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COLLECTIONS

Georgia Historical Society

Vol. VII

PART III

THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT

OF THE ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA,

IN AMERICA, AND OF ITS DEFEAT ON ST. SIMONS ISLAND

BY
GENERAL JAMES OGLETHORPE

Published by

The Georgia Historical Society

Savannah, Ga.

Savannah, Ga.

Savannah Morning News

1913

PREFACE

The translation that follows was made from manuscripts
in the library of Mr. W. J. DeRenne, copied from the origi-
nal documents preserved in the Archives of the Indies at
Seville. Each of these manuscripts bears a heading giving
the provenance of its original, and each is further certified
as being a true copy. Heading and certificate are reproduc-
ed with the first document of the translation, but it has not
been thought worth while to repeat them with the remain-
der.

The papers of this collection fall more or less naturally
into groups : Letters and orders, diaries, reports and re-
turns. The list of sea- and shore-signals, and one set of
naval instructions, have with the returns been placed last
as being somewhat detached, logically, from the substance
of the other papers. They have their significance and in-
terest, however, in that they reveal the extreme care be-
stowed on the expedition. It will be noticed that the list
of signals and the set of naval instructions relate to an
earlier expedition, planned but not carried out.

The sketches of guns and mortars are due to Lieutenant
J. W. Lang, 9th Regiment of Infantry, United States Army.
They are reproduced from illustrations in the catalogue of
the Artillery Museum at Madrid.

The Treaty of Vienna, November 18, 1738, gave Spain
but a short respite from war. Claims and counterclaims
arising chiefly out of colonial questions, led to much diplo-
matic parleying with England, and in January, 1739, she
saw herself obliged to pay that country an indemnity of
95,000. On the presentation of a demand for a counter-
indemnity, England threatened war ; on August 20th au-
thorized reprisals, and finally on October 30, 1739, declared
war. It is of this war, terminated b}^ the Treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, October 18, 1718, that the events of the following
pages form a part.

War or no war, the Spanish had long been contemplating
an expedition against the English Colony of Georgia.
They kept such an expedition on the stocks, as it were, to

be launched when opportune; and finally did launch it in
June of 1742 to overwhelm the English King's new Colony
"in the place called Georgia." To the King of Spain, and to
his subjects in Cuba and Florida, the chief object was puni-
tive : the insolent and perfidious English were to be chas-
tised and the chastisement was to be extermination. There
was no notion of conquest; once the object attained and the
English swept off the face of the earth, troops and ships
were to return to their respective garrisons in St. Augus-
tine and Havana. So much stress, indeed, was laid on this
withdrawal as to justify the belief that its accomplishment
was almost as much a matter of concern as the advance it-
self. This concern undeniably affected the morale of the
commanding general, if not of the entire expedition.

In forming an estimate of the events dealt with in the
following pages, it is needful to place one's self in a proper
point of view. If we place ourselves abroad, the events are
inconspicuous; if we recross the Atlantic, they loom large.
In reality, we must not regard the attempt of Spain on
New Georgia as an affair between small numbers in a dis-
tant and unimportant land ; it was Spain and England striv-
ing for mastery in a vast continent, and although Spain, as
already said, had no notion of conquest, to England, that is
to Oglethorpe, the notion of permanency was ever present
and fundamentally real. To him the question was whether
his beloved Georgia should be a Spanish waste, or a living,
free, English colony, a potential State. How he answered
this question we all know: he brought to naught as grave
a danger as ever threatened the Colonies, and he did it
alone.

The point of view must needs then be local, but with a
national outlook ; it follows that the papers in this collec-
tion acquire a double interest. And this interest grows
with the conviction, begot of an examination of the records,
that Oglethorpe- by all the rules of the game, should have
been beaten. He was out-manned, out-shipped, and out-
gunned. But he was a soldier, and knew his business; al-
though men, and ships, and guns are necessary, alone they
are not sufficient. They must first be welded into a homo-
geneous instrument and then intelligently used, before pos-
itive results can be expected. This homogeneity was lack-
ing to his adversaries, a fact that he must have been ac-
quainted with ; moreover, they had not had time to know
their commander, Montiano, nor he his troops. And lastly,,
it is in the highest degree probable that Oglethorpe had,
measured his antagonist.

That Montiano had failed to take his own measure, is
proved by his pitiable report to his King. Without in the
least intending- it, in complete unconsciousness, he strips
his own inefficiency bare for our inspection and examina-
tion. Psychologically, conditions were against the Span-
iards from the outset, but this must not in the least be taken
to detract from Oglethorpe : he had to reckon on the one
hand with a force much greater than any he could muster,
and on the other hand, with certain possibilities in his favor;
but in respect of these he might very easily have been in
error.

The Spaniards sailed into St. Simons gallantly enough,
and landed their men between the forts and the town of
Frederica. No resistance was offered. Bearing in mind
that a landing under fire is, for the landing party, a delicate
operation, we may well ask why Oglethorpe should have
neglected this opportunity to do his adversary a serious
harm. But a little reflection will show that this case really
offered no opportunity. As soon as it became evident that
the run-past of the ships was, or would be, successful, the
evacuation of the forts was imposed. To leave troops in
the forts, even if they could have held out, was folly so
clear that we need waste no time over the matter. But
once withdrawn, where should they go? Should they pro-
ceed to resist this disembarkation, either alone, or in junc
tion with other forces brought down for the purpose?

But Oglethorpe could not tell where the Spaniards would
land : it was not inconceivable that they would deliver their
first attack on the town itself. If, however, they should
choose to land between the town and the forts, then it was
the part of wisdom to leave them to follow this course ; for
once ashore, they would have miles of swamp to cross be-
fore reaching him, and his inferiority in numbers would be
more than compensated by the advantage of positions se-
lected in advance. If he had attempted to oppose this land-
ing, he would have had the morasses at his back, and so in
case of check, have converted an admirable natural defence
into a most serious obstacle to successful withdrawal.
Moreover, so few were his men that he could not afford
to divide them ; and lastly, and quite apart from any other
consideration, he had no guns to oppose to the Spanish
naval artillery, against which any musketry fire that he
could bring to bear, ineffective in those days beyond two
hundred 3-ards, would have been powerless.

The issue proved the wisdom of his dispositions. The
first attempt of the Spaniards to push their way through the
morasses was also their last, nor did they later make any

effort of any other sort. This failure to undertake any-
thing more must be regarded as discreditable to the "glory
and reputation of the arms of the King," particularly if the
Spanish account of losses be correct. That it is not, we
know from other sources. Indeed, so great were Montia-
no's losses, and among his best troops, so sudden and un-
expected his check, so uncompromising his defeat, that the
matter was really then and there settled. In plain English,
he had no stomach for further business. After that disas-
trous beating when his grenadiers fell only to incarnadine the
waters of the swamp in which they were entrapped, he sent
out only Indians to see "if they could find some other road
to Frederica". Meanwhile his rations were being reduced,
he had not got his guns ashore, and rumors unnerved him.
In these straits he fell to calling councils of war and so was
lost. That he had made only one genuine effort to reach
his objective, that in spite of the failure of this effort, he
still outnumbered Oglethorpe, that in any case his fleet was
substantially intact, these things made no impression on
him. His one concern was to withdraw. And yet so blind
was he to his own shortcomings that he attributes his fail-
ure to the Almighty and actually asks his King to approve
his conduct of affairs and to bestow honors upon him. To
be sure, he had razed a few earthworks evacuated by their
garrisons, carried off a few guns spiked by the enemy,
Ijurned a few houses abandoned by the inhabitants. And
here we m.ay now well leave him, recounting his victories
over inanimate things, and glossing his failure, for this fail-
ure made the State of Georgia possible.

C. DeW. W.
West Point, New York, October 19, 1912.

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GENERAL ARCHIVES OF THE INDIES: AUDIENCE OF
SAN DOMINGO, LOUISIANA AND FLORIDA.

Report Upon the Expulsion of the English from the Territories
They Have Usurped in Florida, and Survey of Limits and
Incidences. From 173S to 1743; Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3.

Affidavit of Juan Castelnau, a Prisoner in Georgia,

Havana, July 24, 1739.*
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas transmits
the depositions made by Juan Castelnau, a native of Los
Pasages in Guipiizcoa, on the present state of the Settle-
ments of New Georgia, where he was held a prisoner for 18
months, and of its fortifications, forces and establishments.

Sir: Juan Castelnau, who says he is a native of Los Pas-
ages in Guipiizcoa, having come from Cartagena in this dis-
patch boat nov/ on her vv'ay to those kingdoms [i, e. Castile
and Leon, or Spain] with the order and permission consist-
ing in a decree petitioned for by him of Lieutenant General
Don Bias de Lesso, I have taken the declarations that follow
to substantiate the reasons he gave to obtain the said per-
mission. As I find from them that he has told the truth, and
given an exact account and trustworthy news of the state of
the towns of New Georgia, its fortifications, forces and es-
tablishments, both as these were at the time of the expedi-
tion intended and planned for the past year of 1738, and
as they were after the arrival of the Commanding General
Don Diego Ogletop,** I have thought it proper to send your
Lordship the testimony of his declarations, to the end that
His Majesty maj'" be thoroughly informed of past and pres-
ent conditions, because it agrees with all the inquiries and
news which I had made and acquired for the expedition,
and with those of the Governor of Saint Augustine in

It should be recollected that these dates are Gregorian; those of the
contemporaneous English accounts are Julian. The difference, as is weU
known, was at this epoch, eleven days.

** Oglethorpe's name has in all cases, been left exactly as the Spaniards
wrote it.

8 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Florida, made after the return of Don Diego Ogletorp to
those Colonies.

God keep your Lordship many years.

Havana, July 24, 1739.
Your most obedient servant kisses your hand.
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes 3'- Horcasitas.

To Seuor Don Joseph de la Quintana.

DECLARATION.

In the city of Havana, on the 18th day of July, 1739, Don
Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas, Field Marshal of
the Armies of His Majesty, his Governor and Captain Gen-
eral over the said city and of the Island of Cuba, said:
That the day before yesterday, the 16th of the current
month, there came into this port [Havana] from that of
Cartagena of the Indies, the dispatch frigate on her way to
the kingdom of Castile and aboard of her, Juan Castelnau,
a native of Los Pasages in the Province of Guiptizcoa, who
was for 18 months a prisoner in New Georgia and other
settlements, which the English have occupied ; and that up-
on his liberation, he succeeded in passing through Virginia
and other parts to the city of Santo Domingo in the island
of Hispaniola, and thence to Cartagena aforesaid. Here
he presented himself to His Excellency Don Bias de Leso,*
Lieutenant General of His Majesty's fleets, Commander of
the Galleons there stationed, and of all the naval forces in
America, who upon request ordered him to proceed here
in the dispatch frigate. In order now to possess ourselves
of all that he has seen, surveyed, and understood, let him
appear forthwith, and under oath, clearly and distinctly
set forth the matter, according to the questions that may
be made to him. And by these presents, I so provide, com-
mand and sign.

Guemes.

Before me, Miguel de Ayala,

Chief Clerk, State and War.

* Leso, or Lezo, is mentioned by Altamira (Historia de Espana, Vol. IV.,
p. 194) as one of the celebrated Spanish seamen of the time.

ATTACK OX THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 9

Declaration of Juan Castelnau.

His Lordship, the Governor and Captain General imme-
diately caused Juan Castelnau, a native of Los Pasages, to
appear before him, who being sworn before God and on the
Cross according to law, promised in consequence to tell the
truth, whereupon the following questions were put to him ;

Asked why he had come to this place in the dispatch
boat that had anchored in its port, the 16th instant, on its
way from Cartagena to Spain, he said, that finding himself
in Cartegena, he had asked permission of His Excellency
Don Bias de Leso, Lieutenant General of the Fleets of His
Majesty, Commander of the Galleons in that port, and of
all the naval forces in America, to go to Havana and make
report to His Lordship of the state of the Colonies of New
Georgia in which the English had kept him a prisoner for
18 months, as appears from the petition which he presented
to the said Don Bias de Leso and from his decree in evi-
dence. Asked why and when he had been apprehended by
the English of the Colonies of New Georgia, where he de-
clared he had been, he ansAvered that it was because they
took him for a spy of Spain, and that it was in the beginning
of the year 1737 on passing from Florida to Carolina, when
he was examined by two tribunals; that after two months
of confinement on account of said suspicion, the tribunals
finding him guiltless, had enlarged him.

Asked how he had passed from Florida to Carolina, and
for what reason he was in Florida, he said he had gone
from Pensacola, where he had assisted the paymaster of
that post, to Florida with the idea of crossing Carolina on
his way to Europe in order to return to his own country,
and that to that end he had received authority from the
Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida, who was then Don
Francisco del Moral Sanchez, to make a journey through
Carolina.

Asked where he had been after being set at liberty in
Carolina, as declared by him. and for how long, he answer-
ed that returning to Florida for the purpose of seeing if he
could not earn some money on account of having spent and
consumed that which he had before while a prisoner in
Carolina, he had embarked in a pirogue at Port Royal and
arrived at Savannah, a town which they said was the cap-
ital of New Georgia, through fear of falling in with the
English commanding officers of the other ports. He put
to sea with the master of the said pirogue, and bad weather

10 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

coming on, they were driven in and compelled to save their
lives by going ashore on an island called Emilia, whence
a guard of four Englishmen there stationed took him to
Saint Simon's. Here had his residence a commanding of-
ficer called Captain Gasquin, who, after enquiring into the
reasons which had brought him thither put him aboard the
manual or coast guard vessel of the place, invariably forbid-
ding him to communicate with whatever Spanish vessel
might be in those waters, until the Commander Don Diego
Obletor having arrived from London, he recovered his
liberty.

Asked in what manner he had proceeded from those parts
to Cartagena, he said that Don Diego Obletor had assisted
him to embark in a ship sailing to Virginia, whence he had
gone by land to Mallorca.* Here he embarked in a bilan-
der bound for the French coast of San Domingo, and having
arrived, he betook himself to the city, and made report to
the President of all that had befallen him ; and the Presi-
dent after taking his declaration, had sent him on to Car-
tagena, to Don Bias de Leso.

Asked if he had been able to learn anything of the posts
occupied by the English in those parts, of what strength
they were and how fortified before the coming out of the
Commander Don Diego Obletor, he answered that he had,
that the established posts were Savannah or New Georgia,**
containing some 200 houses of wood, very far each from the
other, for which reason they take up much room ; the town
situated on a bank of the river of the same name, on a bluff
forty feet high with a battery of 10 pieces, about 8-pound-
ers, without any garrison whatever, the service of the bat-
tery being undertaken by the citizens themselves ; that only
the area surrounding the battery is inclosed by a stockade
of pine logs about 18 feet high and one foot thick, and that
the rest of the settlement is open ; that at the mouth of the
river stood a tower of wood constructed both as a lookout

Evidently New York; elsewhere in tliese papers we have Noynrra ; the
scribe could readily write AfaUorcii, with which name he was acquainted, for
JVoyorca, of which he liad probably never heard before.

* It will be remarked that to the affiant, Savannah and New Georgia
mean the same thinpr. Similarly, in the papers that follow, Florida is fre-
quently vspd where we should write Faint Augrustine. Fometimes the con-
text enables us to distinguish between the chief town and the Colony, some-
times it does not. Thus, when Horcasitas tells Montiano "to raze and destroy
Carolina and its plantations," he may mean Charleston and surrounding
plantations, or the Colony, though the former is perhaps the more likely.
Where no doubt can exist, the name of the town has been given in the trans-
lation. In other cases the MS. has been followed.

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possession of W. J. DeKiniie, Wonisloe, (in,.

[The Horizontal Scale of this Reproduction is one inch 450 feet, very nearly]

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 11

and as a beacon for that port, which the English call Tebi,
and we Criices. And farther to the south lies the Island
of Saint Simon, before reaching which there is another fort
facing the Island of Santa Cathalina which they call Darien,
garrisoned by about thirty Scotchmen, and mounting six
guns of the same calibre. That in the aforementioned is-
land [of Saint Simon] there is a town called Frederica sit-
uated on the bank of the river Saint Simon, and said to
contain thirty or forty houses or huts of boards and palm
leaves, with another battery also of ten guns of the said*
caliber, without any troops for its service, the citizens act-
ing as guard. South of this tov/n, say a league and a half,
is a careening ground with three or four houses of boards,
and on the point on the south of the island they have con-
structed a battery of sixteen guns of the same calibre to
sweep the entrance of the Harbor of Gualquini, which the
English call Fort Frederica, beneath whose guns lay the
manual in which he was a prisoner. Continuing further
south, on the Point of Bejecez, on the Isle of Whales stands
a fort which they called Saint Andrew with sixteen or
twenty men commanded by Captain Makay, mounting ten
guns of the same calibre. Still farther south yet is the Is-
land of Emilia which we Spaniards call San Pedro, where
they keep four men as a lookout, and have one gun and a
stone mortar. That these were at the time in question the
settlements, fortifications and forces which they had. He
was further of the opinion that all the settlers to be found
m.ight number three hundred men, all of whom were capa-
ble of bearing arms.

Asked on what date he set forth from those Colonies to
go to Virginia, when the Commander Don Diego Obletor
arrived, and what troops he brought with him, he answered,
that he himself set out on Nov. 4, 1738, of the past year, and
that the Commander Don Diego Obletor arrived in the pre-
ceding September of the same year with five transports and
one vessel mounting more than twenty-two guns, and said
to be a warship called the Blandfort, and that in the said
transports he had brought over about five hundred men
and more according to appearances, said to be regular
troops ; that in the month of July of said year, Lieutenant
Colonel Cocran had arrived from Gibraltar with three hun-
dred men drawn from its garrison, that after the arrival

1. e. said of the battery at Savannah.

12 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUx\T OF THE

of the Commander Obletor there came an English packet
boat loaded solely with artillery and implements of war;
that the troops mentioned were distributed, six hundred
men in the Isle of Saint Simon in Fort Frederica, and two
hundred in Saint Andrew; and that at the same time when
the five hundred came with the Commander Obletor, came
also two hundred women with them, the purpose being to
compel the soldiers to marry them.

Asked if after the arrival of all these people, and while
he A^as still in those parts, he had seen or learned whether
they were making new fortifications or occupying other
posts or laying out new settlements, or whether he detect-
ed any especial design of the Commander Obletor, he said
that he saw them tracing out under the direction of a French
engineer they had brought out, a castle in the fort at Fred-
erica, and for this purpose had collected a supply of bricks
and timber in the same Isle of Saint Simon between the
town and the careening ground ; that with the same engin-
eer they were taking soundings on the bar and in the chan-
nel ; that they were building two other small forts to com-
mand the land approaches from Florida to Georgia so as to
guard against any surprise by Spanish Indians ; that each
one was occupied by a corporal and 20 settlers, that one of
these [forts] was called Fort Augustus, but he had forgot-
ten the name of the other; that they had not laid out any
new settlements; that he had [not]* detected any especial
design on the part of Commander Obletor, but that he had
heard the officers say that the design in view was to take
possession of Saint Augustine in Florida, and had remarked
that in case the outbreak of war was doubtful they had
made certain arrangements looking to this end.

Asked what number of Indians they had under allegiance
in those parts, where they were situated, and to what use
they were put, he said it seemed to him there were about
200 kept in two towns, one immediately adjacent to New
Georgia, in which they had set up a school for the children,
and the other must be at Darien; that they were to be used
to commit hostilities on the Spaniards and that he had
strong proof of this ; for while he, the declarant, was there,
the Governor of Saint Augustine in Florida had the year
before in 1738 written to Captain Gasquin for satisfaction
by punishing some Indians guilty of homicide, and that

The context shows that the negative particle has been through error
omitted.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 13

he had seen the same Indians on their return from this af-
fair regaled by him with aguardiente and other things, and
told that whenever they brought in Spanish scalps they
would be rewarded, and that he had this from a nephew of
his.

Asked if a town of Esquisaros which is called Surisbu,*
on the bank of the Savannah, adjoining Port Royal due
west, is well advanced, and populous, he said that this town
is now abandoned and demolished, and that its inhabitants
had gone, part to Port Royal, and others to New Georgia,
and that only a few plantations had been left.

Asked the population of Port Royal, what fortifications
it had, if the anchoring ground is good, and whence come
the ships that may anchor there, he said that Port Royal
might contain 40 or 50 houses, but that the country is well
filled with plantations as far as Saint George, worked by
many negroes ; that there is a fort called Vinfort at half a
league from Port Royal to guard the entrance of the port,
square of trace, with 4 curtains and bastions, made of tim-
ber, earth and oyster shell, and that he had heard they were
adding some sort of outwork; that the anchoring ground
of the Port is the best of the entire Province of Carolina,
but that in the entrance there is not sufficient depth for ves-
sels of greater burden than that corresponding to 24 or 30
guns at the most.

Asked what harvests they had in New Georgia, and what
products were most highly prized, he said that corn, rice,
beans, squashes and other vegetables were planted ; that the
product most prized was silk, that consequently they had
planted mulberry trees, and that they continually displayed
more and more ardor in this matter.

Asked what kind of boats they had and how many in
those rivers, for communicating one port with another, he
said that each port had a pirogue with a swivel-gunf in the
bow; and that besides, they had two or three canoes, in
which they carried supplies back and forth, but that 4 or 5
individuals had their own boats.

Asked what was the purpose of the packet boat under
the orders of Captain Gasquin, and what port it served

PuiTsburg.

t Pedrero in MS.. This word means (a) swivel-gnn; (b) small gun;
(c) stone-mortar. Usually there is nothing in the texts that follow to
indicate which is meant. The word is frequently used, and except that the
meaning "swivel-gun" is probably correct aboard ship, ashore the context
throws no light on the point.

14 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

with the greatest frequency, he said that while he was there,,
it set out thrice to cruise along- the coasts of the jurisdiction,
and that during the winter it lay in the port of Gualquini
in the river of Saint Simon, and added that he had seen as
many as twenty pounds of silk made there and of good qual-
ity. He affirms that his declaration made under oath is the
truth ; that he is forty years of age ; and signed his declara-
tion, to which His Lordship appended his flourish.

Juan Castelnau.
Before me, Miguel de Ayala,

Chief Clerk, State and War.

Petition of Juan Castelnau.

Memorial.

Most Excellent Sir: Juan Castelnau, a native of los Pas-
ajes in the Province of Guipuzcoa, kneeling in full devotion
at the feet of your Lordship, says that he was captured in
New Georgia, where the English held him a prisoner for
18 months, and proceeded to the Island of San Domingo in
an English sloop, in order to describe to His Majesty's rep-
resentatives the state and conditions of the English in that
Colony. After having made the proper declaration before
the President of San Domingo, he was sent to this port
[Cartagena] in a bilander chartered for the purpose b}^ the
said President, in order to inform your Lordship of all mat-
ters (as he has done). Desiring now to go on to Havana
to inform his Lordship the Governor of that position, should
it be necessary, of the state of the Colonies of New Georgia,
and to repair his needs by the help of a few friends whom
he has in that city, he humbh' supplicates your Lord-
ship to grant him authority to take passage in this dispatch
boat for the said city of Havana ; and to order its Captain
to transport him v/ithout any cost whatever, a favor he
hopes to receive from the compassion of your Lordship.

Cartagena, June 22, 1739.

Tuan Castelnau.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 15

Official

Decree. Cartagena, June 23, 1739.

Seeing that all the allegations of this person, as set forth
in this petition, are true, he is granted permission to go in
this dispatch boat to the port of Havana, in case it be im-
portant to advise the Governor of that position of all that
this person has seen and declared. And the Captain of this
dispatch boat will transport him without any cost to the
said port of Havana.

Leso.

A true copy of the originals in my keeping, to which I
refer. By oral order of the Governor and Captain General
of this Fortress and Island, I give these presents for de-
livery to his Lordship, written on eight sheets with this
one, at Havana, July 21, 1739. I afnx my seal [there is a
seal] in v/itness of the truth.

Misfucl de Avala.

We certify that Don ]\Iiguel de Ayala, by whom these
affidavits are sealed and signed, is, by royal appointment, a
Chief Clerk, State and War, in this city of Havana and
Island of Cuba, is faithful, loyal and trustw^orthy, and as
such practices his profession, and receives full faith and
credit.

Havana, July 21, 1739.

Christoval Leal, Notary Public (his flourish).*
Antonio Ponce de Leon, Royal Notary (his flourish).
Tomas de Salas y Castro, Royal Notary (his flourish).

True copy of the original preserved in these General
Archives of the Indies, Case 87, Drawer 1, File 3.
Seville, July 6, 1906.

(Signed) Pedro Torres Lanzas,

Head Keeper of Archives.

* The riihrica, or flourish is what gives validity to a Spanish signature.
In some cases, the rubrica is used alone, without the name of its maker.

16 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

LETTER OF MONTIANO TO THE KING ENCLOSING A

MAP AND GIVING INFORMATION IN RESPECT

OF FLORIDA AND ADJACENT

COUNTRIES.

Brief

St. Augustine, August 20, 1739.

The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, says :

That in order more clearly to justify the right of Your
Majesty to the colonies occupied by the English, it has
seemed proper to him to enclose a map of these colonies,
based on the information received from different persons
well acquainted with the country and who have a thorough
knowledge of the bars, ports, rivers and roads therein, hav-
ing trafficked over them, so that having a better knowl-
edge of these territories and of their situation, the proper
measures may be taken.

He says further that as appears from these maps, the
English have occupied the best bars and the deepest ports
capable of sheltering sea-going ships of large size ; such as
the bar of St. Helens ; that of Santa Cruz ; that of St. Simon ;
that of Gualquini; that of the [Bay of] Whales and others
of less depth, a thing which Your Majesty does not pos-
sess on this entire coast running north and south because
the bar of St. Augustine has a depth of only seventeen
palms.

He also declares that the River St. Isabel is navigable
to within two days' journey of the towns of the Uchee In-
dians in the provinces of Apalache and that the English
having craftily occupied them, may now come down as far
as the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on it some
port, such as that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or others. The
consequences of this action would be most fatal to the com-
merce of our galleons and fleets ; and he proposes, in order
to prevent this, the occupation of the said Bay of St. Joseph,
and that a strenuous effort be made to bring about the
evacuation by the English of all the territory from New
Georgia toward the south with the Bar of St. Helens ; and
that whatever territories be left them, limits should be
marked out on a line running southeast and northwest,
taking from them as many as possible of the towns of the

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 17

Uchee Indians and as much as possible of the coast of the
Gulf of Mexico. This done, we should succeed in depriv-
ing them of all hope for their projects and in holding our-
selves ports on that coast, in which our ships and fleets
could shelter themselves whenever accident or misfortune
should overtake them.

I The Letter ]
Sir:

As a result of the remission to Your Majest)^ of the docu-
ments which I have been able to find in the archives of this
place [St. Augustine], justifying the right and title of Your
Majesty to the colonies illegally occupied by the English,
it has appeared to me proper to add a map of these Colo-
nies, based on the information brought in by different peo-
ple well acquainted with the country and thoroughly in-
formed in respect of the bars, harbors, rivers and roads by
reason of having trafficked over them, so that having a full
knowledge of those territories and their situation. Your
Majesty may take such measures as may seem suitable.
And as I conceive it to be a part of my duty to present to
Your Majesty whatever I take to be beneficial to the ro3^al
service and to the protection of the royal dominions, I beg
leave to set forth to Your Majesty that according to the
map, the English have occupied the best harbors and the
deepest ports, able to shelter vessels of deep draft, such as
the Bar of St. Helens, that of Santa Cruz, that of St. Si-
mon, that of Gualquini, that of the Bay of Whales, and
others of less depth; and that Your Majesty, in all the royal
possessions of this coast from north to south, owns nothing
like these, because this port of St. Augustine has a depth
of only seventeen palms. At the same time, I must in-
form Your Majesty that the River St. Isabel is a naviga-
ble one to within two days' journey of the Uchee Indians
in the province of Apalache; and that the English have
occupied them by craft and cunning, so that they can de-
scend to the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico and occupy on
them some port like that of St. Joseph, Pensacola or oth-
ers, the consequences of which would be most serious for
the commerce of the galleons and the fleets of Your Majes-
ty. In order that this may not happen, I make bold to pro-
pose to Your Majesty the propriety of occupying the said
Bay of St. Joseph and that the whole effort of Your Majesty
should be bent on dislodging the English from New-
Georgia toward the south, including the Bar of St. Helens

18 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

and that whatever territories be left to them, their limits
should be marked out along a line southeast northwest,
taking from them as many as possible of the Uchee towns
and those of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. This would
result in depriving them of all hope of carrying out their
projects on the Gulf of Mexico and in furnish'ng Your
ivlajesty harbors on the said coast in which ships, in case
of misfortune, may take shelter.

God keep the Catholic Royal Person of Your Majesty,
many happy years, as demanded by Christendom.

St. Augustine in Florida, Aug. 20, 1739.

(Sgd) Don Manuel de Montiano.
(A Flourish)
[ Answer ]

In a letter of the 20th of August, Your Lordship has en-
closed in greater justification of the right of His Majesty to
the Colonies occupied by the English in those provinces,
a map of these Colonies, based on the information given
to Your Lordship by different persons v/ell acciuarated with
the country and having full knowledge of the bars, ports,
rivers and roads, by reason of having trafficked over them
to the end that having a full knowledge of circumstances,
suitable measures might be taken. These matters, having
been laid before His Majesty, he is informed of the subject
and of the especial exposition v/hich Your Lordship makes
at the same time, to the effect that it would be proper to
occupy the Bay of St. Joseph and apply all our energies
to dislodge the English from New Georgia toward the south,
including the Bar of St Helens and that whatever terri-
tories be left to them, the limits should be a line running
southeast and northwest taking from them as many of the
towns of the Uchee Indians and as much of the coast of the
Gulf of Mexico as is possible, which would result in rob-
bing them of all hope of success for their projects and in
giving us ports on that coast in which, in case of accident
or misfortune, our war ships might take shelter.

His Majesty therefore directs me to say to you that he
will keep in mind all the facts presented for the betterment
of the royal service, and that he is much pleased with the
zeal with which you have acquired these facts and com-
municated them.

May God keep Your Lordship many years.

Madrid, May 24, 1740.
To Don Manuel de Montiano.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 19

Endorsement.

To Don Manuel De Montiano.

Issued in duplicate and triplicate, advising him of the
receipt of his report conveying information relating to the
English colonies and the districts which the English of
Georgia should evacuate.

20 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

THE KING ORDERS THE DISPATCH OF AN EXPEDITION
AGAINST GEORGIA.

The King has entrusted to Don Juan Francisco de Gue-
mes y Horcasitas an expedition of importance the nature
of which he will communicate to Your Lordship as directed.
Toward the execution and success of this affair, it is
proper that Your Lordship, after leaving in a state of de-
fense that [St. Augustine] fortress, should strive with all
available forces, and communicate all the information and
advice expected, in order that action may be concordant
and efficacious. His Majesty commands me to communi-
cate to Your Lordship this decision for your information,
and in order that the aforementioned Governor of Ha-
bana may advise you with the punctuality demanded by
the royal service. May God keep Your Lordship many
years.

Madrid, 31 October, 1741.
To Don Manuel de Montiano.

[No signature] *

The King having resolved upon an expedition from that
Island [Cuba] against the enemy, and having decided that
its Governor General, Lieutenant Don Juan Francisco de
Guemes y Horcasitas should organize it according to the
orders sent him, and deeming it proper that whatever be-
tide, the troops to be selected for the said expedition shall
have their place taken by detachments from the squadron
under the orders of Your Excellency, in such numbers as
shall not interfere with its navigation, or other functions,
His Majesty commands me to say to Your Excellency that
you are to furnish these detachments and that if any naval
officers should wish to go as volunteers on this expedi-
tion, you are not to hinder them. You are to help the
aforesaid Governor to the limit of your powers and of the
necessities of the case, in order to bring about the end con-
fided to him, by reason of the great interest taken in this

We know, however, from Montiano's answer, that thi3 and the following
letters were all sent by the Minister Don Jose de Camplllo.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 21

matter by the royal service. God keep Your Excellency
many years.

Madrid, 31st October, 1741.
To Don Rodrigo de Torres.

[ No signature ]

With regard to the resolution of His Majesty to set on
foot from the Island [Cuba] operations against the enemy,
and to the order sent to Lieutenant General Don Juan de
Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, to carry them
out, His Majesty bids me charge you, that in case of your
selection to take command, you are to accept and execute
that duty, in full confidence, because of your zeal and re-
cord of services, that you will ably discharge this trust in
all that relates to the royal service.

God keep Your Lordship many years.

Madrid, 31st October, 1741
To Don Antonio de Salas.

[ No signature ]

Your Excellency is informed in respect of the motives
which induced His Majesty in the year 1737 to resolve up-
on the extirpation of the English from the new colony of
Georgia and from the territories of Florida which they have
usurped, as well as of the orders sent out to this end, and
of all dispositions made for their execution, until a suspen-
sion was commanded.

I bring these past matters to the recollection of Your
Excellency, because we are now in a state of open war,
and under no necessity to practice the caution which in the
former conjuncture of affairs compelled us to give pause.
His Majesty considers the time opportune to accomplish
the destruction of Carolina and of its dependencies, thus
compensating ourselves for the ancient perfidies of which
the English have made the colony the seat, as well as for
the present hostilities, by inflicting a damage that will ruin
and terrify them, seeing the affection in which they hold
that country, and the benefit they derive from its commerce.
Accordingly His Majesty has directed the organization of
an expedition from that Island [Cuba] to be composed of
some regular troops and of as much militia as may be nec-
essary, and that it pass over to the aforementioned province

22 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

of Carolina with its appurtenant territories, and devastate
it by sacking and Burning all the towns, posts, plantations
and settlements of the enemy, for the purpose of this inva-
sion must be solely to press hostilities until the effort shall
have gone home, and success be achieved. It will help
you to know that the English Colonies in America are so
weakened by the men and supplies drawn off to lay siege
before Cartagena that their relief from England has been
under discussion.

It is the intention of His Majesty that in carrying out
this expedition, regular troops be used in such numbers as
are indispensable, having due regard to the defense of that
Island [Cuba] ; and that deficiencies be made up with mili-
tia and natives in such strength as to secure favorable re-
sults, imitating the course we followed when we recovered
Pensacola from the power of the French.

In order that the number of regular troops to be selected
by Your Excellency for this purpose may not be seriously
reduced, you may avail yourself in any emergency that may
arise, of those in the squadron under the command of Lieu-
tenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres, provided that he
be not reduced to the inability of taking the seas, or of per-
forming any other operations expected of him. To this
end, I am inclosing an order which Your Excellency will
hand him, directing him to further this enterprise to the
utmost, in order to bring it to a happy issue. Although
Your Excellency has a personal knowledge of that coun-
try, of its nature and conditions, through previous recon-
naissances and surveys made in view of practical possi-
bilities, yet His Majesty desires that you communicate
and entrust to Don Manuel de Montiano, Governor of
Florida, the decision taken, propounding to him the meas-
ures to be adopted to carry it out, and directing him to con-
cur with all the forces which the state of defense of his
post will allow. Your Excellency is to advise whether
the enterprise is to be carried on at one point, or at sev-
eral points (which here is thought to be the proper course),
and to inform him in respect of said points. It is further
His Majesty's wish that he give you all the information
in his possession, and should go on informing himself as
to the state of the English inhabitants of Carolina, and any
other matters, knowledge of which might be of import to
Your Excellency. I am inclosing a letter for that Gover-
nor, in which you will find his instructions.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 23

Other directions and details are omitted, because it is
known that Your Excellency has all the knowledge and
light that could be desired to bring so grave a matter to a
successful end. Hence, and because His Majesty is con-
vinced of your zeal, activity and experience, he intrusts
this expedition to your care, directing you to order what-
ever may forv/ard it, with the determination that springs
from your sense of duty and loyalty to the royal service,
and without the loss of a moment of time. In respect of
expenses, dispositions, and methods, Your Excellency has
plenar}' powers to confer and treat of v/ays and means with
officers and persons who may profit by your advice to
spread the desolation and secure the advantages that wc
expect in respect of that province. And in order that
the great volume of preparations may not pass to the knowl-
edge of the English, His Majesty orders that you take your
measures in secret, alleging pretexts to dissimulate and
conceal the end in view, so as to deceive the public. For
otherwise we expose and risk this blow, which is to sur-
prise the enemy without giving him any opportunity to
prepare himself by arming and fortifying and so oppose a
greater resistance and opposition to our efforts.

His Majesty leaves to the judgment of Your Excellency
the selection of the officer or officers to command this ex-
pedition : you are authorized to take those most satisfac-
tory to you, and of best known and approved conduct : but
in the belief that Brigadier Don Antonio de Salas, who is
detained out there [in Cuba] is well fitted for this service,^
I send Your Excellency the inclosed letter in order that
you may give it to him, if you should see fit to employ him
for the command (in which case you will be required to
furnish him the pay corresponding to his duty, or with such
as you may judge proper). If you do not appoint him, you
will withhold this letter.

If a few naval officers should wish to go as volunteers,
you will approve it, assuring them that His Majesty will
not lose sight of their resolution and spirit, but will assist
them in whatever may be for their comfort, and Your Ex-
cellency will divulge this in ample time, so that the sug-
gestion may appear attractive.

It is by His Majesty's command that I communicate
these matters to Your Excellency, so that as soon as you
shall have received this letter, you may apply yourself to
their accomplishment, and take all other steps that may

24 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

lead to the success of an enterprise which His Majesty de-
sires shall be promptly carried out and which it is confi-
dentl_Y expected will produce the results expected, as is
plain from the fervor and zeal which you have ever shown
in His Majesty's service. I should say to Your Excellency
that after the enemy's country shall have been laid waste,
the troops and militia must withdraw to that Island [Cuba],
and a report be made of events.

God keep Your Excellency many years.

Madrid, Oct. 31, 1741.

To Don Juan France de Guemes y Horcasitas.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 25

MONTIANO ACKNOWLEDGES THE RECEIPT OF ORDERS
RELATING TO THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEOR-
GIA, AND REPORTS HIS ACTION.

St. Augustine, in Florida

12 March, 1742.
The Governor, Don Manuel de Montiano, agreeably to
the advice, that he must assist with all the forces possi-
ble in bringing to a happy issue an expedition against Car-
olina entrusted to the Governor of Habana,* reports that
he has sent to the said Governor a return of the garrison
of that post [Saint Augustine] for the selection of the
troops not necessary to its defense, to serve in said expe-
dition, and anticipating a happy issue.

Sir:

In a letter of the 31st of October of the past year, you
did me the honor to say that the King had entrusted to
Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas, an expedition
of importance which he would communicate to me as di-
rected, and that toward the execution and success of this
affair, I should, after leaving this post [Saint Augustine]
in a state of defense, strive with all available forces, com-
municating all the information and advice expected, in or-
der that action might be concordant and efficacious. And
that His Majesty had commanded Your Lordship to con-
vey this decision for my information to the end that the
aforementioned Governor might treat with me with the
punctuality called for by the royal service.

With regard to this determination, I have to inform Your
Lordship, that as soon as I was informed of it, I set to
work to acquire as much information as was possible ; and,
without losing a moment of time, nor engaging in any other
matter, I passed my reports on to the Lieutenant Gen-
eral, Governor of Havana, offering my recommendations
charged rather with hopes than with certainties. But it
is impossible for me to say how contented I am with the

Navarra, in the MS. (Itself a copy of the original In the Archives at
Seville).

26 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

great administration of that Governor General, who will
so adjust his measures to action, as morally to persuade
me that the favorable results expected are in my opinion
almost inevitable.

In respect of other matters, I venture to suggest to Your
Lordship, that, according to my comprehension of the
case, the design of the King will be the antidote, the whole-
some medicine, that will restore to health this debilitated
and deserted Province, of good consideration ; for Caro-
lina once ruined and destroyed, the extermination of her
colonial dependencies will follow, and all the slaves now
under her heavy yoke will pass over to us. This is what
they most desire : as they are numerous, we shall be able
to make here many settlements, and turn their people to
account in war. And what is more, it will follow that the
Indians, no longer having any one to instigate or protect
them, will continue always with us in a state of tranquil
peace ; these Provinces will grow and people themselves,
since they are all as it were paramos,* and families from
Galicia and the Canaries will be able to establish them-
selves in quiet.

I am sending to the aforesaid Lieutenant General, Gov-
ernor of Havana, a return of the troops of this post, and I
leave to his judgment the selection he may, with due re-
gard to the defense of this place, see fit to make for the con-
templated expedition. This is all I have to lay of this mat-
ter before Your Lordship for the information of His Ma-
jesty.

That God keep Your Lordship many years, is my desire.
Saint Augustine in Florida, 12 March 1742.

Sir: I kiss your hand, being your most grateful ser-
vant.

Don Manuel de Montiano

[A flourish follows.]

To Sefior Don ]os6 de Campillo.**

*A paramo Is a high, bleak plateau; the word is South American. Pre-
cisely what plains Montiano had in mind, of course, we do not know. In all
probability he uses the word in a loose way.

* One of the ministers of Philip V., remembered as t\ie author of a book,
"Nnevo sistema de gobiemo econotnico para la America," published posthum-
ously in 17S9. In this work, Campillo criticised the system of colonial ad-
ministration and proposed certain reforms, arraying himself against the mili-
tary system of conquest followed In America. He argued that this system,
however necessary at first, was now out of date, and pleaded for economical
liberty.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 27

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA INFORMS THE
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA WHAT TROOPS AND SHIPS
WILL BE SENT FROM HAVANA, FOR THE EXPEDI-
TION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND MAKES VARIOUS SUG-
GESTIONS.

Sir,

Among- the obstacles and difficulties arising in carrying
out the will of His Majesty, and communicated by me to
Your Lordship under date of February 3rd, past, the most
serious was the possibility that, and doubt whether, the
English, strengthened by the fresh re-enforcement of 4,000
men which arrived in Jam.aica toward the end of January
of the present year, would enter the Gulf of Mexico, and
attempt to attack this Havana or some other position of
the Islands. But this fear has vanished,* as you may
see from the enclosed paper sent me by the Governor of
[Santiago de] Cuba, and from the letter of Don Sebastian de
Eslava,** Viceroy of Santa F^,t a copy of which I enclose.
The occasion seemed to me therefore opportune to profit
by this fortunate conjuncture of affairs, without however
being able to furnish the 3,000 men nor the means which
your Lordship warned me would be necessary to strike the
blow directed by His Majesty. For I have neither the
former, nor the frigates suitable to make it attainable in
the way that I should prefer, nor any ships of war to take
the place of these frigates, inasmuch as these ships must
fulfill their principal purpose. ^

* The allusion is to the failure of the English troops, some 5,000 in all,
to capture Santiago. A squadron under Admiral Vernon and General Went-
worth had landed in Guantanamo Bay; after four months' effort, the enter-
prise was abandoned, with a loss by the English of over 2,000 men from the
effects of the climate.

** This officer conducted the defense of Cartagena against Admiral Ver-
non, who failed in his attempt to capture the place.

t New Granada, In South America, sometimes, as here, called Santa Fe,
the Colombia of to-day. It was one of the Spanish vice-royalties, and occa-
sionally called the reino (Kingdom) of Santa Fe.

In the Spanish navy of the XVIII century "the principal type of war-
vessel was the navio [line-of-battle-ship] assisted by the fragata

[frigate] as scout or despatch vessel."

"Brigantines were also used on despatch duty, and packet boats ^paqve-
botes'i." "Galleys were falling into disuse." "The armament of ships of
war consisted of bronze and wrought-iron guns of calibre varying from 36
to 4 (weight in pounds of the projectile). The average range was about 3,000
meters."

Altamira y Crevea, Historia de Espana, IV, 189-190.

J A British fleet was still in "West India waters.

28 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Wherefore I judged that 1,000 regulars and 800 militia
would suffice, and under this hypothesis was elaborating
this plan, when there arrived here an Englishman, the Cap-
tain of the frigate captured by Fandiiio, and a man of
'^lear mind and straightforward disposition. I tested and
compared his representations with those of Simonin, who,
as Your Lordship knows, is thoioughly acquainted with
that port and its bar [Frederica], and with the number of
whites living in Carolina, and found that his information
differed materially from that which Your Lordship had
sent me.

As a result of this investigation and of my inability to
make a greater effort than the one decided upon, I con-
voked a secret council of war of whose decision j^ou will be
informed by the copy that I am remitting. It is impossi-
ble to assemble a greater number of men; and even if it
were, we could not transport them, for what has already
beer done under this head is due to the assistance of Lieu-
tenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres.

I am sending Your Lordship a boat with this news under
the seal of inviolable secrecy, so that 3^ou may be inform-
ed of the determination we have taken, and show the great-
est activity in equipping the expedition, to the end that it
shall with the greatest promptitude set sail to anchor on
that bar [Saint Simon's], and proceed without the slightest
delay to the extinction of that country [Georgia]. To carry
out these orders Your Lordship will take from your
own post 400 regular troops, 300 of your garrison, the 100
who were sent from this place under the command of Don
Gregorio de Aldana, and also the 100 of the militia of Pardo,
who were sent to you at the same time. From this place
will proceed in 30 transports composed of frigates and
bilanders, 1,300 men, 600 regulars, 700 militia, composing
the 1,800 without counting the seamen ; among the trans-
ports goes separately the vessel for the 500 men who are
immediately to embark at Saint Augustine and besides, two
large barges w.ell armed with swivel guns Of these ves-
sels as many as possible will proceed with guns mounted,
to say nothing of a French frigate of 24 guns, which hap-
pened to be in this port, and which we took for this expe-
dition, of the packet boat "Diligent," and of the galley. I
regard this force as sufficient to attain the end sought with
happiness and without risk.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 29

All the stores and water required, go in the said ves-
sels; it will not be necessary to draw even a single ration
from your post. The proper ammunition, arms and im-
plements likewise will be sent. Your Lordship will ver-
ify the return of property of the Agent of the Exchequer,
who is to go in charge of issues and administration. Such
being the dispositions taken here, Your Lordship will
have equipped the six galliots, the launches; and the
pirogues of your garrison, as well as any other vessel that
may prove useful ; the troops must be ready to embark at
once, without the slightest hindrance. For delay would
be prejudicial, since the urgency of the whole affair (whose
success I believe to be easy) consists in this that the
enemy shall neither perceive, nor be warned of, our inten-
tions.

For all reasons, it has seemed to me that your appoint-
ment to the command of this expedition will insure its
success, for with the knowledge of Your Lordship, your
devotion to the throne, your deeds and your experience,
go the satisfaction and glory of His Majesty, and the sat-
isfaction of all of us who are interested in his service, re-
joicing over the void caused by the forces of Admiral Ver-
non, because of the task upon which these are engaged.

Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel and
Commandant of the Regiment of Dragoons of Italica will
go hence in command of all that set out. From your own
post you will arrange for the services of Don Antonio Sal-
gado as Lieutenant Colonel. Lieutenant Colonel Don INIig-
uel de Rivas may be left behind to command the place.

The Engineer of the Second Grade, Don Antonio de
Arredondo, also accompanies the expedition, as being one
who knows those parts as far as Port Royal, and has ex-
act and detailed information in respect of everything else.
He may be employed by Your Lordship on any duty you
may be pleased to order for the best interest of the under-
taking, and can take charge of the details of operations.
The Engineer Don Pedro Ruiz Olano may also go. Should
Don Pedro de Estrada, a man who has given such good
proofs of spirit and gallantr}'', be in Saint Augustine, it
would be eminently agreeable that he should fit out his
bilander and accompany the expedition in any capacity your
Lordship may think proper.

I remain convinced not only of the partial but of the en-
tire success of our enterprise, because of Your Lordship's

30 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

known leadership. And I am expecting at tke very least
that the forces furnished will without the slightest let or
hindrance forthwith destroy all the plantations as far as
Port Royal. For as Your Lordship knows, it is His Majes-
ty's desire that the sudden blow struck should, as far as
its force will reach, and events permit, lay waste Carolina
and its dependencies. But this course must be consistent
with the information your Lordship may obtain from pris-
oners, and with other measures to be suggested by your
ripe judgment looking to the secure withdrawal of our
forces through the interior channels between the Keys. It
is of the greatest consequence and importance to raze and
destroy Carolina and its plantations. This result can be
better secured bv first getting rid of the regiment of Ogle-
thorpe, which might proceed to the defense of some other
point where hostilities had broken out, if not first attacked
where they are now in Gualquini and Saint Simon, as pro-
jected. It is entirely probable and credible that surprised
by this blow, they will abandon everything and flee to the
woods, and thus give us greater freedom to draw full profit
from this idea and its opportunity so favorable to us. And if
it were possible to find means to notify the negroes in good
time to follow the cause which Your Lordship says they de-
sire, this would be an opportune disposition for the com-
plete success of our plans.

The expedition over with the happy issue desired, Your
Lordship will take steps for the immediate return, with
the least possible expenditure of time, of the troops and
militia about to set forth and also of the detachment which
I sent on some time ago under the command of Don
Gregorio Aldana, sending them in detachments in the ves-
sels which Your Lordship will judge best fitted for the navi-
gation of the Canal. I beg leave to remind Your Lordship
that I have only 400 men left for the service of this place.

Whatever I may have forgotten or omitted, I beg Your
Lordship's attention and perspicuity to supply, as of one on
the spot. It is my desire to overlook not even the most
trifling circumstance which might forward the happy
issue I am anticipating. May Your Lordship have no other
care than to secure and bring victory, unless it be to
employ me in any relation in which I may satisfy Your
Lordship.

God keep Your Lordship many vears.

Havana, May 14, 1742.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEOPvGIA Jl

Postscript in margin.

1 warn Your Lordship that this expedition will sail hence
the 2nd or 4th of the next month, according to the effort
made to complete its equipment, so as to take advantage
of the fine weather, and that you must have made all your
preparations, and warned some of the monks of the mis-
sions in those parts to go along as missionaries.
Your most affectionate, faithful servant
Who kisses your hand.
Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.
To Don Manuel de Montiano

32 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA APPOINTS THE
GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA COMMANDER OF THE EX-
PEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND ISSUES HIS OR-
DERS FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

Sir, Having received orders from His Majesty, to send
an expedition from this island against the English, his
enemy, to punish them for the insults committed against his
subjects, by the subjects of Great Britain in Carolina and
by those recently and unlawfully settled in His Majesty's
territories in a place called Georgia, and impressed by its
importance to His Majesty's service and by the pernicious
results of having tolerated the aforesaid insults, I have
made up a command of all the land and naval forces I can
possibly assemble, to accomplish these very just and very
important ends, according to the wish of the king.

In consequence of this and of the faculty he has bestow-
ed upon me, to select as the commanding officer of this
expedition, one who possesses the requisite character and
qualities, I am led to designate you as the Commanding
General of all these forces, as much by the confidence I
have in your fitness and experience as because of the
knowledge which you possess of those places. I am also guid-
ed by your afifection for His Majesty and your zeal for his
service, as shown in your letter of the 3rd of March of the
present year.

For the troops which are to be under your orders, I an-
ticipate the greatest success, and I am directing you accord-
ing to what I believed was best adapted to secure a
happy termination, in conformity with the resolution of
the board, a copy of which I have sent you, enjoining upon
Your Lordship the least possible efifusion of the blood of
His Majesty's troops and subjects, and to insure in any
event a withdrawal. The number of regular troops will
be 1,000, with proper number of officers, and of militia 800,
composed of whites, mulattoes and negroes, also properly
officered. These troops you will assign as will seem best
to you.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 33

The naval forces which it has been possible to assemble
are reduced to one frigate of 24 guns, to a packet boat of
14, one galley, and the six galliots which you have with
you ; two schooners, two bilanders, and two barges and pi-
rogues under oars, which will be used to convoy the trans-
ports, guard and cover the coasts and inlets, and to man-
age and carry on within the interior channels the move-
ment and landing of troops during the operations. All
these elements (excepting the troops to embark at Saint
Augustine, and the schooner and pirogues to join there)
will leave this port [Havana] under the command of Colo-
nel Don Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel, Gover-
nor, and Commanding Officer of the Regiment of Dragoons
of Italica, who is to arrive off your bar, and deliver this
letter to Your Lordship. He will be under your orders as
second in command and join his forces with the troops and
vessels, which are to be ready in the post for the campaign,.

As the fundamental condition of the most rapid and easy
outcome of the expedition, and of the reduction of risks,,
consists in making withdrawal sure, in whatever misfor-
tune, I regard as indispensable the invasion before any-
thing else is attempted, of the Island of Saint Simon, first
occupying the northern entrance so as to close the pass to-
the enemy, and intercept any relief he might receive from
that direction ; the landing is to take place from three ves-
sels at one and the same time on the beach facing east.

This first step having been, thanks to the Divine Grace,
and to Your Lordship's wise management, successfully
taken, Your Lordship will next adopt such measures as
are suggested by the information you may have or obtain,,
to proceed northward by interior channels, devastating,
laying waste, sacking and burning whatever settlements,
plantations, and towns there may be as far as Port Royal
inclusive, razing its fort, and taking possession of the en-
tire country; for Your Lordship is informed of the fact
that those parts hold no hostile troops able to resist those
under your command. The necessity of gaining time Avhen-
ever possible, without any delay must ever be kept in mind,
so as to give no opportunity for resistance to form. Our
operations must, under His Majesty's commands, be re-
duced to a sudden stroke, and for this reason the greatest
celerity is imperative.

After taking possession of Port Royal, it will be proper
to send out negroes of all languages (some of which sort

34 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

accompany the militia of this place for this very purpose)
to convoke the slaves of the English in the plantations
round about, and offer them, in the name of our King, lib-
erty, if they will deliver themselves up of their own accord,
and to say that lands will be assigned them in the terri-
tories of Florida, which they may cultivate and use for
themselves as owners, under the direction and laws of the
Kingdom of Spain. In proportion as you receive and ob-
tain (and this I believe will be the case) trusthworthy and
favorable information forwarding the conquest and increas-
ing the damage done the enemy, you will act accordingly,
never losing sight of the importance of making sure of
your withdrawal, in order not to lose the fruit of our opera-
tions.

All the neutral and friendly vessels met on the way, you
may detain, requiring them to follow the convoy, until
there sliall be no disadvantage in allowing them to pro-
ceed on their course. To the person who goes as agent
in charge of all matters relating to the Royal Exchequer,
in respect of the good and economical administration of
warlike stores and implements, you will afford all neces-
sary help, showing him and requiring him to show the
greatest attention, corresponding to the confidence I have
reposed in him, and maintaining the best of relations with
him, in order that the service may thus be punctually and
easily performed.

All the effects found and taken by our troops you will
collect and keep in a secure place under the supervision
of the agent of the Royal Exchequer, who will be required
to make an inventory for the distribution in equal parts
among soldiers, militia and sailors.

As regards prisoners, in respect of whose classes and
numbers no decision can be reached in advance. Your
Lordship will take such measures as seem most suitable ;
just as in all the other cases that come up, you will make
such decisions as most redound to the advantage of the
King's service, and to the glory and reputation of his arms.

The expedition having been concluded with the happy
issue that we have a right to expect. Your Lordship will
direct that the troops and militia of this place [Havana] re-
turn to it without the slightest delay, in the vessels that
can make the best way through the channel,* seeing that

The Florida Channel.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 35

now the southwest winds will prevail ; all the ships will
take the same course, even at the cost of increased labor
and of a longer voyage, because thus we avoid encounters
which otherwise might have injurious consequences for
us.

The Second Engineer, Don Antonio de Arredondo, goes
informed with regard to all I have been able to anticipate
and advance for the success and safety of this important
operation. He will communicate with you, so that you
may select what may appear to you best fitted for the happy
issue of our plans, the glory and satisfaction of our royal
master, and of his royal intentions. I am inclosing to
your Lordship a full cop}'- of the orders under which I have
been acting, and of which I beg that you will acquire full
understanding.

Commending myself to your Lordship in the sincerest
affection, I pray Our Lord to keep you many years.

Havana, June 2, 1742. Your most affectionate faithful
servant, who kisses your hand.

Don Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.
To Don Manuel de Montiano.

36 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Illustrations of Spanish Guns.

PEDRERO.
40 cm, Cal., 21 cm. long.
1709 A. D. 6031 Artillery Museum.
Madrid.

5477 Cannon.

310 cm. long, 15.2 cm. Calibre

XVIII Century.
Artillery Museum, Madrid.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 37

Length )

BOMBARD mounted and assembled.

Cana 255 cm.

Recamara 81 " ] Made 1518 A. D.
No. 3301 in Artillery Museum, Madrid.
This piece has 2 recamaras ^used alternately.

3356 Artillery Museum,

Madrid.
PEDRERO.

144 cm. long, 16.5 cm. Calibre.

Made 1679.

38 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

5489. Museum of Artillery, Madrid.
MORTAR
1773 A. D.

Can /^

Recamara

BOMBARD Complete No. 6587 Artillery Museum

240 cm. long XV Century. Madrid.

3570 Artillery Museum, Madrid.
FALCONET XV Century.

105 cm. long, 6.7 cm. Calibre.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 39

ORDERS TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
FLEET.

Orders to be obeyed by the commander of the Fleet, and
instructions for his guidance, with the understanding that he
is in all matters to be under the orders of the general
selected to command the expedition which is to dislodge the
foreigners that have settled and established themselves in
the dominions of the King in the Provinces of Florida.

1. He w^ll leave the post of Havana, if the v/cather per-
mit, on the day appointed, with all the vessels of war and
transports after having made all necessary arrangements
to keep his ships together in good order during the journey,
and established signals for prompt comprehension and cor-
rect action in any case that may come up. He will like-
wise have drawn up the special orders to be observed with
all the precision and claritv possible by the respective com-
manders of the vessels under his command

2. He will proceed directly to Saint Augustine in
Florida, without anchoring anywhere, unless driven to it
by inevitable necessit3^

3. When in sight of the Bar of Saint Augustine he will
approach as closely as possible, and anchor with his entire
fleet on the bar.

4. As soon as the tide serves, he will order the trans-
ports to enter the harbor, and anchor in front of the castle.

5. As soon as the said tide nears the flood, he will de-
termine whether the depth on the bar will permit the en-
trance of the vessels under his command, without lighten-
ing, and if so, these will enter, and proceed to anchor in
front of the Hermitage of Our Lady de la Leche. Should
lightening prove necessary, all will execute it at the same
time with the greatest dispatch, transporting in launches
and boats the weight that may be necessary. But this is
to be done only in case it is impossible, by reason of storms,
to remain at anchor outside.

6. He will remain in port (or wherever else he may
think proper) until the commanding general gives orders

40 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

to begin operations and put to sea with his entire fleet,
which he will obey without loss of time.

7. He will convoy the flotilla of small vessels that are
to cross the bar of the Saint John's River, until he sights
its inlets on an east and west line, when he will either lie-to,
or if the weather permit, anchor; the first is the better
course, if it should be necessary to go outside under the
threat of the east wind, dangerous on this coast; the sec-
ond, in order to avoid drifting with the currents. Circum-
stances must determine which of these two courses ap-
pears to him the better, without losing sight of the fact
that he must endeavor as far as possible to keep the coast
in view during the entire course of the expedition so as
distinctly to observe the signals made from it, or to re-
ceive information sent out to him, since the happy issue of
the enterprise depends partly if not entirely on the unity
and joint effort of the two fleets.

8. He will lie-to or remain at anclior, as may be deter-
mined, off the inlets, until he shall have received from the
beach a signal to proceed on his course.

9. He will continue on his way, observing both by day
and by night the signals made to him from land, so that on
receiving information of the point at which the interior
flotilla happens to be resting, he will again anchor or lie-to,
until again ordered to proceed. For, as the interior flotilla
can proceed only when the tide is favorable, at intervals
of six hours and a few minutes, it is incumbent on the sea
fleet so to adjust its progress, as to be but a short distance
away, and so avoid slipping on and then being discovered
by the foreigners of Fort Frederica or Gualquini before
the interior flotilla shall have come up and taken its dis-
position for attack.

10. Should some accident prevent people coming down
to the shore to make signals, he will proceed along the
coast under shortened sail ; and, after taking into account
the change of tides, and whatever may further the advance,
will estimate approximately where the interior flotilla
must be, giving due regard to the increase of distance
caused by the windings of the interior channels, and by the
fact that on some nights it will perhaps be impossible to
sail and take advantage of the tide on account of a few
narrow passes impossible to navigate save by day.

11. He will also consider a possible delay due to the
capture of the Fort of Vegeses on the channel of the Island

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 41

of Whales, this in order that both fleets may always be ap-
proximately on the same parallel. And if all the precau-
tions mentioned should remain without the result expected,
after having maturely weighed the aforesaid contingencies,
and adjusted his course accordingly, he will set his course
directly for the entrance of Gualquini, where he will an-
chor on the bar with his entire squadron in from four and
a half to six fathoms, so as to bring the point of the north
of the Island of Saint Simon to bear N. N. W., and that of
the north of the bar of Whales to bear S. W. ^ S. If
while on this position, the sea should rise and, unable to
ride it out, he should fear that his cables would not hold,
he may go in nearer to shelter himself, setting his course
N. W. y^ W., and proceeding some four miles in four fath-
oms of water, so that the said point of the Island of Saint
Simon shall bear N., that of Whales S. S. W., and the Castle
of Frederica W. N. W., this being recognizable by the red-
dish color of the mound of earth at the shoulder of the
bastion. If however, he can maintain himself without the
said risk in the said six fathoms, he will do so, in order to
be in a better position to land, on account of the surf on
the shoals at the entrance.

12. He will maintain himself thus at anchor, with the
English flag flying, unless signalled to get under way and
capture the port. This the commanding general will or-
der to take place on the beach of the south point at the
place marked R,* whenever the opportune occasion shall
arise, as determined by his readiness to surprise or attack
the fort which the foreign settlers have built on the island
in question. This in turn will depend on the time of junc-
tion of the two fleets, provided always that not the slight-
est movement shall take place until the proper signal is
made.

13. As soon as he shall see the said signal, he will order
the landing body assigned to this duty with its officers to
embark in launches, and direct it to go ashore on the
nearest beach of the Island of Saint Simon outside of the
surf of the north shoals, near the point Q.

14. The said landing shall be so ordered that the troops
shall set foot ashore a short time before dawn, neither
sooner nor later. To this end he shall measure the time he
may consider necessary, having the day before marked the

The chart to which reference is made here and elsewhere In these
orders, has apparently not come down to us.

42 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

shoals and indicated the nearest point for the execution of
the plan, and approximately observed the distance between
shipside and shore. Although announcing that one and
the same signal will be made of the arrival of the interior
flotilla in the Bay of Gualquini, of the disembarkation of
the troops and of their getting under way to enter the port,
yet, even though the said signal be made at the hour of
prayers, or later, or at any other hour, he will not on that
account undertake any movement before the time already
mentioned of the break of day, unless the signal should be
made to undertake everything at the moment when it is
set, no matter what the hour, because it is possible that this
course might be advantageous; and in this case he will
without the slightest delay set about the disembarkation,
and get under way to capture the port provided that this
operation take place by daylight.

15. As soon as the launches carrying the troops shall
have sheered ofif, the commander will, if the tide be falling,
stand by with his anchors apeak; if not falling, he will
hoist sail ; if the wind does not serve, he will begin to tow,
or do whatever he thinks best. With the bilanders lead-
ing ahead by the hawse he will set out to capture the port,
using his best endeavor to have the landing troops very
early in the morning surprise the look-out of the foreign-
ers, marked O on the chart. He will also cause the fleet
to take the port as early as possible, so that the enemy
seeing himself attacked on all sides without hope of relief
shall at once surrender without resistance.

16. This bar of Gualquini lies in north latitude 31 18',
with 6 to 43/2 fathoms at the point mentioned above. To
enter the port, set the course N. W. % W., and continue on
it in 4^ and 5 fathoms till 3>2 are reached; shift to N. W.
J4 N., when the bar will be found, with 3^^ fathoms at half
tide. From this point with course N. W. 54 W., easing to
N. W., 5, 6, and 7 fathoms will be found, deepening until
a line north and south through the fort of the strangers is
crossed, where 14 fathoms will be obtained, shallowing as
shown on the chart.

17. Having taken the position mentioned with his squad-
ron, if the foreigners open fire on him with their artillery,
he will return it, as will also all the boats under his com-
mand, signal having been previously made to form in line
and to fire on the enemy in the aforesaid case. But if they
do not open fire upon his ships, he will in no wise fire him-

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 43

self, but will merely order his vessels to anchor in good or-
der in the part marked thus Y, provided that if he should be
compelled to fire against the hostile fort, he will endeavor
to dismount and disable its guns. He will direct that in
going about, so as to use both broadsides, all vessels must
have their launches and boats ahead by the hawse, to pre-
vent drifting with the current, in order that they may with
the greatest promptitude forge ahead or in any other direc-
tion which may appear to him suitable. It is indispensable
that each vessel go about in the proper place in which it
may find itself, the vanguard and rear guard standing on
opposite tacks. For if the said maneuver is not executed
in this form and the ships lose their positions, it will be
impossible to make head against the current so as to pre-
sent the other broadside to the enemy.

18. From the conditions already laid down, it is evi-
dent that the ships should lie-to when delivering their fire,
keeping up against wind and current in such manner as to
secure, without undue drifting, a good position for the pur-
pose in hand.

19. It is possible that in this port of Gualquini we shall
find at anchor a packet boat or war vessel which they own.
If this shall not have surrendered when he arrives with his
squadron, he will take possession of it, either by capitula-
tion or by force, if it resists ; he must send it to the bottom
without giving quarter to anybody; but if it surrenders vol-
untarily, he will give it the best treatment possible.

20. If while at anchor outside on the bar with the En-
glish flag flying, as already arranged, there should come out,
as is usual, a boat to reconnoiter or to bring a pilot, he will
cause it to be captured with the boats and launches which
he will have overboard and ready from the moment he shall
have anchored.

21. Should he be forced by any wind to remove from
the coast and for this reason be unable to see all the sig-
nals, then, as soon as the wind shall have ceased, he will
return to the coast, and depending on the length of time
that he will have been absent, he will examine the state in
which he finds the interior flotilla. As a measure of pru-
dence, and according to the conclusions arrived at, he will
see to it that no matter what cause, contingency, delay, or
weather shall have come up, the flotilla shall cross over to
the Bay of Gualquini and take whatever action has been
decided upon.

44 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

22. Whenever he encounters vessels, he will cause them
to be searched as he may think proper; but no matter of
what nation they may be, he will, for the purpose of em-
barrassing the enemy, take possession of them, either peace-
fully or by force, and of all the commercial vessels belong-
ing to these new colonies, from which are to be evicted the
intruding settlers as having furtively and illegally settled
upon them. But if these vessels should be registered from
Noyorca* and bound to St. Augustine with stores for its
garrison, or else returning from the said place to their own
country or coming from any other country, in respect of
which the reason given above does not hold good, he will
not capture them, but will compel and order them to con-
tinue their voyage under his convoy. He will take these
precautions to make sure of the first class of vessels, and to
detain the second, until the commanding general may have
taken cognizance of the case and ordered that there is no
objection to giving them their liberty.

23. The bilanders and other smaller vessels under his
command will proceed nearer to the coast than the larger
ships, in order that they may the more clearly and prompt-
ly pick up the signals made from it and communicate them
to the flagship, according to the directions which the com-
mander of the fleet shall have given to this end before leav-
ing port.

24. As soon as this operation shall have been concluded,
he will leave the port of Gualquini with his squadron and
landing body and proceed directly to the Bay of Saint
Simon, at whose entrance he will anchor on the bar in
proper order and with the same precautions which he ob-
served in that of Gualquini. Here he will remain until the
commanding general orders him by pre-arranged signal
to put to sea, so that if the signal should be set to disem-
bark his people, he will answer by executing the order and
sending his launches to the beach on the south point of the
entrance. In this case, he will order the captains of the
bilanders to sail into the harbor and join hands with the in-
terior flotilla, with orders to fire on the redoubt of the for-
eigners, if this should open. If on the contrary, it should
not, he will keep his station with his ships without under-
taking any movement whatever as much to avoid risking
his ships in entering and leaving the harbor as because it

New Tork, probably.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 45

has been considered unnecessary to employ so great a force
in the reduction of the redoubt and its garrison, and princi-
pally to prevent hostile vessels from going south and thus
possibly embarrassing the w^ithdrawal of our own vessels
through the interior channels. To this end, he will con-
stantly maintain in the tops a good guard of men of the
utmost trustworthiness, who will attentively keep a good
lookout in all directions.

25. As soon as he shall have seen the bilanders leaving
the said port and a signal to make sail and continue the
voyage, he w'ill obey it, setting his course with his entire
squadron direct for the bar of Las Cruces [Tybee Bar] ; and
without waiting for any other order or signal, he will enter
the bay.

26. The mouth of Las Cruces, he will recognize by
means of a lofty, wooden tower, which the foreigners have
built on the north point; on the south, they have a small
redoubt.

27. On coming within sight of the said bar, he will hoist
the English ensign and will keep it flying until he shall
have entered and placed himself in a position to prevent
communication of this event to other parts. He will then
hoist the Spanish ensign and at the same time will send an
officer ashore under a white flag with orders to inform the
commanding officer of the fort, that if he does not surren-
der without resistance or delay, he will be put to the sword
with his entire garrison without exception, and to tell him
at the same time that the remaining forts and settlements of
the south have been depopulated and ruined and that
a strong fleet is coming by the interior channels to destro)'
and reduce to naught those which may have remained.

28. The officer designated for this duty will carefully
observe the disposition and force of the redoubt and the
strength of its garrison in order that in case of refusing to
surrender and ofifering resistance, the most convenient and
best measures may be taken to capture it. He will with-
draw to his ship, as soon as he has executed his commis-
sion.

29. While all this is going on, he [the Naval Comman-
der] will anchor in the middle of the channel, posting the
vessels under his order, so as to occupy both mouths of

46 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

the Tamaja,* these being the same which on joining form
the Savannah River. In this way, all the approaches will
be covered and the communications of the enemy embar-
rassed.

30. If the commanding officer of the said fort should
surrender without resistance, the garrison will be distrib-
uted among the vessels of the fleet, orders being given to
treat them well. The guns, munitions and stores found
will be collected and orders given to burn to the ground all
the houses and to ruin and destroy whatever may be found.
The same orders will be issued with regard to the tower
mentioned.

31. If the commanding officer, in contempt of the cour-
teous and peaceful proposition made to him, should decide
to defend himself, the naval commander will make the best
disposition to invest the place. He will disembark troops
in sufficient number, having regard to the report on the
garrison of the fort and its situation made by the officer
he sent ashore, to secure success without risk, because if
he considers that the operation is somewhat difficult he
must not expose himself, but instead will send with the
greatest dispatch one or two launches, well armed and
manned, to the south through the channels, with an offi-
cer to report everything accurately to the general ; and,
in addition, the conclusion he had come to in respect of what
is needed to attack and conquer the said fort and settle-
ment. The officer will be enjoined to travel night and day
until he shall have met the interior flotilla. He must be
furnished with the countersign and parole because it is
considered important that this information should reach
the general as soon as possible.

32. Even should the commanding general of the fort
surrender without resistance, the two launches will be
sent to report this result to the commanding general with
all the incidents which mav have occurred, and with an ac-
count of the state in which it was found.

33. Since it is possible in the said port to find a few ves-
sels from Europe, bringing stores and people, for the sup-
port of these settlements, he will take as many as he shall

* This word suggests the Altamaha: but as this stream has no connection
with the Savannah, it is not impossible that the scribe has written T for Y,
and that the word is really Yamaja, i. e., Yamacraw. If this emendation be
acceptable, then the author of these orders probably has some local con-
figuration in mind.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 47

have found, using them for the service and re-enforcement
of his squadron. He will take the most exact precautions
for safety until the general shall have joined and given
directions, the expedition being concluded, for its orderly
and well-arranged withdrawal.

There is no doubt that in all relations the general v/ill
labor, in accordance vv^ith the zeal and experience he is
knov/n to have, for the complete success of the royal ser-
vice, and the glory and reputation of the king's arms. In
respect of accidents which cannot be anticipated, I have
confidence that his experience and prudence will lead him to
display the same zeal in prosperity as in adversity, and a
perfect constancy, such that neither will success produce the
slightest carelessness nor misfortune abate his courage,
keeping in mind, as he will, that all of us depend upon the
Divine Omnipotence to which must be attributed both
prosperity and adversity, while displaying on his own part
the diligence, activity and strength that are required to
achieve success in anything upon which we have set oifr
hearts.

48 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

LETTER OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CUBA TO
THE KING'S MINISTER, ANNOUNCING THE FAILURE
OF THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA, AND EN-
CLOSING TWO JOURNALS OF EVENTS.

Sir,

Hoping as I have been from day to day to receive from
Florida the happy news I had promised myself of the suc-
cessful results achieved by the expedition against the En-
glish Colonies in the North, I had kept back the dispatch
boat under the command of Don Juan Baptista Goicochea,
which had entered this port from Vera Cruz on its way
back to Spain, so as more promptly to communicate this
news.

Accordingly, on the eighth instant, through the fortu-
nate arrival, after 42 days' journey, of a boat which was
sent to me, I learned that the first convoy of small vessels
had on the 9th of June safely reached the Bar of Saint
Augustine, as did on the 15th of the same month, that of
the larger ones, which left this port under the orders of
the Naval Lieutenant, Don Antonio Castaneda. At Ra-
tones Inlet, the messenger was pursued by an English
sloop, which was trying to capture him, and so he was
compelled to run aground, but succeeded in saving all his
people and the dispatches which later he managed to send
on to me in a coast fishing boat.

Just when I thought that the expedition was at least well
advanced, if not as completely successful as we had reason
to expect, the Governor of Florida tells me in letters that
I received, dated the 26th, and postdated the 28th and 29th
of the same month of June, that partly on account of the
bad weather and partly on account of the necessity of water-
ing the boats, and of other inconveniences arising out of
the difficulties and dangers of navigation over that bar
[the Bar of St. Augustine], he had been as yet unable to
embark the troops which were to set out from that garrison
to join hands with those from this particular place and with
the militia which has been selected for the purpose. Upon
this aforementioned day, the 29th, he was still at

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 49

St. Augustine with all the troops on board ready to put to
sea to carry out the orders with which he was charged. The
Engineer of the Second Class,* Don Antonio de Arredondo
reports the same thing to me, sending me the journal which
accompanies this letter and includes the 23d of the said
June. From this journal, Your Excellency will take note
of the encounter between some of the small vessels of the
first convoy, on the coast of Florida between the Bar of
Mosquitos and that of Matanzas. It would seem that the
English had gone in a boat and launch to capture a small
sloop from the presidio of Florida, which was carrying the
detachment of artillerymen from the garrison of this place
[Havana] as well as to capture another launch from this
port. As they boarded these vessels to loot them, our peo-
ple who had jumped ashore, fired upon them from the sand
dunes, and compelled them to surrender to the number of
sixteen, among them a lieutenant of the frigate. In this
affair, we had the misfortune to lose the sub-lieutenant of
artillery and the corporal of the detachment.

Notwithstanding Arredondo's assertion, under date of
19th, in his journal, that from a few prisoners returned by
Don Diego Oglesor, Governor of Georgia, to the coasts of
Florida, it was learned they had discovered nothing of our
plans, yet I feared that they had been warned by the delay,
so far of 14 days, off the bar of Saint Augustine, of a fleet
so numerous as ours and that it was not impossible that
they might be on their guard, and so hinder us ; and all this
in spite of the effort I had made in advance, to advise the
Governor of Florida through an officer (as I informed Your
Excellency in a letter of June 8, of which I inclose a dupli-
cate), who arrived more than 20 days before the arrival
of the convov of larger vessels under the command of Don
Antonio de CastaSeda.

Having received this news, and fearing that through the
delay they had already made they might suffer, if supplies
should be lacking, and in order to forestall any accident due
to necessity or want, I at once prepared a brigantine and a
sloop to send a month's supplies in addition to those of three
months and a half that they took out with them. These
boats left this port with the stores on the 15th inst. On

Ingeniero en segundo, Tt was not until 1756 that engineers held mili-
tary rank in the Spanish army, elsewhere In these papers, Arredondo U
given the first grade, ingenerlo en jefe.

50 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

the following day there returned to it a sloop, one of those
that had set out with the expedition, and in it came Naval
Lieutenant the Marquess de Casinas and the captain of the
militia battalion of this place, Don Laureano Chacon, with
his company. From these officers I learned that the issue of
the expedition had not corresponded to our well-founded
hopes and to the measures that had been taken for its suc-
cess, and that all the vessels in different divisions had strug-
gled to regain Florida and this place Havana, without any
other result than that of having attacked Gualquini with
success, capturing its forts, artillery, mortars, munitions and
implements ; and that this outcome was due to the bad
weather which had delayed and disordered the execution
of our plans, to say nothing of hindrances later encountered
and felt.

I have up to the present day no other information than
that given me by the aforesaid officers, and that which is
contained in more or less detail in the private diary kept by
the Marquess de Casinas of daily events, and brought off
by him and given to me.

Seeing now that the whole expedition had begun to re-
treat and that they had sighted land six leagues farther to
the south of Saint Augustine, these officers judged it proper
to set their course for this port and assured me that the
other boats were doing the same thing.

Such being the news in hand, it has appeared to me proper
no longer to delay the dispatch boat under the command of
Don Juan Baptista Goicochea. As soon as I shall have re-
ceived the information to be given me by the Governor of
Florida, it will be dispatched in another boat which I am
holding ready for the purpose. I shall then explain with
greater particularity all that has happened and the reasons
that prevailed against continuing the expedition and in
favor of forming the resolution to retreat.

As I had already made up my mind, from the condi-
tion in which I considered the enemy to be and from the
superiority of our forces, that at the very latest, his towns,
plantations and settlements would be attacked and des-
troyed as far as Port Royal; and as I had even flattered
myself that these favorable results might be obtained as
far as Carolina [Charleston] I have been profoundly aston-
ished at the frustration of hopes so well founded of serving
the king advantageously and maintaining the glory of his
arms; and that the labor and zeal inspired by my devotion,

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 51

and by my interest in our success should have come to
naught. But although not successful everywhere, yet
according to the relation of the Marquess de Casinas, the
destruction of the forts and settlement of Gualquini and
that of Bejeces was accomplished. That many stores and
implements should have been destroyed, and the harbor
gallantly forced in the face of all its fire, both by sea and
land, with such intrepidity, as reported by those to whom
I have talked on the subject, is due to Don Antonio
Castaiieda.

The King and Your Excellency do not need to be inform-
ed how deeply I am mortified that this expedition has not
been carried out to the complete satisfaction of His Majes-
ty's desires ; and that on my part nothing was omitted that
could have the least bearing on its happiest issue. Until
all the vessels with the troops and militia shall have re-
turned, I shall take all the precautions that are due.

Praying Your Excellency to report to His Majesty the re-
sults so far of this operation, may God keep Your Excel-
lency many years.

Havana, August 18, 1742.

Excellent Sir:

Your most humble, grateful servant kisses your hand.
Don Juan Francisco,

Guemes y Horcasitas.
(A Flourish.)
To His Excellency Don Joseph de Campillo.

[Letter acknowledging receipt of that of Guemes, with
papers.]

With the letter of Your Excellency of the 18th of August,
have been received the accompanying reports and diary,
treating of the management and progress of the expedition
which left your port against Carolina. We have also the
news reported to Your Excellency, through Naval Lieuten-
ant Don Carlos Riggio (who has arrived at that place
[Havana] ) by the Governor of Florida, and also that for-
warded by Your Excellency in a letter of the 20th, to the
effect that on that day Don Antonio Castaneda returned to
that port [Havana] with the greater part of the convoy and
troops. The King, having acquainted himself with your
report upon the measures and arrangements you made for

52 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

this expedition, and also with your reflections upon its is-
sue, and the reasons why it did not come up to the expecta-
tions produced by the forces and arrangements with which
it was undertaken, desires me to express to Your Excel-
lency his satisfaction with everything done by Your Excel-
lency, a satisfaction in exact agreement with the confidence
!he was gracious enough to repose in your zeal and efficiency.
He considers as entirely sound the remarks you make
upon the unhappy issue of events. His Majesty under-
stands that this is to be traced to the poor direction, lack
of diligence and inefficiency of the one who should have
made extraordinary efforts to profit by the advantages that
placed success within his grasp.
May God keep you many years.

San Ildefonso, October 28, 1742.
To Don Juan Francisco Guemes y Horcasitas.*

JOURNAL KEPT BY DON ANTONIO DE ARREDONDO,
CHIEF ENGINEER OF THE PRESENT EXPEDITION.

June 5, 1742.

At sunrise the signal was made to put to sea and execut-
ed by the entire convoy, as it was ready to sail. At twelve
o'clock, we sallied from the Morro, at which time we haul-
ed up our launches and boats; steady drizzle.

June 6th.

From yesterday noon until today at the same hour: at
one o'clock in the afternoon we ran into a rain squall with-
out wind, which lasted until 5. We stood all night under
foresail and mizzen sail until 5 o'clock in the morning. At
noon, we took the sun, but as there were great differences
in the observations, we took the mean to fix the course
which was northeast by north.

June 7th.

From yesterday until today: at sunset, all the elements
of the convoy kept together. At nine in the evening, great
signs of a squall which burst upon us with thunder, light-
ning and rain, 'lasting until one o'clock in the night. At
sunrise two vessels were missing. At noon, we took the

Not signed but probably written by Campillo. In the MS. this letter
follows Arredondo's diary. We have put It where it belongs, immediately
after the letter which it acknowledges.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 53

sun and found our latitude to 24 40', and our longitude
205 16'. At this hour the two boats which had been miss-
ing rejoined us.

June 8th.

From yesterday until today: at one o'clock in the after-
noon, we sighted Long Key, its northeast head bearing
north five and a half decrees toward the east and the south-
west point, west. At sunset all the vessels were together.
At midday the sun gave us 25 3' latitude and longitude
295 40', all the vessels being together.

June 9th.

At three of the afternoon, signal was made to crowd on
all sail which was kept up till four. At six land was dis-
covered from the top and recognized by the pilot as Bis-
cayne Key which bore west by north at a distance of five
leagues. At six in the morning, the top announced that
only twenty-two vessels were in sight : at seven, land was
visible and after examination by the pilot he declared that
it was the shore of Jega, bearing west by northwest. At
8 a sloop signalled that she wished to speak to us, and ob-
serving that her bowsprit had been injured, the Honduran
was sent to find out what was the matter, and returned say-
ing, that it was the royal sloop "St. Joseph," and that the
night before, on going about, the guard schooner had foul-
ed her, and thus had damaged her bowsprit, but that she
was not making any water nor had suffered any other dam-
age. At noon we took the sun and found ourselves in 26
54' latitude and 295 25' longitude. On this day a sloop
of the convoy was missing.

June 10th.

From yesterday until today: at 4 of the afternoon, we
sighted main land, being the palm grove of Ays, according
to the pilot. At 5, signal was set to go about, which was
executed by the entire convoy, the course being set S. E.,
with the wind E. N. E. At sunset the top announced that
only twenty-two vessels were in sight. At this hour we
had lost the land. The whole night remained calm. At
sunrise we saw the same vessels as those of yesterday after-
noon and found at noon our latitude to be 28 28' and lon-
gitude 292 15'.

54 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

June 11th.
From yesterday until today : at 1 :30 of the afternoon
signal was made to put about, which was done, and the
course set W. ^ N. W., the wind being north and light. At
sunset all the boats visible this morning were still in sight.
The whole night a moderate wind blew out of the south-
west. At sunrise twenty-one vessels were seen. At noon,
we took soundings and found ourselves in twenty-two
fathoms, bottom reddish gravel and dark colored sand.
At ten, we tacked to the S. S. W., wind west, and at noon
our latitude was 30 1' and longitude 295 10'.

June 12th.
From yesterday until today : at 2 :30 of the afternoon
sounded in twenty-six fathoms; found the bottom the same,
for which reason we decided to cast anchor because the
currents were carrying us to leeward. Signal to this effect
was made and obeyed. At sunset only eighteen vessels
were seen because apparently the currents had prevented
their keeping together, and at the same time it was con-
jectured that they were invisible because the horizon was
overcast. The entire night was calm, with the wind to the
southwest, but we found the currents extremely strong;
at 5 :30 of the morning, signal was made to hoist sail, which
was done with the wind to the northwest, course S. W.
Only fifteen vessels were visible, being those only that had
anchored. At noon, our observation gave us 29 42' lati-
tude, and longitude 245 4'.*

June 13th.
From yesterday until today : at one of the afternoon, we
set our course W. S. W., with the wind north, northwest,
eastern horizon heavily submerged. At three of the after-
noon we saw land but could not make out what it was,
bearing W. ^ S. W., at a distance of three leagues. At
sunset signal to go about and set the course east, wind
north, northeast. At this hour only fourteen vessels were
in sight. The eastern horizon was strongly overcast, with
more or less indications of weather. At ten at night the wind
freshened from the north into a squall so that we stood un-
der foresail and mizzensail. At three in the morning signal
was made to change our course to the E. S. E. and S. E.,
with the wind northeast, this on account of having sounded
and found only twelve fathoms and a half. The night con-

So In original, probably Copyist's error for 295" 4'

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 55

tinued calm with some swell until half past four, when the
wind settled in the south and southeast with many squalls
and showers. At this hour we set our course to the E, and
E. 34 N. E. At sunrise, the sun being invisible, the top
announced that fifteen vessels were in sight. Afterwards
two others, small ones, were discovered and a frigate to
the windward which made a signal of recognition which
was answered, and we found it to be the Sacra Familia, so
that we were now eighteen, all told. At ten we sounded
in fifteen fathoms and the skies having cleared and the rain
stopped, signal was made to head south, the wind being
east-southeast. At midday we took the sun and found our
position to be latitude 29 28', and longitude 297 7'.

June 14th.
From yesterday till today; at six of the afternoon, sig-
nal made to set the course N, E. by N., with the wind east-
southeast. At this hour there was a flurry of rain. At
sunset seventeen vessels were in sight, the two small ones
that were seen this morning having been unable to come
up. The night continued calm, and the currents proving
more powerful than the wind, we cast anchor in twelve
and a half fathoms of water at half past one in the morning.
At six, signal to make sail was set, which we all did, with
the course S. S. W. ; wind east-southeast, which all six-
teen vessels executed. At 8:00 land was seen at a distance
of four leagues and a half, continuous coast. At midday
the sun gave us 29 latitude and at the same time we recog-
nized that we were off the bar of Mosquito Inlet, for which
reason we set our course N. N. W.

June 15th.
From yesterday till today: at six of the afternoon, the
packet boat "Diligent" was signalled to come up within
speaking distance and ordered to press all sail and hasten
to reconnoiter the bar of Matanzas and inform us by can-
non shot and to hoist a signal lantern for our guidance ; and
that as soon as she should be off the bar of Saint Augus-
tine, she should anchor, and from time to time make a
smoke signal. We continued with the rest of the vessels
on the same course and at one o'clock in the morning an-
chored east and west on a line with the tower of St. Anas-
tasia in twelve fathoms of water. As soon as it dawned
we discovered at anchor the seven vessels which had been
missing. They had succeeded in getting in two days

56 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

before, so that we were finally all reunited. At 8:00 there
came alongside a boat from the garrison to take ashore the
second in command, Don Francisco Rubiani and myself.
The officer who came ofif told us that on the 5th, the first
division of small vessels that had set out from Havana on
the first day, having run into an English frigate, our gal-
ley called upon her to show her colors and as she failed to
do so, we cleared for action and opened fire on her with
our guns, to which the frigate made no answer, and under
her courses alone, advanced upon our galley, and prepared
to attack her. But this design was perceived, and the wind
being fresh, the galley rejoined the convoy under a signal
to press on all sail ; but her commanding officer seeing that
the Saint Augustine sloop, in which were embarked the
sub-lieutenant and the artillerymen of Havana, was far
astern, gave orders to stick close to the sloop and resist
the launch and boat of the hostile frigate, which she had
just put overboard and was directed to cut of? two schoon-
ers which were somewhat delayed behind the remainder
of the convoy. As the wind continued to freshen, the gal-
ley sent a boat with the ensign and ten men of his garri-
son to re-enforce the aforesaid schooners. In fact, the
launches of the Englishman had come alongside to board,
but were by the help of the officer and ten men just men-
tioned, formally beaten off in the three attempts that they
made. In this afifair we suffered no damage, except that
Don Francisco Molina, the lieutenant of the militia of Gua-
nabacoa, was wounded in the thigh. The hostile ship, see-
ing that her launches had not succeeded in their attempt,
now directed them to attack the Saint Augustine bilander
and the launch from the convoy sent by the commanding
officer of the galley to support the vessels that were far
astern. Although the utmost defense possible had been
made, they were unable to resist the fire of the ship which
was at anchor in three fathoms of water, and so ran ashore,
the sub-lieutenant, Don Domingo de la Cruz, having been
killed in the action by a gun-shot, as well as the corporal,
Manuel del Pino, by another. When they saw our people
had got ashore, the enemy leaving their boat, swarmed
over the bilander in order to loot the cargo which they
supposed she carried. From the shore, we opened fire on
them, encouraged by seeing that the English boat had sunk
in the surf on the shore, and assisted by two Indians who
happened to be fishing, and who had come up at the sound

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 57

of the guns. We succeeded in overcoming our adversaries
who, after a moment or two of struggle, asked for quarter.
Of the English in the boat, six were wounded and nine un-
hurt. The ship when it saw her people captured set sail.
The dragoons who went to the help of the bilander were
clever enough on going ashore to take their arms with
them and from the shore diverted the hostile launches,
so as to permit the artillerymen also to go ashore. With-
out this, the affair would not have succeeded. The prison-
ers have been brought to this place and among them, the
officer in command, who is a brother of Captain Makay.
From these we learned all about the fight and that the ship
is one of the men-of-war of Carolina. I have had word
of mouth with one of them but have learned nothing more
than what we already know. In respect of the condition
of affairs in Saint Augustine, I also learned that the day;
before our arrival a schooner had allowed itself to be sight-
ed on the north and that she had changed her course as
soon as she had seen the seven vessels at anchor. At one
o'clock of the afternoon, the second in command, Don Fran-
cisco de la Peiia and I went ashore, and we passed the rest
of the day informing ourselves of the state of the prepara-
tions of this place.

June 16th.

Today we convened the pilots, white as well as Indian,
and examined them carefully in regard to everything we
should know for the purpose of our expedition. Later we
held council, the commanding officers and the naval en-
sign, Don Francisco de la Pena, in which we agreed upon
the method of attacking the north and south entrances of
St. Simon's in order to cut off the communication between
the various stations of the enemy, deciding to detach th'^ee
galliots with their canoes to the more northerly entrance
and two to enter by the Bar of Whales ; these two to post
themselves within the river between the Fort of St, An-
drew and Frederica. Today we had squalls from the north-
east and more or less water was sent on board, in spite of
the fact that all the launches were busy unloading stores.

June 17th.

Another council was held between the commanding of-
ficers and Don Francisco de la Peua, in which was discuss-
ed the question of *:he point at which we should disembark

58 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

to invade the Isle of St. Simon ; and after various reflect-
ions upon the matter, and weighing all the circumstances
with the greatest attention, it was unanimously agreed that
the disembarkation should take place on the east coast at
the most sheltered point of the shoals north of the Bar of
Gualquini and that from this point a cordon should be form-
ed with part of the troops to reach as far as the careening
ground in order to maintain free communication within
the river with our ships and to receive supplies and what-
ever else might be needful from that point in full security.
It was further agreed that the ships and the remaining
vessels should enter in good order and force the hostile
battery, and should string themselves across the river of
the harbor in the formation to be prescribed by the senior
naval officer, Don Antonio Castaneda, and that afterward
operations should conform to the turn of events.

I caused lists to be given to me of the troops, the con-
victs, the Indians and the negroes of the garrison, the first
being composed of five pickets of the re-enforcement and
of one of the garrison, well equipped ; of ninety convicts,
of fifty-five Indians and of fifteen negroes, all armed. Then
I promptly made the lists of distribution of all these classes
according to the capacity and quality of the vessels and
they were so allotted.

We continued today sending as much water as we could
on board, having regard to the necessities of the vessels
and especially those of the royal frigates. Today we had
squalls from the northeast and some of them gave us real
concern, by preventing communication and because our
vessels were so completely exposed out beyond the bar.
Our arrangements were thus delayed.

Today we saw a schooner off in the north and the com-
manding officer Don Antonio Castaneda, made signal to the
Honduran ship to chase her, and after some time, she de-
clared herself to be English and put her boat overboard
and sent it to us with the French captain who was captur-
ed on this bar at the beginning of March of this year, with
three Spanish prisoners and a negro of Espinosa's. Don
Diego Ogletorp was returning these people with a letter
to the Governor of St. Augustine, with directions to leave
these prisoners at that place. I learned from the French
captain that the schooner in which he had come is the same
that was seen on the fourteenth ; that on account of the bad
weather she had not approached the shore to carry out the

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 59

order of Oglettorp and that having recognized our sloop,
the English captain had taken the resolution to leave
aboard of her both the French captain and the prisoners.
These declared that they had been kept confined and de-
prived of all communication. The French captain, a rea-
sonably just, fair man, had been kept on board of the bi-
lander which, from the description he gave, is the one from
this place which they captured after it had come to anchor
in the river of St. Simon. He was not permitted to set foot
on shore more than twice, when he was taken before a
Board, presided over by a Doctor, to make a declaration in
respect of certain effects and bilanders. These he lost, for
the verdict was adverse although it was established that he
had come to bring supplies to the garrison. In spite of the
closeness of the confinement in which he was kept, they
nevertheless treated him with the greatest distrust as
though he had been an enemy. He understood that Oglet-
torp had not the forces to resist ours because, all told, they
have not more than six hundred English, divided between
troops and farmers, and that these are distributed in differ-
ent posts. He relates further that the battery of the city or
town of Frederica is dismounted and he reports the deep
poverty in which they are living, without fresh meat, the sol-
diers without money and without any relief, except that a
French officer has a few sheep and cattle. The negro of
Espinosa, however, enjoyed a little liberty and says that a
storm and heavy rains have gradually destroyed the battery
at the entrance of Gualquini, so that he saw it, at least so he
says, fallen over on one side. On asking the French captain
what opinion Oglettorp's people had formed on seeing our
seven vessels anchored in front of the bar, he said, that
they thought it was the privateer, Estrada (who has as yet
not come in from his cruise), with a few prizes; and that
the captain of the English man-of-war, whom a few days
before he had met, had told them of the combat which he
had had with our galley and the boats of the first division,
and that he had given them an account of the prisoners
which the Spaniards had taken from them at the Bar of
Mosquitos, telling them that they had come with stores
for the garrison escorted by the galley; so that it seems
they have not perceived the purpose for which our expedi-
tion is intended. The letter of Oglettorp to the Governor
reduces itself to communicating to him the fact that he
is returning the prisoners aforementioned, claiming credit

60 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

for having rescued them from the power of the Indians
who had captured them ; and to saying that the others which
he holds in his power must, by order of the king, his mas-
ter, be sent to London, Don Romualdo Morales being of the
number; and makes frivolous excuses for not having before
given an answer to our Governor.

June 18th.

We drew up plans of battle, divided the troops into col-
umns, and selected the reserve ; the three naval lieutenants,
Don Vicentte Quintta, Don Carlos Regio, and the Mar-
quess de Casinas, were appointed to take over as many
other pickets* belonging to the Captains Don Bernardo
Quena and Don Gregorio Bermejo, on duty as regimental
staff captains,** and that of Don Francisco Palafox, chos-
en as aide-de-camp by the commanding general. Ballast
was sent out to the frigate, Escalera, assigned to the fleet
by direction of the commanding general and in agreement
with his royal officers and the agents of the Royal Ex-
chequer. Besides we continued to send out water and I
made a distribution of cartridges, at the rate of twenty
rounds for the disembarkation, and ordered them to be
distributed to each vessel by the adjutants. f I also ordered
the issue of 183 muskets and bayonets to the militia but
these orders could not all be carried out because there was
not time during this day on account of the great distance to
be covered and because the tide did not serve. The supply
of water has continued and the ballast for the frigate of
Escalera. I ordered the negro of Espinosa to be held a
prisoner with directions that he should be allowed to speak
to no one because I suspected some knavery.

The piqitete at the beginning of the XVIII century, was a provisional
and temporary company forming up on the left, and made up of men drawn
from all the companies. Later In the text it has its regular meaning of
picket, 1. e. guard.

* Sargentos maiores, [or mayores, in modem form]. The sargento
mayor was charged with duties of administration, accountability, inspection
and discipline. He took rank after the captains, but they nevertheless were
under his orders in matters relating to his office. The title is rather that of
an office than of a grade. There is no English equivalent.

t Aytidantes, in all probability the assistants of the sargentos mayores,
who were called ayxuiantes. The term used in the translation "adjutant,"
must not be taken to mean what we actually understand by it in the military
service, but is used In a more general way. Strictly speaking we have no
Bnglish equivalent for ayudante, any more than we have for sargento mayor.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 61

June 19th.

I have drawn up the order of disembarkation and the
stores have been transported to the frigate of Escalera for
the troops which are embarking-, namely, the detachment
of Don Gregorio Aldana, The schooner, Guaraia, has suc-
ceeded in entering this port. It has on board a part of the
supply of stores for the schooners and other vessels of
the garrison [of Saint Augustine]. The baggage of the
officers of the pickets has been ordered on board, and the
supply of water and ballast to the boats has continued with
the greatest energy, each of these being about completed.

Today we saw a schooner to which chase was given, by
order of the senior naval officer, by the bilander of Fide
and the Honduran. They did not succeed in overtaking
it, but we have formed the opinion that it is the same one
which brought the Frenchman and prisoners sent by Ogle-
torp and that it has come to spy us out and observe our
movements.

June 20th.

While we were completing the distribution of stores, I
passed the day writing to the Captain General of Havana,
giving his Excellency an account of all that had passed up
to the present day. Orders have been given for the em-
barkation tomorrow afternoon of the troops of the garri-
son, and that they should set out at the first tide and come
to anchor near the flagship, in order that each may receive
its sailing instructions from the naval commander and
that there may be nothing more to do than to put to sea.
Today we saw a brigantine which we have decided must
be that of Estrada, because it seems suspicious that so large
a vessel off this bar could have disappeared. We are copy-
ing out the order of disembarkation in order that each one
of the vessels may have its own copy.

June 21st.

Yesterday we finished supplying the vessels of the garri-
son with their proper stores. The watering of the ships,
too, has been finished. At dawn, we saw a brigantine
which we decided to be the same as that seen yesterday;
and in fact, at one o'clock of the afternoon it anchored oflF
our bar, and we discovered it to be that of Estrada. At six of
the afternoon the ship's writer came ashore with a letter
from the said Estrada, giving us an account of what had
happened on his cruise. He reports having captured a

42 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

schooner of rice which has already arrived here and a packet
boat, and reports further having been attacked by a
Carolina war vessel on the third instant at about six of
the afternoon, when the combat opened ; that it lasted un-
til midnight and that each damaged the other more or less,
with the loss on the part of the Spaniards of one man killed
and four wounded; among them, the captain in the hand^
the lieutenant in the head, and two sailors. As for the loss
of the English, he knew nothing. He judges merely that
the damage must have been great because the fire of all
sorts which he opened on him was incessant, and because
the Englishman, dropping astern, was the first to cease
the combat, so that this action may be compared to that
which Don Pedro Goycochea had with the English frigate
between the islands of San Domingo and Porto Rico, be-
cause the circumstances were almost the same. He also
says that he has learned from prisoners that two hundred
sailors have been sent from Boston to re-enforce the fleet
of Admiral Vernon which it is known was occupied, ac-
cording to current reports, before Cartagena; and that it
was common rumor that additional forces were to come
out to join those of Oglettorp and that if these should
arrive, he would doubtless use them before St. Augustine ;
that Carolina was not of a mind to give the help which
Oglettorp was seeking, unless there should be some order
from the King to that effect, and the command of the
expedition committed to some other chief.

The brigantine comes in short of meat and for that rea-
son cannot form part of the convoy ; only as soon as it shall
have entered, we shall try to shift its arms and equipment
to the guard schooner, and if Captain Estrada shall have re-
covered from his wound, we shall give him the command
of her. This night we had squalls, winds and showers.

June 22nd.

Frequent rains, squalls and thunderstorms have today
impeded the embarkation of the troops, nor was Estrada's
brigantine able to come in ; and as the horizons indicated
foul weather, all the pilots were assembled and gave their
opinion that the vessels should not set out, but should re-
main until tomorrow when the embarkation would take
place and the ships put forth, but only if the weather
should be good.

In a gazette from Boston, brought by Estrada, there is
a ridiculous article as follows : It says that a gentleman,

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 63

of Georgia, who had arrived in Boston on the 26th of
March, had given trustworthy news that General Oglet-
torp with eight hundred men had gone to lay siege to St.
Augustine, that among these men he had three hundred
Indians who had resolved to burn the place; and he added
that the motive of Ogleltorp's expedition was that he had
got news that the Spaniards were weak and in great need
of stores, caused by the presence of Admiral Vernon's
fleet in the waters of Cuba.

June 23rd.
Although we had thought that today we could set forth,
the morning dawned with a strong wind from the north-
east, accompanied by squalls and showers, and the water
on the bar had become so rough that it was impossible to
cross it; notwithstanding which two attempts were made,
in order to bring in the brigantine of Estrada, which is
causing us concern, on account of its bad condition. It
fired a few guns of distress but it was not possible to
reach it. At ten of the morning, we had the unhappy
news that Father Domingo, chaplain of the packet boat
"Diligente," and a sailor of its crew, who were going on
board, had been drowned at the exit of the bar, but that
fortunately the vicar general of the expedition had mirac-
ulously saved his life by happily seizing hold of the launch
and keeping himself on it until she came ashore. We have
also seen ashore on the beach a boat without knowing
which boat it is, nor how many people have been drowned.
This afternoon it became calm so that the Commanding
General assembled the commanding officers and naval
officers and the pilots of the garrison, and requested that
each should give his opinion in respect of our sallying
forth, as it was important that our trip should be short,
and clear that the inconveniences of delay would be se-
rious; in general, each person should give reasons for and
against. The pilots were unanimous in declaring that it
was not possible to cross the bar as long as the sea was
still up, aritated as it was by the squalls and wind that
had prevailed. After various reflections on the subject,
and after taking into account the fact that the small boats,
which were to follow the fleet without losing land from
view were absolutely necessary to the success of our op-
erations, and therefore should not expose themselves to
separation from the convoy, on account of the contrary
v/inds that had been blowing, and the great variation of

64 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

the weather, and considering further that the journey
from this point to the hostile coast was so short, it was de-
cided to be absolutely necessary that we should set out in
settled weather. Accordingly, all minds were of the opin-
ion that we should wait until things were safe and that if
the wind should shift tomorrow we should go out. With
this opinion, the order was given that at the beat of the
drum everyone should go on board his ship.

[End of Arredondo's Journal.]

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 65

DETAILS OF WHAT OCCURRED IN THE PRESENT EX-
PEDITION, ENTRUSTED TO THE CARE OF BRIGA-
DIER DON MANUEL DE MONTIANO, FROM THE 15TH
DAY OF JUNE, ON WHICH THE CONVOY ARRIVED
FROM HAVANA AT ST. AUGUSTINE, THE WHOLE BE-
ING CONTAINED IN A JOURNAL, KEPT BY THE MAR-
QUESS OF CASINAS, ETC.

Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani and the Engineer-in-
Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo, were immediately put
ashore and set to work to draw up the plan of battle, giv-
ing at the same time directions to provide the vessels with
water. As, on account of the distance and difficulty of
crossing the bar, the dispatch desirable in this case is al-
most impossible, our departure has been greatly delayed.
Moreover, we wished to wait in order to determine the
effects of the moon, in respect of which, an unfavorable
forecast had been made.

The intervening time was spent, however, in inspecting
all the tools and implements and ammunition brought by
the vessels of the convoy for the purpose of adding to them,
if necessary, from those in the garrison, and so it was dis-
covered that the nine hundred water jars were defective,
which it was decided to repair along with the smaller ves-
sels of all the ships. On the 26th the pickets of this garri-
son embarked, 600 strong, after the Lord Bishop had preach-
ed them a sermon. On the 28th the commanding officers
went on board, but a strong wind having come out of the
west-northwest, and maintained itself until the 30th, the
smaller boats, such as launches, pirogues and galliots,
which carried water for only four days, were compelled
to return to shore to renew their supply. This de-
layed our departure, which finally took place the first of
July at 7 :00 in the morning, with wind east-southeast. We
had determined in orders and arranged that the disembar-
kation should take place outside of the Port of Gualquini,
and beyond the range of its guns, but in consequence of the

66 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

representations made by Don Antonio CastaSeda and of the
excellent reasons he gave in favor of the advantage of forc-
ing the port, orders were given to this end. The convoy
was composed of fifty-two vessels, which remained together
only the following day, because the wind coming on from
the west-northwest, with considerable force and raising
a considerable sea, four galliots and the pirogues were
compelled to seek the shelter of the coast as best they
could ; and as the wind held with great tenacity in the west,
north and the northwest, and as there were frequent
squalls, it resulted that various vessels were separated
from the convoy; of these, two pirogues filled with In-
dians and convicts succeeded in returning and were taken
in tow ; one by the pink, San Lorenzo, and the other by
the frigate of Flecha.

On the 9th, having made land at sunset and the wind
having fallen, we cast anchor in fourteen fathoms of water
at which time we heard two cannon shots and at the change
of countersign, two more, which helped us set our course
for the nearest point to the Port of Gualquini, otherwise
known as St. Simon.

At half past four of the afternoon on the 10th, we an-
chored in ten fathoms about two leagues from the coast
and about three to the north of the port. All the vessels
had arrived so short of water that in some of them only a
pint could be given out ; there being none among the thir-
ty-three which had succeeded in anchoring in these waters
which could giA^e any help unless it was the flagship and
the packet boat, Avhich was ordered to make a return of its
water supply with orders to give none out. Water was
issued every day by the flagship in half rations.

The enemy made a show at various times of sallying
forth from the port as far as the range of the guns of their
castle. Five bilanders would come out and anchor and
then return after a short time. In these attempts or ob-
servations they passed the entire afternoon as well as in
firing various guns, which we inferred was for the purpose
of testing their batteries. We, ourselves, did nothing else
but send out Don Antonio Arredondo in the boat of the
flagship to reconnoiter the shore and make soundings in
order to determine if our vessels could get closer in shore,
and thus facilitate the disembarkation, in case we should
find it convenient to attempt it here. Having noticed be-
fore sunset that a launch had set out from the port and was

Tills map lepioduced from tlie original in the
rosscssioii of W. ,r. DcKeniie, Wormsloe, Ga.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 67

pressing forward under sail and oar in the direction of our
flagship, she ran up the English ensign and pennants, the
other vessels of the convoy doing the same thing, but
nothing came of it, for in a short time the aforesaid launch
retired. At 8:00 in the evening, the launch of the packet
boat having met the boat of the flagship which had sallied
forth for the purpose of sounding, they fired on each other
until a mutual recognition caused the fire to be stopped,
fortunately without any damage having occurred on either
side. During this night, we heard from time to time a few
hostile c?nnon shots of the enemy.

On the 11th, the galley joined and a bilander, one of
those which had fallen out of the convoy, as well as a
barge. The wind continuing fresh from the W. W. S. W.
and S. W. with frequent squalls and high seas, prevented
our entrance. Our desire to execute this movement in-
creased with the complaints of the lack of water. This
want was met in the manner already given, for no water
could be got from the shore, as the enemy observed our
every movement, and we should have exposed ourselves
to loss. This day nothing special occurred, unless it was
the usual gun shots at the change of countersign and guard
mounting: there were some others too during the course
of the day.

On the 12th, the day dawned fair and so the command-
ing general set the signal to begin the disembarkation.
With this end in view, a few boats with troops on board
set out to take a position astern of the flagship, when
there came up a squall so violent that it was only with
much labor and difficulty that the vessels were able to re-
sume their positions. We now recognized that any wind
from the outside, even one blowing only a short time, rais-
ed a great sea and surf ; that we were compelled to keep our
vessels at a great distance from shore because there was
not sufficient water closer in for the larger ones ; further,
that the absence of the launches, boats and pirogues from
the garrison of St. Augustine as well as of the four gal-
liots which the v/eather had separated from us, made an or-
derly landing impossible. Therefore, Don Antonio Cas-
taiieda announced it as his opinion that the port should be
forced, adding to the excellent reasons already given, the
no less excellent consideration that our vessels were in
strong peril and exposed to some fatal damage, in conse-
quence of the severity of the season which gave us no hope

68 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

of anything but bad weather. In consequence, it was de-
termined to force the port and to wait for this purpose
for suitable weather. The winds continued west-south-
west and west, with great strength and tenacity, raising
a heavy sea and accompanied by squalls until the fifteenth,
when we hoisted anchor to challenge the fort. The wind
having fallen, we anchored closer in, having gained some-
thing like two leagues. Until that particular day, noth-
ing special occurred unless it was the continued clamor
for water, a need that was met by the flagship and the
packet boat. The enemy continued his practice of firing
his guns at the change of the countersign, when they
mounted the guard, except the fourteenth day, when from
ten in the evening until eleven, many flashes were seen on
the beach and from eleven till twelve many cannon shots
were heard, as many as fifty having been counted. Con-
siderable doubt existed as to what could have occasioned
so unusual a thing, but according to the best of our infer-
ences, we decided that it must be our four galliots cannon-
ading Fort San Pedro.

JOURNAL FROM THE DAY V/HEN THE PORT OF GUAL^
QUINI, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ST. SIMON, WAS
FORCED.

July 16th.

At seven in the morning, the entire convoy hoisted an-
chor, and as there was not water enough, anchored at the
entrance of the port at a distance of a league and a half to
wait until the tide should rise and thus make the entrance
surer. The galley and two galliots accordingly were or-
dered to sound the channel and while so employed were
fired on by the enemy. This fire they returned without
having received any damage. They then withdrew, having
been recalled by the commanding general at three in the
afternoon, because now we had had two days of a growing
tide with a fresh wind astern and a smooth sea. We sailed
straight into the harbor, following the pre-arranged order,
and using as buoys the galley and the galliots which had
been sent forward for this purpose. These, as soon as the
flagship had passed them, used all diligence to get in closer

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 69

and open fire under the guns of the fort, and of a man-
of-war schooner, and of four bilanders which were eche-
loned out from it. From this time, the enemy began to
answer, maintaining the fire with the greatest intensity
from the time the flagship entered until the last vessel
passed. This vessel was the pink of Parreiio, which unfor-
tunately had gone aground under the fire of the enemy,
who continued to fire incessantly during the time of one
sand glass; but the tide rising, the boat got off, having lost
only one man killed and three wounded and received much
damage in its hull and two cannon shots between wind and
water. The whole convoy was at anchor inside the har-
bor at half after five of the afternoon, and it was discov-
ered that the total damage received in the rest of it was
confined to the pink of Acosta, three men killed and one
wounded; to the pink hospital, Lieut. De Berroa wounded;
in the bilander, one wounded; in the galley, three. In a
few vessels some of the foremen had been cut down and
the bilander of Don Pedro de La Madrid had had its mast
shot away. As we feared that the enemy might during
this night bring up some guns, and after constructing a
battery on the shore opposite the point where the vessels
were anchored, do them some damage, we decided to land
the troops immediately, to w^hich end the commanding
general at six o'clock set a signal. It being now after sun-
set, as many as eighteen boats, most of them very small,
now pushed off from the flagship. Some of these contain-
ed only six men each, because the sea and wind being con-
trary allowed no more.* The three barges, however,
brought off the companies of grenadiers, but these came
last of all on account of the struggle against contrary winds
and tides, landing three hours after every one else. This
first landing of 500 men was commanded by Lieutenant
Colonel Don Antonio Salgado. There was no resistance,
but on account of the night there was some disorder which
may always be expected on such occasions. Fifty men,
all told, had disembarked by seven in the evening, the rest
having come on immediately afterward, except the men in
the launches. After setting foot ashore, the troops formed
up in three ranks, throwing out advanced sentinels and

These words are followed In the MS. by the expression "en los cortcu-
bufjxies". The meaning of this compound word is unknown; the word Itself
can be found in no Spanish dictionary. In copying it, the scribe has roada
an erasure, as though he were not sure himself of the original.

70 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

posting a few pickets in advantageous positions. The
movement was supported by the galley, galliots and packet
boat, which before the boats took on the men, swept the
shore and beach with their fire, and the immediate point
where the landing was to be, maintaining the fire until
the men had gone ashore. At ten o'clock came the com-
panies of grenadiers ; and at half past eleven the command-
ing general, Don Manuel Montiano; the second in com-
mand, Don Francisco Rubiani ; and the Chief of Staff and
Engineer-in-Chief' Don Antonio Arredondo. At this time
there must have been ashore about a thousand men who,
as they continued to arrive, formed up, as already stated.
Between ten and twelve, we saw a few fires started by the
enemy, which as far as we could make out, seemed to be
three bilanders and something else larger. From the great
blaze which arose, we thought this last must be some pow-
der magazine which they had blown up. At this hour,,
came the Indians who had been sent out to reconnoiter.
These declared that they had entered a few houses at some
distance from the fort but had found them unoccupied;
they brought back with them a few trifles, such as dishes
and fruit. Nothing especial occurred this night, nor did
we undertake any movement, nor did we observe anything
else on the part of the enemy, than what has already been
set forth. This disembarkation continued until daylight.

July 17th.

At two, we sent out the Indians again. They returned at
four, with the news that the enemy had abandoned the fort
and bringing back with them a few weapons and some mer-
chandise from a bilander, which the enemy had left loaded
with supplies of some value. The companies of grenadiers
were now sent out to occupy the said fort, and at six o'clock
the entire body took up the march along the beach where
we recognized the three bilanders that had been burnt,
whose cargo must have consisted of flour and meat, be-
cause we found many barrels on the beach. These stores
however profited but few, for in their keen desire to find
stuff of any value whatever, the Indians had spoiled them ;
recognizing that the same thing had happened to the armed
bilander at the hands of the said Indians as well as of
the sailors who had sacked it, an officer was detached with
a guard to preserve whatever he could, and orders were
given to the agent of the exchequer to make an inventory

Chart for tlu- Miilr;iiu\'
(i:ialc|uiiii. River of Saint Sim
iMii- in north hitituih- M

l.cijcnd
A. t'hatnu'l h'.ulint; o\ rr the h;

c

its depth in fathom 2* (Unii

ishcs to 3 at half tide.
JV SottlemciU fortiliod hy ;i li;

tcry of 16 guns, 8-pouncltM i,

and 1 1 liouscs of hoards ui \

palms, called Fort Krodcric L
(. The River of Saint Sinn n

leading to the town of l-'re |.

erica.
] ), Careening ground. |

J.; ** Koad joinin.i;- tlu- sittij

ment and careening groii
] I'. Tidal inlets.
(I. River leading to the Bar it'

Whales,
1 I. Inland of Saint Sinmn.
1.. Ishmd of Sparrow ll.iwk- ot

of Whales.
M. Sawmill of the hji^H^li
NX. Water, good hut turhid.
< >. Look out made of logs. .
1'. I'.akery. |

* This S) inhol h.is delird inl
pretation; it does not appe.ii
the chart.

The letter V. does not api'.i
on the chart ; prol, ' ' 'hi
lopyi.st's error.

This m:'.]) is one-foni ''

a tracing of the origin.' 1 nia;i ii
llie Spanish .\rchi\-es at Srvill.

/.iXntd of t/ic Sca!(-

Scale

o 50 f>

I Toises.

Duplicate. Havana, M.i

Don .\ntonio de .\n. <'. nd"

This map rcpriMlcici-il from llii' nri-aiMl in II
possi.-ssit)ii ,)f \V. .1. lii'Kcniie, Woniisl,

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 71

of whatever should be found. Similarly, on finding that
the schooner and man-of-war had succeeded in escaping
during the night, the naval commander, Don Antonio Cas-
taiieda placed the captain of the galley, Don Domingo de la
Cron, under arrest, for having failed to execute the order
given him to approach the man-of-war as soon as the land-
ing should have taken place, and fire upon him during the
rest of the night in order to prevent his escape. We found
on the beach an Englishman badly wounded in the back by
a gunshot, who said that he was the captain of the bilander
that had a cargo. He declared that Obletorp had retired
to Frederica with five hundred men and that he himself
could give no account of Frederica because he had never
been there, since it was only a few days since he anchored
in Gualquini. This prisoner was sent on board the hospital
ship to be cured.

The troops had now got up to the fort and orders were
given to reach the northern entrance by marching under
the cover of some tall and thick live oaks found here and
also of the plantations or settlements of neat houses which
surround the neighborhood. The soldiers were forbid-
den under pain of death to go more than two hundred paces
beyond their posts. Inside the fort, we found another
Englishman, a sailor, who could give no more account of
things than the wounded man. We also found another
man dead, killed by our Indians, who, according to their
custom, had scalped him. These declared that they had
done this because he had resisted them with his sword.
The fort is made wholly of earth, composed of four cur-
tains, with a salient in the midst of each. It has a ditch
and a good stockade with a glacis, and on the glacis, joined
to the stockade, a parapet of barrels filled with earth.
There were besides a few huts and some large magazines,
one of which had been blown up, for we came upon three
burnt eighteen-pounders, imperfectly spiked, whose car-
riages were of such especial construction and so well de-
signed that two men sufficed to maneuver them ; one of
these had been dismounted by a cannon shot from one of
our vessels. We also found six six-pounders, five of
which had been imperfectly spiked, and one left unspiked ;
and inside of a budge-barrel 190 loaded handgrenades, and
a number of musket balls ; among the remains of the mag-
azines that had been burnt, we found various kinds of iron
wares, shovels, picks and some barrel hoops.

72 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

From the fort to a block house, which is at the entrance
of the harbor, there is a level stretch of country, more or
less elevated, v/hich commands and looks out on the beach,
and the rim or entrance of the woods. This stretch could
contain eight or ten thousand men. Here we found six
lines of houses in the form of a camp ; among these were
sixty distant only one pace from one another. These we
were able to save, because we succeeded in preventing dis-
order on the part of the soldiers who, without having re-
ceived orders to that effect, had set fire to sixty other
houses along the lines just spoken of and to four magazines
of supplies. The block house is made of earth with a body
of oyster shell, whitewashed and resembling stone work.
It is composed of two curtains, and of an arc of circle on
the side which overlooks the entrance of the port. In it
we found a shell mortar, nine burnt-out handgrenades, a
magazine and some huts, in whose remains we found a
few grenades, bullets and other ammunition. Beyond this
house, at a short distance and in front of it, had been con-
structed a battery. This battery overlooked the entrance
of the port and mounted six guns, left unspiked, four six-
pounders and two four-pounders. In the sack of the
houses, of the camp and of the plantations, there had been
some disorder, as is usually the case on these occasions, in
consequence of which we lost some cattle and goats and
considerable quantities of rich wines, oils, beer, fine but-
ter, cheeses and other delicacies, to say nothing of a great
supply of hard tack, salt meat and flour. These, which
had been all burnt, might have been very useful for our
maintenance. We continued our march to the terrain be-
tween the two forts where we took up a formation in the
shape of a hammer, sending from this point two guards,
one to each fort ; and having announced to the troops that
whenever there was a call-to-arms, the site just mentioned
should be the assembling point, orders were given to re-
turn to the sixty houses which we had found in the camp.

July 18th.

At six in the morning, Don Sebastian Sanchez, with one
of the companies of the garrison of St, Augustine and a
picket of forty men was sent out to reconnoiter the road
to the careening ground, as he was considered well fitted
idt this duty. Similarly Don Nicholas Herndndez with
twenty-five men of his company and the forty Indian

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 73

scouts,* was dispatched along- the road through the coun-
try to Frederica, the purpose being to select, according
to the infc)rmation they should bring back, the best direc-
tion in which to attack that town.

At 8 o'clock we found a dragoon dead at the edge of the
woods, and some other people who were accustomed to use
in these parts, brought the news of having found one of
our Indians dead. As some hostile Indians also brought in
this news, and we ourselves heard shots fired in the wood,
the troops stood to arms and orders were given to send
out two pickets as outposts. At ten o'clock, came a sol-
dier sent by Don Sebastian Sanchez with the report that
he had found a very narrow trail, and that Don Antonio
Barba, who was in command of the reconnoitering party
had succeeded in going, say two leagues, and that nearly
the entire trail was nothing but a path passing through
thick woods, leading at intervals into a few savannahs or
clearings of a swampy nature, and going across on a cause-
way made of brush wood no wider than the trail ; that
thus, no formation whatever was possible nor any manner
of march than single file because any one leaving the
brush wood would be mired ; and he reported further that
two miquelets** and a corporal with two Indians whom they
had found and carried on with them, and four grenadiers,
had noticed on the path something novel, consisting of a
cut-log stockade, and also here and there some brush wood
arranged like a parapet, none of which they had observed
before. He, therefore, halted to reconnoiter the place, and
at the same time they began to fire on him from the right
and the left without his being able to see anything more
than the flash of discharge. This fire he undertook to re-
turn for more than one hour without knowing whom he
was engaged with because of the thickness of the forest.
He continued firing until he had used up all his ammunition
and then retired in good order, so as not to have his retreat
cut oft", seeing that the ground gave all the advantage to
the enemy. In this action, the two companies lost seven
men killed and eleven wounded ; among the killed, the
ensign of the company of Havana, Don Miguel Rucardi.
The militia suffered no loss, because they formed the rear
guard, which was not reached by the fire of the enemy.

Desplay adores, the word is not found In the dictionaries.

According to Spanish authorities, the miquolet is the ancestor of the
modern scout.

74 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

On receiving this news, the troops stood to arms and con-
tinued from this night to sleep on them in hammer-like for-
mation. Two other advance outposts were turned out and
their reserves indicated for each one.

On this day, we noticed a few pirogues going about with
people of the island on board. They were waiting to pass
through the channel that goes to Frederica. We sent out
a little boat with six sailors through this channel to get
water, but they were all killed by hostile Indians.

July 19th.

At six, the Indians were sent out to reconnoiter the for-
est and to see if they could find some other road through
it to Frederica. At 9:00 we sent out a small boat with
eight men to obtain water in a lagoon at a short distance
from the shore and on the edge of the woods and not more
than half a cannon shot from our camp. Two of these
men were killed by hostile Indians and the remainder fled
precipitately to our camp. The sailors who were on the
shore withdrew when they heard the shots so close, where-
upon we beat to arms and sent out two pickets, one of
grenadiers along the beach, and the other through the
woods. We also gave an order to the galley to come up
close and fire on them. But all these orders were at once
cancelled because the Indians had already withdrawn. At
12:00 our people returned without having discovered any
other road than the narrow one, and without having seen
any enemy. Having heard that pirogues of the Island
of Frederica had been seen plying back and forth, Indians
were sent out, who returned saying that there were no
people in it, and that they had burnt houses which they
had entered and took to be hospitals, because there were
many beds and mattresses and a few saddles which they
brought back. During the entire day eight or ten re-
turned, miquelets, and a few wounded from the picket
of Sdnchez, besides a few disabled by the rough character
of the woods ; and also a few Indians who had been missing,
but not one of whom had suffered any harm because they
returned in complete health. All announced that they
had seen Captain Sanchez beaten with blows and taken
prisoner: that they knew nothing of the captain of the
miquelets, Herndndez.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 75

July 20th.

At 2 :00 in the morning, the captain of miquelets, Don
Nicholas Hernrmdez, came to our camp ; confirming the in-
formation just given, he declared that he had tried to
escape from the enemy by leaving the trail and hiding in the
woods, but that in a short time he ran into two men who
made him prisoner, but that he had succeeded in freeing
himself from them because he recognized that they were
somewhat careless, and the hope inspired by this, gave
such an impulse to his valor that he succeeded in carrying
out the extreme resolution of killing them both. At 6:00
we sent out the Indians to reconnoiter the woods and to
find some other road to Frederica. We began to demolish
the forts and to carry their guns on board, and considering
the serious inconveniences resulting from not having com-
pleted our water supply through the risk to which it ex-
posed our people, and that we had no buckets in the neigh-
borhood of the camp or the castles, for which reason we
had lost eight men, we determined to make a sufficient
number to give a supply to all in the ditch of the fort ; and
so we have begun to complete our water supply.

At 8 :00 o'clock, there took place a junta, at which were
present Don Antonio de Castaneda, the captains of the
grenadiers and of miquelets, to consider certain facts, such
as the position of the trail and the dififiiculties of the for-
ests. In view of the fact that they had decided, and
especially the captain of miquelets, who understands wood-
craft, that another road ought to be found, before un-
dertaking to attack Frederica, and as all agreed that none
other had been found, except the narrow one, and that an
attack along this line was impracticable, it was decided
to send the galley and the galliots on a reconnaissance
through the channel that leads to Frederica, to see how
much depth of water it held, and to find a point more suit-
ed for the disembarkation, and further that the engineer
from St. Augustine should go out on this business.

At two of the afternoon there arrived at this port a
schooner and one launch with one hundred men of the
pickets of St. Augustine. These had been separated from
the convoy by bad weather. As many as fifteen vessels
had come together; among them, the four galliots under
the command of the naval ensign, Don Francisco Pineda.
He had arrived within sight of this port, and not meeting
any of our vessels, which had within twenty-four hours

76' THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

been sent off by the staff officer who happened to be in
command of that post,* he had considered it proper to main-
tain himself in those waters and await news of the arrival
of our convoy at Gualquini. On seeing that this news was
delayed, he determined to send on the vessels already men-
tioned,** to notify the commanding general of all these
matters, and that in passing he had engaged Fort San
Pedro for one hour; and that one of his galliots had been
attacked by four large pirogues filled with troops, one of
which he had sunk near the shore where her people suc-
ceeded in saving themselves.

At 4:00 of the afternoon the entire body of troops formed
up for a review which was over at 6:00, when we posted
anew the usual guards in the form which has always pre-
vailed, namely, that of a hammer. At prayers we saw out
on the beach in the neighborhood of the fort a few Indians,
wherefore we strengthened its guard and marched out
the supports to re-enforce the outposts ; our Indians sallied
to explore but returned in two hours without having met
anybody. During this night, there were two false alarms
so that the entire body remained under arms.

July 21st.

At 5 :00 in the morning, we began to entrench the out-
posts with barrels of earth on account of the repeated false
alarms which kept the troops continuously anxious and
because our camp had no protection whatever nor artil-
lery. This had not been put ashore because we were await-
ing from one day to another the arrangements to be made
to march on Frederica. At 6:00 we sent out the Indians
to explore the forests and at the same time we sent out a
launch toward the Bar of Whales, ordering the naval ensign
Don Francisco de Pineda to proceed by the interior chan-
nel, sounding the passes as far as that port. The com-
manding general had approved his conduct in the operations
which he reported having undertaken with the convoy
under his orders.

What post Is meant, there is no means of determining'. The original
passage is more or less obscure in its references. The vessels mentioned
are those reported, ante under date of the 3d, as being compelled to seek
shelter under the coast.

TTie schooner and launch.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA V

At 4:00 in the afternoon, the galley and the galliots re-
turned from a reconnaissance of the passes leading to Fred-
erica. These had gone out in the morning under the or-
ders of Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein. He de-
clared that the channel contained enough water for all the
boats, but that at a little more than half tide, the least depth
he had found was 20 spans, the three vessels entering on
the same front ; that on arriving within cannon shot of
Frederica they opened on him, apparently with four guns,
eight-pounders, and fired 18 shots, all of which passed over
his head, and four bombs so well aimed that they fell very
close ; that there is a stretch to be reached only by passing
within cannon range, but that beyond they would be shel-
tered from fire, in a stretch of pine woods, clear, open, and
level, large enough for the formation of a far greater num-
ber of troops than ours ; but that he was in doubt whether
the beach was firm enough for a landing because grass
land was seen everywhere, and that because in this, quak-
ing grass is usually found; that he was unable to examine
into this matter because he noticed that a number of troops
had passed in pirogues to the shore of the island and that
they could have done him much harm by musketry fire,
especially as he had received orders not to open fire him-
self. Our Indians returned without finding anything in
the woods, having been unable to catch a prisoner or a de-
serter who could give us any light or any help toward
forming any plans for the attack on Frederica with the
accuracy that is desirable.

July 22nd.

Our Indians sallied forth at 6 :00 in the morning to re-
connoiter the woods, according to daily custom. As doubt
exists in our minds in respect of the firmness of the ground
for the landing in the channels, we determined again to
send out the galley and two galliots for the determination
of this matter. The commanding general turned this mat-
ter over to the senior naval ofificer, Don Antonio Castaileda
for the next day.

During the morning there came in a miquelet. whose
declaration confirms the others: thirty-six men being
missing so far of the two pickets ol Sanchez and Herndn-
dez. This man told us that he had come along the beach,
outside of the port, and that at a short distance from the
entrance he found a trench with three loaded six-pounder

78 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

guns ready to spike and that he thought this battery had
been put up through fear lest we should disembark out-
side. This day we had no false alarm, nor did anything
special occur. The Indians returned like all the rest with-
out having accomplished anything whatever, but we should
not be astonished that they should refuse to expose them-
selves, seeing that they are rich, for a few have more than
six hundred dollars worth of loot. These are the only
people who have succeeded in getting anything, being the
first ones to engage in loot.

July 23d.

The junta or council appointed for the day did not take
place because Don Antonio Castaileda was sick and it was
put off until the following day. Today there was nothing
especial. We continued demolishing the forts.

July 24th.
At 2:00 in the morning we were informed by our out-
posts that they had heard four shots and at once we heard
in our camp the noise of drums, for which reason our peo-
ple stood to arms and we re-enforced the outposts. At
3 :00 there came into our camp a deserter, a prisoner, of the
French nation, who declared that Obletorpe had been
marching the entire niglit with 500 men with the design of
surprising us, and that having heard the shots which put
our camp on its guard, he thought that he was discovered
and therefore withdrew, beating his drums. During this
time, the deserter succeeded in making his escape. He
also told how he had been compelled to take arms and
that the five hundred men were made up of two hundred
regular troops, two hundred militia, fifty Indians and fifty
sailors ; that he believed that the entire force in Frederica
amounted to from nine hundred to one thousand men, and
that help was expected from Boston, from which news
had been received; that he [Oglethorpe] had sent all the
women fifty leagues inland, and that in the affair with our
two pickets, he had taken about twelve prisoners, among
them. Captain St'inchez. At 8:00 in the morning, this
prisoner was sent on board the Penelope. At the same
time Don Antonio Arredondo held a conference with Don
Antonio Castaiieda on this news and to propose action that
could be most rapidly taken, after all our vessels should
have taken on their water.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 79

Between 12 :00 o'clock and 1 :00 of this day, one or our
outposts reported that five vessels had been seen to the
north, apparently headed for the port. In a short time,
we could make them out and having taken account of their
build, seeing that they were only two or three leagues
off, we saw that one was a frigate of thirty guns, and that
there were two packet boats, a brigantine and a sloop.
This, together with the occurrence of the morning (al-
though this, like the arrival of the French prisoner and his
declarations, was considered an artifice), caused us to fear
not so much what Avas involved, nor the vessels in sight,
as the vessels which might follow in greater force. These
reflections were held to justify our resolution to withdraw,
which was forthwith carried out in the best form and order
possible. After having collected everything in the camp
without leaving anything that had been disembarked, the
commanding officers were taken in the galliots to the
Island, named after the castle, facing Gualquini, the
Penelope having been the first to cross after collecting
her crew ; the plan was to journey to the interior chan-
nels over the bars of San Pedro and San Juan to Florida,
demolishing on the way the forts of Bajeses and San
Pedro. Orders were consequently given the troops
to disembark and march two leagues in order to ar-
rive in front of the castle or fort of Bajeses, and to all
the small boats to pass through the said channels as soon
as the tide should permit, in order to cross over the troops
to the said fort which was situated on another island in
front; but because the orders were misunderstood, some
confusion resulted, for some entire pickets and a few scat-
tered men not having come up with any boats, followed the
convoy of Casteiaeda. About fifteen hundred men remain-
ed this night on the island in question.

The naval commander Don Antonio CastaCeda ordered
the galley to approach the shore and endeavor, if it could
do so without exposing its crew, to put its small boat over-
board for the purpose of spiking the two guns lying on the
shore and to burn certain houses if it were decided there
were no enemies in the camp. This was done, for we saw
them burning, as we did some hostile boats which could
not be manned. Don Adrian Cantein carried these orders
out. At the same time this commander made his disposi-
tions for receiving the enemy, drawing up his strong ves-
sels in line and withdrawing more to the interior of the

80 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

port those that were unarmed. He had determined to set
out with the tide on the following day if the weather per-
mitted, to attack the enemy's ships outside in case they had
not first come in themselves. At sunset we saw them
standing for the outside and it was in this state that we
left the houses of Gualquini at the time of our withdrawal.

July 24th.

At 3 :00 in the morning, the troops took up the march and
continued along the beach until 7 o'clock, when we began to
make out a few of our vessels, for which reason we halted
in order to wait for all of them, because now we could see
that they were at anchor solely to wait for the slight tide.
At about four of the afternoon a schooner having come up,
the company of grenadiers of the battalion of Havana went
on board of her with the Indians in order to cross over to
the fort of Bajeses which was considered to be abandoned
by the enemy, so that having taken possession of it, all
disorder should be prevented, and the place preserved with
its magazmes until the entire body of troops could be
brought up, and other directions should be given. At
about 6 :00 of the evening, the vessels which had been at
anchor moved up, excepting those of Truxillo, Oyarbidos,
and Camejo. These, on account of their size, and of the
stores they had aboard, the last one carrying the guns and
mortars of the enemy, drew too much water, for which
reason they were compelled to take up their course out-
side. This was verified by the adjutant Don Albaro, who
on account of the anxiety caused by this matter, was sent
out to determine the reason why the said boats held back.
He returned with the information that he had seen them
all put out with the vessels under the command of Don
Antonio Castafieda, the last one being the packet boat of
the king, for which reason and because it had seen a few
hostile people on the beach, it fired a few shots. We began
to embark the troops, but could not finish because night had,
fallen.

July 26th.

We continued embarking the troops until 6:00 in the
morning, when they were all on board. We waited at this
hour until the four galliots, under command of Naval En-
sign Don Francisco de Pineda, should join the whole col-
lection of our vessels; and having noticed the absence of

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 8J

the remainder of his convoy, we learned that they had with-
drawn with the troops they had on board to Florida, by an
order which they had to this purpose from the general and
which was dispatched in his own launch from Gualquini.
Proceeding thus to the Fort of Bajeses, we arrived at 8 :00
in the morning and anchored, and at one and the same time
all the troops began to go ashore in as good order as was
permitted by the nature of the ground. We found the fort
abandoned and containing only a few things, such as a
four-pounder gun spiked, two swivel guns unspiked, fifty
handgrenades, six empty jars and number of iron hoops.
The fort is situated upon an eminence which commands
the entire beach and has no other fortification than that
afforded by a dense girdle of lofty and large pines and the
superiority of its position. Within this enclosure was a
house of limited accommodation and in an angle an under-
ground room which appeared to be a powder magazine ;
about one hundred paces beyond this circle were three
houses at a short distance one from the other, the largest
of which, from its construction seemed to be a storehouse ;
the next one vv^as a stable because it was surrounded by a
fence inside of which we found fifty to sixty horses. These
at first we thought we would take on to Florida with us.
but as we had no means of doing so, an order was given
that they should be immediately killed in order that our
enemies might have a taste of the same treatment to which
they had subjected us in Florida. At this very moment,
however, this order was suspended until we should begin
our march. The third house was immediately at the land-
ing which showed that it was either a tavern or a low eat-
ing house. Our commanding officers took for their head-
quarters the house in the fort, leaving the others for the
other officers. The troops went into camp at a distance
of about two hundred paces from the fort in an open pine
grove on level ground and more or less shady on account
of the thick pines growing there. There seemed to be an
abundance of water with which the men refreshed them-
selves ; they managed to resist the scarcity of food from
which they sufifered on this day until the afternoon, for it
occurred to some of the men to obtain relief by killing a
few horses and eating their flesh. In the afternoon an issue
was ordered of a little rice and of one hard tack apiece
and at the same time a return was asked of the stores which
were actually on board in the boats with us. This was

82 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

all the more easy to make from the fact that the stores on
hand permitted us to subsist for the space of eight days
and no more, because the boats that carried the reserve
stores were no longer within reach. This being the state
of affairs, orders were given to man the boats in propor-
tion to their burden and naturally the issue of rations fol-
lowed suit.

July 27th.

At 4 :00 of the afternoon we remarked in the direction of
the entrance of the Bay of Whales, three pirogues and one
launch or canoe, passing from one side to the other as
though they were carrying troops ; for which reason Don
Antonio Arredondo proposed that the galliots should go
out to stop them, and that the Indians should be put ashore
to cut off the advance of any people who might be coming
to the help of those who were in the fort of San Pedro ; for,
according to the information received from the galliots, it
was known that the said castle was garrisoned, since it
had fired on them the night before. But the General would
not consent to this and therefore this action was not taken,
but instead the order was given at about 5 :00 in the after-
noon for the troops to go on board. This operation was
begun and carried on until three or four pickets had em-
barked; when the order was suspended and another one
issued that everybody should march and take up a forma-
tion near the fort, where we remained all night.

July 28th.

At dawn, the pirogues or schooners which had brought
about the resolution to embark on the day before, again be-
gan to reconnoiter and for the same cause on this day we
hastened a fresh embarkation, so that at about 9 :00 o'clock
we were all on board. At this hour we provided for the
security of our vessels by the following disposition : the
sloops and large schooners were to sail outside under the
orders of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio de Salgado ; and
the galliots, with the remaining vessels and a number of the
little boats, should proceed by interior channels to the Bar
of the St. Johns River. With these were to go the Com-
manding General, Don Francisco Rubiani, and the Chief-
of-Staff and Engineer-in-Chief, Don Antonio Arredondo,
because it had been provided in advance that horses from
Florida should join the detachment at the mouth of the

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 83

St. Johns River and in this way facilitate the return of the
said gentlemen and officers to the garrison of St. Augustine,
Florida. The time now having come to separate the ves-
sels into these two classes, Don Antonio Salgado pointed
out that inasmuch as his vessels were of no military-
strength, it would be proper that the galliots should con-
voy him out beyond the bar of the Bay of Whales but this
suggestion raised considerable opposition, in which Don
Antonio Arredondo took the lead, showing over and over
again what inconvenience this course would cause the
General, who, his mind now being made up, ordered the
galliots to proceed to the point mentioned in accordance
with the plan of embarkation, and that he was only waiting
on them before setting out himself, and so Don Antonio
Salgado put out with his convoy and succeeded in crossing
the bar without having met the hostile vessels, of which
he was so fearful, and the galliots returned to join the gen-
tral. The wind fell at half past six and the convoy anchored
about a league outside the bar.

July 29th.

At four o'clock in the morning, we hoisted anchor, the
land breeze blowing, and at 9 :00 o'clock, found ourselves
in front of the entrance of the Bar of San Pedro and about
two leagues ofif ; at 10 :00 having gone about one league more
from the said mouth and at a distance slightly more than
three from the fort, we began to hear a few cannon shots
and remarked that these were answered by a few vessels
which we could not see because they were hidden by the
land. The number of rounds rose to more than seventy
and we heard besides a few discharges of musketry, lasting
for an hour. We then saw a few boats coming out, which
from their bearing left no doubt in our minds that they
were the convoy of our general. Nothing unusual occurred
in the journey to the Bar of the St. Johns where we
anchored because the wind had fallen.

July 30th.

At 2:00 o'clock in the morning we hoisted anchor with
the wind fresh from the east-northeast. At noon we found
out that we had slipped by St. Augustine six leagues and
were now, thanks to a heavy squall, separated from the
convoy. The currents too were now carrying us with
great force to the south, so that it would have caused us

84 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

much effort to return to the said bar. Moreover, it was
agreed by the captain and officers of this sloop, whose name
was El Canto, that it was perfectly clear that the weather
was such as would greatly help us to continue our voyage
to the Port of Havana. This course, too, would be useful
to the service of the King, because the general and other
officers of high rank had been heard to say with respect to
the remaining vessels that it would be of advantage to
send them on as rapidly as possible on account of the disad-
vantage that would result from any other course, because
St. Augustine with so many people within its limits would
be called upon to make a great expenditure of stores and
that it would be impossible to revictual it, considering that
it would be necessary in the weather prevailing to send
stores for thirty days. And even if the vessels should find
it impossible to make the journey, a report would be given
to the Governor of Havana so that he could himself issue
the necessary orders in the case. Having considered all
these things, and the fact that the campaign was over, and
that we had a sufficiency of stores on board for returning
the troops with which we had come out, we unanimously
agreed upon the said resolution of returning straight to
Havana. On this day we saw a sloop astern following in
our wake, for which reason we thought it must belong to
the convoy.

July 31st.

At 12 :00 o'clock, noon, we arrived off the Bar of Mosquito
Inlet and skirting the coast with but little wind, we
anchored at night because it had fallen calm.

August 1st.

At 4:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor, with the wind to the
east-southeast. Upon its veering to the southeast and
falling almost a dead calm, we anchored at 6:00 o'clock
in the afternoon at about six leagues from the Canaveral
Channel.

August 2nd.

At 2:00 o'clock we set out with the wind northeast and
light. We passed the Canaveral Channel at noon and the
wind falling, we anchored, having rounded the Real de la
Almiranta de Chebes and being about two leagues to the
windward of the River of Ys.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 83

August 3d.

At 4:00 we set out with the wind east-northeast and at
9 :00 o'clock rounded Casacho and anchored at 6 :00 by-
reason of a calm.

August 4th.
At 4:00 o'clock we set out with the wind east-northeast
and at 12:00 rounded Ropa tendida. At about 6:00 of the
afternoon the wind shifted to the east-southeast, and so
stood fresh all night but we made no progress because of
the force of the currents and so anchored.

August 5th.
At 7 :00 we turned the Inlet of Sober and at 6 :00 in the
afternoon were off Sega, having kept the wind all day east-
southeast. At 6 :00 o'clock in the morning we descried a
frigate off our bow at a distance of three leagues, and, like
us, at anchor through lack of wind. At 11 :00 we hoisted an-
chor with the wind east-northeast and fresh, and coming
up at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to within less than one
league we showed this frigate our colors, confirming it by
a gun shot, in the belief that she must belong to our con-
voy because she had followed the same course as we, close
in shore. It appeared to us to be the little frigate of the
company commanded by Pablo Rodriguez, but as she
refused to show us her colors we continued on our voyage,
leaving her at sunset astern.

August 6th.
At dawn, it was calm ; we had not gained more than one
league during the past night on account of the great
strength of the currents. We remained at anchor this en-
tire day and night through lack of wind. We employed a
part of this day in taking on water from a lagoon close by.

August 7th.
The calms and contrary winds continuing we remained
at anchor this entire day and night.

August 8th.
At 3 :00 we hoisted our anchor with the wind east-north-
east which we kept until night when, because it fell off, we
anchored at the Banda del S. R. of the Rio Seco, one
league.

86 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

August 9th.

At 2:00 in the morning we hoisted our anchor with the
wind northeast and at 6 :00 passed Ratones inlet ; and at 10
anchored at the inlet to the north of Biscayne Key.

August 10th.

At 5 :00 of the morning we hoisted anchor with the wind
east. We passed Biscayne Key, the Candiles de la Parida,
the Candiles de las Mascaras, the shoal de las Mdscaras,.
the first Canaleja of Long Key, the Playuelas, the shoal of
las Tetas with its inlets, Escribano Key, and anchored near
Melchior Rodriguez at 10 of the night.

August 11th.

At 5:00 o'clock we hoisted anchor with the wind east,
passed Tabanos Key, the inlets of Guimero, Old Matacumbl
and Young Matacumbi, Biboras Key, Bascas Key, and at
10 of the night anchored in Bahia Honda.

August 12th.

At 5 we hoisted anchor, wind east; passed Caguamas-
Point, and Boca chica, and anchored at 4 of the afternoon
in Key West.

August 13th.

We stayed here all day, anchored at night because of
squalls.

August 14th.

Hoisted at 2 of the morning, and anchored about a half
league out in Key West Channel. Hoisted anchor at 5:30,
wind N. N. E. and put out through the small channel of
Key West. Proceeding thus, at 10 the wind shifted to the
north, at 5 :30 to N. E., at 8 of the morning to E. W. and so
held until 12 when it veered to the S. S. O. where it held all
day, our course being S. E.

August 15th.

At six we made out the range of Camarioca; when about
6 leagues to leeward of them, the wind shifted to the E. S.
E., and with our head to the south, at 5 of the afternoon we
reached Bacuniaga, 5 leagues to leeward of Matanzas.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA ' 87

August 16th.

Dawn found us in Jaruco Inlet, 8 leagues to leeward of
Havana, in which harbor we anchored at 2 :30 of the after-
noon.

[ End of Casinas' Journal.]

aB THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

MONTIANO'S OWN REPORT.

Sir,

I transmit the report herewith, to the end that your Lord-
ship place it in the hands of the Royal and Supreme Coun-
cil of these Indies for their information.

Your Lordship holds me in faithful unalterable affection,
always at your command, and praying Our Lord to keep
Your Lordship many years.

Saint Augustine, in Florida, 3 August, 1742.

Don Manuel de Montiano, your most obedient servant,
kisses your Lordship's hand.

To

Don Fernando Trivino.

Letter of Montiano to the King.
Sin-
In a letter of October 31st of the past year, Don Jos6 del
Campillo advised me that Your Majesty had resolved upon
the formation in Havana of an expedition to lay waste Caro-
lina and its dependencies, and that he was communicating
this news to me by command of Your Majesty, to the end
that I might give Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco
de Guemes y Horcasitas, Governor of Havana, all the infor-
mation that I might have and that might conduce to the
happy issue of these royal instructions. These, I obeyed
with all the promptness demanded, and posted the results
to the aforesaid Lieutenant General Governor of Havana,
offering myself for any duty in the Royal Service that he
might see fit to give me. In consequence he informed me
in a letter of May 14, brought by an officer of that garrison
[Havana] in a small boat, that he had selected me for the
command of the expedition, sending me at the same time
the particular charges and directions for the best advantage
of Your Majesty's Service. He informed me that the

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 89

expedition was ready to put to sea, and that, although a
secret council he had called of the senior officers of both
Services in Havana, as well as of those of the squadron under
the orders of Lieutenant General Don Rodrigo de Torres,
had declared impracticable the royal intention and will of
Your Majesty through lack of sufficient naval forces, yet it
was agreed that at the right time some operation should
be set afoot against Georgia, to indemnify us in part for
the insults and perfidies attempted and committed to the
injury of these Provinces, and of Your Majesty's indispen-
sable right to them.

The convoy of ten small vessels manned by a few mili-
tiamen and escorted by a galley, sent in advance by the
aforesaid Lieutenant General, fell in on June 6th with an
English coastguard man-of-war of 24 guns, which with
its artillery, launch, and boats, attacked a few of our
vessels beforementioned. And as our galley could not go
to the help of all of these, they presently found themselves
in danger so great, that two of them were compelled to run
ashore, one of them having lost a lieutenant of artillery and
a corporal killed, and had a lieutenant of militia wounded.
One of their boats tried to board a sloop of ours aground,
but our troops that were on shore began to fire and so
forced the crew of the English boat to ask for quarter.
We thus captured one officer and 18 sailors.

On the 15th of the aforesaid month the entire expedition
arrived safely of? this bar [that of Saint Augustine] under
the command of Colonel Don Francisco Rubiani. But on ac-
count of the scarcity of water, and because of the fierce
squalls and strong winds which did us some damage, and
wrecked a launch, drowning a chaplain and some sailors, I
was unable to leave this port [Saint Augustine] before the
23rd of the month ; and as on that very day the wind blew
hard out of the northeast, I delayed my departure until July
1st, when I put to sea with all the vessels of the Expedition.
I laid my course for Georgia, and reached its neighborhod
on the 2d, when a furious storm beyond any human power
to resist, overtook us from the southwest and scattered
us all. We remained dispersed many days. The greater
part of the fleet having reassembled (except 4 galliots, 4
pirogues, 2 schooners, 2 launches and 1 small boat), we
.anchored on the 10th in sight of the port of Gualquini, where
we remained, unable to close in by reason of the contrary
winds, until the 16th, when we gloriously forced the port,

90 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

with no greater loss than 5 men, against resistance by sea,
and land in succession.

At the entrance of the harbor was constructed a fort of
sod with brick parapets, in the shape of a horseshoe, con-
taining a bronze shell mortar, and five for smaller shells.*
It had in its neighborhood a large trench mounting 3 guns
to sweep the entrance. At a distance of two musket shots,
and to the west, was another fort, of square trace, with four
bastions, one in the middle of each curtain, constructed of
heavy timbers and of earth, and having a ditch one toise**
and a half wide and four feet deep. On its parapet were a
few rows of barrels filled with earth, and planted with
thorns, to serve as a parapet. Along the interior ran a
stockaded covered way to prevent a surprise, on which
were mounted 7 guns, 3 of them 18-pounders and six gren-
ade-mortars. Between the first and this second fort they
had constructed a strong trench mounting 5 guns: to the
west of these works was yet another large trench of circular
form, whose purpose it was to annoy us by musketry.

Within this harbor between the forts mentioned were sta-
tioned a 24-gun frigate, a schooner of 14, then a bilander
of 10 guns. Behind these came a line of eight bilanders and
schooners well manned to defend the entrance with mus-
ketry; but in spite of all this, we took possession of the
Port and anchored at five of the afternoon.

I immediately gave orders for the disembarkation of the
entire body, in order to allow the enemy no opportunity to
recover from the dismay into which our triumph had thrown
him. This operation was successfully accomplished with-
out resistance. At dawn, I set out with the entire force,
my intention being to advance on the first fort. I first
sent out some Indians to approach and reconnoiter the state
of affairs and movements of the enemy; these having re-
turned and reported having seen no one, the Chief of Staff,
Don Antonio de Arredondo, moved forward to verify the
information, having with him two companies of Grenadiers
which I ordered out to ensure the greater thoroughness of
the reconnaissance, and to determine whether the enemy had
really retired. When this was confirmed, I continued my

Granadas reales, smaller than the bombas, but projectiles of the same
fort.

The toesa {ttiesa in MS.), a measure of length about 6.4 feet.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 91

march to his works which I at once occupied, posting the
necessary guards, and a few pickets on what appeared to be
avenues of approach, in order to check any attack they
might make.

The Indians and grenadiers brought in two prisoners,
who confirmed the flight of General Oglethorpe to the town
of Frederica, distant slightly more than two leagues from
the forts of Gualquini. Although I might have overtaken
him, this step did not appear to be prudent, so long as I
was ignorant of the road and of the ground over which one
should march with full knowledge. Accordingly, as it
seemed to me advantageous to advance on Frederica along
two lines at the same time, I dispatched the captain of one
of the pickets of this post [Saint Augustine], Don Sebastian
Sdnchez with 50 men, as being acquainted with these parts,
to reconnoiter the road leading to the careening ground, at
which point it seemed to me that it might be more advan-
tageous to disembark the artillery.

At the same time I sent the Captain of Miquelets, Don
Nicholas Herndndez, with 25 of his men and 40 Indians, to
examine the road that leads directly to Frederica. It fell
out that Don Sebastian SAnchez lost the trail he was to
follow, and joined the Hernandez party. These two con-
tinued as far as the town, in whose vicinity they were
attacked by a body of English and Indians in a very narrow
defile of the woods. This accident brought on inevitable
disorder, in which we suffered the loss of the two captains
and 11 men captured, 10 men wounded, and 12 killed.
When news of this reached me, I detached three companies
of grenadiers to support our troops and cover their re-
treat; but before the companies of grenadiers could reach
the site of the action, they were attacked themselves by.
another ambuscade surrounding a swamp, over which the
path gave passage only in single file. The Captains of
Grenadiers, realizing, if they continued their efforts, that
no advantage was to be gained save the sacrifice of their
troops, through the impossibility of seeing who was firing
on them, or of taking up any formation by reason of the
nature of the ground, prudently resolved to withdraw in as
good order as possible, with the loss of Don Miguel Bucareli
and 6 grenadiers, who were killed.

The Captain of Miquelets, Don Nicholas Hernandez, tak-
ing advantage of the fact that he had been very insecurely
tied by the two soldiers who were taking him along,.

92 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

succeeded in breaking loose, which the soldiers observed ; on
their endeavoring to make him secure by tying his arms,
he gave them no chance, for like a man of valor and spirit,
he rushed upon one of them and took away his sword, and
with it, its owner's life, and then slew the other, thus earn-
ing his liberty and returning to our camp four days later.
This Captain and some of his soldiers, although born woods-
men (hombres de monte), were so exhausted by the difficul-
ties of the undei^brush, that they thought they would give
up the ghost before coming out on the road.

I now took these matters under serious consideration, as
well as the report of the Captains of Grenadiers and our
Indians, to the effect that the forest was impenetrable be-
cause of its impassable undergrowth, besides being full of
swamps and lagoons. Furthermore, the representations of
Don Antonio de la Atora, agent of the Exchequer, in re-
spect of the consumption of stores, and that those to be
consumed on our withdrawal should receive first thought,
there being barely enough in hand to last to the end of
August, gave me pause.

The tempestuous weather of August and September was
also a fact of no mean weight. I was moreover compelled
to take into account the naval forces then off the coast of
Carolina, superior to ours. Our prisoners declared that it
was commonly known that General Oglethorpe was expect-
ing them. Our delays caused by bad weather, the action
between the man-of-war and our galley and small convoy,
and the fact that we had maintained ourselves on his
coasts, must have convinced the General of our inten-
tion to attack him, and thus have given him time to prepare
his defense. The failure of thirteen vessels, among them
four galliots carrying some troops and all the sappers, to
rejoin the convoy, had caused us supreme embarrassment,
for without these men and the row boats, no operation
was possible ashore or on the rivers within a radius of some-
what more than two leagues. Lastly, I could not overlook
the special injunctions of Lieutenant General Don Francisco
de Guemes y Horcasitas to consider the most important
matter of assuring the withdrawal of the troops, having re-
gard to the notable reduction that had taken place in the
garrisons of both Havana and Saint Augustine.

Having therefore maturely considered all these matters, I
called a council of war composed of the senior officers of
the army, and having laid before them the reasons which

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 93

had led me to assemble then, I asked them to advise what
we should do in the situation that faced us. They answer-
ed that there was in their opinion nothing else better than
to reconnoiter the river leading to the town of Frederica,
and see if there were not some place where the men and
artillery could be conveniently disembarked, in order to
batter the fort and town ; that while this was in hand, the
vessels could continue taking on water, for it was to be
recollected that even if favorable terrain could be found
for the disembarkation, nothing should be undertaken that
would demand more than six days for its execution. The
fact that we had supplies for no later than the end of Au-
gust was of such gravity that we ought to think of nothing
else but to withdraw to our respective garrisons, and thus
avoid the dangers threatened by delay. In consequence
of this advice, the Engineer Don Pedro Ruis de Olano went
out with the galley and the two galliots to make the recon-
naissance agreed upon, and got within musket shot of Fred-
erica, without finding any place suitable to a disembarka-
tion, because the bank of the river is a marsh throughout
its length, and overgrown with grass ; he was unable to
determine whether it was quaking grass or water swamp,
and it was only within cannon range that he thought there
might be a clear place where he thought a landing might
be possible. But on taking into account the well-recogniz-
ed risk of exposing the men to much loss, especially as he
had been unable to determine whether there was a battery
or entrenchment or not, I resolved that it would be disad-
vantageous to undertake an operation so palpably danger-
ous. Nevertheless, I withheld my decision so far as to call
a second council, principally because at dawn of this day
a deserter came into camp, and declared that General Ogle-
thorpe had been marching the entire night with 500 men
to surprise us before dawn. In answer to questions intend-
ed to inform me as to the condition and forces of Ogle-
thorpe- he said they numbered one thousand, half of them
regular troops of his own regiment, and the remainder set-
tlers and Indians, that the town of Frederica was defended
by a battery that commanded the river, and mounting small
guns, some 18-pounders, and mortars of both and large
calibre; and that on the bank of the river near the town
there was a trench in which he could place his men under
cover, and prevent our landing. He continued that another
channel through which our vessels could easily pass was

94 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

defended by a garrisoned mortar battery. He added that
the General was placing his chief trust in the thickness of
the woods and the morasses. He also declared that he
was expecting both men and ships, that the people of Caro-
lina would not be long in appearing, likewise Virginians
and Philadelphians, in as much as he had sent letters in all
directions by reason of the suspicions excited by the affair
of the galley and small convoy off Cape Canaveral, and
confirmed by our long stay on his coasts.

A few hours after the arrival of the deserter, and just as
the second council was about to sit, the outposts on the
shore, and the men in the tops, announced that three cruis-
ers, one bilander and a schooner were approaching the
port. This information compelled me to adjourn the coun-
cil, and to hold one composed only of Colonel Don Fran-
cisco Rubiani, of Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Sal-
gado, and of the Chief of Staff Don Antonio de Arredon-
do. These all agreed that we should bend all our ener-
gies to retreat, that our fear lest Oglethorpe should at-
tack by land while his ships did the same by sea was
normal. I consequently ordered that all the troops should
cross over to the island in front, in order to give our ships
time to prepare, unencumbered, for the defense; and that
the smaller vessels should, while I was marching ashore
with the troops, enter the River of Whales, and await me on
the bar of the same name, where I intended to embark and
go on to the capture and demolition of Fort Saint Andrew.
This was all done ; the fort I found unoccupied, it had one
gun, a 4-pounder, three stone mortars, a few implements,
and a number of horses, which we killed. From this point,
in order to improve the time while the smaller vessels were
completing the task of bringing up the stores that were
lacking, I arranged to detach 200 men ashore to occupy
Fort San Pedro, which the night before had fired on the
four galliots, launches and pirogues separated from us by
the storm, and which had now rejoined ; but as I was with-
out supplies, inasmuch as the vessels that had them on
board, were going outside straight to Florida, I thought
the most rapid transportation possible of the troops to
Saint Augustine, preferable to a delay without provisions.

I consequently commanded all the vessels to pass out by
the Bar of Whales, while I with the 4 galliots, launches and
pirogues took the inside of the river, in order to reconnoiter
the aforesaid Fort San Pedro, and to attend to anything

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 95

that might come up. This done, and notwithstanding the
fire which they opened, and which I ordered the 4 galliots
to return, I continued on my way and reached the River
Saint John, where I went ashore and thence on August 1st,
to this fortress [Saint Augustine] where I found all the
troops carried by the vessels that had gone outside.

During the time in which I abode in camp at Gualquini,
notwithstanding the lack of sappers, I took such measures,
that the troops and militia in detachments destroyed and
razed the castles [i. e., forts] and batteries; that the artil-
lery, mortars, and implements were carried aboard; that
the houses in the country were burned to the number of
thirty, and the planted fields laid waste; and so finished
this business on the last day as regards the remainder of
the settlement, say seventy houses in seven streets, that not
a sign or vestige remained, to show that the place had ever
been settled.

And I did the same sort of thing with the enemy's ves-
sels, excepting two bilanders, which I manned, and put into
our armada, and the war ship, which on the very night we
forced the pass, under favor of the darkness, and of a storm,
succeeding in escaping, in spite of the efforts of Don
Antonio Castaneda to prevent its flight.

I consider that the damage done the English will amount
to between 250,000 and 300.000 pesos. On the day when
I went by land to the Island of Vejeces, the land wind that
was blowing drove off the hostile vessels from the coast,
and also took ours out, for it was the intention, suggested .by
me, of Don Antonio de Castaneda, commander of the Fleet,
to attack the enemy. As he was unable to fmd them how-
ever, he set his course for Havana.

All the officers, both senior and junior, of regular troops
and militia; Don Antonio de Castaneda, and the naval vol-
unteers, have given proof of special zeal and devotion to
the service of Your Majesty; and particularly Colonel Don
Francisco Rubiani, Lieutenant Colonel Don Antonio Saiga-
do, and the Engineer of the Second Class, Don Antonio de
Arredondo, who discharged the functions of Chief of Staff
with incessant toil. For these reasons I recommend them
to the notice of Your Majesty as worthy of distinction.

I do pot know, Sir, whether my conduct of affairs will
meet with the roval approbation of Your Majesty, seeing
that my entire effort has been to discharge the trust com-
mitted to my care with no other end than the ruin of the

96 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

enemies of the Crown, and the honor and glory of the arms
of Your Majesty. These might have been better advanced
had not the All Powerful, who disposes of all things, brought
to naught the plan I had in mind, of sending 3 galliots under
the orders of the Naval Lieutenant Don Adrian Cantein to
the river of Saint Simon, and two to the river of Whales
under the command of the Ensign Don Francisco Pineda,
for the purpose of cutting the enemy's communications and
prevent succor reaching him from the north, agreeably with
the instructions of Lieutenant General Don Juan Francisco
de Guemes y Horcasitas.

Nevertheless, I expect of the royal magnimity of Your
Majesty, that it will deign to regard itself as having been
well served in the operations under question, and that I
shall have the satisfaction of receiving honors from Your
Majesty, whose Catholic royal person I pray our Lord to
preserve as many happy years, as Christendom may need.
Saint Augustine, in Florida. August 3, 1742.
Don Manuel de Montiano.

(flourish.)

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 97

ORDERS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS IN THE

EXPEDITION TO BE UNDERTAKEN AGAINST

THE ENGLISH.

Orders to be observed by the officers of the troops des-
tined for the expedition to be undertaken for the expulsion
of the foreigners that have intruded upon the territories
of His Majesty in the provinces of Saint Augustine in
Florida, under command of Colonel Don Juan Bautista de
Echevarria, appointed as commanding general for its
duration, in respect not only of regular operations, but also
of the orderly conduct of the march.

1. They will obey w^ith the greatest punctuality and ac-
curacy all and any orders whether written or oral, all apply-
ing the most particular attention to discipline, and to the
good condition of the unit committed to their care. When-
ever the case calls for it, they will display the constancy and
fortitude, corresponding to their obligations and to the
honor and glory of the arms of the King.

2. All the small vessels told off to the expedition which
is to pass through the channels, will proceed with the troops
and officers assigned to each under the orders of the com-
manding general; the total number will be divided into four
parts or squadrons each with its designated chief.

3. Whenever the commanding general shall hoist a sig-
nal, the chiefs of squadrons will at once hoist the same by
way of answer; as soon as the signal is hauled down, the
others will follow suit successively, to show that the signal
has been understood.

4. When the formation is single line abreast, the post
of each chief of squadron will be in front of his squadron;
in forming four lines in four ranks, on the right ; in column
of four or more abreast, at the head, and on the right, of
the first file of his squadron ; in forming single line abreast
with the four squadrons, he will occupy the proper post by
the side of the last vessel of the squadron he is following,
keeping the remainder of his vessels on his left flank, all
of which will proceed to their proper places in succession
on the flank of their commander, and preserving in all

98 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

movements their place and distance, whether under way,
at anchor, or moored.

5. Every commanding officer of a vessel must observe
with care all the signals whether day or night, made by his
immediate chief, and included in the list which each for
better understanding will have with him : he will without
delay execute the import of said signals.

6. Each commanding officer of a vessel will divide his
crew into two watches, which will be on both by day and
by night; the watch will be relieved every four hours; dog
watches will be stood between 4 and 8 of the evening, in
order to share fatigue and rest. Two sentries will be left-
continuously posted, one in the bow, the other in the stern,
with orders to keep a sharp lookout in all directions, for
people ashore, signal fires or boats; they shall carefully ob-
serve the signals made by their immediate commander, and
communicate them at once to the sergeant or corporal of
the guard, and the latter to his officer, for suitable action.

7. Each commanding officer of a vessel will give severe
orders to maintain the deepest silence by night and by day,
and that no one discharge a fire arm without orders ; in no
case will anyone be allowed to smoke* by night.

8. Each time that a signal is made to go ashore to cook,
the master of the vessel will take off only the number ab-
solutely necessary for the purpose, that is, will detail a num-
ber sufficient to act as guard. No one else will be allowed
ashore. As soon as the food is cooked, he will order it
carried on boaid, in order that all may eat. He will do the
same in respect of going ashore for water ; and see to it that
his people do not mingle with those of other boats, and
that the business in hand shall be carried on as near his
boat as possible, in order that his people may promptly go
on board, should necessity require it.

9. The armed party that goes ashore to act as guard, will
post itself as strongly as possible covering the watering or
cooking party, in such a way as to command the approaches
and so prevent any sudden attack.

10. Whenever the flagship signals to head inshore and
disembark for any purpose, each commander of a vessel
will so order the landing that as it progresses, his men
shall, if the nature of the ground permit, form four in front
and three deep ; and if it should not permit, eight or more in

Chupar tabaco, a quaint expression, literally to "suck tobacco."

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 99

front, according to circumstances, marching at the same
time on one line to occupy sufficient ground for the forma-
tion of the entire body under his orders. This movement
concluded, he will halt and await orders.

11. Each commanding officer of a vessel will at dawn
cause his sails to be furled and remain under bare poles; he
will send a man aloft to look around for signs or people
ashore, signal fires or boats; and will communicate his dis-
coveries by proper signal.

12. Only the commanding general will fly by day a blue
pennant, which he will cause to be lowered whenever he
wishes to make a signal.

13. Whenever the commanding general shall set a signal
he will keep it flying until he is satisfied that the squadron
commanders understand it. This will be signified to him
by their using the same signal in answer; when the com-
manding general hauls down his signal, the squadron com-
manders will do the same, it being understood that no one
shall fly a flag, unless ordered, or necessary for signalling
as prearranged.

14. Whenever the commanding general shall make the
signal for general disembarkation, each commanding officer
of a vessel shall at once obey it, leaving on board only two
soldiers as a guard, and the sailors, ordering them under
no circumstances to leave the position in which ordered to
remain. ,

15. Each commander of a vessel on discovering any peo-
ple ashore, boats, or fires will at once inform his squadron
commander by suitable signal, and keep his signal up until
said commander answers by the same : in all cases this pro-
cedure will indicate that signals have been understood.

16. Each squadron commander, on receiving a signal
from any vessel of his squadron, will determine its meaning,
and then answering with the same, will keep it flying until
the commanding general shall have made suitable acknowl-
edgement.

17. The commanding general on receiving a signal from
a squadron commander will acknowledge with the same,
after he has made out the cause, and will give such orders
as he deems proper.

18. The commanding general will, whenever the nature
of the channels to be navigated permit it, adopt the forma-
tion in column four abreast, or anchor in this order, as best
lending itself with least confusion to all other maneuvers

100 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

demanded by circumstances. He will order the galliots to
precede the entire fleet, the other boats to follow in order,
so as to be on hand for such action as offers.

19. Each commanding officer of a vessel, besides ob-
serving orders given, shall constantly maintain himself near
the flagship, so as to hear promptly whenever hailed by it
either by voice or speaking trumpet to draw near in order
to receive orders. These will be at once executed. To this
end, each commanding officer will take turn on guard; so
that if nothing material comes up, the captain of the guard-
boat will at 11 of the morning, the hour at which the orders
must be given, go on board the flagship to receive the coun-
tersign and parole, and will then proceed to communicate
it to all the squadron commanders and captains, so that if
at night some vessel not of the convoy, or some hostile ves-
sel should be met, that fact may be recognized by its fail-
ure to give the countersign and parole when challenged.
Should this happen and be verified, suitable action will be
taken. If the guard boat should, when needed, be on duty
elsewhere, the next boat on the roster will come up when
hailed by the flagship, so that the commanding general may
always have some one to distribute any orders he may wish
to give.

Juan Francisco de Guemes y Horcasitas.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA

101

Havana, March, 1738.
LIST OF NAVAL SIGNALS, AND VARIOUS DIRECTIONS,
FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA.

Signals to be made by night by the Commanding General and obey-
ed by Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships.

A light astern and one in
the bow.

Two lights astern.

Light astern.

Light in the foretop for the
first and light in the bow
for the second.

Light astern and one in the
bow.

Two lights astern.

Light astern.

Light in the foretop for the
first case, and one in the
bow for the second.

1. Hoist anchor and get
under way forming front
with the entire fleet.

2. Hoist anchor and get
under way each squadron in
four ranks.

3. Hoist anchor and get
under way in column of four
abreast.

4. Hoist anchor and sail
in column, two abreast, or in
single file, bow and stern.

5. Anchor with the fleet
in a single line.

6. Anchor each squadron
in four ranks.

7. Anchor in column, four
abreast.

8. Anchor in column, two
abreast, or in single file, bow
and stern.

102 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Light to port and another to
starboard.

9. Go ashore and cook.

The same signal aloft, add-
ing another light in the
bow.

10. Each man to go aboard
his ship.

Light in the main top, anoth- 11. Everybody to go
er in the foretop and one ashore,
on the bow. ,

Light in the main top, anoth-
er in the foretop.

12. The people of the first
and second squadrons, and
no more, to go ashore
reckoning the command-
ing general's as the first.

Light in the foretop
another in the bow.

and 13. The people of the sec-
ond and third squadrons
to go ashore.

Light at half mainmast and
another at half foremast.

14. People of the third and
fourth squadrons to go
ashore.

Light at half mainmast.

15. Half the people of each
boat to go ashore.

Light at half foremast.

16. A fourth of the people
of each boat to go ashore.

Three gun flashes if to the
westward and two if to
eastward.

17. To give notice that
there are people or a noise
ashore.

To show a light three times 19. To give notice of one or
at the bow, giving suffi- of many boats,
cient time between appear-
ances to allow them to be
distinctly counted.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA

103

Light in the bow.

20. Whenever the com-
manding officer of a vessel
gives notice that he needs
something, or reports
something unforeseen or
unprovided for aboard his
ship.

Light astern and three gun- 21. To give notice that a
flashes. hostile ship has been en-

countered and captured.

Light astern and four gun
flashes.

A swivel-gun shot and a
light in the main top.

A light in the main top and
three rounds from a swiv-
el-gun shots.

22. To give news that a
hostile ship has been en-
countered and has escap-
ed.

23. All the ships will go to
quarters.

24. All the vessels will fire
their swivel-guns against
their antagonists whether
ashore or afloat.

Light in the main top and 25. All the vessels will open
three swivel-gun shots. with their swivel-guns

and small arms.

Note-
It should be noticed that this order deals only with ves-
sels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and
not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might
be ahead ; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for
all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and
thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time- as intend-
ed by this order, then only those will open that have a clear
field of fire in front, or are so situated that they can fire
without embarrassing one another, so that the fire may be
opportune and useful and all confusion and danger avoided,
for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless these
precautions were taken.

Two lights on the mainmast, 2. To go about whether un-
one about a yard below the der sail or under oars.
other.

104

THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Note-
It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried
out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after
having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file
and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same
where the second went about; the fourth where the third
and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until
the rear guard is reached ; one succeeding the other in the
same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall
have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation as
before.

Day Signals to be made by the Commanding General and obeyed by
the Commanding Officers of Squadron and Ships.

The Spanish ensign in the
bow and the pennant of
Spain in the mainmast.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and the same pennant in
the foretop.

Standard of Spain in the bow
and the pennant at half
mainmast.

1. Hoist anchor and get
under way forming front
with the whole fleet.

2. Hoist anchor and get
under way in column, four
abreast.

3. Hoist anchor and get
under way in column, four
abreast.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and the pennant at half
foremast in the first case;
and in the second the en-
sign of Spain in the fore
top.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and pennant of Spain in the
maintop.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and the same pennant in
the foretop.

4. Hoist anchor and get
under way in column, two
abreast, or in single file,
bow to stern.

5. Anchor in single line of
the whole fleet.

6. Anchor, each squadron
in four ranks.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA

105

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and the pennant at half
mainmast.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and pennant at half fore-
mast for the first case ; and
for the second, ensign of
Spain in the foretop.

7. Anchor in column, four
abreast.

i. Anchor in column, two
abreast, or in single file,
bow to stern.

Ensign of Spain in the main- 9. Go ashore to cook,
top.

Ensign of Spain in stops in 10, Each man to return to
the bow and blue pennant his ship,

in the maintop.

Blue pennant in the foretop. 11. Go ashore for water.

The same blue pennant at
half mainmast.

Ensign of Spain in the bow
and red pennant in the
maintop.

Ensign of Spain in the main-
top and pennant of Spain
in the foretop.

Ensign of Spain in the main-
top and blue pennant in the
foretop.

12. Each man to return to
his ship.

13. All ships will display
their ensigns in the bow.

14. Everybody ashore.

Ensign of Spain in the main-
top and blue pennant in the
foretop.

Ensign of Spain in the fore-
top and Spanish pennant
in the maintop.

15. The people of the first
and second squadrons, and
no more, to go ashore,
reckoning the command-
ing general's as the first;
the people of the remain-
ing squadrons not to stir.

16. The people of the sec-
ond and third squadrons,
and no more, to go ashore,

17. The people of the third
and fourth squadrons, and
no more, to go ashore.

106 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Ensign of Spain at half main-
mast and Spanish pennant
at half foremast.

Ensign of Spain at half main-
mast.

The ensign of Spain in stops
at the stern and the bow
set or pointing to the place
where the people were
seen, and so kept until the
flagship answers with the
same signal which will be,
when it will have picked
up the said people.

Spanish ensign in stops in
the maintop and the bow
pointing where fire was
seen and to remain in this
fashion until the flagship
answers wtih the same sig-
nal.

Ensign of Spain in stops in
the bow, this pointing
where the ships were seen
and the said stopped flag
hoisted and lowered as
many times as there were
boats seen, with a suffi-
cient interval to give op-
portunity to distinguish
them.

Ensign of Spain in the bow,
hoisted and lowered three
times and the commanding
officer of the squadron will
answer in the same way in-
forming the commanding
general, who will take the
proper action.

18. Half the people of each
ship, and no more, to go
ashore.

19. A quarter of the people
on each ship, and no more,
ashore.

20. To give notice of hav-
ing seen people ashore.

21. To give notice of some
fire ashore.

22. To give notice of one or
of many vessels seen.

23. Whenever the com-
manding officer of a vessel
gives notice that he needs
something or reports some-
thing unforeseen or unpro-
vided for aboard his ship.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 107

Ensign of Spain in the bow 24. All ships whether under
and red pennant in the sail or at anchor will go to
foretop. quarters.

Ensign of Spain in the bow 25. All vessels to open fire
and the red pennant in the with their swivel-guns on
maintop. their antagonists whether

afloat or ashore.

Ensign of Spain in the bow, 26. All vessels will open fire

red pennant in the maintop with their swivel-guns and

and another Spanish pen- muskets at one and the

nant in the foretop. same time.

Note-
It should be noticed that this order deals only with ves-
sels having the enemy in their front or on their flanks and
not embarrassed by such others of their own ships as might
be ahead; because if it should be impossible, as it may, for
all our ships to extend their front against the enemy and
thus perhaps be unable to fire all at the same time, as in-
tended by this order, then only those will open that have
a clear field of fire in front, or are so situated that they
can fire without embarrassing one another, so that the fire
may be opportune and useful and all confusion and danger
avoided, for these could easily occur in our own fleet unless
these precautions were taken.

Spanish pennant in the main- 27. To go about whether
top. under sail or under oars.

Note-
It should be noticed that this maneuver must be carried
out so that the vessels of the second file shall go about after
having occupied the place in which the flagship or its file
and vanguard went about; the third file will do the same
where the second went about ; the fourth where the third ;
and the movement will be carried out in this fashion until
the rear guard is reached; one succeeding the other in the
same order and distance so that after all the vessels shall
have tacked, the fleet will remain in the same formation
as before.

108 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

Day and Night Signals which the Commanding General of the Ex-
pedition will Order to be made on the Coast and in the Places
Indicated, to Maintain the Union and Co-operation Required
and Provided for in the Instructions on the Journey and During
the Operations of Both Fleets.

A fire on the beach.

1. In order that the com-
manding officer of the sea
squadron may know where
the interior flotilla happens
to be, let him either lie-to
or anchor.

Two fires on the beach, a
quarter of a mile apart.

2. The said commanding
officer will put to sea and
continue his voyage.

One fire in the place indicat-
ed and eight or ten flashes
of powder at intervals.

3. Order the disembarka-
tion of the troops designat-
ed upon the beach of the
Island of St. Simon, get
under way and capture the
port of Gualquini, accord-
ing to previous instruct-
ions.

Two fires on the same beach
already mentioned, the
same flashes and a few
musket shots at the same
time.

4. Order the disembarka-
tion of the troops on the
beach of the said island,
get under way, capture the
port as soon as this signal
is received, without wait-
ing for any other.

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 109

Three fires on the beach at 5. The armed bilanders to
a distance of a quarter of get under way, enter the
a mile, one from the other. Bay of St. Simon so as to

co-operate with the disem-
barkation of the troops,
told off for this purpose,
on the beach of the south
point; the ships to remain
at anchor outside, as al-
ready decided.

Signals of Recognition by Day or Night.

Whenever the commanding general sends a boat or
launch to speak to the commanding officer of the sea squad-
ron, if it should be day, he will carry a Spanish flag in his
bow and fire a blank cartridge from his swivel-gun. To
this, answer will be made with a Spanish flag in the stern,
by clewing up the mainsail and foresail, lowering and hoist-
ing the main topsails, and by bracing the foretopsail, lying-
to and waiting. If it should be night, he will show a light
in his bow and fire three blank rounds from a swivel-gun
and the answering signal will be a light in the stern, another
in the bow, and lying-to to wait.

Whenever the commanding officer of the sea squadron
shall send a boat or launch to speak to the commanding gen-
eral- if it be day, he will carry the Spanish ensign in his
bow and when near enough, will fire five musket shots.
The answering signal will be to lower the distinguishing
pennant, to place the ensign in the bow and five mus-
ket shots. If it be by night, he will show a light in his
bow, and challenged "Who goes there?" will answer "Phil-
lip the Fifth and Havana." The answering signal will be
a light in the stern, and as many other musket rounds, and
on receiving the same challenge, the answer, "Spain and
Cuba."

110 THE SPANISH OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE

NOTE ON THE BATTLE GROUND OF BLOODY MARSH.
By Otis Ashmore.

The battle in which Oglethorpe defeated Montiano on
St. Simon's Island is known locally as the Battle of Bloody
Marsh and the exact site of this engagement has long been
in much doubt.

In the summer of 1912, accompanied by Lawton B.
Evans, C. B. Gibson, Col. Charles M. Snelling, and L. B.
Robeson, I made a visit to St. Simon Island for the pur-
pose of identifying if possible the exact location of the
battlefield. Every account of the battle had been carefully
studied, including that of Montiano himself, from transla-
tions furnished by Lieut. Col. C. DeW. Willcox, U. S. A.,
professor at the United States Military Academy.

In the light of all these accounts, and after going over the
ground very carefully, there seems to be no doubt that this
memorable battle was fought at a point upon the margin
of the marsh about two miles from the south end of the
island, and about one mile from the hotel, where the road
from Gascoigne's Bluff enters the road to Frederica. This
spot agrees perfectly with the account of Capt Thomas
Spalding,* which for many obvious reasons is by far the
clearest and the most trustworthy. A sketch of the island
and of the battle ground itself, made at the time of my
visit, will make more clear Spalding's graphic account, and
will show all the stragetic points in the campaign more
satisfactorily than any verbal description could do.

It is, perhaps, needless to say that with the exception
of the causeway, which still exists, and the crescent shaped
woodland so well described by Spalding, not a vestige of
this tragic episode remains. No trace of the road around
the crescent could be found, as this circuitous pathway has
long since been abandoned for the more direct road across it.

See account of this battle by Capt. Thomas Spalding In Vol. I. Ga.
Hist. Society Collections.

i: i

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i*" . jauoo D *Y

=.v|

JBA-rrte CcRo^wD orBwooy H^arsw

St. Simons Island and Frederica

ATTACK ON THE COLONY OF GEORGIA 111

The traditions of the people living upon the island all
agree that the marsh just east of the causeway is the true
battle ground of Bloody Marsh.

There is scarcely a doubt that the ambuscade was laid
at the two points of the crescent woodland where the road
from Gascoigne's Blufif enters the main road to Frederica,
and that the Spaniards were entrapped in the curved
roadway around this crescent. In their confusion the
Spaniards attempted to retreat along the road over the
causeway, but when they were met by the claymores of the
Highlanders, they were forced into the marsh just east
of the causeway where much of the execution took place.

TABLE OP CONTENTS

Page

Preface 3

Affidavit of. Juan Castelnau, a prisoner in Georgia.... 7

Letter of Montiano to the King- 16

The King orders the dispatch of an expedition against

Georgia 20

Montiano acknowledges the receipt of orders for the

expedition 25

The Governor General of Cuba gives the Governor of

Florida information with respect to the expedition 27
The Governor General of Cuba appoints Montiano to

the command of the expedition and gives orders. . 32

Orders to the Commanding Officer of the Fleet 39

The Governor General of Cuba reports the failure of

the expedition and sends journals of events 48

Arredondo's Journal 52

Casinas's Journal 65

Montiano's own report 88

Orders for an expedition against the English 97

List of signals, etc., for the expedition against Georgia 101
Return of the troops, crews and stores, ship by ship,

facing 108

Note on the Battle Ground of Bloody Marsh 110

Return of ships, troops and stores of the expedition

facing 112

LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Portrait of Oglethorpe Frontispiece

Map of the Atlantic Coast from St. Augustine

to Charleston facing page 7

De Brahm's Plans, Sections and Elevations

of Works projected for the Colony of

Georgia facing page 11

Illustrations of Spanish Guns pages 36-38

Map of Jekyll Sound facing page 66

Arredondo's jNIap of the Entrance to Gual-

quini facing page 71

Plan of Fort Saint Andrew facing page 94

Map of St Simon and Frederica facing page 110