and a greater burden on
existing school facilities. In our mobile age, it also brings about greater
traffic and parking problems. We have already mentioned the questions
of water supply and sewage and other public services; these require-
ments will also be increased. All of these potentialities must be recog-
nized in any comprehensive plan of community development.

35

We have observed earlier that agriculture is no longer the sun
about which the economy revolves. It would be an equally great mis-
take to ignore the influence of the surrounding farm areas and their
influence on the local economy. The farming community forms a market
for various commercial and industrial enterprises within the area. The
income of farmers varies from time to time, both with the market and
weather conditions. These variations in farm income have an important
effect within the community, such as the store owners, banks and public
welfare departments.

Let us now turn from our first question to the second, namely how
did the community happen to have the resources that it does have? We
are not interested in geneologies or historical minutiae. What we are
really interested in are those economic forces which shaped the com-
munity into the form which it now has. Carrollton, Georgia, for ex-
ample, was initially important as a cotton trading center. In a local
bank are murals showing the present square crowded with wagons
loaded with already baled cotton. Certainly one would be surprised
to see a similar setting today. Cotton has been largely supplanted by
synthetic fibers. Its economic importance has substantially declined.
With its decline, the related functions of storage, sales, brokerage, have
also declined. Carrollton has been more fortunate than many commun-
ities in that as the cotton trade declined, new activities came to take its
place. This was not true in all Georgia communities, and a resulting
economic impact has been extremely unfortunate. Through the years,
Carrollton has gradually acquired industries dealing with metal pres-
sing, wire processing, and other operations that have little to do with
textiles. At an earlier period in Carrollton history, the only industries
were those related to textile processing of one sort or another.

The question remains, where can definite statistical information
on resources be obtained? Actually, almost every area already has
public histories and records available. Sometimes, it must be admitted
that historical information is not usable in the form that is required,
or sometimes a more ambitious effort is proposed than can be marshall-
ed. If this is the case, there are a variety of other sources of information
that may be readily accessable including early city directories, early,
maps, atlases, and gazateers and the accounts of travelers in the area.
These by no means exhaust the possibilities. Oftentimes there are

36

manuscripts or typed copies of anniversary addresses, sermons, early
photographs and paintings which give a clue to the manner in which
the community grew. If this still does not suffice, there are other
available records such as collections of private letters, old account books,
diaries of early residents, sometimes newspapers and early periodicals
are available, and of course, the earlier United States census reports
continue to be available. All of these are useful in their own way. Finally
there are many of the older businesses having records over a considerable
period of time. In general, they are perfectly willing to make these
available for legitimate research.

It must be recognized such an examination of the past provides
more than a mere chronology of economic development. It also provides
an insight into local traditions, customs, practices, and bits of legend.
It is of this substance that the local folklore, and the local mores are
developed. It establishes the tone of the community. And though some
of these institutions and some of these practices may now be past, many
of them survive into the present day, and these are part of the resources
that you must now deal with.

All have heard such expressions as "We don't do that sort of
thing in this community," or "Someone suggested that a long while
back and nothing ever came of it," or "We don't normally hire that
sort of person on this job." This is the framework in which you must
operate. It is true that we have various pieces of legislation about this
type of thing at this time. We have the Fair Employment Practices Act,
and we have other legislation relating to nondiscriminatory practices.
But we all recognize that the law does not make the fact. Certainly it
does not achieve it within the shortrun. As business men who have a
vested interest in community development one must recognize that
limitations can be formidable and yet plans for development must be
within this framework.

The third question of the shape of things to come, must now be
considered. This question must be resolved by those who would develop
their communities. It is up to those businessmen who do have vested
interests. It is they who must do the groundwork, create the framework
within which growth can occur, set the pattern of what they want within
the resources available.

37

This paper barely touches the high points of the problem. Its pur-
pose was not to give a complete plan which in the final analysis is up to
those who are concerned. One hopes that the recognition that the
businessman does have a vested interest in community development
was established and second, that it is possible to protect this vested
interest through planning, research, and recognition of his community
potentialities.

38

PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
GEOGRAPHY TO LOCAL PLANNING

By Jack L. Jewell*

The discipline of geography has valuable contributions to make
to the development and execution of local community development
plans. However, due to the popular misconception of geography as
an elementary school survey of "far away places with strange sound-
ing names," the important role of academic geographical research in
solving local and specific problems has often been overlooked. By
nature, geography addresses itself to the understanding of the spatial
attributes of the earth's surface in whole and in part. "The objective
of geographic study is to portray and interpret the patterns of man's
occupancy of the earth. At an elementary level this means concern
with the 'where' of countries, cities, rivers and mountains ... At a
more advanced level geography is concerned with understanding how
and why the human race has organized the earth's surface as it has."'

The basic relationship between geography and planning is that
the geographer seeks to understand the total environment as it has
evolved to the present and is changing at the present, whereas, "the
planner is concerned with value judgments in the course of making
decisions to change the environment." 2 To say it another way, "the
value system of the planner differs from that of the geographer par-
ticularly in that the planner is committed to active intervention in social
and natural processes while the geographer is not." 3 The task of
regional planning involves value judgments as to " . . . the best lo-
cation for economic activities, the proper complement of public capi-
tal investments to support and facilitate economic growth, the de-

* Assistant Professor of Geography

' A. K. Philbrick, This Human World (New York: Wiley, 1963) preface.

2 John N. Jackson, "Geography and Planning: Two Subjects or One?" in
Canadian Geographer, Vol. XI (1967), p. 359.

3 Robert B. McNee, "The Structure of Geography and It's Potential Contri-
bution to Generalist Education for planning", in Professional Geographer, Vol.
XVIII (March, 1966), p. 67.

39

sirable pattern of private and public land uses, and the proper scope
and role for urbanization." 4 Planning is committed to the practical
human end of what should be, is a practical science as opposed to a
theoretical science, and fulfills social rather than scientific goals. It
is more closely related to applied geographic studies than to theoretical
geography. 5 Geography includes several technical skills applicable to
regional and urban planning. Notable among these are map representa-
tion, aerial photo interpretation and field research methods. However,
a greater contribution of geography to planning is the geographic
methodology which views specific and diverse landscape elements as
part of one integrated whole. Therefore, geography aids planning as
it seeks to encompass the entire city or region which may be undergo-
ing constant internal and functional changes. 6

The role of geography, as viewed in this essay then, is not to
develop comprehensive plans for future land use but to analyze the
interrelationships of the present-day landscape as to form and function.
An understanding of present spatial conditions in a city, town, or
region is necessary if comprehensive plans for future development
are to be successfully executed. Spatial conditions involve physical,
cultural, and human distributional patterns. Physical spatial conditions
include climate, soils, topography, drainage, and natural vegetation.
Cultural spatial conditions include population distribution, transporta-
tion networks, utility, industrial, commercial and professional distri-
butional patterns, institutional facilities, recreational facilities, and
various types of residential distributional patterns. Human spatial
conditions involve population age and sex ratio distributional patterns,
and race, religion, and political distributional patterns. All of these,
and perhaps other elements, are viewed by the geographer as inter-
woven to form the fabric of the ever-changing local landscape. Ef-

* Gerald Hodge, "The New Vista for Regional Planning: What Role for the
Geographer", in Canadian Geographer, Vol. IX (1965), p. 124.

5 Sherwin H. Cooper, "Theoretical Geography, Applied Geography, and Plan-
ning," in Professional Geographer, Vol. XVIII (January, 1966), pp. 1-2; see
also Harold Mayer, "Geography and Urban Planning: Theory and Applica-
tion," in Economic Geography, Vol. XLII (October, 1966), p. 283.

6 Donald W. Griffin, "Some Comments on Urban Planning and the Geo-
grapher," in Professional Geographer, Vol. XVII (January, 1965), pp. 4-6.

!()

fective planning must account for each geographic element in its
spatial context and in its relation to the whole community.

Notable among recent community self -study aids by planners and
geographers are works by Melvin, 7 by Warren, 8 and by Gross. 9 Local
Georgia communities may receive aid for self-analysis and planning
from several area development and planning commissions. The ad-
dress of the nearest of these agencies may be obtained from the tele-
phone directory of any sizable town in the state. In addition, the
University of Georgia Institute of Community and Area Development
in Athens and the Georgia Institute of Technology Industrial Develop-
ment in Atlanta are available for assistance. Local planning com-
missions have been established by several Georgia cities and counties.
Many of these agencies have indicated a desire to serve the planning
needs of West Georgia communities, yet, in many communities they
do not serve simply because they have not been engaged to serve.

An element common to all planning endeavors is that planning
for future land use must be based on spatial circumstances of present
land use. T. W. Freeman in his book, Georgraphy and Planning says,
"Planning has an inescapable geographical basis ... It is essential to
the planner's work, for the planner must understand the existing land-
scape before he tries to reform it both in town and country." 10 An
initial step in planning, then, is either to make a thorough analysis of
all available maps or to prepare maps of the specific areas for which
planning is to be undertaken. Applebaum has developed an easy and
inexpensive method of gathering initial data of this sort for specific
cities by using the Sanborn Atlas and the city directory. ' '

7 Ernest E. Melvin, Community Self Assistance (Athens, Georgia: Institute
of Community and Area Development, University of Georgia, 1963).

s Roland L. Warren, Studying Your Community (New York: The Free Press,
1965).

9 H. H. Gross, The Home Community (Chicago: National Council for Geo-
graphic Education, 1965).

10 T. W. Freeman, Geography and Planning (Hutchinson, Kansas: Hutchinson
University Library, 1958), p. 13.

1 1 William Applebaum, "A Technique for Constructing a Population and
Urban Land Use Map," in Economic Geography, Vol. XXVIII (July, 1952).
pp. 240-243.

41

Mapping is one of the few undisputed tasks of the geographer
and a good geographer has an uncanny ability to observe a landscape,
sort through the myriad elements composing the landscape, and select
and map the proper elements which portray the essence of the planning
problems under consideration. An excellent example of the role of
maps in the formation and execution of land use plans is the work of
Robert Brengle of the Troup County Planning Commission in La-
Grange, Georgia. Brengle has prepared a set of maps and transparent
overlays showing various combinations of physical, cultural, or human
spatial characteristics relating to specific planning problems. Dis-
tributional data are plotted for any city block of LaGrange as to zon-
ing, present land occupance, present and projected utility services,
present traffic flow, maximum traffic flow the streets will carry, and
slope or other physical characteristics of the block. In a matter of min-
utes one can observe any point in the city and ascertain the popula-
tion density of the immediate area, the quality of housing, the size
of the water mains and sewer lines, the volume of traffic and the
maximum traffic volume that the street will safely carry, the size of
electrical power lines and transformers, kinds of commercial, pro-
fessional, and institutional establishments in the immediate vicinity, and
several other pertinent spatial elements which blend to make up the
specific areal personality of that section of the city. Each element is
mapped separately on transparent overlays and can be analyzed in-
dividually or simultaneously with the others.

The geographer-planner, by using maps, aerial photographs,
field observations, interviews, and other geographical field method
techniques, attempts to understand present land use. But, this merely
introduces the land-planning process. What of the subsequent stages of
spatial development? Predictions of future land use conditions may be
based on studies of the sequence of spatial change in the recent past
and assumptions formulated as to emerging future spatial conditions.
Stability of land value, tendencies of physical and cultural erosion,
and capacity of movement and flow of traffic volumes are some of
the characteristics which must be analyzed as to recent developments.
Based on these sorts of data projections can be made as to future spatial
trends. If data are not available for a specific area under study, pro-
jections can emerge from studies of comparable conditions elsewhere.

42

In looking to the future, the geographer-planner will envisage
a variety of different possibilities which may emerge from the present
spatial circumstances of the landscape. For example, urban expansion
may be expected to follow recent "leapfrogging" trends or, it may
become necessary to attempt to structure future urban growth so as
to minimize costs of extending utilities to suburbia, to preserve valu-
able and productive agricultural land, or to develop scenic and recrea-
tional facilities. When several optional possibilities of land use and
development are envisaged, each must be evaluated as to cost, develop-
mental feasibility, and maximum benefit to the population. Planning
policies must be formulated which will lead to the desired results in
land use. In this phase of planning the geographer only seeks to help
the planner understand the present landscape and to anticipate the
variety of circumstances which may be expected to emerge from pres-
ent spatial conditions. If future spatial conditions are to be structured
it is the role of the planner, not the geographer, to attempt to establish
policies under which future conditions will emerge.

In summary, geography as a discipline brings to planning a tra-
dition of analyzing specific areal and spatial conditions in light of their
role in the total physical, cultural, and human environment. The broad
approach of the geographer contributes to the understanding of how
the local scene relates to the total environment. The techniques and
methodology of geography in analyzing and mapping spatial phe-
nomena contribute to the understanding of present areal conditions
and how these conditions may co-vary in the future. A knowledge of
present landscape conditions is imperative if future land use plans are
to be formulated and executed. In planning, the political scientist may
focus on political conditions, the sociologist on social considerations,
and the economist on economic developments, but the geographer's
forte is as purveyor of knowledge about how phenomena co-vary in
geographical space and time. As the bulk of community development
planning relates to the arrangement, or rearrangement of spatial con-
ditions, geography contributes greatly toward planning for a better
tomorrow.

43

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By Tom J. Lightsey*

Community development is an undertaking that has many facets.
The role that education plays in our lives today is so crucially import-
ant to the total development and progress of our entire society and
culture that one should look at some changes that are occurring in our
modern, fast-moving society with some implications for education.

Today, we are living in the fastest-changing times that man has
ever known. Everything is speeding forward at an ever-accelerating
pace. Scientific know-how and technological development have
snatched us from horse-and-buggy days and thrust us into the space
age in less than two generations. Rural electrification, the miracle that
did more to transform rural life than any other one thing for thousands
of years, is only thirty years old. Many things we use today were not
known just a few years ago.

Time has, for a very long period, been measured in Ages. The
Stone Age lasted some 12,500 years, the Bronze Age some 2,500
years, the Iron and Steel Ages some 3,000 years ,the Atomic Age 23
years and the present Space Age some twelve years. When we realize
that most Ages lasted for thousands of years, it is frightening to think
that a young person only 23 years old has lived in three distinct Ages.
He was born in the Steel Age, moved into the Atomic Age in 1945,
and was ushered into the Space Age with the launching of Sputnik in
1957.

The technological developments have, on the one hand, brought
to a large majority of the citizens of our country the highest standard
of living the world has ever known; while on the other hand, we
still have so many citizens that are shackled by poverty and near-
poverty. How can this be true in such a society and culture as ours?
Is this not the land of opportunity? The real answers to this problem
lie in rapid change and the adjustment of educational level of the peo-
ple to cope with it.

*Assistant Professor of Education

44

Each September, more than fifty million people enter some kind
of school, and this number is growing each year. Yet, today, more than
fifty per cent of our adult population has not graduated from high
school, and many have not attended a high school. 1 There has been
a continuing development of all kinds of scientific, industrial, tech-
nological, agricultural and other types of occupations that constantly
move toward displacement of the unskilled segment of the labor force.
Ditches and postholes are mechanically dug and much garbage is
collected by machines today. The economy of Georgia is no longer an
agricultural-industrial economy, but has recently moved to an industrial-
agricultural economy. This, coupled with the increasing mechanization
of agriculture, is causing the displacement of large numbers of former
agricultural workers, many of whom have little educational training or
needed skills for industry.

In addition, we have a serious dropout problem in our schools.
Progress is being made in the holding power of our schools, but much
more must be done to meet the educational needs of all of our young
people, plus the needs of so many of our adult citizens who do not
have skills that make them employable in worthwhile jobs. So many
school dropouts and unskilled adults are the last to be hired and the
first to be fired when seeking ways to make a living. Too many
potential workers' hands are tied by the lack of skills. To alleviate
these problems and to raise the total economic and social standing of
our people we must support educational advancement at all levels.

Education is the key to a better way of life for all of our citizens.
Far too long have we allowed too many of our less affluent citi-
zens to be deprived of better education and training. We must act
hurriedly to ensure that we stop the drain in skill and brains that has
caused us so much trouble and so great a loss in personal and mutual
returns. Better educational programs can bring us far greater develop-
ment at the local, state, national, and international levels. Communi-
ty development programs can pay untold dividends.

A rather concrete example of the value of education can be noted
in the prospective lifetime earnings of American men. The average

i James Monroe Hughes, Education in America (New York: Harper and Row
1965), p. 3.

45

lifetime earning is $200,000. A man with a grade school education
earns an average of $182,000, or $18,000 less than the overall aver-
age. A high school graduate earns $258,000. A college graduate
jumps drastically and earns an average of some $435,000. Each year
of college training is worth about $45,000 in lifetime earning power.
Equivalent training in the trades and skills pays similar dividends.

The best known and most widely accepted definition of the role
of education is that American education should make all of our peo-
ple worthwhile citizens in our democratic society. If this role is to be
implemented fully, it is going to take a much more thorough under-
taking at all levels of educational endeavor. A major reason for the
necessity of more involvement in education has been the understand-
ing that education has become one of the principal avenues of op-
portunity in Twentieth-century America. College education is needed
for upper middle-class occupations and high school education for most
of the lower middle-class occupations. Education leads to economic
opportunity. Young people, through education, secure higher status
jobs than their fathers had. With the greater incomes, young adults
from lower-status families tend to associate with persons of higher
status and learn and adopt their ways. It may be concluded, conse-
quently, that education provides the channel not only to better socio-
economic status, but also to social mobility in the broader sense. 2

The past few years have brought much more involvement in edu-
cational matters from all governmental levels, more especially at the
federal level. When we look at the Georgia scene, we find the state
spending much larger sums for educational development. In addition,
the state is requiring local school systems to make much larger invest-
ments in education. This increased educational development is helping
many more communities become better communities. A commonly
used educational slogan is that better schools make better communities.
One of the first things that businesses or industries look for when
contemplating locating in a new community is the educational program
of the community. A great plus on the side of a community in re-
cruiting new business or industry is a good school program.

2 Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, Society and Education, (Bos-
ton: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 70-71.

46

The role that education plays in community development cannot
be overemphasized. Communities that have effective school programs
have better communities economically, socially and generally. Educa-
tion is really a major key to all other phases or facets of community
development. All citizens should be vitally concerned with education
and its relationship to the entire community in that every citizen is
either a student, parent, or taxpayer.

Educational authorities can help community leaders in identifying
community problems in various ways. They might help conduct surveys
of interest to all citizens of the community. They can keep the public
as well as potential business and industry informed about both the
current and long-range educational programs and plans. On the other
hand, potential industry can work with educational leaders in planning
special programs to meet community needs. Educational needs and
future plans can be supplied to all community leaders when overall tax
plans are made. The schools are often the focal points when consider-
ing development of programs to better facilitate racial and social har-
mony. 3

There are related educational problems in many communities.
They need attention by those who would improve their community.
Typical problems relate to:

1. Ways to finance new programs for local schools which
methods have been successful and which have not?

2. How to meet the needs of new industry that must have man-
power with special skills. (Many industries cannot locate in
our state because they cannot find the trained and skilled labor
force to staff their plants. The area vocational-technical school
is a step in the right direction toward solving this problem as
are adult and continuing education programs and special train-
ing programs of some industries.)

3. How to deal with the school dropout problem.

4. How to meet the needs of both the college-bound and non-
college-bound students.

3 Sam P. Kelly, "Know Your Community," American School Board Journal,
Vol. CXV (May, 1968), pp. 14-15.

47

5. How to provide adult education programs.

When considering ways that some of these problems can be
solved, financing new programs is imperative. Since the cost of edu-
cation has been going up at a rapid rate in recent years at all levels,
new programs that require considerable new financial outlays can be
unpopular unless the public is thoroughly convinced of the need of
the new program. It is very essential that the entire school communi-
ty be given all information that is needed for a complete understanding
of the proposed project. One supporting a new program should se-
cure the aid of news media, civic leaders and clubs in getting basic
information to everyone. A positive approach in selling should be
planned. Preparation and distribution of leaflets and brochures should
take place so that the voters can actually study the merits of the pro-
posal. Good public relations is essential and all educational leaders
may need to work overtime in such a program. School bond issues are
often passed as a result of good selling jobs and much of the sting is
removed from increased tax levies by letting the people know.

In order to help solve the problem of manpower with special
skills it is often necessary to set up a special training program in co-
operation with both the industry and a vocational-technical school or
a college. If a vocational or technical school is available locally or if
there is a college nearby training of initial personnel can be arranged.
If this is not possible help might be secured from the state vocational-
technical schools. As a final possibility a crash program can be under-
taken to establish a vocational-technical school.

The school dropout problem is a very serious one that is not
easy to solve. Georgia has the highest rate of school dropouts in the
United States a position that no other state desires. Part of the drop-
out problem can be attributed to the fact that so many of our schools
are not gearing their programs to meet the real needs of the students.
Far too little is being done to hold potential dropouts in school.

Many of the high schools in Georgia are trying to meet the needs
of the college-bound student, while in 1966 only twenty-eight out of
every one hundred college-age Georgians were enrolled in college.
This compares with fifty-one out of every one hundred for the nation,
while the average for the South is thirty-eight out of every one

48

hundred. According to information from the Georgia Educational Im-
provement Council, only South Carolina has a lower percentage than
Georgia." Our schools must come nearer to meeting the needs of all
of our students. We must develop plans that are attractive enough to
to hold potential dropouts in school in addition to meeting the needs
of those who plan to attend college. It might be wise to offer a good
vocational offering beginning at the seventh grade level as this is a
good place to identify potential dropouts. A good vocational program
for younger students will hold large numbers of students in school
who would otherwise not stay. It must be understood that vocational
offerings are not the total answer, as there are other causes for drop-
outs such as economic needs of family, failure in school work, school
program not meeting needs, increase in pregnancies of teenagers, to
seek employment, and general disillusionment with school. However,
vocational training is among the best answers we have.

We must develop programs to meet the needs of the seventy-two
percent of our college-age citizens who are not in college, plus the vast
numbers of our unskilled adult population. Vocational programs are
vital in this endeavor. Our goal should be to bring every Georgia
citizen up to the optimum level of his potential, regardless of whether
it is in an academic or non-academic educational program.

The role of education in community development may be sum-
marized by saying that educational development is a key that will un-
lock innumerable doors to almost every kind of development. Educa-
tion is the force that can prepare all of our people for a richer and
higher type of life regardless of their occupational or professional
pursuits. Education can help individuals and communities in reaching
their goals. In keeping these thoughts in mind, we must agree with
Gnagey that education is a continuing process from cradle to grave. 5

4 Georgia Educational Development Fact Sheet, "College Enrollment," Geor-
gia Educational Improvement Council, Atlanta, n.d.

5 Theodore P. Gnagey, "The Coming Revolution in Education," Adult Educa-
tion, Vol. XV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1964), p. 9.

49

THE COMMUNITY AS A
SOCIAL SYSTEM

By Fred Parsons*

Working as a generalist in two professional activities sociology
and social work can be interesting, enriching and rewarding. There
are clearly defined and limited areas within both sociology and social
work, but these areas seem minimal to those in which complementary
relationships predominate. Basically sociology is seen by some as "the
science of society," while social work is seen as the practice area
within society which implements or interprets knowledge, research and
techniques in the agency, city or community. It is inconceivable to
make a worthwhile scientific investigation without some awareness that
the study per se will influence the society in some way. Certainly the
spending of time and resources in making a scientific study seems to
demand application. Likewise, the attempt to modify or enhance the
development of a community without some knowledge, facts and pro-
fessional bias seems inconsistent.

The community has been studied by the early and contemporary
sociologists. The studies Yankee Town, Middletown and Middletown
in Transition are examples of early studies by community sociologists. 1
Today the community is viewed as the ghetto, slums, megopolis and
urban areas. The influence of the mass media and improvements in
transportation are studied by sociologists. Other areas of sociological
interest are population characteristics, ecological processes of man's
relationship to his environment and institutional changes and people's
efforts to maintain the status quo. The community practitioner needs
to understand these aspects of the community if he wishes to isolate
behavioral patterns, or to modify the community along some pre-
determined pattern.

The use of the sociologist's professional objectivity and ways of
looking at human behavior seems to offer an excellent opportunity to

*Assistant Professor of Sociology

' W. Lloyd Warner, Yankee Town (New Haven: Yale, 1963), Robert and
Helen Lynd, Middletown (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1929) and
Robert and Helen Lynd, Middletown in Transition (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1937).

50

identify community problems. If we follow the Talcott Parsons theor-
etical reference of society as a social system, 2 then smaller portions of
society can be understood at different levels. An example of this view
is seen in the following chart by Sanders. 3 The emphasis should be
made that each portion of a social system is made up of certain forms
and activities. Since all of these are interrelated the change or lack of
it in a given unit can be seen in terms of some modification of the
relationships of the system.

COMMUNITY
SYSTEM

(Reference is
made to communal
properties of these
major systems)

Economy

lehgion

Family

Government

Education

MAJOR SYSTEM Family Economy

(Institutionalized
unit meeting basic
human needs)

Government Religion

Education
and Public
Information

SUBSYSTEM

(Widespread social
network)

Transportation

Banking

Industry

Commerce

Agriculture

Medicine

Organized labor

Political

Party

Officialdom

Various

reliqious

bodies

School
Press
Radio
TV

ind

SOCIAL GROUPING Parents Cotton growing Aliens

,_ , with farmers

(Categories of l i i_i

people with common pre-school Homeowners

characteristics) children

ChurchgoersUniversity
graduates

SOCIAL GROUP

(3 or more
people in social
contact)

The house-A hospital
hold staff

A construction

crew

Members of a

law firm

Local League Ministerial Members of
of Women association adult educa-
Voters tion course

SOCIAL
RELATIONSHIPS

(2 people or units
in social contact)

Parent-
Child

Merchant-
consumer

Official-
citizen

Clergyman- Teacher-
member pupil

THE PERSON
(As a type)

Parent

Consumer

Citizen

Member or Teacher
adherent

a Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: MacMillan, 1952).

3 Irwin T. Sanders, The Community: An Introduction to a Social System

(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), p. 31.

51

A second method of understanding community problems is the
institutional study of the community. Five of the institutions are shown
on the above chart. Each social institution is said to cluster around
essential activities. The family serves a procreation function. The econ-
omy functions in the creation and distribution of goods and wealth.
Government regulates each of the other functions, attempts to pro-
vide for the national security, the international relationships, and the
social welfare of the members of a community. The church explains
unknown factors in a society and meets the religious needs of man.
Lastly, the education program is carried on by the family and attempts
to teach individuals how to live comfortably and efficiently within
their environment.

Viewing the community in its entirety, it is easy to see that
sociology is equally concerned about children as ,aged people, with
illness and health, with illegitimacy and church membership, about
education as well as employment. The list is endless due to the "whole-
ness" or generalizing nature of sociological studies and interests.

The development of a community offers the social scientist
numerous areas of study. Some areas getting the most attention at
present are poverty, crime, race relations, family changes, and religious
values. How can different rates of reported crime between urban areas
and rural areas be explained? Why does poverty exist in America, and
what can be done to allay the long term damages of poverty? Why do
people still meet monthly in Carrollton, Georgia, to trade dogs, guns,
knives, and other items? How do you explain more people attending
formal educational programs for longer periods? While there can be
no single cause or explanation of any of the above phenomenon, they
can be studied in terms of changes within the social system or the
institutional functions.

It has been speculated that society is becoming more "task and
thing-oriented" rather than "person-oriented." Studies have shown
that groups may teach various ethnocentric biases, or prejudices which
are not subject to reason or facts, but rather to attitudes and feelings.
W. F. Ogburn states that a cultural lag exists when the material aspects

52 '

of society outdistance the social or non-material aspects of a com-
munity/

Using the family as an example of understanding community
development, it can be readily seen that the family behaviors influence
the community, and the community the family. Children are born
within a family and much of the future expectations for the child has
been based on the social position of the parents. What the child learns
is clearly built upon the interests, behaviors, values, personalities, and
number of persons living in and around the child. The child is taught
what to work for, not to work, how to speak, and what behaviors are
rewarded by the family and community.

As the child is taught to function in his family group, it becomes
increasingly clear that other institutionalized programs of the commun-
ity share in the socialization of the new member. The family, by
teaching the child how to behave in church is helping the child and
the church to develop an arrangement which will benefit the entire
community. The school, now starting as day care centers, shows
clearly the concern which society has with teaching social values, skills,
and other cultural facts. The education process does not stop with the
formal schooling but continues throughout the life. of the individual.

Other portions of the community which are concerned with the
development of each new member, and the skills of community resi-
dents are the occupational or economic structures. The employment of
individuals, their income, how the family spends its money, and how to
encourage further spending and distribution are very complex situations
of greatest concern to each member of a community.

Government is of continuing importance to the individual and as
society becomes more complex tends to increase in control and com-
plexity. Historically, government was the last institution to develop
the control factors which it now enjoys. Political sociologists are con-
stantly studying the mechanics of government, voting behavior, and the
influences which cause the changes in this area. It is in government
and the general welfare of the population that many of the studies

* W. F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mif-
flin Company, 1964), pp. 659-695.

53

about the individual, the family and the community are financed and
supported. The most meaningful data for sociological research is
found in the governmental -supported census. The birth of a new
member is recorded by governmental agencies, the diseases and
skills, as well as the death are reported to the government, and infor-
mation evaluated by the governments. 5

Sociology is concerned with people who do not become a con-
forming part of the community. When people are physically, mentally,
socially, or economically different, interesting studies can be made. The
services to these categories of people and the evaluation of the com-
munity development in serving these people are equally in the domain
of the social scientist and practitioner.

One of the most fruitful and involved areas of the social sciences
today is that of social change which implies development. There are
several theories of change at the current time, one which most popular
being that explained by Lippitt. 6 He envisions change through both
sociological and psychological means. The self explanatory Phases in
this process are shown below:

Phase 1 : The client system discovers the need for help, some-
times with stimulation by the change agent.

Phase 2: The helping relationship is established and defined.

Phase 3: The change problem is identified and clarified.

Phase 4: Alternative possibilities for change are examined and
change goals or intentions are established.

Phase 5: Change efforts in the reality situation are attempted.

Phase 6: Change is generalized and stabilized.

Phase 7: The helping relationship ends or a different type of
continuing relationship is defined.

5 Further information can be found in J. O. Hertzler, American Social In-
stitutions: A Sociological Analysis. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1961)

<> Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, and Bruce Westley, The Dynamics of
Planned Change (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1958), pp. 122-123.

54

Utilizing the above frame of reference it is possible to enhance
community development or clarify with the community the need to
plan change. This is based on an attempt to show that a community
is not static and that change is inevitable. Conversely, not all change
in a given community can be viewed as progress. The need to study
ourselves, our community, and our decision making processes to facili-
tate studied, planned, and structured change appears to be a cultural
imperative.

55

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY
AND MENTAL HEALTH

By Kenneth R. Whittemore*

The development of adequate community-based mental health
programs has recently become a priority health effort at both the
federal and state levels. For several years the recognition has been
growing that many mentally ill persons will respond to treatment better
if such treatment is available in a local setting, than they will if
they are removed from their local communities and sent some dis-
tance away to a state mental institution. In response to this knowledge,
the Public Health Department of the State of Georgia has begun the
construction of several regional mental health institutions located
throughout the state.

Further, the Georgia Department of Public Health has divided
the state into thirty-one designated planning areas. Carroll County is
included in Planning Area 14 along with Harris, Troup, Haralson,
Heard and Coweta Counties. LaGrange is designated as the center of
this area and is seen as the site of the future location of Comprehensive
Community Mental Health Services for the area. Area 14 ranks sixth
in construction priority for such services out of the thirty-one areas. It
is noted further that Carrollton, "... extends some influence in the
northern part of the area." 1

In a preliminary survey conducted by the Division of Mental
Health of the Georgia Department of Public Health in 1965, it was
estimated that 361 persons resident in Carroll County had received
benefit of psychiatric services during the year 1963. It was also esti-
mated that private physicians in Carroll County saw a total of 405
patients with mental health problems during a typical week. 2 Given

*Assistant Professor of Sociology.

i "Plan for the Construction of Community Mental Health Centers and
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded 1967." (Georgia Department of Public
Health, Division of Mental Health), p. 25.

2 "A Comprehensive Mental Health Plan for Georgia." (Georgia Department
of Public Health, Division of Mental Health, 1965), p. 100.

56

such a realization of the extent of treated prevalence alone, it is easily
understood that the development of local mental health services is an
imperative.

The thrust toward community based mental health services is
motivated by far more than simple need, however. The development
of local mental health programs has received strong motivation from
the development of theory and principles within the rapidly expand-
ing field of community psychiatry. One noted authority sees the devel-
opment of community psychiatry as no less than a major revolution in
the historical development of psychiatry itself. Community psychiatry
has as one of its basic guiding principles "... the resolve to view
the individual's psychiatric problems within the frame of reference of
the community and vice-versa." 3

There is growing recognition that "mental illness does not en-
tirely reside within the individual (since) . . . the degree of psychosis
is related to the social and interpersonal setting of the patient. " A It
has also been noted that, "A significant aspect of this development
(community psychiatry) has been the involvement of the community
and its members in the concern for its own mental health. The citizen
as well as the mental health professional must play an active role in
the mental health of the community." 5

Indeed, the increasing involvement of members of the community
in a direct manifestation of their concern with the mental health of
the community is necessitated by the shortage of traditionally trained
mental health professionals, if for no other reason. There simply are
not now and will not be enough mental health professionals to staff
the developing local programs in a traditional manner.

The State of Georgia has a particularly acute shortage of trained
mental health professionals of all kinds. The state ranks 42nd out of

3 L. Bellak, editor, Handbook of Community Psychiatry and Community
Mental Health, (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1964), p. 5.

4 Matthew Dumont, The Absurd Healer: Perspectivees of a Community
Psychiatrist. (New York: Science House, 1968), p. 29.

s S. M. Heilig, Norman L. Farberow, and R. E. Litman, "The Role of Non-
Professional Volunteers in a Suicide Prevention Center." (Los Angeles Suicide
Prevention Center, Los Angeles, California), mimeograph, undated.

57

the 50 in the numbers of psychiatrists per one-hundred-thousand popu-
lation. If the number of psychiatrists in the state were immediately
doubled, we would still fall far short of the national average. Of the
159 counties in Georgia, 148 of them are without a resident psychiatrist
and Carroll County is among them. The shortage of clinical psycholo-
gists and social workers is similarly acute.

Such statistics as the above make it increasingly obvious that we
need to provide in-service training and experience in mental health
for "non-professionals," both paid and volunteer. We also need to
start new academic and technical training programs for whole new
occupational careers in the "middle-level" between the psychiatric aide
(who needs to work under the supervision of a professional), and
the now existing "upper level" professionals mentioned in the para-
graph above.

There is further need which I believe to be equally urgent and
which requires the effort of all concerned citizens. All of us need to
become as concerned with providing services for any person "having
trouble" as we are with handling those persons whose symptoms have
become so manifest that they are "giving us trouble." We need to see
each mentally ill person as a measure of the breakdown of community
and institutional organizations. This will give us valuable insight into
needed changes in the social system at large, as well as seeing such
a person as an individual in need of treatment.

The successful use of non-professionals as counselors in suicide
prevention centers and emergency mental health services throughout
the country has demonstrated that the average citizen, given some
training in basic counseling techniques, can effectively function as a
first line resource in crisis situations. It is essential that such a person
have a thorough knowledge of community resources which are avail-
able to persons in crisis, both helping persons and helping agencies.
Since the initial contact of the person in question can be assumed to
demonstrate a felt rapport between the caller and the person called to
render help and counsel, the person so contacted can use this rapport
to help define the nature and circumstance of the crisis. He can then
refer or transfer the case to the most appropriate available resource.

)8

Initial referrals will most often be made to non-mental health
professionals within the community who are identified as known help-
ers; such as physicians, clergymen, social workers, etc. It is well within
the competence of such persons to successfully handle the majority
of cases brought to their attention provided such persons have access
to the back-up support and counsel of an established mental health
professional.

A broadly based community mental health program, working
within the realistic limitations imposed by the shortage of trained
mental health professionals, is then envisioned as consisting of at least
three levels or stages:

1 . an informed citizenry with some basic training in the handling
of persons in stressful situations and with a thorough know-
ledge of sources of help available within the community to
which persons in need of assistance are referred;

2. more fully trained non-mental health professionals who will
handle the persons in stress and crisis with the support and
counsel, if necessary, of

3. a trained mental health professional such as a psychiatrist,
clinical psychologist, psychiatric nurse, or clinically trained
social worker.

It is obvious upon analyzing the above article that the author
has largely rejected the concept of mental "illness" associated with per-
sons manifesting signs of emotional or mental disturbance in times of
stress and crisis. It is quite normal to become emotionally upset in
times of stress and such upset is not necessarily a symptom of under-
lying pathology. The handling of the crisis focuses on defining the
immediate precipitating cause and relieving the stressful condition.

It should be equally obvious that the above model accepts the
traditional medical model of division of labor and task specialization.
In a medical setting it is often the nurses aid who provides the ma-
jority of the care of the patient under the supervision of a nurse who
dispenses prescription medicines under the instructions of a physician
in charge and ultimately responsible for the treatment program. It is
suggested here that the psychiatrists' most appropriate function should

59

be similar, he should supervise the persons who axe counseling the
patients or clients, rather than seeing persons in need of care directly
himself in one-to-one therapy. The utilization of the trained mental
health professional in the manner suggested above seems to be logical
and most efficient use of such persons especially when there exists
such a shortage of trained professionals. All of us need to expand
our horizons and become as concerned with the development of a
positive environment for mental health in our communities as we are
with the need to provide treatment and services for those already
mentally ill. The first task of any community mental health program
should be the prevention of mental illness by eliminating those stress
factors present in a community which often serve to bring the illness
about.

60

HISTORY'S RELATION TO

SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT

By Theodore B. Fitz-Simons*

It is far easier to make a firm positive assertion of the value of
history as a discipline in community development than it is to describe
and assess the value of this role. One of the most apparent reasons for
this difficulty is the lack of communication between the social sciences
and the consequent mutual misapprehension of their respective natures,
Even though at some point in his career the student of history must
consider the relation of his subject to the other social sciences and
may even be exposed to some of them in survey courses, specialization
in his own field allows little time for further exploration.' The result
is at worst a stereotyped concept and at best an ineffective effort to
update old impressions. This is probably true to varying degrees in
the companion disciplines. Since community development is sometimes
identified with sociology, it becomes necessary at the outset to clear
away some of the misunderstandings which seem to obscure the mean-
ingful relationship between history and sociology in this matter.

Sociology is probably remembered as that social science which
considers man and his role in the group, the relation of one group
to another, and the whole process of socialization and change in
society. The sociologist is more concerned with man here and now
and often relies on the historian for "a description of any social act

* Associate Professor of History.

i In anticipation of objections on the part of historians to the classification of
history as a social science the writer is well aware that "Many historians . . .
do not think that the study of man is a science. The historian's material . . .is
often limited; he frequently lacks the factual data, such as the statistical runs
employed by the social scientist. History, therefore, is not a science per se.
although it often employs the disciplined techniques of the scientific method."
Call them what you will the interdependence of the 'social sciences' still exists.
Donald B. Cole and Thomas Pressly, Preparation of Secondary-School History
Teachers (Washington: American History Association Committee on Teaching
1968), p. 12.

61

that does not occur within immediate experience . . . " 2 As for com-
munity development it is likely to mean all things to all men. It is
new industry to the Chamber of Commerce, a successful revival to a
minister, renovation of commercial property to the merchant and real-
tor, urban renewal to a councilman, a new community center to a civic
club, or a Headstart program to a VISTA volunteer. To most people,
including the historian, it probably has a vague connotation of progress.
Let the historian venture first into the realm of community develop-
ment as seen by the sociologist.

It becomes immediately apparent that sociologists are by no means
completely agreed on what community development is nor on the best
way of bringing it about. At the same time it is obvious that in spite of
differences, sociologists have some rather definite ideas on what con-
stitutes community development and that these do not necessarily co-
incide with those of the historian. This makes it essential to modify
the general rather nebulous definition before attempting to appraise
the value of his discipline in this field.

Existing differences among sociologists appear to be largely cen-
tered on the scope of the community development process. Irwin T.
Sanders in his text on the community as a social system, sees it as a
large "umbrella" under which all interested in community organi2ation
and change can gather. Advocates of planned change, sponsors of
adult education, city planners, agricultural extension personnel and
civic club leaders as well as social workers would be included. Sanders
is quick to note, however, that this definition does not suit all and
carefully points out that some community developers are inclined to
divorce themselves from the concepts of community organization and
social work. 3

William W. and Loureide J. Biddle favor this more restricted ap-
proach. The Biddies feel that the most effective community develop-
ment comes not as a result of planned change effected through a

2 Caroline B. Rose, Sociology: The Study of Man in Society (Columbus. Ohio:
Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1965), pp. 1-3, 43-58.

3 Irwin T. Sanders, The Community An Introduction to a Social System
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1966), pp. 504-509.

62

marshalling of the support of members of the power structure who
have been identified as integrally involved in the desired change.
They feel that community development comes through the recognition
on the part of the underprivileged of the need for change and active
involvement in it. Interested parties on all levels are encouraged to
recognize the need and community initiative must work in the direc-
tion of what hopefully will be a beneficial change. The desire for
change should be subtly developed by a catalyst in the person of one
who is called an "encourager" and who plays the role of an informal
associate guiding wherever possible but without intruding as a domi-
nating leader. Community development in this case is an intangible
idea or spirit as opposed to the material and tangible results evidenced
by the building of a clinic, for example.*

Even though sociologists see community development as seeking
"to bring about growth in competence more than alleviation of misery"
and feel that "it needs to maintain its own identity as a discipline,"
they do not reject aid from other sources. 5 Adult education is recognized
as among the earlier of the "helping professions" in the field, but it
cannot serve all of the needs of the community developer. Children
are also "included within the scope" of their activity "even though
. . . served by other, more formal educational processes and institu-
tions." These services and this formal education are the responsibility of
institutions from the public school to the university. The community
developer in this narrower sense of the term does not become a teacher
or an instructor but rather prefers to call in experts in specific fields as
the need arises. 6 With respect to history the Biddle study has this
interesting observation. A sense of history is important not so much
that entombed in books, but more the kind which is lived. The in-

* William W. and Loureide J. Biddle, The Community Development Process:
The Rediscovery of Local Initiative (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
Inc., 1966), pp. 221, 223.

s Ibid., p. 221. "Basically, community development is a social process by
which human beings can become more competent to live with and gain some
control over local aspects of a frustrating and changing world ... It calls for
the utilization of ali helping professions and agencies (from local to inter-
national), that can assist in problem solving. But personality growth through
group responsibility for the local common good is the focus," Ibid., p. 78.
6 Biddle and Biddle, The Community Development Process, pp. 243, 244, 247.

63

dividual's experience of development can be discussed as part of the
history that is recorded in books. And even the small processes of
change in a nucleus or neighborhood can take on significance as a
part of great flows of events into the future. 7 The implications of this
statement for the sociologist and historian can be more appropriately
considered later. At this point it will be fitting to conclude the sociolog-
ists' views of community development with a brief critical evaluation by
one other authority in the field.

Professor Roland L. Warren, 8 in considering the matter of com-
munity change identifies specifically the various methods, including
the "enabler model" which the Biddle study would prefer to call the
"encourager" model. 9 He notes the increasing complexity of planned
change and sees the "goal-oriented model of change agent (as being)
more appropriate than that of the enabler model, particularly in the
larger communities ..." The entrance of government agencies in a
"massive and deliberate singling out of the poor and culturally de-
prived" who are not ordinarily members of organizations and usually
not responsive to community meetings makes the enabler model a
helpful approach. 10 It might be well to suggest at this point that
there is probably a significant number of people in the community
who while neither culturally deprived nor poor by community stand-
ards are disinterested if not apathetic to such meetings. This perhaps
should be more explicitly expanded to include those who are dubious
of the motives and effectiveness of 'do-gooders and uplifters" as well
as those whose conservatism opposes any sort of 'tampering' with
things as they are.

7 Ibid., p. 209.

s Professor Warren is Professor of Community Theory in the Florence Heller
Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare at Brandeis University.
9 The Biddies mention the enabler model, but they give specific reasons for
their preference for the term encourager as opposed to a number of others
including enabler. Their objective is to use as informal an approach in stimu-
lating community initiative as possible, hence they shun words such as teacher,
leader, etc., in preference to their own term. Biddle and Biddle, The Community
Development Process, pp. 243, 244, 247.

io Roland L. Warren, "Community Changes: Planned and Otherwise" copied
from a typewritten speech by Ronald L. Warren presented as a University
Assembly lecture sponsored by the Department of Community Development,
University of Missouri, May 7, 1965.

64 ____^______

Reflecting on the studies consulted the historian's role is partially
revealed and some of the problems are identified. The sociologists
concerned with community development all stress education and direct-
ly or indirectly involve history, even though they may differ with
respect to methods to be used. Acknowledging the fact that the his-
torian can be of help to the research sociologist in achieving a better
understanding of the present in terms of the past, how can he deal
with the culturally deprived or the materially prosperous but culturally
unaware? How does the sociologist view the historian's potential as
an ally? The historian can profit from the words of the poet Burns as he
says,

Oh wad some power the giftie gie us

To see oursels as others see us!

It wad frae monie a blunder free us . . .

No historian could be labeled as overly sensitive if he were
stung by the implications contained in the Biddies' reference to the
role of history in community development. Does the sociologist see the
historian as a grave digger for facts? To what extent does the his-
torian, wittingly or unwittingly, formalize and "entomb" his discipline?
Has the point been reached at which history has lost contact with ev-
eryday life and reduced itself thereby to an esoteric study in which
historians write articles and books purely for the consumption of their
colleagues? Just what is the discipline's objectives? Is it justified at
all? Let the historian now refresh the sociologist's memory in the
hope of achieving a mutual appreciation of interdependence.

It is trite but nonetheless true to say that there are as many de-
finitions of history as there are historians. For the purposes of this
paper, however, what Philip D. Jordan refers to as the "common
properties . . . inherent in all history" will serve to establish the gen-
eral nature of the historical process. First of all, history, like sociology,
is man-centered, be it man the individual or as a part of a group or
culture. The historian is more than a record keeper, for he "must at-
tempt to describe institutions created by man and to explain why his
social inventions and techniques take the form they do." The "con-
cept of change" is vital to the historian. He must ask why a particular
change has come about and what its meaning is? His study of his

65

topic is hopefully an objective one which leads him to a valid con-
clusion and an interpretation which become a part of a longer and
broader stream of history." History must ever be a dynamic study
and never a static one. It is dynamic in the sense that it is constantly
being made and more important in the sense that continuing study and
research give new and different meaning to the past. History is
creative in that it requires conscious thought. Discovery and analysis of
new material give it life. 12 It is always in the act of "becoming". It is
the "seemingly paradoxical strands of perpetual change and never
ending continuity." 13 If this is not enough to overawe the historian
with immensity of his task, let a few final words from Norman A.
Graebner provide the finishing touch. "A nation that attempts to live
without history is in the same position as the man who each morning
cannot remember what occurred on the previous day." He finds the
lesson of history to be that the lesson has not been learned. "For
all of this the historian must share the responsibility, for so much of the
effort of historians fails to instruct." Professor Graebner sees the
challenge "to record and analyze" as one facing the local historians
and teachers of history. 1 A Implicit in this approach is the idea that
history must have meaning for the present, it must be relevant whether
written or taught and that this is the obligation of the historian which
he should not ignore.

This is not to say, however, that relevance should be stressed
to the point of eliminating the study of the history of man. All
history is relevant when well-written or taught and has meaning for

ii Philip D. Jordan, The Nature and Practice of State and Local History
(Washington: American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers
of History, 1958), Pub. No. 14, pp. vi-viii.

te Jordan, The Nature and Practice of State and Local History, p. iv; Walter
T. K. Nugent, Creative History An Introduction to Historical Study (New
York: J. B. Lippincott, 1967), p. 10; Norman A. Graebner, "The Importance
and Meaning of History," in Louis Leonard Tucker, ed., The Chalenge of
Local History (Albany, 1968), p. 1. The last work is the published report of "A
Conference designed to broaden the interests of New York State local his-
torians in scholarly history" and is published by the Office of State History
of the State Education Department of the University of the State of New York.
'3 Constance McLaughlin Green, "Changes in the Community," in Louis
Leonard Tucker, ed., The Challenge of Local History (Albany, 1968), p. 16.
i* Graebner, "The Importance and Meaning of History," pp. 3-4.

66

the present. Thus the individual through study becomes aware of
himself in community, state, nation, and world as a descendant of the
earliest civilizations.

Assume for the moment that historians could communicate this
idea of history to the members of a community, what would it hold for
them? Ideally the individual would become aware of his participation
in the making of history. He would have a better understanding of
how he and his community came to be where they are as well as have
a realization that change is ever with them. He would see his life as
a part of an historical continuity that is anchored in the past but pointed
to the future by way of the present. He would apprehend that change
can mean progress when the community of individuals sees the need
and works to produce it or at least acquiesces in it.

Were it true, it would be a valuable asset to the community de-
veloper, but unfortunately the assumption is apparently not valid. For
the man on the community street, history may seem to be a static, cut
and dried record that lives only through repetition. The repetition has
been further drained of vitality by the destruction of any idea of
continuity or relevance. It may tend to become a series of isolated
events, usually either glorious or gory, which are quite unrelated and
closed to further question or investigation interesting stories to be
retold. In the decade now nearing its end, a Civil War Centennial has
been celebrated with what one authority refers to as "a burst of com-
mercialism and ill-conceived hoopla." 15 Nationwide interest in the
Civil War period has generally focused on the political and military
aspects of the struggle as opposed to the social and economic. The
conflict stands as an island in the nineteenth century stream of history,
a romantic memorial to the 'sacrifices' and the 'glory' of its participants.
The case is closed! There has been no enthusiastic rush on the part of
the public to investigate and ponder its social and economic causes. Its
isolation is significantly emphasized by the fact that some four years
of the Reconstruction centennial have passed with no noticeable
demand for a commemoration. The current struggle over civil rights

'5 Russell W. Fridley, "The Uses of State and Local History," in History
News, (Nashville, Tennessee: American Association for State and Local
History), XXIII, No. 12, p. 240.

67

hardly qualifies as such. The continuity of cause and effect have again
been ignored as the Reconstruction era which remains an emotion-
laden story lifted from the historical context of the nineteenth century
to justify the expression 'damyankee.' It is devoid of relevance to
both an older and a younger generation even though it is fairly burst-
ing with implications for our own troubled times.

The individuals in any given community who hold such distorted
views of history might vary widely. Obviously the Civil war buff
might well be one to whom history means qualification for membership
in a patriotic organization. On the other hand any number of ordinary
citizens whose only contact with history was in a high school course
could have distorted views. Distortion might be evident in the mind of
a member of a minority group whose contact with secondary educa-
tion served only to turn him against a history with which he could not
identify. The inability to appreciate the nature of history and the con-
sequent failure to see oneself and his community as a meaningful
part of the historical process is tragic.

How is the situation to be accounted for when history of state,
nation, and world is taught on every educational level from elementary
to graduate school? How can it exist when there are over two thousand
local historical societies in the United States as well as a number of
regional, sectional, and national organizations? It would be a grave mis-
take to look for a scapegoat and naive to assume that once the prob-
lems are identified that they would be susceptible to immediate and
complete solution. There can be no harm in discussing them and
suggesting possible changes. There are a number of factors, attitudes
and individuals involved, and the manner and degree of involvement
will be affected not only by variation in individual personalities but
also by the rural or urban nature of the community. The approach
must be general and flexibility in the application of possible remedies
is anticipated.

It would be well to begin by recognizing an inherited disposition
to view history as primarily political in nature and concerned only with
the memorization of dates and facts. This attitude is perpetuated as it
is unconsciously handed down from father to son. If change is ex-
pected the cycle must be broken. There are programs of adult educa-

68

tion which are specifically concerned with community development
which might well be utilized to modify this attitude. In practice, pro-
grams implemented and funded in Georgia under Title I of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 follow the planned change approach recom-
mended by Professor Warren. Local leaders are encouraged to utilize
the aid of specialists from colleges and universities in identifying prob-
lems and seeking intelligent and practical plans of action on the part
of the community concerned in the interest of its general welfare. 16
The limitations of such programs have been suggested by Professor
Warren and efforts to reach the culturally deprived who would not
ordinarily attend such meetings might put the enabler approach of the
Biddies to use. The historian should be willing to make his contribu-
tion in either case when called upon to do so.

The public school system provides an avenue of approach to the
community's children on all levels. It is here that a foundation can be
laid for an understanding of history. The way in which history is
taught should be carefully examined and constructive criticism offered
where needed. The college teacher is prone to complain about the in-
adequate background of his freshmen students. This area is an ex-
tremely sensitive one which demands tact because "Secondary school
history teachers naturally resent the criticism by university historians .
. . when they remember . . . dull, lifeless, and ineffective lectures by
these same university historians." 17 The critic will do well to remem-
ber that the freshmen he receives are his own students once removed.

Another weakness stems from the public school administrative at-
titude that history is designed to teach citizenship and since this is

16 A number of reports, informal notes, and summaries dealing with com-
munity development in Georgia have been examined. In addition to this,
material dealing specifically with Northwest Georgia has been consulted. The
latter would include a "Report of the Area Planning Conference, Northwest
Georgia area," a "Summary of Presentation in the Group Leadership Training
Course," held at Turin, Georgia, April 14 through May 23, 1967, "Report: A
Course in Community Development Bartow County," September 18 through
November 6, 1967, and a projected plan for a similar course in the Rockmart
area. This material is in the files of Department of Continuing Education at
West Georgia College and was made available by Professor Collus O. Johnson
of that Department.

i7 Cole and Pressly, Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers,
p. 24.

69

common sense, anyone can do it. This is compounded by the submerg-
ing of history in a social studies curriculum in which none of the
social studies are actually identified in the process of teaching, and
finally there is the non-scholarly atmosphere of the school in which
there is little emphasis on further study for teachers." 18

It should be noted immediately that these are general areas of
weakness that have been identified and do not constitute a blanket in-
dictment of teachers and administrators. Happily the trend seems to
be in the direction of frank examination and recognition of problems
that exist. The endorsement of a substantial subject matter curriculum
for teachers and an effort to see that secondary teachers are well pre-
pared has been recommended by the Service Center for Teachers of
the American Historical Association. In addition to this, the high
school history teacher is being encouraged to consider himself a pro-
fessional historian while the university professor is being urged to ac-
cept and indeed to cultivate a professional group that extends to all
levels of teaching. 19 "The National Defense Education Act has made
funds available for university-based programs of teacher training in
history," which give the secondary school teacher the opportunity to
keep up with his field and to learn new techniques of presentation. 20

In still another way the public school can make a contribution to
the understanding of history and to community development. It has
been suggested that "community history" be instituted in the fourth
grade of school as a means of introducing the student to history by
means of that which is more familiar. As the student tries to find
himself in his community it can be pointed out to him that history
cannot be confined to a locality and that he must go beyond. On the
sixth grade level he should be introduced to state history at which

is ibid., pp. 5, 20, 21.

i9 Cole and Pressly, Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers, pp.9-13;
W. Stull Holt, The Historical Profession on the United States, (Washington:
American Historical Association Service Center for Teachers of History, 1963),
Pub. No. 52, pp. 10-35.

20 Cole and Pressly, Preparation of Secondary-School History Teachers, pp.
22-23. West Georgia College as a branch of the University System of Georgia
has for three consecutive years conducted history institutes for high school
teachers.

70

time he will come to understand, if taught properly, that the history
of the state is bound up in that of the nation. In all of this, the child
should be encouraged to write and study the object being "not only
to put life into history, but (to) ... put history into the life of the
pupil." 21

These activities take on added importance when it is realized that
the opportunity is afforded to reach students black and white from
all social and economic levels. No historian will be so naive as to
think that the beneficial results of such a program will come over-
night or that there will be an immediate or overwhelming change for
the good of the community. The teacher on whatever level he teaches
needs foresight, imagination and above all patience since it might well
be a generation before the change is noticeable. A recent reference
to Walter Prescott Webb might be appropriately quoted:

... he believed that teachers do not reap the harvest of the
seeds they plant because they plant for posterity and man-
kind. And on at least one occasion he said General William
Booth's borrowed quotation should be . . . framed over the
desk of every teacher and administrator: 'Sow the seeds and
fear not the birds for the harvest is not to yours.' 22

community. Every community has its official or unofficial historian,
as an ally in establishing a better understanding of history within the
community. Every community has its official or unofficial historian.
The professonal historian is sometimes inclined to look askance at
his efforts and to dismiss him as a hopeless antiquarian. It is not
so much his reason for doing this as his wisdom in doing it that is to
be questioned. Indeed the gulf that separates the two is widened as
the local historian returns the professional's disdain and considers his
accuser as a pompous, ivory-towered, footnote worshipper. Both are
right to a point. The local historian is often an antiquarian with an
outdated notion of history whose scorn for the profession stems partial-
ly from his own frustrations in handling the mechanics of writing

21 Jordan, The Nature and Practice of State and Local History, pp. 17-23.

22 Wilbur R. Jacobs, John W. Caughey, and Joe B. Frantz, Turner, Bolton,
and Webb, Three Historians of the American Frontier (Seattle: University of
Washington, 1965), p. 102.

71

local history. The professional on the other hand can be pompous
and his condescending attitude toward the amateur is perhaps the more
intense because he knows that the amateur has a wealth of valuable
material that he will never see. Obviously some rapport needs to be
established between the amateur and the professional and it is up to
the latter to make the first move. The need has been recognized and
action taken in some cases, but there are probably too many who feel
it beneath their dignity or beyond their responsibility to become in-
volved.

In the first place the local historian should be encouraged to
write. As Philip D. Jordan says, "Don't fence them in and don't look
down your nose at them." They need to learn, as does the professional
that he must "live with footnotes, but he does not have to live for
them." 23 The state of New York has a law which requires the ap-
pointment of local historians. Recently under the sponsorship of the
National Endowment for the Humanities, that state has begun a
program to encourage them in scholarly history by means of a con-
ference with leading authorities. This was no attempt to cover up the
animosities which divide the amateur and professional but rather a
realistic attempt to illustrate interdependence and to broaden the
outlook of the local historian. No glittering claims have been made
for the success of the experiment but it was a beginning. 24

Interest in local history in Georgia has led to the founding of the
Georgia League of Historical Societies. The League is interested in
the organization of local historical societies and encourages them to
write and publish their own material. Conferences give members the
opportunity to learn about publication and writing of local history as
well as acquainting them with the activities of the various local organi-
zations. The League has the support of the Georgia Department of
Archives and History as well as that of the Georgia Historical Com-
mission and hopefully will do much to increase interest and improve
the quality of local history in the state. Community development
stands to benefit from any effort which leads to the identification of
community and a better understanding of the groups that make it up.

23 Jordan, The Nature and Practice of State and Local History, pp. 34-35.
2 Tucker, The Challenge of Local History, pp. iii-iv.

72

While it now seems clear that both disciplines, history and soci-
ology, have some areas of common interest, among them the local
community, this is not to say that the historian is a social worker or a
community developer. He is not. It must be frankly admitted that
there are indeed historians who write primarily for other historians,
who study history for the sake of knowledge alone and who deplore the
very idea of any responsibility for writing or teaching what might be
called consciously relevant history. The fact is that history when well-
written or taught is relevant whether the historian would have it so or
not. Even the cloistered scholar's work will probably reach the public
in a text or through a teacher's exposition.

The historian would probably prefer to see himself in an indirect
role. He would prefer to feel that he is developing in his students the
capacity to be critical and analytical rather than indoctrinating them
or becoming involved in the community itself, although this is not
always the case. Each individual historian must find his own place
whether it be writing history for others to use, teaching and preparing
elementary or secondary teachers who will be more directly involved
with the community, or instilling a critical appreciation of history
in those who will become members of communities. Some historians
will play a somewhat more direct role in community development
ranging from direct involvement as 'amateur community developers'
to the less direct but equally important tasks of aiding in community
studies, working with public school teachers, and cooperating with
community or local historians. Success is dependent on the historian's
ability and willingness to see his role, acknowledge his responsibility,
and act. A certain amount of humility is a necessary quality in that
he must recognize that he cannot do it alone nor can he accomplish a
great deal with an antagonistic attitude toward other disciplines or other
levels of his own discipline. If his chosen field has any meaning for
him he will find his job and make his contribution.

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VIII

June, 1969

Number 1

SOME ASPECTS

of
BLACK CUL

Published By

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume VIII June, 1969 Number 1

SOME ASPECTS

of

BLACK CULTURE

CONTENTS

Saunders E. Walker

Black Poetry for High Schools and Colleges 6

Robert Hersch

Negro Slavery and the Emergence of the South as a
Distinct Region Prior to 1850 14

Melvin Drimmer

Teaching Black History in America:

What are the Problems? 24

Robert H. Claxton

A Latin American Alternative to Racism: Some

Aspects of the Thought of Eugenio Maria

de Hostos 29

Elaine F. Thomas

Some American Negro Artists 40

Ernst Bjerkerot

Observations on the African "World- View" and its
Encounter with Christianity 46

E. Bradford Burns

The Black in Brazilian History:

An Exploratory Essay 52

FOREWORD

The articles on the following pages are based upon lec-
tures delivered at the Conference on Teaching History which
the Division of Social Sciences presented at West Georgia
College on May 8, 1969. This Conference, in turn, was a re-
sult of interest generated through a weekly lecture and dis-
cussion series on Afro-American culture during the preceding
February and March. Both programs were conceived and di-
rected by Robert Claxton, Assistant Professor of History,
West Georgia College.

Several ideas were fundamental to both the Conference
and the earlier lecture series. Since contemporary university
controversies and the staggering problems of American cities
relate in part to racial difficulties, informed citizens, especial-
ly potential teachers, need historical background information
regarding such crucial matters. Because our knowledge of
history is too often limited to western Europe and the United
States a full and realistic appreciation of the non-western
world, notably African cultures, is essential today. Further-
more, much can be learned through comparative history as
in the case of examining the role black people have played in
Latin American development. Finally, the resources of several
disciplines, including fine arts and literature, can enrich our
understanding of history which should be the study of the
record of all human achievement and activity.

A special note of appreciation is due to Professor Collus
O. Johnson of the Department of Continuing Education at
West Georgia College and to Mr. Clyde D. Ware of the Sears
Roebuck Foundation. Mr. Johnson's department arranged
for the publicity on the Afro- American culture lectures while
Mr. Ware's Sears Roebuck Foundation sponsored this pub-
lication. Of course, thanks go to the contributors, their audi-
ences and all who worked with both programs. As in all joint
works the authors views are their own.

Eugene R. Huck, Editor
Studies in the Social Sciences

Copyright 1969, Division of Social Sciences

West Georgia College

FIRST PRINTING
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-625241
Printed in the United States of America Price SI. 25

CONTRIBUTORS

SAUNDERS WALKER earned two master's degrees from the
University of Michigan, one in English and one in Speech.
After completing the Ph.D in English at Western Reserve
University, Dr. Saunders studied at Harvard and the Banff
School of Fine Arts. He also nearly completed requirements
for a second doctorate, in Speech, from the University of
Michigan. For several years, Dr. Saunders was Chairman of
the Literature Department of Tuskegee Institute and is now
Chairman of the Division of Humanities at Fort Valley State
College, Fort Valley, Georgia.

ROBERT C. HERSCH studied at Harpur College, and re-
ceived his M.A. from New York University, where he is pres-
ently completing his doctoral work. Mr. Hersch has done re-
search on the history of black culture and has participated
in a course on the development of Afro-American culture at
West Georgia College. He is a member of Phi Alpha Theta,
the national historical honor society, the Conference on Latin
American Flistory, and the Southeastern Conference on Latin
American Studies and is an assistant Professor of History at
West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia.

MELVIN DRIMMER graduated from City College of New
York and received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester.
In addition, he has studied at Oxford and at the University
of London, where he completed post-doctoral work in African
history followed by travel in West Africa. Dr. Drimmer has
directed summer institutes in Negro history, sponsored by the
United States Office of Education. He has co-ordinated an
American summer study group in Ghana, Dr. grimmer has
read papers at various conferences of historians and has writ-
ten several book reviews. He is the editor of Black History,
A Reappraisal (1968), an interpretive anthology of essays
about the American Negro past. His research interests in-
clude the history of slavery and the life and works of W.E.B.
DuBois. At present, he is an Associate Professor of History at
Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia.

ROBERT C. CLAXTON has degrees from Houghton College
and the State University of New York (Buffalo) and is a can-
didate for the Ph.D. in Latin American history at Tulane Uni-
versity. He has done research in Guatemala, El Salvador,

Costa Rica and Nicaragua partly sponsored by a West Geor-
gia College Faculty Research Grant. He is currently Assistant
Professor of History at West Georgia College.

ELAINE F. THOMAS was educated at Tuskegee Institute
where she graduated first in her class and has a M.A. from
New York University. She has studied at Mexico City College.
Northwestern University, Berea College and the University
of Paris. A member of several professional organizations and
holder of two Rosenwald Fellowships. Mrs. Thomas is an
artist in her own right. She has had exhibits in New York City.
Atlanta, Mexico City, Tuskegee and Paris. Cited in Who's
Who in American Education and Who's Who of American
Women, Mrs. Thomas currently is curator of George Wash-
ington Carver Museum at Tuskegee Institute. Tuskegee.
Alabama.

ERNST BJERKEROT received his B.D. from Union Theo-
logical Seminary. Gothenburg. Sweden and M.A. from Emory
University. Atlanta. Georgia. As a Methodist missionary to
South Africa and Rhodesia he served as Director of Adult
Education in the Eastern Transvaal District and professor of
church and society at the Ecumenical Epworth Theological
College, Salisbury. Rhodesia. While spending eight years
in Africa he did field investigations within the areas of cul-
tural anthropology with a special emphasis on the African
world-view and philosophy, and on the African Independent
Churches. He is Assistant Professor of Sociology and teacher
of African studies at West Georgia College. Carrollton. Geor-
gia.

E. BRADFORD BURNS received degrees from the Univer-
sity of Iowa and Tulane with the Ph.D. from Columbia Uni-
versity. He has studied at universities in Guatemala. Portugal,
and Venezuela. Dr. Burns has taught at Rutgers, the Brazilian
University of Parana, the State University of New York at
Buffalo, and Columbia University. A frequent reviewer for
learned journals for the past ten years, he has also written
articles on aspects of Brazilian history including Jesuit ac-
tivity in colonial times, the Enlightenment, the early twentieth
century Amazon rubber boom and Brazilian foreign policy.
He has published four books: A Documentary History of
Brazil (1965), Perspectives on Brazilian History (1967). and
Nationalism in Brazil (1968) and in 1966, The Unwritten Al-
liance. For this last work on Baron Rio Branco. Burns received

the Bolton Memorial Prize. Dr. Burns has served as a language
consultant to the Council on Foreign Relations, is a member
of the General Committee of the Conference on Latin Amer-
ican and a Corresponding Member of the Institute Historico e
Geografico Brasileiro. He is now an Associate Professor of
Latin American history at the University of California at Los
Angeles.

BLACK POETRY FOR HIGH SCHOOLS
AND COLLEGES

BY SAUNDERS E. WALKER

That the Social Science Division of West Georgia College
would consult an English teacher about poetry to offer in high
schools and colleges suggests respect for inderdepartmental
consultation. That the division would request a Negro to rec-
ommend black poetry for students suggests the concern of
that division in helping to solve some of the numerous social
problems. The request is indeed salutary; it is one that both
teachers and students would appreciate.

The person asked to recommend poetry by black writers
is one who was educated in the public schools of a large South-
ern City and in a predominantly Negro liberal arts college,
also in the South. In large measure this means that the courses
he studied and the books he read were about the same as those
used by white students. It follows that his acquisition of know-
ledge of Negro poetry was as limited as that of his white con-
temporaries. Whatever ascendency he may have acquired
over these white contemporaries is attributable, first, to a
sensitiveness to the dearth of materials devoted to Negro lit-
erature and, second, to his will to take full advantage of the
few available printed sources. This determination in the early
years of his career no doubt prepared him to teach a course
called Negro history and literature in the high school from
which he had graduated. For the same school, he wrote and
directed a pageant, titled "The Spirit of the American Negro."

In ascribing reasons for the omission of Negro achievement
in the literature studied in high schools and colleges, one
must be rational. Teachers familiar with the content and or-
ganization of textbooks and with the approaches to the several
forms of literary expression know well the practices followed.
They know that authors and editors have not concerned them-
selves with writers merely as representatives of particular
ethnic groups. In American literature they have been uniform
in selecting representative men and women of letters. These
the textbook writers have not extolled merely because of
racial identification.

That the literary selections have seldom included the
achievement of black writers, despite the plan and organiza-
tion of the book adopted, has constituted a grave offense.
Chief among those offended are the black American students
and those of other nationalities who in increasing numbers
are crusaders for the full emancipation of the black man.

To such offended people Crevecoeur's striking imagery
of America as a land where "'individuals of all nations are
melted into a new race of men" remains an unrealized ideal.
The offended see the literary output of black Americans as
a missing ingredient from the social melting pot. They loudly
demand that this ingredient be added. What the offenders do
not realize is that those who stir the literary pot do not know
the appropriate ingredients to add.

Frantic but sincere, makers of textbooks for literature
classes are turning to black Americans for recommended
selections. Too often the recommendations offered have
included Negro poets singing on only one key, namely, protest.
The recommenders feel that the only significant poetry and,
certainly, the only significant prose, are composed by protest-
ing authors. They believe that the literary achievement of
the American Negro must reflect the temper of the present
time: unequivocally that temper is protest. This insistence
has caused readers, Negro and white, to expect black writers
to produce only an ebony literature slanted toward complaints
and castigations.

The insistence upon protest literature makes for non-
recognition of the merits of other forms of expression. Writ-
ers dealing only with protest are vulnerable to misunderstand-
ing, if not to violent objection. A black poet who responds to
the tender clasp of a baby's smile or to the dimples of a coy
maiden is a potential traitor to the black man's cause.

Coupled with castigating the black poet for treating uni-
versal sentiments is the readiness of black militants to daub
the term "middle class" upon Negroes who read such poetry.
They employ this label without considering' the trials, sacri-
fices and persistence shown by those who have reached the
imagined middle position. They assail their own people for
having had ambition and the will to rise above injustices and
racial bitterness. They seem never to have realized that fail-
ure to recognize good achievement might be spurs to lofty
goals reached by thousands of American Negroes.

In other words, exponents of literary protest have given
scant attention to the positive protest. By this term is meant
the employment of high quality workmanship and acumen
sufficient to induce logical thinking, or thinking tinted by
neither emotion nor inaccuracy. Protest, sustained to a point
of diminishing returns, impairs thinking and warps person-
alities. When this is done, the antagonists are in ascendancy.

A sane point of view is to realize that literary militancy
is not new. It has been a motif followed by writers over wide
spans of time. The teachings of ancient philosophers, even
the pages of the Bible, offer evidence of the protesting pen.
Editors Woodward and Clark support this observation through
selections from a wide range of rebels in American litera-
ture. 1 Their listing, fortunately, includes five Negroes: Martin
Luther King, Jr., Stokeley Carmichael. Charles V. Hamilton.
James Baldwin and Leroi Jones. It is good to see these black
writers grouped with other writers treating the theme of social
rebellion, Students using a book such as this one will appre-
ciate the effort of the editors to give full consideration to
black writers.

Though the plight of youth may appear irrational, it de-
mands a sympathetic appraisal. It springs from the humilia-
tion suffered too long by black people compelled to face the
literary vacuum resulting from a deliberate omission of their
own talented writers. In these moments of humiliation they
have lost sight of certain problems faced by many writers.

Foremost among the problems the black literati have
faced are those of sustaining the writer while his work is in
progress. Even when the financial ends are met, the black writ-
er has felt insecure in finding a publisher to accept his manu-
script. Aware that state governments, systems of education,
and even public libraries have been known to ban stories
treating white rabbits having contacts with brown rabbits.
Negroes have shunned the precariousness of publication. If
white writers have lost prestige and suffered embarrassment
for even an accidental effort to promote integration. Negroes
know that their effort along similar lines would be doomed
from the beginning.

1 Robert H. Wcxxiward and James J. Clark. The Social Rebel in American
Literature (New York: The Odyssey Press. 1968).

What is needed is to face the matter with calmness and to
realize that all ethnic groups are innately sensitive to matters
of heredity; they are more sensitive when they and their elders
have been objects of both scorn and invisibility. With a sane
point of view will come the realization that the black militants
have understandable rights to demand recognition of their
literary achievement in all forms of expression. The great
danger of such recognition is concluding that Negroes as well
as those who write about them regard protest as the only ap-
proved genre. Such acceptance seems to say that the black
man has no capacity for responding to beauty or to the nobility
of character found in people in spite of discord and racial
enmity.

One proposed alleviation is to allow for fuller coverage of
Negro poets in courses taught in both high schools and colleges.
If a unit of study is flanked by colonial America, one might
direct attention to Phillis Wheatley, a coy slave brought from
Senegal to Boston, where John Wheatley, a wealthy tailor
purchased her as a maid for his wife. The Wheatleys, recog-
nizing the intrinsic worth of their servant, her poise and bril-
liant mind, spared no opportunity of teaching her to read and
of exposing her to classical and modern literature. In time
Phillis was writing poems showing the influence of Alexander
Pope. An ardent admirer of George Washington, she wrote of
him as "first in peace and honours," an epithet that was to be
heard again in the resolutions drawn up by the House of Repre-
sentatives following Washington's death in 1799:

"To the memory of the Man, first in war, first in
peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen."

At times when students are imbibing the lyrics of poets of
other hues, lines from Georgia Douglas Johnson (1886-1965)
whose poem "I want to Die While You Love Me" might be
injected as follows:

I want to die while you love me,
While yet you hold me fair,
While laughter lies upon my lips
And lights are in my hair.

I want to die while you love me.
I could not bear to see,
The glory of this perfect day,
Grow dim or cease to be.

I want to die while you love me.
Oh! who would care to live
Till love has nothing more to ask.
And nothing more to give.

I want to die while you love me.
And bear to that still bed
Your kisses, turbulent, unspent.
To warm me when I'm dead.

Readers of Negro poetry think of Paul Laurence Dunbar
(1872-1906) as the poet of Negro dialect, a form of expression
which must be handled with care less it offend the sensitive
minds of young Negroes. That Dunbar wrote in another key is
attested by the following:

Because I had loved so deeply.
Because I had loved so long,
God in his great compassion
Gave me the gift of song.

From "Compensation"

Dunbar's "My Sort O' Man" echoes the immortal lines of
Robert Burns "A Man's a Man for A That," as the following
excerpt will indicate:

But I jedge no man by his clothes,

Nor gentleman nor tramp:
The man that wears the finest suit

May be the biggest scamp.
An' he whose limbs are clad in rags

That make a mournful sight.
In life's great battle may have proved

A hero in the fight.

If the aim of a given assignment is to illustrate the poetic
imagery, classes in American literature on both the high school
and college levels would find rewards in poetry by Langston
Hughes ( 1902-1967), from whose "The Negro Speaks of Rivers"
the following are selected:

I've known rivers:

I've known rivers ancient as the world and

older than the flow of human blood in

human veins.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers

11

I bathed in the Euphrates when dawns were youns
I built my hut near the Congo and it lulled me
to sleep.

I looked upon the Nile and raised the pyramids

above it.
I heard the singing of the Mississippi when

Abe Lincoln went down to New Orleans, and

I've seen its muddy bosom turn all golden

in the sunset.

I've known rivers:
Ancient, dusky rivers.

My soul has grown deep like the rivers.

Langston Hughes wrote poems meeting the requirements
of the positive protest. They convey an awareness of existing
evils but inject a sense of determination, self assurance, and
victory. "I, Too," a short poem which identifies the poet with
the very heart of America, despite the scorns black Americans
have suffered.

I, too, sing America.

I am the darker brother.

They send me to eat in the kitchen

When company comes.

But I laugh.

And eat well.

And grow strong.

Tomorrow,

I'll be at the table

When company comes.

Nobody'll dare

Say to me,

"Eat in the Kitchen,"

Then.

Besides,

They'll see how beautiful I am

And be ashamed

I, too, am America.

12

It is from Langston Hughes also that one might assign lines
whose protest is subtle but elevating, as noted in "I Dream a
World."

I dream a world where man

No other will scorn.

Where love will bless the earth

And peace its paths adorn.

I dream a world where all

Will know sweet freedom's way.

Where greed no longer saps the soul

Nor avarice blights our day.

A world I dream where black or white.

Whatever race you be.

Will share the bounties of the earth

And every man is free.

Where wretchedness will hang its head.

And joy, like a pearl.

Attend the needs of all mankind.

Of such I dream

Our world!

History records numerable protests, crusades; even revolu-
tions. Often these have been catalysts to progress and better
living, peace and serenity. Literary history would hardly dis-
close a time when all writers felt impelled to cry out in dis-
dain. In all epochs somebody has used his pen to raise minds
above existing chaos. It must be hoped that sufficient writ-
ings, poetry included, will be preserved to meet the needs of
people when demands and demonstrations have run their
courses.

Across America young people, though alive and though
vociferous in many quarters, seem sound asleep to universal
truths. The literature of inspired souls, whether black or white,
might be the road returning them to harmony and serenity.
Most teachers and most students await the dawn to a new day.

An angel, robed in spotless white.
Bent down and kissed the sleeping Night.
Night woke to blush; the sprite was gone.
Men saw the blush and called it Dawn.

"Dawn" By Paul Laurence Dunbar

13

SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
FOR BLACK POETRY

BONTEMPS, ARNA. American Negro Poetry, (New York: Hill and Wang,
1963).

CHAPMAN, ABRAHAM, Black Voices: An Anthology of Afro-American
Literature, (New York: New American Library, 1968).

GROSS, SEYMOUR L. and JOHN L. GROSS. Images of the Negro in Amer-
ican Literature, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

HAYDEN, ROBERT, Kaleidoscope: Poems by American Negro Poets, (At-
lanta: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967).

14

NEGRO SLAVERY AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE SOUTH AS A
DISTINCT DISTRICT PRIOR TO 1850

BY ROBERT C. HERSCH

Historians have often been intrigued by the regional pe-
culiarities of the American South. One of these was Dixie's
almost obsessive retention of human bondage, long after its
virtual demise on the rest of the continent. Slavery, an unfor-
tunate but hardy perennial in the history of the race, helped
shape the South's character and people, and contributed heav-
ily to her emergence as a distinct region.

Slavery had the unfortunate effect of insulating the South
from the rest of the nation. Much of the lower South still pre-
sents a picture of bleak isolation, and inhabitants of farming
communities retain parochial and traditionalist viewpoints.
Black servitude increased the isolation endemic to rural regions.

Black labor contributed immeasurably to the development
of the plantation system, to the point where planters consider-
ed its employment almost necessary for significantly profit-
able staple cultivation. As indentured servitude declined in
importance, the cost of Negros had to be reckoned in the
capitalization of almost any such venture. Land was generally
cheap and available, while labor was not.

Negro slavery helped make the rise of cotton cultivation
possible in the Old South, thus widening the crevice between
the already distinct Northern and Southern economies. As
cotton and other staple producers moved into the piedmont,
slaves journeyed west with planters. From 1800 to 1840. the
black population of Mississippi grew by 306,391. coinciding
with a sharp rise in white settlement. 1

Cotton could be and was cultivated by free labor in ante-
bellum times. In the absence of machinery, however, slaves
could be easily utilized for the routinized labor involved.

1 Charles S. Sydnor, Slavery in Mississippi (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1966) p. 186.

15

and planters found the gang system suitable for the task. 2
Southerners therefore associated slavery with the booming
Southwestern cotton economy which developed after the War
of 1812. By 1850, raw cotton accounted for nearly half of all
American exports. 3 Ulrich B. Phillips has noted a strong cor-
relation between slave and cotton prices in major markets. 4
Since blacks were easily movable, a vigorous internal slave
trade developed. Planters in tidewater areas, faced with de-
pleted soils and economic competition from newer areas,
sold their surplus to developing regions further west. The
scarcity of labor in the Southwest and frequent availability
of cheap new lands fostered economic dependence on slavery.
Planters in older sections profited handsomely from the sale
of their chattels. This produced a simultaneous expansion
and integration of the slave system, increasing its importance
in the Southern economy. Slaves proved susceptable to good
management, and became increasingly efficient in the cul-
tivation of cotton. From 1800 to 1840, man hours expended
in the production of one bale dropped from 601 to 439. 5 During
the same period, cotton production increased nearly ten times. 6
Planters apparently profited in times of economic health, given
a continuous demand for cotton and other staples in the world
market. Smaller slave-holders often employed additional
blacks to increase the size of their holdings. By 1850, coales-
cence between slavery and agriculture marked the South as
an economically discrete section.

2 Clement Eaton. The Growth of Southern Civilization: 1790-1860 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1961) p. 27; Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture
in the Southern United States to 1860, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: The Car-
negie Institution, 1933) p. 479.

3 Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, Vol. I: The Fruits of Manifest Des-
tiny (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1947) p. 466.

4 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Sup-
ply, Employment and Control of Negro Labor As Determined by the Planta-
tion Regime (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966) pp. 370-
372.

5 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office,
1960) p. 281.

6 Slavery in Mississippi, p. 185.

16

Slaves raised staple crops which produced a major part
of Southern income. Blacks were not only gears in the sec-
tional economic machine, but required a heavy capital invest-
ment which did not immediately appreciate. Southerners fail-
ed to put a significant proportion of their wealth into circu-
lation, and this freezing of capital had an unfortunate effect
on the entire regional economy. It checked investment in in-
dustry and commerce, and the high initial cost of chattels led
to overborrowing by many. This created an element of insta-
bility in the economy, reflected in the vulnerability of many
nascent Southern credit institutions. Under such circumstances.
Southerners made relatively little venture capital available
for the financing of local commerce, and in many cases tended
to operate their plantations or farms as self-contained econ-
omic units, utilizing few manufactured goods and making the
rest by hand. Slaves often functioned as artisans in such cases.
The entire plantation economy was based on the extensive
cultivation of one crop for export, and the planter found it
unnecessary to patronize local markets, except to secure
cheap cloth and foodstuffs for his slaves. Farmers owning
relatively few or no chattels generally produced crops for
little more than their own subsistance and occasional trade
to neighbors. It was only in the border states that farmers
developed a significant local market for their produce." But
the economic isolation of the self-sufficient plantation bred
an economic parochialism, aggravated by lack of money. Un-
der these circumstances, some commercial transactions de-
generated into mere barter. 8

Lack of capital and the drive towards plantation self-suf-
ficiency limited the home market. In Mississippi for instance,
cloth of local factories had to compete with both imported
products and homespun manufacture. One agent for a textile
factory plaintively advertised in 1852, "It is hoped that all

This discussion is based on several sources. See Eugene D. Genovese.
The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of
the Slave South. (New York: Vintage Books. 1967); American Negro Slavery.
pp. 344-401; The Growth of Southern Civilization, pp. 49-71: Harold D. Wood-
man, "The Profitability of Slavery: A Historical Perennial." as reprinted in.
Allen Weinstein and Frank O. Gatell. eds., American Negro Slavery: A Modern
Reader (New York: Oxford University Press. 1968) pp. 259-275.

8 A weekly "trade day" still exists in the hamlet of Collinsville, Alabama. It
is probably a survival of antebellum times. Mary Jane Baker. Centre. Alabama-
letter, 31 August 1969, to the author.

17

friends of Southern enterprise will at least call and look at
these goods." 9

Southern industrialists, however, generally refused to
decry slavery. They counted plantation owners among their
natural allies, because few other Southerners possessed the
resources necessary for investment in native manufacturers. 10
Their enterprises were often raw material extractive or pro-
cessing industries, either utilizing slave labor at some point
or dependent upon slave grown products. Blacks twisted
plantation-produced Kentucky hemp on primitive ropewalks.
Their product was used to bind cotton bales in Alabama.
Even in Richmond's famous Tredegar Iron Works, chattels
labored beside free men in skilled operations. 11 The employ-
ment of blacks meant decreased job opportunities for white
mechanics, and was a cause of social and economic tension
before the Civil War.

Lack of native capital also meant underdevelopment of
local credit sources. Many Southerners had to depend upon
the financial expertise of New York merchants, who had the
worldwide contracts so necessary in international trade. Plan-
tation products were generally shipped to Europe via New
York. From the end of colonial times until the 1850's, most
Southern ports assumed secondary roles. 12 Consumers in
Charleston had to pay significantly higher prices for imported
goods than those in Philadelphia. 13 Southern cities functioned
a little more than outlets for plantation products. This situa-
tion combined with the failure to develop sufficient home
industry to retard urban development. The plantation re-
mailed isolated, a victim of its own economy.

One-crop agriculture utilizing slaves also detracted from
the Southern economy by helping produce soil exhaustion.
By 1850, the average value of land in the South was $5.34
per acre compared with $11.39 in the Northwest. 14 Black

9 The Southern Reveille, Port Gibson, Miss., Nov. 3, 1852, as quoted in Slavery
in Mississippi, p. 25.

10 The Political Economy of Slavery, p. 181.

1 1 Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 35.

12 The Growth of Southern Civilization, pp. 197-198.

13 Historical Statistics of the United States, pp. 1 19-122. Price indices for several
American cities are listed herein.

14 Ordeal of the Union, I, p. 492.

18

labor did not cause soil depletion, but as Charles Sydnor noted.
"It did not pay to use an S800 slave in ditching, terracing, or
manuring S8 an acre land, especially when more could be
bought whenever it was exhausted." 15 By forcing a westward
movement, soil depletion contributed to population dispersal
and a slackening of population growth in seaboard regions.
Such unstable tenure gave much of the South the character
of a transient frontier, which it retained until the Civil War.
While slavery contributed to the South's economic develop-
ment, it also rendered it incomplete.

Human bondage had an even greater influence on the de-
velopment of a distinct Southern society. Thomas P. Govan
noted that slavery was *'. . . not so much an economic system
as a social order to permit two unlike peoples to live togeth-
er." 16 The slave's dependence on the Southerner and the
Southerner's on the slave produced a cross cultural inter-
change despite mutual tensions. The farmer or planter often
lived in closer proximity to his blacks than he cared to ad-
mit. Men were vexed with the constant care of dealing with
their slaves, putting them to work profitably, preventing them
from running away or revolting, ensuring their fecundity,
and making them believe that they were members of an in-
ferior caste, somewhere between animal and human. Numer-
ous Southerners also suffered from the moral conflict in-
volved in keeping another human being in social and psycho-
logical fetters.

The planter was generally victimized by an isolation pro-
duced by engrossment of contiguous lands, poorly develop-
ed transportation, and lack of urban centers. This circum-
stance often fostered close contracts between master and
slave. Frederick Law Olmstead, a tireless contemporary re-
porter of the mores of the slave states, was ". . . struck with
the close cohabitation of black and white." 17 By the time of
the Civil War, Africanisms such as yam, tote, and goober had
become part of the regional vocabulary. Black speech pat-

is Slavery in Mississippi, p. 192.

16 Thomas P. Govan, "Was Plantation Slavery Profitable T Southern Historical
Review (November, 1942) p. 513.

17 Frederick Law Olmstead, A Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, With Re-
marks on Their Economy (New York: Dixand Edwards. 1856) p. 17.

19

terns surely contributed to the formation of a distinctive South-
ern accent. Even before the Revolution, planter's ladies
"talk (ed) like negroes" in the Carolinas.is

But slaveholders often sought escape from the fears and
frustrations involved in governing human beings. They de-
veloped elaborate visiting patterns, in part copied from Great
Britain, but also an indigenous response to their lonely exis-
tence. 19

Practically the only other external diversion the planter
had was religion. After the rise of cotton cultivation, he es-
chewed Jeffersonian deism. During the early years of the Nine-
teenth century, a vigorous evangelical movement swept the
South. 20 The emotionalism of revival drained off interest in
the doctrine of natural rights. Successful missioners enfolded
numerous slaves and slaveowners, and worship often became
a common bond between the two. During the preceding cen-
tury, many slaveholders felt religion would make slaves restive,
but they eventually realized its value in producing tractable
chattels. The slaves received a version which emphasized the
homily "servants obey your masters:" preaching about free-
dom and equality was considered dangerous. 21 The planter's
aim was to reconcile the slave to his servile status, and thus
decrease the problem of control. Acquiescing to this doc-
trinal twist must have added to the master's own religious
conservatism. After 1830, Southerners increasingly equated
religious liberalism with abolitionism. Since the North seemed
to be a hot-bed of radical new sects, their hostility to things
Northern increased. Fifteen years later, both the Baptist and
Methodist churches split into Northern and Southern wings
over questions involving slavery. Thomas R. Dew and other
religious luminaries developed a defense of slavery which de-

is Lorenzo Turner, as cited in Lerone Bennett, Jr.. Before the Mayflower:
A History of the Negro in America, 1619-1964 (Baltimore. Md. : Penguin Books,
1966) p. 28: St. George Tucker. Diary, 1774, Tucker Papers (Colonial Williams-
burg, Inc.) as quoted in Carl Bridenbaugh, Myths and Realities: Societies in the
Colonial South (New York: Atheneumri962) p. 73.

19 Myths and Realities, p. 27.

20 Growth of Southern Civilization, p. 14.

21 Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Life and Labor in the Old South (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1963) p. 202.

20

pended on the Bible for its sanction. This suited many South-
erners, who literally believed in divine law as revealed in the
Old Testament. 22

The slaveholder's contention that tyranny was a social
good if it curbed potential anarchy produced a profound
conservatism and a contempt for civil liberties. Southerners
of the Revolutionary era often realized the hollowness of
preaching freedom for some while keeping black slaves in
bondage. Thomas Jefferson solved this dilemma by concluding
that the Negro was wholly inferior to the white. After 1830.
a new generation put such doubts aside, and turned to the
powerful weapons at hand to legally enforce Negro inferiority.
They found a series of black codes which provided harsh pen-
alties for any indication that a human being questioned his
servile status. To some courts, the slave was a passive piece
of property transferable at will, and almost completely de-
prived of Constitutional rights. But all Southerners had not
divested themselves of humanitarianism. As one Tennessee
judge bluntly stated, "A slave is not in the condition of a
horse. . . .'"23 This fundamental contradiction continued to
pose an insoluble problem for Dixie legalists, and helped
produce a significant differentiation between Northern and
Southern law. Ultimately the civil liberties of white as well
as black suffered. The stricture that slaves could not testify
against whites under any circumstances limited legal redress
for men of both races. 24 After 1830, the slave codes furnish-
ed a justification for the transference of Southern hvsteria
over the renewed abolitionist movement to strictures on free-
dom of the press and speech. After that date, private citizens
increasingly constituted themselves as vigilante bodies, thus

22 Clement Eaton. The Freedom of Thought Struggle in the Old South (New
York: Harper & Row. 1964) p. 312; Charles S. Sydnor. The Development of
Southern Sectionalism. 1819-1848. Vol. VoM History- of the. South, eds. Wen-
dell Holmes Stephenson and E Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press. 1968) pp. 294-300: Charles S. Sydnor. "The Southerner and
the Laws," as reprinted in Abraham S. Eisenstadt. ed.. American History: Re-
cent Interpretations. Book I: To 1877 (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Com-
pany. 1962) p. 404.

23 Kenneth M. Stampp. The Peculiar Institution: Slaven- in the Ante-Bellum
South (New York: Vintage Books. 1956) p. 217.

24 "The Southerner and the Laws," p. 407.

21

honoring an old Southern custom. In 1845, such a group forced
Cassius M. Clay, abolitionist editor of the True American,
to leave Louisville, Kentucky. 25

Above all, Southerners feared servile revolt, a fear par-
ticularly acute in areas where blacks constituted a high pro-
portion of the population. Many slaves were apparently crush-
ed into a childlike mold in which they unconsciously parodied
their masters. 26 Others appeared to do so while nursing a
sullen hatred for the slaveowner. Still others, their spirits
unbroken, engaged in individual and group acts of defiance
ranging from inefficiency at work to full scale revolt. Those
choosing the latter course, such as Gabriel Prosser and Nat
Turner, excited whites to violent and sometimes hysterical
reprisals, since Negro revolt threatened to turn the rigid black
and white caste division bottom up. The problem was particu-
larly acute in urban areas and towns, where restraints tended
to break down as blacks increased their social contract with
free men, and decreased those with their masters. Under
these circumstances, local governments devised slave patrols
and militias. In the absence of strong formal government,
men in outlying regions sometimes took matters into their
hands and formed vigilance committees. These groups added
to the violence and militarism endemic in Southern society.

But the basic unit of Southern law was the individual slave-
holder. On both plantation and farm his word superseded that
of the state. As Bridenbaugh has remarked, the slaveowner
lived *'. . . in a sort of fearful isolation among . . . negro slaves." 27
The interplay of command, fear and mutual dependence help-
ed produce the distinctive personality noted by de Tocque-
ville:

. . . the first notion he acquires in life is, that he

was born to command, and the first habit he contracts

is ruling without resistance. His education tends,

then, to give him the character of a haughty and hasty

man irascible, violent, ardent in his desires .... 28

25 The Freedom of Thought Struggle, pp. 185-189.

26 I have tentatively accepted Stanley M. Elkins*s controversial theories on
slave personality. See Stanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American In-
stitutional and Intellectual Life (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1963) pp. 81-139.

27 Myths and Realities, p. 21.

28 Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America (New York, 1898) I, 507-508,
as cited in John Hope Franklin, The Militant South, 1800-1861 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1964) p. 67.

22

The command of slaves was only a step to the command
of whites. Slaveholders constituted the most prestigious group
in the Old South, and status was often partly reckoned by
the number of slaves a man held. A manufactured aristocracy
copied from Virginia was unsuited to the frenetic new cot-
ton regions of the Nineteenth Century, where an abundance
of cheap land helped produce a relatively high degree of phy-
sical and social mobility. Under these circumstances, family
counted for less than visible wealth. In back areas where there
were few slaves, prestige did not always depend on owner-
ship of blacks. 29 Moreover, small farmers hoped to become
planters, and were often related to plantation owners. Poor
whites developed a virulent prejudice towards blacks, based
on fears of possible social and economic competition in case
of abolition. J. D. B. De Bow and other planter spokesmen
stressed that there were no class lines in Southern society ex-
cept those of color. 30 This view masked the real distance
which existed between the wealthy and poor in many areas
in the Old South, but it does point to the very real thread of
equalitarianism which ran through Southern society.

In 1850, large planters still enjoyed a pre-eminent posi-
tion in society and hence in sectional and national politics.
The Virginia aristocracy, connected by ties of family and
interest, maintained a high position during the early national
period. Movement of population westward due to soil exhaus-
tion and cotton cultivation diminished their prestige, and con-
tributed to the rise of democratic forces in the West. In the
entire seaboard South except Florida, the back country chal-
lenged the coast for political leadership. The new demo-
cratizers were not against slavery, and often defended it more
vehemently than the older politicos. The seaboard planters
had accumulated their slaves and were content, as long as
no force threatened to deprive them of their property. The
men of the back country ambitiously sought more chattels,
and hence more political, social and economic status. Slavery
helped create a tenuous bond between back country and
coastal regions, and between new states and old.

29 Edward W. Phifer, "Slavery in Microcosm: Burke County. North Carolina"
as reprinted in American Negro Slaver}' : A Modern Reader, p. 82.

30 J. D. B. De Bow. The Interest in Sloven- of the Southern Non-Slaveholder
(Charleston. 1860) pp. 3, 5, 8-10, as cited in The Militant South, p. 85.

23

Various other slave related issues united Southerners.
One of the most widely discussed was expansion. New lands,
they reasoned, would provide fertile soil for wasteful plan-
tation agriculture, lessen the possibility of servile revolts by
removing the black population from areas of high concentra-
tion, and redress the growing political imbalance between
North and South. 31- They both stated and acted on their views
in such imbroglios as the Talmadge amendment, the Mis-
souri Compromise, the Mexican War, the Texas debate, and
the Wilmot Proviso.

The decade of the 1830's was the critical point for the form-
ation of a true feeling of Southern sectionalism. Southerners
felt they were losing their influence in national politics but
were not entirely correct, for the South retained its grip upon
presidential politics. But scarcely had the nullification crisis
subsided when a renewed and vehement abolitionist movement
sent many Dixie politicians scurrying to their oratorical storm
shelters. They feared that Garrisonian crusaders would spark
slave rebellion, and the Turner revolt seemed to translate their
worst thoughts into bloody action. The millenium of Southern
consciousness had finally arrived. John C. Calhoun succinctly
expressed the change in sectional thought:

Many in the South once believed that it (slavery) was
a moral and political evil. That folly and delusion
are gone. We see it now in its true light and regard
it as the most safe and stable basis for free institu-
tions in the World. 32

Slavery had indeed contributed to the development of a
unique socioeconomic milieu in the South, but it was one
which exuded crippling financial and human waste. The South
isolated herself within the prison of human servitude and
therefore became estranged from the rest of the Nation.

31 The Militant South, p. 97.

32 Richard K. Cralle, ed.. The Works of John C Calhoun (New York, 1853)
III. 180. as quoted in The Growth of Southern Civilization, p. 307.

24

TEACHING BLACK HISTORY

IN AMERICA:
WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS?

BY MELVIN DRIMMER

Black History and Black Studies are in a chaotic state at
the present time and will be so for some years to come. After
years of disinterest and neglect, one finds that universities
and colleges are falling over themselves to develop Black
History programs regardless of their own resources and the
needs of the black community. Schools which hardly ever
saw a Negro from Reed College in the wilds of Oregon, to
Oshkosh State in the wilds of Wisconsin, to the newly founded
York College in the wilds of Queens are now trying to come
up with Black History programs. Harvard's Black Studies pro-
gram has already crumbled a failure from the start by some
predictors. Now Yale's Afro-American program is awaited
and although it looks good on paper it may fail unless they
can get some dynamic and radical black teachers to run the
program. And when one considers the San Francisco State
exotic program one realizes that it is still tentative, pending
funding by California Regents and reopening stabilization by
that spunky scholar and gentleman. Dr. S. I. Hayakawa. So
one must wait while, in the words of another Asian gentleman.
"a hundred flowers blossom." After a shake down period it
will be easier to know which program or programs will suc-
ceed. It might be useful to see a couple of hundred colleges
try various programs based on the needs of their student
body, the Black Student Alliances, the community in which
they are situated, and their own resources.

There is no one formula which can be applied to all
schools. That concept would be the most dangerous idea
which college educators could accept. The Atlanta Univer-
sity Center, with six thousand black students, must devise
a very different program from the one which might be used
at Reed College with its thirty-five black students. There
also may be a need for two different curriculas. one for black
and one for white students. When this idea was suggested in

25

Atlanta to the Afro-American Studies Conference all hell
broke loose among the whites attending. Having taught Afro-
American history to blacks at Spelman, and to whites at New
York University, it seems that blacks and whites bring various
levels of awareness and knowledge to the basic course. White
students must be brought along slower, realizing (and not to
be patronizing) that they are culturally deprived. To whites
every little thing must be explained and proved. The six black
students who took my course at N. Y. U. were outraged and
angered by the naivete of the thirty-six white students. On
the other hand, I found in observing the white high school
teachers who participated in the two NDEA Institutes in Negro
History at Spelman in 1966 and 1968 that they felt too embar-
rassed and somewhat intimidated to ask questions and to
participate in classes held by C. Eric Lincoln and Vincent
Harding. In these classes the level of discussion, teaching and
argumentation between the instructors and the majority of
black teachers was very intense. The black teachers, many of
whom had taught Negro history in their high schools and com-
munities, were personally involved in the nature, meaning
and future of black people in this country. The whites, who
had never heard blacks express themselves too forcefully
before were impressed but were too embarrassed to ask ques-
tions, and generally were lost. As an expedient solution a track
system might be needed for whites and blacks, possibly with
white instructors teaching the whites and black instructors
the blacks. This could be done in the same school and in the
same department. Certainly, if many of the major universi-
ties can have more than one expert in certain fields in their
departments, there is no reason why there cannot be a few
professors teaching Afro-American history.

While one must wait and see which programs succeed,
there is a danger of every school having a fully developed
Afro-American program at the present time due to the limited
teaching personnel available. This does not mean that every
college should not teach Afro-American history. There are
in every community, black high school teachers in the social
sciences who could meet the needs of teaching a course or
two in Black Studies at the college level. Certainly the cali-
ber of black high school teachers who attended NDEA In-
stitutes would indicate that there is a wealth of under-used
talent in school systems around America.

26

The real future of Black History and Studies does not
lie in spreading university-trained talent around the country
but in developing a dozen or more centers for the teaching
and study of Black History. It is rather ironic and sad that
while there are at present over a dozen major centers for
African Studies in the United States, there is not one for the
teaching of Afro-American Studies. This is an indictment of
the academic community and the major foundations of this
try. The Foundations, in particular, have poured millions
into African study, but have given very little for Afro-Ameri-
can programs. Of course, African Studies was looked upon
as an adjunct to American foreign policy during the Cold War,
and, therefore, money was available. Now that we have a hot
war in our ghettos and the country is trying to save the cities,
and the blacks are viewing themselves as people of another
country, we have a foreign policy crisis at home, and there-
fore, Foundation money will soon be available.

Although logic has little to do with Foundation grants,
some say there are two logical places for the development of
Black Studies. The first place is with those schools which al-
ready have African Studies Centers: U. C. L. A., Wisconsin,
Northwestern, Indiana, Boston, Columbia, and so on. The
other place is the black colleges, particularly the Atlanta
University Center, Fisk, Howard, Lincoln, and Morgan State.
The black schools have the students, the faculty, the basis
of good library facilities and collections, and the traditions
of black scholarship. It is worthwhile to remember that black
scholarship in America was supported and kept alive at black
schools, despite tremendous financial hardships which the
schools faced, and the ever watchful eye of reactionary and
racist state governments. Major works of W. E. B. Du Bois,
Charles Johnson, Horace Mann Bond, Rayford Logan, Alain
Locke, Ira Reid, A. A. Taylor, Lorenzo Green, Monroe Work,
J. Saunders Redding, William Leo Hansberry. Charles Wesley,
John Hope Franklin, Benjamin Quarles, and C. Eric Lincoln,
to name just a few, came out of black schools. Yet. there is
concern among many that now that Black History is fashion-
able, the best faculty will be lured away from black Southern
colleges by Northern institutions, and Foundations will over-
look Negro colleges for major developmental grants. They
will be in a sense, raped and forgotten. In fact, it is immoral
that white schools which never so much as lifted a paternalistic

27

finger to help blacks, are now throwing thousands of dollars
into the faces of black faculty in an attempt to lure them up
to their schools to teach their token enrollments of black
students. This is a complete disregard for the Jiundreds of
thousands of students that that man or woman presently serves
in the black community. It would seem to me that a better
solution would be to send black students down to the Atlanta
University Center or other black schools for a year or so on
a meaningful exchange rather than continue the present policy
of raiding black schools.

Another remark regarding the development of Black His-
tory and Studies program is that there are dangers of over-
selling Black History. The way some speak of Black History
one would think it is a panacea for all the ills besetting the
black community and American society. Black History in it-
self will not put bread on the table, eliminate white racism,
solve the problems of the cities, end the war in Viet Nam or
reorient national priorities. It might even be argued that Black
History may have a negative effect on blacks. As Frederick
Nietzsche observed, history, by telling us what the past has
done, limits our sights on what we might achieve in the future.
History limits our goals by saying future objectives cannot be
reached because it failed or had not been tried in the past.
It may be that by showing how deeply ingrained racism is in
American history and how hard whites have fought to keep
blacks down, Black History courses would discourage blacks
from fighting to change a system which they view as impreg-
nable. To argue, as some blacks do, that all whites are devils
and are to be distrusted may have the effect of seeing a unity
in white society where none exists. It may, therefore, dis-
courage blacks from opposing an order where they see them-
selves facing a united front of ten whites for every one black,
which to oppose might cause them to face certain extinction.

The real problem is not to segregate Black History from
the basic American history programs but to build the black
vision and experience into the American experience so that
a completely new version of American history emerges. This
is the revolutionary potential of Black History. It not only
teaches black pride to blacks, but it will, and I have seen this
happen, reorient the whites. To see the black experience in
America as central to the history of this country would be to
revolutionize a whole generation of white American students.

28

Once whites have learned that almost all of the traditional
American history has been a pack of half-truths or outright
lies they will become alienated from the traditional myths
which go by the name of American history. It would be like
telling a son that his father has a mistress, or mistreats his
workers, or is dishonest. This is why Black History should be
taught to every student, from engineer to elementary edu-
cation major, from ROTC recruit to home economics student.
One reason why white America has had to hide Black History
from its own children is because it has not been willing to
face up to what it has done to blacks or to Indians or Mexi-
can-Americans for that matter.

Let us not make Black History too glamorous for whites
with only tales of freedom fighters, heroes, African kings,
and all the others who triumphed over great odds. Let us not
forget to mention the past millions who were crushed, ex-
ploited, physically and psychologically mamed, and cut off
from the main stream of economic and social development.
Let us not prettify the story of the Afro-American so that
white students will forget what it has meant to be a black
man in white America. And let us remember that Black His-
tory is not only a way for blacks to see themselves but a way
for whites to see themselves as well. Above all, we must see
Black History as central to the meaning of the American ex-
perience. Take away the black man from the American ex-
perience and one sees a totally different history. This country
has developed from its Euro-Afro-Indian roots. Once we un-
derstand this then we can realize the significance of W.E.B.
Du Bois' question: "Would America be America without her
Negro people?" This is what Afro-American history is all
about. "I, too, sing America," wrote Langston Hughes. "I
am the darker brother."

29

A LATIN AMERICAN ALTERNATIVE

TO RACISM:

SOME ASPECTS OF THE THOUGHT

OF EUGENIO MARIA DE HOSTOS

BY ROBERT H. CLAXTON

Eugenio Maria de Hostes y Bonilla was distinguished as a
traveler, a writer on a surprising variety of subjects, an edu-
cator, and a representative of incipient Puerto Rican nation-
alism. 1 The son of a Creole functionary of the Spanish govern-
ment, Hostos was born in 1839 near Mayaguez, Puerto Rico.
After completing his primary schooling, Hostos continued his
education in Spain. During the time he was studying for a law
degree in Madrid. Spain passed through a period of turmoil
culminating in her first republican experiment. Never en-
thusiastic about becoming a lawyer and disappointed that
the Spanish republicans were not as interested in reforming
colonial administration as he was, Hostos abandoned Spain
and went to New York. There he attempted to join with Cuban
exiles, but he found them hopelessly divided by factionalism.

Hostos decided to organize support in various Latin Ameri-
can countries for the liberation of the Spanish Antilles. During
the early 1870's, Hostos resided in Colombia, Peru, Chile,
Argentina, and Brazil. The would-be liberator established
Cuban auxiliary societies, turned to journalism and literary
pursuits, and supported himself through teaching. He tried
again in 1874 and in 1875 to cooperate with Cuban exiles in
New York and in the Dominican Republic, but his efforts were
futile. Consequently, Hostos thereafter concentrated on being
more of an educator than a liberator.

He then served as a school administrator in Venezuela and,
subsequently, introduced educational reforms into the Domin-
ican Republic. In 1888, he accepted an invitation from the
Chilean government to improve that nation's schools. While

1 This article is based upon the author's "Inter-American Relations in the
Thought of Eugenio Maria de Hostos y Bonilla'' (unpublished master's
thesis, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1964), a study directed
by Professor George A. Brubaker.

30

he was in Chile, the Spanish-American War broke out. Having
been sent by the Chilean authorities to the United States to
investigate educational methods, Hostos used the occasion to
register with President William McKinley his objection to the
North American occupation of his homeland. Disillusioned
concerning prospects for Puerto Rican independence, Hostos
returned to the Dominican Republic where he died in 1903.

During his extensive travel, Hostos developed his thought
concerning human relations. Convinced of the decadence of
the Old World, he glorified the New World Indian "noble
savage" and condemned Negro slavery in the Spanish Carib-
bean. He regarded society as an organism of essentially rational
men and he believed that the fusion of races and cultures was
ideal. In fact, Hostos suggested that the Caribbean peoples
had a special destiny in assisting humanity toward attaining
that goal.

Hostos looked upon the condition of Europe as an im-
pediment to the progress of man. He observed that emigration
to the New World was increasing in his time and he reasoned
that, beneath all European appearances of progress, luxury,
and wealth, there were gangrenous sores upon its society.
Moreover, it was especially disgusting to Hostos to find Euro-
pean monarchy in Brazil and a people in Buenos Aires bent on
imitating European tastes. Why, he wondered, should nations
destined to exemplify cultural fusion in the world want to
copy the exclusivism of Europe? Hostos left Europe as the
Franco-Prussian War was being fought. He hoped that the
coming of peace would bring a new era for Europe. But for
him it was the New World which held the promise of a bet-
ter future. 2

In addition, the educator-liberator found something mysti-
cally wonderful about the very appearance of scenes in the
New World. Puerto Rico became a "most precious jewel."

2 Eugenio Maria de Hostos y Bonilla, October 31, 1869 entry, Diario:
tomo I. Obras Completas [hereafter OC] (20 vols.; Havana, 1939), I, 166;
December 26, 1873 entry, Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 67; Mi tiaje al sur, OC,
VI, 90 and 483; "La Latina America," in Temas sudamericanos. OC, VII,
10-12; "Tres Republicas," ibid., p. 94; "Memoria de la exposicion," ibid.,
pp. 218-219; La peregrination de Boyodn, OC, VIII, 61, 168, and 177;
Tratado de moral, OC, XVI, 404; "Geografia politica universal," in Ensayos
diddcticos: tomo III, OC, XX, 28 7 .

31

an emerald, while Cuba was the "pearl of the Antilles. " The
beauty of the countryside near Cartagena, Colombia, reminded
him of the "primitive nature that smiled innocently upon her
violators."' 3 Nevertheless, the New World came to represent
progress for humanity, according to Hostos. Speculations
of learned theologians notwithstanding, Columbus discovered
America, a triumph of experimentation over scholasticism.
The early nineteenth-century revolutions, moreover, meant
the beginning of a break with the errors of the past and a new
and unstained alignment with freedom, order, and progress.
For Hostos, the civilization of the New World by reason of
its varied bases seemed more complete than the narrowness
of Europe. He believed that, in the New World, there would
be a new race, the product of the fusion of all races, and a
new and superior civilization as well. 4

A natural ramification of a tendancy to think in terms of
European decadence and New World potential was an ideal-
ization of the Indian past. Before Europe discovered gun-
powder and the use of the printing press, even before the
birth of Christ, there was, Hostos pointed out, civilization in
the New World. Hostos declared that the pre-Columbian
Indians of the Caribbean had agriculture, elementary crafts,
religion, music, a form of government, and a division of labor
into specializations. Along with that innocent race there was
the intelligent civilization of Mexico whose art and architec-
tural forms were advanced. Furthermore, the Incan culture
represented a major achievement in social and economic
planning as far as Hostos was concerned. Hostos described
Pedro Valdivia, who attempted to conquer Chile, in terms
of ignorance and cruelty. In contrast, he glorified the Arau-
canians of the region in terms of their nobility and heroism.

3 Quoted from Mi Viaje al sur, OC, VI, 23-24; ". . . Cuba tiene mas
enemigos que Puerto Rico...," in Eugenio Carlos Hostos (ed. ), Espana y
America (Paris, 1954), p. 211; La peregrination de Boyoan, OC, VIII, 143.

* "El descubrimiento y el descubridor," in La cuna de America, OC, X,
37, 39, and 107; "La reforma de ensenanza," in Forjando el porvenir
americano: tomo I, OC, XII, 98; Tratado de moral, OC, XVI, 421 and 437;
"Espana y America," in Espana y America, 267.

32

Finally, he admired the "robust, beautiful, intelligent, and
heroic Guarani race." 5

As a student, Hostos found one of Spain's most vicious
and disgusting policies to be the maintaining of the anach-
ronistic institution of slavery. Abolition became a basic de-
mand since Hostos attributed lack of progress in the Carib-
bean to this one factor. He reasoned that to enslave the Negro
was to enslave the Antilles; to free the Negro was to liberate
the entire population. He pointed out that other nations had
prospered after emancipation. Hostos felt that all America
needed immigrants to develop its resources. Free immigrants
did not care to compete with slaves. Therefore, he contended
that, with the end of slavery, labor would seem more honor-
able, the political equality of all men would become more
feasible, and poverty would turn into prosperity for the Carib-
bean masses. 6 Hostos charged that Spain had been very un-
cooperative with British efforts to end the slave trade and
that Spanish administrators in Cuba, he complained, had
enriched themselves in this traffic. Consequently, die abuse
of the Negro continued and the Caribbean isles remained in
subjugation. 7

Hostos based his regard for the New World's non-European
people on his total view of human relationships. By no means
the originator of the idea, Hostos described society as an
organism, "and like all organisms, it consists of component
organs, fulfills duties, carries on business, it has and it satisfies
needs.'" 8 As theorists in the biological sciences explained

s Quoted from "Tres Republicas," in Temas sudamericanos, OC, VII,
79-80; "Memoria de la exposicion," ibid., pp. 304-305; Mi riaje al sur,
OC, VI, 115-117, 233, and 236-237; "El descubrimiento y el descubridor,"
in La cuna de America, OC, X, 15; Tratado de moral. OC, XVI, 434-435;
"Historia de pedagogia," in Ensayos diddcticos: tomo I. OC, XVIII, 51.

6 May 7, 1870 entry, Diario: tomo I. OC, I, 2^3-27-4; April 2, 18"4 entry,
Diario: tomo II. OC, II, 90; Mi riaje al sur. OC, VI, 39; "Placido," in Temas
cubanos, OC, IX, 46; "Las reformas en las Antillas," in Espana y America,
141; "La abolicion de la esclavitud en Puerto Rico," ibid., p. 29".

7 La peregrination de Boyodn, OC, VIII, 145; "Placido," in Temas cubanos,
OC, IX, 25 and 73-74; "El problema de Cuba," ibid., p. 213; "Las reformas
en las Antillas," in Espana y America. 133; "La isla de Cuba," ibid., p. 186.

8 Quoted from Lecciones de derecbo constitutional. OC, XV, 17; "Memoria
de la exposicion," in Temas sudamericanos, OC, VII, 254-255; Tratado de
sociologia. OC, XVII, 178; "Nociones de derecho constitucional," in
Ensayos diddcticos: tomo I, OC, XVIII, 350.

33

evolution in terms of the functional union of cells, so Hostos
distinguished five societal organs evolving from the social
cell, the rational individual. These were the family, the mu-
nicipality (clan), the region or province (tribe), the nation,
and the family of nations or humanity as a whole. 9

Hostos supported this analogy in several ways. -He noted
that within a single organism the inter-relationship among
individual organs was in accord with unchanging processes.
In a similar way, explained Hostos, social relationships ought
to be governed by definite principles. No organ, furthermore,
could live disconnected from other living organs; neither
could an individual human, observed Hostos, have all his
needs satisfied if he lived in total isolation. Likewise, just
as individual persons developed from infants into mature adults,
so nations and the whole of humanity would grow, according
to the interpretation of Hostos. Similarly, as in the animal
world, like functional components (social institutions) uni-
versally appeared in every body (culture). Finally, Hostos sup-
posed that singleness of thought or unanimity of sentiment
among diverse members of one social body should exist as it
did within any one rational individual. 10

In his description of society, the individual was the most
important factor. "The individual is an essential element of
society; so essential that, should individuality not exist, society
itself could not exist," he explained, n Hostos presumed that
man was basically "good," rational, and the determiner of his
own fate. He often spoke of the dignity of man and the equal-
ity of all men by reason of natural rights. At one point he de-
scribed "man which God made" as being not fundamentally
evil but rather "born rational in nature . . . (and) compelled
to seek truth . . . ," 12 Hostos declared that it was through com-

9 Lecciones de derecho constitucional, OC, XV, 18; Tratado de sociologia,
OC, XVII, 123, 132, and 154-156; Tratado de Moral, OC, XVI, 112.

io Tratado de moral, OC, XVI, 9 and 109; "El Programa de los inde-
pendientes," in Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 222 and 234; Tratado de sociol-
ogia, OC, XVII, 90-91; "Nociones de derecho constitucional," in Ensayos
diddcticos: tomo I, OC, XVIII, 352.

1 i Quoted from Lecciones de derecho constitucional, OC, XV, 32; Tra-
tado de moral, OC XVII, 123, 147, and 233-

!2 Quoted from "La estadistica criminal de Puerto Rico," in Espana y
America, 230; "El Programa de los independientes," in Diario: tomo II,
OC, II, 241, 243-244.

34

mon sense, reason, and conscience that moral knowledge
came to man. 13

Because he maintained that man was essentially rational,
Hostos believed that the best way to a better society was
through education. If ignorance were the basis of corruption,
then contrariwise, "the moral security of society is principal-
ly in the home and in the school." 14 It was logical therefore
that Hostos dedicated so much of his life to educational re-
form. Confidently viewing man's development as evolution
from savagery, to barbarism and semicivilization, and finally
to civilization itself, Hostos contemplated "a humanity more
rational than that which exists today." 13

The basic belief that society, as an organism, ought to
exist as a healthy creature led Hostos to shun the use of force
and violence, to insist upon autonomy for the individual, and
to assume natural mutuality among the organs of society.
Hostos believed that the ideal cooperative society would as-
sure personal liberty through basic law. 16 Nevertheless, to
Hostos, personal liberty by no means meant isolation or
anarchy. He complemented his abomination of force and
coercion with a belief in mutual respect and voluntary as-
sistance as the foundation of interpersonal and international
order: mutually dependent organs living within one body. 17
Among those traits which Hostos considered to be social vir-
tues were tolerance, benevolence, kindness, mutual encourage-

13 Tratado de moral, OC, XVI, 15-19.

it Quoted from "La educacion en contra de las males costumbres," in
Forjando el porvenir americano: tomo 11, OC, XIII, 240; August 6, 1892
letter to his sister, in Pdginas hit/was, OC, III, 394; "La proclama de Cuba,"
in Temas cnbanos, OC, IX 223; "Lo que suele ser el poder electoral," in
Hombres e ideas, OC, XIV, 355; Tratado de sociologia, OC, XVII, 139;
"Nociones de ciencias de la pedagogia," in Ensayos didacticos: tomo I. OC.
XVIII, 115.

15 Quoted from Mi viaje al sur, OC, VI, 201; January 26, 1870 entry,
Diario: tomo I, OC, I, 239; Tratado de sociologia, OC, XVII, 89 and 140.

16 "Estatutos de la Liga," in Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 228; Mi viaje al sur,
OC, VI, 10; "La noticia de la muerte de Maceo," in Temas cubanos, OC, IX,
473; "Lo que suele ( ser el poder electoral," in Hombres e ideas, OC, XIV,
349; "Nociones de derecho constitucional,.' in Ensayos didacticos: tomo I,
OC,' XVIII, 357.

i7 May 1, 1903 entry, Diario: tomo 11, OC, II, 403; "Respeto a vida," in
Forjando al porvenir americano: tomo II, OC, XIII, 258.

35

ment, impartiality, prudent use of liberty of action, unanimity,
humility, and respect. Relationships in society were, according
to Hostos, based upon necessity, gratitude, utility, law, and
duty. This was as true of personal relationships as it was of the
organic relationships among nations. Hostos saw the peoples
of his day becoming linked to one another through commercial,
industrial, economic, political, scientific, and artistic ties.
Liberty, but not isolation; self-determination, but also co-
operation, were basic to the thought of Hostos on interpersonal
and international relations. is

Most essential to the fulfillment of the duties of social
ethics delineated by Hostos was a fundamental belief in the
equality of all races. To Hostos, regardless of whether a per-
son was Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American Indian,
or Polynesian, he was basically a rational human being and
entitled to personal liberty. 19 Hostos, for example, spoke of
"this noble race" when referring to Negroes; his seriousness
in that matter did not allow him to appreciate the private
humor of his fellow reformers which contradicted principles
they expressed in public. Hostos, furthermore, catagorized
as ridiculous the notion that liberated Cuba should be par-
titioned in terms of racial segregation. Rather, he insisted that
the absolute equality of every man before the law should be
guaranteed in a written constitution. Likewise, while in Chile,
Hostos felt obliged to defend Chinese laborers from exploi-
tation. 20

Hostos repeatedly stated that mutual respect among men,
based upon the concept of the worth of the individual, ought
to lead to peaceful cooperation among peoples. From such
cooperation would come mutual cultural interchange and a
final amalgamation of races and differing ways of life. As he

is "Tolerancia," ibid., p. 254; Tratado de moral, OC, XVI, 32-53, 122,
125-126, and 133-134.

19 January 9, 1870 entry, Diario: tomo I, OC, I, 216; "El programa de
los independientes," in Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 241; Mi tiaje al sur, OC,
VI, 43; "Placido," in Temas cubanos, OC, IX, 5; "El siglo XX," in Hombres
e ideas, OC, XIV, 423; "La soberania nacional," in Espana y America, 106.

20 January 2, 1870 entry, Diario: tomo I, OC I, 198; September 19, 1874
entry, Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 157; "Estarutos de la Liga," ibid., p. 229;
Mi viaje al sur, OC, VI, 380; "El chino," in Temas sudamericanos, OC, VII,
150; "Los chinos," ibid., 174; "Cuba y los Estados Unidos," in Temas
cubanos, OC, IX, 289; "La isla de Cuba." in Espana y America, 184.

36

traveled from country to country in the New World, he ob-
served such a process taking place. When he reflected upon
its implications for the future, he identified his beloved Carib-
bean islands as the focal point of this mingling and blending
phenomenon.

Hostos made specific observations of human relations in
the United States. In addition to admiring Anglo-Saxon free-
dom and ingenuity and the North American religious heri-
tage with its beneficial social effects, Hostos did not overlook
cultural fusion in the United States. Wnen Hostos first visited
the northern republic, slavery had recently been abolished
whereas it persisted in Spanish Middle America and. as a
"monstrous dissonant," in Brazil. Hostos expected greater
African contributions to New World culture when the freedom
of the Negro was universal. Had not the establishment of
Liberia, he asked, been an attempt to show that a man of color
was as capable of nation-building as a white man? It was an
inspiration to Hostos to see free Negroes in New York. 21
Another ethnic element was to be found among European
immigrants. On July 4, 1870, Hostos witnessed a multitude
of "men, women, youth, children, old people, Negroes, and
Europeans . . . celebrating a past event, the greatest event
in modern times . . . .*' 22 For Hostos, the population of the
United States was proof that diverse elements could live to-
gether in harmony. Hostos, however, felt it was unfortunate
that the North American Indian policy left much to be de-
sired. 23

When Hostos made his Latin American tour in the 1870's.
he was very much aware of other examples of racial and cul-
tural fusion. Having seen and having undoubtedly reflected
upon the immigrant groups in New York, Hostos saw the solu-

2i Quoted from Mi viaje al sur, OC, VI, 250; ibid., pp.79 and 380-381;
January 2 and June 29, 1870 entries, Diario: tomo I, OC, I, 19 7 -198 and
322-323; "El programa de los independientes," in Diario: tomo II. OC, II,
244; "Placido," in Temas cubanos, OC, IX, 75 an d 86; ' : Los fusilados en
Cuba," ibid., p. 273; "Geografia politica universal," in Ensayos diddcticos:
tomo III. OC, XX, 221.

22 July 5, 1870 entry, Diario: tomo I. OC, I, 342.

23 June 13 and July 2, 1870 entries, ibid.. 285 and 338; "El programa
de los independientes," in Diario: tomo II, OC, II. 251 (footnote); "Los
Estados Unidos de America," in Espana y America. 322.

37

tion to Peru's situation in which the Indian and the European
coexisted separately. He suggested that when definitive fusion
was complete, the mestizo would be the true Peruvian. Hostos
was pleased to see evidence of such amalgamation already
begun in Callao and Lima. Of the considerable number of
immigrants in Argentina, Hostos had several comments to
make. Argentina, he once remarked, had manifested the most
elevated attitude of all the South American republics on this
matter. Basques, Italians, Swiss, Germans, and even English-
men were living in contiguous territory with Bolivians and
Chileans. Not even religious differences successfully divided
the people among themselves. Hostos, then, concluded that
a public school system would complete the cultural unification
process. Likewise, Hostos recalled walking through a beauti-
ful public garden in Brazil in which pure whites and Negroes,
as well as mulattoes, appeared to regard each other as equals,
the institution of slavery albeit persisting. Somewhat later,
Hostos recommended that the Dominican Republic welcome
persecuted minorities. Indeed, Hostos declared. America
ought to be a universal homeland for all strangers. 24

One of the basic premises of Hostos was that racial and
cultural blending was a positive good. The more cosmopolitan
the population, Hostos concluded, the more developed die
territory. Moreover, was not the high civilization of the Creeks
a product of centuries of fusion? He observed that immigration
was bringing a very obvious increment of wealth to Argentina
and North America, not to mention an enrichment of culture
itself. It occurred to Hostos that, rather than producing an
atavistic nightmare as some speculated, the progeny of inter-
racial marriage might well retain only the best attributes of
all races. Racial and cultural fusion was, therefore, to be con-
sidered prerequisite for progress. Hostos identified the New
World as the place where this "enlargement upon progress
due to the unification of races" would most likely begin. 25

24 September 28, 1873 entry, Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 65; Mi viaje al sur,
OC, VI, 101, 118-119, 132, 245, 266, 332, 368, and 395; "El Peru," in
Temas sudamericanos, OC, VII, 117; "Memoria de la exposition," ibid.,
pp. 269 and 274; "Inmigracion y colonization," in La cuna de America,
OC, X, 370 and 375-376; "Geografia politica universal," in Ensayos didac-
tic os: tomo III, OC, XX, 352.

25 Quoted from the September 28, 1869 entry, Diario: tomo I, OC, I, 147;
"El programa de los independientes," in Diario: tomo II, OC, II, 2^0-251;
Mi viaje al sur, OC, VI, 133 and 263; "Federation argentina," in Temas

38

The providential destiny of Middle America in particular
in relation to the matter of cultural interchange and synthesis
was a recurrent theme in the writings of Hostos. Of all the
areas of the New World, the Caribbean seemed to him to be
best suited to initiate the fusion process if certain policies
were followed. The strategic position of those islands made
them likely stations of world commerce and appropriate con-
ductors of civilization between two continents. The Caribbean
peoples might well speed the process of admixture and assimi-
lation by forgetting Spanish exclusivism and standing open to
the flow of all human thought. An inter-continental university
in the Antilles seemed most appropriate to Hostos. 26 The
key word in understanding the role Hostos expected the Carib-
bean to play in international relations and in cultural inter-
change was balance. The peoples of Middle America had been
in active contact with the peoples of both North and South
America for years. Hostos remarked that the southern con-
tinent gave those peoples their origin, character, morality,
and intellectual disposition: the northern continent gave them
commercial and industrial connections. Hostos reasoned,
moreover, that once a union of Latin nations had been estab-
lished, the Anglo-Saxon spirit of liberty might be imitated by
the Latins. The North Americans would also bring a fusion of
European types and the South Americans would contribute an
Indian-Negro-Iberian ethnic composite to the "gigantic federa-
tion of the future. "27 Such union clearly depended upon a
flow of people, products, and ideas through the Caribbean
region whose populations would balance the forces of two
cultures acting upon each other.

Filled with exuberant nationalism. Eugenio Maria de
Hostos y Bonilla found the Old World moribund and the New
World much more alive to progress. Because of this belief.

sudamericanos, OC, VII, 98; "El cholo," ibid., pp. 152-154; "Chile en la
Guerra Pacifico," ibid., pp. 329-330; "Placido," in Temas cubanos. OC, IX,
13-15; "Centro de inmigracion y colonias agricolas," in La c una de America,
OC, X, 383; "Inmigracion," ibid., p. 390; Tratado de moral. OC, XVI, 423.

26 September 25, 1869 entry, Diano: tomo I, OC I, 14"; August 30, 18^3
entry, Dtario: tomo II. OC, II, 59; "El programa de los independientes,"
ibid., p. 257; Mi naje al sur, OC, VI, 2-6.

27 Quoted from the March 26, 18 7 entry, Diano: tomo I. OC I, 285; "El
programa de los independientes," in Diano: tomo II. OC II, 253; Mi naje
al sur. OC, VI, 79 and 84; September 19, 188" letter to Guillermo Matta,
in Temas cubanos. OC, IX, 359.

39

he romanticized the Indian cultures and objected to the con-
tinuing existence of Negro slavery. With unbounded faith in
human nature, Hostos described society as an organism com-
posed of individually important cells. His message was one of
natural and beneficial voluntary cooperation among rational
persons which would lead to racial fusion and to social unity.
The thought of Hostos on human relations indicates that an
attitude of racial superiority need not be regarded as inevi-
table.

40

SOME AMERICAN NEGRO ARTISTS

BY ELAINE F. THOMAS

When a few American Negroes, less than three genera-
tions ago, began to paint and sculpture and aspire to be
"artists," most people thought theirs was the Negro's first
attempt at art. The Western world had not yet realized that
primitive civilization not only had its artists but also had pro-
duced a great art and that the many types of primitive art now
known were yet to be discovered. There is an artistic tradition
and skill in all the major crafts running back for generations
and even centuries among the principal African tribes. Fac-
tually, pioneer American black artists were starting the Negro's
second career in art and unconsciously were trying to recap-
ture a lost artistic heritage. Thus, the task of the early Negro
artist was to prove to a skeptical world that the black could
produce genuine art. He proved his point. That doubtful world
did not know that the African had been a capable artist in his
native culture and that independent of European culture he
had built up his own techniques and traditions.

One must not expect the work of the Negro artist to be too
different from that of his fellow artists of other races. Product
of the same social and cultural soil, his art has an equal right
and obligation to be typically American at the same time that
it strived to be typically Negro. The work of Negro artists is
found in many galleries and private collections from New York
to Los Angeles. It is clear that Negro artists have never be-
longed to any one school but have responded to all the cur-
rents moving through American and European art history.
Many black artists have naturally concerned themselves with
Negro subject matter but today they are mostly in the inter-
national mainstreams. Whether they choose to call themselves
Negro, black, or Afro-American, these talented individuals
ask to be judged only on their merits.

The purpose of this paper is to briefly cite a few dozen
Negro artists whose lives span the two hundred years to the
present. Their styles range from primitive to sophisticated
with examples of landscapes and portraits, academic realism,
and abstract expressionism. Their general high level of quality

41

is one thing they have in common in addition to being Negro
art. It is hoped that this catalog will be a point of departure
for other researchers.

Three Negro painters works are known from the Eighteenth
Century. It is believed that the first portrait of a black by a
Negro was pastel of Richard Allen at the age of twenty-five.
It was done in 1785 by G. W. Hobbs, then a minister in Balti-
more. Scipio Moorhead of Boston was painting before 1773,
as we know from a poem by Phillis Wheatley. It is believed
that he engraved the cover design for her volume of poems
published in 1773. Patrick Reason, who actively associated
with the Anti-Slavery Society, is relatively well known as an
engraver and lithographer in New York City.

The Nineteenth Century produced an interesting and ex-
panded group of Afro-American artists. Joshua Johnston, of
Baltimore, who was active from 17% to 1824, was the best
known Afro-American painter of this period. He was noted
for his portraits of well-to-do Maryland families.

A Scotch-Canadian Negro artist named Robert S. Duncan-
son (1817-1872), was born in New York, educated in Canada,
and was a resident of Cincinnati. He was commissioned by the
Longworths and other prominent families of that city to paint
portraits and landscapes. His murals still adorn the stately
Longworth mansions now called the Taft Museum. Duncan-
son, traveling in Europe on an award, enjoyed the hospitality
of Alfred Lord Tennyson while in England. Tennyson is re-
ported to have remarked that Duncanson had truly captured
the spirit of his poem, "The Lotus Eater," in his painting of
that subject.

Two other Nineteenth Century American Negro artists,
a painter and a sculptress, were Edward M. Bannister (1828-
1901) and Edmonia Lewis (1845-1890). It is said that in 1867 a
statement in the New York Herald which denied that Negroes
could create art urged Bannister to prove the contrary. He
was moved by a deeply rooted love for woods and waters of
which landscape painting was a part. His first great success
came in 1876 at the Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia
where his large landscape. Under the Oaks, was awarded a
medal. This painting sold in Boston for SI 500 which, at that
time, was considered a high price for a work by a living artist
and which helped to compensate for a hard early life.

42

Edmonia Lewis, a petite, brown-skinned orphan girl of
Negro-Indian extraction found support for a short period of
schooling at Oberlin College. Later in Boston she opened her
own studio with eight dollars. That she was dedicated to the
great struggle for freedom was evident in her exhibited sculp-
ture. Her work began with a medallion of John Brown and
Colonel Robert Shaw, the latter having died leading the first
all-Negro regiment during the Civil War. Only six weeks earlier
on 28 May, 1863, Edmonia had seen Shaw at the head of a
ceremonial parade. Mrs. Shaw bought the bust of which hun-
dreds of copies were quickly sold. The proceeds took Edmonia
Lewis to Rome before she was twenty where she created neo-
classical busts and statues related to her dual racial heritage.
At the Carver Museum in Tuskegee. Alabama are two marble
sculptures by her. One is entitled Awake, and the other is
The Arrow Maker. Two other women sculptresses. Meta War-
rick Fuller and May Howard Jackson, followed Edmonia
Lewis' example.

Beginning the Twentieth Century, Henry O. Tanner
(1859-1937) emerged as an outstanding artist of international
reputation who achieved substantial success during his life-
time. In very recent years his work has begun to enjoy re-
newed interest. Tanner studied at the Pennsylvania Academy
of Fine Arts with the noted Thomas Eakins and journeyed to
Paris to continue his studies where he was awarded the Legion
of Honor by the government. He developed a distinctive
style restrained, mystical and scientific in its attention to
detail. Tanner received support from his father, a bishop of
the African Methodist Episcopal Church, although the father
did not approve his son's choice of art as a career. Most of
young Tanner's paintings portray a Bibical theme. His Banjo
Lesson indicated at last that Negro life could inspire a Negro
painter. An oil by Tanner entitled Flight into Egypt hangs in
the Carver Museum's collection.

Two younger talents who were influenced by Tanner were
William A. Harper of Chicago, and William E. Scott of India-
napolis. Harper's early death at twenty-seven in 1910 was a
great loss in that he was approaching maturity after much
promise. He left only a small collection of his paintings in-
cluding Autumn Landscape now at the Carver Museum. A
portrait of Dr. Booker T. Washington by William Scott also
hangs there.

43

The 1920's produced a new black movement, sometimes
referred to as the Negro Renaissance. This was a period of
great social and intellectual ferment, and Afro-Americans
were very much a part of it. In the black community dozens
of literary art publications appeared, and for the first time
in American history a cultural racialism developed among
Negroes. The spirit of this movement was concisely stated by
the poet Langston Hughes: "We, the younger Negro artists,
intend to express our individual dark-skinned selves without
fear or shame."

During this period of the 1920's a substantial number of
Afro-American artists began to consider Negro subject matter
and themes a proper concern for artistic exploration. Negro
Renaissance painters such as Aaron Douglas, retired chair-
man of the Art Department of Fisk University, and Archibald
Motley helped to raise the level of Negro portraiture to a re-
spectable standard. Renewed interest in Negro history and
mural painting attracted Douglas, Hale Woodruff, and others
to that epic medium. Hale Woodruffs gift for design has lost
none of its vitality through his many duties as Professor of
Art Education at New York University. Richmond Barthe
emerged as the preeminent black sculptor of the new Negro
movement. Thousands of the visitors at the Carver Museum
are attracted by the bronze bust of Dr. George Washington
Carver by Richmond Barthe. The versatile Lois M. Jones,
Professor of Art at Howard University, initially captivated by
the French landscape, fell in love with Haiti that Africa in
the New World which has held a special fascination for many
Afro-American artists. Charles Dawson made a remarkable
contribution as illustrator, portrait and figure painter, de-
signer and engraver. As the first curator of the Carver Museum
at Tuskegee Institute, Dawson became the designer of the
basic interior plans and arrangements of the American Negro
Exposition of 1940 which was sponsored by the State of Il-
linois. He also co-supervised the construction of the historical
dioramas which were presented to Tuskegee Institute as a
permanent exhibit through the courtesy of Illinois Governor
Dwight H. Green.

The next generation of artists was confronted by the lean
years of the Depression. The Federal Arts Project rescued
many of them and made available better opportunities than
would otherwise have existed. Some of the best known Afro-

44 .

American artists of today emerged during the 1930"s and 1940's.
Recently the Smithsonian Institution presented to the Carver
Museum twenty paintings by William H. Johnson which is
shared with other communities as a traveling exhibition.
Hughie Lee Smith's dignified, isolated men and women have a
surrealistic touch, expressing man's lonely and confused con-
dition in a complex technological age. Romare Bearden's
skillful use of the collage penetrates the Afro-American life
and conveys man's oppressed condition. Ernest Crichlow has
been consistent in his social commentary on black life. Both
Charles Alston and Norma Lewis have maintained a vital in-
terest and proficiency in abstract painting. Elizabeth Catlett.
long resident of Mexico, is a sculptress of considerable power.
Mention of this period would not be complete without re-
calling the extraordinary work of the late Horace Pippin, of
Pennsylvania, one of the finest of the Twentieth Century self-
taught American artists.

Since the end of World War II the number of Afro-Amer-
ican artists has greatly increased and a considerable number
have earned international reputations. Although there are so
many a few must be singled out. The work of Professor John
Biggers of Texas Southern University in Houston, reflects a
growing interest in Africa and the superb colorist and land-
scapist, Richard Mayhew, must be mentioned for his distinc-
tive use of restrained color to transmit feeling and mood.
Richard Hunt, the Chicago sculptor, fashions metal abstract
forms from themes suggested by nature. Sam Gilliams' ex-
periments with new materials, forms, and techniques place
him among the noted of American artists. The lyrical abstract
paintings of Bernie Casey, a professional football player with
the Los Angeles Rams, and the promising work of Philip Hamp-
ton, Gregory Ridley, and Oubre reveal a wide range of style
and technique, all stamped by the artists' individual person-
alities.

With such a distinctive past and such a promising present,
what is the future of Negro art? Any future is a matter of time
and patient waiting. However, we can note three trends that
seem to point toward three desirable goals. One is the en-
couraging growth of the number of Negro artists, another is
the vital promotion of Negro art, and a third indicates the
development of the Negro theme and subject as a vital phase
of the artistic expression of native American life. The net

45

results of what we have already reviewed show that at least
the Negro and his works are definitely upon the artistic map
and negritude with all that it implies seems destined to come
to the foreground.

46

OBSERVATIONS ON THE AFRICAN

"WORLD- VIEW" AND ITS

ENCOUNTER WITH

CHRISTIANITY

BY ERNST M. BJERKEROT

During recent years scholars have become increasingly
interested in what can be called "the African world-view"
or African philosophy. Unfortunately, this interest has as
yet not resulted in any great amount of publicized material
on the subject. Among the books available, three works ap-
pear more important than others, namely La Philosophie Ban-
toue by Father Placide Tempels, The Primal Vision by the
Rev. John V. Taylor, and African Religion and Philosophy
by Professor John S. Mbiti. It is rather significant that two
of these books were written by white missionaries. During
many decades Africans have been indoctrinated that their
old culture was inferior and that they had to accept Western
ways in order to fit into modern society. However, with the
growth of African nationalism and political independence,
a number of educated Africans have made a conscious efforts
to regain their ancient culture.

In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must here be made
clear that the term "African" here refers to "black Africans"
and not to the Arab and Ethiopian population of the northern
and north-eastern part of the continent. Excluded also are
such groups as the pygmies of Central Africa and the Bushmen
and Hottentots in the south.

An old West African myth says that when God withdrew
from the world because of the sin of man, he entrusted the
world to a power called bunsi or mhissi-nsi. This is the central
principle in the primal world-view and is best known to the
West under its Melanesian name of mana. It is a potency
present in every element and in every living being. It is not
only present in living man, but is also present in a much great-
er intensity in the dead. 1 It is, consequently, impossible for
an African to visualize the individual man cut off from the
inanimate forces surrounding him existing only for himself.

1 John V. Taylor, The Primal Vision. (London: Student Christian Move-
ment Press, 1963), p. 73.

47

Man is not only a living being, but he also is a vital force exist-
ing in conjunction with other forces, influencing those forces
at the same time as he is influenced by them. Tempels actual-
ly says, that the human being has no existence, in the con-
ceptions of the Africans, apart from the ontological hierarchy
and the interaction of forces. 2

The ontological question the question about the nature
of being is therefore important in African philosophy. The
concept is difficult for a Westerner to comprehend but it must
in the first place be emphasized that for the African the con-
cepts of "being" and "force" and interchangeable, and they
therefore speak, act and live as if for them beings were forces.
Force is not merely an attribute to being, as it is for us, but
force is the nature of being being is force and force is being.
Consequently, when the Westerner thinks in the concept of
being the African thinks in the concept of force, and here one
sees concrete beings, the other sees concrete forces. Of course,
not all forces are identical. There is a definite difference in
the essence, or nature, of forces. Divine forces are thus dif-
ferent from animal or mineral forces, human forces are dif-
ferent from vegetable forces, and so on. Force is, however,
present everywhere, as all being is force, and exists only as
force, and the category "force" must include all that is re-
garded as "being 1 ' God, living and departed men, animals,
plants and minerals. 3

Man needs force, vital force, in his encounter with the
forces of nature. Supreme happiness, the only kind of good
fortune that is important, is the possession of the fullest vital
potency. The only kind of misfortune that matters is the loss
or diminution of this power. Every sickness, affliction or ad-
versity, each injustice and every frustration is regarded and
described by the Bantu as a diminution of the vital force. It
should be noted, however, that the African does not regard
himself to opposed to the forces surrounding him, and he
does not try to seek greater happiness by grasping the life-
force latent in other beings. A man is really happy when he
is in harmony with the cosmic totality. This means that the
greatest good is achieved when everything goes well.

Placide Tempels, La Philosophie Bantoue (Paris: Presence Africaine,
9), pp. 68 f.

1959), pp. 68 f.
3 Ibid. pp. 33 ff.

48

On the other hand, if something goes wrong, if he has a
spell of bad luck, the African feels that the totality has become
hostile, and he falls prey to acute insecurity and anxiety. He
then turns to the nyanga, the diviner, for help.

It is not difficult to observe the similarity between the
traditional African world-view and ancient Semitic religion
according to which nature is alive with powers that can be
directly experienced by man. Nothing is inanimate. Man con-
ceives of himself as living in the kingdom of a throbbing, per-
sonal nature, that is, in the kingdom of the holy gods. His
life must be integrated in the interplay of the gigantic forces
of nature. 4

Even if the African feels himself a vital force in actual,
intimate and permanent rapport with the other forces, he
recognizes an important difference between human beings
and the rest of creation. The uniqueness in the human force
lies in the possession of creative intelligence by which a human
being can directly strengthen or weaken the life-force of an-
other person. It is this creative intelligence which lies behind
the use of herbal medicines and of magic, the knowledge of a
diviner and the power of a witch. D But the same unique force
is in operation rn whatever a man does. Therefore, sowing
is not sufficient by itself to make the corn germinate and grow.
Speech, song and prayer must be added, for it is the proper
ritual that makes the grasses germinate, the fruits grow, and
the cow to make milk or bear a calf. Even handicraft needs
the ritual if it is to succeed.

Thus the African conceives of religion not merely as one
element in the whole system of social life, but as controlling,
permeating, penetrating and influencing every part of it. Re-
ligion is therefore not only a system of beliefs and creeds with
personal application attached, but is also a system of fixed
traditional practices, rites and ceremonies which man has to
go through systematically and invariably. Thus it is demand-
ed of each individual that he participate with intensity and
devotion in the rituals of the family or clan.

4 G. Ernest Wright, The Old Testament Against its Environment. (London:
Student Christian Movement Press, 1961). p. 275.

5 Taylor, p. 78.

49

Bishop Bengt Sundkler refers to the traditional African
society as being "the clan community of the Living and the
Dead.'" 6 There are two important factors involved in this
statement.

The first is that African traditional life in the past regard-
ed the clan or the kinship group, the tribe, or, in a few in-
stances, the nation, as a unit. It was the duty of every member
of such a group to support and help other members, but there
was no obligation to help those outside the group. For in-
stance, a Tshwa from Mozambique has to help others from
the same clan, but he was under no obligation to help mem-
bers of another clan, even if that clan belonged to the same
tribe. A Zulu, on the other hand, has a moral and religious
obligation to help all other Zulus.

Religious rituals were never carried out by isolated in-
dividuals, but community worship was the practice. Most
common was the family worship, always carried out by the
head of the family, who thus acted as priest. Certain rituals,
such as the first-fruit rites, were always carried out at the clan
level, with the chief, as the head of the clan family, acting as
priest. Among Africans with a sense of the tribe as a nation,
such as the Zulus, the Swazis and the Ndebele, certain fes-
tivals are held at the national level, and here the paramount
chief acted as priest in his capacity as father of the tribe.

The second factor related to the interaction of the dead
and the living is that the African family today is still a single,
continuing unit, and is not conscious of any radical distinc-
tion between the living and the dead. An intimate relation-
ship is maintained by sharing food with the departed who are
believed to be present at the meal, not as a distinct group,
but as members of the community. One difference between
the living and the dead, possibly the most important, is sum-
med up in Alexis Kagame's epigram: "The living man is hap-
pier than the departed, because he is alive. But the departed
are more powerful." 7

The head of a family is the only person who can approach
the ancestors directly. He thus is the mediator between the

6 Bengt Sundkler. The Christian Ministry in Africa. (London: Student Chris-
tian Movement Press. 1960), p. 282.

7 Quoted by Taylor, p. 156.

50

living and the dead. This conforms with the African custom
that no one makes a request directly to the head of a.family
or a chief. Instead, one always asks the person next in rank
under the chief to act as mediator. The family-head is consid-
ered next in rank to the ancestors, since he is the oldest mem-
ber of the family and probably will be the next to join them.
The ancestor thus supplicated can either give the assistance
asked for, or he can transmit the request to one of his own
ancestors who, in turn, can help if he has the power: other-
wise, he can send it further, until it reaches the first ancestor,
the uNkukunkuku of the Zulus, the most powerful member
of the lineage. His power is actually so great, that in some
tribes the Zulu, Tshwa, Tsonga and Ronga of Southern
Africa he has taken the place of the Supreme Being and the
first ancestor of the clan, the "Abraham" of the tribe, can
petition him, but only on very rare occasions does this Creator
intervene. Generally speaking, he is a withdrawn God. a Deus
Remotus.

Most Africans recognize that all men have a common
nature, that they are 1 ultimately the descendants of a common
ancestor, but this concept does not seem to be significant.
The Africans are still building their psychic, political and re-
ligious security on the old, narrow claim: "We have Abraham
to our father." When Adam is introduced to the African world,
he can cause a revolution, at the same time that he is strength-
ening the traditional world-view. In the opening chapters of
the Bible the African can find the charter for human solidarity,
a character needed in these days, when tribal and kinship ties
are being destroyed. They who share a common ancestor must
also share a common destiny and the end, like the beginning,
must be God's creation. It should also be noted that the Afri-
can is able to understand the curse of Cain much better than
can a Westerner. The curse laid upon Cain was that he was
to be cut off from the soil and from society, and this was more
than Cain could bear. 8 To "be cut off from his people" was
a very severe punishment, given only for serious offenses,
both in the Old Testament society and in the African. The
reason is that both the Bible and the African world-view rec-
ognize that one becomes a real person only in and through
his relations with other persons. The individual self has no

8 Genesis 4:1 1-14.

51

independent existence which gives it power to enter into re-
lationships with other selves. Only through living intercourse
with other selves can it become a self at all.

This is not the only similarity between Biblical and Af-
rican concepts of life and society. On the contrary, the civili-
zation described in the Bible is similar to the traditional Af-
rican culture and the African recognizes this. One author
noted that an African reading the Bible is happy to find in it
a civilization which moves in the same rhythm as his own.
Life is quite simple as it unfolds in its tragedy, its hopes, its
slow rhythm and its cruelties. There is no obsession with ef-
ficiency here. The events of the life of Christ are rarely fast-
ened to any date and although the Westerners attempt to map
out the life of Christ with some historical guideposts this is
foreign to the Africans. The African views the message as
more important than the statistical data.

Into this African world, with its strong sense of the in-
dividual's responsibility to society, the Protestant mission en-
tered with a message of the individual's salvation, a message
based to a large extent on Western individualistic philosophy.
Fortunately, the traditional world-view is reflected continual-
ly in thoughts and attitudes of Christian Africans, as is ob-
served by Michael Gelfand, a medical doctor with a lot of
anthropological knowledge. He found that an African can
believe in his own religion without necessarily practising it,
and at the same time be a practising Christian. 9

The encounter between the African world-view and Chris-
tianity has not been an easy one. At first many Africans ac-
cepted Western teaching without questioning. After all, the
white man did possess a superior technology, and it was there-
fore believed that he also possessed more vital force than the
Africans. However, as the Africans experienced the whole-
sale condemnation of their old culture they became increas-
ingly uneasy about the situation. As a result thousands of
so called Independent African churches have come into being,
churches which try to combine the best element of Chris-
tianity with traditional African philosophy. Many have suc-
ceeded in an amazing degree, and it has been said that a new
Reformation is taking place in Africa at the moment, a Re-
formation during which the Biblical message is translated to
the concepts of the existential African situation.

9 Michael Gelfand, Shona Ritual. (Cape Town: Juta & Co., 1959), p. 2.

52

THE BLACK IN BRAZILIAN HISTORY:
AN EXPLORATORY ESSAY

BY E. BRADFORD BURNS

The blacks predominated numerically during most of the
history of Brazil. In the three centuries before the abolition
of the slave trade in 1850, nearly four million Africans entered
Brazil, many times the number of Portuguese who immigrated
to the New World. When Brazil declared its independence in
1822, for example, the population numbered approximately
3-1/2 million of whom more than two-thirds were "men of
color." The commerce in slaves, trade in other products (Bra-
zilian tobacco, sugar, manioc, beans and spirits for African
palm oil. rice, ivory, and gold), religious dependence (the
Bishop of Angola was suffragan to the Archbishop of Bahia.
for example), and the exchange of governmental officials
between Brazil and Portuguese Africa created an intimate
relationship across the South Atlantic. Only after the termina-
tion of the slave trade and the influx of European immigrants.
1870-1930, did those ties loosen and the racial composition of
Brazil alter appreciably. Still, in the mid-twentieth century,
the well known social historian of Brazil, Gilberto Freyre.
could observe, "Every Brazilian, even the fairest blond, bears
in his soul, if not in his soul and body for there are many in
Brazil whose whiteness hides a tint of black dye the shadow,
or at least the imprint, of the Negro." l

Despite the presence of formidable numbers of Africans
and their descendants, there still is no history of the blacks in
Brazil nor a full account of their contributions to Brazilian
history. The major historians of Brazil, native and foreign, all
have been white. They have consulted only white sources.
Obviously, then, in any study of Brazilian history the white
point of view prevails. When the historians have shown any
interest at all in the Africans" role in the evolution of Brazil,
they have concentrated their attention almost exclusively on

1 Quoted by Jose Honorio Rodrigues. "The Influence of Africa on Brazil
and of Brazil on Africa." Journal of African History. HI. 1 (19621. p. 32.

53

the institution of slavery. In effect, the black, a major com-
ponent of Brazil's population, has been written out of the
nation's history.

The Visconde de Porto Alegre once remarked, "To know
the biographies of all the outstanding men of a period is to
know the history of those times." Much of Brazil's historio-
graphy reflects that view complementary to the white patrician
class. One of Porto Alegre's contemporaries, George Eliot,
suggested an alternative approach to history in her novel
Middlemarch: "The growing good of the world is partly de-
pendent upon unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill
with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the
number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited
tombs." The unnamed, too, deserve their place in history. It
was not only princes, prelates, and politicians who built Bra-
zil but the anonymous bandeirantes who explored, conquered,
and opened up vast tracts of the interior; the tireless mission-
aries who infused European church-centered civilization into
the New World; and the forgotten Negro slaves upon whose
skill and muscle the development of Brazil depended. Heroes
appear as they must, but they serve to illustrate and to par-
ticularize broad trends of their times. Most often historian 6 of
Brazil have so emphasized the individual, that trends or groups
have been slighted. No group has been more slighted in Bra-
zilian history than the great black masses.

If the historian has neglected the black in Brazilian history,
the anthropologists and sociologists have been busy during
the past few decades studying certain African contributions
to Brazilian civilization. Precisely here is a good place to begin
the study of the blacks in Brazil. Their numerical prepon-
derance suggests the influence they exerted over the Indo-
Portuguese society into which they were forcibly injected.
Indeed, they modified and reshaped that society, changing
it just as they were changed by it. The social scientists point
out the black's influence on Roman Catholicism that funda-
mental matrix of Iberian civilization. On the one hand, he
enlivened church-going with festivals, street dances, and folk
plays, and on the other he developed a syncretized Afro-Bra-
zilian religion heavily under Yoruba influence. Known as
Candomble in Bahia, Xango in Pernambuco, and Macumba in
Rio de Janeiro, it combined the beliefs found in the religions
brought from Africa with the Christianity imported into the

54

New World by the ruling class. The African contributed sig-
nificantly to the creation of a Brazilian cuisine by introducing
into the diet new stables such as red peppers, Wack beans,
okras, cola nuts, yams and palm oil, new culinary concoctions
such as efo, vatapa, caruru and various rice and bean dishes,
as well as by introducing into the kitchen new utinsels such
as the wooden spoon and the pestle and mortar. That the
Portuguese language spoken in South America differs from
that heard in Lisbon is owing partly to African influence. The
black softened the pronunciation and simplified verb forms.
He infused many African words into the vocabulary of which
bengala, bunda, cachaca, mocambo, moleque, quilombo.
samba, and senzala serve as examples.

Brazil's distinctive music, both popular and classic, owes
much to Africa. The foremost classical composers of this cen-
tury, Francisco Mignone, Camargo Guarnieri, Jose Siqueira.
and Heitor Villa-Lobos, all have turned to African themes
for inspiration. The lively samba tunes issuing from every
radio testify to the African predominance in popular music.
A wide variety of musical instruments, the drum, reco-reco.
marimba, marimbau, and tambourine, to mention only the
most obvious, have migrated across the South Atlantic to en-
liven Brazilian music. Folklore, too, bears the stamp of Af-
rica thanks to the black's imagination and his memory of
proverbs, riddles, tales, and myths from another continent.
These contributions have been vital to the formation of Bra-
zilian civilization, but they by no means exhaust the impor-
tance of the black.

Still to be defined is the historical role of the black in
Brazil. Much research remains to be done, but at this point
it seems safe to suggest that the conquest, settlement, and
development of Brazil were a joint Afro-European enterprise.
Neither race could have accomplished those tasks alone.

To that joint enterprise, the African applied above all
else his labor and his skill. His contributions and influence
began on the large plantations. The blacks farmed the land
drawing the immense riches from the fertile soil. Cacao, cot-
ton, tobacco, rice, and above all else sugar provided the
capital for the development of Brazil. From the fields the
black influence spread quickly to the manor house. There

55

the African women left their imprint on the formation of Bra-
zil as cooks, wet nurses, and as companions of the lady of the
house. African influence permeated the nascent towns where
the blacks worked as domestic servants, peddlers, mechanics,
and artisans. Unlike his brother in North America who for the
most part was barred from exercising trades, the Brazilian
blacks were about the only ones available for those occupa-
tions. Wood-carving, basketry, weaving, and iron-working
were but a few of the skills the African brought to Brazil.
His long experience in gold washing and cattle herding were
extremely important for the development of the economy.
In Brazil, then, the black put to use the many skills which he
already had mastered in Africa and quickly learned new ones
from the European. One American visitor to Brazil in the
mid-nineteenth century, Thomas Ewbank, marvelled at the
variety of skills the Blacks displayed. He noted:

I have now seen slaves working as carpenters, ma-
sons, pavers, painters, sign and ornamental painters,
carriage and cabinet makers, fabricators of military
ornaments, lamp-makers, silversmiths, jewelers, and
lithographers. It is also a fact that sculptures in stone
and saintly images in wood are often done admirably
by slaves and free blacks. . . . All kinds of trades are
carried on by black journeymen and boys. 2
Information on the slave auctions was equally explicit de-
tailing the many and varied skills and trades possessed or
acquired by the blacks.

If the African gave of his mind and body to Brazil, he
also contributed his blood. European and Amerindian and
blacks mixed extensively. Miscegenation began early and
still continues. Nowhere has it been more complete than in
the vast interior of Brazil. Historians and sociologists cus-
tomarily refer to that region as the melting pot of the races.
There the African continued to fuse his blood with the Euro-
pean's and began to miscegenate with the Indian. The slave
owner encouraged the mating with Indian women in order to
claim the offspring as his slave. Many fugitive blacks who

2 Thomas Ewbank, Life in Brazil (New York, 1856), p. 195. More recent
scholarship confirms the conclusion that the blacks filled the ranks of the
artisan and mechanical classes in Brazil. See Margaret V. Nelson, "The Negro
in Brazil as seen through the Chronicles of Travellers, 1800-1868," Journal of
Negro Historv, XXX (1945), 212-213; and Donald Pierson, Negroes in Brazil
(Carbondale, Illinois, 1967), pp. 38-39.

56

roamed and inhabited the interior took up with Indian women
and in that way accelerated racial mixing. The subsequent
crossing of the three races over the course of centuries pro-
duced a homogeneous Brazilian. One of the most perceptive
visitors into the hinterlands, Euclides da Cunha. observed in
his classic Os Sertoes that as one moved inland from the coast
the distinct races disappeared. The pure white, pure black,
and pure Indian became rarer. He noted first men of a variety
of different shadings; then he came upon that "indefinable
compound," the Brazilian. He considered the amalgamated
man of the backlands as the "bedrock" of the Brazilian "race."
a new race created in the New World by the confluence of
African, Portuguese, and Indian. 3

That new race made possible territorial expansion, one
of the most dynamic aspects of Brazilian history. Portugal
responded defensively to foreign threats and interlopers in
the New World by establishing tiny, isolated, agricultural
nuclei along the coast. Olinda in the north, Salvador da Bahia
in the center, and Sao Vicente in the south were the first set-
tlements of strategic and commercial importance. In due
course, men from the coastal settlements penetrated the in-
terior to explore and to search for wealth in the form of pre-
cious metals and Indian slaves. By exploring new territory,
opening new routes of communication, and claiming new
regions for the crown, they hoped for the rewards of royal
recognition and preferment. Inland expansion began timidly
in the Sixteenth Century, became the marked characteristic
of the last half of the Seventeenth and the first half of the
Eighteenth Centuries and in certain phases lasted until the
early Twentieth Century when Brazil acquired Acre, its west-
ernmost state, and reached its present gargantuan size of three
and a quarter million square miles to be the fifth largest nation
in the world. That spectacular expansion resulted from the ac-
tivities of hardy adventurers known in Portuguese as baiv-
deir antes.

All races contributed to the bandeirante expansion.
Mamelucos, the offspring of Indians and Portuguese, com-
posed the majority of the rank and leadership of the expedi-
tions, but blacks in their status as either slave or freedmen

3 Os Sertoes was published in English in 1902 as Rebellion in the Backlands.
In particular see his "Note V," of the Chicago, 1957 edition, p. 481.

57

took an active part as well. Mulattoes on occasion led some
of the expeditions. The African participation in the epic sweep
across a continent from the shores of the Atlantic to the foot-
hills of the Andes thus far has been neglected. Nonetheless,
the blacks participated and not only in the conquest of the
hinterlands but in their settlement and development as well.
In 1776, the first calculation of the population of Minas Gerais,
the most important captaincy of the interior, revealed the
presence of 60,000 whites, 82,000 mulattoes, and 164,000
blacks. 4

The cattlemen followed on the heels of the bandeirantes
to use the newly explored and opened territories for their
herds. The cattle industry, notable for an insatiable appetite
for large tracts of land, radiated outward into the Sertao from
Pernambuco, Bahia, and Sao Paulo. In those diverse regions,
the sinewy cowboy of mixed Indian, African, and European
blood, settled and held the frontier. The black had much to
teach his fellow cowboys. In his former home he had been a
skilled cattle raiser and in the New World he shared this know-
ledge.

Gold mining was another important occupation of the
interior at which the black worked. The discovery of gold in
Minas Gerais in 1695 enticed thousands of eager prospectors
from Portugal and the Brazilian coast into the South Amer-
ican interior. From practically zero at the time of the dis-
covery, the population of Minas Gerais climbed to 30,000 by
1709 and zoomed to half a million by the end of the century.
The mania for gold quickly propelled the prospectors farther
west. In 1718 gold was discovered in Cuiaba, Mato Grosso, a
seven months' river journey from Sao Paulo. The diggings
were shallow there and they were exhausted more rapidly than
those in Minas Gerais, but that did not prevent a rush into
Mato Grosso to exploit the new finds. In 1725, Goias witness-
ed the discovery of gold and the familiar pattern of rush and
boom ensued. The new arrivals into the interior brought with
them the maximum number of African slaves they could af-
ford, and the black was put to work to extract gold. Again he
worked at a job with which he was already familiar. He had
extracted and processed gold in Africa. Transferring that
experience to the New World, he introduced into Brazil the

4 Various useful population figures are given by Aires da Mata Machado
Filho, O Negro e o Garimpo em Minas Gerais (Rio de Janeiro, 1964), pp. 23-25.

58

wooden pan for gold washing. Throughout the Eighteenth
Century approximately two million pounds of gold were pro-
duced legally, which meant that Brazil provided about eighty
percent of the world's gold supply in that century. The riches
from the gold regions of Brazil's interior which momentarily
enlivened the Portuguese empire resulted from the skill and
labor of the Blacks. One Brazilian historian of the West, Cas-
siano Ricardo, flatly asserted, "'without the Negro, there would
have been no gold."' 5

The blacks brought into the interior many other essen-
tial skills in addition to their knowledge of gold washing and
processing. They made up the ranks of the artisan and me-
chanic classes just as they had along the coast. In short, it
was the black who introduced the essential services and skills
required to maintain settlement in the backlands. The records
reveal, for example, that one Fernando Dias Falcao left Sao
Paulo in 1719 for the interior with forty blacks, among whom
were "iron workers, carpenters, and tailors," to add to others
he already- had at his inland settlement. 6

There can be no more cogent testimony to the vital role
played by the blacks in the Brazilian interior than the plea
sent by the governor of the Captaincy of Sao Paulo e Minas
do Ouro to the king in 1713. In it, he emphasized the cap-
taincy's desperate need for more blacks: "They are essential,
not only to cultivate the land and to exploit the new mines,
but also to continue making new discoveries which cannot
be done without these slaves." 7 Exploration and exploitation
of the vast interior depended then on the presence and parti-
cipation of the Blacks.

The governor might well have added that the blacks were
also needed to defend the interior. From the time of their
arrival, they were called upon to protect Brazil from attacks
and incursions by pirates, European interlopers, Indians, and
Spanish-speaking neighbors. Brazil's longest armed struggle
was to expel the Dutch from the sugar rich Northeast, an area
the Dutch held from 1630 until 1654. The Indians, blacks, and
Luso-Brazilians all contributed soldiers to the campaign. From

5 Cassiano Richardo. "O Negro no Bandeirismo Paulista." Revista do Ar-
quivo Municipal (Sao Paulo), XLVII (1938), 37.
6. Ibid., 21.

7 Quoted in Sergio Buarque de Holand a (ed.). Historia Geral da Civilizacao
Brasileira (Sao Paulo. 1960). II, 187.

59

the long guerrilla struggles the leader of the black regiments,
Henrique Dias, emerged a hero. He was a freedman whose
parents had been born in Africa and shipped as slaves to Bra-
zil. The Crown lauded his services and conferred many honors
on him, not least of which was the coveted Order of Christ.
Alas, once the Luso-Brazilians had wrested the Northeast from
the Dutch, the Portuguese monarch conveniently forgot the
black hero.

One historian of the wars against the Dutch, C. R. Boxer,
observed that on at least one occasion the blacks displayed
a greater loyalty to the Brazilian cause than did the white plan-
tation owners. Concerning a call to revolt against the Dutch
sounded by Joao Fernandes Vieira in mid-1645 in Pernambuco,
Boxerrevealed, "About 150 men, mostly mulattoes and Negroes,
answered his summons on the first day, and others rallied to
him daily; but the bulk of the moradores remained quiescent,
evidently waiting to see who would win the first round before
they irrevocably committed themselves.* 8 The blacks re-
sponded to other emergencies as well. In 1711, when the French
sacked Rio de Janeiro, the Governor of Minas Gerais rushed
to aid the city with 1,500 horsemen and 6,000 armed blacks.
Again, in 1763, when war threatened on the Guapore River
between the Spainards and the Portuguese, the Portuguese
force at Conceicao consisted of 244 men of whom "114 were
armed Negro slaves." Black militia regiments were formed
and trained during the colonial period for the defense of Bra-
zil. The traveler Henry Koster observed one of these in the
early nineteenth century and left these impressions of it:

There are two of these regiments for the province of
Pernambuco. . .distinguished from each other by the
names Old Henriques and New Henriques. ... I have
seen some portion of one of these regiments in Recife
.... They were dressed in white cloth uniforms, turned
up with scarlet: and they looked very soldier-like. They
were in tolerable discipline. . . . They acted with an
appearance of zeal and the desire of excelling. Those
of which I speak formed a finer body of men than any
of her soldiers which I had an opportunity of seeing

8 C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654 (Oxford, 1957), p. 166.

9 Arthur Ramos discusses the Negro as a soldier in O Negro na Civilizacao
Brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), pp. 167-180.

60

in that country. . . . These men received no pay, so that
their neat appearance on such occasions bespeaks a
certain degree of wealth among them. 10

Black regiments also fought valiantly against the Para-
guayans in the protracted War of the Triple Alliance. 1865-
1870. Black soldiers distinguished themselves, but the ten-
dency to eulogize only leaders means that praise for generals
and admirals even the most ordinary ones eclipsed the
part played by men in the ranks. The bravery of black heroes
such as Cezario Alves da Costa, Antonio Francisco de Mello.
and Marcilio Dias still remains to be told in the detail that
their gallantry merits.

Largely unstudied is the long struggle of the blacks for
their own freedom, an epic of a different genre. The struggle
assumed two aspects: one peaceful, the other bloody. The
slaves revolted, murdered their masters, or committed suicide.
In Bahia alone nine such revolts disturbed the province be-
tween 1807 and 1835. Other slaves fled from the plantations
to establish their own communities in the hinterlands, the
quilombos. Scholars have identified thus far ten such major
quilombos which florished in colonial Brazil." The most
famous of them. Palmares, existed throughout most of the
Seventeenth Century and serves as the principal example of
the Blacks setting up in Brazil their own state following African
patterns. The omnipresent fear of physical slave protest in-
fused a feeling of constant tension among the population. One
student of the institution of slavery in mid-nineteenth century
Brazil, Agostinho Marques Perdigao Malheiros. referred to
the slave as *'a domestic enemy" and "a public enemy" and
warned, "He is a volcano that constantly threatens society,
a mine ready to explode at the least spark." l2

At the same time many blacks worked peacefully to end
slavery. They banded together to form cooperative associa-
tions which facilitated the slaves* purchase of their own free-
dom. Many blacks joined the abolitionist movement in the

10 Henry Koster. Travels in Brazil (London. 1816). II. pp. 182-183.

11 One of the best discussions of quilombos is R. K. Kent. "Palmares: An
African State in Brazil." Journal of African History. VI. 2 (1965). 161-175.

12 Agostinho Marques Perdigao Malheiros wrote a three volume study of
slavery in Brazil, A Escravidao no BrasilEnsaio Juridico. Historico. Social
(Rio de Janeiro. 1866). Particularly pertinent for this essay was Volume Three.

61

nineteenth century and labored to free the remaining slaves.
Some talented black abolitionist leaders emerged to impress
the nation with their dedication and ability. Jose Carlos do
Patrocinio, a persuasive journalist, wrote ceaselessly for the
cause and became a symbol of the campaign. Andre Reboucas
organized abolitionist clubs and spoke and wrote profusely
in support of the cause. Luis Gonzaga de Pinto Gama spent
his own youth as a slave and later became a distinguished
lawyer who specialized in defending slaves in court. He claimed
credit for freeing 500 slaves through the courts. A fiery ad-
vocate of immediate abolition, he declared, "Every slave
who kills his master, no matter what the circumstances may
be, kills in self-defense." 13 He also preached "the right of
insurrection." Another Black lawyer, Jose Ferreira de Menezes,
earned fame as a polished and persuasive speaker for the
abolitionist cause. These black leaders campaigned vigor-
ously for the rights of their race and triumphed in 1888 when
slavery was finally abolished in Brazil.

Bernardo de Vasconcelos, a statesman of the first half of
the Nineteenth Century, once exclaimed in the Chamber of
Dupities that Brazil owed its civilization to Africa because
it was the black who produced the nation's wealth and pro-
vided the leisure for the aristocracy to pursue the arts and to
govern. He thus indicated the tribute which should be paid
to the black in the formation of Brazil.

Expanding on that tribute, this essay has tried to suggest
the historical role of the blacks in Brazil. They constitute
a sizeable portion of the population; indeed, for most of Bra-
zil's history they formed the majority. Not surpirsingly, there-
fore, their skill, muscle, and blood shaped that nation. They
helped to explore, conquer, settle, and defend it. Together
with the Indians and Europeans, they helped to build the
social, economic, and political structures of the nation. In
general, the black made his contributions silently; he lived a
"hidden life:" he rests in an "unvisited tomb." Yet, without
him, Brazil could not have developed.

!3 Lucio de Mendonca, "Luis Gama," Revista da Academia Brasileira, Vol.
41, No. 135 (Jan., 1933), 336.

LI

Uv

LY

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume IX

June, 1970

Number 1

THE UNITED STATES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS:

OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

Published By

RECEIVED

DEC 11 197)

PERIODICALS Dtf! WENT

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE LIBRARY

CARROLLTON, GEORJIA

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE

A Division of the University System of Georgia

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

*?t*jbb^

ii!S

1/

^V-.

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume IX June, 1970 Number 1

THE UNITED STATES
AND WORLD AFFAIRS:

OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

Paul-Henri Spaak

The Crisis of the Atlantic Alliance 3

James Gidney

The Middle East: The Last Crusade 16

/. Chal Vinson

The Senate and Foreign Policy Since 1945:

Operational, Optional, or Obsolete? 30

Thomas A. Bryson

United States Involvement in Vietnam

A Survey of Conflicting Interpretations 40

Robert W. Sellen

Origins of the Cold War:

An Historigraphical Survey 57

FOREWORD

With the exception of the Spaak essay which was delivered at the
Parents Day address, May, 1968, the enclosed papers were delivered at
a conference, entitled "The U.S. and World Affairs: Old Myths and New
Realities," at West Georgia College, Saturday, May 9, 1970. Sponsored
by the West Georgia College Department of History and Division of
Education, the West Georgia Educational Development Program and
the Service Center for Teachers of History of the American Historical
Association, the sessions were designed to familiarize high school
teachers, interested college teachers and graduate students with some of
the complexities of American foreign policy in the Cold War Era. Two
of the papers were cast in a historiographical mold to demonstrate to
the teacher the important fact that history is, in the final analysis, a
dialogue and that no one is capable of writing the ultimate history. The
program was organized and directed by Dr. Thomas A. Bryson of the
Department of History.

Readers and contributors may be interested in knowing that this
journal is circulated free of charge upon request to institutions of higher
learning everywhere from the University of Washington to Yale Uni-
versity. Foreign requests include, among others, Central America and
Moscow. The regular distribution is to all institutions of higher learning
in Georgia; the five largest universities in each southern state; other
universities in the nation by request; about a hundred high schools in
Georgia (West Georgia area and the larger institutions). It is sold to in-
dividuals for $1.50.

Appreciation goes to Clyde D. Ware and his Sears Roebuck Founda-
tion for their continued financial and moral support. Of course, thanks
are due to the contributors, their audiences and all who worked with
this program. As in all joint works the authors' views are their own.

Eugene R. Huck, Editor
Studies in the Social Sciences

Copyright 1969

Division of Social Sciences

West Georgia College

Printed in the United States of America.

THE CRISIS OF THE
ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

BY PAUL-HENRI SPAAK*

In order to understand the nature of the crisis through which the
Atlantic Alliance is passing and in order to measure its importance, one
must return to the origins and remember how this Alliance was born,
what has been its evolution and what were its original objectives.

The Atlantic Alliance, at the end of the Second World War, was
not envisaged by the statesmen responsible for Western policy. Their
desire was to maintain their co-operation with the U.S.S.R. What they
sought, was to entrust to a World Organization the care of making and
maintaining peace. Within this organization, the Great Powers, through
the right of veto, had granted to themselves special powers which ob-
liged them to act in concert, since the opposition of any one of them
rendered impossible any decision.

The creation of the United Nations represented the crowning point
of the policy which led to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, to the Franco-Soviet
Treaty and to the Yalta Conference, where Anglo-Saxons and Soviets
reached an agreement concerning the shape of the world to come after
the Second World War. This policy was valid. Its success could have
ensured peace. If it failed, it was due to the Russians' fault.

It was very soon quite clear that Stalin did not want to collaborate
with the West. It was only circumstances which had led him to a rap-
prochement. In 1939, he had concluded with Hitler the pact which had
given to the latter the possibility of waging war against Poland. For two
years, he fulfilled his duties as an ally, supplying Germany, rejoicing in
her successes, dealing with her in order to obtain his share of Europe.
By following that policy, he was caught in his own trap and Hitler's at-
tack of U.S.S.R. in 1941 surprised him completely.

He was forced to join the Western democracies by the events and
not at all because of his own free will or because he felt solidarity with
them. From this alliance, which was but temporary for him, he was de-
termined to derive the maximum benefit. One can but say that he suc-
ceeded.

"Ministre d'Etat (Belgium) and Former Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO).

The U.S.S.R. was the only country which realized territorial con-
quests from the war, when the three Baltic states, a part of Poland, of
Finland, of Rumania, of Germany, came under Soviet domination.
Millions of men and women were obliged to live, against their will, un-
der Soviet laws. Stalin, not satisfied with these conquests, cleverly
pursued a policy of internal subversion and external pressure and suc-
ceeded in establishing in most of the Balkan countries, in Central and
East Europe, Communist governments under Russian influence. From
the Soviet viewpoint, these were incontestable successes. Soon, it ap-
peared that Stalin's ambitions went even further. In Iran, in Turkey, in
Greece, he attempted to make predominate his influence and, in the
United Nations using and abusing of his right of veto, he systematically
prevented the functioning of the organization and ruined all the hopes
which it had inspired. For several years, the leaders of the Western
world refused to accept the evidence. They clutched at their desire of
cooperation.

In 1947, after his visit to Europe, General George C. Marshall pro-
posed to all European countries, Communist included, that they meet
and prepare proposals to the United States in order to obtain the assis-
tance which could save them from distress.

Molotov, speaking for the Soviet Union, refused in terms so brutal
and so violent that Bevin and Bidault, at that time Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of Great Britain and France, understood that nothing further
could be expected in the way of collaboration with the U.S.S.R. They
took then the decision of organizing Europe and the Western world.

At the beginning of 1948, Bevin made, in the House of Commons, a
speech in which he described hjs disillusionment and expressed his
anxiety concerning the policy pursued by the U.S.S.R. He proposed,
in formal terms, a union of the countries of Western Europe and sug-
gested the possibility of an alliance with the United States. He was suc-
cessful, and one month after his speech, Great Britain, France, and the
Benelux countries (Holland, Belgium, and the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg) signed the Treaty of Brussels.

The same day, President Truman announced that the United States
would give its support to the alliance that had been created. The United
States abandoned its traditional policy and, in peace time, took com-
mitments to ensure her security and that of her allies. Isolationism and
the Monroe Doctrine had become obsolete. One year later, on April 4,
1949, the Treaty of Washington was signed. The Atlantic Alliance was

born together with a new concept of world policy for the democratic
countries.

* * *

What were the objectives of the signatories of the Treaty of Wash-
ington? In the first place, they wished to secure themselves against an
eventual aggression of the U.S.S.R. and to ensure the defense of Europe.
Secondly, and this is quite as important, they wanted to unite the forces
of the Free World so as to give them the possibility of defending, in com-
mon, certain forms of life and government. At that time, the Western
democracies were definitely conscious of the Communist peril. To-
gether, they wanted to resist it.

The first objective of the Treaty to organize the defense of Europe
and to halt in Europe the advance of Soviet power has been fully
achieved. This must be stressed and repeated. It is extremely rare to
see a diplomatic undertaking reach so completely its objective. Nobody
can contest that, since 1949, no country of Europe has been submitted
to the destiny of the countries of Central, Balkan, or Eastern Europe.
Peace has been secured on the European continent. The break-out of
war in Europe is, today, practically impossible and this, notwithstanding
the German problems which still demand a solution. Sheltered in this
peace, democratic Europe has accomplished an economic and social
development without precedent in its history. This is definitely "on the
credit side" of the Alliance.

This success allows me to assert firmly that it would be a grievous
fault to destroy or even to weaken a system which has been so successful.
This fault would become a folly when one cannot propose any substitute
policy! The Atlantic Alliance's destruction would only represent dis-
order and chaos for Europe.

And yet, notwithstanding this success, the Atlantic Alliance is living
in a crisis which could become extremely dangerous because Western
Europe, the United States and Canada no longer show the same 1949
solidarity.

During the first years of its life, the Atlantic Alliance exerted itself,
first of all to solve the military problems, obviously its most urgent task.
But very soon those who had the responsibility of the Alliance became
conscious of two truths: (1) that between allies, a common defense re-
quires also a common foreign policy; and (2) that it is difficult to be
allied in one area of the world and to be opposed in another. An alliance,
if not total, runs a serious risk of becoming void.

Already in 1955, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the fifteen mem-
bers of the Alliance after seven years' experience, judged it necessary
to determine precisely what the Alliance should be. For this object,
they appointed three of their members, Lange, Pearson, and Martino.
respectively Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Canada, and Italy,
and asked them to make a report on the non-military aspects of the co-
operation. This report was published in 1957, and in the NATO language,
it is called the "Report of the Three Wise Men." It is a very important
document, and its conclusions are definitely plain and clear.

They can be summed up as follows:

1. the policy of defense against eventual aggression must be
maintained. The changes which have taken place in the
U.S.S.R. since the death of Stalin do not allow a relaxa-
tion of the West's vigilance;

2. the Alliance can only be maintained if its members pur-
sue together a political and economic policy;

3. such a policy is only possible if, above and apart from the
fear of aggression which was at the origin of the Alli-
ance, the participants accept to group the sister nations
of the Atlantic and of Western Europe for ends other than
strictly defensive and this is particularly audacious to
put in common a part of their national sovereignty;

4. the development of such a community implies a per-
manent association of the free peoples of the North
Atlantic, attempting to reinforce their unity, to defend
and serve their common interests and civilization;

5. such a policy has for purpose to resist the threat which
communism, as a political doctrine, represents for the
world; and

6. finally, such a policy cannot be limited to a part of the
world only. It must be general.

In other words, the Atlantic Alliance, created in order to resist
an eventual Soviet agression, should tend to become, a little at a time,
a military, political and economic Atlantic Community. This report of
the Committee of Three was, in December, 1956, adopted unanimously
by the fifteen Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Alliance. At that time,
it showed a common opinion, a similar vision and a same ideal.

Ten years have gone by. We can but now seek to find out why this
ideal has not been reached and why, on the contrary, the cohesion, the

solidarity in the Alliance has diminished. I would like to examine three
causes, one at a time, and these are, in my opinion:

1. a man, General de Gaulle;

2. a mistake of the United States, its nuclear policy;

3. the weaknesses, the illusions and the complexes of Europe.

* * *

Looking at the first cause, it seems obvious that one cannot under-
stand the history of Europe and that of the Atlantic Alliance during
the recent years without taking into account the personality of General
de Gaulle. I really do not think that he is a great man. Very little will
remain of what he has done. Notwithstanding the role which he has
played, he is but an accident in the history of France. He is not the
continuation of anybody. He is not a man of days gone by. Contrary
to what his admirers say, he has no clear view of the future.

The essence of his thoughts is an out of date nationalism. Whilst
in the period which we live, only co-operation between countries can
solve the existing problems, General de Gaulle advocates the disen-
gagement of France. It is in herself alone, he reasons, that she must
find the forces which will allow her to adapt to the modern world. To
my point of view, this is absurd. An isolated France does not have the
possibilities of ensuring her security. This withdrawal gives no hope to
her for the development of her economy and social progress.

This fundamentally erroneous idea is still augmented by the per-
sonality of the General. He is haughty, proud, convinced of his intel-
lectual superiority, and, at the same time, is a man full of resentment,
never forgetting a failure or a lack of consideration. His feelings and
his reactions play an essential role in his policy. That is why what he
is, is more important than what he does. When one wants to understand
his actions, one must always keep in mind his psychology.

His nationalism has led him to a morbid anti-American feeling. He
can never forget or pardon the United States for the position it occu-
pies in the world and the role it plays. He is under the feeling that some-
thing has been stolen from his country and from himself which for
him, in any case, is the same thing because of his propensity to identify
himself with France.

He is a man who cannot admit that things can be decided without
him. He wants events to bear the hallmark of his personality. He was
out of power for some twelve years, which were very important in the

history of France, those of reconstruction and new options. General
de Gaulle does not want to accept this international equilibrium result-
ing from the Atlantic Alliance, nor the unity of Europe as it was con-
ceived while he lived in a resentful retreat at Colombey les Deux Eglises.

Since his return to power in 1958, he is bent on a re-shaping of the
world and pursues different or even contradictory policies, with his
sole object the assertion of his personality. In 1967, he left NATO, and
one is inclined to fear that in 1969 he will perhaps withdraw completely
from the Atlantic Alliance. He follows a policy of neutrality, although
ten years earlier he offered a triumvirate concept to have the Americans
and to the British join him conducting world affairs in the name of the
West. He has never forgiven the refusal and very rightly so because
the accepting of his proposal would have lead to the destruction of the
Atlantic Alliance. From that day his decision was taken. Since the Anglo-
Saxons refused to organize the world as he had proposed, he would
take his stand against them; against the United States within the Atlantic
Alliance, against Great Britain within the European Community.

His fixed ideas prevent him from seeing things as they are. He does
not understand the necessity of remaining the ally of the United States,
nor the necessity for the democratic countries to pursue a common
policy toward communism, nor the necessity for Europe of accepting
Great Britain in the European Community.

His neutralism alienates more and more all the natural and tradi-
tional allies of France. To their friendship he prefers that of certain
under-developed countries to whom, in any case, he is not in a position
to give efficacious assistance.

Fortunately, it seems that abroad and even in France, people are
more and more awakening to the actual situation. His legend, partly
justified by his actions in 1940 and by the fact that he probably managed
to avert for his country a civil war in 1958, is being dispelled.

As he becomes older, his faults become more and more visible. He
was long considered as a clever and astute diplomat, and this was true.
His haughtiness not to say arrogance his brutality, the equivocal
situations which he has created impressed his opponents and also his
partners, but it seems that he can no longer measure the real extent of
his forces.

In the interval of a few weeks in 1967, he committed two mistakes
which have made him lose, in France itself, a part of his authority.
His compatriots, even those which admire him, cannot understand the

position which he has adopted towards Israel and can even less approve
his extraordinary attitude in Canada.

His popularity is on the decline. That is a fact. And yet one cannot
base oneself too much on this element since de Gaulle is not the sort
of man who bends to the general will of the population. He is a man who
can live alone, and he has a bizarre attraction for unhappiness. His
strength of character and the conviction he has of his superiority find
an encouraging element in his solitude and even in the hostility he has
to meet. As long as he can, he will clutch to power. His last speeches
show that his satisfaction of his work increases in proportion with the
rising criticisms.

With this man, one can but stand fast, never yield and not permit the
irreparable. His rule cannot continue for long. Perhaps it will end be-
fore the most nefarious consequences of his policy mature.*

* * *

For the reason which I just listed, the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance
is essentially due to General de Gaulle. Does this mean that the policy
followed in relation with him was faultless? Alas! No. The impossibility
of the Atlantic Alliance to solve the problem of nuclear armament
has greatly incited the General in the pursuit of his own policy. He
cannot accept the idea that the most efficacious arms in an eventual
modern war, in the Western world, belong to the United States. The
fact that the British possess also some of these arms is far from improv-
ing the situation.

From his return to power in 1958, General de Gaulle made clear
his position on nuclear power. His argument is simple. It can be summed
up in a syllogism. A Great Power must possess atomic arms. France is
a Great Power. Consequently, she must have atomic arms. Against for
what is evidence for him, there is nothing to be done. Perhaps one
should try to understand him and attempt, when it was still time, to
find a solution. The refusal of the United States to assist him in build-
ing up his own force de frappe was one of the greatest subjects of dis-
satisfaction to the General and one of the essential elements of his
hostility towards the Atlantic Alliance. The General's atomic policy is

*Ed. note: Charles de Gaulle resigned from his Premiership on April 28, 1969,
as a result of the defeat of a referendum on local matters (provincial reorgani-
zation). The vote of no confidence obligated him to honor an earlier resignation
promise he had made.

10

not a wise one. It is expensive for France and does not reinforce the
West, but it is a fact which has to be taken into account.

During the 1960's, it was possible for the United States to give
some assistance to France in the building of her force de frappe and
take profit from the circumstances to reinforce common defense in the
Atlantic framework. For many reasons, lack of imagination and perhaps
also lack of confidence, the United States let escape both the time and
the occasions. The General sought to become independent. Personally.
I do not think that he succeeded and that his force de frappe is not
valid, but that is not his opinion. He considers that even weak as it is.
he can utilize it, so as to involve his allies in a nuclear war.

France's refusal to sign the Treaty of Moscow, her hostility towards
the treaty of non-proliferation, her refusal to participate within NATO
to any serious survey concerning atomic strategy, show the gap.

* * *

A third cause of the Atlantic crisis is the weaknesses, the com-
plexes and the illusions of Europe. In 1949, at the time of the signa-
ture of the Treaty of Washington, Europe had hardly emerged from the
immense difficulties caused by its reconstruction. Politically, she lived
in fear of Communism and Soviet agression. Under these circumstances.
Europe could not but accept with gratitude the assistance given by the
United States and, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the
so-called leadership of the U. S. A.

I would, on this matter, clearly define my position. It would be
ridiculous to say that the United States has not played a role of the very
first importance in the Atlantic Alliance. During many years, it has
assured practically all the defense of the West, through its atomic
monopoly and by the considerable amounts of money which it has given
or lent to the European countries to allow them to re-build their armies.
While admitting this fact, I owe to truth to say that in the framework of
the Alliance, the United States has never attempted to profit from this
position de force to impose a policy contrary to Europe's own ideas.

Concerning European problems such as the unification of Germany,
the status of Berlin, the organization of defense, and, more generally
speaking, those of relations with the Communist countries of the East,
there has never been any serious disagreement between the European
countries and the United States. The policy followed in these various
fields has been decided with all members in full agreement. It represent-
ed the common will. The United States has always agreed to discuss

11

subjects fully and loyally and has never tried to impose its views by
taking advantage of the fact that force was on its side. All discussions
concerning American leadership and the complaint made now seem to
me to be arbitrary and unfair.

By 1967, the psychological state of Europe had greatly changed. For
several years now, its economic prosperity is relatively stable. Social
progress in several countries has been considerable. Six among them,
united in the Common Market, have become conscious of their impor-
tance. At the same time, the policy of the U.S.S.R. appears as less dan-
gerous. Consequently, they support with more difficulty the so-called
American leadership.

Among the reasons I have touched upon, one must take into special
account the modifications of the Soviet policy in Europe. It is obvious
that this policy has ceased to be so aggressive. There can be no doubt
that for the time being the U.S.S.R. has renounced conquests in Europe.
It is also less interested than it was some twenty years ago in support-
ing subversive movements.

In my opinion, these positive modifications are due, to a consider-
able extent, to the existence itself of the Atlantic Alliance. Nobody can
foresee what Soviet policy would be if the Alliance disappeared. Such
a disappearance would cause political disorder, a loss of confidence,
possibilities of plottings and pressures. The stability which Europe has
enjoyed for some twenty-five years and of which it has so greatly bene-
fitted materially would be destroyed.

We must also ask ourselves if that policy of detente has given better
results than that of the cold war. To reply to this question we must re-
member how it came about and what it means for the Communists. The
origin and explanation of the "Cold War" are to be found in a speech
made by Khrushchev in January, 1960, at Moscow. The Soviet leader
observed with pride that never had the U.S.S.R. been so powerful
militarily. It posessed arms which gave it the possibility of destroying
all its enemies. He added, however, with humility that notwithstanding
this power, he could not guarantee to shelter his country and his people
from an attack or a retaliatory action of his opponents. It was perhaps
the first time in history that such a confession was made.

Khrushchev drew the logical consequences of this statement: Com-
munism cannot hope to establish itself in the world by force. It must
renounce this method. It must thus propose to the world a system of
peaceful co-existence. Peaceful co-existence is not a policy freely

12

chosen by the Communists; it is a policy which is imposed upon them be-
cause of the existence of atomic arms.

Khrushchev said: "the atomic bomb ignores the class struggle."
And yet the Soviet leader did not renounce his convictions and his am-
bitions. He continued to believe that Communism was a valid regime
for all the peoples of the world and that, finally, it would be imposed on
all. He simply admitted that it would not be done by war.

For him, peaceful co-existence is a struggle between the Communist
and the capitalist world in the political, economic, and cultural fields,
but not the military. Apart from all doctrinal discussions, peaceful co-
existence represented a hope welcomed by the Western world. Such a
policy, rare for the Communists, met the deep aspiration of the democ-
racies and the foundations of Western civilization.

Here resides the ambiguity of peaceful co-existence. It is, for the
Communists, the expression of a policy imposed by facts and for the
Western democracies, the application of their principles. Seven years
after Khrushchev's speech, one can draw up the balance sheet of this
new policy.

One thing is certain: peaceful co-existence has given the possibility
of an intensification of commercial and human relations between the
democratic and the Communist countries. The exchanges of goods as
well as the cultural exchanges have increased considerably. This is really
a very good thing. It is all the more a good thing that we have nothing
to fear from a comparison with the situation in the Communist coun-
tries. Not only is our standard of living much higher, but the way in
which we live is infinitely more agreeable and more attractive. Very
few people go over from the West to the East. Very numerous pass
from East to West, and still more of them would like to do so. The Wall
of Berlin is a proof. It is also a symbol.

But these results represent the limits of the positive elements of
the peaceful co-existence. In Europe, the Soviets have not reduced even
slightly their military efforts. They maintain the same number of divi-
sions in occupation of Eastern Europe. Politically, the U.S.S.R. and its
allies have not made the slightest concession concerning the German
problem.* On the contrary, more and more the Federal Republic be-

*Ed. note: In August, 1970, Willy Brandt, Chancellor of West Germany traveled
to Moscow to sign a treaty of non-aggression and friendship thus indicating a
fruitful result of the peaceful co-existence policy.

13

comes conciliatory, more and more of the Communist countries Ru-
mania excepted and perhaps Czechoslovakia show greater suspicion
and hostility.

In the rest of the world, one can but say that Soviet policy is not so
bad or as aggressive as could have been feared. In Vietnam, in the Mid-
dle East, and in Africa it is unlikely that it could have been more harm-
ful. Although their activities are far from being favorable to Western
interests, it must be admitted that they are exercised with a certain
moderation.

But this is due to a second fact which cannot leave the Soviets in-
different. It is the dangerous hostility manifested against them by Red
China. The atomic bomb has led the Soviets to renounce any form of
armed aggression against the West. Chinese policy might lead the Rus-
sians to request one day the assistance of the West. They know it and
reserve this possibility.

These are the realities that the Europeans, in their prosperity and
in their joy of finding themselves less directly threatened than twenty
years ago, do not evaluate exactly. It is also certain, on the other hand,
that the Americans have to meet a very difficult situation. The policy
they pursued since 1948 and which was logical, after their participation
in the Second World War, is extremely expensive for them. It demands
also an extraordinary continuity of their effort. The United States now
possesses a power never equalled in the history of the world. Its respon-
sibilities are greater than those assumed by France or Great Britain at
the time when they were at the top of their power. In 1939, the United
States followed a policy of isolationism. In 1967, it became, by force of
circumstances, the policeman of the world against Communist sub-
version. The Americans have completely succeeded in Western Europe.
The Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Alliance have sheltered this part
of the continent. But the struggle is much more difficult in the rest of
the world. The distress of the populations, the weakness of the govern-
ments and, in too many cases, the corruption of the leaders complicate
terribly their task.

To those Europeans who criticize American leadership, there is but
one reply. This leadership is the result of their own weakness. Within
the Atlantic Alliance, the Europeans could be valid partners for the
United States if they joined their forces, if they succeeded in making a

14

united Europe, unanimous in the expression of its ideas and ready to
take its responsibilities in the world.

Certainly, they have made an attempt to make a united Europe.
They have made certain progress but have not managed to reach the
decisive stages. This united Europe was desired by the Americans. They
did everything in their power to assist in its realization. No reproach
can be made to them at this point of view.

The Western world which united in 1949 would be terribly mistaken
if it relaxed its bonds of solidarity. This solidarity is more necessary
than ever and its expression the Atlantic Alliance must be main-
tained in the spirit in which it was created. But it should, also, enlarge
its action. It is no longer sufficient to reach an agreement on the settle-
ment of European problems. An agreement must also be reached con-
cerning the other problems. It is impossible to divide the world into
compartments, to do what is necessary in one of them and to take no
further interest in what is happening in the others.

At the same time, the Atlantic Alliance may not confine itself ex-
clusively to military preoccupations. Our security, certainly, must re-
main its main objective, but the Alliance must also prove that it could
be in Europe an important factor of the East-West rapproachement.
Far from being a cause of war, the great alliances are factors of equilib-
rium which must lead to negotiations on progressive disarmament and
to a closer political understanding between states and different forms
of government. Such are the tasks, suitable to today's necessities, for
which the Atlantic Alliance should strive.

* * *

These are the considerations the crisis of the Atlantic Alliance sug-
gests to me.

When I speak of these problems, I am undoubtedly not quite impar-
tial and objective. I realize that I am defending a policy to which I have
collaborated during a quarter of a century. I know perfectly well that
the situation is no longer exactly the same as it was just after the Second
World War, but I cannot understand why fundamental changes are nec-
essary nor what organization or system could be set up in its place. On
the contrary, the more I think about it, the more I believe that the Al-
liance remains valid and that the only thing that can be done is to pursue
its activities and to develop them with all their consequences.

I remain deeply convinced that there exist nowadays two essential
problems linked together: the Atlantic and the European problems. The

15

defense of Western civilization is deeply impregnated by Christianity,
based on the respect of human dignity and the love of freedom, of which
democracy is the political expression. This society, this mode of living,
this civilization are threatened by the totalitarian spirit which appears
as well in the dictatorships of the right as in those of the left.

This defense implies the alliance of all those who live the same sort
of life, and are inspired by the same principles. The framework of this
essential solidarity is the Atlantic Alliance. It implies a united Europe
which, alone, can be a real partner for the United States. It implies for
this united Europe the will to play again a role at a world scale, sharing
its part of responsibilities, while rejecting any kind of selfishness.

It also implies for the United States an effort which is quite as great.
It must not be blinded because of its present power, and it must realize
that, in the long run, alone, they are as incapable as a divided Europe,
to solve the problems. Perhaps only a little more time will be necessary
to make these facts clear.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the present time, the misunder-
standings, the reciprocal criticisms, the situation is not desperate. The
crisis of the Atlantic Alliance can be overcome in two phases.

One, which is immediate, is a short term program which can cope
with France's defection, comprising a certain number of precise objec-
tives such as European security, partial disarmament, and a common
policy towards the U.S.S.R. and the Communist countries of the East.
The other, at a much longer term, would include the definition of a
world equilibrium, the sharing-out of the tasks between the United
States and a united Europe and a common effort to meet the claims of
the underdeveloped countries.

The effort to be made is considerable. It is not impossible, but there
is no time to lose. We want audacious political leaders. They must have
a great ideal extending farther than the national framework and leading
to a general conception of the world. In a democratic regime, people
have the leaders they deserve. This implies for each of us the conscience
of our duties as the will to fulfill them.

We live in a difficult period. We are perhaps at a very decisive time
in the history of mankind. We must be aware of that. Each one of us
must contribute to the solutions which have to be reached. It is our
future, the future of our civilization, which is in the balance.

16

THE MIDDLE EAST:
THE LAST CRUSADE

BY JAMES GIDNEY*

Since the title theme contrasts old myths and new realities, we may
as well start with the myth not entirely mythical that spared us during
much of our national life from the obligation to concern ourselves with
the kind of problem now concerning us. I refer of course to the myth
that the sun never set on the British empire. Reliance on the British to
maintain order over a large part of the earth, one of the greatest pro-
tections of our young and rapidly growing republic, has now failed us.
Perhaps one of the results of that failure is that we can no longer so
easily regard ourselves as an exceptionally moral nation, almost provi-
dentially chosen to show others the way. Today we are no longer exempt
from the pains of unsatisfactory political choices that are the lot of a
great power. The present crisis in the Middle East is a good example of
our legacy from the British Empire. Seen from today's perspective,
the most striking thing about our policy in that area is that, until World
War I, we had none.

If we define the Middle East as the Arabic-speaking portions of Asia
plus Egypt, Turkey, and Iran it is clear that the two Moslem but non-
Arabic-speaking countries are not critical areas for the United States
at this time. With Turkey and Iran the United States maintains diplo-
matic and commercial relations which are normal and generally friend-
ly. Occasionally, as in Iran's efforts to nationalize the foreign oil com-
panies or in Turkey's conflict with Greece over Cyprus, relations may
become strained, even hostile, but such episodes have been brief. In
the main, the United States has been supportive rather than antagonistic
toward these states. Turkey has been a valuable ally in the Cold War.
while successive administrations have regarded a stable, moderately
progressive government in Iran as desirable in containing the spread of
Communism.

Turkey and Iran then hardly justify special treatment. We are left,
then, with the remainder of the area I have defined. In other words, the
"Middle East" is just what you thought it was Israel and the Arabs.

Associate Professor of History, Kent State University. Kent. Ohio.

17

The behavior of the United States toward the Israeli-Arab quarrel
has been frequently criticized, but the quarrel itself was none of our
making. A series of developments had rendered it virtually insoluble
by the time of United States involvement. Paramount among them were
the simultaneous rise of political Zionism and Arab nationalism. Had
only one of these movements achieved its objective, the other would
have been one of history's smaller footnotes and whatever the state of
the Middle East today, the present conflict would be no part of it. Con-
flict has arisen from the astonishing success which created in a single
generation a cluster of self-governing Arab states around a self-govern-
ing Jewish state.

That the two movements would grow and clash was rendered more
probable by the diplomatic pronouncements and agreements during
the first World War that earned for Palestine the title of "the over-
promised land." Within two years the British government had divided
all of the Arabic-speaking lands north of the peninsula with France in
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, promised all of them except southern Iraq
to the Arabs in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and awarded
the already twice-promised Palestine to the Jews as a "national home"
in the Balfour Declaration. 1

These were wartime promises and may not have meant much to
those who made them. In diplomacy saying things does not make them
so. Nonetheless, if the saying is official and emanates from the winning
side, it becomes one of the coefficients of future decisions. The British
declarations reenforced the determination of both Jews and Arabs to
have Palestine by assuring each side that it had a strong legal and moral
claim to the country. This surely increased the probability that two
bodies were going to try to occupy the same space.

By the Treaty of Sevres and by acts of the League of Nations the
Arab lands of the Fertile Crescent were divided into mandated terri-
tories, close to the lines of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Great Britain
received Iraq and Palestine; France received Syria and Lebanon. The
national home was recognized in the award of the Palestine mandate by
the League of Nations, which imposed on the mandatory the duty of

1 Sykes-Picot Agreement in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle
East: A Documentary Record, 2 vols. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company,
Inc., 1956), II, 18-22; Hussein-McMahon correspondence, ibid., 13-17; Balfour
Declaration, ibid., 26.

18

fostering it and authorized the creation of a Jewish agency to be respon-
sible for relations with the mandatory. 2

None of this was the doing of Americans nor was the Middle East of
much concern to our people. The King-Crane Commission, which
President Wilson sent to the area in 1919, recommended a curtailment
of the Zionist program, 3 but it is not known yet whether Wilson ever
read its report. It certainly had no effect on American policy.

Opposition to Jewish immigration appeared early among the Arabs
indeed had already appeared at the time of the King-Crane visit and
some clashes took place. However, it did not appear in the 1920's that
co-existence of the two peoples was impossible. During that decade
immigration did not exceed the absorptive capacity of the country. 4
Moreover the Arabs were reassured by statements such as that of Win-
ston Churchill in 1922 that His Majesty's Government had no intention
of making Palestine a wholly Jewish country. 5

The persecution of the Jews under Nazi Germany made some show-
down inevitable. A gentle flow of immigration became a flood. The
Jewish population of Palestine increased by 452 per cent from 1922 to
1940; the total population increased only 128 per cent. 6 In a country
the size of Massachusetts the time would come when there would not
be room for all. To the Zionists this was perhaps no insoluble problem,
for they had believed all along that most of the Arabs had to go. But
the Arabs could hardly be expected to see it that way.

Someone had to say it would not work. In 1937 the Peel Commission
said publicly for the first time that the promises made to Jews and

2 Ibid., 107-11.

3 U. S. Department of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States: Paris Peace Conference 1919, 13 vols. (Washington: Government
Printing Office) Xll, 792-95.

4 Population figures for Palestine under the mandate in John H. Davis, The
Elusive Peace (London: John Murray, 1968), p. 23.

5 Ibid., p. 22.

6 Ibid., p. 23.

19

Arabs were irreconcilable and that the only way out of the difficulty
was to divide the country between them. 7

The British government, fearful of approaching war and eager to
keep the Middle East calm, reacted with the White Paper of 1939, which
stated that the British objective was the creation of a Palestinian state
in ten years. In that interval the country was to become gradually self-
governing. Immigration would be limited to 75,000 for the first five years
and none without Arab permission after that. Moreover, further ac-
quisition of land by Jews was to be restricted. The result of this policy
would be a country two-thirds Arab when it became self-governing in
ten years' time. The British government did not pretend ignorance of
what it was doing. The White Paper stated bluntly: "His Majesty's Gov-
ernment now declares unequivocally that it is not part of their policy
that Palestine should become part of a Jewish state." 8

The White Paper was a crushing blow to the Zionists. To the Arabs
it should have been victory, for a two-thirds majority was enough to
control the state in any case in which the two peoples disagreed. Yet,
inspired by the leadership of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, the Arabs
spurned the opportunity and rejected the White Paper on principle.
They never got another such chance.

While the plight of European Jewry in the 1930's caused an emo-
tional involvement with Zionism on the part of large numbers of Ameri-
can Jews not felt before, the United States was not officially implicated.
An overt step was taken in 1942 when the American Zionist Organiza-
tion sponsored a conference at New York's Biltmore Hotel, which
brought six hundred Zionists. They called for vesting control of im-
migration into Palestine in the Jewish Agency and the conversion of
Palestine into a Jewish state. 9 While the Biltmore Resolution did not
make the United States a party to the Palestine dispute, it transferred
leadership of the international Zionist movement to America. Zionists,
like other lobby groups, would put pressure on our government and
they do it better than most.

7 Great Britain: Palestine Royal Commission, Report, Cmd. 5479 (London:
H. M. Stationery Office, 1937).

8 Great Britain: Statement of Policy , Cmd. 6019 (H. M. Stationery Office, 1939).

9 Hurewitz, II, 234-35.

20

Admitted that as the Zionists put the case before the American
public there was little concern for the welfare or opinions of those "non-
Jewish populations" of Palestine whose rights had supposedly been safe-
guarded in the Balfour Declaration. But when World War II ended,
there was little opportunity to worry about the Arabs. The remnants of
Europe's Jewry wanted to in most cases, had to leave Europe. There
was no open door for them in the United States, Great Britain. France.
Australia, or in Brazil. In short, no one who could say "no" said "yes."
But the Arabs were not a self-governing people, so the world, led by the
United States, said "yes" for them. Americans, despite the increasing
secularism of the age, still found it easy to identify Jews with Palestine.

I am speaking now of popular opinion, not of official policy, but
popular opinion of such intensity can hardly fail to get into partisan
politics. Between 1945 and 1948 major parties in the United States vied
with one another in expressing devotion to Zionism. This provoked dis-
gust and anger among those in Great Britain charged with responsi-
bility for the mandate, yet the British agreed in 1946 to the appointment
of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. The commission's recom-
mendations were somewhat more favorable to the Jews than the White
Paper had been. 10 The British, however, would not attempt to put
them into effect without the help of the United States, which they could
not get. What they got instead was a demand by President Truman on
October 4, 1946 (Yom Kippur) for the immediate admission of 100.000
Jews into Palestine, 11 a figure that was later matched by Governor
Thomas Dewey who wanted to be president. 12

Palestine was of course still a British charge. We bore no responsi-
bility for a permanent solution or even for temporary maintenance of
order. In 1947, however, this relatively happy state of affairs came to
an end. That was the year the British began shedding global responsi-
bilities. The Indian subcontinent was turned over to India and Pakistan
and the protection of Greece and Turkey against the Soviet menace
was handed to the United States. On April 2 the British government
asked that the future of Palestine be placed on the agenda of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations and that a special committee should
study the question and prepare recommendations for the fall meeting.

10 Ibid., 264-66.

11 New York Times, Oct. 4, 1946. pp. 1,2.

12 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1946, pp. 1,5.

21

At the end of August the U.N. Special Committee recommended
that the mandate be terminated as soon as possible. The British agreed
to end it by August 1, 1948 and later moved the date up to May 15, 1948.
The committee's majority asked for partition of the country into a Jew-
ish state and an Arab state with a U.N. trusteeship for Holy Places. The
British were to remain for two years to supervise the transition. 13

Perhaps there was merit in the proposal but how was it to be carried
out? The British refused to put into effect any proposal which was not
acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. There could be no such proposal.
Between a non-negotiable Arab Palestine in which Jewish immigrants
would be welcome only as a minority and a non-negotiable Palestine
"as Jewish as England is English," the talents of Henry Clay himself
could not have found an accommodation in 1947, nor can they find one
now.

The Zionists, however, were willing to accept the partition plan as
at least a step in the direction of their objectives; the Arabs, standing
firmly on the principle of self-determination of nations, were not. 14
Intense efforts were made to influence votes at the U.N. on this, I am
persuaded, much of the story is still untold. On November 29, 1947 the
majority resolution was voted on favorably by 33-13 with ten abstentions.
The United States and the Soviet Union voted with the majority; Great
Britain abstained.

The result was a victory for Zionism and in a sense for the United
States. Yet an analysis of the vote suggests trouble ahead. Outside of
the European-American world only Liberia and the Philippines voted
for partition. Voting against were twelve Arab and Asian nations and
Cuba. The British were joined in abstention by Ethiopia, Yugoslavia,
Chiang-Kai-shek's China and six Latin American nations. It ought to
have been evident then, as it certainly is now, that while the western
community thought of the Jewish state as a triumph of liberal, humani-
tarian ideals, the non-western communities thought of it as the last
writhing of the imperialist dragon.

However, the resolution had clearly carried. The British prepared
to leave Palestine. Their withdrawal led to two small wars, the first,
ending in May, 1948, between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, the second

13 Ibid., Sep. 1, 1947, pp. 1-3.

14 Ibid.

22

between Israel and the neighboring Arab states. During these conflicts
many Arabs left Israel willingly, say the Israelis; forced out, say the
Arabs. Israel was left in control not only of the territory assigned to it
by the U.N. resolution, but of West Galilee, assigned by the U.N. to the
Arabs, as well. But perhaps the greatest triumph of Zionism came on
May 14, 1948, when the American president recognized the existence of
the newly declared state of Israel, confounding everyone at the U.N.,
including the American ambassador who was still working for the ma-
jority resolution which the United States and thirty-two other nations
had voted for the preceding November.

By this time who could doubt that the United States was involved
in the fate of the Jews in Palestine? But we were involved on the other
side as well, not only because we must have known, although we never
admitted it, that we were in part responsible for the Arab refugees,
but because American oil companies had begun moving into the Middle
East. Our allies needed the oil and the mideast was a convenient source.
Without necessarily being opposed to the Jews, the oil companies had u
vital stake in friendship with the Arabs.

All might have still been well for the United States if the Arabs had
accepted their defeat. While some Zionists would never had been satis-
fied with anything less than all of Palestine and some not even with
that it is at least possible that, had partition been accepted, the bulk of
the Israeli population would have been grateful for the creation of a
Jewish state and made the best of it while the Arabs' antagonism could
have been gradually softened in various ways, not least by the foreign
aid for which President Truman asked Congress early in the next year.

But the Arabs never accepted defeat nor the existence of Israel.
Those who had been exiled harassed the new state by raids over its
borders. The Arab states imposed a boycott, bringing pressure on Arab
firms to do no business with foreigners who traded with Israel. Naturally
there were numerous violent incidents resulting in death and injury
on both sides. The Arabs' resentment against the United States did not
disappear it probably increased. We gave as much foreign aid to two-
million Israelis as to thirty-million Arabs, while American press coverage
was heavily weighted on the Israeli side.

There were some who thought our policy might become more im-
partial with the inauguration of a Republican president in 1953. How-
ever, the efforts of Secretary John Foster Dulles in that direction were
rather unproductive until 1956 when they became spectacularly counter-

23

productive, moving the Egyptians to buy arms from the Communist
bloc and to seize the Suez Canal from its foreign owners.

Dulles partially redeemed his failure by his insistence that Great
Britain, France, and Israel give up their armed attack on Egypt in Oc-
tober. Most significantly, he did this just before the presidential elec-
tion in which the Republican administration was returned to office by
a larger margin than it had enjoyed in 1952. The election returns did not
mean that the American people were pro-Arab; they probably did mean
that although a majority continued to sympathize with Israel, it had no
intention on being plunged into another world war on Israel's behalf.

There seemed therefore to exist, as President Eisenhower started
his second term, a real opportunity to make another try. While far from
giving up on Israel, the United States had shown that it was not totally
committed to Israel nor totally antagonistic toward the Arabs. We were
the only signatory of the Tri-partite Pact of 1950 15 to honor it. The
others had intervened to violate it. Could we not, taking advantage of
our momentarily altered image in the eyes of the Arabs, embark on a
program of aid and friendship to them while attempting to bring them to
accept the existence of Israel and live at peace with their new neighbors?

In retrospect we can see that there was no such chance. We had
waited too long and Secretary Dulles had bungled too monstrously. The
chief oeneficiary of 1956 was the Soviet Union. Pushing southward
since the time of Peter the Great, thrown back from the Turkish Straits,
which they thought they had finally won by the Constantinople Agree-
ment of 1915, 16 the Russian Empire and its successor state had never
abandoned the hope of reaching the Mediterranean and the Persian
Gulf. In 1956 it saw a chance to realize its old ambition by vaulting over
Turkey and Iran and gaining the seas by supporting the Arabs.

The Suez invasion did not settle anything between Israel an^ her
neighbors. They returned to the kind of uneasy peace which had pre-
vailed before the crisis and there things remained until 1967 when
Egypt threatened to interrupt the passage of Israeli ships through the
Straits of Tiran. The Suez Canal had been closed to Israel since 1956;
hence the Straits represented their only outlet to the Indian Ocean. This,
more than anything else, appears to have touched off the brief war that

15 Hurewitz, II, 308-9.

16 Ibid., pp. 7-11.

24

erupted early in June, 1967. The third trial at arms resulted in a quick,
overwhelming victory for the Israelis. When it was over they were in
control of all of Palestine. Partition had been ended by conquest of the
entire country. Moreover, Israel occupied Egypt's Sinai Peninsula to
the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights in Syria.

The outcome of their Blitzkrieg was far more sweeping than the
victory of 1948 but paradoxically, not more conclusive. The very one-
sidedness of the clash finally brought home to the Palestinian Arabs the
futility of waiting for salvation from the Arab states. Far from sinking
into apathy and despair, they found a new life in relying chiefly upon
themselves. At the same time the Israelis felt that at last their Arab
neighbors must realize they were beaten and had no choice but to come
to terms. Instead, Israel was harassed by stepped-up guerrilla warfare.
Although this warfare is incapable of seriously damaging Israel in the
near future, it can and does make life endlessly miserable. Nor is there
any suggestion that the Arabs are moving closer to conceding anything.
The Israeli victory, far from bringing peace, has only involved Israel
again in the hardest kind of war.

Moreover, Israel has slipped somewhat in world opinion. 17 Some
of the change must be ascribed to improved Arab public relations. There
was a time when all the propaganda was on the Israeli side. From the
Arabs we got only threats to "drive the Jews into the sea." Most Ameri-
cans have not lived among Arabs and do not know how to discount
their exuberant rhetoric. Nonetheless, it still remains incomprehensible
to me that the Arab leaders could not anticipate the effect this would
have on a western generation which will never get over its guilt for the
destruction of Europe's Jews. Today, with slogans like "We want to go
home" and with assurances that Palestine can be home for all its people,
including Jews, 18 the Palestinians are getting the world's ear and many
people who have supported Israel are beginning to show sympathy for
the refugees. Increasingly, Jewish voices are being raised against some
of Israel's policies, including one eloquent one in the Knesset. 19 As
the third anniversary of the Six-day War approaches, Israel is still far

17 The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 23, 1970, p. 5.

18 Ibid., Max. 10, 1970, p. 1.

19 Uri Avnery, editor-in-chief of Ha'olam Hazeh and author of books and arti-
cles published in the west.

25

more powerful than its neighbors, yet does it not seem that, as compared
to three years ago, the Arabs' situation is more hopeful, the Israelis'
more worrisome?

What does this mean for American foreign policy? Obviously we
are not suffering as the participants are, but we seem almost as frus-
trated. We have been fortunate in our dealings with other nations. Our
history has given us a taste for quick solutions and an assumption that
we can get them. It has also bred in us a conviction that we live on a
higher plane than the rest of the world, that when we participate in its
ruckuses, it is either to defend a clearcut and obviously reasonable
American position or to straighten things out for somebody some-
times for everybody and then go home. If people are so stubborn and
benighted as not to accept our ministrations as the answer to their prob-
lems, we hear demands that unless we are prepared to blast somebody
or something into oblivion, we should "pull out." The frequency of this
demand in our interventions in Korea and Vietnam suggests that we
would be urged to pull out of the Middle East but for our deeper emo-
tional involvements there.

Apparently we can not pull out. But no more can we persuade or
compel the parties to the conflict to become reconciled. We still look,
it seems to me, for some kind of "solution" that just has to be there.
What I am arguing is that it just is not there.*

We cannot persuade the parties to make peace because neither side
wants to give up the struggle, and neither feels obliged to. Israel has
been hurt by the hostility of its Arab neighbors and by that of the Soviet
Union. It has been hurt, although not much, by the attacks of the guer-
rillas and saboteurs. Continued fighting and continued armed isolation
will hurt more. Today the state spends twenty-one per cent of its gross
national product on defense. 20 At the same time, our government and
the American Zionists seem still willing to pay the bills. Militarily, in-
juries inflicted on Israel's people by Arabs have been fewer in number
than those caused by automobile accidents. 21 Psychologically, the

*Ed. note: At press time (August, 1970) U. N. Mediator Gunnar Jarring was be-
ginning his meetings with representatives of both sides (exclusive of guerrillas)
in New York City following what has become known as the United States Peace
Plan, the elements of which have been endorsed by most interested nations.

20 Don Peretz, "Israel's 1969 Election Issues: The Visible and the Invisible" in
The Middle East Journal, XXIV, no. 1 (Winter, 1970), 42.

21

Ibid.

26

damage may be greater but there are psychological gains, too, in stand-
ing up to danger together. Israel is neither obliged to nor disposed to
give up.

Neither are the Arabs. Granting that their actions have so far been
relatively ineffective, there are indications that they are getting better.
The Israeli military budget testifies that they are not to be as lightly
dismissed as some official pronouncements might have led us to believe,
and indeed we do not seem to be hearing so many of those pronounce-
ments. At least one report says that in recent fighting in the Golan
Heights the Syrian troops performed notably better than" in the past. 22
Moreover, the Arabs do not have to be as good as the Israelis. A writer
in The New Statesman, strongly pro-Israel, made the point recently that
Israel can not afford to lose a battle, while the Arabs can afford to lose
another war. 23 They are getting more sympathy overseas than at any
time since 1948, they are well backed financially, and their morale ap-
pears to be high. There is no reason why they should give up.

If neither side will give up, what are the chances they may come to
some agreement? We hear frequent hints that some kind of peace talks
are in the offing. It may even be true that positions are softening among
some people but are they the people who can make peace? Nasser
may be willing to come to terms but the guerrillas are not and it is by
no means sure that Nasser could stay in power if he did. The point is
clearer in the case of King Hussein. It is quite evident he wants to come
to terms with Israel, but the guerrillas have exposed the weakness of
his position by preventing an American assistant secretary of state from
visiting his capital. 24

On the Israeli side, some may want to let Nahum Goldmann, Presi-
dent of the World Jewish Congress, talk to Nasser but the government

22

The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 4-6, 1970, pp. 1,3.

23 Paul Johnson, "Israel: The Militant Peacemaker," reprinted in Middle East
Information Series, no. 10 (Oct., 1969), p. 26. Curiously, this view is echoed by
an official of Israel's Mapai Party, Hannah Zemer, according to Jean-Francis
Held of Le Nouvel Observoteur, who quotes her as saying: "We know we can't
really win a war with the Arabs. We can only win battles and more battles. How
long?" Eric Rouleau, Jean-Francis Held. Jean et Simone Lacouture. Israel et
les Arabes (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1967), p. 52.

24 The Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 20, 1970, p. 3: Apr. 23. 1970. p. 5.

27

does not. 25 Students may be less reverent toward Moshe Dayan than
they used to be 26 but Dayan has not changed. If anything, he is more
bellicose than before, threatening that Israel may attack Russian pilots
if they venture into the canal zone. 27 Israel's elections of 1969, which
weakened the left and gave additional seats in the Knesset to the Gahal
and Mizrachi Parties, seem indeed to have strengthened the hawks. 28

Peace induced or imposed by outsiders seems equally remote. There
is no slackening in the conviction in some American quarters that the
United States must sustain Israel to final triumph. Surely the United
States has no intention of abandoning Israel, but it is more likely to see
its obligation as not letting Israel lose than as helping it to win. The
policy is defensive and must be, for if Israel approaches the point of re-
ducing the Arabs to total helplessness, the Soviet Union may feel ob-
liged to intervene actively. We would then have to come in on the Israeli
side with results that need little specification. Hence, the only sensible
policy is to see that the Soviet Union is pushed to no* such decision.

The Arabs, on the other hand, cannot count on prevailing through
the help of the Soviet Union, which is deterred by us as we are by them.
Since neither of the great powers dares go so far as to provoke active
military intervention by the other, both, whatever they say, are commit-
ted to the status quo.

My rueful conclusion is that this conflict will continue for a con-
siderable time into the future and that there is little, if anything, anyone
can do to change it for the better. The role of diplomacy is to make sure
it gets no worse. The American people are going to have to do what
earlier great powers have done to live with an unhappy, even tragic
situation for which there is no visible remedy. The Roman defense of
the Danube is a case in point; the British defense of the Khyber Pass
is another. In neither case was there any policy of victory in the Ameri-
can sense, but a mere grubby maintenance of the status quo.

These are actions at which Americans have not excelled unless we
were clearly at a disadvantage, as in the defense of small frontier settle-
ments against hostile Indians. Since we became a great power we have

25 Ibid., Apr. 9, 1970, p. 2; Apr. 11, 1970, p. 2.

26 Ibid., Apr. 9, 1970, p. 2.

27 Ibid., Apr. 17, 1970, p. 3.

28 Peretz, esp. pp. 34-35.

28

not resorted to such a policy except in Korea and, I suppose, in Vietnam,
and in each of these cases, at the cost of deep and passionate divisions
among our people. We have failed in the British techniques not because
we are incapable of mastering them but because we do not respect them.
We lack tolerance for a conflict that can not be clearly decided.

It is my contention that in Palestine we must learn such tolerance.
Watchful and patient waiting while the suffering goes on is painful, but
an attempt to precipitate a decision can be much more painful.

I would therefore urge Americans to adjust to the facts of the Mid-
dle East. They might begin by recognizing that the conflict is not the
result of misunderstanding which could be settled by dialogue. It is not
even in the usual sense a conflict of interest which could be settled by
splitting the difference. It is a struggle engaging the deepest aspirations
of both sides for a home, for a community, for a place on the surface of
the earth.

Our role is to stand by watchfully until such time as we may find it
possible to be helpful. The chance of being helpful when the time comes
will be better if we have been as impartial as possible in the meanwhile.
Some tension between ourselves and the Arabs is unavoidable. The
United States identifies Zionism as an active and powerful element in
its own society and Communism as a powerful foreign enemy. Arabs
identify Zionism as the chief threat to their own society and Commu-
nism as a powerful foreign friend. Moreover, by welcoming the intru-
sion of the Soviet Union, the Arabs have in effect taken sides in the
cold war.

Our policy therefore can hardly be expected to be totally impartial.
But if it is to avoid complete futility or deadly danger it must make more
of an effort than it has to be fair. People who have to submit their per-
formances to popular referendum at regular intervals will find it easier
to be fair as the public becomes more so.

It would help also if Americans could insist that the chief function
of American diplomacy is to protect the interests of the United States.
In the absence of an international community with enforceable law this
must continue to be not only the right but the duty of a national govern-
ment. The interests of the United States certainly include friendship
with the Arabs. I hesitate to appear as an advocate of our oil companies,
but there has to be something wrong with our nation when our people
are quite willing to offend the Canadians, our closest friends, because of
a supposed need for oil from Alaska, but find it somehow immoral to be

29

concerned with defending the American oil business in the part of the
world where it is most productive.

Nor are the Arabs important internationally solely because of oil.
They represent an overwhelming majority of the population on the
eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. They have the sym-
pathy of millions of Moslems and of ex-colonial people and they have
stimulated interest in both China and the Soviet Union. Yet much of
our population is not only unwilling to try to win Arab friendship for
the west but throws a tantrum when the French try to do it.

Above all, we should be careful that the balance of power is not too
drastically altered. This may be the hardest of all for Americans who
have regarded the balance of power as a very base ideal. (I have myself.)
Nonetheless, until the parties to the dispute can bring it to an end, a
balance of power is essential to avoid turning the struggle into a third
world war.

Could the United States stand by and allow Israel to be overwhelm-
ed? I very much doubt it. The pressure for intervention by the Zionists,
backed by much non-Jewish opinion, would be very strong. Equally
strong would be the feeling that the United States was being humiliated
and that its international standing would be badly damaged by what
would be interpreted as a Soviet victory.

On the other hand, how many more blows can the Soviet Union ex-
pect its clients to endure? How many more lightning wars, how many
more air raids on Cairo, how many more invasions of Lebanon? As the
balance shifts bit by bit in favor of Israel, will not the Soviet Union, bit
by bit, increase its aid to the Arabs? What is ultimately the only aid that
is of any use is all-out military intervention? Should it not be a vital ob-
jective of American diplomacy to see that it does not come to that? And
in our present anarchistic world order, what way is there to that objec-
tive other than the maintenance of a balance of power?

So, the United States can look for no solution in the Middle East as
a result of Arab-Israeli negotiations, with or without our permission,
nor can we achieve anything important by compulsion, nor can we say
"a plague on both your houses" and retreat into isolation. Our money
will not settle things, nor will our power, our democracy, nor our hu-
manity. We must worry along with a very large measure of imperfec-
tion. Let us remain alert that the situation does not become worse, let
us be deeply concerned for all the values involved, even more con-
cerned for all the people involved, let us strive without stint to bind up
their wounds whenever we can but please, no more crusades!

30

THE SENATE AND FOREIGN

POLICY SINCE 1945:

OPERATIONAL, OPTIONAL, OR OBSOLETE?

BY J. CHAL VINSON*

Evidently there is little agreement as to the role Congress has
played in formulating foreign policy since World War II. Diplomatic
historian Julius Pratt heads a section on this topic in his textbook with
a title that speaks of the greatly expanded authority of Congress since
1945. Historian and journalist Merlo Pusey devotes a recent book, The
Way We Go to War to the way in which congressional authority has de-
clined in that same period. A news commentator asserted earlier this
year that "there is growing evidence" that the Senate "is an anachronism
and has outlived its usefulness. ... It is nothing more than an obstruc-
tion to the smooth operation of modern government." Of course Con-
gress has always had critics. A generation ago Will Rogers remarked that
when he ran out of material for his humorous writings he just bought a
newspaper and read about what Congress was doing. Not only has there
been much criticism, but it has varied greatly from decade to decade.

In part this is true because Americans are generally impatient with
failure and anxious to correct mistakes. Americans, it has been said,
tend to look upon foreign policy as a series of specific problems that can
and must be solved; Europeans look upon foreign policy as a predica-
ment that must be endured. Consequently Americans have been con-
cerned with methods and machinery for the definition and resolution
of issues in foreign affairs. Much time and effort has gone into perfecting
constitutional guarantees to prevent one branch of government from
dominating the management of foreign policy. For more than a century
and a half Americans have been interested in peace societies and the
possibilities of world organizations conceived in the hope that they
might achieve just and lasting solutions to end all problems of inter-
national life for all time and, indeed, to do away with diplomacy as such.
Meanwhile, Europeans have been concerned with diplomatic negotia-
tion as a means for reducing and containing an endless succession of
inevitable conflicts. The general outlines of this contrast in viewpoints
were well illustrated by French Primer Clemenceau's impatience with

*Professor of History, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.

31

President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Frenchman ob-
served that "God Himself had only Ten Commandments."

Certainly so broad a generalization of a national attitude must be
subject to reservations, but it is useful here in underscoring the legalis-
tic and mechanistic methods that Americans have hoped would bring
a Utopian solution to the vexatious problems of diplomacy. As a conse-
quence, even in the brief span of the twentieth century there have been
many shifts in the American interpretation of the role of the Senate in
foreign policy.

One reaction to any major failure in foreign relations is an attempt
to reinterpret the role of the branches of the federal government in such
a way as to reduce the power of the branch thought to be most directly
responsible for the most recent failure. There are outstanding examples
in the last half century.

The Senate was held responsible for defeat of the League of Nations
in the United States in 1920 in many scholarly articles and books. Be-
lieving this action to have been a disaster, these same scholars, in look-
ing to the future, not infrequently sought to reduce the Senate's evil
influence. They agreed with John Hay's conclusion while Secretary of
State in 1901 that there would always be one-third of the Senate plus
one on the wrong side of every question. The obvious constitutional
remedy was to abolish the requirement for a two-thirds majority in the
Senate to approve a treaty.

Scarcely a decade later in the 1930's the President rather than the
Senate became the scapegoat for failure in foreign policy. This failure
was now defined as American intervention in World War I rather than
the peace making efforts at Versailles. Revisionists historians, abetted
by Senator Gerald Nye's sensational investigation of the munitions
industry, won popular acceptance for the theory that President Wilson,
either by design or by incompetence, had forced Congress into declar-
ing war.

Many legal checks on presidential authority were suggested. One,
the Ludlow Referendum, demanded a Constitutional amendment pro-
viding for a national referendum vote of approval before a Congression-
al decision to enter a foreign war became law. Congressman Walter
Frasier of Minnesota introduced a measure to implement the anti-war
pledge in the Kellogg-Briand Pact by making it illegal to declare war or
to approve any appropriation for armament in peace time. These ex-
treme curtailments of Presidential authority failed, but the neutrality

32

laws, beginning with the Johnson Act in 1934, specifically removed Pres-
idential discretion in applying or interpreting the acts. They were man-
datory, following strictly the steps laid down by Congress to assure
absolute neutrality.

The threat to American security represented by the outbreak of
World War II bought recognized need for executive acendancy in policy
making which President Roosevelt skillfully exploited. Senator Arthur
Vandenburg lamented in March, 1941 that the passage of Lend Lease
"drove the final nail into the coffin of neutrality." Certainly Roosevelt's
authorization in September, 1941 of American naval convoy for ships
carrying Lend Lease goods confirmed the Senator's view.

Actual Congressional authority in policy making was sharply re-
duced insofar as wartime decisions were concerned. At the same time
the administration recalled President Wilson's fight for the treaty after
World War I and great care was given to preserving and placating
Senate prerogatives. The Senate formally gave its advance approval to
the peace keeping agency to be formed after the war. In the debates
on the United Nations Senate leaders publicly acknowledged that the
Senate had "killed" the League of Nations and that a strong League
might well have checked the aggression that led to World War II.

Thus the Executive emerged from World War II in a much more
powerful position than did the Congress. A lapse into peace might
have restored the balance to the legislative branch, but there was no
real lapse. The Cold War crisis in 1947 demanded unity and action.
President Harry Truman met the crisis with his far reaching decisions
for aid to Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan. This was strong
executive leadership and the title, Truman Doctrine, gave no recogni-
tion to Congress. Yet, as Herbert Agar has pointed out in The Price
Of Power, Congress could have blocked the President. Indeed, this
same Congress consistently voted down all the President's major domes-
tic programs and Truman made political capital in the 1948 campaign
by denouncing the "do-nothing Eightieth Congress." But it was this
same Congress, largely by virtue of Senator Vandenburg's efforts for
a bipartisan policy, that approved the Truman Doctrine. Bipartisanship
itself was a necessary move to meet crisis conditions, but its overall
effect was to reduce the power of Congress by sacrificing debate and
minimizing disagreement in order to assure quick action. Continuing
crisis since 1947 has reduced the time for deliberation and dulled the
edge of honest criticism for executive action.

33

American foreign policy in the last twenty-five years has broken
in many ways with the traditions that guided it from 1776-1945. One
obvious example is the proscription against alliances that held down to
1947. Since that year the forty-odd alliances formed by the United States
are sometimes described as evidence of pactomania. It is even more
obvious that this change in method is a symptom of a basic change in
position. It is not that Americans have accepted a mission to global
leadership and a commitment to world peace only since 1945. President
Monroe, said in 1822, "The United States owes to the world a great ex-
ample, and, by means thereof, to give the cause of liberty and humanity
a generous support." It is rather that in former times both of these ob-
jectives were, at least in American minds, sought only by peaceful and
legal means. Now the United States is committed to the philosophy of
peace through power and democracy by intervention. As Selig Adler
has written in the Isolationists Impulse:

"By 1950 the United States had returned not to the isolation
of Warren Harding, but rather to the Realpolitik of Theodore
Roosevelt. . . . Our post war diplomacy thus bore a closer re-
semblance to the statecraft of Prince Metternich and Bis-
marck than to the doctrines of President Wilson and F. D.
Roosevelt."
The assumption since 1947 and the advent of the Cold War has been
the need for unceasing vigilance and superior counterforce to contain
the protracted hostility of the Soviet Communist world. The military
became more important than heretofore. This led to continual rivalry
with the Soviets in every possible sphere. Walter Lippmann complained
in 1950: "We can hardly send milk to babies abroad without explaining
that this is an important action in our cold war with Russian commu-
nism." Or another less well known sage remarked that if we heard that
Russia had launched a project to go to hell we would immediately
counter it with a plan to get there first.

With the Cold War underway the United States faced a condition
unique in its history an unrelenting threat to its security. Continual
crisis inevitably reduced Congressional deliberations in favor of execu-
tive actions. Congressional authority reached its apogee in the 1930's
when there was a general feeling of national security. It was typified
by the expert opinion of Adminal William Sims that not even a navy
of 1000 ships, capable of 100 knots per hour could invade the United
States. When that feeling of security was shattered at Pearl Harbor
enthusiasm for Congressional dominance of foreign policy waned.

34

Modern technology with the mass destruction of atomic weapons linked
to the speed of rockets has reduced time available for deliberations
almost to the vanishing point. It has been estimated that in the event of
a reported missile attack the President would have fifteen minutes in
which to decide whether or not it was a hostile attack and how to react
to it in the event that it was. This, of course, contrasts with the three
year period of debate before the United States entered World War I
and the two years before World War II.

The possibility of an almost instant executive decision of far reach-
ing significance became a fact in 1950 when President Harry Truman
ordered American troops into Korea. Congress was subsequently con-
sulted and, in theory at least, the President's act could have been coun-
termanded. It is both difficult and dangerous to withdraw troops already
committed to combat; Congress approved Truman's act.

The later unpopularity of the Korean war together with concern
about the vast increase in executive agreements after 1938 began to
cause Congressional leaders concern in the 1950's. This problem was
further complicated by the presence of the United Nations and the
possibility that multilateral international agreements might contain
provisions counter to the interests of the United States. The Senate,
under the leadership of John Bricker, sought to assert itself by constitu-
tional change designed to meet these problems. The Bricker Amendment,
first proposed in 1953 and later defeated in 1954 by one vote, proposed
to amend the Constitution in order to give Congress power to regulate
all executive agreements with foreign nations and require a vote in
Congress to implement provisions of treaties relating to the United
States. President Dwight Eisenhower attacked this restriction on execu-
tive power asserting that the amendment was an attempt to destroy the
Constitution brick by brick by Bricker.

Even when Congress has been consulted in advance the results have
not been entirely satisfactory. The most celebrated incident of this
sort is the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The resolution has been attacked
on the ground that insufficient and inaccurate information was given to
Congress at the time the decision was made and that, in any event. Con-
gress did not intend to grant the President unlimited authority to expand
the war. As public opposition to the war mounted, recourse to Constitu-
tional checks have once again come into popularity.

Last year the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out
Resolution 85 with but one dissenting vote. This resolution reaffirmed

35

the right of the Senate to a voice in making any "national commitment"
through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative instrument-
ality. In this resolution the Senate charged that "the executive has ac-
quired virtual supremacy over the making as well as the conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States. It cited a long list of specific
examples over many years of the President's power to commit the coun-
try to war by means of unilateral official declarations in the Middle
East, Vietnam, SEATO, and Spain. To rectify this situation the resolu-
tion proposed to force the executive to reconsider its excesses, and the
legislature to reconsider its responsibility for allowing executive domina-
tion in the making of foreign policy to the end of restoring the division
of responsibilities called for in the Constitution. There have also been
other proposals to revoke the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. After the
presidential order to move into Cambodia there were new resolutions
to curb his authority along with a general revival of all of the older
ones of the last few months.

The possibility that these resolutions will, through the Constitution,
provide a larger Senatorial voice in foreign policy making is not well
founded. The Constitution despite its 180 years and the relative calm
of that era gave the decisive advantage in the conduct of foreign rela-
tions to the Executive. Nations of a necessity must deal with each other
through individuals and these individuals inevitably belong to the execu-
tive branch of the government. Thomas Jefferson observed after he
became President: "The transaction of business with foreign nations
is executive altogether." Theodore Roosevelt took a parallel but even
broader view with the assertion that the Presidency was as big as the
man who held the office.

The Supreme Court in reviewing the Constitution has defined the
President's powers in foreign relations as "delicate, plenary, and exclu-
sive." Short of the expenditure of money, the binding conclusion of
treaties, and the formal declaration of war the President is virtually
unrestrained in the conduct of foreign relations. A Monroe Doctrine
may be announced without any prior consultation or approval by the
Congress. He can make promises, give advice, enter into informal
commitments, send the armed forces anywhere in the world and can
commit them to hostile acts short of war. Obviously these powers make
it possible to so limit the choices which constitutionally lie with Con-
gress as to eliminate them altogether. Truman could have used armed
force in the Berlin crisis of 1948 or Kennedy could have done so during

36

the missile crisis of 1962 and thereby involved the nation in war without
any Congressional approval.

Hans Morganthau has wisely observed that not since 1945 has
an unconstitutional seizure of power by the executive concerned
both Congress and citizens. What is new is the frequency with which
the constitutionally sanctioned powers have had to be called into
play because of the continuous rather than sporadic demands of con-
temporary international affairs.

The constitutional intent was for Congress to check the President
and for the Senate to check the House. The Senate still can delay,
modify, emasculate and even prevent executive action. It cannot, how-
ever, directly act to initiate a new policy. It can only adopt a resolution
recommending a course of action and the executive may then honor or
ignore it. Over the past generation America's commitments in world
affairs, as never before, demand action, sometimes almost split second
action and Congress simply cannot act under such circumstances.
That is to say that in fact the Senate's voice in making policy has been
muted.

Another development since 1945 that has tended to reduce the
role of Congress in foreign policy making is the vast growth of govern-
ment. In the early years of the Republic the State Department, which
had only 600 employees as late as 1930, alone was responsible for the
nations foreign relations. Now the State Department has over 12,000
employees and the Hoover Commission found an additional forty-six
"departments agencies, commissions, boards, and interdepartmental
councils" at work on some aspects of the conduct of foreign relations.
In order to coordinate the work of these diverse agencies, thrity-three
interdepartmental committees were at work. Some of these were created
by law, some by executive order and some by departmental agreements.
These are by no means insignificant groups.

One of these thirty-three committees is the National Security Coun-
cil created under the National Security Act of 1947. Its members include
the President, the Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of
Defense. It does not, however, include a member of Congress. It con-
siders options brought up to it by a number of lesser committees. The
President's special advisor on foreign affairs heads the planning staff
that makes the initial suggestions based on policy papers prepared by
members of a Study Committee who work in five regional areas (Europe,
Asia, etc.) and five topical divisions (Foreign Aid, Stategic posture, etc.).

37

This information goes to a Planning Staff, headed by the President's
special advisor, which reports its findings to a Review Board also headed
by the Presidents special advisor including the State and Defense De-
partments along with the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With this
information in hand the National Security Council reviews the options
and advises the President on his decisions.

The Department of Defense, with its many agencies and all of its
expert opinion on highly technical matters, along with an $80 billion
budget, also has vast influence on Congressional decisions relating to
foreign policy. The very enormity of government operations tends to
complicate the task of any Senator who seeks to give direction to policy.

Congressional authority is limited politically as well as Constitu-
tionally. In regard to China policy A.T. Steele in The American People
and China asserts that American policy has remained inflexible for
twenty years in part because of "congressional paralysis based on the
assumption that any suggestion of change would provoke a hostile pub-
lic reaction." The "loss of China" in 1949 and the Congressional attack
led by Seantor Joseph McCarthy against the Roosevelt-Truman ad-
ministrations and the State Department worked to reduce the issues of
China policy to a test of attitude on Communism. Hence, Congress
has year after year passed by voice vote resolution opposing the seating
of Red China in the UN and no successful presidential candidate since
1944 has advocated anything other than a hard line toward Communism.
For good or ill Congressional policy on China has been frozen by the
Congressman's estimate of the public attitude on the issue. "The first
principle of a politican is to be elected or re-elected, and on this basis
the less said about China the better."

In the case of China policy this inflexibility on the part of Congress
bound the Executive, Steele says, and "the policy fashioned by John
Foster Dulles was a natural out-growth of it." That is to say Congress
was the controlling factor in China policy although Dulles as the super
active executive agent made it appear that the hard line on Communism
was an invention of the executive. Truman, Acheson and the Demo-
cratic party were charged with being soft on Communism in 1952 presi-
dential election. In a highly critical article on Dulles in The New Re-
public (October 28, 1967), Hans Morganthau asserted that Dulles as-
sumed he must prove to Congress his adamant anti-communism and to
achieve this end was willing to allow the dissmissal of foreign service
officers for alleged Communist sympathies when Dulles knew the

38

charges were not valid. The assumption must be that a strong and con-
tinuing demand by Congress for an alternative policy would also have
been reflected in executive policy.

China policy also reflects another limit on Congress the power of
organized lobbists. Pressure groups have so great an influence on Con-
gress that Robert Dahl asserted in Congress and Foreign Policy: "A
large part of the history of American foreign policy since World War I
might be interpreted as a series of successful intimidations by pressure
groups." More recently the Committee of One Million offers possibly
the best example of this trend. This committee, organized two months
after the conclusion of the Korean War. opposed admission of Com-
munist China into the U.N. The letterhead of the organization carries
the names of six senators including Thomas J. Dodd, William Proxmire
and Hubert Humphrey. Former senators Paul H. Douglas former con-
gressman Walter H. Judd helped to organize the group. In less than a
year the committee got more than one million signatures on a petition
to keep Red China out of the U.N. In 1961 a second stronger petition
was circulated. It again advocated exclusion from the U.N. and now
opposed recognition of Red China by the United States as well as any
other steps which might serve to build the power and prestige of the
Peking regime. Again over a million signatures were gotten including, by
1964, 345 members of Congress. A third revision of the petition in 1965
almost immediately got approval in the form of signatures from 312
Congressmen. In part this was due to personal conviction and in part
to the committee's threat that Congressmen who did not sign would
be placed under pressure of letter-writing campaigns, pressure by na-
tional organizations, and visits from constituents. The Committee has
a "talent for making any suggestion of modification in our China policy
seem unpatriotic and contemptable." A majority of Congress has sub-
scribed to its doctrine ever since its foundation even though its execu-
tive secretary, Marvin Liebman, has an annual budget of only S60.000.
Political expedience enhances immeasurably the leverage of organized
pressure groups even though as in this case they be, what one critic
called them, "a term rather than a reality."

Whether or not such power by a vested interest constitutes a decline
of Congressional authority depends on one's attitude toward the policy
in question. Thus, it could be argued that a hard line toward Communism
and in particular toward Red China has represented for the last two
decades the will of the American people and the will of Congress. Such
Presidential policies as the intervention in Korea and the escalation in

39

Vietnam were taken within the framework of this demand for contain-
ment sanctioned by concensus. It is at least interesting to speculate as
to the Congressional reaction had Presidents at various points of crisis
attempted to gain support for a soft line. It would appear that no
President could have long sustained a policy contrary to the general
assumptions of policy makers in the Congress.

Congress quite clearly still exercises vast authority in its traditional
role of setting general aims for foreign policy and approving the general
methods that are to be used to execute them. The question in many
cases is the wisdom of a particular policy as proven by time. This, as
has been shown, has been the case many times in the last half century
in the relations of Congress and the President.

When one branch or the other seems to be responsible for failure
the remedy ought to be the use of Constitutional power rather than an
attempt to amend it to some imagined higher degree of perfection. Is-
sues between branches of the government are political. The remedy for
poor Presidential leadership is not so much legal devices to curb the
President but voting power to replace him. Conversely a Congress that
is too complacent on foreign policy issues can be changed. The pro-
posal for Constitutional change do serve the purpose of focusing popu-
lar attention on a problem. But the problem is more likely to be solved
by political measures than constitutional ones.

In summary of the role of Congress in the years since 1945 the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1967 report on "National Com-
mitments" is instructive. This committee found that Congress had lost
a measure of its influence on foreign relations. In part this was due,
they believed to the nation's new role in world affairs and the many
unprecedented situations growing out of this context. Many of these
situations were crisis and under the pressure of emergency Congress
had neither the opportunity nor the will to devise a proper response.
Congressmen tended to be cautious. Further they were confused and
"overawed by the cult of executive expertise." Not many Congressmen
were usually well informed on all of the complex problems of foreign
relations and none had access to vast amounts of classified information
freely available to the top level officers in the State Department and
Defense Department. Finally, the report suggested that there "may also
be a historical memory at work" in the conviction that Congressional
dominance of foreign affairs after World War I with its great emphasis
on peace was shown to be a failure by the advent of World War II.

40

UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

IN VIETNAM:

A SURVEY OF CONFLICTING

INTERPRETATIONS

BY THOMAS A. BRYSON*

The American presence in Vietnam has aroused heated debate on
American foreign policy, a controversy which has produced a large
body of literature. In early 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson's escala-
tion of the conflict gave rise to an even greater volume of literature on
the subject. Since then hawks and doves, each striving to win converts
to a particular point of view, have debated the wisdom of the American
role in Vietnam. The polemical nature of the literature resulting from
this debate highlights the many shortcomings inherent in writing on
events of a contemporary nature. Too many writers are concerned with
expressing a particular point of view. Their works are general in na-
ture, with little documentation to substantiate their theses. Actually,
documents are not yet available to the historian in sufficient number
to warrant the writing of an objective history of the American involve-
ment in Vietnam. Memoir material is still in the process of being written.
Subjectivity replaces objectivity. Moreover, in the face of highstrung
emotions, detachment is well nigh impossible. In spite of these short-
comings, however, many have undertaken to write about the American
role in Vietnam.

The purpose of this paper is to survey briefly literature pertinent
to the American presence in Vietnam. Some effort has been made to
choose representative works from the scholarly community, from ad-
ministrative apologists, from congressional critics, from the radical
left, and from the outnumbered but articulate group that approves the
policies that led to Vietnam. A survey of this material made apparent
that five basic questions were uppermost in the minds of those con-
concerned with the American entanglement in Southeast Asia.

As Senator Eugene McCarthy so aptly wrote concerning the Ameri-
can involvement in Vietnam: "Quite suddenly and surprisingly we have

*Assistant Professor of History, West Georgia College, Carrollton, Georgia.

41

found ourselves involved in the third largest war in our history " 1 Is

United States involvement in this Southeast Asian land the result of
drift or of design? If design, what is the purpose of this presence and
who is responsible? Accepting the drift thesis, Russell Fifield's cau-
tious, scholarly work Southeast Asia in United States Policy views the
American presence in Vietnam as one that slowly evolved over a period
of years in response to the Communist challenge. The United States
had no design for establishing American hegemony in that country. 2
Fred Greene, also, in the equally balanced study U. S. Policy and the
Security of Asia, maintains that the United States presence in South-
east Asia is in response to the Chinese threat to the security of that
area. 3 Greene's work, like that of Fifield, tends to accept official gov-
ernment policy statements concerning the American role in Southeast
Asia. Elaborating on this drift thesis, Theodore Draper contends there
were actually seven steps involved in the process of step-by-step esca-
lation, each made in response to a political failure of the government
of South Vietnam. 4

The thesis that the United States drifted into the Vietnamese quag-
mire step-by-step, assumes that policy initiated by President Harry S.
Truman in early 1950 was continued by each succeeding President in

1 Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, The Limits of Power: America's Role in the
World (New York, 1967), p. 187. Because of the historiographical nature of
this article all items cited a second time or more will follow the short form.

2 Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy (New York, 1963),
Chapt. 2.

3 Fred Greene, United States Policy and the Security of Asia (New York, 1968),
pp. 36-40.

4 Theodore Draper, Abuse of Power (New York, 1966), pp. 16, 24, 30, 49, 54,
68, 107 and 197. Other writers in agreement with this step-at-a-time involvement
are John Kenneth Galbraith, "Vietnam: The Moderate Solution," reprinted in
John R. Boettiger, Vietnam and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1968),
pp. 128-37; J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York, 1966),
pp. 117-18; and Richard Goodwin, Triumph and Tragedy: Reflections on Viet-
nam (New York, 1966), p. 29. Richard Barnet, in an interesting paper entitled,
"The National Security Bureaucracy and Military Intervention," in Pricilla
Long, ed., The New Left: A Collection of Essays (Boston, 1969), views the
American involvement in Vietnam as the result of "a series of mistakes" made
by officials in the "structure and organization of the national security bureau-
cracy" rather than by the President or his assistants in the cabinet.

42

response to the increased Communist challenge. There is little dis-
agreement that Truman made the first commitment to Vietnam in June,
1950, and that it was similar to the policy already initiated in Europe
to stem Communist expansion. American aid to France was predicated
upon the assumption that France was making a stand against Communist
expansion in Southeast Asia. Vietnam was thus tied in with the over-all
Cold War struggle.

It is generally agreed that President Dwight Eisenhower's commit-
ment to the Diem regime was limited to economic and military aid for
the purpose of creating a viable state as a bulwark against further Com-
munist encroachment into Southeast Asia. Writers George McTurnan
Kahin and John W. Lewis, in one of the best works on the subject of
American entanglement, agree, saying that the Southeast Asia Treaty
did not make an iron-clad American military commitment to Vietnam. 5
These writers note that the treaty did violate the Geneva Accord of
1954, since it granted American de facto recognition to a South Viet-
namese state when in reality permanent partition was not the inten-
tion. 6 Kahin and Lewis point out, too, that, although Eisenhower made
no military commitment, he was responsible for a massive military build-
up of the South Vietnamese army pursuant to his letter to Diem of
October 1, 1954, whereby two billion dollars in American aid was ex-
tended to the Diem Regime between 1955 and 1960. But even so, they
conclude, the Eisenhower commitment to Diem's regime was limited. 7
It is noteworthy that Eisenhower's commitment to Diem achieved such
momentum that his successor in the White House evidently considered
himself obligated to continue the policies of his predecessor.

5 George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam:
An Analysis in Depth of the History of America's Involvement in Vietnam
(New York, 1967), pp. 62-63. However, Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Vietnam to the
effect that American presence in Vietnam was pursuant to the SEATO com-
mitment. See The Vietnam Hearings: With an Introduction by J. William Ful-
bright (New York, 1966), p. 11. Theodore Draper agrees with the conclusion of
Kahin and Lewis concerning the limited nature of Eisenhower's commitment.
Draper, Abuse of Power, p. 39; the biographer of John Foster Dulles also ac-
cepts this view. Louis Gerson, John Foster Dulles (New York, 1967) p. 195.

6 Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, p. 63.

7 Ibid., p. 333.

43

President John F. Kennedy, apologists Arthur Schlesinger and Theo-
dore Sorensen agree, inherited the Vietnam question from the Eisen-
hower administration. Both writers maintain that Kennedy considered
the American pledge made by Eisenhower to South Vietnam to be an
"overcommitment" and felt himself captive of a policy initiated by the
previous chief executive. 8 Kennedy understood the blueprint of wars
of national liberation and realized that counter-insurgency was pri-
marily a political problem. But even so, it is recognized by some writers
that, while Kennedy inherited the commitment from Eisenhower and
had a keen insight into the complexities of guerilla warfare, he was
nevertheless responsible for the militarization of American policy in
Vietnam. They assert that the young President came increasingly under
the influence of the military. 9 In light of this occurrence, some have
asked the question: Would Kennedy have escalated the war had he
lived? Roger Hilsman, sympathetic to Kennedy and a member of the
State Department staff during his time in the White House, states with
some degree of assurance that Kennedy would have kept "the fighting
as limited as possible." 10 Richard Barnet, also a State Department
official during the Kennedy years, addressing himself to Kennedy's
policy and the possibility of future escalation, maintains that the young
President actually "set in force the bureaucratic momentum that would
make it a certainty." 11 But Kahin and Lewis, while agreeing that Ken-
nedy made only a limited commitment to Diem, cautioned that "it is
quite impossible to predict what he might have done." 12 Although

8 Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House
(Boston, 1965), p. 538 and Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York, 1965),
p. 651.

9 This interpretation is accepted by the following: Draper, Abuse of Power,
p. 53; Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, p. 137-46; Richard Barnet,
Intervention and Revolution: America's Confrontation with Insurgent Move-
ments Around the World (New York, 1968), p. 211-12; Sorensen, Kennedy,
p. 653; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 544-48 and The Bitter Heritage:
Vietnam and American Democracy, 1941-1968 (Greenwich, Conn., 1966),
pp. 20-28.

10 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the
Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1964), p. 536.

11 Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, pp. 212-15.

12 Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, p. 146.

44

Kennedy's future course is difficult to determine, the record is clear on
his successor's design for Vietnam.

Lyndon B. Johnson, Philip Geyelin declares, must bear the burden
for taking the step that Americanized the war in Vietnam. Geyelin
writes that the war was "an orphan when it was passed along" to him,
but after February, 1965, Johnson began to give Vietnam serious atten-
tion and made the war his own. 13 Although Barnet contends that Ken-
nedy set in motion the process of escalation, he agrees with Geyelin
that Johnson, in the final analysis, must bear the onus of widening the
war and of relating it to the American global commitment to the free
world. 14

While the latter conclusion is generally accepted, there is some
disagreement about Johnson's motive for escalation in early 1965.
Geyelin asserts that Johnson carried the war to the North in order to
obtain a better negotiating position. 15 Theodore Draper differs with
Geyelin, declaring that the American decision to escalate in early 1965
was based on the need "to bolster the morale of the South Vietnamese
government . . . ." Escalation was "far more intimately related to South
Vietnamese disintegration than to North Vietnamese infiltration,"
Draper concludes. 16 Richard Goodwin offers the same interpretation,
writing, "Vietnam became an irrevocably American war" after the
decision to escalate, because American policy-makers feared a Com-
munist victory in Vietnam was imminent. 17 Eric Goldman, Johnson's
scholar-in-residence in the White House, takes exception to this view.
Goldman points out that Johnson raised the ante in Vietnam in order
to prevent another Munich. Johnson, a captive of the Munich analogy
who took the position that a monolithic Communist threat in the form
of a Peking-Hanoi axis was about to overrun South Vietnam, elected
to hold the line rather than to appease the land-hungry Communist
dragon. 18

13 Philip Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World (New York, 1966), pp. 186,
219, and 223.

14 Barnet, Intervention and Revolution, p. 218.

15 Geyelin, Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 219.

16 Draper, Abuse of Power, pp. 84-85.

17 Goodwin, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 32.

18 Eric Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York, 1968), pp.

474-75.

45

Writers on the Left disagree with the foregoing views, taking the
position that the American presence in Southeast Asia was designed to
achieve American dominance in that region. Noam Chomsky, the na-
tionally recognized linguist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-
gy, conjectures that the "international Communist conspiracy" is a
device designed to justify policies that "extend American hegemony"
over that area in order that American bourgeois institutions might
prevent the extension of the Communist ideology. He concludes that
the United States is leading a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement
in defense of "vested interests" in a world-embracing colonial empire. 19
Accepting this position, Gabriel Kolko, a professor of history at the
State University of New York at Buffalo, postulates that

the United States has fought in Vietnam with increasing

intensity to extend its hegemony over the world community

and to stop every form of revolutionary movement which

refuses to accept the predominant role of the United States

in the direction of the affairs of its nation or region. 20

In not quite so strong a vein, Ronald Steel asserts that the American

role in Vietnam is in response to a Communist threat, but that as a

concomitant result the United States, in the eyes of the world, has

extended her colonial empire of "nominally independent client states"

to include those of Southeast Asia. 21

Mention of colonial empires brings us to the second question. Why,
in light of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's wartime declaration of
American opposition to the continuation of colonial empires in the
post-war era, did the United States not encourage France to give up
her imperial holdings in Southeast Asia in the 1940's when the force of
nationalism was so blatantly evident? Joseph Buttinger, in one of the
more outstanding works on the Vietnamese conflict, suggests that
"France was too important an ally in Europe to be officially rebuffed

19 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (New York,
1967), pp. 258, 313.

20 Gabriel Kolko, Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power
and Purpose (Boston, 1969), p. 132.

21 Ronald Steel, Pax Americana (New York, 1967), pp. vii, 154.

46

by Washington for her Indo-Chinese policy . . . ." 22 That France was
a necessary partner in the containment of Russia in Europe is a general-
ly accepted conclusion. The second part of the question is also raised:
Why did the United States aid France in her colonial war to retain Indo-
China? There seems to be a basic disagreement on this question. Dean
Acheson, former Secretary of State under Harry S. Truman, claimed
that American concern for France in Vietnam was tied to the American
Europe-first policy. By helping France to conclude successfully the war
in Vietnam, the United States would hold to a minimum the strain
placed on France, thus enabling her to play a stronger role in Europe,
where American policy called for the containment of Russia to pre-
serve European security. The former Secretary concluded that Ameri-
can involvement during the Truman era resulted from the primary
concern for the security of Europe. 23

Opposed to the Europe-first interpretation of Acheson et al were
those who viewed initial American involvement in Vietnam as linked
directly to the preservation of Southeast Asian security, which was
threatened by Communist aggression. As Theodore Draper puts it,
"Acheson and Dulles enlisted the United States actively on the side
of a colonial power a total about-fact from the Roosevelt position.
From their point of view, of course, colonialism was preferable to
Communism." 24

In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting Europe-first and Asian-
security theses, Kahin and Lewis declared that at the outset American
aid to France was based on the primary concern for French coopera-
tion in the American policy of containing Russian expansion in Europe.

22 Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled 2 vols. (New York, 1967).
II, 805.

23 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York, 1969), pp. 671-72. In agreement with this thesis are Donald S. Za-
goria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi (New York, 1966), p. 29;
Fifield, Southeast Asia in United States Policy, p. 16; Buttinger, Vietnam,
II, 805.

24 Draper, Abuse of Power, p. 27. Sharing this interpretation are works by
Senator J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, p. 115; Frank N. Trager.
Why Vietnam? (New York, 1967), p. 12; Edwin O. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam:
The United States and Asia (New York, 1968), p. 21; Hans Morgenthau. A
New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York, 1968), p. 193; and Steel.
Pax Americana, pp. 23 and 160.

47

Only later, after the United States assumed the status of belligerent in
the Korean War, was aid to France in Vietnam based on the necessity
for containing China. 25

The theory of containment of the Communist menace in Asia
leads to the next question. Was there, in fact, a plot, motivated by
the monolithic Communist movement led by Peking and Hanoi, to
overrun Southeast Asia? If so, was the American response to this ef-
fort similar to the policy of containment utilized in Europe? If the
latter be true, is this policy of containment, given the conditions that
obtain in Asia, applicable in Vietnam?

The issue that has aroused perhaps the greatest controversy revolves
around the State Department stand that American involvement in Viet-
nam is a response to the Peking-Hanoi plot to conquer South Vietnam
and bring it into the Communist orbit. 26 Secretary of State Dean Rusk
repeatedly echoed the official White Paper statement of 1961. 27 The
plot thesis has been stated most clearly and concisely by former State
Department official William P. Bundy. Chinese Communist leaders,
Bundy declares, are trying to restore China to her "past position of
grandeur and influence." Adding to the Communist state territory that
has been traditionally associated with the Manchu domain has been
given top priority. High on the list of aims, the former Assistant Secre-
tary believes, is the annexation of Southeast Asia. 28

25 Kahin and Lewis, pp. 30-31.

26 "Introduction to United States Department of State White Paper, 1961,"
reprinted in Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, 396-98 and "Intro-
duction to United States Department of State White Paper, 1965," reprinted
in Ibid., pp. 405-08.

27 For example, Rusk expressed the plot thesis to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, while testifying before that body in 1966. See "The Statement and
Testimony of Secretary of State Dean Rusk," reprinted in The Vietnam Hear-
ings, p. 12.

28 William P. Bundy, "The United States and Communist China," reprinted in
Boettiger, Vietnam and American Foreign Policy, pp. 77-83. Bundy's estimate
of Chinese intentions to overrun Southeast Asia is shared by Fifield, Southeast
Asia in United States Policy, p. 207; General Maxwell Taylor, Responsibility
and Response (New York, 1966), p. 18; Trager, Why Vietnam? pp. 115, 119, 164
and 167; Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 650; Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Night-
mare (New York, 1965), p. 14; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 419 and 471;
Gerson, John Foster Dulles, p. 192 and Greene, United States Policy, pp. 226-28.

48

That America is actively engaged in Vietnam in response to a Com-
munist plot from the North is an appraisal that has been rejected by a
large number of writers dealing with American policy towards South-
east Asia. Kahin and Lewis maintained that the insurrection below the
seventeenth parallel is rooted in South Vietnam and was initiated by
South Vietnamese in response to the "heavy-handedness of Diem"s
government. " There is no evidence, these writers avow, to substantiate
the plot thesis which sees the anti-Diem revolution as cued from Peking
through Hanoi, the Vietcong being the tool of the Communist axis. 29
Vehement in their rejection of the plot thesis are the writers on the Left.
For example, Noam Chomsky, a polemicist and perhaps the most ve-
hement and articulate of the radical element, declares the "international
Communist conspiracy" to be merely a propaganda foil designed by
State Department planners to justify policies that extend American
domination to Southeast Asia. American presence in Vietnam extends
this nation's political and economic goals to that region of the world,
he asserts, ensuring thereby American influence and preventing the
incursion of the alien Communist ideology. 30

The matter of preventing the incursion of Communism into South-
east Asia and of containing China brings us to the next basic question.
Since stemming the expansive tide of the monolithic Communist plot
is the basic raison d'etre for American entanglement in the morass of
Vietnam, many writers have raised two allied questions: Is this American
policy in Southeast Asia similar to the policy of containment initiated
by the Truman administration in Europe in 1947? If so, given the condi-
tions that obtain in Asia, is it applicable to that part of the world? In
answer to the first question, the distinguished American scholar Hans
Morgenthau observed that the American policy in Southeast Asia is

29 Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, pp. 119, 199 and 135. Agreeing
with this interpretation are the works by Morgenthau, A New Policy, p. 136;
Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam, p. 171; Fulbright. The Arrogance of Power.
p. 112; Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, p. 104; Schlesinger, Bitter Heritage, p. xii;
Bernard Fall, Vietnam Witness, 1953-66 (New York, 1966), pp. 97, 137; Barnet.
Intervention and Revolution, pp. 206-07; Malcolm Browne, The New Face of
War (New York, 1965), p. 238; Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between Two Truces
(New York, 1966), pp. 22-23 and U. S. Senator Ernest Gruening and Hubert
Wilton Beaser, Vietnam Folly (Washington. D. C, 1968), p. 17.

30 Chomsky, American Power, p. 258. In agreement with this view are Howard
Zinn, Vietnam: The Logic of Withdrawal (Boston. 1967), pp. 73 and 77 and
Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy, p. 117.

49

merely an extension of the two-fold European policy of containment
and economic restoration expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the
Marshall Plan. As the European policy was successful, the pattern has
been applied to Southeast Asia. 31 There is wide-spread agreement
among writers that the American policy in Europe has been transfer-
red to Asia. 32 However, those on the radical Left view the American
presence in Southeast Asia as a means of extending American influence
and the prevailing socio-political-economic system, not as a means of
containing Communism. Noam Chomsky, for instance, says the Com-
munist conspiracy to overrun Southeast Asia is "a perfect propaganda
device to justify actions that reinforce and extend American hege-
mony." 33

Moving on to the second part of the question concerning contain-
ment, Professor Morgenthau asserts that the policy, as employed in
Europe, is not applicable to Southeast Asia, where conditions differ
greatly from those that obtained in Europe. Morgenthau declares that
the policy of containment, as practiced in South Vietnam, is actually
counter-productive, for the American presence forces Hanoi to make
common cause with Peking, where she can obtain aid and comfort.
But in reality, Morgenthau maintains, the best barrier to Red Chinese
expansion would be a viable, highly nationalistic Vietnamese state,
perhaps on the order of Tito's Yugoslavia. The University of Chicago
professor also observed that, contrary to official State Department pro-
nouncements, no monolithic Communist threat existed in Asia as in
Europe. The Vietcong and Hanoi, he asserts, were not the agents of
either Peking or Moscow. The Communist bloc, Morgenthau says,
has disintergrated. The nationalistic nature of the several entities gives
the lie to the charge that the bloc still retains the monolithic nature it

31 Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy, pp. 129-30.

32 In agreement with this point are works by Draper, Abuse of Power, p. 156;
Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, pp. 58-61, 325; Fulbright, Arro-
gance of Power, p. 109; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 676; Reischauer,
Beyond Vietnam, p. 40; Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, p. 79; Zinn, The Logic of
Withdrawal, pp. 101, 103; Steel, Pax Americana, pp. 123, 160; Robert Scigliano,
South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (New York, 1964), p. 216; and David P.
Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," reprinted in Boettiger, Vietnam
and American Foreign Policy, pp. 85-96.

33 Chomsky, American Power, p. 258.

50

enjoyed during an earlier era, because each component seeks its own
ends and does not follow a common course in international relations.
Finally, Morgenthau questions the wisdom of fighting a war of insur-
gency by relying totally on military might. The nature of the war in
Vietnam, he says, requires a comprehensive program of reform. Un-
fortunately, reform in Vietnam is futile, for it is asking too much of a
government that sees as its chief purpose the maintenance of the social-
political-economic status quo to make radical departures in the direc-
tion of reform. 34 Ronald Steel agrees with the conclusions of Morgen-
thau, and he maintains that containment of China is possible only by a
cordon sanitaire of viable national states in which the several peoples,
embued with a spirit of true nationalism, will reject Chinese overlord-
ship. 35 Kahin and Lewis and Senator Ernest Gruening also view the
American belligerency in Vietnam as having a counter-vailing result
in creating a situation in which Hanoi must seek comfort from Peking. 36
David Mozingo is also critical of containment as practiced in Asia.
Economic aid and military containment, Mozingo argues, do not apply
Asia. In Europe the American policy met with success because the
nations had long histories of political maturity and economic viability.
Given this background, the nation states of Europe, which had been
blighted by years of war, required only a transfusion of Marshall Plan
aid to invigorate and nourish once-healthy economies. In Asia the nation
state system is only slightly removed from colonialism. Too, regionalism
has not made sufficient headway; there is much competition among the
several states; and the force of nationalism is everywhere evident. The
factors do not lend themselves to containment. Finally, the Southeast
Asians, Mozingo concludes, do not regard China with the same degree
of fear that Europeans had for Russia in the 1940's. 37

However, a number of writers assert that containment is applicable
in Asia. William Bundy views Chinese leaders as seeking to reassert
Chinese hegemony over Southeast Asia and other areas that had come

34 Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy, pp. 130-35.

35 Steel, Pax Americana, p. 160.

36 Kahin and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, pp. 326-27 and Gruening and
Beaser, Vietnam Folly, p. 24.

37 Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," pp. 85-96.

51

under the Manchu domain. Bundy postulates that containment, as
utilized in Europe, is the only means of stopping Communist expan-
sion. 38 Frank Trager, in one of the first works defending administration
policies in Vietnam, asserts that containment is the only means of pre-
serving the security of Southeast Asia. 39 Russell Fifield shares this
view, maintaining that NATO is an excellent model for holding the
line against further Communist aggression. 40 On the other hand, Fred
Greene, while not viewing containment per se as a good alternative,
suggests that the United States might use the balance-of-power concept
to prevent China from dominating Southeast Asia. With India, Japan,
Pakistan, Australia, and the Philippines as counter weights, Greene
asserts, China might be prevented from achieving hegemony. 41

It is apparent that many scholars and others have rejected contain-
ment as a valid means of combating the Communist menace. Not only
has this policy been rejected, but many have also questioned the almost
exclusive reliance on military means to implement this policy. Many
officials having special knowledge about counter-insurgency have
warned of the futility of relying too heavily on military means to halt
Communist expansion without simultaneously inaugurating a com-
prehensive program of political, social, and economic reform. 42 With
this caveat in mind, it is now necessary to turn to the final question.

# * #

The two-fold policy of utilizing military and economic means to
deter the spread of Communist expansion in Europe was also employed
by Pentagon and State Department planners in Vietnam for a similar
purpose. But in the latter instance, Roger Hilsman points out, officials
responsible for a strategy of counter-in surgency have relied chiefly on
military measures, while making little effort to nourish well-conceived
reform programs. This negligence has prompted many critics of the

38 Bundy, "United States and Communist China," pp. 77-83.

39 Trager, Why Vietnam? pp. 161, 212-13.

40 Fifield, Southeast Asia, pp. 406-7.

41 Greene, U. S. Policy, pp. 36-40, 50.

42 Roger Hilsman, an American officer engaged in guerrilla war in Asia during
World War II, has produced an excellent capsule description of the complexi-
ties of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. See Hillsman, To Move a Nation,
Chapt. 28 and pp. 578-79.

52

American Vietnamese policy to question the wisdom of placing too
much emphasis on military effort. Donald S. Zagoria states that the
United States has made two errors in pursuing its policy. First, frus-
trated in the South in the attempt to bolster the politically weak Diem
regime, American planners decided to attack the North. Second, of-
ficials responsible for Vietnam put too little emphasis on reform in
the South. The preservation of the South Vietnamese Republic being
the primary American goal, Zagoria writes, major emphasis should
have been placed on reform of the Saigon regime to gain the support
of the countryside, while a "low-level war strategy" would have been
sufficient to meet the military challenge in the South from the insur-
gents. In light of the militarization of the American counter-insurgency
program, Zagoria questions whether the United States has the wisdom
to conduct successfully a war of this nature. 43

Conversely, Hans Morgenthau and Howard Zinn have concluded
that, given the right-wing orientation of the Saigon government, the
program of reform sponsored by American policy-makers was futile.
How, these authors ask, can the United States expect a government
based on the preservation of the status quo to make such far-reaching
reforms? 44

Equally concerned with the choice between military and political
alternatives, a number of writers feel that conditions in Vietnam after
1959 were not auspicious for the implementation of a broad program of
political, social, and economic reform. They hold that military force
must be utilized to guarantee the security of South Vietnam, and that
only when this goal is achieved will the climate be ripe for reform. 45

Even more critical of United States policy in Vietnam is the charge
leveled by Theodore Draper, Senator Fulbright, Ronald Steel, and

43 Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle, p. xiii. His criticism is shared by Scigliano.
South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, p. 216; Buttinger, Vietnam:, II, 918-20;
Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution: The Story of Twenty Years of Neglected
Opportunities in Vietnam and of America's Failure to Foster Democracy There
(New York, 1965), Chapt. XII; Hillsman, To Move a Nation, p. 578; and Kahin
and Lewis, United States in Vietnam, pp. 334-35.

44 Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy, pp. 134-35 and Zinn. The Logic of
Withdrawal, pp. 47-48.

45 Accepting this view are works by Trager, Why Vietnam'! p. 160; Buttinger,
Vietnam:, II, 805-11 and Taylor, Responsibility and Response, p. 29.

53

Noam Chomsky. The United States, these writers declare, has arro-
gated to itself the exclusive right to use military force at will for the
purpose of achieving desired diplomatic ends. 46 Draper and Fulbright
question the wisdom of the frequent utilization of force to achieve ends
that, in their opinion, might not really be in the national interest. 47 To
a generation of diplomatic historians, aware of the unique relationship
between military force and diplomatic goals and of the criteria imposed
by the realist school of Hans Morgenthau and George F. Kennan, Noam
Chomsky's raising the question of the morality of the American war in
Vietnam comes as a reminder of the criteria used in the days of Wood-
row Wilson. Chomsky, the parapetetic linguist, poses anew that ques-
tion: Is the utilization of military means bombs, napalm, heavy artil-
lery, flame-throwers and the like morally right in view of the high
loss of life among the civilian population? 48

Also anxious about the resort to military force to obtain a solution,
Richard Goodwin, in a more pragmatic vein, asks if increased militariza-
tion to achieve ultimate victory does not carry with it the enormous
risk of enlarging the war in the North? He points out that a war with
China could result from escalation. 49

Escalation has held no fears for the hawk writers. Hanson Baldwin,
the military editor of the New York Times, suggests that the situation
in Vietnam calls for massive military escalation. This long-time critic
of American military and foreign policy argues for the intensification
of the bombing effort, additional buildup of ground forces, and removal
of restrictions on the military in order that a successful conclusion to
the conflict may be achieved. Accepting the Munich analogy that views
appeasement as leading ultimately to defeat, Baldwin, in an approach
that would find acceptance by the American Right, argues for massive
retaliation should China intervene. 50

46 Draper, Abuse of Power, p. 219; Fulbright, Arrogance of Power, p. 18;
Steel, Pax Americana, 322 and Chomsky, American Power, pp. 247-48.

47 Draper, Abuse of Power, pp. 1-2 and Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power,
pp. 5, 130-38.

48 Chomsky, American Power, p. 378.

49 Goodwin, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 48-55.

50 Hanson Baldwin, "Case for Escalation," reprinted in Wesley R. Fishel,
Vietnam: Anatomy of a Conflict (Itasca, Texas, 1968), pp. 753-64.

54

The American Right generally agrees with the argument proferred
by Baldwin. J. Bernard Burnham, writing in The National Review,
the organ of the American Conservatives, opposes what he called
"incremental escalation" and urges that "quantum escalation," similar
to the scale suggested by Baldwin, would be necessary to bring the war
to a conclusion satisfactory to American diplomatic ends. 51 In the
same vein, Frank Meyer, also a staff writer for the same journal, urges
escalation of the conflict to a degree suficient to destroy the Hanoi
regime. Meyer even suggests the use of nuclear weapons should China
intervene. 52

In discussing the use of political or military means to obtain a
solution in Vietnam, it becomes immediately apparent that those ad-
vocating the former stratagem see the problem in terms of a Southern
strategy a strategy that would emphasize reform sufficient to broaden
the political base of the Saigon government. Given greater popular
support, a moderate program of counter-insurgency employing a low-
profile military force along with a comprehensive program of reform
would be more likely to succeed then. Advocates of the primacy of
seeking a solution by military means see the conflict in terms of carry-
ing the war to the North by bombing raids, blockade at sea, interdiction
of supply lines, and destruction of the will of the enemy to fight an
aggressive war. Such a position overlooks the important fact that even
if Hanoi were removed from the conflict, some quarter-million guerrillas
would continue in the South their war of insurgency.

Fighting a war of counter-insurgency with the proper utilization
of military and political means in the right proportions is the main
thesis of Roger Hilsman's work To Move a Nation. Part memoir and
part apology for the Kennedy role in the war, Hilsman's study is very
critical of the American military effort in Vietnam. While President
Kennedy understood the complexities of guerrilla warfare and their
counter-measures, Hilsman maintains, these policies were not imple-
mented, he says, because the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and many generals were lukewarm to the use of new methods
of warfare. Hilsman also lays on the shoulders of Diem blame for the

51 J. Bernard Burnham, "The Bit-by-Bit War," The National Review, Jan. 10.
1967, pp. 35-37.

52 Frank Meyer, "Reflections on Vietnam: Principles and Heresies," The
National Review, Feb. 22, 1966, p. 162.

55

poor military showing and the lack of political reform. In so doing, he
introduces the press war waged in Vietnam by American correspondents
over the effectiveness of the Diem government to carry out adequate
political and military policies for the prosecution of the war. 53

No discussion of the merits and demerits of military versus political
resources to wage a war of counter-insurgency would be complete with-
out some mention of the Diem regime. The press war waged by Ameri-
can newspaper people over Diem's efficiency is important, for ultimately
the war of ink has expanded and led to very embarrassing credibility
gap between Johnson administration claims and accomplishments.

Correspondents David Halberstam and Malcolm Browne have
documented the ineffective way in which the Diem regime carried out
reforms, lost the support of the people by its brutal tactics of repression,
and carried out the war in a slovenly manner. In works very critical of
the American conduct of the Vietnamese war, they blame American
military leaders in part, but they attribute much of the fault to the
Diem regime. 54 Substantiating the charges of Halberstam and Browne,
John Mecklin, head of the United States Information Service in Saigon,
has also documented the failures of the Diem regime and the short-
comings of the American military. 55

On the other side of the coin, Marguerite Higgins takes issue with
Halberstam, Browne, and Mecklin. It is her view that the Kennedy
administration dumped the Diem regime the only regime capable of
winning the war. She blames American policy-makers for trying to
impose "instant democracy" and to enforce Western ideas on the
Vietnamese. She asserts that Diem was a scapegoat for the failure of
the war effort. 56

Most of the works dealing with the American involvement in Viet-
nam are concerned with executive decisions, the role of important
individuals and with the day-by-day fighting of a war of new dimensions.

53 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 499, 578.

54 David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (New York, 1965), pp. 162-78
and Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of War (New York, 1965), pp. 215-17.

55 John Mecklin, Mission in Torment: An Intimate Account of the United
States Role in Vietnam (New York, 1965), Chapt. IV.

56 Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York, 1966), pp. 289-92,
302-3.

56

Little effort has been made by scholars to study the composition of
those agencies in the State Department and Pentagon bureaucracies
where alternatives and options were worked out for the consideration
of high policy-makers. Political influences at play during the time
decisions on Vietnam were made have received little attention by
historians. Finally, there are a number of important internal factors
such as public opinion, the race and economic questions that have
received virtually no treatment.

In a recent paper delivered at the December, 1969, meeting of the
American Historical Association, Professor Alexander DeConde sug-
gested that at least thirty years will elapse before all of the sources
necessary to competent scholarship are available. 57 Lacking, the his-
torian can often make only assumptions based on semi-educated guess-
es, and such is the case with the writing about the American involve-
ment in Vietnam. Writers on both sides of the question are, or should
be, conscious of the lack of material so necessary to document their
interpretations. Sufficient time has not passed to permit the detachment
and reflection that must accompany objective historical writing. But
the scholar is not to be censured for making a contemporary appraisal
of the events leading up to the American involvement in Vietnam and
covering the course of that involvement because he cannot substantiate
with data his interpretation of events. Critics on both sides of the Viet-
namese issue have an obligation to make some effort to explain the
American role in Vietnam. Scholarship must have a beginning. Con-
temporary scholarship, regardless of the limitations imposed by the
proximity of the events iti question, marks a beginning. It is on this
beginning that later historians, with better sources at hand, can make
more scientific judgments and avoid the pitfalls of subjectivity.

57 Alexander DeConde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History."
reprinted in SHAFR Newsletter [Society of Historians of American Foreian
Relations], I, (May, 1970), 1-11.

57

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR:
AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY

BY ROBERT W. SELLEN*

The years since 1945 have been difficult for Americans. We be-
lieved that the second World War would teach mankind the lessons
at best half-learned in 1918: war is evil, peace can be achieved, men
of good will can work together to suppress aggressors. It was to be a
good world, whether in Cordell Hull's terms a world in which spheres
of influence and balances of power were abolished in Henry Luce's
terms, an "American Century" of world progress under Yankee leader-
shipor in Henry Wallace's New Deal terms, a world in which every
child had a nutritious diet. 1

A quarter-century later we look back with wry smiles. As Robert
Divine puts it,

The preparations made at San Francisco for a security league
of sovereign nations to prevent aggression now seems like the
preparations some little girls might make for a lawn party as
a thunderhead gathers just beyond the garden gate. The
lemonade will be spiked by lightning. 2
Americans were euphoric at war's end. Then we became uneasy
over little wars that plagued Greece, Palestine, and an almost unknown
place called Indo-China. We began to learn of Andrei Gromyko as
the nyet man at the United Nations. In early March, 1946, millions of
us heard the familiar growl of Winston Churchill, speaking in Harry
Truman's presence and in the President's home state:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron
curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that
line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and
Eastern Europe .... All these famous cities and the popula-
tions around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere,

*Professor of History, Georgia State College, Atlanta, Georgia.

1 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), II, 1314-15; Henry R. Luce, Ameri-
can Century (New York, 1941); Henry A. Wallace, Democracy Reborn (Nev
York, 1944), p. 188.

2 Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in
America During World War II (New York, 1967), p. 315.

58

and all are subject . . . not only to Soviet influence but to a
very high and in many cases increasing measure of control
from Moscow. 3

Perusing the New York Times one finds that by March and April.
1947, fear of war was commonplace. The first mention of the term
"cold war" appears in the Times of Sunday, October 5, 1947, 4 and by
December "cold war" was no longer in quotation marks.

Since then we have lived in crisis, which has varied in intensity
from the boredom of another veto or another harangue by Fidel Castro
to the nerve twisting fear of nuclear war during the missile crisis of
October, 1962, accompanied by a sudden popularity of fallout shelters.
NBC television reached an audience of some 25 million when on Sep-
tember 7, 1965, it pre-empted three and a half hours of "prime" evening
time for a news program on the cold war.

NBC President William R. McAndrew stated the purpose as simply
"to present the factual history of United States participation in world
affairs during this twenty-year period . . . ." What we learned as factual
history was that as soon as Hitler was clearly beaten the Soviet Union
lost interest in cooperating with the West and felt free "to pursue the
Communist aims of world revolution . . . ." Hence, its breach of wartime
agreements and our response and cold war. 5

The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize various accounts which
purport to be factual history of the origins of the cold war. One's hope
is that comparing various approaches will help us arrive at a less be-
wildered condition when we think of the origins of the situation in
which we live.

The literature on the cold war's origins is almost infinite. The
trail starts in studies of American foreign relations, leads back into
histories of Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, China; into the occult art of
Kremlinology; into studies of American political behavior: and at some
points into abnormal psychology. In an attempt to stay within reason-
able limits this paper deals almost exclusively with American views,
though some foreign studies will be mentioned.

3 Randolph S. Churchill, ed.. The Sinews of Peace: Post-War Speeches of
Winston S. Churchill (Boston, 1949), p. 100.

4 New York Times. October 5, 1947, 111, p. 5. col. 1.

5 National Broadcasting Company News, American White Papers: United States
Foreign Policy (New York, 1967), pp. vi, 2-5.

59

American writings on the cold war began with a flood of memoirs,
diaries and tales of trips to Europe. Most of these were done by men
who had served in the government and were connected in some way
with our foreign relations. Some were defensive, having shared in policy
making; some attacked those who had made policy. Eventually, docu-
ments appeared which made it possible to verify the memoirs' authen-
ticity.

A second category is the rightist reaction after 1945 to "that man"
Franklin Roosevelt, his successor, Harry Truman, and their advisers.
That, in turn, called forth a defense of government policies before,
during and after the war. This veritable snowstorm of paper became
what we may call the orthodox liberal approach. More recently has
flowered a new revisionism from the left, another attack upon the
Roosevelt-Truman administrations but from a radically different
position.

* * *

Journalists were the first into print, as usual. Legions of them had
reported the war from various points, and Russia remained a mystery
to be explored and, if possible, explained. From conservatives to leftists
they reported similar findings: suspicion toward foreigners, an obses-
sion with security, absolutism, misunderstanding of America. Some
emphasized the police state or Marxist belief in an inevitable war with
capitalism, but in 1945 and 1946 most concluded that the principal
Soviet motivation was not conquest but fear, and that war was not
inevitable between the United States and the U.S.S.R. 6

Memoirs began to appear in January, 1947, with General John R.
Deane's The Strange Alliance. Deane, head of the U. S. military mis-
sion in Russia from October, 1943, until October, 1945, noted Russia's
secrecy, suspicion, but also its sporadic cooperation with the West. As
did the newspapermen, he enjoyed Russian friendliness at the personal
level. He ascribed Russian wariness to a mixture of ideology and the
Soviet leaders' isolation from and thus ignorance of the West. Writing
in the late summer of 1946, Deane concluded that the U. S. could get
along with Russia, "once the policies of present Soviet leadership are
modified . . . ." In Moscow he had known George Kennan on a first

6 John Fischer, Why They Behave Like Russians (New York, 1947); Edgar
Snow, Stalin Must Have Peace (New York, 1947); William L. White, Report
on the Russians (New York, 1945).

60

name basis; it is not strange that Deane proposed a "counterpoise"
including armed strength, use of economic pressure, cultural exchange
and direct negotiation. 7

The most important among early memoirs was James Byrnes' record
of his time as Secretary of State, July, 1945 to the end of 1946. In Speak-
ing Frankly Byrnes displayed a controlled pessimism born of frustration
at the conferences at Yalta and Potsdam and the difficulty of making
peace treaties.

He could still say of Stalin, "The truth is, he is a very likeable per-
son," a remark cut out of Byrnes' later memoirs. But Byrnes dwelled on
the difficulties that arose right after Yalta over Poland and Rumania
and, shortly, over the U. N. Byrnes believed that Stalin was not much
interested in the U.N. and that his "idea of a friendly government is a
government completely dominated" by the U.S.S.R. 8

Byrnes also believed that the Soviet Union violated the Yalta agree-
ments in order to control eastern Europe, that Russia desired to expand
into Greece and Turkey but not beyond; it would merely dictate govern-
ment policies elsewhere through communist party influence. He saw
this expansion as rooted in Russian history ("only the personalities
and the tactics have changed") and encouraged by victory in war. 9

Byrnes claims that he was impressed when Stalin and Molotov spoke
of seeking security, Russia having been invaded through Poland twice
in 25 years. But he assumed that freely elected governments in East
Europe could be friendly to the U.S.S.R. and was unable to comprehend
Russian suspicion when he said so. 10 Byrnes' memoirs are those of a
"total American," so ethnocentric that his self-proclaimed understand-
ing of others' views was hopelessly shallow.

In 1948 appeared a massive book which was ostensibly biography.
Roosevelt and Hopkins does contain the life story of Harry Hopkins.

7 John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance: The Story of our Efforts at Wartime
Co-operation with Russia (New York, 1947), pp. 48, 160-1, 165-66, 217. 247-8.
254, 273-83, 289-91, 320-34.

8 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Franklv (New York, 1947), pp. 32. 37. 44-5. 49-56.
61-2.

9 Ibid., pp. 72-4, 115,282-94.

10 Ibid., pp. 73,98-100.

61

notorious among conservatives as head of the W. P. A. But the core of
the book is Hopkins' close relationship with Franklin Roosevelt during
World War II, and Sherwood published hundreds of pages of Hopkins'
talks with F. D. R., Churchill, Stalin and others. This is probably the
greatest contribution to our understanding of summit diplomacy next
to the minutes of the meetings, which did not appear for another seven
to twenty years. 11

In the same year three men of obvious good will recalled their ex-
periences, possibly helping to make Americans even more anti-Soviet.
General Dwight "Ike" Eisenhower concentrated on the military aspects
of the war, disclosed that he tried to keep military and political matters
separate so as to concentrate on winning the war, and commented sadly
on the tension that "shattered our dream of rapid progress toward uni-
versal peace . . . ." 12

Henry L. Stimson, Republican statesman who was Secretary of State
for Hoover and Secretary of War for both Taft and Franklin Roosevelt,
was interested in a peaceful world open to trade, with its conflicts
adjusted by the new U. N. As did Eisenhower, Stimson praised the
Russian cooperation. He disliked Russia's police state and obstruc-
tionism. Yet, he emphasized the necessity of not increasing Russian
suspicion by brandishing our atomic bombs; instead, we should ap-
proach the U.S.S.R. at once to come to an understanding as to the
future of atomic energy. 13

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State longer than anyone else in American
history, retired in November, 1944, when few thought of a cold war.
His memoirs are a meticulous account in which all the dates and terms
of agreements are correct, and in which Hull's personal traits both
distorted the record and made it fascinating. Denying what everyone
in Washington knew that Roosevelt ran American foreign policy-
Hull revealed his own long held desire to establish free international
trade, the object being to raise living standards and minimize the chances
of war. A Utopian of sorts, he sincerely believed that "there will no longer

11 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York, 1948).

12 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City, New York, 1948),
pp. 194-95, 457-58, 475.

13 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and
War (New York, 1948), pp. 566-8, 591-5, 635-53.

62

be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or
any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy
past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their
interests." So Hull told the U. S. Congress on November 18, 1943. By
the autumn of 1944, he says, Russian deeds in the Balkans caused him
to worry and he quoted with approval a cable from Ambassador Averell
Harriman in Moscow which suggested firmness. 14

Quite different in tone were oth r memoirs of 1948, savage indict-
ments of the U.S.S.R. by former prime ministers of Hungary and the
Polish exile government in London. Supporting them was a former U.S.
ambassador to Poland, Arthur Lane, who accused the Russians of ar-
ranging the destruction of the Warsaw underground in 1944, removing
a host of anti-Russian Poles in so doing. Lane was unsympathetic to
Russian security needs, wanted to take a tough position toward the
U.S.S.R. in 1944 and was distressed by the police state he found upon
arriving in Poland in July, 1945. He made clear the ways in which the
elections promised at Yalta were postponed and then rigged for the
defeat of non-communist dandidates. 15

Reaction in American public opinion may have given impetus to
former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in preparing his
memoirs of Yalta. Roosevelt and the Russians is an able defense of the
President, listing the numerous concessions that F. D. R. wrung from
Stalin. Stettinius even believed that Stalin may have had trouble in the
Kremlin on his return for having been too friendly and having "sold out"
the U.S.S.R. Harriman warned that some elements in the Soviet govern-
ment were less trusting of the West than Stalin. Stettinius added that
Roosevelt's death may have strengthened that group. Soon after, the
U. S. S. R. impeded the formation of the German Control Commission
and again sought a procedural veto in the proposed U. N. 16

The one writer of 1950 openly and totally loyal to Roosevelt and
Truman was Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Opera-

14 Hull, Memoirs, I, 191-6, 352-64; II, 1314-15, 1459-61, 1739-40.

15 Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York, 1948):
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression
(New York, 1948); Arthur Bliss Lane, / Saw Poland Betraved (Indianapolis.
1948), pp. 43-53, 66-72, 79, 161-73, 197-212, 276-88.

16 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference
(London, 1950), pp. 272-83.

63

tions, Ambassador to Vichy France, and the President's Chief-of-Staff
during most of the war. Leahy insisted that Roosevelt was mentally
alert at Yalta, conducting negotiations there "with great skill," and
reminded readers that Russia took the full force of the German army
until our Normandy invasion in June, 1944. His narrative becomes criti-
cal of the U.S.S.R. only after Yalta, and Leahy obviously admired Tru-
man for adopting a tough attitude toward Charles de Gaulle's France as
well as toward Russia. 17

But General Lucius Clay and Mark Clark recalled the difficulty
of dealing with the Russians in Germany and Austria, attributing this
to communist zeal for spreading the true faith. 18 General Walter Bedell
Smith, well known as Ike's chief of staff during the war, identified by
1948 a "war psychosis" among Soviet leaders who accused the West
of acts they were themselves perpetrating. Smith, too, blamed commu-
nist ideology but added old Russian imperialism and Stalin's own nature:
suspicious, revengeful, and ignorant of the West. 19

The most important memoir to appear in 1951 was the diary of James
V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy and the first Secretary of Defense,
a man close to Truman during the early years of the cold war. Forrestal
was a tense, introspective man who was caustic in his condemnation of
the U.S.S.R. and of Americans who favored cooperation with it. His
diary is a glimpse into the process of decision making at the highest
level of government from November, 1944, to March, 1949, from the
point of view of a man who wanted to discredit Harry Hopkins as a revo-
lutionary and whose own belief was in maximizing American power. 20

Equally important the following year were excerpts from the diaries
and letters of Republican Arthur Vandenberg, one of the most influen-
tial members of the Senate. Vandenberg had long been suspicious of the
U.S.S.R., though he wanted to keep it as an ally until the Axis powers

17 William D. Leahy, / Was There (New York, 1950), pp. 290-322, 329, 373.

18 Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York, 1950), pp. 452-94; Lucius D.
Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, New York, 1950); Lucius D. Clay,
Germany and the Fight for Freedom (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).

19 Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, 1950),
pp. 61-3, 305-15.

20 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. xvi, 14-15,
45, 49, 57, 72-3, 81, 95-8, 102, 107, 110, 462.

64

were beaten. 21 He was wary of postwar foreign aid, shared the strong
congressional hope for the success of the new United Nations as well as
congressional restlessness under strong executive leadership. Vanden-
berg recorded his irritation at Russian tactics in the San Francisco con-
ference on the U. N. and at postwar meetings of the U. N. and the
foreign ministers. Believing that "America must behave like the Number
One World Power which she is," and that Russia must be contained,
by April, 1946, he asked publicly what Russia was up to and later force-
fully supported aid to Greece and Turkey and then the Marshall Plan. 22

The era of deep cold war in the early 1950's saw more memoirs
from conservative diplomats. Joseph C. Grew, twice Under-Secretary
of State and Ambassador to Japan, emphasized his career prior to 1942.
Yet, because Stettinius spent much time abroad or at San Francisco
with the embryo U. N. charter, Grew was acting-Secretary of State
much of the time during Roosevelt's last weeks and Truman's first
months. His influence was bent toward countering Russia in Europe. 23

Admiral William Standley, another former Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, was Roosevelt's ambassador in Moscow during two years of the
war. His book is full of Russians' suspicion of the West, from Standley's
1896 visit to Vladivostok through 1943. He also reported Stalin's sar-
castic references to the promised but undelivered second front and
Roosevelt's thoughtful silence when in October, 1943, Standley pre-
dicted that Russia would try to control eastern Europe after the war. 24

Truman himself published memoirs in the middle 1950's, the most
important since Winston Churchill's six volumes on World War II.
Since Truman was almost totally inexperienced in foreign affairs one
is not surprised to find him deeply involved in domestic matters and
heavily reliant on what advisers said in foreign affairs. Particularly for
April through July, 1945, until Truman went to Potsdam and became

21 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed.. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg
(Boston, 1952), pp. 23, 31-33, 39, 41-2, 45, 47-48, 50, 56, 96-7, 136-8. 148-52.
161, 165, 176-216.

22 Ibid., pp. 66-74, 167, 171, 176-216. 246-49, 262-87, 289-303. 341-50. 373-91.

23 Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years.
2 vols. (Boston, 1952), II, 1445-65.

24 William H. Standley and Arthur A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia
(Chicago, 1955), pp. 467, 498-99.

65

more self-confident, the book is full of what Stettinius, Harriman, Grew
and others had to say. What they said about the U.S.S.R. was that it was
creating puppet regimes in eastern Europe, violating its Yalta pledges,
and giving us only superficial cooperation. 25

Truman's reaction was amazing and in some ways typically Ameri-
can "I would not expect one hundred per cent of what we proposed.
But I felt we should be able to get eighty-five per cent." Assuming
that America should get eighty-five per cent of what it sought, Tru-
man began to talk tough, dressing down Russian Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov. Yet, he still sought to carry out his understanding
of what Roosevelt had been trying to do, sending Harry Hopkins to
Moscow for a final visit to clear up difficulties about the U. N. veto.
Truman wanted to avoid making Stalin feel that he and Churchill were
ganging up on Russia, tried to oppose colonialism, insisted on keeping
our agreement to move our troops to the proper zones of Germany,
recognized the new government of Poland, and retained a hope that he
could reach an understanding with Stalin. 26

Truman says that Potsdam taught him that the Russians were re-
lentless bargainers, pressing for every advantage, "not in earnest about
peace" because they planned to take advantage of America's weak-
ness during an expected postwar depression. Force, he decided, is all
they understand, and he became determined to keep them out of the
occupation of Japan. 27

His memoirs admit no aggressive American intent. He claims that
the atomic bomb was used merely to bring about a Japanese surrender,
and avers that U. S. economic dealings with postwar Europe were to
be a matter of aid to a starving continent and assistance for rebuilding.
Hence, we would lend to Britain and also attempt to increase German
productivity. 28

25 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, 2 vols. (Garden City, New York, 1955-56), I,
15-25, 70-78.

26 Ibid., I, 71, 79-82, 257-65, 275, 298-301, 321-22, 341-42.

27 Ibid, I, 341-412.

28 Ibid, I, 415-22, 464-97.

66

Despite his concern over Manchuria, Iran and eastern Europe.
Truman continued the demobilization of America's armed forces,
apparently assuming that this was the thing to do after a war. Apprecia-
ting the importance of atomic energy, he appears to have been unablt
to come to an early decision about its peacetime control. He decreed
secrecy in the meantime, listened to those who wanted secrecy to con-
tinue (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and those who said it would retard
scientific progress (science adviser Vannevar Bush). Ultimately, taking
a leaf from F. D. R.'s book, Truman put off decisions on international
control, and did not approach the Russians as Stimson had urged. 29

Beneath his mild pretensions Truman's aggressiveness shows. He
clearly wanted the British Empire opened to American trade and by
early 1946 was "tired of babying the Soviets." He decided that to be
heard by the Russians one had to speak bluntly. Hence, when the
U. S. S. R. continued to be difficult keeping troops in Manchuria and
Iran, putting pressure on Turkey Truman reacted. He sent sharp
protests and made American aid available to Europe through the Tru-
man Doctrine and Marshall Plan programs. In his view the Russian
response, including the Berlin blockade, made permanent the division
of Europe and declared the cold war. 30

Most memoirs since Truman's have been anticlimax. Byrnes pro-
duced a volume covering his whole career, but the portions on 1945-
1947 are a condensation of Speaking Frankly omitting favorable refer-
ences to Stalin and rewritten to make Byrnes appear much more
anti-communist than he really was. 31 David Lilienthal, New Deal head
of the Tennessee Valley Authority and first chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, published his Journals, which throw light on the
botching of international control of atomic energy partly because of
Bernard Baruch's senility. 32

Dwight Eisenhower, writing of later years, put in a few lines on
Russian aggression as the cause of cold war, 33 and his old associate

29 Ibid., I, 507-39.

30 Ibid., I, 537, 551-52; II, 76-77, 93-131.

31 James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), pp. 252-391.

32 David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal. II: The Atomic
Energy Years (New York, 1964), pp. 39-40, 49-50, 55, 69, 73.

33 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years. II: Mandate For Change,
1953-1956 (New York, 1965), pp. 111-16.

67

Robert Murphy added more illustrations of both French and Russian
contributions to the breakdown of allied cooperation in Germany. 34
John Morton Blum's edition of the diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
shows the Secretary of the Treasury's role in making soon discarded
plans for postwar Germany. 35 Dean Acheson, once denounced by
Republican campaigners as the "Red Dean" but always in reality a hard-
line cold warrior, summarized a point of view strikingly similar to
Eisenhower's. 36

The only memoirs since Truman's which have contributed new
evidence are fragments by Milovan Djilas, Charles Bohlen, and George
Kennan's Memoirs, 1925-1950. Djilas, obviously anti-Russian, shows us
Stalin, endlessly suspicious of the West, pointing to a map of the
U. S. S. R. and exclaiming, "They will never accept the idea that so
great a space should be red, never, never!" Djilas also portrays Stalin
crying out in April, 1945, "We shall recover in fifteen or twenty years,
and then we'll have another go at it." 37

Bohlen's Blaustein lectures at Columbia University in April, 1969,
were not intended to be autobiographical. But Bohlen was interpreter
for Roosevelt and Truman at all the "summit" meetings, and for Byrnes
and Marshall later, and his memories of what happened are important.
He reveals Roosevelt's "serious concern" over Russian behavior by
April, 1945, the tone of the Soviet press, and the process of inventing
the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Not quite so indignantly
anti-Soviet as Kennan, he still sees the origins of cold war in Soviet
ideology, totalitarianism and fear. 38

George Kennan published his fuller memoirs in 1967, revealing a
long-held "intellectual distaste . . . for Russian Marxism." He could

34 Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York, 1964),
pp. 257-323.

35 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries, III: Years of War, 1941-
1945 (Boston, 1967), pp. 327-62.

36 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department
(New York, 1969), pp. 150-51, 194-96.

37 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), pp. 73-4, 81,
114-15.

38 Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1969), pp. 26, 71-76, 88-89.

68

never accept "the stony-hearted fanaticism" that meant the end of
civil liberties and the liquidation of masses of people. Kennan main-
tained an anti-Soviet attitude throughout his career, meticulously ob-
serving Russian suspicion of foreigners and subversion of Poland's
independence, and speculating shrewdly on Soviet motives and future
policies. The most revealing and rewarding portions of the book are
Kennan's papers on the U. S. S. R., one of September, 1944, the famous
"long telegram" of February 22, 1946, which became the "X" article,
and others. 39 In these and in Kennan's colloquies with Harriman and
members of the State Department are origins of the containment policy.

Researchers of the cold war had to begin with few published docu-
ments. The Department of State Bulletin did provide speeches and
some official correspondence, though for a decade little but private
publications appeared. The World Peace Foundation brought out
volumes of selected documents 40 and the Rosenman edition of F. D. R.'s
papers was completed by 1950. 41 Not until the middle 1950's did the
Foreign Relations of the United States series approach the cold war,
and then only because Republicans who believed that something sinister
was hidden in the Yalta papers pushed the State Department into rapid
publication. 42

In the late 1950's the Foreign Relations volumes for the period of
World War II began to appear, not to be completed until the late
1960's. 43 Finally, the 1960's have also seen the publication of papers
from the other summit meetings: Casablanca, Teheran and Potsdam. 44

39 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston, 1967), pp. 68-72, 190, 199-
215, 250, 503-65.

40 Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll, eds., Documents on American
Foreign Relations, July, 1944-June, 1945 (Princeton, 1947); Raymond Dennett
and Robert K. Turner, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Julv 1,
1945-December31, 1946 (Princeton, 1948).

41 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 1941-1945, 4 vols. (New York, 1950).

42 U. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Confer-
ences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, 1955). Series hereafter cited as
FRUS.

43 FRUS, volumes for 1941-1946 (Washington, 1958-1969).

44 FRUS: Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1945, 2 vols. (Washington, 1960);
FRUS: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington. 1961); FRUS:
Conferences at Washington, 1941-1942, and Casablanca, 1943 (Washington.
1968).

69

From foreign sources, too, have come diaries, memoirs, and some
important documents. 45 The researcher now has almost too much to
work with.

* * *

Attack from the right began in the dying days of World War II.
William Henry Chamberlin completed a book in early 1945, crying out
that Europe was being carved into spheres of influence, that the
U. S. S. R. was using its strength and Communist parties to take over
eastern Europe. Chamberlin summarized Soviet goals as annexation of
territory up to the 1941 boundaries, creation of a wide sphere of influ-
ence beyond those borders, and preventing the creation of a British-led
bloc in western and southern Europe which might be a counterpoise.
He dismissed Russian needs for security, commenting that Russia had
twice been invaded when it held Polish and Baltic territories. 46

William C. Bullitt, a self-styled expert on the U. S. S. R. who had
wormed his way into Woodrow Wilson's attention in 1919 and had since
served as F. D. R.'s ambassador to Russia and France, completed a book
in April, 1946, contending that Stalin's goal was "the great globe itself."
Using Halford Mackinder's dubious formula of geopolitics, 47 Bullitt
claimed that Soviet control of eastern and central Europe was

45 Examples are: Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri (New Haven, 1950);
Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, 3 vols. (New York,
1955-1960); Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide and Triumph in the West
(Garden City, New York, 1957-1959), the diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alen-
brooke; Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and her Destiny (London, 1958); Anthony
Eden, Full Circle and The Reckoning (Boston, 1960-1965); The Memoirs of
General Lord Ismay (New York, 1960); Lord Moran, Churchill: Taken from the
Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston, 1966); Arthur W. Tedder, With Prejudice
(Boston, 1967); Harold Macmillan, The Blast of War (New York, 1968); Ivan
Maisky, Memoirs of a Soviet Ambassador (New York, 1968); Royal Institute
of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948 (Lon-
don, 1952) and Documents on International Affairs, 1939-1946, II: Hitler's
Europe (London, 1954); U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stalin's Cor-
respondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941-1945, 2 vols.
(New York, 1958).

46 William Henry Chamberlin, America: Partner in World Rule (New York,
1945), pp. 115-17, 144-45, 165-80.

47 Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.

70

a terrible military threat to Western Europe and to Great
Britain, and ultimately to the United States. No peace is
to be found in a division of Europe into a huge zone con-
trolled by the Soviet Union pressing against a small ring of
disconnected democracies clinging precariously to the
coasts of the Atlantic.
Having frightened himself by his own imagery, Bullitt contended that
Stalin was unappeasable because of Russian habits of suspicion, auto-
cracy and expansion; because of the Bolshevik goal of world revolu-
tion; and because Russia's "digestive powers are unrestrained by any
considerations of humanity or morality." 48

John Foster Dulles, already a leading Republican spokesman on
foreign affairs, used Life magazine as a vehicle for his views of the
U. S. S. R. as expansionist by any means, fair or foul. Almost echoing
Oliver Cromwell, he urged Americans to maintain military defenses
and demonstrate religious faith. 49

Others assured us that Tito was Moscow's agent in winning its
"centuries-long struggle to reach the warm-water seas." 50 repeated
the contention of Russia's leading a "world-wide, conspiratorial move-
ment for the conquest of a monopoly of power," 51 asserted that "war
between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
... is likely to materialize some time between the summer of 1952 and
the fall of 1956," 52 indicted F. D. R. as weak or ill or witlessly pro-
Soviet, 53 added indictments of such aides as Harry Dexter White of

48 William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself: A Preface to World Affairs
(New York, 1946), pp. 27-49, 60-70, 100-1, 194-95.

49 John Foster Dulles, "Thoughts on Soviet Foreign Policy and What to Do
About It," Life, XX (Jun. 3, 1946), 113-26; (Jun. 10, 1946), 118-30.

50 David Martin, Ally Betrayed: The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich
(New York, 1946), pp. 1-2.

51 James Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York, 1947), p. 59.

52 Ellis M. Zacharias, Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold
War (New York, 1950), p. 3.

53 William Henry Chamberlin, Beyond Containment (Chicago. 1953), pp. 27-46:
Edgar E. Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership (Philadelphia, 1955). p. 360;
Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956); George N. Crocker. Roose-
velt's Road to Russia (Chicago, 1959).

71

the Treasury, 54 presented violently pro-Polish views of the Moscow-
Warsaw-Lublin-London struggle, 55 and did all this in an increasingly
bitter tone. Anthony Kubek, for instance, wrote in 1963 of "a totally
depraved criminal conspiracy openly determined upon our destruction
as a free people." 56 Bullitt, one of those who believed Roosevelt was
too weak at Yalta to be effective, unconsciously got to the bottom of
the Right's approach in saying,

It was the President's duty to see to it that we won the war
and that we won security by our victory. . . . only three years
later, our insecurity is such that we may be forced into war
this year. 57
Condemning New Dealers for wanting security for people within
the domestic economy, rightists demand security in the infinitely less
controllable world of international politics. They somehow assume that
the United States can have anything it wants. The difference between
them and Harry Truman, expressed in mathematical whimsy, is that
while Truman would settle for eighty-five per cent of what he wanted,
they insist upon 100 per cent.

Seen in the light of others' writings and from the distance of a
decade, some scholars turn out to be quasi-rightist who once might
have been considered part of the "liberal establishment." Hungarian-
born John Lukacs adopts the view of Winston Churchill that the
U. S. S. R. clearly understood its goals in eastern Europe, but Churchill
was unable to save that region because the U. S. was "noncommittal
and insensitive," having mistakenly separated military from political
affairs. Lukacs writes in a glib, overblown style full of portentous
phrases but superficial in analysis. 58

54 Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, 1962),
p. 125.

55 Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland (New
York, 1958).

56 Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost (Chicago, 1963), pp. 441-42.

57 William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace," Life, XXV
(Aug. 30, 1948), 83-97, (Sep. 6, 1948), 86-103.

58 John Lukacs, A New History of the Cold War (Garden City, New York,
1961, 1966), pp. 42, 44-8, 282-389.

72

Walt Whitman Rostow, a darling of the American intellectual com-
munity before he became associated with Lyndon Johnson's "escalation"
of the Vietnam War, 59 produced a study of American foreign policy
at the end of the Eisenhower years, calling for a return to realism from
the moralism of "Ike" and Dulles.

Rostow, too, was Churchillian, seeing Churchill himself as aware
of reality but Americans as behaving as if their interests could be pro-
tected by "a steady retraction of commitment in Eurasia." According
to Rostow, Stalin sought to expand "to the maximum" the area he could
control in Eurasia, and Mao since 1935 had looked to power in China
plus "hegemony in Asia and major power status on the world scene."
But the U. S. lacked a conception of interest in Europe sufficiently
clear to make the fate of eastern Europe a matter for a military ulti-
matum. As in the case of Manchuria in 1931, it was worth a protest
but no more. 60 Rostow implies that East Europe was worth a military
ultimatum, possibly forecasting his later zeal for military action in
Vietnam. Lukacs and Rostow leave the same final impression: had the
U. S. been alert to realism in diplomacy it could have saved eastern
Europe from Russia and possibly prevented the cold war.

# * *

At war's end academic liberals still defended the idea of coopera-
tion with Russia, believing in reconcilable differences within "one
world," looking for hopeful signs of change inside the Soviet Union, and
urging that America act to reduce Russian suspicion of the West. 61

By 1947 they had read George Kennan's "X" article in Foreign
Affairs, setting forth the ideological and historical bases for Communist
aggression, suggesting that an innate antagonism would continue be-
tween Russia and the West and that Russia should

... be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of
counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical

59 Towsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York, 1969), pp. 20-23.

60 W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York, 1960).
pp. 141-43, 166-78.

61 Harold H. Fisher, America and Russia in the World Community (Claremont.
California, 1946), pp. 130-55, lectures in the spring of 1945; Quincy Wright, ed.,
A Foreign Policy for the United States (Chicago, 1947), pp. 13, 26-32; Harris
Foundation lectures in July, 1946.

73

and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneu-
vers of Soviet policy . . . . 62
They had also read Walter Lippmann's rejoinder, printed in his news-
paper column and then collected in a small book. Lippmann believed
that containment would permit the U. S. S. R. rather than the West to
define the issues between them, would mean using a variety of "satel-
lites, clients, dependents and puppets," and would alienate our natural
allies. 63

The liberals wavered. Some tried to understand Russian motives
and saw a clash because both the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. reached for
greater power as a result of World War II. 64 Some emphasized Russian
aggression and its ideological and historical bases; 65 now and then one
reminded us of how friendly Americans had been toward Russia during
the war. 66

A consensus began to emerge by the end of the 1940's of a well-
meaning America confronting a tendentious Soviet Union. This con-
sensus granted genuine reasons for Russian suspicion of the West not
only Marxist ideology but also the intervention after World War I,
western hostility between the wars, the long delay of a second front,
our continued recognition of such Fascist states as Spain, the abrupt
end to Lend Lease in 1945, and our inept handling of a Soviet request

62 George F. Kennan ("X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs,

XXV (Jul., 1947), 566-82.

63 Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (New York, 1947).

64 Vera Micheles Dean, The United States and Russia (Cambridge, Mass.,
1947), pp. 36-79, 130-9, 145-57, 174-83, 279-84.

65 William L. Langer, "Political Problems of a Coalition," Foreign Affairs.

XXVI (Oct., 1947), 73-89; Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion,"
The American Slavic and East European Review, VII (Oct., 1948), 197-213;
Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and Nationality Conflicts in East Central Europe"
in Waldemar Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1951). Other
Mosely articles are reprinted in Philip E. Mosely, The Kremlin and World
Politics (New York, 1960).

66 Warren B. Walsh, "American Attitudes Toward Russia," Antioch Review,
VII (Summer, 1947), 183-90.

74

for a major loan. Always prominent, too, was the Russian need for
security from invasion, especially from Germany. Hence, Soviet sus-
picion never died out, the changes within Russia were not meaningful
and Stalin set up the cold war by creating his own cordon sanitaire
in eastern Europe as the Red Army went outside of Russia. 67

But we sought the political independence and economic revival
of other nations, social reform, and the cooperation of all countries
in the U.N. Though we had been bothered by an apparent lack of Rus-
sian gratitude for Lend-Lease, at V-J Day Americans still had "a vast
reservoir of good will toward their valiant Russian ally. But the Kremlin
brutally slapped aside the outstretched American hand," overusing
the veto in the U.N., controlling eastern Europe, preventing the opera-
tion of Germany as an economic unit, helping Mao in China, putting
pressure on Turkey and Iran, and generally making the West anxious.
We soon shifted our position, public opinion became anti-Russian,
there was a conservative reaction in the U. S., and the government
began containment in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Russia's
response was to reject Marshall Plan aid, reject economic progress in
Germany, and impose the Berlin blockade. To this the West responded
with the famous airlift and, presently, the North Atlantic Treaty alliance.
The Cominform and Warsaw Pact were established in East Europe and
the cold war was a hard, bitter fact by 1949. w

67 Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia (Ithaca, New York, 1950), pp.
289-328; Raymond J. Sontag, "Reflections on the Yalta Papers," Foreign Affairs,
XXXIII (Jul., 1955), 615-23; Henry Roberts, Russia and America (New York.
1956), pp. 58-59; John L. Snell, ed.. The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge, 1956).
pp. 11-14.

68 Bailey, America Faces Russia, pp. 305, 334-35; Thomas A. Bailey. A Diplo-
matic History of the American People (New York, 1940-1969), pp. 777-99;
Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy (Englewood Cliffs.
N.J., 1955, 1965), pp. 456-61; Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of American Foreign
Policy (New York, 1948-1966), pp. 109-110; William Reitzel'et al. United States
Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington, 1956), pp. 86-93: Snell. Meaning of
Yalta, pp. 14-24; Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After: America.
1945-1960 (New York, 1961), pp. 10-13, 34-35.

75

This view has dominated American academic writing on the origins
of the cold war ever since, 69 but two works stand out above all the
rest. William H. McNeill, depending on a few interviews and material
published by early 1952, produced a volume for the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, amazingly balanced for a work appearing in the
"Joe McCarthy" phase of the cold war, and with a breadth apropriate
to the future author of The Rise of the West. 10 Herbert Feis, once an
important official in the State Department, has recently completed a
series of books made richer by his being able to use department files
and the papers of Truman and Harriman. 71

McNeill began by labeling Russia "half an ally." Suspicion was
suppressed but always present; national interest required collaboration
to defeat Germany, but ideology and history led to hatred of the West.
The U. S., also wary of foreigners, was led by men dedicated to close
cooperation with Britain in a swift military victory over the Axis, but

69 Prominent examples are: Richard W. Van Alstyne, American Crisis Diplo-
macy (Stanford, 1952); Frederick L. Schuman, Russia since 1917 (New York,
1957), pp. 297-369; Norman A. Graebner, "The Truman Administration and the
Cold War," Current History, XXXV (Oct., 1958), 223-28; Louis J. Halle, Dream
and Reality: Aspects of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1959), pp. 283-99;
Stephen D. Kertesz, ed., American Diplomacy in a New Era (Notre Dame,
Indiana, 1961), pp. 17-62; John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy since
World War II (New York, 1962), pp. 10-26; John L. Snell, Illusion and Necessity:
The Diplomacy of Global War, 1939-1945 (Boston, 1963), pp. 136-215; Richard
L. Walker, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. (Vol. XIV in The American Secretaries
of State and Their Diplomacy, Robert H. Ferrell, ed.; New York, 1965), pp.
32-56; Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War (New
York, 1965), pp. 119-74; Herbert Druks, Harry S. Truman and the Russians,
1945-1953 (New York, 1966), pp. 269-70; Dexter Perkins, The Diplomacy of
a New Age (Bloomington, Indiana, 1967), pp. 17-41; Charles L. Robertson,
International Politics Since World War II (New York, 1966); David F. Trask,
Victory Without Peace: American Foreign Relations in the Twentieth Century
(New York, 1968), pp. 130-31; John A. Garraty, Interpreting American History:
Conversations with Historians (New York, 1970), II, 225-31.

70 William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1946 (London,
1953); The Rise of the West (Chicago, 1963).

71 Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the
Peace They Sought (Princeton, 1957); Between War and Peace: The Potsdam
Conference (Princeton, 1960): The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II
(Princeton, 1966); Contest Over Japan (New York, 1967).

76

was also a nation in the grip of a myth that the defeat of fascism would
mean "an era of international peace, prosperity, freedom, and justice." 72

What sundered the temporary alliance was German defeat and the
question of the shape of the postwar world. Roosevelt and Hull fought
off early settlements, tried to prevent the creation of spheres of in-
fluence, and hoped for a world security organization to take care of
the future. Roosevelt knew that Americans would soon want to with-
draw from Europe and believed that a "modest policy" based on the
U. N. and "Big Three" cooperation would avoid the reaction of 1919-
1920 and permit continued U. S. participation in world affairs. More-
over, Hull's poor health and the State Department's inability to move
with the needs of the times allowed military leaders to have almost a
monopoly of Roosevelt's attention. Dealing with strategy, they avoided
political problems on principle. 73

But Stalin had specific goals, one being security from another
German invasion. Germany must be kept weak, Russia must be strong,
the countries between them must be friendly to Russia, and the Big
Three must be cordial enough toward each other to prevent Britain and
America from joining Germany in an anti-Soviet movement. McNeill
believed that Stalin sought security first and by insisting upon it alien-
ated the West "without clearly recognizing what he was doing until it
was too late." 74

Truman's brisk approach clashed badly with Stalin's insistence up-
on his security goals, and the whole climate of opinion changed radical-
ly in the latter half of 1945. America stood on the sidelines for a time
while Britain and Russia seemed to be antagonists in the Near East and
southeastern Europe. Then a halt to Russia's reparations from West
Germany produced a bitter anti-American campaign in the Russian
press, and the American loan to Britain in July, 1946, must have shown
Stalin an Anglo-American front against him. Communist ideology was
once more prominent in Russia and by the end of 1946 Americans gave
up their mood of "back to normal." Russian rejection of the Marshall
Plan, the coup in Prague and Mao's success in China hardened American
opinion against the U. S. S. R. Cold war, says McNeill, began by 1947. 75

72 McNeill, America, Britain, Russia, pp. 3-31, 62-87, 402, 760-61.

73 Ibid., pp. 403-5.

74 Ibid., pp. 405-9, 579-80.

75 Ibid., pp. 607-20, 652-737.

77

Feis follows a similar line, though without quite the impartiality
of tone and with a myriad of details added. His books are in some ways
anthologies of conversations and documents, and all the more valuable
because of it. We learn how blunt Stalin was in expressing his suspicion
about the postponement of the second front, and how serious Roose-
velt, Churchill, and their military staffs were in trying to find ways to
open such a front despite their lack of materiel and different approaches.
We sit in on squabbles over the handling of liberated Italy and soon to
be liberated Poland. We witness moments of apparently genuine cordial-
ity in the "grand alliance" giving way to pessimism over Poland and
then to hope because of Russian leniency with Finland and, for a time,
others. 76

Ambiguity is the watchword for late 1944 and early 1945, with the
Lublin (Communist) Poles taking over, Bulgaria dominated by Moscow,
but Czechoslovakia and Finland retaining genuine independence.
Agreement at Yalta gave way to a coup in Rumania, "incurable troubles"
over Poland, and Stalin's total disbelief of western good intentions in
the attempted German surrender in Italy. In Roosevelt's last few days
of life two messages came from Harriman in Moscow warning of Rus-
sian aggression in eastern Europe through the satellites and in western
Europe through communist parties. 77

Truman wavered, testing Soviet intentions by sending Hopkins on
a last mission to Moscow, talking tough to Molotov, yet meeting Stalin
at Potsdam. But, concludes Feis, the Russians "were trying not only to
extend their boundaries and their control over neighboring states but
also beginning to revert to their revolutionary effort throughout the
world." 78

Truman, Feis believes, was impressed at Potsdam by Soviet aims
and definitely decided that the U. S. S. R. would have no role in the
occupation of Japan. And Feis wrote an entire book on Truman's
maneuvers to achieve that result. 79

76 Feis, Churchill, pp. 47-98, 105-18, 134-35, 182-94, 237-78, 325-27, 378-89,
411-17.

77 Ibid., pp. 500-98.

78 Ibid., pp. 634-38, 647-55.

79 Feis, Contest over Japan.

78

Feis was depressed by the collapse of the alliance and the onset
of a cold war in which antagonists were restrained mainly by the
"mutuality of terror" of nuclear weapons. 80 It was a feeling common
among American intellectuals in the 1960's, brought on by the sadness
of writing history that seemed headed nowhere except eventual holo-
caust.

One task was accomplished with more zeal. That was a defense of
Roosevelt, Truman, their advisers, their policies and their deeds. Right-
ist attacks had moved out of books into political campaigns, becoming
a basic weapon of one wing of the Republican Party. 81

Feis defended Roosevelt's decision to defeat Germany before Japan
by indicating the possible unhappy consequences of taking Japan first;
he went on to show Roosevelt as a realist who sought first to win the
war, who saw that Russia could seize the parts of East Europe it wanted,
whose information on Russia was ambiguous at best, and who employed
the realistic Harriman. 82

Philip Mosely and Robert Divine reminded us that where the armies
went spheres of influence were created automatically. Mosely adds
that Roosevelt tried at Yalta in the Declaration on Liberated Europe
to safeguard eastern Europe, and Divine adds that "Roosevelt's attempt
to seek a reasonable accomodation with the Russians threw the onus
for the subsequent cold war squarely upon Stalin." 83 John L. Snell and
Richard Leopold, among others, have said that Roosevelt got what one
could get at Yalta, even to Russian support for Chiang K'ai-shek over
Mao. 84 Feis and others have portrayed Truman as a realist who re-
sponded valiantly to the Russian offensive. 85 This has no doubt corn-

so

Feis, Between War and Peace, pp. 322-24.

81 See the Republican Party platform on Yalta, 1952; Kirk E. Porter and Donald
Bruce Johnson, eds., National Party Platforms, 1840-1964 (Urbana. Illinois.
1966), pp. 497-500.

82 Feis, Churchill, pp. 46, 125, 174-75, 197-98, 597-98.

83 Mosely, Kremlin in World Politics, pp. 200, 211; Robert A. Divine, Roosevelt
and World War II (Baltimore, 1969), pp. 73, 97-98.

84 Snell, Illusion and Necessity, pp. 197-98; Garraty, Interpreting American
History, II, 228.

8 5

Feis, Contest over Japan; Druks, Truman and the Russians.

79

forted loyal Democrats, but what has it added to our understanding of
the cold war?

# * #

Consensus, once a favorite word of Lyndon Johnson's, haunted
him in the election year of 1968 when the Vietnam War shattered the
Democratic Party. Consensus, once a favorite term of historians, has
been wrecked by the New Left's challenge to orthodox liberal historio-
graphy. The New Left is not really new; Charles Beard, J. Fred Rippy
and others showed the way to economic interpretations and to admit-
ting that America was not flawless in its morality. 86 But the New Left
has shocked historians out of the slothful ease of consensus and into a
review of evidence on the origins of the cold war. It is thus responsible
for our first real progress in interpreting the cold war since McNeill's
work of twenty years ago.

Norman Cousins of the Saturday Review and Thomas Finletter,
later to be Truman's Secretary of the Air Force, were the pioneers.
Barely ten months after Hiroshima they inquired,

Can it be that we were more anxious to prevent Russia
from establishing a claim for full participation in the occu-
pation against Japan than we were to think through the
implications of unleashing atomic warfare? 87

But in an increasingly chilly atmosphere of cold war it was all one
could do to defend Roosevelt and Truman from the primitives who
accused them of being red agents. For a time it was enough to stay out
of congressional hearing rooms or avoid being branded as a security
risk. And, as we have seen, the orthodox liberals established their own
patriotism along with that of Roosevelt and Truman.

For fifteen years there were few hints of the revisionism of the left.
Albert Z. Carr, who had been an assistant to Donald M. Nelson when
the latter was chairman of the War Production Board, wrote a brave
book at a bad time, 1950, recording that Russia sought a loan from us

86 Some examples: Charles A. Beard, The Open Door at Home (New York,
1935) and Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1943);
J. Fred Rippy, The Capitalists and Colombia (New York, 1931); Latin America
and the Industrial Age (New York, 1947); Globe and Hemisphere (Chicago,
1958).

87 Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, "A Beginning for Sanity," Satur-
day Review of Literature, XXIX (Jun. 15, 1946), 5-9, 38-40.

80

only to be thwarted by America's desire to use the loan for political
leverage. Stalin, says Carr, had been emphasizing Soviet economic
needs, must have seen Roosevelt failing at Yalta, and in the spring prob-
ably worried about this new, unknown factor of Harry Truman. Stalin
turned to reparations as a substitute for American credit, upsetting us
by despoiling Germany and Manchuria. East-West division had pre-
ceded the Potsdam meeting; "haggle and snarl" over Germany and east-
ern Europe at Potsdam and after merely symbolized the division and the
onset of cold war. 88

William Appleman Williams, who has become the patron of the
Left, entered the field in 1952 with a survey of American relations
with Russia. This was almost orthodox liberal history, but Williams did
pick up the notion of how we thought of using our economic power in
the postwar era. His tentative conclusion was that Truman decided to
use that power not for negotiation but to force American versions of
settlements; hence, Truman's stern attitude toward the U. S. S. R.
Williams adds of the atomic bomb that our secrecy fetish merely made
Russia more suspicious than ever. 89

A year later James P. Warburg, scion of an old banking family and
New Deal adviser, took Truman to task for adopting an over-simplified
view of international politics. Warburg said that the "disastrous conse-
quence" was our having a merely negative foreign policy, one aimed
at thwarting the Soviet Union, giving Russia the initiative, and (shades
of Walter Lippmann!) making us choose friends on the sole test of their
"anti-Sovietism." 90

But these were mere fragments of history and attracted little at-
tention, as did Herbert Aptheker's obviously pro-Russian writings. 91
Staughton Lynd hinted at something in claiming that the cold war began
because "for the first time the challenge of authoritarian socialism to

88 Albert Z. Carr., Truman, Stalin and Peace (Garden City, New York, 1950),
pp. 13-26, 32-42, 59-61, 67-80.

89 William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New
York, 1952), pp. 262-81.

90 James P. Warburg, Germany: Key to Peace (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).
pp. 60-62.

91 Herbert Aptheker, American Foreign Policy and the Cold War (New York,
1962).

81

democratic capitalism was backed by sufficient power to be an ever-
present political and military threat." 92

A new synthesis, however, had to wait for Williams' researches
to bear fruit and for D. F. Fleming to come to the end of a dozen years
of work inspired by his being "appalled" at a "new balance of power
conflict." 93

Williams' The Tragedy of American Diplomacy begins with the
conceptions guiding American foreign policy:

One is the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to help
other people solve their problems. A second is the principle
of self-determination applied at the international level, . . .
the right of every society to establish its own goals . . . and to
realize them internally through the means it decides are
appropriate. These two ideas can be reconciled . . . but the
third idea . . . insists that other people cannot really solve
their problems . . . unless they go about it in the same way
as in the United States. 94
To this controlling attitude Williams added economic as well as
political motives for our entry into World War II. Businessmen and
government officials alike refused to consider our having "a more
self-contained economy" and by 1943, says Williams, there was agree-
ment among officials of business origins Harriman, Nelson, Stettinius,
Forrestal, Adolf Berle, Paul Hoffman that America would have to
seek new economic frontiers to insure postwar prosperity. 95

Franklin Roosevelt was originally unwilling and later too fatigued
to reconsider "America's conception of itself and the world." At his
death we had not resolved the contradiction between our tradition
of the open door and the new presence of the U. S. S. R. as a great

92 Staughton Lynd, "How the Cold War Began," Commentary, XXX (Nov.,
1960), 378-89.

93 D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960, 2 vols. (Garden
City, New York, 1961), I, xii.

94 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New
York, 1959, 1962), p. 9.

95 Ibid., pp. 160-200.

82

power with its own messianic impulses, or, indeed, the new revolutions
in the underdeveloped regions. 96

Roosevelt's successors did not understand this problem and "em-
barked upon a program to force the Soviet Union to accept America's
traditional conception" of the world-wide open door. This, says Wil-
liams, "crystallized the cold war," hardening the natural antagonism
between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. Truman's tough approach played
into the hands of hard line men in Moscow, turning Stalin away from
the "softies" who wanted to improve the quality of life in Russia and
to have good relations with the West rather than rivalry. 97

Americans continued to be driven by "the nightmare of depression
and the vision of omnipotence," believing that America must find
greater markets or suffer a depression or endure a socialist economy.
The "vision of omnipotence" came from our monopoly of atomic power
combined with a belief that the U. S. was "the agent of positive good"
and should combat evil Russia. 98

"The diplomacy of the vicious circle" ensued. The U. S. S. R. began
to rebuild in part on reparations from Germany and eastern Europe and
also established its security zone there. However, it did withdraw from
Iran and gave up attempts to win concessions from Turkey. Williams
ignores "sabre-rattling" remarks from Moscow which began in August,
1945, and calls attention instead to aggressive statements by Truman.
Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, and our stopping of further Russian
reparations from West Germany. The U. S. S. R., he says, responded
with further repression in eastern Europe 99 and the cold war was on.

There are two major problems in Williams' work. One is that he
uses Russian thoughts and deeds only at moments which suit his pur-
poses, that is, in presumed response to western aggressive acts. Second,
he provides little documentation and his evidence is difficult to track
down if not evanescent.

Williams has since dug further into the origins of America's search
for an "open world," presenting a challenging mass of evidence on the

96 Ibid., pp. 204-6, 297-309.

97 Ibid., 205-8, 214-18, 225-29.

98 Ibid., pp. 220-27, 244-54.

99 Ibid., pp. 259-74.

83

latter years of the 1800's. 100 One of his pupils has gone farther than
Williams in the period of World War II and the cold war. Using the
same words, "an open world," Lloyd Gardner records the ideas of
Will Clayton, Lachlan Currie, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and other ad-
visers to Roosevelt and Truman, all to the effect that there must be
free international trade even to an "open sky" for air routes. We invited
the U. S. S. R. to participate in the Bretton Woods conference and other
meetings for opening up future trade, but not to share in Near Eastern
oil. By the end of 1944 Americans began to worry about a Russian
sphere in eastern Europe being closed, not part of the open world. 101

Political quarrels over Poland and the meaning of the Yalta agree-
ments made both sides more suspicious of each other. At this point
Gardner dumps Truman into the presidency, deciding to "meet the
issue now" instead of later and talking boldly to the Russians. Truman,
he says, became angry at reports of American interests "rapidly being
pushed out of Eastern Europe by the Russian steamroller." There was
briefly a division in the administration "between those who demanded
good deeds from Russia first and those who argued that the good deeds
had to come from America at the same time ..." an,d-trre former won. 102

Gardner believes that atomic energy made things worse. Secrecy
became an American obsession, understandable in a wartime atmos-
phere, but Truman also became overconfident and before 1945 was
over, men in the Kremlin were speaking of preparations to fight the
capitalists. By the time we presented the "Baruch Plan" on atomic energy
"Cold War positions were already frozen." 103

In the spring of 1970 Gardner published a second book, a gallery
of portraits of Americans responsible for our share in the origins of
the cold war. William Bullitt appears, violently anti-Soviet but Gardner

ioo William Appleman Williams, "Rise of an American World Power Complex"
in Neal D. Houghton, ed., Struggle Against History (New York, 1968), pp. 1-19;
William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern American Empire (New
York, 1969).

101 Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison,
Wisconsin, 1964), pp. 263-94.

102 Ibid., pp. 302-18.

103 Ibid., pp. 319-25.

84

fails to show that he was of any impact during this period. F. D. R.
stands accused of trying to make reality conform to the Atlantic Char-
ter, a charge for which there is some basis but which hardly brands
him a cold warrior. Harry Truman disappears among his strong-willed
advisers, Gardner seeking once again to find Truman involved in econ-
omic expansion. Byrnes is presented as an advocate of tough public
diplomacy and Will Clayton more realistically as a believer in the growth
of American trade. George Marshall is shown only in his hopeless mis-
sion to China, a topic handled with infinitely greater knowledge and
skill by Tang Tsou. Bernard Baruch vanishes into our preoccupation
with American control of atomic energy, but Gardner nails down Dean
Acheson as a manufacturer of mantles of holiness with which we cover-
ed crass goals. Two other incisive chapters summarize Lucius Clay's
role in the rebuilding of Germany, portray the near-psychotic anti-
Soviet Forrestal, and show us George Kennan as almost equally anti-
Soviet but balanced in personality and politics and therefore upset at
the results of his "X" article. 104

Finally, Gardner claims that we could have avoided "the worst
moments of the cold war" if we had been decent about economic aid to
the U.S.S.R., had guaranteed permanent German disarmament, and had
approached the Russians sooner and more directly on atomic energy.
Instead, "against the fear of revolution, the United States erected a
barrier built upon the Bretton Woods system and anchored by the Bri-
tish loan." 105 Gardner is far more reliable than Williams in his use of
evidence; his problem is an apparent unwillingness to give adequate
weight to non-economic factors in men's minds.

D. F. Fleming's The Cold War and Its Origins is also well doc-
umented, but most of its footnotes refer to secondary sources and Flem-
ing made heavy use of newspapers. In attitude, Fleming is a good pupil
of the late James T. Shotwell, believing in a good world and writing with
missionary zeal to help avoid a third and presumably nuclear world war. 106

Fleming begins with western opposition to Soviet Russia: horror at
the very existence of a Bolshevik government, the intervention of 1918-

104 Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American
Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). See also Tang Tsou, America's
Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago, 1963), pp. 349-440.

105 Gardner, Architects, pp. 301-18.

106 Fleming, Cold War, I, xii-xiv.

85

1920, ostracism of Russia between the wars, trying to turn Hitler against
Russia at Munich. Russia's response, the expedient alliance with Germany,
seizure of territory in Poland, the Baltic region and Rumania, produced
further western anger which was only partly cooled by the German attack
on Russia in 1941. 107

Fleming grants that western aid was of crucial importance to Russia,
but says that the West's reluctance to confirm Russia's 1941 frontiers
led Stalin to depend instead on the Red Army which won "much wider
and deeper guarantees in eastern Europe " This was self-defeat by
the West, which lost a chance to set limits to Russian expansion. The
U.S.S.R. was also upset by continued postponement of a real second
front. Fleming's account of these matters is marred by an anti-British
bias and a lack of strategic sense as to what the West could or could not
do, given its resources in 1942-1943. 108

The tale of Yalta betrays further Fleming's indignation. He finds
"historically justified" the moving of millions of Germans to create "a
strong Poland, both industrially and agriculturally," without recognizing
the fact that Poland's twenty million people were not going to be a strong
country. In viewing "unsurpassed suffering" of the Ukraine and Byelo-
russia, true enough in itself, which made it difficult to deny their claims
to seats in the proposed U.N. Fleming ignoring both the facts that they
were out of place in an association of independent nations and the real
reason for Stalin's insistence upon their being seated the alarming
amount of anti-Soviet sentiment revealed there in 1941. 109

After Yalta came the clash; we expected the Russians to "accept
our way of life in Poland and the Balkans," including the impossible
act of allowing free elections. The clash was exacerbated by Churchill's
intervention in Greece and Russia's overthrow of reactionary regimes
in eastern Europe. 110

Roosevelt, Fleming thinks, could have prevented the cold war, but
Truman

was quick to maximize the difficulties and to be tough with
the Russians. He was soon engaged in what would have been

107 Ibid., I, 3-137.

108 Ibid., I, 139-70.

109 Ibid., I, 199-203.

110 Ibid, 1,208-11.

86

inconceivable to Roosevelt an attempt to "contain'' and en-
circle the Soviet Union with arms, alliances and bases

Why? Truman was a belligerent personality surrounded by anti-Soviet
advisers and pushed to the right by such powerful congressional leaders
as Arthur Vandenberg. 111

Russia, too, emerged from the war with self-confidence, having
overcome the worst that could be thrown against it. Russian policy,
says Fleming, included "a sincere offer of cooperation with the world"
in the U.N. but also security measures in eastern Europe. Polish intran-
sigence, Red Army brutality and the creation of satellites upset the
West and led to mutual recriminations. This was made worse by the
U. S. monopoly of atomic power and worse yet by both sides' use of a
double standard. Each expected the other to acquiesce in its organiza-
tion of part of Europe but not to organize the other part of Europe. 112

By the autumn of 1945 America and Russia were going separate
ways on the crucial issue of atomic energy and in the winter came a
dispute over Iran in which the West forced Russia out of a region of
vital Russian interests. At the same time came Churchill's Iron Curtain
speech, which Fleming accuses Truman of instigating, basing his charge
solely upon Truman's determination to quit "babying" the Soviets.
But the result was fury in Moscow and toughness became the response
of East and West to each other. Truman fired Henry Wallace for seek-
ing better relations with Russia, illustrating Fleming's contention that
Americans and Russians wanted peace but their leaders could not
agree on the terms of peace. 113

Caught in the grip of what Robert M. Hutchins called "tribal self-
adoration," the U. S. created the Truman Doctrine that it "must" sup-
port free peoples who were resisting attempts subjugation. This response
to guerrilla war in Greece and pressure on Turkey Fleming regards as
the declaration of the cold war. After the U. S. proposed and Russia
rejected the Marshall Plan, the U. S. S. R., too, accepted the world as
divided into two opposing camps. The coup in Prague in February. 1948.
smashed what had been a bridge between East and West. 114

111 Ibid., 1,214-16,266-84.

112 Ibid., I, 219-62, 285, 308-30.

113 Ibid., 1,330-423.

114 Ibid., I, 415, 438-96; see also Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of
Czechoslovakia, 1 938-1 948 (Princeton, 1959).

87

There followed the hardest phase of the cold war, with western
demands for containment or even preventive war, further Anglo-Ameri-
can cooperation in Germany, the Berlin blockade and airlift, the crea-
tion of NATO, Russia's atomic bomb, American work on the fusion
bomb, and blind reaction inside both camps Russia's expulsion of Tito
from the Cominform and attempts to overthrow him, and McCarthyism
in America. 115

Fleming often imitated Williams in picking and choosing his evi-
dence. But he had intriguing ideas and enormous scope, inspiring Fred
Cook's study of the "warfare state" and possibly helping push ex-banker
Warburg farther left. 116

Attracting much more attention has been Gar Alperovitz's Atomic
Diplomacy, which contends that Harry Truman decided on a show-
down with Russia, tried the pressure of Lend-Lease and troop positions
in Europe, found these unsatisfactory, and then delayed a real show-
down until the U.S. had possession of the atomic bomb. Then he used
the bomb on Japan not to end the war but to overawe the Russians. 117

One basic flaw in Atomic Diplomacy is its narrow concentration
on American policy, an approach which makes Alperovitz unaware of
realities in Moscow or Tokyo. A second flaw is that the reader is in-
troduced to an automatically anti-Soviet Harry Truman. One infers
that American pride and assumptions of superiority, plus anti-Soviet
advisers pushed Truman in this direction, but there is a strong impres-
sion left that Truman perversely decided to be tough. 118

A third flaw is Alperovitz's misuse of evidence. He thinks Truman
felt himself little bound by the terms of Lend-Lease legislation, but his
citations in the Potsdam Conference papers prove the opposite that
Truman did recognize Lend-Lease as being a wartime measure. More-
over, Alperovitz ignores strong congressional attitudes, which were

115 Fleming, Cold War, I, 449-540. See also Fleming's "Can Pax Americana
Succeed?" Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Vol. 360 (Jul., 1965), pp. 127-38.

116 Fred J. Cook, The Warfare State (New York, 1962), pp. 68-87; James P.
Warburg, The United States in the Postwar World (New York, 1966), pp. 11-63.

117 Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York,
1965, 1967).

118 Ibid., pp. 13-14, 19-33.

bound to have impact on the former Senator Truman. Finally, an im-
portant recent article using the Stettinius papers and other such manu-
scripts reveals not only the legal limits of Lend-Lease but the fact that
Stettinius and Harriman wanted no showdown with Russia until after
the U.N. conference at San Francisco. The Truman decision on Lend-
Lease was to deliver not only what the U. S. S. R. needed for the Pacific
War but also industrial plants partially delivered. Bureaucrats fearful
of congressional pressure turned ships back, shocking not only Stettinius
and Harriman but Will Clayton, who is often cited as a proponent of
economic pressure against the Soviet Union. 119

Alperovitz asserts that Truman then sought to delay the Potsdam
meeting until the atomic bomb was ready. He dismisses as "impossibly
weak" Truman's explanation to Churchill of preparing a budget mes-
sage, ignoring all the domestic problems that clamored for a President's
attention. 120 Roosevelt had put most of his dwindling energy into the
war, peace was approaching and with it endless problems of reconver-
sion, and Truman's own major interests had been domestic.

Another major Alperovitz point is Truman's being "tremendously
pepped up" by word of the successful atomic test at Alamogordo and
that Truman's manner at the Potsdam conference tabled changed ab-
ruptly once he had read the full report of the bomb's power. He became
more confident and blunt. Robert Murphy testifies to a change in that
direction. Yet, if one goes to the Potsdam minutes one finds Truman
perhaps talking a bit more than at previous meetings but not enough or
boldly enough to support Churchill's remark that ". . . he was a changed
man . . . generally bossed the whole meeting." Alperovitz himself ad-
mits that at the first plenary session at Potsdam,

In striking contrast to Roosevelt, who had habitually allow-
ed Stalin and Churchill to take the lead, Truman confident-
ly produced detailed American proposals for the broad
range of issues he intended to discuss during the Conference.
Take up Eastern Europe, the President bluntly asserted. . . . 121

119 Ibid., p. 39; FRUS: Potsdam, I, 818-19; II, 341, 1184-85; Vandenberg Papers.
pp. 66-74, 161, 167; George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the
Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945," Journal of American History. LVI (Jun..
1969), 93-114.

120 Alperovitz, A tomic Diplomacy, pp. 55-68.

121 Ibid., pp. 127, 147-52; Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 273; FRUS:
Potsdam, 11,86-98, 116-37, 203-21, 225.

89

Alperovitz must ultimately stand or fall on the use of the atomic
bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. "From any rational military point of
view," he says, Japan was beaten. But his discussion of the end of the
Pacific war ignores Japanese sources, accepts as "overt and explicit'"
the ambiguous Japanese peace feelers, fails to mention Japanese prepar-
ations for meeting an invasion with over 10,000 Kamikaze aircraft, and
ignores the deadlock in the Japanese Supreme War Council after both
atomic bombs and the Russian declaration of war a deadlock broken
by Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki's arrangements with Emperor Hiro-
hito. Small wonder that Herbert Feis says of Atomic Diplomacy,
The conclusion is reached by ignoring the total pertinent
historical circumstance and concentrating on diverse frag-
ments in memoirs and diaries which can be read to fit pre-
conceptions. 122
The most recent synthesis is Gabriel Kolko's The Politics of War,
doing for the second world war what Arno Mayer has done for the first
one. 123 Kolko builds a picture of a war-wrecked Europe in which the
prewar social system was disintegrating and the Left was emerging as
the strongest single political force. The West wondered if the U. S. S. R.
were behind the Left and by 1943 the assurance of victory revealed that
old hatreds were not dead between East and West. Kolko says that the
U. S. S. R. actually restrained as much of the Left as it controlled,
Tito and Mao being free agents, but the U. S. considered all blocs that
it did not dominate as undermining its objectives for "an integrated
world capitalism," or, Williams' open world. Coalition had come only
from a common need to defeat a common enemy, now Americans saw
evidence of Communist expansion and shifted priorities to contain-
ment of the dual menace of the European Left and the U. S. S. R. 124

122 Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, pp. 106-19, 176-92; see also Kase, Journey
to the Missouri; Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, p. 202n;
Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, 1954); Louis
Morton, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Foreign Affairs, XXXV (Jan.,
1957), 334-53.

123 Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign
Policy, 1943-1945 (New York, 1968); Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the
New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959) and Politics and Diplomacy of
Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-revolution at Versailles, 1918-1919
(New York, 1967).

124 Kolko, Politics of War, pp. 3-37, 618-21.

90

Kolko handles evidence much more judiciously than Alperovitz
and avoids the latter's blunders by placing American foreign policy in
the only setting in which it makes sense the world it had to deal with.
His distortions lie in two areas. The first is Anglo-American relations.
Properly, he sees the U. S. as opposed to a British dominated West
Europe block, but he misses what McNeill had described, the intimate
connections through the Joint Boards of the two countries' wartime
economies. He also accuses Britain of opposing a second front in France
and of putting political goals above military victory, but provides no
evidence for this. 125 His second distortion is in going beyond the avail-
able evidence in arguing that America was determined to have its way
in an open world.

But normally Kolko is meticulous and he reminds us of much that
has been forgotten: "the Polish suicide complex" of Sikorski and his
associates who believed their country to be a great power and sought
to make it head of a bloc of East European states; America knowing the
kind of economic world it wanted and making elaborate arrangements
for postwar trade, as in the International Monetary Fund; America
having only the vaguest political goals and simply opposing spheres of
influence, seeking control of the U.N. through the veto and a Latin
American bloc, and then throwing a curtain of moral rhetoric around
the whole business; the fascist quality of most prewar regimes in eastern
Europe, which meant that Anglo-American political traditions were
irrelevant there and also that the U. S. S. R. could not reasonably permit
a return to 1938 ways. 126

Kolko sees Truman as carrying out Roosevelt's policies in a harsh,
undiplomatic manner, using the atomic bomb to end the war rather
than frighten the Russians. But he thinks America preceived the Euro-
pean Left and the U. S. S. R. as far greater threats than they really
were. Since we had set a precedent in our exclusive handling of Italian
and French politics after liberation, the Russians followed suit in east-

125 Ibid., pp. 7, 21-5; McNeill, America, Britain, Russia, pp. 118-50; for an
example of Churchill's motives see Feis, Churchill, p. 202n; for the plight of
America and Britain in 1941-1943 see Henry H. Adams, 1942: The Year That
Doomed the Axis (New York, 1967); Winston S. Churchill. The Second World
War, IV: The Hinge of Fate (Boston, 1950); Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe,
pp. 16-30; Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, II: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-
1942 (New York, 1966).

126 Kolko, Politics of War, pp. 99-121, 167, 242-79, 404-20.

91

ern Europe and did not understand our objections. The combination
of old hatreds and fears with new misunderstandings were enough to
convince each of the other's bad intentions. Kolko's verdict on Yalta
is a good one for his view of World War II: "betrayal . . . was really a
deflation of the illusions cultivated . . . ." 127

Is there any newer or better way to look at all this? Modified New
Left views have been disappointing. Walter LaFeber, too, occasionally
distorts evidence, writing that

Truman delivered a speech larded with references to Amer-
ica's monopoly of atomic power. In one sentence the Presi-
dent attacked Russia's tightening hold in Eastern Europe:
it is one of the "fundamentals" of American policy, Truman
announced, that "We shall refuse to recognize any govern-
ment imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign
power. 128
But if one reads the entire Truman speech of October 27, 1945,
one finds the President adding eleven other "fundamentals" which
said that we sought no expansion, had no plans for aggression, wanted
all nations to have equal access to trade and raw materials, and would
work through the United Nations. Moreover, his references to atomic
power were to the effect that the U. S. would not use it and wanted
international control of it. 129

Fred Warner Neal, writing a modified Williams approach, did better
by contributing the psychological insight that America rejected the
"real world," becoming so obsessed with what the Russians might do
that we developed "a set of apocrypha" to explain all events by means
of a Soviet conspiracy. 130 The reductio ad absurdum of this has been
the John Birch society.

127

Ibid., pp. 38-96, 128-31, 368, 381-82, 436-56.

128 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York, 1967),
p. 1.

129 Truman Papers: 1945, pp. 431-38.

130 Fred Warner Neal, "The Cold War in Europe, 1945-1967," in Houghton,
Struggle Against History, pp. 20-40. For a summary of the Williams-Alperovitz
approach, see Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman
Administration (Chicago, 1970).

92

For those who want to begin their own research, Arnold Kaufman
has identified the biases of various approaches, Norman Graebner has
reviewed recent literature, and Robert Divine has collected a bibliog-
raphy on World War II and it's aftermath. 131 But for our own new
model let us take the outline of the most elegantly written work in the
field, Louis J. Halle's The Cold War as History. Halle's tone is wistful
as he shows people "struggling like Laocoon with the enveloping prob-
lems of the day," and there seems an inevitability in his tale. Indeed,
he says,

If you put a scorpion and a tarantula together in a bottle
the objective of their own self-preservation will impell them
to fight each other to the death. For the moment, at least, no
understanding between them is possible. If either stopped
fighting he would immediately be killed. From the point
of view of each, the basic situation is that the other is trying
to kill him. . . . The situation is tragic. The proper attitude
for the observer, therefore, is one of sympathy for both
parties. 132

Are the United States and the Soviet Union scorpion and tarantula?
Halle begins with "the behavior of Moscow as a reflection of Russia's
historic experience." Experts of widely varying shades of opinion and
of different academic approaches agree with him. There is in the border-
line States of Russia a xenophobia created by centuries of devasting
invasions. As a result of insecurity and the nationalism of a vigorous
people there is an old tradition of expansion and an equally old tradition
of absolutism. Ideology enters at two points: the ancient sense of Rus-
sia's mission as the "Third Rome" and a newer vision of Russia as leader
of a movement toward Communism. Stalin's own paranoid personality
reinforced these tendencies. Moreover, these same tendencies were a
trap, causing Russian leaders to preceive the West as more hostile even

131 Arnold S. Kaufman, "The Cold War in Retrospect" in Irving Howe, ed.,
A Dissenter's Guide to Foreign Policy (New York, 1968), pp. 65-94; Norman A.
Graebner, "Cold War Origins and Continuing Debate: a Review of Recent Litera-
ture," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (Mar., 1969), 123-32; Robert A.
Divine, ed., Causes and Consequences of World War II (Chicago. 1969). pp.
31-44.

132 Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York, 1967), pp. xii-xiii.

93

than it was and, in Barrington Moore's words, making "it almost impos-
sible to believe in the friendly intentions of American leaders." 133

To avoid facing these facts is, as Fred Warner Neal would put it,
to reject the real world. But it would also be rejection of the real world
to ignore American attitudes which are what Halle calls "a reflection
of experience opposite to that of the Russians." 134

Americans have their own notions of the unreliability of foreigners,
descended as we are from immigrants who fled the Old World's evils.
We have had a sense of being different from the rest of mankind and
morally superior to it. We early adopted a double standard that "deeds
wrong in themselves when done by other peoples, become perfectly
permissible when done by the United States." It was not imperialism
for us to annex overseas territory because our purposes were philan-
thropic. We oversimplified the world into the good, seeking peace, and
the evil, aggressors who started wars. Arthur Ekirch, who is far from the
New Left, comments that by 1945 we were "supremely confident of
America's strength . . . ill-prepared to accept any forthcoming challenge
to United States world leadership," especially by "new revolutionary
forces." Indeed, "in the fervor of their recent conversion from isola-
tionism to internationalism, the American public was all too frequently
blind to the fact that their own new views often only projected older
nationalistic prejudices upon a world stage." 135

Halle contends that after the war "for the moment, the United States
was without a workable foreign policy." The public wanted our soldiers
brought home and demobilized, the Senate wanted to resume its role

133 Ibid., pp. 10-19; Wright, A Foreign Policy, pp. 26-29; Dean, U. S. and Russia,
pp. 36-79; Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," Barrington Moore, ed.
Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 370-1 ; Roberts, Russia and America,
pp. 58-60; George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin
(Boston, 1961), pp. 387-93; Frederick L. Schuman, The Cold War (Baton Rouge,
1967), pp. 10-23; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of
Soviet Foreign Policy.

134 Halle, Cold War, p. 20.

136 Ibid., pp. 20-29; Charles O. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967), pp. 108-19; Robert W. Tucker, The Just War
(Baltimore, 1960), pp. 11-28; Arthur Ekirch, Jr., Ideas, Ideals, and American
Diplomacy (New York, 1966), 171-72; for a general treatment of American
division of the world into good and evil see Halle, Dream and Reality.

94

of watchdog over foreign policy, a national debt of $275 billion meant
close scrutiny of budgets. Military spending was pared down sharply
even in requests by the Army and Navy, and the Congress was interested
in cutting even more. As late as June, 1947, all major contracts for
long-range missiles were cancelled and missile research would remain
negligible until the early 1950's. 136

As to America's wish for an open world, we have hunted profits in
foreign trade since the colony of Virginia first exported a leaf of tobacco
or since the colony of Massachusetts sent its first shipload of fish to
Europe. But even Gardner admits that freedom of trade was not to be
for America only; all nations were to have equal opportunity. Moreover,
American assumptions were that an international economy freed of
government controls would be the most efficient one possible, that it
would serve all nations' interests equally well, that the many nations'
economic interests were in the long run fundamentally harmonious.
There is no sinister plot in this, but merely erroneous judgments. New
Left writers also err in emphasizing the executive branch, for Congress
had its own ideas which acted as a latent veto on a loan to Russia and
which kept the executive on a short tether with only brief renewals
of the Trade Agreements Act. 137

America in 1945 could not decide on the role of power. While de-
mobilizing our armed forces, in October, 1945, Truman asked for
Universal Military Training as a permanent measure. In the same month
he spoke of the Golden Rule as our guide, and added,

I think Russia has been badly misrepresented in this country,
as we have been badly misrepresented in Russia We have
always been friends, and I hope we always will be. 138
Given these mixed attitudes, how did Russo-American trouble begin?

136 Halle, Cold War, p. 102; Reitzel et al, U. S. Foreign Policy, p. 91; Edward
A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1941-1963 (Columbus.
Ohio, 1966), pp. 38-64.

137 Gardner, New Deal Diplomacy, pp. 287-88; William Y. Elliott et al. The
Political Economy of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1955), pp. 206-9:
Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins
of the Cold War, 1943-1946," Journal of American History, LVI (Jun., 1969).
70-92; William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1957), p. 32; for what Stettinius, Acheson and Clayton actually said
see Goodrich and Carroll, eds., Documents, pp. 28-39, 467-79, 485-99.

138 Truman Papers; 1945, pp. 380-87, 404-13.

95

World War II was obviously a three-cornered war. Each of the major
allies entered it in a different way, Britain because of Neville Chamber-
lain's frustration at being swindled by Hitler and to seek a new balance
of power; Russia by attack from Germany, once more fighting off a
western invasion; the U. S. by Japanese attack but really because of
its partnership with Britain and sympathy for China. Each nation fought
its own war.

One point upon which right, center and left all agree is that mutual
suspicion was thinly concealed during the war, hostility emerging at
real or imagined grievances. The U. S. S. R. declined to recognize the
difficulties of a second front in France 139 and the New Left joins it
in suspicion of British motives, though the British strategy of opening
the Mediterranean fitted western capabilities and weakened Germany
sufficiently for the Normandy invasion to be a swift success. 140 The
U. S. S. R. also failed to appreciate fully the contribution of Lend-
Lease and it is worth noting that in the spring of 1945 when American
suspicion was rapidly growing we increased deliveries to Russia while
cutting them to other countries. 141

Franklin Roosevelt had always "played by ear," seeking to keep
freedom of action, all possible options open, as was his basic political
style. His foreign policy goals remained vague, his attitudes toward
Russia were ambivalent to his dying day. But Stalin knew him and,
despite inevitable misgivings, 142 found it possible to deal with him.
Truman was entirely different. Not nearly as smooth as Roosevelt, he
could be as blunt as any Soviet leader, and lacked experience in foreign
affairs. Moreover, he often botched administrative matters in his early
months in the White House, permitting misunderstandings to arise or

139 Standley, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 271, 274, 282, 467; see also references
in note 138 above.

140 See Churchill, The Second World War: Bryant, Turn of the Tide; Bryant,
Triumph in the West.

141 Robert H. Jones, The Roads to Russia: United States Lend-Lease to the
Soviet Union (Norman, Oklahoma, 1969); Goodrich and Carroll, eds., Docu-
ments, p. 152.

142 James McGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York,
1956); Robert McNeal, "Roosevelt Through Stalin's Spectacles," International
Journal (Toronto), XVIII (Spring, 1963), 194-205.

96

to grow worse. 143 While it is clear that he u^ed the atomic bomb pri-
marily to insure a quick Japanese surrender rather than to threaten the
U. S. S. R., it also appears probable that the change in the White House
was upsetting to the Russians.

Walter LaFeber sees another point: the movement of fleets and
armies toward the defeat of Germany and Japan put American and
British forces in positions from which the Axis had threatened the
Soviet Union. Given the Russian attitudes toward the West, the trap
in which Soviet leaders could never really trust the West, it was in-
evitable that they became intensely suspicious of western motives. Be-
tween August and November, 1945, Mikhail Kalinin, president of the
Supreme Soviet, and Foreign Minister Molotov both warned Russians
that their country was still alone in a world of enemies. The Russian
press followed suit. 144

In this context of hostility there were real problems. The bourgeois
Poles had been defeated in their attempt to create a great Poland, leav-
ing a bad taste in American and Russian mouths. 145 A civil war raged
in Greece, perhaps based on old internal troubles left unsolved by re-
pressive governments but with communist involvement now. While
direct evidence was lacking, the U. S. S. R. and the Greek communist
party used similar arguments and there was aid from Tito and Bul-
garia. 146 The U. S. S. R. was obviously marking out a sphere of in-
fluence in Azerbaijan in northern Iran, 147 and great power cooperation
broke down in Germany. he Canard Enchaine (Paris) quipped. "At
Potsdam, the Germans divided the Allies into four zones." 148

143 Truman, Memoirs, I; Lilienthal, Atomic Years, p. 7.

144 LaFeber, America, Russia, pp. 1, 23; McNeill, America. Britain, Russia.
pp. 653-4.

145 Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War (Bloomington, Indiana. 1966);
for a New Left review of Herz see Gar Alperovitz, "How Did the Cold War
Begin?" New York Review of Books, VIII (Mar. 23, 1967), 6-12.

146 L. S. Stavrianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago,
1952); D. George Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek
Communist Party (London, 1965), Balkan Studies VIII (1967), 225-296.

147 Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars (New
York, 1969), pp. 55-75.

148 Clay, Decision in Germany: John L. Snell, Wartime Origins of the East-
West Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans, 1959); Carr, Truman. Stalin, p. 67.

97

Ambiguity was the pattern through 1946. Finland and Czechoslo-
vakia remained free, Hungary apparently so, the Red Army evacuated
Iran; but the foreign ministers wrangled whenever they met, vetoes
became the style in the U.N. Security Council, and the Greek and Ger-
man problems remained troublesome. During the year came an escala-
tion of words.

On February 9, 1946 Stalin warned Russians that the recent war
had been "the inevitable result of . . . world economic and political
forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism." It was impossible
to avoid such wars "under present capitalist conditions . . . ." 149 A
month later Churchill delivered his Iron Curtain speech. In February
George Kennan's long telegram (the "X" article) had arrived from
Moscow and some worried American policy makers thought that it
was what we had been looking for.

We now had a theoretical base for our foreign policy that led us
to the Truman Doctrine 150 and Marshall Plan. They in turn led to a
Soviet reaction and our counter-reaction, NATO. But as Kennan admits
containment got out of hand. In an orthodox liberal view of the cold
war, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., warns us of "the classical revisionist
fallacy the assumption of the rationality ... of states" even when
they are in the grip of ideology. Halle adds that "ideologically minded
societies are given to a rhetoric of generalization that ... is absolute
and universal." It may not be intended for use, but this rhetoric scares
others who may think that one does mean it. 151

We wind up with what Reinhold Niebuhr calls "the mythical dis-
tortion of the adversary's expansiveness, . . . singling out the most
unacceptable motive, such as the exploitative." But the "mythical

149 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New
York, 1960), pp. 221-23.

150 Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955).

151 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, XLVI
(October, 1967), 22-52; Halle, Cold War, p. 159.

98

distortion of one's own expansiveness . . . consists in singling out the
missionary motive, rather than the exploitative or power motive." 152
The U. S. and the U. S. S. R., building on old fears made new, saw
each other's worst and ignored each other's better impulses, while each
one reassured itself that its own deeds were pure. Caught in this pre-
dicament they are not scorpion and tarantula, fighting by instinct, but
rather two victims of hysterical paralysis sitting in wheelchairs. They
are able to hurl epithets at each other, but while there is no organic
block to their reaching out to each other such an outreach has become
functionally impossible.

152 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Social Myths in the 'Cold War,'" in John C. Farrell
and Asa P. Smith, eds., Image and Realitv in World Politics (New York. 1968),
pp. 40-56.

WEST GEORGI
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIEN<

AMERICA VS. AMERI
THE REVOLUTION IN VALU

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Volume X June, 1971 Number 1

AMERICA VS. AMERICA:
THE REVOLUTION IN VALUES

Tom Clark

"Justice Ye Shall Pursue" 3

William M. Pinson

America Churches in Revolution 8

Mark D. Altschule

Beyond Good and Evil or How to Create the

Dark in Which to Whistle 16

David Mathews

America Changing Values in Education 33

i%

CEIVED

MAR 2 r 1972

PEkluuiortUI L)tr"hrtiwiENT

WEST GEORGIA COLLEGE LIBRARY.

CARROLLTON, GEORGIA

Copyright 1971

Division of Social Sciences

West Georgia College

Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

The papers contained in this issue were delivered as speeches at
Kennesaw Junior College in Marietta, Georgia on April 30, 1971 during
the course of a symposium on changing values in American society.
Sponsored jointly by the Cobb County Medical Society, Kennesaw Jun-
ior College, the Cobb Judicial Circuit Bar Association, and the Mari-
etta-Smyrna Ministerial Association, Symposium 77 represented an
effort to evaluate from a variety of perspectives the impact of the revo-
lutionary changes now occurring in the American value system.

This symposia also included a paper by Dr. Margaret Mead entitled
"The Revolution in Values An Overview." It was given as a banquet
address at the Regency Hyatt House on Friday evening, April 30, 1971.
Because of other commitments by her, that article does not appear here.
Earlier symposia titles beginning with the first in 1966 are as follows:
"Law Moral, Medical, Civic Man's Responsibility;" "Eastern and
Western Views of Man," 1967; "Human Sexuality," 1968; "The Progress
of Man Towards the Year 2000," 1969; and "Frontiers of the Mind,"
1970. Copies of these may be obtained from the Cobb County Medical
Society, 737 Church Street, Marietta, Ga., 30060, for a nominal fee.

The Studies in the Social Sciences is an organ of the Division of Social
Sciences, at West Georgia College. This publication was privileged to
carry the symposia proceedings this year. Upon request, copies of this
journal are provided free of charge to institutions of higher learning
throughout the United States and abroad. The regular distribution is
to all institutions of higher learning in Georgia, the five largest uni-
versities in each souther state, and approximately one hundred high
schools throughout Georgia.

The editorial staff wishes to express appreciation to the members
of the Symposium 71 Committee for their assistance in preparing this
edition. Special thanks are due to Dr. Noah D. Meadows, Jr.. Chairman
of the Board of Trustees of the Cobb County Symposia, Inc. whose
enthusiastic support for this project proved invaluable to its
consumation.

Eugene R. Huck, Editor

Roald Mykkeltvedt, Assistant Editor

"JUSTICE YE SHALL PURSUE"

By TOM CLARK*

About 150 years ago Daniel Webster elaborated a little bit on the
ancient Biblical command of "Justice, ye shall pursue," by saying that
justice is the first interest of man on earth. And certainly so it is today.
But it is nothing new because it has been the great interest of man on
earth for many centuries. We hear much today that the system is too
slow; that the Establishment is on the other side; that it is America
against America. I trust this conflict is on a philosophical basis, and not
on a physical one. Some have a tendency to put it on a physical basis
which is a great mistake. Their error is more compounded because
change can be indeed, has been brought about within the system it-
self. It shall first be my purpose to bring you just a few instances
of change that have occurred during the lifetimes of most living Ameri-
canschanges that have been phenomenal.

You know well the changes in science, in communication, and in
transportation. I am sure that if I were to have told my father that I
would one day be able to see on a screen someone speaking simultane-
ously in India, he would have thought that I should be sent to a mental
asylum for safekeeping. But today television is an actuality which we
take for granted it is "old stuff." Justice and law likewise are too
frequently regarded as "old stuff!" Many people think justice just occurs
and they do not have to do anything to preserve and promote it. That
is one of the greatest mistakes that we make today. Behind that traffic
light that appears when you cross the street is a whole phalanx of a
constabulary, and of the court system, that causes the electricity that
changes that bell to have real force and authority. If that electricity
and that bell and light did not have that force and authority, it would
break down the system, and therefore would bring chaos insofar as
traffic is concerned.

Now we have made great progress in law. I am going to allude to
just three phases of law in which we have made significant advances in
recent decades. First, consider criminal law, because criminal law is the
closest to all of us. I hope and I know you hope that it never will touch
you, that the knock will not come to your door. But in order that if it
does come, that knock will be an orderly knock, we must protect every
door, and every person who is behind that door. Those doors are onlv
as secure as is the weakest door of anyone's house regardless of his
station in life or the amount of money that he may have in the bank.

*Fonner Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court.

3

When I went on the Court about 21 years ago. we did not permit a
defendant to have a transcript of the record of his trial. Now when you
think about it, that is an amazing thing. How could a person appeal a
case intelligently unless he had a record of the proceedings at his trial?
Of course, if he had the money to buy a transcript, he could get it very
easily. In the case of Griffin v. Illinois (1957) the court rectified this
injustice by holding that Griffin was entitled to have a record even
though he could not pay for it that the state had to provide a free
transcript for appellate purpose. Following this decision, indigent de-
fendants began to get free trial records in other states.

Before long, however, defendants asked. "What is the use of having
a record?"' if a person has little or no knowledge of the law he can hardly
be expected to tell from the transcript of his trial whether or not he was
convicted by due process of law. Using this reasoning, persons convicted
of crimes began petitioning the Supreme Court to provide free defense
counsel for indigent defendants. Prior to that time by Belts v. Brady
( 1947), we required that states provide free defense counsel for indigents
in capital cases, but not necessarily in felony or misdemeanor cases.
Eventually, in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) the court reversed this posi-
tion by holding that all persons accused of felonies were entitled to
defense counsel that the state must provide free counsel for any penni-
less defendant.

Almost immediately, the court was asked to decide at what point in
the criminal proceedings an accused should have the advice and counsel
of a defense attorney. Defendants in state criminal cases quite properly
observed that the presence of a defense counsel at their trial was of little
benefit to them if the police had secured a confession from them prior
to the trial. If an accused does not know his rights he may, under duress,
confess to a crime he did not commit. The court quickly responded to
the logic of this agrument in the cases of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964).
and Miranda v. Arizona (1966). As a result of these rulings in these
cases, police must now issue a four-pronged warning to any person
taken into custody before interrogating him: that he is entitled to a
lawyer; that he may demand that counsel will be provided if he can not
afford to hire his own attorney; that he may demand that counsel be
present during interrogation; and that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law.

This was regarded as a revolutionary development in the field of
criminal law. We heard many cries of outrage and anguish from police
officials throughout the country. I recall, for example, attending the
Convention of the International Chiefs of Police in St. Louis following
the Miranda decision. I had been asked to address the delegates and
present various awards for distinguished achievements. The President of
the State Bar Association met me at the airport to warn me that I might

4

expect a hostile reception that the delegates to the convention believed
the court had handcuffed the police and contributed to the rising crime
rate. During the course of our conversation I asked him if Miranda had
significantly reduced the number of confessions obtained by police in
his state. He indicated that the decision had very little impact on the
confession rate that despite the advice of counsel to remain silent,
persons accused of crimes often felt compelled to relieve their
consciences by admitting their guilt. To illustrate, he cited one case in
which the accused had secured the aid of a public defender immediately
after being taken into custody at 2:00 a. m. The attorney advised him of
his rights and told him to remain silent. At 10:00 a. m. the defense
counsel returned to confer with his client only to discover that he had
voluntarily confessed to 27 burglaries in the interim. When the astonished
lawyer asked him why he had ignored his advice, the accused responded
that he just wanted to get it off his chest.

This is not an isolated incident. In the surveys that we have made
since Miranda, we have found all the way from New Haven to Los
Angeles that the number of confessions has increased. For a
while after Miranda they diminished by about 10%, but they went up
after about six months. We have had other fruits from Miranda. One of
them is that criminal detection has been improved. Now, of course, we
have spent millions of dollars since Miranda about 500 million last
year alone on improving techniques of criminal detection. But that
case has done more to improve the techniques of criminal detection
than all the money that we have expended because it taught the police
one thing that is, that a confession is suspect. You may lose this con-
fession when it goes to trial. There may be some fault in it. Before
Miranda when police got a confession they generally closed a case from
an investigative standpoint. Why investigate anymore? The defendant
has confessed. But after Miranda, police knew that a confession could
well be thrown out, and consequently they continued the investigation
to secure supportive evidence. We find now that more cases are prose-
cuted on testimony that has been secured from investigations after con-
fessions are made than they are on the confessions themselves.

The second area of law in which we have made tremendous progress
concerns the right to vote and to have one's vote count. Prior to our
decision in Baker v. Carr (1962), state governments had not generally
required that either state legislative districts or Congressional districts
be equal in terms of population. This meant, in particular, that persons
living in urban areas were not as well represented either at the state or
national levels as persons living in rural areas. When urban voters
brought their case to court as in Colegrove v. Green (1947), and asked
that they be granted a more equitable voice in our state and national
legislative assemblies, they were told that this was not a legal issue that
could be resolved by judicial orders it was a political issue which must

be settled by the very legislative assemblies which were dominated by
rural representatives. In the Baker case we changed this ruling and de-
clared that courts could hear and decide such cases. Subsequently, in
Reynolds v. Sims (1964), and Wesberry v. Sanders (1964), we held that
state legislative districts and congressional districts respectively had to
be equal in terms of population that regardless of where people lived,
their vote should count the same. Out of all the 50,000 cases on which
I have passed, none was as important as the Baker case because it gave
one the power to tell a politician, "No! No! That's far enough!" And I
tell you, the young people in particular, that you are going to see a com-
plete change in our system within the decade that is before us because
ol this one case. The power that was once vested through the legisla-
tures in the rural communities is going to be placed in the population-
infested communities, the metropolitan areas, the places where people
live. And one's vote is going to have as much weight as the vote of any-
one else in this great state.

Finally, I direct your attention to the changes in the field of
education which have been effected through the law. I recall that
when I first came to the court in 1949, Brown v. Board of Education
( 1954), was one of the cases pending on our docket. It was not decided,
however, until five years later. Precipitous? It took us five years to
resolve! In the meantime we reached decisions in several other cases
involving segregated educational programs. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950).
for example, we held that the University of Texas Law School must
admit black students. Finally, in 1954, we passed down our decision in
Brown that segregation in all levels of public education was inherently
unequal and thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I now reiterate, "Justice ye shall pursue." The question is, how do
you pursue it? You are a young man or woman in a university or in
business, or you are a middle-aged person in business, or you are an old
man like me, now retired. How do you pursue it? Well, there are plenty
of ways you can pursue it. Do not get into the habit of saying "I am just
a small fellow and I cannot do a thing about it." You can do so much
about it. You can do so much about it in your community. You can do
it in part through the law established in Baker v. Can; through that
power that you have of voting, and voting to see that the will of the
people is brought about. You can bring to the attention of people those
injustices that we still have. I am the first to say that we still have in-
justices. We have done our best to try to correct them and today we are
making great progress in that area. Recently, at a very distinguished
town, Williamsburg, Virginia, the President of the United States, the
Chief Justice of the United States, the Attorney-General of the United
States, 44 chief justices of the states of the United States, 37 attorneys
general of the United States, and over 200 other people interested in
the improvement of the administration of justice met together. They

passed a resolution that called upon the states to create a national center
for state courts. This is now in the realm of possibility. Indeed, the Con-
ference of Chief Justices has appointed a committee which I think is
going to announce shortly its creation. It will be an institution which
will have tremendous force in correcting injustices throughout the
country.

But it is also up to you! It is you who see the injustices first, because
you live with them. They come in contact with you. Living in communi-
ties that have become heavily populated, metropolitan areas, you brush
shoulders with more people, and you see the injustices that are done
them. If you report those injustices to those in authority and receive
no response, then have the courage to speak up! If you do, we will see
these transgression of justice cured; we will see them abolished; we will
see that the justice which Daniel Webster spoke about become a reality.
Chief Justice Hughes once said that a Constitution is but a piece of
parchment unless all of us act to give that parchment life, force, and
implementation. That is your job, the job of every American, and I
know we are going to do it!

CHURCHES IN REVOLUTION

By WILLIAM M. PINSON, JR.*

My task is to outline some of the changes, revolutionary develop-
ments, and conflicts in the religious life in America. From personal
experience as well as academic research I have come into contact with
the conflict. Each seven years the seminary in which I teach gives a
faculty member a year to travel and study. Last year my leave took me
across the United States and I read everything I could about what was
happening in our country, especially in the cities. Somehow I felt that
unless I could live in the major cities, breathe the air, hear the sounds,
and feel the fear of the metropolis that I really could not grasp the
conflicts in America. So with my family, I set out.

I tried to pick the cities which seemed to be the key places in Ameri-
ca to grasp an understanding of what was happening in our nation. I
chose Atlanta as our first stop and we lived in a downtown highrise. the
Landmark. I walked the streets at night, visited the churches of all de-
nominations, spent time in the black and the white areas, visited the
rich and the poor churches, and talked with students and faculty on the
various campuses of the city. Then we lived in New York six months.
San Francisco six months, and Los Angeles a month. The situation is
truly America versus America. It is not just long hairs versus short, or
straights versus hips. It is not simply those who crave a new kind of
economy versus those who crave an old one. We are in a revolution a
revolution consisting of people who want a new way of life, a new style
of living, and a new way of doing things. This revolution affects all of
us. Although rapid changes are occurring, it is difficult to draw a clear
picture of what is actually taking place. I really doubt if it is possible.

The American religious situation is like a huge river it is constantly
changing and its appearance varies according to the vantage point of the
observer. For example, I have seen the Mississippi River many times. I
have flown over it, driven over it on bridges, ridden across it on ferries,
been on it in boats, and walked beside it. From an airplane it looks like
a small crooked brown string. On a bridge it appears slow, sullen, and
shallow. From a ferry it looks treacherous, fast, and deep. When you
walk along the shore, although you think the Mississippi runs from north
to south, you find that sometimes it runs from south to north, and east
to west, and west to east as well. And that is the way it is with religion in
America: it depends on how you are looking at it. where you are stand-

*Professor of Christian Ethics, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.
Fort Worth, Texas.

ing, what your perspective is as to how you see it. There is one thing
about it, however, and that is that it is terribly complex and diverse.

Most people think of religion in America in regard to traditional
institutional churches, but that is just like the bit of the iceberg that
sticks up among the waves. Most of the religious life in America is not
confined to the traditional institutional churches.

America's religious make-up is like a three-layered cake. One
layer the top which most people see is made up of the institutional
churches. This visible layer is composed of the traditional structures
which people usually attend on Sundays or on Saturdays to sing, pray,
worship, and study sacred scriptures.

The second layer, not so readily seen, is also composed of institu-
tions and organizations, but not traditional denominational structures.
This layer is composed of different elements. There are the organiza-
tions dedicated primarily to specific causes, such as evangelism. For
example, the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association, which is not a
church, has an employee list of about 500 people with a budget of over
$14 million a year. This organization reaches all the way around the
world and is more active than many of the mainline denominations. Or
there is Oral Roberts with a university, a television show, and a radio
program with mail sacks flooding into his office. Other organizations
in this middle layer are devoted mainly to spiritual renewal. Elton True-
blood, Keith Miller, Bruce Larson, Word Books, and Faith at Work are
examples of those active in the renewal movement. Also in the second
layer are groups which deal with some particular social issues, such as
the anti-Communism organization of Billy James Hargis and others.
Most of those in the renewal movement are still attached in some way
to institutional churches but are disatisfied with them and are trying
to find meaning, direction, and soul fulfillment in a retreat-renewal
concept of life.

There is also a third layer. This is the layer that so far is largely
uncharted and misunderstood. It is the underground church, the unor-
ganized element of the Christian movement. In this layer are the Jesus
Freaks, the house churches, the thousands of informal Bible study and
prayer groups across America, and the commune Christians. It is a
boiling cauldron of agitation and concern which sometimes spills over
into excessive ecstatic experience. This is a segment of American life
which most of us really do not know much about. We are not part of it,
and we find it difficult to understand. But there is great feeling here
that tends to push up into the other two layers to affect us all.

To make the American religious scene more complex there are also
differences of outlook which cut across the three layers. There are the
denominational differences, for example. We still have them, you
know Methodist, Baptist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ,

Church of Christ, Assembly of God Roman Catholic, Jews, and others.
Ours is the most pluralistic land in the world, in regard to religious
groups and denominations. But to further complicate the picture within
these denominational structures are many differences of opinion.

There are theological differences, for example. The old orthodoxy
which existed relatively unchallenged up until the seventeenth century
has been challenged by liberalism. Liberals try to reconcile orthodoxy
with the scientific approach to life by taking the Bible as something of
a search by man for God instead of God's search for man. Liberalism
was met with a reaction, the fundamentalist movement, led by men such
as Billy Sunday of several generations ago. Sunday insisted that the Bible
was the literal word from God and that there was no need to try to recon-
cile it with science.

The next main theological development was the neo-orthodox move-
ment which began after World War I. This movement was led by Karl
Barth. Emil Brunner, and Reinhold Niebuhr. Generally the neo-orthodox
theologians insisted that the Bible was truly the Word of God, but that it
could in some ways be reconciled with science. Neo-orthodoxy main-
tained that the Christian faith demanded the people of God to take
seriously the social problems of the day.

Next there developed a kind of theology called by many names, con-
servatism and neofundamentalism being the most common. Conserva-
tism has been led by Billy Graham, Carl F. H. Henry, and a host of
people who insist that fundamentalism is too rigid, negative, and re-
strictive; there should be a certain openness about life while still taking
the fundamentals of the faith seriously. More recently a radical left
movement in religion has emerged led by men such as Thomas Altizer.
who talk of the death of God. So the theological scene is literally frag-
mentized.

The conflicts go beyond theological divisons. Debate has raged on
the ethical scene. Joseph Fletcher, advocate of situation ethics, decries
legalism and insists that love is the only absolute. John R. Rice, Bob
Jones, and others, on the other hand, insist that there are certain rules
to be followed because they come directly from God. T. B. Maston and
other moderate principlists insist that there is a "middle way" between
the two extreme positions on ethics. There are also racial divisions the
black churches, the brown churches, and the white churches with dif-
ferent life styles and different viewpoints. There are different views on
how the Christian life is to be expressed. For example, the pietists stress
prayer and the activists emphasize action.

Now against this backdrop of the complex and frustrating situation
in American church life today. 1 would like to try to paint in broad
strokes like painting a mural with a broom, not with any fine lines of
distinction the two main thrusts of revolution and unrest in American

10

cnurches: first, in regard to drat which centers in conflict, and then that
which centers in basic trends and movements.

The conflict in American churches seems to be not primarily over
theology, or how you do ethics, or denominational differences, but
really over basic life styles. For example, there is a serious conflict
between the institutionalists and the noninstitutionalists. The former
believe that there has to be a building in which to meet and a liturgy to
follow. The institutionalists believe that until an idea is captured, pro-
gramed, and mortarized, that it in no way bears influence. Denomina-
tional bureaucrats, the defenders of the programs of the traditional
churches, seminary professors, pastors, and lay leaders frequently are
among the institutionalists.

Another host of people, however, believe very strongly that the mo-
ment an idea, a belief, or a conviction is captured, programed, and
mortarized, that in some way it is mutilated and lost. They insist that
the only way religious expression can breathe freely and approximate
what God wants is through a noninstitutional expression. The under-
ground church is probably the best example of this approach simply
meeting together in homes, no boards, no committees, no synods, no
judicatory, just people getting together with people.

The above two seem to be in irreconcilable conflict. If you sit them
down together in a room for very long, you usually have a heated argu-
ment. I have yet to be at a meeting in which there was ever really much
reconciliation because each believes that the other is so wrong, so dan-
gerous, and so harmful that they must in some way be eliminated.

A similar conflict exists between the pietists and the secular acti-
vists. The pietists believe that the main function of religion is to get
people in a relationship to God so that they can feel accepted, reconcil-
ed, or forgiven. They emphasize saving souls, prayer, devotional life,
worship, and personal ethics. They make up the dominate part of most
of the traditional institutional religious structures. On the other hand,
a growing number of people believe that man in relationship to God
exists primarily to see that God*s will is done in all of life, including
the social order. They see that there is racial injustice and they know
that God is no respector of persons. Their primary religious response
is not prayer, worship, reading holy scripture, but action to eliminate
racial injustice which is contrary to God"s will. They see people who
suffer economic injustice and who are paid inadequate wages such as
the migrant farm laborers in the valley of Texas, or the grape pickers
in California, or the domestic help of many of the homes of the South.
The activists feel that inadequate, unjust, and unlivable wages must be
eliminated and replaced by justice between employer and employee.
They see their religious activity in strikes, crusades, demonstrations,
meetings for economic reform. When the pietists and the activists get

11

together there is frequently nothing but conflict for they see their roles
so differently. It is America versus America within the churches.

Another conflict exists between those who are traditionalists and
those who are iconoclasts. Traditionalists tend to identify religion with
the status quo. They see religion's role as supporting things in the way
they have been, as they were in the "good ole days." For them religion
serves to tie the generations together, as links in a chain, and keeps
values ongoing without a break in the chain. The traditionalists general-
ly are afraid of the new, whether it is the new mass in English in the
Roman Catholic Church or new ministry forms in Baptist congregations
or new policies in regard to women in the Episcopal Church.

The iconoclasts, on the other hand, think that if anything is old it is
bound to be bad. The only thing to do with something old is to replace
it. They swallow everything new that comes along. They use little dis-
cernment and demonstrate small ability to tell what is good and bad.
They simply accept something because it is new, because it opposes the
old. Again, these two forces America versus America are very diffi-
cult to reconcile within our churches. They tend to tear the structures
apart in the traditional ones and frequently gravitate to the underground
church.

There is another conflict on the horizon, one which looks like it is
going to build to storm proportions. That is the conflict between the civil
religionists and the prophetic religionists. Civil religion wants state pre-
scribed prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. It attempts to
wed the flag and the cross. It believes that American foreign policy is the
way God does his work in the modern world.

In conflict with the civil religionists are the prophetic religionists
who insist that they owe allegiance to no country and to no man. They
claim to be citizens of the Kingdom of God. Their primary responsibility
is to God and not to any country, employer, or economic system. One of
my students had a meeting with a corporation president who was con-
sidering hiring him as a chaplain. The man tried to force his beliefs about
ecology, race, and other things on the student. And finally the corpora-
tion president insisted to the student that his main belief was in his coun-
try. And this student said, "Mine is not. It is in Jesus Christ." Now that
is the way of the prophets. They challenge anything that they feel to be
contrary to God's will. And the two are very difficult to reconcile. The
civil religionists feel fervently that their patriotic cause is right. And you
know the prophets: there have always been those who felt so strongly
that they were right that they were willing to get sawed in two or thrown
into pits or stoned. In fact some prophets seem to have a masochistic
bent about them. They almost seem to enjoy getting kicked.

Out of the conflict in American church life, there apparently is
developing some basic trends which cut across all three layers of the

12

cake. Let me briefly outline thern. One is the trend toward religious
revival in America the spiritual awakening which many observers are
now calling the Great Awakening 1970-71, comparing it to the awaken-
ing under Jonathan Edwards in pre-revolutionary America. Some feel
that it is the greatest, the most significant, the most basic revolution in
religion and spiritual experience which has hit this nation. A number of
people do not know that it is happening because they still keep their
religious statistics from the traditional, institutional churches and that
is not where the revival is taking place. All the polls show declin-
ing church attendance. Most of the denominational budgets show drops
in offerings. But if you consider what is going on across the whole of
the three-layered religious cake, a mighty and significant religious re-
vival is taking place.

The revival is expressed in many different ways in the large
numbers of young people who are responding to religion, the thousands
who march in religious parades on the West Coast, the Christian com-
munes, the Jesus Freaks, the students who preach the gospel on campus,
the Bible-study groups, and Campus Crusade. It is a fantastic phenom-
enon unparallelled and unprecedented in our history. It is different
from the religious revival of the 1950's which was primarily made up of
middle-class, sedate people joining traditional churches. This is not that
kind of revival. It is a revival of people who are anything but staid and
sedate. It often expresses itself in ecstatic experiences; there is an out-
burst of speaking in tongues, for example. The folks leading the revival
know nothing about liturgy, but they know a great deal about celebra-
tion. They know little about quiet organ music, but they know a good
bit about hand-clapping and foot-patting music. It is an experience
which affects all age groups, but mostly the youth.

The revival is also affecting the traditional churches. Experiences
have been happening in local churches which have seldom happened
before. One church in a two-week period had four thousand people
make public commitments to Christ. Another in a period of six months
saw twelve hundred people come into its fellowship on commitment to
Christ. Another church grew to a membership of sixteen thousand in a
relatively short time. Inadequate facilities cause the stacking of worship
service upon service and the spilling into apartment houses and trailer
parks in order to try to minister to the people. In the underground
church, in the Billy Graham movement, in Campus Crusade, in tradi-
tional churches, in all layers of the cake there is a phenomenal spiritual
awakening.

Another characteristic of the developing religious life in America is
that it is not just "pie-in-the-sky-by-and-by" religion, but it has a very
practical aspect to it, a rugged aspect. For these people who are experi-
encing the tug of God upon their lives are committed to more than prayer
and Bible study they are committed to changing the world! They are

13

revolutionaries! Most of them are non-violent. But they are revolution-
aries none the less. They are determined to see that the Bible which says
that God is no respector of persons is applied in daily life. They have
come to see that the Bible they believe in and read speaks about hunger
as well as heaven, about race relations as well as about regeneration.
And they are determined to see that the Bible they believe is practiced.

Many leaders in the religious revival are biblical literalists. They
take the Bible to be literally true. They will tackle city hall, the Federal
government, the state capitol, the courthouse, anything to bring about
change and eliminate what seems to them to be contrary to the way God
wants things.

Religion in America has a definite social action emphasis. The civil
rights movement was the first major social action thrust by religious
leaders. Later peace, and now ecology became primary concerns.
Churches are also organizing to try to minister more effectively to urban
problems tutorial services, breakfast programs, literacy education,
activities for dropouts, ministries to youth in the summer, aid for those
who are poor, and housing committees. It is a new day. Many of those
involved in these programs are pietists with an activist bent, It may be
the beginning of the breakthrough of the reconciling of the pietists and
the activists.

Another trend in America's religious life is openness. There is no
settled way of doing things in most churches anymore; it is kind of a
"let's try it and see what happens" attitude. This openness manifests it-
self in getting together across professional lines, such as this very pro-
gram represents. It manifests itself in cooperative Christianity. Although
the ecumenical movement seems to be floundering, cooperative Chris-
tianity is thriving with denominations working together for spiritual
renewal, evangelism, ministry, and social action. It is showing itself in
the way that people are trying new programs in churches. For example,
new opportunities are opening for women. The Episcopal Church has
considered ordaining women to the priesthood. American Baptists ordain
women, and they serve as pastors. Some Southern Baptist churches are
ordaining women as deacons. It is a new day for women, and it is going
to be an even newer one. There are also opportunities in new program-
ing; new things are being tried. And finally, it is a new day for youth.
The main religious movement is among young people and laymen. We
who are the professional clergy are in danger of being left behind. Youth,
in all aspects of what is happening, in all three-layers of the cake, lead
the way; and laymen are not far behind.

I do not know what the future holds. But there is one thing for sure.
God is a long way from dead! Apparently He is not even sick. And the
churches, though they may not be recognizable by former standards,
are very much alive and on the move. I am rather glad that God has let

14

me be a churchman in this day. With a colleague, I have recently written
a thirteen-volume set on church history entitled 20 Centuries of Great
Preaching. From the study done on this project I feel that of all the years
which have ever been, if I had my choice, I would pick this era in which
to be alive!

15

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, OR: HOW TO
CREATE THE DARK IN WHICH TO WHISTLE

By MARK ALTSCHULE, M. D.*

The title of this symposium America versus America mentions
values but it does not require that the speakers make value-judgments.
When physicians consider their patients' illnesses they do not make
moral judgments concerning them. Accordingly I shall not discuss any
of today's revolutionary changes in terms of their possible morally good
or evil effects or attributes. If on occasion my words have the appear-
ance of adverse comment, this is only an appearance. For the most part
my feelings will not be identifiable, if at all detectable, and I suggest that
you waste no time in searching for them and in attempting to relate them
to my childhood experiences, or to what is more serious, to the fact that
I have forgotten my childhood experiences. What I shall say will be en-
tirely descriptive and largely self-explanatory.

Before, however, discussing the revolutionary changes with which
we are all familiar, it would be well to establish whether they lie in the
field of morals or of manners. We shall define the first as those aspects
of human behavior (including the verbal) that involve content, whereas
manners involve form. Although content and form inevitably overlap,
a general separation is possible.

To start with a summary: One serious problem is "the ridiculous
and deplorable softness of parents, slaves to the caprices of the im-
mature. . ." "Each gives his children an education superior to that which
is suited to their social and financial status; so that children, despising
the knowledge of their parents, reject criticism based on the latter's
experience. Accustomed to follow all his inclinations, and not
accustomed to discipline and to contradiction, the child, having arrived
at maturity, cannot resist the vicissitudes and reverses by which life is
agitated. . . ." On the other hand "an undue severity reproaches for the
slightest faults, harshness exercised with passion, threats and blows,
exasperate children, irritate youth, destroy the influence of parents,
produce abnormal tendencies to disease." "The ties of marriage are
mere pretenses, which are formed by the wealthy either for gain or to
gratify their self-love, and which the common people neglect, through
disdain for the clergy, indifference, and immorality. . . ." In recording
medical histories information about whether the patients are married
or unmarried is valueless because it in no way bears on their behavior.
"From a record kept for ten years at several hospitals, one third of the
women admitted are very aged, paralyzed, and in senile dementia. . . .

Clinical Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School.

16

These infirm patients would formerly have remained in their families. . .
People avail themselves of an easy means of relieving themselves of the
burden of their support."

These comments are descriptive of today's society; however they
were made by a leading European physician of 150 years ago. Another
physician, an American, who practiced and wrote a hundred years ago
made comments that are even more applicable to today's problems. He
stated a century ago that American "social life scattered widely the seeds
of distrust; developed precocious ideas of independence; and made youth
familiar with evil before it was prepared to judge intelligently, and when
it should be shielded by parental care." These evils, he said, "were but
too plainly exemplified in the mental traits characteristic of young Amer-
ica and in the increasing stream of depravity, and disease both physicial
and mental, which permeated the social fabric, and threatened to injure
not only the present but future generations." We may therefore immedi-
ately make two conclusions: 1) the views of a physician are likely to
be different from those of philosophers and social critics, and 2) man-
kind has not changed much, at least in the last 150 years.

It is evident to any physician that today's revolution is largely one
of manners. This conclusion is most evident to a physician in a communi-
ty with strong academic ties. With two notable differences, no individual
person that I may see now is doing or saying anything different from
what a number of individual patients of mine did and said forty years
ago. Although individual human behavior has not changed, there have
been changes in the relative numbers of people engaged in different
types of behavior. Moreover although individual behavior has not
changed in detail, group behavior has changed somewhat for reasons
that will be discussed.

In addition, evaluation of our behavior has changed markedly in
that it has been given an unwarranted implication of moral change. This
is owing to several reasons, the most important of which is that now be-
havior manifested by persons more than twenty-five years old is ascribed
by some social critics to boring, stupid, or vicious motives, whereas all
behavior of persons less than twenty-five years old is said by these critics
to be motivated by truly humane, idealistic and honorable impulses, un-
less the behavior was distorted by the boring, stupid or vicious acts of
people more than twenty-five years old. Today we recognize that a
middle-aged man who intoxicates himself with the alcohol in liquor is
making a disgusting brute of himself whereas a young man who intoxi-
cates himself with the other alcohols in marijuana is undergoing an
ennobling experience.

Early in their careers medical practitioners learn that people are all
alike. (If people were not all alike physicians could not function.) Some-
what later in their careers physicians learn that all people are also dif-

17

ferent. (If they were not there would be no need for physicians and some
machine could make diagnoses and recommend treatment.) Apprecia-
tion of the similarities and dissimilarities of people is the basis of all
medical practice, regardless of whatever scientific data may be involved.
In preparing to care for a particular patient a medical practitioner must
learn how his patient resembles and differs from other persons, and he
does this by studying his patient's past life. In short, he must be a. his-
torian, and, in Plutarch's words, he must be "like the watermen who look
astern while they row the boat ahead."

A sick society must be similarly studied if the causes of its malaise
and its possible cure are to be worked out. The utility of history for this
purpose has been denied by a segment of our population, and to some
extent properly so. All physicians know that most of a patient's history
is not relevant to the problem at hand; the physician must seek and select
those items that lead to an understanding of the malaise, if there is one.
or to an appreciation of the factors that may make an old illness seem
new. Actually, it is impossible to avoid historical evaluations in discuss-
ing social ills. For example when we read: "We have changed our old
usages in favor of speculative ideas and dangerous innovations. . . .
There are no longer any domestic feelings, not of respect, not of love,
not of authority," followed by the statement that fifteen percent of all
persons in mental hospitals are students, we should know that the com-
ments were made in 1838 by the world's leading psychiatrist, Esquirol.
and not by some modern Cassandra.

Rather than multiply and amplify such generalities we shall limit
ourselves to a few specific aspects of behavior that many today deplore.
For example, as regards the hippies, the Epistle of Jude stated. "These
filthy dreamers defile the flesh, despise dominions, and speak evil of
dignities." It is, however, impossible to know today whether this actually
referred to hippies. Perhaps a more explicit statement might be more
illuminating. Another author wrote". . . A youth approached me. He was
bearded; his clothes were dirty; he wore a student's cloak and he looked
a typical New Cynic of the sort I deplore. I have recently written at con-
siderable length about these vagabonds. In the last few years the philo-
sophy of Crates and Zeno has been taken over by idlers who. though
they have no interest in philosophy, deliberately imitate the Cynics in
such externals as not cutting their hair or beards, carrying sticks and
wallets, and begging. But where the original Cynics despised wealth,
sought virtue, questioned all things in order to find what was true, these
imitators mock all things, including the true, using the mask of
philosophy to disguise license and irresponsibility. Nowadays, any young
man who does not choose to study or to work grows a beard, insults the
gods, and calls himself Cynic." This was written by the Emperor Julian
in the fourth century A. D. Perhaps this is too remote in time or place
to be to coin a cliche' relevant.

18

Let us turn to another author who wrote about people who were
recognized by their "taciturnity and downcast looks, a total neglect of
dress and person, long nails and beard, dishevelled and matted hair,
indifference to surrounding objects, insensibility to heat and cold. . . .
Such persons seek for, rather than shun human society. Sometimes they
wander through neighborhoods in the capacity of beggars. . . .There are
some instances in which the moral faculties are impaired, in which case
they are mischievous and vicious, but they are more generally inoffen-
sive, and disposed to be kind, and even useful, in hospitals and families."

These words are not from some modern writer's description of
hippies; they are written by Benjamin Rush of Philadelphia in his dis-
cussion of what he called "partial insanity," published in 1812. (I believe
that his clinical diagnosis was correct.) At any rate it is clear that the
pursuit of hippiness is not new, and that the relation of drug abuse to
today's hippy behavior is not an essential one.

As in earlier times, today the desire to legitimize avoidance of re-
sponsibility prevails among many inadequately educated persons who
use fragmentary and distorted knowledge to disguise their aims. The
wish to be free of all responsibility is probably as ancient as man, but
good records regarding this matter go no further back than the Greco-
Roman era. For example, Seneca said, "To make a man happy, add not
to his possessions, but subtract from the sum of his desires." These words
were merely a paraphrase of what Stoic philosophers and their Oriental
precursors had been saying for generations. The ancient idea that peace
of mind can be attained only by not striving for property, position, or
power is still popular today. It implies that the effort of securing or
maintaining any of these materialistic goals produces unbearable un-
certainty and disappointment as well as destructive changes in the per-
sonality. This view holds that when finally the goals have been
reached if they ever are they prove to be not only a nuisance to
maintain but so boring in themselves as to increase the dissatisfaction
that originally had led to the pursuit. The youth of the Classical Era
who absorbed the teachings of the Stoic and then the Cynic philosophers
believed that those who lived according to these philosophies were a
fellowship of superior souls, not bound by family ties; they were the
only ones who were happy, free, beautiful, and truly wealthy. These
happy few maintained that they were also emancipated from all moral
laws. All other men, according to these ancient philosophies, were mad
or wicked creatures who wasted their lives as slaves to conformity.
These ancient philosophies seem to have a perpetual appeal.

What about the drug scene? We shall not refer to the lotus-eaters,
or to the men changed, into beasts by Circe, nor shall we mention that
Charlemagne took hallucinogenic drugs, or that the Holy Roman Em-
peror Henry IV became permanently insane when his wife gave him
drugs for erotic reasons. Nor is there any need to refer to the fact that

19

what is today called the witchcraft epidemic of late medieval Europe
evidently was an epidemic of drug abuse, and the descriptions of what
witches did were based on delusions and hallucinations. This was
pointed out by Fodere' in his Traite du Delire in 1817 and more re-
cently by Barnett. in the New Scientist, July 22, 1965. The main drugs
used were apparently of the stramonium-mandrake group, similar to
the Asthmador used by today's drug abusers. Since according to current
views of history these remote events cannot possibly have any relevance
for us today, let us turn to others.

In one country, in the decades following a long and bitter (and
probably useless) war five percent of the population became addicted
to morphine; this was our own Civil War. The widespread opium addic-
tion of the late Georgian and early Victorian eras is better known. The
pattern of drug abuse has however changed. The abuse originally seems
to have been related to affluence. For example the psychiatrist Sir
Charles Ellis wrote in 1830: "The ultimate effects produced upon the
nervous system from taking opium to excess are very similar to those
which arise from spirit drinking; but this vice is not one generally com-
mitted by the lower orders."

Today anybody can be a drug abuser, and this clearly represents
social progress. Drug abuse is a most common cause of death in young
people in America. Moreover in some cities, the number of men of mili-
tary age dying of drug abuse in one year exceeds the number of men
from that city killed in the enti-re Viet Nam conflict. It is ironical that
some of those most violently opposed to the war are equally vigorous
in their attempts to make drug abuse easier. The cure of drug addicts
under 25 is virtually impossible, and of addicts over 25 statistically dis-
appointing. Hence, as in dealing with an infectious epidemic disease,
prevention becomes most important, but this is impossible in our per-
missive society.

Why has drug abuse always been so persistent a human practice?
Let us consider some biological observations: If monkeys are connected
to an apparatus that injects intravenously a measured amount of a drug
when a bar is pressed, the animals will press the bar frequently in order
to receive morphine, pentobarbital, ethyl alcohol, cocaine, or ampheta-
mine but not some other drugs. In the self-administration of alcohol
malnutrition is a frequent complication. Cocaine causes "the most
frightening picture. After one injection experience, the monkey will
self-administer the drug until he dies in Convulsions." (See M. H. Seevers.
"Laboratory Evaluation for Drug Dependence," in New Concepts in
Pain and Its Clinical Management. E. L. Way. Ed. Philadelphia. Pa.:
F. A. Davis Co. 1967.) Does the monkey thus become a drug addict in
order to escape the stresses of his daily life? Does he have a death wish?
Does the monkey wish to extend his mind? Or are these currently popu-
lar romantic psychologizings nonsense? Perhaps the best answer to this

20

question is provided by Sir Humphrey Davy's report almost a century
and a half ago. He inhaled nitrous oxide and experienced an awe-
inspiring revelation of the secret nature of everything in the universe.
He wrote it all down, and after recovering from the effects of the in-
halation, hastened to read what he had written. The words said: "This
stuff has an awful stink." Despite Sir Humphrey's disappointing experi-
ence young people of his time, including many college students, con-
tinued to have ether parties or laughing-gas parties as a lark.

Actually the fact that the alleged benefits of psychedelic drugs were
illusory seems to have been recognized centuries ago. One account of
the Garden of Eden events is to be found in an old English poem, today
called Genesis B. (See Speculum 44:86, 1969). This tale describes how
the Serpent promised Eve that if she ate the fruit of the Tree of Know-
ledge she would be granted the sight of heaven and of the throne of God.
She did eat the fruit and she did have the vision, which she described in
words of exaltation and joy. Heaven and earth seemed brighter to her,
she could see for great distances, and wherever she looked light shone
brightly before her. (The vision of Heaven she experienced is identical
to other described visions of the Last Judgement.) The account indicates
that Eve did not really see all these things but only believed she did. At
any rate she used the promise of the vision to tempt Adam to eat the
fruit. Adam ate it but had no vision, and when the effects of the fruit in
Eve had worn off they both recognized that they had been ruined. Al-
though Eve's action had been in good faith their punishment proceeded.
Regardless of which plant history proves to have led to Eve's halluci-
nations in the Garden, the event itself foretold what today seems to be a
frequent occurrence, the ruin of a young person by a friend, lover, or
spouse who induced him or her to try a drug through the promise of a
beautiful experience.

What about the cannabis group, marijuana and hashish? Predictions
of the future status of cannabis can be made only through extensive
study of its past history. Most current accounts refer only to its use by
laymen as an intoxicant; this use, or at least the sale leading to this use,
is now illegal in most countries. However cannabis (as tincture of can-
nabis) was considered a valuable medication in the nineteenth century
for the treatment of maniacal patients in mental hospitals. These patients
had not only great strength but great cunning, and the tincture was given
to make them both docile and stupid. It was included in the form of the
extract and the fluid extract in the U. S. Pharmacopeia as an official
drug up to 1930 but, since there was no way in which it could be standard-
ized, it was dropped from it. Today its active principle is known, and
hence should be used medically where tincture of cannabis was formerly
employed. Since cannabis is effective when inhaled, its use as an aerosol
by police attempting to control a mob is a possibility. Aldous Huxley's
Brave New World describes an event of this sort: The police sprayed the

21

unruly crowd with some substance that made the mob peaceful and full
of happiness and love for everybody. Of course when the police begin to
use the drug in this way, students will shun it.

What about the generation gap? Is this new? Pinel around 1800
quoted La Bruyere as saying that "there are strange parents whose whole
life seems to be spent in giving their children reasons to be consoled for
their death." Pinel added: "The public houses of correction, and the
asylums for the insane are constantly furnishing examples suitable to
serve as commentaries on this text. How often do we see bitter reproaches
for the slightest faults harsh words uttered in the voice of anger nay
even threats and blows exasperate a hasty youth, break through all the
ties of blood, produce the most abnormal disposition, or precipitate the
sufferer into serious madness." On the other hand Shakespeare said:
"How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child." In
fact it is traditional for the elders to complain about the youngsters. For
example in ancient Greece Socrates said: "Children now love luxury.
They have bad manners, contempt for authority. They show disrespect
for elders, and love chatter in place of exercise. Children are
now tyrants. . . ."

In a slightly more modern era, this behavior was described as owing
to the children's insecurity. For example, one author of several decades
ago, John P. Marquand, in Chapter III of his book Life at Happy Knoll.
ironically ascribes all sorts of teenage rowdiness and general misbehav-
ior to young people's search for the security of which society has de-
prived them. The discovery that they are considered to have been made
insecure by our imperfect society has been one aspect of social progress
that has been a boon to teenagers. Of course, the ancient Greeks did not
know that young people acted that way because they were insecure
which shows how much the world has progressed since then.

Successive generations have always regarded each other as peculiar
and to some extent difficult. However although the exteriors differed,
the generations were usually regarded as internally alike, at least by the
elders. These ideas were well described by the poet Cowper, in a letter
to Unwin, his friend: "When we look back upon our forefathers,
we seem to look back upon the people of another nation, almost upon
creatures of another species; we can hardly believe that a people who
resembled us so little in their tastes, should resemble us in anything else.
But in everything else, I suppose, they were our counterparts ex-
actly;. . . time. . . has left human nature just where it found it. The
mind of man, at least, has undergone no change; his passions, appetites.
and aims, are just what they were; they wear perhaps a handsomer dis-
guise than they did in the days of yore, for philosophy and literature
will have their effect upon the exterior, but in every other respect a
modern is only an ancient in different dress."

22

This benign view of things is far from universal today. Although a
certain amount of conflict between generations is to be expected, today
we seem to have an excessive amount of it. Some conflict between gener-
ations is inevitable, since a generation that grows up in a given social or
physical environment knows no other, and inevitably takes a different
view of it from that taken by an older generation that had to adapt itself
to an environment that was new to it. This revolt of the young against
their elders has always taken one of several forms, and has always been
justified by basing it on idealism, freedom, and the preservation of in-
dividuality. The last is most strongly emphasized and gives rise to the
same so-called individuality among the entire generation. This collective
individuality is not individuality at all but is merely conformity carried to
excesses of hypocrisy. Nevertheless these mass movements of pseudo-
individualistic young people with their restless energy and strong idealism
may accomplish good, either as such or by calling emphatic attention to
things that need to be done, as many philosophers including Plato and
Aristotle have pointed out.

On the other hand the urge to be individualistic may deteriorate
into mere unthinking rebellion: What should be a well thought-out posi-
tive attitude becomes an uncritical negative position. This rebellion has
repeatedly fallen into a few stereotyped patterns for a thousand years
or more:

1. Delinquent behavior and disrespect toward parents. Shakes-
peare, in his Winter Tale, summarized thus: "I would there
no age between ten and three-and-twenty, or that youth
would sleep out the rest, for there is nothing in the between
but getting wenches with child, wronging the ancientry,
stealing, fighting. . . ."

2. Favoring one's country's enemies (this must be distinguished
from expressions of a desire for peace). The pattern is as
follows: The students and faculties of the universities are sick
of war. Although the eneny had been guilty of many atro-
cities the young academics ignored this and instead praise
the enemy forces for their heroism and nobility. They
describe their own country as a monster of imperialism ruled
and ruined by a lot of old men their parents who are not
only incompetent but wicked. This familiar pattern occured,
e.g., in the English universities in the 1920's and was de-
scribed by Claude Cockburn in his autobiography, In Time
of Trouble.

3. Disdain toward established modes in fashion and the arts.
This pattern is described, for example, in La Nevrose Revolu-
tionnaire by Cabanis and Nass (1906).

23

4. Derogation of accepted standards of cleanliness and neat-
ness owing to a faked preoccupation with spiritual matters.
St. Jerone (A. D. 340-419) described the Roman youth who
claimed to have turned their backs on the materialistic
world, affecting "hair as long as women's and beards as
goats'" worn in order to convince people of their wearers'
spiritual superiority. He pointed out that if the relative
length of the beard is an index of spirituality nobody is more
spiritual than a goat. Paradoxically the denser the hair
covering a fact the easier it is to see through.

5. Contempt towards their elder's accumulated worldly goods
because they are assumed to destroy spiritual values. After
the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent the youth of Florence,
activated by Savonarola's sermons, formed mobs to destroy
the accumulated evidence of Renaissance worldly luxury.
They attacked wealthy and cultivated men and women and
burned books by classical scholars and the paintings of great
artists. The movement ended in severe repression by a new
government. In other events groups of young men who had
just completed their formal education settled in an
abandoned house and decided to spend their lives in a freely-
shared ascetic life seeking mystical awakening. This
occurred in various places and at various times, for example
in Venice in 1400.

The reasons for today's excessively wide generation gap require elu-
cidation. Shakespeare described this discord as a symptom of a weak
social order. When in his Troilus and Cressida (Act 1, Scene 3) he has
Ulysses say, "And the rude son should strike the father dead" he was
describing what happened in such societies. We have to answer a
question: If, as we have shown, the general patterns of human behavior
have not changed in the two thousand years of recorded history, why is
our social order so much weaker than some others? Stating that our
order differs from the others only as regards quantitative and not quali-
tative aspects of behavior does not satisfactorily answer the question
but it does give direction to the inquiry.

There is no need to multiply the examples that show the stereo-
type of human behavior; every physician knows that people are all
alike. It is important to examine the factors that have produced the
quantitative differences in what is basically stereotyped human behavior.
These clearly fall into two main groups:

1. technologic changes

2. prevalence of superstitious psychologic and sociologie
doctrines, including those that lead to faulty education

24

There is no need to emphasize that technologic developments
change behavior drastically. It is not our purpose to refer to such specific
inventions as that of the electric guitar, that has made rock and roll
music so great a cultural force, or the bull-horn, that essential instru-
ment of social protest. We shall speak in more general terms.

The Industrial Revolution, during which machine power came to
replace human muscular effort, started the process which has now
reached a point at which the laborer is often merely a gadget attached to
a machine or is a cog in a complicated administrative complex. The
creative aspects of work have largely been lost and a vast boredom has
supplanted it. The fact that boredom creates serious psychologic stresses
has long been known to observers of human activity although largely
neglected by modern psychologists and psychiatrists.

As Crichton, an early nineteenth-century English psychiatrist noted:
"It is a favorite opinion with Helvetius and many other philosophers,
the ennui is one of the most powerful motives in the mind of man which
stimulates him to great actions. There can be no doubt of the general
truth of this fact, only it is not quite accurately expressed; for it is the
desire of relief from pain and not the languor from which the actions
spring." These philosophers evidently believed that boredom, or the
need to avoid it, is one of the most powerful motive forces in human
life. (They differed with John Locke, who said that anxiety, or the need
to avoid it, played that role. Today Locke's name is spelled F-r-e-u-d.)
In everyday life physicians have the opportunity to observe how pro-
tracted boredom produces increasing restlessness, tension, and in some
persons, anxiety. One of the effects of stress is regression in behavior
patterns, so that previous patterns emerge. Hence boredom, like any
other stress, induces immature and pre-social behavior.

The recent technologic (including the chemical) revolutions have
made sexual activity much less likely to have some untoward results
than was true in the past. This has removed one important incentive to
chastity and has helped to reveal the insubstantiahty of virtue. (This is
reminiscent of the medieval situation. In those days no lady could yield
to a gentleman until he had proved his manliness in three armed con-
flicts. This made some men appear braver than they actually were and
since many of the men did not survive the requisite three fights, it made
many women appear more virtuous than they really were.) The techno-
logic developments responsible for the improvement in contraceptive
practice have permitted the development of the sexual freedom that
prevails today in the so-called civilized world. They have permitted an
unprecedented degree of enjoyment of venereal pleasures. Unfortunate-
ly they have permitted a prevalence of venereal diseases that makes
them outrank all other infectious diseases in teenagers. The increase
in teenage pregnancy, with its high rate of medical complications, is

25

a paradoxic consequence of the sexual revolution induced by technologic
changes.

Another behavioral consequence of the current advanced state of
technology is the prominence of the Female Liberation Movement. No
amount of philosophizing or of propagandizing could ever have advanced
that movement to its present prominence but for the technologic pro-.
cesses that permitted women to have employment in industry, that
filled the house with labor-saving devices, and that markedly reduced
child-bearing. Whether or not any significant number of women has
formally joined some segment of the Female Liberation Movement is
not under discussion here. What is meant rather is that technologic de-
velopments permitted women sexual freedom and partial escape from
the demands of a mother's role. The sexual freedom has not by itself
been as liberating to the spirit as was expected and the results have
been experimentation involving the social organization of sexual
behavior, e.g., spouse-sharing and group sex, and experimentation in-
volving the physical practice of sex. Both have produced a sex-life de-
void of its most elevating emotional aspects and conducive only to more
boredom than they were intended to relieve.

Worst of all is the fact that the technologic revolution has crowded
people into cities and adjacent suburbs. Agriculture as a way of life
that permitted people to exist spread out in the country can no longer
exist. Also modern technology demands the creation of huge manufac-
turing centers and in consequence a concentration of population. At
the same time man's innate search for anything that will permit de-
creases in the requirements for physical and mental effort has drawn him
to the cities. These factors have emptied much of the country (a fact
that escapes the notice of those who travel only by main highway) and
has concentrated people into environments that have no precedent in
primate biology. In addition to the problems of water supply, solid waste
and sewage disposal and atmospheric pollution created when people
cease to be dispersed and became aggregated and these are bad
enough there are the worse problems caused by the effects of people
on people.

Although animals with highly developed societies exist and their
rigidity and stereotypy should not be ignored primates living in nature
comprise small and loosely organized social groups. The huge groups
organized into complex societies that characterize today's highly indus-
trialized cultures are of recent origin. In fact permanent village life is
probably no more than ten thousand years old. Contrast this with the
millions of years in which social insect societies evolved and came to
exist. It is evident that when human personalities come into contact each
of them must lose some of its attributes. Compare the personality of any
normally developed individual studied alone with the personality of a

26

group of ten and then of a hundred, and then a thousand. There is no
doubt that the total is always less than the sum of its parts; the larger
the number involved, the greater the difference between the total and
the sum. This loss of personality is transitory, often briefly so and hence
unnoticed, when a few people aggregate for limited periods. However
when large numbers of people come together for extended periods, a
serious persistent atrophy of their personalities occurs. This atrophy
may be masked by the pace of interaction that may occur in aggregated
populations but this interaction is simplified and stereotyped; in fact
it is boring to watch and boring to participate in. The underdeveloped or
atrophied personality is highly susceptible to boredom, and cannot es-
cape from it. Lacking the personal resources for a stimulating existence,
it can only seek the company of other personalities many of which are
similarly underdeveloped or atrophied, and hence, boring. A further
atrophy of the personality, and increasing frequency and persistence of
the boredom are the bewildering result, and it becomes more pronounced
with advancing age. No wonder the young find most older people un-
satisfactory but will follow any stimulating older person no matter how
depraved or nutty he may be. The aging atrophied personality is capable
only of simple stereotyped responses and hence is labeled conservative.
This is not a correct use of the term a conservative personality is not
necessarily a stultified one and vice-versa.

Another consequence of city living has, to my knowledge, been
touched on by few if any sociologists. This is a change in the attitude to-
ward people in general. To rural people Nature often exhibits inimical
attributes: storm, flood, drought, frost, insect pests, etc. If these natural
hazards exist at all in the city, they are so rare and so diminished that
Nature ceases to be regarded as inimical and Man takes its place. Any-
thing untoward that occurs to the city dweller can be blamed, rightly or
wrongly, on the actions of other people. Hence, whereas the country
dweller takes mankind as, in the words of John Quincy Adams, "as we
take a wife for better or for worse, ,s to the city dweller every man who
is not at the moment a friend is at least at the moment probably an
enemy. This paranoid thinking is further stimulated by the involuntary
togetherness prevalent today. The paranoia often leads to a belief in
witchcraft among the superstitious and of conspiracies (e. g. the Estab-
lishment) or familial malevolence (e. g. the mother as the cause of
schizophrenia, the spouse as the cause of alcoholism, the children as
the cause of senile psychosis) among the half-educated. This general
attitude also leads to the fantastic belief found in children's fairy tales,
the belief that some day soon the Final Battle between Absolute Good
and Absolute Evil will occur, and the rich, bloated arrogant treacherous
forces of Evil will be wiped out (except for the few who confess their
error) by the ragged, starved, poorly equipped but unceasingly valiant
forces of Good.

27

Our advanced technology has led to a habit of immediate gratification
of all wants, with little or no effort. This habit, or at least expectation is
far more prevalent than it was a century ago. Immediate gratification
and no toil could not possibly be widespread in the mainly agricultural
society that then existed. The idea of planting, cultivating and. after
considerable time, harvesting, prevailed in occupations and carried over
to other matters of daily life. The number of persons who could legally
exist off the surplus created by the toil of farmers was not large. These
non-producers instinctively limited their numbers by excluding, osten-
sibly for genetic reasons, those who wanted to join their number. Al-
though the industrial revolution has permitted the harnessing of water
and steam power for a variety of manufacturing processes, manufactur-
ing as a whole still involved much direct contact between the worker and
the object, and the transformation of raw materials into manufactures
was still relatively slow and dependent on the effort of individual workers.

Life today is completely different in this country. Agriculture is a
way of life for only a small segment of the population. Those who today
participate in industry do not see the gradual transformation of raw
material into finished product. They are more closely in contact with
some machine than with the product it is helping to create: in fact are
more likely to think and act like attachments of machines than like the
creators of products. Moreover, the development of electric power and
of electronic regulating devices has made man even less of a participant
in the creation of things he uses than he was a generation ago. These
and other recent developments have produced an entirely different pat-
tern of behavior from that which previously prevailed.

Today's persons less than thirty years old were brought up condi-
tioned to respond to most wants, both physical and mental, by pressing
buttons, ripping open cans, dissolving concentrates, thawing frozen food
or drink, spraying a mist on some surface alive or inanimate, etc. The
idea that at least the onset of gratification might be delayed as much as
thirty minutes is enough to make a person start hiding candy bars under
his mattress.

As John Reid said in 1816: "Expectation is the vital principal of hap-
piness. It is that which constantly stimulates us to exertion, and fills up
the vacant spaces of life. We are in general more interested by a pre-
carious good in prospect, than by, the most valuable realities in our
possession. The blossoms of hope are better than the ripened fruits of
fortune. We complain of the vicissitudes and uncertainty attending upon
our present state, and yet as it is, in this very uncertainty and vicissitude,
that its interest, and of course its value, principally consists. Anticipated
changes constitutes the predominant charm of life." This has been
largely lost.

28

Today's era of electronic gadgetry has had another effect: it has not
only created the delusion that immediate gratification is the normal
way of life for everyone but it has also created vast surpluses that seem
to justify this notion. The effects of these economic factors have been
reinforced by current American theories of child-rearing which theories
hold that anything restrictive is bad.

The affluence produced by the recent technologic revolution has
also created problems. The idea that poverty is bad and hence affluence
must be good is one of the inanities of current sociologic thinking. Huge
efforts are currently being made to eliminate poverty, because poverty
has evidently demoralized many people of all ages, especially those
under 25 years of age. It is equally evident, however, that affluence
has also demoralized many people, especially those under 25 years of
age. In fact as the affluent segment of the population becomes more
numerous, the demoralization produced by affluence becomes more
evident. We unfortunately have no great body of current writing on the
sociologic disorders produced by affluence although psychiatrists of
earlier eras did have much to say on this subject. It is clear that af-
fluence spoils particularly when it is combined with permissiveness.
For example. Sir Charles Ellis, superintendent of the mental hospital
at Wakefield, wrote (1838): "When in early life the inclinations have
never been thwarted, and the passions have been allowed to remain un-
subdued, the disappointments and reverses of fortune, which almost
invariably attend every human being in his passage through the world,
frequently cause overanxiety in the mind, before unaccustomed to
restraint." Conolly wrote (1830): "Mental ease is destroyed by the want
of those privations and difficulties of which the operation is always
beneficial, though seldom duly appreciated" even when the person is
distracted by the excitements of life in a large city.

Although it would be absurd to declare that technologic advances
and affluence can only be evil, it is difficult to say any such thing about
permissiveness in child-rearing. A permissive upbringing is widely
recommended as a means of preventing personality disorders. However,
permissiveness is, in fact, one of the most subtle and extreme forms of
rejection.

It is at least as important as excessive harshness in separating parents
and children. Another behavioral consequence of parental permissive-
ness is the spread of antisocial phenomena, phenomena that interfere
with or even interdict those social processes that favor the maximal
development and operation of the personality attributes of all the mem-
bers of the community consistent with minimal impairment of particular
personality attributes of any of its members. This is true because the
demand for permissiveness is a demand for abdication of judgment in
social affairs, and derives from the absurd notion that since there is no
such thing as an absolute standard then there should be no standards
at all.

29

The reason for the prevalence of permissiveness in our society is
hard to define. The philosophy that underlies it evidently originated in
the writings of Rousseau. In his defence and he is not an easy man to
defend he did not believe that his theories of child-rearing should be
universally applied; he intended them to be used only by the upper
classes. Since at that time these classes were numerically insignificant,
his theories could not lead to a serious collapse of society. However his
philosophy became one of the main components of modern American
social science. Today the so-called social sciences have come to domi-
nate all aspects of mental life in this country.

As that outstanding social scientist Professor Martin Gross pointed
out in The New School Bulletin five years ago, they have gained in the
colleges power of "magnificent, and undeserved proportions. The typi-
cal university curriculum is heavily weighted in the social sciences. . . .It
might be said, without too great a fear of exaggeration, that the modern
undergraduate is a social science addict. In the community outside the
campus, the social sciences exert an impressive influence in such institu-
tions as free public education (through educational psychologists and
educators) welfare, penology, probation, social work, family and child
guidance, adoption, numerous manifestations of psychology and psy-
chiatric care, work with delinquents, and massive federal programs of
every variety, from poverty to race relations. . . ." This enormous ex-
pansion of a need for practitioners of the social science led our educa-
tional system to turn out large numbers of mediocrities in this field (as
in some others). As de Tocqueville observed, "A middling standard is
fixed in America for human knowledge. All approach to it as near as
they can; some as they rise, others as they descend." The general tenden-
cy of American education to produce mediocrity, acting upon a branch
of learning notable for its vagueness of formulation, disregard of rules
for interpreting data and validation of method, and bizarreness of some
of its leading thinkers had produced a vast number of educationalists
who have created a crashingly erroneous concept of the nature of man
and the goals in his education.

In passing, it might be noted that the harmful effect of philosophies
has been a matter of comment since earliest days. Athenaeus told how
Antiochus Sidetes, a Syrian king of the second century B. C. wrote to
one of his officials: "We have already directed you that no philosophers
shall stay in the city or district, yet we hear that there are not a few. and
that they debauch the young, owing to my orders not being carried out.
Upon receipt, therefore, of this letter, issue a decree to expel all philoso-
phers, threatening any youths found in their company with hanging,
and their parents with gravest censure. Let there be no mistake about
this." Similarly, the Roman Senate, in 161 B. C. passed a decree ex-
pelling philosophers on the grounds that they were corrupting Roman
youths to abandon their parents, traditional habits of thought and wavs
of life.

30

Today's popular philosophies deny the importance of contact be-
tween successive generations either as such or through their works. In
so doing they ignore the biological nature of man. As Cassirer has
pointed out, man is a "time-conserving animal" because man consciously
and unconsciously uses the past experience of his species more than
does any other animal; indeed, as far as is known, only man has develop-
ed history as a scientific discipline and a literar mode. To put i in
more general terms, man as a biologic organism seeks the consolation
of certainty in tradition at the same time that he seeks the consolation
of hope in change. He conserves the past but flavors it with anticipation
of the future. To assume that man can create a future while ignoring,
or actually by rejecting the past is the height of biologic absurdity.

The lessons of the past are useful because they maintain social forms
that are of proven value either as guides to behavior, as examples of
beautymnjoyed by all, or as inspiring reminders of some great events in
people's history. In addition, of course, the traditions created by past
experience help to give culture the unity that binds different ages and
different social groups so that the culture may survive. Traditions should
be questioned because conditions change. Moreover, traditions are often
a poor guide in making cultural changes required by changing conditions.
Adherence to tradition may submerge new modes that clearly should be
adopted; this happens because men find it difficult to believe in or
even notice the unfamiliar while the familiar is constantly before their

The decision when to modify or abandon a tradition is a difficult
one. Impatient and foolish men solve this problem by advocating the
overthrow of all traditions. This suggestion may be advanced either as
having practical ends or as a way of "liberating the spirit" whatever
that means. The indiscriminate overthrowing of traditions has always
had unfavorable results. It is clearly not in harmony with man's biologic
nature. The two opposing forces implied in the wish to preserve tradition
and to institute change underlie all human social life.

It is evident that man's biologic nature, that of a time-conserving
animal, must use both the past and the future. (The present is only a
point in time and strictly speaking has no duration.) The radical ignores
most of the past in planning for the future and hopes to create a static
Utopia. The reactionary wants to return to the modes of the past, even
though they have ceased to work and, in some cases, have been rejected
by society. He too hopes to create a static Utopia. Accordingly, neither
radicals nor reactionaries are time-conserving animals. The truly time-
conserving man must pay equal attention to both the past and the future:
he must therefore always favor things as they actually are i. e., con-

31

stantly changing through the fusion of useful old traditions with the new
ideas for the good of the future.

Unfortunately those young people whose peculiar education condi-
tions them to believe that there are no valid standards, that only feelings
should determine actions, and that the beliefs (and feelings) of any who
differ with them are irrelevant are clearly unable to maintain, and much
less to build a just and orderly society. It is unfortunate that all that
some young people have acquired is little more than these notions from
the education that we have provided for them. The fanatical allegiance
to their own group that many of them exhibit is not praiseworthy. Exclu-
sive loyalty to an immediate group prevents the growth or survival of
any larger social organization. It prevents social coherence and may lead
to pointless conflicts characterized by a meaningless alternation of vic-
tories and defeats. A higher loyalty, to society as a whole, must outweigh
all limited allegiances. Loyalty is the cement of a social system, much
more so than any system of laws. All those who comprise a social
order and two social orders cannot occupy the same place at the same
time must be loyal to each other.

It is evident that if we apply the word revolution to recent events in
this country, in most cases the word should mean going in circles. This
circular phenomenon, with its recurrence of the same types of event, is
freed from complete stereotype mainly through social changes intro-
duced by the accidents of technologic discovery. Moreover much of
what we call the revolution in moral values today is merely a revolution
in manners. In large part this change in manners is due to the change in
the proportion of affluent in society. Since there are many more of them.
their defects in behavior are more noticeable. The only real revolution
in manners that has occurred is the rejection of privacy and at least out-
ward respect for the rights and comfort of others together with the stated
wish to be offensive to all persons, friend or foe (and this includes
offending the senses of hearing, sight and smell). The issue has become
confused because this revolution in manners is not only excused as a
consequence of a moral revolution but actually claimed to be such a
revolution. This is an attempt to give it an elevated status that it does
not deserve. Today's revolutionary changes in behavior cannot be judged
in terms of moral good or evil. For example the notion that considerate
manners are mere hypocrisy is merely an attempt to justify inconsiderate
manners on fake moral grounds. Those accustomed by poor education to
use slogans as if they were great moral principles easily fall into this
error.

Unfortunately this error has been reinforced and perpetuated
because some men who claim high principles have adopted the notion
that it is necessary to perform antisocial acts to gain a purported future
good. The imagined good end has been used to justify the present means:

32

however socially desirable formulas become not indications of planned
reforms but rather the battle cries of antisocial violence. When this kind
of violence deliberately sacrifices the present for an imagined future, it
always loses the future too. Violent behavior and its attendant dogma-
tism become the refuge of weak persons who lack the character to en-
dure dissatisfactions long enough to eliminate them by democratic
processes without replacing them with new (and worse) ones.

When men who claim high principles condone or recommend anti-
social actions in the name of social progress, less highly motivated indi-
viduals are encouraged to pursue similarly antisocial behavior. Today,
many antisocial acts are performed out of boredom by persons who lack
the resources needed to initiate worthwhile engrossing activities. When
such people lack ethical standards of behavior of their own and reject
the guidance offered by moral leaders in the community, they easily
fall into antisocial ways. Antisocial behavior undertaken to escape bore-
dom leads to more and more extreme antisocial behavior.

The general decline in personal standards of behavior is largely due
to educational practices of the last few decades. The Dewey-eyed
theorists (John Dewey, that is), who established child-rearing practices,
have failed to take into account the need for externally imposed disci-
pline in children if self-discipline is to develop in adults. (Giving self-
discipline the pejorative name "inhibition'* is not only harmful, it is
inaccurate. Self-discipline is voluntary and rational; inhibition is invol-
untary and irrational.) When a community's leaders and their unthinking
followers engage in antisocial pursuits, all the rascals are emboldened to
do likewise. Hence the responsibility for wisespread antisocial behavior
lies with the leaders of the community. When these leaders encourage
antisocial actions by word or example, the community deteriorates. Such
leaders are therefore not qualified to lead. Men of sense and tolerance
instinctively work both for the present and for the future. In order to do
so, however, they must borrow from the past, because borrowing wisely
from the past strengthens the possibility of an improved future. Ignoring
the past favors the perpetuation of disorder, the most ancient social
condition, in which irrational slogans, senseless planning, and pointless
destruction predominate. Accordingly, those who today claim to be the
most revolutionary as regards the social system are actually the most
reactionary. Contrariwise, those who today seem to be least revolution-
ary by advocating deliberation in reform and study of the past are, in
fact, the most revolutionary. They alone can be responsible for what-
ever progress is made. What is equally important is that they will lead
the community in the direction of progress without the setbacks produced
by antisocial times. They will be actingin accordance with man's biolog-
ic nature the time-conserving animal.

It is easy to see how the development of affluence and urban
crowding, the ascendancy of an absurd philosophy in sociology and edu-

33

cation, and above all the confused thinking of persons widely regarded
as community leaders have created the dark in which we now are. Let
him who will whistle in it.

In 1688 Fontenelle wrote in his Les Anciens et les Modernes, "We
are under obligations to the ancients for having exhausted almost all
the false theories that could be formed." The young of today should be
similarly grateful to their elders; the young will be spared the impossible
task of creating new false theories.

34

A PATTERN FOR A NEW SOUTH

By DAVID MATHEWS*

Almost one hundred years ago, Henry Grady used Atlanta as a
forum for his plea for a new South, a South that should shed its romantic
myths in order to participate in the new industrial and commercial
prosperity of what became known as the Guilded Age. Like Henry
Grady, I am here today to talk of Souths, old and new, but I am not here
to talk of plowing under and building up. Nor am I here to talk about a
new romanticism for the South. I am here to talk of using myths and
traditions for a new reality.

In the real world, the South has always been a powerful stimulant,
and the role of the South is therefore an important topic. For example,
at the 1970 meeting of the Southern Historical Association, Joe Frantz
of the University of Texas gave a witty and perceptive address on the
effect of the South upon the Presidency. He noted the fact that with few
exceptions, Southerners dominated the Presidency until the Civil War.
But he concluded that since the war, the South has served as a goad to
the Presidency; that is, the problems presented by the South to the na-
tion have constantly challenged the Presidency and have forced it to
extend itself to be and to do other than it would have.

The "Southern Question/* whether it be political reconstruction,
cultural assimilation, or economic revival, has been before the nation
since the Civil War. Today the South longs to be something other than a
problem. And possibly in this decade, the nation may find in the South
a source of answers, not of problems. The heritage of the South pre-
sents the nation with wholesome opportunities to blunt the harshness of
modern life and to soften the undesirable aspects of a technologically
dominated society. Today, with increasing concern for the quality of
national life, people may be looking to the South, which has since the
founding of the Republic prided itself on the unique quality, the dis-
tinctive flavor of its life style. I heard recently of a small town news-
paper editor in Alabama who was asked by Northern urban planning
group to serve as an advisor. The editor asked what he could possibly
contribute to the study of urban life. The Northerner quietly assured
him that perhaps he knew more about living in his small town than any
one in the East.

The challenge of building a "New South*' as a shining example to
the nation, of course, is not new. Almost one hundred years ago young
men of the South, like Henry Grady, turned from the wounds of war to

*President, University of Alabama.

35

proclaim a "New South" of industrialization and dynamic change. To-
day, Southerners turn from the scars of the civil rights battles of the
1960's to press the claims of the South to pre-eminence in solving the
problems of change. I am too much a realist to talk of grand and glori-
ous designs for a New South, but I can talk realistically about the South
that was, is, and may be. Our problem may well be not so much deciding
what should be new in the South, but what should be retained of the old
and woven into the future. Indeed, the heart of creating a future is the
job of sorting among a multitude of traditions, each often filled with
contraditions, for a new mythology that is coherent and compeling and
most importantly capable of working in the real world. That after all
is the ultimate test of any hypothesis, law of nature, or myth.

The South has more than once in its history been identified with a
quest for renewal. In the 1500's Ponce de Leon sought the fountain of
youth in Florida; in the days of the early Republic Jefferson sought
pure democracy in the yeoman farmer; in the 1850's William Lowndes
Yancey and other young romantics sought aristocratic idealism in a
plantation-dominated independent nation; in the ISSO's and 1890"s
Henry Grady and his colleagues sought economic plenty in textile and
iron mills; and in the 1920's and 1930's Allen Tate and the Agrarians
sought refuge from industrialized materialism in the South's heritage
and tradition. Each sought the uniqueness and the promise of the South
in a separate area, sometimes in a totally different one from that of the
preceding search.

What then, or even where, is the South? Is the South Jefferson's
yeoman farmer in the foothills of the Piedmont? Is the South Yancey's
independent nation, a nation in essence of black belt and delta planters?
Is the South Grady's bustling mills in cities such as Atlanta and Birming-
ham? Is the South Tate's heritage in the hearts of those who love it?
Perhaps Tate, the poet who deals in ideals and qualities rather than tons
of production and dollars of exports, gives us the best clue as to where
to seek the quality of the South.

The Tates have been those who have understood that what we need
is to examine carefully the history, the legends, the traditions of the
South and to choose from them those qualities that can impart
individuality and, above all, humanity to the modern world which so
often seems to thunder over us in a mass of computer cards, plastic, and
uncollected garbage.

But which of the many traditions of the South is the South that we
wish to preserve.

While I do not want to fall into the trap which prompts many his-
torians and South-watchers of this century to see only the negative
qualities of the South, I must admit that there are certain aspects of our
heritage that we should gladly forget.

36 .

Poverty, for one, has been a prevalent condition of the South. In
1938, Franklin D. Roosevelt labeled the South as the nation's number
one economic problem, and that, or today's poverty, is nothing to be
proud of.

The South has also been too often characterized by racism. Ulrich
B. Phillips, the noted southern historian and native Georgian, observed
that the distinguishing characteristic of the South was a fervent belief
in white supremacy. Time and the civil rights movements of our day
have shown many that racism is not peculiar by any means to the South.
The South has lived with the problems of race relations longer and more
intimately than any section of the nation. Many have observed that if
the complex national problems of racism are solved, it will be the South
which provides many of the answers. We are beginning to eradicate the
heritage of racism and we tire of being assigned the role of scapegoat
for what is indeed a national, even a world, problem.

The South has too often been associated with isolationism. Perhaps
because of the labels of poverty and racism the South has borne,
Southerners have too often prejudged others, believing that they did
not like us and we therefore would not like them in retaliation. That
reaction is not to our credit, and it is not a legacy we need to pass on to
our children.

The South has too often been characterized by anti-intellectualism.
Our introspective, defensive attitude has made us resist currents of
thought which could improve our way of life. It was after all, one of the
most pre-eminent Southerners, Thomas Jefferson, who said, "I have
sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility against every form of
tyranny over the mind of man."

The South has too often been characterized by violence, a corollary
of anti-intellectualism. Southerners have fought opposing ideas with
the sword. Henry Adams, descendent of presidents and an intellectual
Bostonian, observed that Southerners of the 1850's had no mind; they
had only temperament. Temperament and passion have too often led
Southerners to lash out with anger rather than to reach out with reason.
The terrible results of violence in our society during our own lifetimes
make it clear that violence is a tradition best forgotten.

The South has too often been characterized by a neglect of educa-
tion. Indeed there has been a long tradition of belittling education in
the South. In the South itself this stereotype has been accepted to an
amazing extent, and it is daily reflected in the pessimism of many of the
region's leaders. Southerners have marched so long in the rear guard of
educational advance that their idea of the possible is fixed not by the
front file but by those who are just one step ahead.

The South has too often been characterized by its dependence upon
the past. The past has served to shelter us from criticisms hurled by

37

those who emphasize the baleful characteristics of the Soutn. As an
historian, I cherish the past. But it is pitiful to see those who can think
of nothing but the past, whether the victories or the defeats. It im-
mobilizes them; it blinds them. It makes them incapable of acting when
action is required. We need to remember the past, to use it, but not to
live it.

The Southerner's history is not simply a textbook experience. And
this perhaps is what makes this area distinctive. As Mr. Toynbee ob-
served, history for us, black and white, is something that visited our
people and left its stamp. The past for the Southerner has left a legacy
of myths, myths which persist today. I am not speaking here of myths
as untruths, although there is that aspect, but of myths as a set of pervad-
ing feelings that recognizably are part of the Southern character.

Southerners love their land, and justly so. Even the young radical
Southerner is likely to be distinguished from his Northern counterpart
by his sense of place. We are historically an agrarian people, close to
the soil and to the lessons of nature. Even as cities rise in our midst and
more of us live in urban areas, most of us are still descendents of rural
people, and none of our cities are far from large areas where crops,
crossroad stores, checker games, all-day singings, and dinners-on-the-
ground are regular features of society. The benefits of nature have been
a chief source of our heritage and of our pride, and publicists of the South
have long emphasized the attractiveness of our land and climate.

But our land must be preserved if it is to continue to be a source of
pride. We used to blame most of our economic troubles on the destruc-
tion wrought by Yankees during the Civil War. But the Yankees did not
destroy our air, our water, or our land. Yet. we in our own mad dash for
industrialization stand in danger of destroying the very irreplaceable
treasures the Civil War never touched.

A second aspect of our heritage which we must preserve is our sense
of identity, our belief that we do have a heritage upon which we can
draw. Carried to its extreme, this characteristic becomes an immobilizing
retreat into the past, but intelligently used our sense of who and where
we are in history gives us roots and imparts meaning to our lives. A
Southerner can come home (Thomas Wolfe, to the contrary notwith-
standing) and that in our stress-filled world is of immeasureable value.
Many serious thinkers in this country are worried that the American
people are becoming culturally homogenized to such an exient that all
our own individuality will be lost and even worse, that we will lose the
creativity and resiliency that are products of a sense of who we are.
Cultural "rootlessness" can produce in society an alienation, an insta-
bility not unlike that produced by a personal loss of identity.

A third aspect of our heritage which we must preserve is our inde-
pendence. Those who have a land and a history are their own men.

38

They owe only themselves and their God, and to these they owe a will-
ingness to dare and to do, which sets them apart and gives them confi-
dence of spirit, of ambition, and of dignity. These qualities move the
world, and as long as we are careful to retain a sense of balance in our
purpose, we as Southerners could trade more confidently on our
independence. The quality that has made us defiant could be put to
far more constructive ends.

We must also preserve our sense of pride, a sense of working hard
and of doing a job well, whether it results in a straight furrow or a
good sermon. Pride keeps people involved until the job at hand is done
and done well. Today we face many problems some of them seem
insoluable but pride will keep us to the tasks until solutions come.
Pride makes people '"pitch in" rather than "drop out."

We must also preserve from our heritage the courtesy, the civility
for which we have long been famous. Too many people today believe
that civility is frivolous. In the history of man. however, politeness has
been one of the most effective devices men have used to allow them to
live together in times of great stress. The simple act of politeness is
social insurance against the destructiveness that inevitably comes from
the abrasion and friction of human competition. It is a rare and dis-
appearing quality in our society. Without genuine thoughtfulness and
consideration, our other virtues identity, independence, and pride-
become instead, faults of isolationism, and racism. Each beneficial aspect
of our heritage can be carried to a point where it becomes a damaging
characteristic unless it is a genuine concern for humanity. Our civility
must have depth, or else it is meaningless form.

Finally we must preserve a sense of mission. The South has too
long been known as a land of lost causes. But the causes of Jefferson,
and of Jackson were not lost. Our causes when they have suffered,
perhaps, have not been so much lost as ill-chosen.

This time we must choose causes that are just and have a future.
We must choose them deliberately and realistically. We must, if need
be, create our future not by abandoning our past but by realizing that
all of our traditions are two sided coins, and that the very tendencies
that have made Southerners reactionary could, indeed, have at times
made them progressive. We must use myths then, but we must not do
what we have done time and time again, turn from reality to romanticism.
That is true of both Northern romanticism and the Southern version.
The people of the South, black-white, rich-poor, conservative-liberal,
have one thing in common; they are keenly aware that they must once
again influence their own destiny. And they must begin by weaving
together a common vision of future reality hard nosed, tough minded,
individual and humane.

39

/dYk ~/?6