A TREATISE,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL,
ON
THE HUMAN WILL
BY ARCHIBALD J. BATTLE, D.D.,
President of Mercer TJntveretty, Macon, Ga.
ATLANTA, GA.: JAKES P. HAEBIBON & Co., PBtNTEBS AND BINDERS.
1876.

CONTENTS.
Section L--Preliminary Outline........................................... 9 Section EL--The Nature of the Will. .................................... 11 Section HL--Relations of the Mental Powers.............................. 14 Section IV.--The Law of the WHL........................................ 17 Section V.--Historical Illustrations of the Doctrine of the WilL.... ........ 2 Section VL--The Intellect not a Determining Force to the Will.............. 24 Section VH.--Analytical View of Conscience............................... 27 Section VEX--Scriptural Examples--Analysis of Faith..................... 31 Section IX.--Regeneration and Evangelical Faith........................... 36 Section X.--The Will in Reference to Mechanical, Indifferent, and Reluctant
Actions............................................................ 39 Section XL--The Doctrine of Motives................. j...._............. 42 Section XEL--The Theory of the Autonomy of the Will.................... 47 Section XIGC.---The Scheme of Necessity................................... 52 Section XTV.--Free Agency........ ...................................... 56 Section XV.--Autonomy a Scheme of Licentiousness....................... 59 Section XVL--Moral Agency and Accountability............................ 61 Section XVIL--Autonomy Denies Moral Responsibility..................... 65Section XVHL--Divirie and Human Agency.......... .,,. ................... 6ft Section XIX.--Autonomy Sets at Naught the Divine Influence in Regenera
tion ............................................................... 70 Section TX---Theodicy.................................................... 75 Section XXT.--Autonomy Asperses the Divine Perfection................... 79 Section XYTT,--Resume of the Argument.................................. 82 Section XXHL--The Importance of the Sensibility......................... 86 Section XXIV.--Culture of the Sensibility.................................. 94 Section XXV,--The Energy of the Will.... ..............................100 Appendix ................................................................103 Errata...................................................................105

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IDKDIO^-TION".
TO MY VENERABLE FATHER, DR. CULLEN BATTLE, Of Eufaula, Ala.,
The faithful guardian of my youth, the judicious guide of my earlier thoughts, and the prudent counsellor of my matnrer years, who, after a long life of usefulness, now in his ninety-second year, awaits with calm faith and pa tience, the summons to a higher sphere, this little Toluine ia affectionately Inscribed.
THE AUTHOB.

555831

PREFACE.
THIS Treatise is an expansion of a series of communica tions written for "THE CHRISTIAN INDEX," in compliance with the request of an earnest inquirer. At the sugges tion of many friends, they are submitted, in this more per manent form, to the general reader. The author makes no apology for infusing so strong a theological ingredient into a work essentially metaphysical. He is convinced that no theory of the Will is tenable that ignores man's relation to God, as revealed in the Christian Scriptures. The law of the Will, as here enunciated, embodies a truth that has repeatedly been admitted by many philosophers. But not to the author's knowledge, has that truth ever been formulated as the law governing this part of our constitution. Yet it seems to be verified by conscious ness, by history and by revelation. It makes our psychol ogy more simple, and seems to accord more perfectly with the New Testament doctrine of regeneration than any view hitherto proposed.
The analyses of Conscience and Faith are submitted to the judgment of ethical and theological thinkers, as im portant corollaries from the author's doctrine of the Will.
It will be seen, that the term, "autonomy" has been employed as a designation for the theory of the selt-determining power of the Will. It is recommended by several considerations. It is a single word, and, therefore, prefer able to the usual circumlocution. It is expressive: im plying sovereignty, or power of self-government; it quite accurately describes the scheme in question. It is a word not in very common use, so that it may stand without any adjunct, as a technical name for the theory. It involves

8

Preface.

nothing of opprobium, such as that attaching to "fatal ism," or "the scheme of necessity," applied to the oppo site doctrine. It covers both the philosophical and theo logical ground, and, hence, may be used instead of Arminianism--a theological designation. Its derivatives, auton omous, autouomic and autonomists, are brief descriptives, con venient for reference to the doctrine and its advocates.
A. J. B. MERCER UNIVERSITY, March 20, 1876.

ERRATA.
The present publication not being stereotyped, it was impossible to give it a final revision before binding. This will explain the appearance of a number of typographical errors which mar the appearance of this edition. Some of the more important errata, are here added:
Page 15, line 7, for " exists," read msi. 27. line 10. for "by," read be. 28. line 13, for " councils." read counsels. 35, tenth line from bottom, for "beleiving," read believing. 45, line 5, for "pursuaded." read persuaded. 53..ninth line from bottom, for "those," read one. 53, third line from bottom, for " meeting," read sometimes. 55. line 19, for " psychical." read physical. 55, next to last line, for " spyeheal," read psychical. 62, line 17, the asterisk (*) refers to Dr. A. T. Bledaoe. 62, line 5, for " intrinsic," read extrinsic. 88. line 4, for " have," read has. 67, line 31, for " labarynth," read labyrinth. 72, line 26, for " gorgous," read gorgons. 56, line 2, for " undeterminate," read indeterminate.
Considering the difficulties in the way of revision by the author, the work is remarkably free from misprints.

THE HUMAN WILL.
SECTION I.
PRELIMINARY OUTLINE.
The Will is a subject which concerns both the psychol ogist and the theologian. To comprehend its nature and powers, we must study the philosophy of the soul; to as certain its relations to our duty and destiny, we must ex amine it in the light of Divine revelation.
This section will be devoted to a hrief survey of the fac ulties of the human soul, preliminary to the main discus sion.
The soul, or mind, is that part of our nature which thinks and feels and wills. As matter cannot perform these acts, the soul is spiritual and not material. The acts just men tioned indicate a natural division of the faculties of tne mind. There are three great cardinal powers, viz: the Intellect, or the power of thinking and knowing; the Sen sibility, or the power of feeling; and the Will, or the power of decision. This is the ultimate analysis of the soul, upon which most philosophers are now agreed. They will be considered separately.
I.----THE INTELLECT.
The Intellect, sometimes called the Understanding, is that part of our spiritual constitution which knows and thinks. It includes, among its functions, the perception of the ex ternal world, remembering, imagining, judging, reasoning, and, in short, all those mental acts which belong to man's rational nature. When we know anything, whether it be an object in nature, a mathematical principle, or a moral truth, that knowledge is an exercise of the Intellect. When we remember a past event, or impression or acquisition; when

10

The Human Will.

we imagine--frame ideal conceptions and mental pictures; when we compare and reason--form judgments, convictions or beliefs; when we rise to abstract principles and original intuitions; in each and all of these forms of soul-activity, we exercise the Intellect. It is seen, then, that this is a vast, important and noble power of the mind. Without it, there could be no thought, nor knowledge, nor belief, nor conviction. The Intellect is a cardinal element of the Soul.
II.--THE SENSIBILITY.
The second cardinal power of our spiritual nature is the Sensibility, or the power of feeling or emotion. We are all familiar with-that state of the mind which we call feeling, as distinguished from thought and knowledge. It is an ex perience so peculiar arid marked, that we are in no difficulty to recognize it. When we love or hate, rejoice or grieve, hope or fear, we are conscious of indulging feeling, and hence, these are exercises of the Sensibility. The forms or phases of Sensibility are'almost innumerable, but they are susceptible of classification.
They may be divided into two general classes, viz: I. Sensations--Physical or animal feelings, such as the sensations of hunger, thirst, bodily pleasure or pain. II. Emotions--Purely spiritual feelings, having no direct connection with the body. As our discussion does not concern the Sensations, we will classify only the Emotions. On one principle, they may be reduced to two kinds, as follows: 1. The sympathetic emotions, characterized by uneasi ness, restlessness, obtrusiveness or demonstrativeness; as love, joy, hope, sorrow. 2. The rational emotions, characterized by calmness, strength, nobility; as virtuous ambition, satisfaction in suc cessful achievement, pride in discovery, joy in the triumph of truth, sentiment of duty, approval of virtue, admiration of the beautiful.

The Human Will.

11

On another principle we may classify the Emotions un der different names, as follows:
1. The Simple Emotions--Transient feelings of the soul. 2. The Affections--More permanent and steady feelings. 3. The Passions--Violent or tumultuous feelings. 4. The Desires--Feelings seeking gratification.

III.----THE WILL.
The third cardinal element of the soul is the Will, or the power of resolution or decision. This is a state of mind distinguishable from both Intellect and Sensibility. The Will does not think or know, neither does it feel, but it re solves upon action, it wills to do. In one sense, it may be called the executive power of the soul. The Intellect may show the end to be attained, and the way; the Sensibility may aspire to the end; but the Will is the executive au thority, which decrees that it shall be accomplished.
With this preliminary survey, we proceed to consider more fully the Will as a distinct power of the mind.

SECTION II.
THE NATURE OF THE WILL.
The three-fold division of the mental faculties into Intel lect, Sensibility and Will, has received the a'most unani mous assent of philosophers The former two-fold classi fication, of Understanding and Will, has been entirely abandoned, and the emotions,affections, and desires, which, for a long time, were regarded as modifications, or phe nomena of the Will, are now grouped into a distinct class ; while the Will is considered an individual power, altogether different in its nature and functions, from both Understand ing and Emotion.
A distinction was, long ago, carefully drawn between Will and Desire, by the celebrated philosopher, John Locke; though he does not seem to have discovered the the triple natuie of the soul. Reid also limited the Will to the capacity of decision, excluding from it the emotions

12

The Human Will.

and desires. Sir William Hamilton divided the powers of the soul into faculties of cognition, capacities of feeling and powers of conation--including, under the last head, desire and will. But the present beautiful analysis of the soul, into Intellect; Sensibility and Will, brought out in clear and distinct evolution by M. Cousin, has superseded all other methods, and has been adopted by the great body of modern philosophers. Indeed, until the trichotomy of Cousin was proposed, psychology did not seem to be established on a true scientific basis.
The Will has been defined the power of decision or res olution to act It has also been described as the executive faculty of the soul. Perhaps that which most distinctly marks the true nature of the Will is its imperative char acter--its office of commanding. Action takes place only when the Will issues its mandate, and inevitably follows the order, unless prevented by physical force--what the earlier theologians called co-action. The proper exercise of the Will is called volition. When, therefore, the mind puts forth a volition, it utters an authoritative decree, en joining obedience or action upon whatever powers, physi cal or mental, it may make the instruments of execution.
I. THE WILL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INTELLECT.
A comparison of this power with the Intellect will dis close a palp'abie difference. When we perceive an object-- that is, know it, by means of the senses or consciousness-- we exercise the Intellect, but not the Will. When we recall anything in memory; when we portray unreal scenes by imagination; when we analyze, abstract and reason; when we evolve by reflection general principles and intuitive truths: in none of these intellectual processes is there any thing akin to the act of resolving to do, of commanding to action. The imperative feature is wanting in every intel lection or exercise of the Intellect.
An intellection is a quiet, calm, comtemplative process; a volition is a quick and instantaneous energy. The In-

The Human Will.

13

tellect deliberates and legislates; the Will orders the exe cution.
II. THE WILL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SENSIBILITY.
The former view of the soul which regarded the Will as a modification of desire, and the affections as phenomena of the Will, confounds powers and acts, which are essen tially and radically different. For the sake of convenience, we shall designate any state or exercise of the Sensibility as an emotion. Now, the emotions may be sharply distin guished from the volitions. Emotion is any kind of feel ing; volition is the resolve or command of the soul to act. A sensation of pain or pleasure, an emotion of pity or contempt, an affection of love or grief, a passion of anger or revenge or jealousy--these are states of the sensibility, feelings of the soul; and are in no respect similar to voli tions--resolutions to act. The emotions may be indulged to any extent, and yet no action follow. Even desire, a positive impulse, into which most emotions culminate be fore resolution is born, may exist without a resulting voli tion.
Thus, I may think, know, reflect, imagine, remember, judge and reason; yet if this be all, there is no exercise of the Will, no resolution to act. There is only intellection put forth.
I may suffer pain, experience joy or grief, indulge love or hate, cherish ambition, malice or revenge, become the sub ject of raging passion; and. yet in none of these emotions is there any determination or command to act. I may ardently desire to do a given thing, and yet, while it is only feeling, there is no volition. Nor, until emotion passes into resolution, or rather invokes the imperative injunction to act, does the Will exert itself. As soon, however, as voli tion is put forth, action follows. It is the decree of authorityj which nothing but physical necessity can successfully resist. Our constitution is such that what we will to do, we always do, unless prevented by an external power over which we have no control.

14

The Human Will.

It follows, then, that the Will possesses an inherent en ergy--an activity of its own--and its efforts are not the move ments of an inert substance, like dead matter. This is evinced in the vehemence, tenacity and activity character istic of the purposes of many men. Though the Will is aroused to activity by the influence of causes, yet it is not comparable to the movements of a machine, or the me chanical motion of masses of matter excited by anterior causes, but is analogous, rather, to the great dynamical agents, fire and steam, which, though produced by ante cedent causes, are yet endowed with energies of their own, that defy computation.
We have likened the Intellect and Will, respectively, to the Legislative and Executive departments of civil govern ment. There is also an intermediate power of the soul as of the State. And though the functions of the Judiciary are more like the Intellect in its power of judging, yet the Sensibility resembles -that section of the body politic, in that it determines the- direction in which the Executive power of the soul shall display its energy.

SECTION III.
RELATIONS OF THE MENTAL POWERS.
We are now to investigate the relations of the three cardi nal elements of the soul, viz: the Intellect, the Sensibility and the Will. 1 It is reasonable to suspect that a close connection sub sists between these, which, though unlike in their phenom ena, are yet powers of one indivisible soul. To suppose that each, or any one of them, is an independent, self-de termining or self-moving force, is to suppose an anomaly in the system of the universe. For, outside of man's soul, there abides, throughout the creation of God, the unceas ing relation of dependence, of antecedence and sequence, of cause and effect. Through the entire framework of material things, the filaments of influence are so interlaced, that nothing exists insulated and independent. In the planetary world law reigns supreme, and one force binds

The Human Will.

15

systems, suns, planets, satellites, comets, meteors together, in harmonious union. The soul and body are united in the closest bonds. The various organs and members of the body are so intimately connected, that all share in the influence that affects a single one. In the social economy, the same interdependence and interpenetration of influence exists, so that the character and conduct of one individual affect, in some way, all the rest. It is difficult, often im possible, so to understand this network of causes, as to "untwist the mystic chain,".to trace a given effect to its cause, or to explain the bond of connection between them. From the prevalence of this principle of dependence in the outer world, we may reasonably infer the existence of some law of relationship governing the powers of the soul.
What relation can be discovered between the first and second, the Intellect and the Sensibility? This much, at least, that without some form of intellectual activity,there can be no exercise of sensibility. The principle may be stated in the form of a law: Intellection is the necessary antecedent to emotion.
Let us illustrate the law. 'I cannot desire an orange, unless I know or think something about the orange. I cannot love an individual, unless I have some knowledge of the individual--cognizance of his existence and judg ment of his traits of character. The desire and the love are emotions; the knowledge and judgment are intellec tions. The latter are the conditions precedent to the former. Whether the intellection be the efficient cause, producing the emotion, or only the occasion of awakening the sensibility, the influence is not a very determinate one. Do we know in every case what particular emotion is ap propriate to a given intellection ? Can we predict the de gree of sensibility that will be aroused when any particular idea is presented ? We answer, that we know of no law, infallibly determining either the kind or degree of emotion which a given intellection will awaken. There are, how ever, certain feelings appropriate to certain cognitions. The

16

The Human Wilt.

perception of beauty is calculated to excite admiration, and the contemplation of vice is naturally adapted to kindle a feeling of disapprobation. But these results are not inva riable in actual experience. The sensibility is the most vol atile part of our nature, and its action is notably unsteady and incalculable. We cannot anticipate its movement with any more certainty, than we can calculate the precise di rection and energy of gun-powder or nitroglycerine. What excites love or admiration in one may awaken aversion or disgust in another. And while, in the same individual, the contemplation of an object may, to-day, carry the feel ing to ecstacy or passion, it may, to-morrow, fail to stir the most vapid emotion.
" Beamy soon grows familiar to the lover, Fades in the eye and palls upon the seuse."
Thus, while we discern the tendency--seeming constitu tional--of certain forms of knowledge or thought, to pro duce certain kinds and degrees of emotion, yet, in our ex perience, a given intellection does not always excite its ap propriate emotion, nor that emotion in its proper measure.
The question suggests itself, was man originally--before his fall--thus constituted ? Or is this inconsequential rela tion a symptom of derangement, an effect of the fall? May not this loosening of the nexus between these two great powers of the soul be eminently the effect of the fall ? May it not be true, that, in normal souls, in which no dis order has entered and broken the original perfect harmony of the spirit, there exists a link of connection between these faculties so firm that every form of knowledge, by an invariable law, develops its appropriate sentiment and in its due intensity? Christ possessed a human soul per fect in it* nature. A clear, sound, vigorous and penetrat ing intellect He surely had. A well regulated sensibility doubtless responded to the convictions of His judgment, and to the various ideas of imagination and reason. In Him no wrong emotion, no malevolent affection, no tumultuous passion arose, to darken or disturb the bright serenity of His

The Human Will.

17

sensitive nature. Doubtless, this was the constitution of man as he first came from the Creator's hand. Doubtless thus, also, will redeemed humanity appear in the perfection of the future state.
Before concluding this subject, we call attention to the reflex influence of the Sensibility .upon the Intellect. Our emotions often set trains of thought into action, give direc tion to these currents, and stimulate them to quickened ac tivity. Ambition suggests plans for compassing its aims. Avarice urges the thoughts into channels entirely new. Cu riosity quickens the energy of intellect, and develops powers previously unsuspected.
Injurious is often the reflex influence of the Sensibility on the Intellect. A wrong feeling, an absorbing affection, or a violent passion, casts a mist over the Intellect, obscuring its perceptions, distorting its imaginations, and beclouding its judgments. Through the false medium of passionate love, jealousy, or prejudice, our judgments are inaccurate and unjust. Love transforms deformity into beauty; jeal ousy gives the color of guilt to the most innocent act; prej udice perverts truth into error, or transmutes error into truth.

SECTION IV.
THE LAW OF THE WILL.
We proceed now to inquire what is the true relation of the Will in the spiritual organism; or what is the law of the Will? A close connection has been established be tween the first and second of the mental elements, Intel lect and Sensibility. The inference is irresistible that the Will bears some relation to one or both of these powers.
If we attend carefully to the mental process which pre cedes any act we perform, we shall find that the three great powers already described, have their part in contrib uting to the result. The process is as follows: / know: Ifeel: I will. That is, knowledge precedes and awakens emotion ; emotion precedes and induces volition; and voli-

18

The Human Will.

tion commands action. Thus the chain is complete, be ginning with intelligence and ending in voluntary action. We enunciate, then, the law of the Will as follows: The Will bears a direct relation to tlte Sensibility, and is subject to its immediate sway, the Volition being always determined by tJie dominant Emotion. This emotion usually takes the form of desire, before it is resolved into volition, although other impelling or restraining sentiments may sometimes govern. By " dominant emotion " is meant that feeling, or combi nation of feelings, which is most powerful in the breast at the time of action. The emotion maybe a single, indivis ible passion, overpowering all conflicting impulses, or a desire compounded of two or more different and even con trary emotions, yet all combining to create an irresistible incentive.
Now, to exemplify the law as above stated, let us take, first,a very -simple action--namely: the eating of an orange. The acts, or states, of the soul, in their order, are:
1. Intellection--I perceive the orange, and know its de licious and refreshing flavor.
2. Emotion--Upon this knowledge, appetite--the desire to eat it--is awakened.
3. Volition--If this be the dominant impulse, my Will yields: I resolve to eat the orange.
But other desires or impulses of the sensibility may con tend for the mastery. Suppose I am an invalid, and know or believe that by thus indulging my appetite, I would seriously endanger my health. Dread of increased suffering and desire for recovery, combine now to constitute a powerful impulse. The mental process would be thus:
1. Intellection--I know or believe that the eating of the fruit would cause increased sickness and suffering.
2. Emotion--This conviction awakens dread of suffer ing and desire for health--a combined emotion.
3. Volition--I resolve to reject the orange, being im pelled by a feeling stronger, at the time, than appetite.
Or a different kind of affection may come into play. Just

The Human Will.

19

as I am about to indulge my propensity to eat the fruit, a hungry little orphan approaches and begs for the orange. Pity is awakened, kindling into benevolence, and pleads for the child.
1. Intellection--I perceive and understand the famished condition of the orphan.
2. Emotion--Benevolence creates a desire to relieve her evident want.
3. Volition--I resolve to surrender the orange to the child.
Now, it is palpable that the volition, in each case, has fol lowed the dominant emotion, and the Will has submitted as readily as the most loyal vassal obeys the command of his sovereign.
Observe, in the examples above, three grades of emotion, namely: appetite, self-love, and benevolence. Now, as has been before shown, no known law of our present condition enables us to determine, infallibly, which of these emotions will predominate in every case. In regard to some indi viduals whose characters are well known t us, we might anticipate, with confidence, the kind of emotion which would prevail, and might predict their actions with moral certainty. Here is A,'who seems incapable of impulses higher than appetite. He will sacrifice health, fortune, happiness, honor, to gratify this animal instinct. B knows no sentiment superior to self-love. He will submit to no inconvenience for the advantage of his neighbor, and will even invade the rights of others to promote his own inter est. C possesses a nature so exalted, that he subordinates all lower propensities to benevolence. It is unquestionably true, that the nearer we approach perfection in our spiritual culture, the more will prevail the higher and nobler sus ceptibilities, and, consequently, the more regularly will the Will prompt to better and worthier endeavors.
Take another illustration, in which the Will would seem the prominent factor. Let us suppose the country in a state of war. The question before my mind is that of vol untary enlistment in the service. Shall I volunteer or not? Now, although the very word employed to denote the action

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The Human Will

implies will-energy, yet it will be seen that there is "a power behind the throne"--a motor which impels the will forward. The Intellect has surveyed the question on every side, and passed various judgments. On these intellections various sensibilities have sprung into being.
1. I know, or believe, that in the army, I can effectively promote my country's honor and weal. Upon ftus,patriotisi is awakened, and a desire to serve my country.
2. I know that in battle I am in constant peril of being wounded or killed. Cowardice, ihefeat of pain and death, supervenes.
3. I believe, or imagine, that in the army I can acquire military glory. Ambition, desire for fame, is born of this reflection.
4. I conceive of the probability that in my absence from home, my family will suffer want and starvation. Upon this conception arises anxiety for my family's welfare and safety.
Here we have four different judgments of the intellect, followed by as many different forms of sensibility. Of these four emotions, two, namely, patriotism and ambition, urge to enlistment; and two, cowardice and domestic affec tion, prompt to stay at home. Let any single one be stronger than the rest, and the volition will take the direc tion of that impulse. If patriotism predominate, I will en list, not from love of military glory so much as from love of country, and no fear of danger, nor dread of ruin to my family will hinder me. If cowardice be the dominant im pulse, I will refuse to serve from this ignoble motive alone, and patriotism and ambition will lift their voices in vain. Or cowardice and domestic solicitude may unite their pleas, and becoming a stronger impetus than the other two com bined, will carry the volition before the dominant emotion. In this example, as in the first, the Will is found obeying the dictates of the Sensibility, and thus the principle enun ciated receives further confirmation.

The Human Will.

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SECTION V.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.
The doctrine, propounded and illustrated in our last section, that the volition is always determined by the dominant emotion', will now be enforced by a few historical examples.
Sir Philip Sidney, an accomplished courtier and soldier under Queen Elizabeth, was mortally wounded in an action between the English and Spaniards, near the fortress of Zutphen, in Holland. As he 'lay on the field, mangled with wounds and faint from the loss of blood, an attend ant brought him a flask of water to relieve his intense thirst. The nobleman observed a private soldier lying near him, whose piteous moans strongly aroused his sym pathy, and saying " Thy necessities are greater than mine," he resigned the flask to his dying comrade. Now, in this act of rare self-denial, it is unquestionable that the Will was governed by an influence extraneous to itself, and that this influence proceeded from the Sensibility. It is evident that humanity or benevolence was the determining emotion prevailing, at the time, over self-love, which must have pleaded strongly for his own relief.
The memorable pause of Julius Caesar on the brink of the Rubicon, was a case in which the Will was held in abeyance by a momentary conflict of emotions. Patriot ism bade him turn back; ambition urged him onward. The volition, held in suspense for a time, at last yielded to the sway of the more powerful impulse, and the passage of that stream opened the way for the destruction of Ro man liberty.
When Caesar had risen to the very summit of power in the republic, he was suspected of cherishing ambition for the imperial crown. Brutus, a prominent patriot, was Caesar's personal friend. And to the claims of friendship he remained loyal, so long as these claims did not conflict with duty to his country. He loved Caesar well, but he loved Rome more. And when convinced that, while Cae-
2

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The Human Will.

sar lived, there was no hope for the liberties of his country, he headed a conspiracy to take the life of his ambitious friend. Patriotism triumphed over friendship, and became the ruling passion of his soul. The volition obeyed, and the loving Brutus became an assassin.
Charles V., the illustrious Emperor of Germany, abdi cated his throne, in the year 1555, at the age of fifty-six. As he had displayed great ambition and enterprise, his resignation, at an age when objects of ambition operate with full force on the mind, excited universal attention, and many were the conjectures as to his motives. In his address at Brussels, on the occasion of his devolving the imperial authority upon his son Philip, he assigned as his reason for retiring from the cares of an extensive empire, the growing infirmities and exhausted vigor of his frame, in consequence of an incurable distemper. There is no doubt that the failure of some of his grandest projects, added to the v/eight of the cares of state, and aggravated by a mortal disease, had produced disappointment, mortifi cation and disgust; and these feelings, together with his hopes centered upon his son. combined to create a great master emotion, which, prevailing over ambition, induced him to resign the crown and place it upon tne brow of his beloved Philip. The volition was swayed by the dominat ing complex emotion.
It was fanaticism--a feeling composed of religious fer vor and malignant passion--which prompted Charles IX. of France, and his wicked queen-mother, to plot the mas sacre of sixty thousand Protestants, on St. Bartholomew's eve--3. crime which has rendered the names of Charles and Catharine execrable forever, and made that day the blackest in Time's calendar.
Macbeth--a historical personage, though best known through Shakspeare's drama--assassinated Duncan, his kinsman, his guest and his king. Ambition goaded him to the bloody deed. But other emotions protested against the treachery and wickedness of that unparalleled crime.

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Gratitude for multiplied favors, love for his amiable kins man, loyally to the noble monarch, a sense of duty to his trusting guest, and dread of detection, united their eloquent pleadings for the life of the gentle Duncan. Above all, conscience rose up in stern rebuke of the meditated guilt. But lust of power drowned in its tumultuous torrent the voices of these safe monitors, and swept the unhappy Macbeth into the gulf of crime. Here the strongest emotion con trolled the volition.
Archbishop Cranmer, primate of England under Henry VIII and Edward VI, was a prominent champion of Pro testantism against the doctrines of the Church of Rome. When Mary, the bloody Catholic queen, acceded to the throne, the religion of the realm was changed, and the Protestant leaders were arrested and compelled to recant, on peril of being burned alive. Scores had already perished at the stake. Cranmer, in sight of the fires of Smithfield, where Latimer, Ridley and Hooper had endured their ter rible martyrdom, was overcome by his fears, and signed the recantation. Afterwards, stung by remorse and shame, and sustained perhaps by faith, he publicly recalled his re cantation, and bravely confronted the fiery doom. Here, the emotion of fear impelled to the subscription of that odious document, against which his moral sense rebelled. Subsequently conscience re-established its authority, and triumphed over the baser impulses of nature.
The fiendish crime of the wretch, Thomas or Thomassen, developed at Bremerhaven, on the llth of December, 1875, has rung its peal of horror throughout the civilized world. It is confidently stated, that this demon in human form, to secure the insurance on the steamer Mosel, delib erately contrived a scheme for blowing up the ship, by placing a case of dynamite in the hold, with clock-work attachment, so arranged that it would probably explode, when the vessel should be on mid-ocean. But, by an ap parent accident, the material exploded on the quay, before it could be smuggled on board of the steamer. The result was

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The Human Will.

the loss of more than sixty lives, and the mutilation of two hundred persons. The successful execution of his plot would have effected the destruction of the ship with all on board, and none would have escaped to tell the tale, and no trace of the awful tragedy would have been left upon the track less waters. It was cupidity--the greed of gain--the love of money--in the heart of that debased monster, which determined the volition to the execution of a crime so atrocious as to call forth the unanimous execration of man kind.

SECTION VI.
THE INTELLECT NOT A DETERMINING FORCE TO THE WILL.
In each of the examples thus far adduced, it is clear that the resolution to act was not produced by judgment, or rea son, or any form of intellectual activity, but by the impulse offeeling. Does reason, or judgment, ever impel to action ? We reply that there is nothing-, in mere intellect, of the na ture of force, or incentive to action. Between it and the volition, feeling must intervene. The general opinion of philosophers is in accord with this view.
Sir William Hamilton, in his lectures on Metaphysics, asserts that "the mere cognition--i e. intellection--leaves us cold and unexcited; the awakened feeling infuses warmth and life into our action ; it supplies action with an interest; and without an interest, there is for us no voluntary action possible. Without the intervention of feeling, the cognii tion stands divorced from the conation--i. e. effort--and, apart from feeling, all conscious endeavor after anything would be altogether incomprehensible."
The testimony of Locke is to the same effect. He says: " Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind, but that which immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasi ness of desire, fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment of

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pleasure." Elsewhere he says: "For good, though ap pearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it hath raised de sires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the sphere of its activity."
Sir James Mackintosh is more to the point. He says: "We can easily imagine a percipient and thinking being, without a capacity of receiving pleasure or pain. Such a being might perceive what we do; if we could conceive him to reason, he might reason justly; and if he were to judge at all, there seems no reason why he should not judge truly. But what could induce such a being to will or to act? It seem.>. evident that his existence could only be a state of passive contemplation. Reason, as reason, can never be a motive to action. It is only when we superadd to such a being sensibility, or the capacity of emotion, or sentiment of desire and aversion, that we introduce him into the world of action." .
Haven admits that the majority of philosophers concur in these opinions. He says: "The intellect they regard as acting upon the will, not directly, but through the me dium of the sensibilities, the various emotions and desires which are awakened by the perceptions of the intellect. That this is the correct view, admits of little doubt."
But there are cases, in which it does, at first, seem, that men are impelled to action more by judgment or reason than by feeling; in which the volition is determined by the intelligence, rather than by the emotions. In exigencief of danger and doubt, we are embarrassed by the question, which of several courses must we take ? We must decide the question by the reason first. That must inform us, which of the possible courses is wisest, safest, or best. And yet a scrutiny of the mental process will discover, that a feeling or desire supervenes upon the decision of the intel lect, and before the volition takes place. A general is in doubt, which of two or more methods of strategy to adopt; whether to advance or retreat, to attack boldly in front, or

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surprise on the flank or rear, to employ infantry or artil lery. His object is to defeat the enemy and gain a victoryIt is his desire to accomplish this, which nerves him to the endeavor. His judgment must decide the method, but his interest--his desire for success--spurs him on to the achieve ment. A mere decision between two courses has in it nothing of impulse, or inducement to action.
It is said that when Csesar was at the height of his pop ularity and power, " a kingly crown " was thrice offered him, which he thrice refused. It would seem that his action, in this instance, was dictated by policy--i. e., judg ment of prudence or expediency. Moreover, supposing him to be ambitious of the imperial dignity, it would ap pear that he willed in opposition to his desires. He desired the royal power, yet would not take the crown. Why? He knew or feared that the acceptance of the symbol then was premature, and would precipitate a revolution which might deprive him of the reality of which that diadem was only a sign. His desire or ambition was for the power, and not the symbol; therefore, he refused the symbol that he might more certainly enjoy the power. 'Twas ambition that caused him to reject the proffered emblem.
But do we not sometimes act from judgment, and at other times from feeling. We say one man acts from prejudice, a second from passion, a third from reason or judgment. It is said to be characteristic of wise men to be controlled by principle, and foolish men by impulse. So we speak. But it would be more correct and more philosophical to say, that wise men act from the impulses of the rational sensi bilities, and foolish men from those of the lower propensities. Two men may have the same judgment as to the impro priety of a given act. The one, impelled by passion, rushes headlong into its commission. The other, re strained by conscientious obligation, or sense of duty or honor, avoids it. One has obeyed the impulse of passion, the other the impulse of a nobler feeling.
In the early days of the Roman republic, the sons of the

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consul, Lucius Junius Brutus, were arraigned before their father on an allegation of crime. He found them guilty and gave sentence accordingly. Parental love pleaded strongly for his children, but duty argued more powerfully for justice and the good of the commonwealth. His will obeyed the dictate of duty.
Now what is duty ? It is simply obligation to do what is right, or just, or wise, or prudent, or safe, or honorable, or courteous, or anything which may be called praisewor thy. "If there by any virtue, any praise," duty bids us " think on these things." Now, of course, the judgment must decide what is praiseworthy--that is, it must inform us which, of several courses, it is our duty to pursue. But if that decision be all, nothing will be done. Unless we feel the obligation, unless the sense or sentiment of duty be awakened, as an impulse in the heart, there will be no vo lition, and hence no action. Duty, therefore, presupposes judgment; but its essential nature is impulse--which is feeling.
In our historical illustrations, we had occasion to speak of conscience, both as a restraining and impelling influence to the volition. Its voice warned Macbeth of the crime he meditated, and urged Cranmer to revoke his treason to his faith. The question arises, how is Conscience an influence to the Will ? Is it to be classed among the emotions ? Conscience is a subject of much difficulty, and of sacred importance. It will be discussed in the next section, in which its nature and relation to the Will may be seen.

SECTION VII.
ANALYTICAL VIEW OF CONSCIENCE.
Among the impulses to volition residing in the human breast, one of the most powerful is that of conscience, or the moral faculty. As an incentive to voluntary action, it is of the nature of obligation, allied to duty, though not identical with it. Duty is an obligation more general than

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that of conscience, having reference to a wider range of qualities. Duty concerns all estimable and praiseworthy actions; conscience has regard to one feature of conduct only, the moral quality--the right and wrong. Conscience enjoins obligation to God, as our Creator and moral Gov ernor, and to men as the creatures of God. It commands reverence and obedience to our Maker, and enjoins charity, justice, truth, honesty, chastity to our fellow creatures, on account of our common relations to God. Duty involves not only al! these, but other excellent qualities and actions not properly classed as moral. It includes expedient, poli tic, wise, appropriate, prudential and aesthetic relations, as well as those that are moral. It not only councils to pious, just and charitable conduct, but to the observance of what is becoming, dignified, graceful and politic. Conscience regards morals alone; duty whatever is commendable or excellent. Duty includes conscientious obligation, but has a wider sphere of action.
Duty is essentially an emotion--a feeling of obligation to do what is right, or wise, or appropriate, or expedient, or courteous. It presupposes reason and judgment, but its real nature is emotional. In this also it differs from con science, which is a complex power, made up of both intel lectual and emotional elements.
Conscience may be defined that faculty, or department, of our spiritual nature which is concerned with moral quali-. ties and duties--the right and the wrong in human affairs. Right is that which is pleasing to God; wrong is what is displeasing to God. Conscience involves the recognition of the existence and moral perfections the Supreme Being, and enjoins those obligations which arise out of man's rela tions to Him. It approves every act done in accordance with these obligations, and censures every violation of the same. It is thus seen that conscience involves several functions. Some of these are intellectual and some emo tional.
An analytical view of the moral faculty is here presented.

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Conscience may be resolved into four different factors, or states, each of which is a compound of intellection and emotion.
1. In the first state, the intellectual element is the idea of a God. This idea is intuitive and universal, being found or developed in every human breast. Upon this idea there springs up a responsive emotion--namely, awe of a God-- a feeling of subdued terror, in view of the existence and perfections of this exalted Being. Both the idea and its emotional correlate are fundamental and universal--lying at the basis of the moral faculty and existing among all men.
2. Following upon the acknowledgment and awe of a Deity, arises the second state of the conscience. This con sists of the conception of right and wrong--the intuitive notion of a possible something pleasing or displeasing to God; and the correlative feeling of approval of the right and disapproval of the wrong. This compound state is also universal, all men having it in a greater or less degree.
3. The third state of the development of conscience is reached, when an act involving moral quality is proposed. The intellectual element is now, not an intuition, but a judgment. It decides whether the act is right or wrong. And as all judgments are fallible, the ethical judgment is liable to be erroneous. Hence, some things which one man believes to be right, another regards as wrong, and vice versa. This is the feature of conscience ,in respect to which there is such a wide difference among men. While all men have some notion of right and wrong, based on their recognition of a Supreme Being, they differ in their judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. Much depends on education for the correctness of our moral judgments. The defects of the ethical judgment need to be supplied by the truths of revelation.
Following close upon this intellection, comes the feeling of obligation to do the right or refrain from doing the wrong. Wheth'3er our judgments are correct or erroneous, the

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emotion responds to the intellection, and we feel impelled to do what we believe to be right, and to abstain from what we think to be wrong. This is a natural emotion, and, when encouraged, will urge us to duty. But like all other emotions, it may be blunted by neglect and repeated disregard of its monitions.
This part of conscience requires the most careful atten tion and nurture. The intellectual element should be dil igently cultivated by thoughtful attention to the character and. bearings of every act, aided by the teachings of Holy Writ. Only thus can the discriminations of conscience be trusted. And no less should the emotional element--the feeling of obligation--be scrupulously fostered and obeyed. Otherwise, habitual disregard will benumb the moral sen sibility, and render us a prey to the power of corrupt affec tions and malign passions.
4. The fourth and last state ef conscience supervenes after the performance of the act, or after a proposed in dulgence has been successfully resisted. The conscience then surveying the r.ct, experiences pleasure if it was right, and pain if it was wrong.
RECAPITULATION.
First State. Intellection--Idea of a God. Emotion--Awe of a God.
Second State. Intellection--Idea of right and wrong. Emotion--Approval of right, disapproval of wrong. *
Third State. Intellection--Judgment as to the right or wrong of a given act. Emotion--Obligation to do the right and refrain from doing the wrong.
Fourth State. Intellection--Subsequent contemplation of the act. Emotion--Pleasure on having done right, pain on hav ing done wrong.

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These four intellections, with their corresponding emo tions, make up the whole of that mysterious department of our nature called conscience. It is that part of the soul which binds us to the throne of God, and is, in one sense, the vicegerent of God in the soul.
An analysis of a moral action will discover to us the rela tion of. the conscience to the. Will. Suppose the question to be as to the commission of a theft.
Intellection--I discern in this act a moral quality-- namely wrong; that is I judge the theft to be wrong.
Emotion--Upon this judgment I feel impelled to abstain from the act; that is, a feeling of obligation restrains me.
Volition--If no stronger emotion prevails, I will refrain, in obedience to the dictate of conscience.
The impulse of conscience, or the feeling of moral obli gation, is the most sacred and authoritative impulse of the soul. In well regulated sensibilities, it holds the highest rank of all the natural emotions, subordinating self-love and all the lower propensities to its authority. In such natures, the Will ever commands right actions, because it is under the sway of moral obligation--the dominant emotion.

SECTION VIII.
SCRIPTURAL EXAMPLES--ANALYSIS OF FAITH.
The Bible will now furnish some instances illustrative o the theory of the Will, heretofore propounded.
It is undeniable that the first transgression--the fall--was the result of the tempter's assault upon the heart--the sen sibility--of the mother of the human race. Desire was kindled in the breast of Eve. This desire, whether sensual or rational, whether appetite, lust or ambition, gained the ascendency over the holy affections of her original nature, and, in a moment of supreme mastery, prompted the de termination to eat the forbidden fruit. Then discord began in the soul, the elemental forces of the sensibility lost their

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due subordination, and depravity became the leprous Inheri tance of the race.
The first murder was instigated by hatred, begotten of jealousy in the heart of Cain. David's double crime was the offspring of sensual lust. Peter's denial of his Master was prompted by cowardice, and the treachery of Judas by avarice. Thus it is plain that the sensibility was the seat of the evil in every instance. The master passion swayed the Will, determining the volitions to those acts necessary for its gratification.
We now turn to more pleasing illustrations of the doc trine, in which we shall see exhibited the triumph of the nobler affections.
Abraham was divinely commanded to offer up his only son as a burnt sacrifice on Mt. Moriah. Pity, humanity, sympathy, parental love, stimulated to intensity by the un paralleled circumstances of the case, cried out with vehe ment protest against the execution of the dreadful order. An act so unnatural and horrible was never before required of a father. But against these eloquent appeals of nature stood the direct, positive, and inflexible command of Al mighty God.
Abraham resolved to obey the divine mandate. What impelled to this obedience? Most persons would say that he did it in spite of his inclinations, and that he stifled all the feelings of his heart. Not so; else it would never have been done. He yielded to the dominant emotion, the af fection that held supreme sway in his soul.
But let us contemplate Abraham as he makes up liis mind to execute the stern decree. We exhibit the mental process in the manner before adopted.
Intellection--Abraham understood the order, and appre ciated all the revolting features of the case.
Emotion--Parental love--the unspeakable yearning of the father's heart over Isaac, his only son, the son of his old age, the son of promise--urged him to disobey.

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Volition--Had no stronger impulse dominated in his sen sibility, he had refused to obey God and spared his son.
But he obeyed, and from what impulse ? The apostle Paul attributes it to faith. " By faith, Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac." Now, what was the prin ciple which, triumphing over every natural feeling of the breast, prompted that good man, that loving father, to lay his darling upon the altar for a burnt offering ?
As was shown in a previous section, there is no im pulsive force in mere intellect; to constitute a motive to action, the energy must come from the emotional part of our nature. This has been variously exhibited in the exam ples already adduced. We found emotional elements in the moral faculty, and showed that wherever conscience urged to action, the volition was determined by tiae feeling of ob-. ligation. The opinions of eminent philosophers were also produced, corroborating this principle.
At this stage of our investigation, it is proper to inquire whether the Scriptures throw any light upon this subject. Solomon exhorts: '' Keep thy Jteart with all diligence, for out of it are tJte issues of life" The heart is the seat of the sensibility,- and we are here taught that from it spring the actions that make up the history of our lives. Our Saviour teaches that " out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, Ynurders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphe mies; these are the things which defile a man." The apos tle John sums up everything in the world opposed to the Father in three emotions, '' the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life"--all affections of the sensi bility. Good actions, also, are the issues of the heart. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." The divine summary of duty is love to God and to our neighbor.
Since, therefore, actions, both good and bad, are prompted by the heart, if faith be a motive to conduct, it must have a heart element, an emotional power. The apostle distinctly ascribes Abraham's obedience to faith. Let us analyze his faith.

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1. Intellection--Abraham believed in the existence and glorious perfections of God.
2. Emotion--Upon his belief, supreme love to God was awakened.
Hence, faith is a complex act or state of the soul, involv ing both intellect and sensibility. Abraham's faith was a compound of intellectual conviction and holy affection; in short, of belief in God and love to God. It was trust or confidence in God, and was more or less a permanent condi tion of his soul. Let us now analyze his act of faith--his obedience.
1. Intellection--Abraham was convinced that the com mand really came from God, and that obedience would be pleasing to God.
2. Emotion--Upon this, was awakened desire to please God--based on love to God.
3. Volition--This desire prevailing over parental affec tion, determined the Will to compliance. Thus we find again action commanded by the Will, in obedience to the dictate of the dominant emotion. It seems that the Scrip tures ascribe the efficiency of faith, as a motive, to emotional power, when it teaches us that " faith works by love" and "with the Jieart man believeth unto righteousness."
The choice of Moses affords another striking illustration, of the doctrine in question.
Moses, though a Hebrew, was the adopted child of the daughter of Pharaoh, and enjoyed al! the pleasures, riches and honors of a prince of the house of Egypt. His coun trymen, the Hebrews, were abject slaves, doomed to pov erty, shame and wretchedness. At the age of maturity and discretion, he resolved to identify himself with his afflicted people, sharing their degradation and hardships, renouncing the affluence, dignity and luxury of the Egyp tian court. What impelled him to this choice? All the natural feelings were against it.
Voluptuousness--love of pleasure--prompted him to

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remain amid the enjoyments of the most sensual and lux urious court of ancient times.
Avarice--love of riches--urged him to continue in the possession of the treasures of Egypt, that surpassed the wealth of all other nations of that period.
Ambition--love of fame and power--impelled him to abide in a position where present honors clustered thickly around his person, and where, perhaps, royal dignity awaited him. All these feelings combined to create a powerful desire to stay where * he was, associated with the wicked and idolatrous natives of the land. But a contrary impulse predominated. " By faith Moses, when he was come to years, refused to be called '. the son of Pharaoh's daughter; choosing rather to suffer affliction with the peo ple of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season; esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than all the treasures in Egypt; for he had respect unto the recom pense of the reward."
Here the choice of Moses is clearly attributed to a mo tive', faith. The Will is determined by faith. We have seen that its impulsive power is in the sensibility. It is love to God. It is this faith which, "working by love," urges the pious missionary to forsake home, friends and comfort for ihe hardships and perils of a life among savages. It is this same faith which, " beleiving with the heart," induces the sinner to seek pardon and salvation at the Cross of the Divine Redeemer, and to consecrate his life to the service of his Master.
It triumphs, as we have seen, over natural inclination. It must, therefore, be a supernatural principle. It is an inspiration. " It is the gift of God."
We are prepared now to consider the Will in its rela tion to regeneration and Christian obedience. This will be discussed in our next section.

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The Human Will.

SECTION IX.

REGENERATION AND EVANGELICAL FAITH.
We have now discovered a striking coincidence between our philosophy of the Will and the teachings of revelation. Both unite their testimony to the truth that the impulse to volition and action is derived from the seat of the affec tions--the sensibility, as psychologists term it; the heart, as it is denominated in the Scriptures.
It was suggested in the third section of this tre'atise, that there was a symptom of disorder in the loose nexus binding the Intellect and Sensibility. This symptom is betrayed not so much in the variety of emotions awakened by a given intellection, as in the false, base and malevolent affections aroused by ideas ivhich ought, legitimately, to produce the contrary feelings. The human soul is a grand instrument, whose chords are capable of a great va riety of musical sounds. But it is sadly out of tune. The keys, though struck by a master hand, awaken uncer tain, false and dissonant tones, so that what should be sweet and thrilling harmony is jarring and jangling discord.
The Sensibility, then, is the chief seat of evil in man's soul. No longer under the sway of right reason and a pure conscience; it often flames like raging fire, and de stroys in its malignant fury.
The Bible, also, teaches that the heart is the seat of cor ruption in man. "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked." Christ, as we have seen, de clared that "out of the heart proceed all evil thoughts, murders," etc. As all goodness consists in love to God and our neighbor, so all wickedness results from the absence of these holy affections. But man, in his natural state, does not love God. ' The carnal mind is enmity to God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." From enmity nothing pleasing to God can flow. There fore, man's Will, prompted by natural feeling, never com-

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mands righteous and holy actions. Thus man is, by nature entirely a sinner, because his heart is opposed to God.
We have shown in the cases of Abraham and Moses, that, in matters of duty to God, righteous men are impelled by a principle superior to the natural dispositions of the soul. This principle, therefore, is supernatural in its origin. It is awakened by Deity. We have said that faith is an inspiration. By this we do not mean to say that it is an exotic transplanted into the soul--that is, a foreign sub stance added to the furniture of the soul; but a capacity developed by Divine power to do what, of its own un aided nature, it could not do. We have found faith to be a compound of intellection and 'emotion--namely, con viction of certain truth and responding affections. One who possesses this faith is regenerated, "born again," or "born of God." The scriptures emphatically assert the necessity of this regeneration, which it as emphatically ascribes to Divine Power, the power of the Holy Spirit:
Now, in order to regeneration there must be new intel lections--convictions of truth of which the soul was be fore incapable. There must be also new sensibilities awakened--affections hitherto inexperienced and impossi ble. The gospel furnishes the truth or knowledge, which the Holy Spirit fastens in clear conviction on the intellect, and then aw ikens thos i emotions which follow appropri ately and legitimately. The reception of this truth, and the consequent affections, make up evangelical faith.
Thus evangelical faith is both intellectual and emotional. We exhibit its elements as follows :
Intellection.--Belief of the Gospel. This includes the conviction of the following prominent truths: Man's de pravity and ruin--God's hatred of sin, yet love to the race --Christ's Divine satisfaction for sin--pardon and salvation to the penitent.
Emotion--Love to Christ. This involves the following . prominent feelings : Sorrow for sin--trust in the Saviour --desire to glorify Him.

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The Human Will.

Now, it is easy to see that if this faith is once created in the soul by Divine Power, these higher impulses will pre vail over the lower propensities of the carnal nature, and the Will, obeying the dictate of the dominant emotion, will command actions pleasing to God, and the subject of this faith will do what is right.
Thus it is the effect of regeneration, as it is its design* to bring the soul of man into harmony with the mind o God, and the human will into co-operation with the Divine Will. Thus it produces in him loyalty and obedience to his Maker and righteous Lord. Thus "God worketh in us both to K/z7/and to do of His good pleasure." He doe s not arbitrarily or violently bend the Will to His behests' compelling it to act against the disposition of the heart, but He creates in us right affections and holy desires, and thus so works in us that we will and -we do of His good pleasure. The question is sometimes asked, which is first in order, regeneration or faith ? Our theory of faith set tles the question. Regeneration is the process ; faith is the product The Spirit is the agent, regeneration the method by which He operates, and faith the result. But while regeneration psychologically precedes faith, chronolo gically they are one and instantaneous. As "God speaks and it is done" so when he decrees the moment of the new birth, instantly faith is awakened, and the new-born soul breathes the air of liberty. The regenerated man is at once a new man, because his heart is changed at once. Saul of Tarsus was at one moment breathing threatening and slaughter against Christ and His people, and in the next, was lying on the ground in an agony of remorse, crying "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do ?" His mind was then no longer enmity against Jesus, whom he had perse cuted, but eager to know what he could do to serve Him. He was a regenerated man, the subject of evangelical faith.
One of the admirable effects of regeneration is the grad ual and complete restoration of conscience to its normal supremacy, and the other natural sensibilities to their

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proper subordination to its authoritative impulses. Thus, in harmonizing the human soul with the will and law of the Creator, it re-establishes harmony within the soul itself. The ultimate result of the process is to bring man back to the perfection of his original state, when he bore the clear and complete image of his Maker; or rather to elevate him to that state of perfection and security, from which ft will be impossible for him to fall. The full realization of this perfection will be in the future life.

SECTION X.
THE WILL IN. REFERENCE TO MECHANICAL, INDIFFERENT, AND
RELUCTANT ACTIONS.
From a study of consciousness, the reports of experi ence, and a wide range of historical inquiry, both sacred and profane, we have, by generalization and induction, drawn the conclusion, that the Will is subject to the control of the sensibility, its acts being put forth in obedience to the prevailing emotions. This induction is corroborated by the declarations of Scripture and the opinions of phil osophers.
If, therefore, any actions come under our observation, for which we can discover either no motives at all, or mo tives that appear to be other than impulses of the sensi bility, it is reasonable to infer that these are only seeming exceptions to the law, and that a perfect analysis, were it always possible, would disclose the secret cause in the emotional part of our nature. Some of these apparently exceptional instances will now be considered.
There are many actions of a minor character, in regard to which it is very difficult to _ discern any prior impulse, incentive or motive. The utterly insignificant and trivial character of these actions naturally suggest that their causes are of a feeble, vague and shadowy kind. Among these may be included all merely automatic or mechanical

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actions--those that we do unconsciously from long habit or practice ; whimsical actions; actions performed without any apparent interest; and actions prompted by a choice between two or more proposed courses to which we are seemingly indifferent.
An example of the mechanical action is seen, when one, on setting out to walk, unconsciously takes up his umbrella for which he has no need ; or when one, while studying, twists his hair, or thumps his cheek, It is evident, that in such cases, the action is involuntary--neither head, heart nor will has anything to do with it. The mind is abstracted, and action results from habit alone. It is the facility which the mind acquires of working in channels from which long use has worn off the friction, and its movements are auto matic, like those of a machine. There is no volition, and hence no impulse to action, other than the predisposition of habit.
An example of the second kind is, when one, with a per fect consciousness of what he is doing, intentionally strikes the table at which he is sitting with all the muscular force of his arm ; or, rising from his seat, kicks over a chair from pure caprice. These acts seem to be done without any motive whatever, and though there is physical or muscular energy put forth in the action, no interest, or feeling, or purpose is discernible. These appear to be cases of volition, independent of prior motives or causes. Are they really so ? The incentive may be unwise and unrea sonable ; it may be a whimsicality bordering on idiocy or insanity; but there is an impulse nevertheless, and that is the impulse of desire. For some reason or other, he is pleased to do it. And his pleasure, or whim, or wish, or desire was ^Jeeling.
A case of the third kind is that of one who is persuaded by another to take a walk, though he feels no interest in the act--does not " care " whether he walks or not. But however little may be the interest in the walk, the desire to gratify his friend may not be lacking.

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The fourth kind is that of action in view of equiponder ant motives--that is, where the interest or motives for two or more courses appear to be equally balanced. As long as the equilibrium of motives is preserved, it is certain that there will be no action. The Will is held in suspense, and the man will hesitate or vacillate. As soon as action takes place it is proof that one of the incentives has prepon derated, and carried the volition before it. Here, for ex ample, are two different places I wish to visit I cannot go to both--yet strong but different motives impel to both. For some time these motives are equiponderant. Finally, I barely incline to one of the proposed courses. It is the preponderance of one impulse of desire over the other.
Or suppose two apples be offered me. equally ripe, sound and inviting. I have no choice between them at first--that is, I do not care which I take. Finally I do choose one of them, but the act of selection has been done without any interest. This is almost wholly automatic--it is as if I had shut my eyes, and left the choice to accident. In propotion to its recession from the automatic, the vol untary feature [is more evident, and the interested feeling more discernible. There may have been little force of vo lition, and so behind it there was little force of desire. As the desire on the instant of action inclines, ,in that direc tion is the bent of the Will. I have done as I pleased, and this demonstrates feeling.
Another class of actions, apparent exceptions to the law, may be denominated reluctant actions. It frequently hap pens that we do that to which certain feelings offer power ful opposition. It is common to say, that, in such cases, we acted against our wishes, or did what we did not wish to do. It would be more correct to say that the act was reluctant--done in spite of strong opposition on the part of certain sympathetic and demonstrative feelings. The sympathetic emotions--such as love, hatred, grief--are more restless, boisterous and turbulent in their manifestations'than the rational sensibilities--such as duty, moral

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sentiment, and other like dictates of high and virtuous feeling. The indulgence of the former makes us uneasy to a certain degree, and their cries are heard above " the still small voice " of rational impulse; yet, as in nature, the most powerful agents are the most noiseless and impercept ible, so in the mind, the calm, deep sensibilities are the most effective impulses of the breast.
Take this example. A young lady is strongly attached to a young man whom her father forbids her to marry. Or, to put a stronger case, the father commands her to marry a man whom she does not love--nay, positively dislikes^ Finally, after a struggle, she yields to her father's injunction > and gives her hand to the man whom she despises. In the most extreme case of this kind, where one yields to the imperious will of another, there is very little volition, ifVany at all. And behind the volition, where it exists, there is some feeling of dread, or reverence, or duty, which, after a struggle with the more sympathetic emotion, prevails-- the reluctating affection becoming more feeble in its oppo sition as the contest goes on. Finally, when the time of action arrives, the more quiet, yet authoritative, feeling gains the mastery of the more turbulent affection, and car ries the volition before it.

SECTION XL
THE DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES.
The motive theory of the Will was propounded by Jon athan Edwards, the most distinguished of American meta physicians, and one of the ablest thinkers of modern timesHis view has been accepted by a large class of philosophers, and by the great majority of Calvinistic theologians. The doctrine is this: " Tlte motive which, as viewed by the mind, is strongest, is that which determines the Will." By motive is meant whatever moves, or excites to action. With re spect to the Will, motive is simply the cause of volition To say that the Will is determined by the strongest mbtive,

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is the same as to say that it is determined by the strongest cause, which sounds very much like a truism.
But it is the motive which is strongest, '' as viewed by the mind." This expression "strongest, as viewed by the mind," is explained to mean " most agreeable and inviting to the understanding." If this conveys any idea at all, it is that the Will is determined by some influence which awakens agreeable feeling or desire in the mind; and that, unless it does arouse feeling, it causes no volition, and, therefore, is not a motive at all. To be a motive it must kindle emotion, and to be the strongest motive, it must ex cite the strongest emotion. Thus President Edwards main tains that the motive operative upon the Will is a force out side of the- soul, and is operative only as it arouses feeling.
Our theory is much simpler, and, we think, more intelli gible also. It places the motive in the sensibility--it makes feeling the motive, rather than that which awakens feeling. Edwards seems to place the motive a degree or two behind the impulse to volition, which he virtually admits to be feeling. The doctrine of Edwards was based upon a de fective psychology; and imperfect analysis of the soul. He recognized only two great cardinal powers of the soul-- Understanding and Will. As he regarded the understand ing as capable of feeling pleasure, it is evident that he as cribed some emotional character to that intellectual faculty, and Will he manifestly considered as a form of desire. Thus, with a confused" psychology, he naturally fell into confusion of thought. It should be remembered that the present three-fold classification of the powers of the soul--Intellect, Sensibility and Will--is a comparatively recent triumph of science, and when Edwards wrote, more than one hundred years ago, was entirely unknown.
Another objection to the motive hypothesis is, that it does not clearly characterize the motives, nor define their proper sphere, and, hence, does not satisfactorily explain the phenomena of volition. The spirit of inquiry demands, "Where do these motives reside, and what is their na-

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ture ? Is their sphere objective or subjective ? Do they proceed from sources external to the mind, or do they orig inate within the soul itself? If external, are they the powers of intelligent agents, the emanations of matter, or the blind influences of circumstances and events ?"
Let us inquire whether exterior influences do ever be come motives to Volition--do ever affect the Will without the intervention of intellectual or emotional activities. The most important influences from without the soul, capable of impressing the mind, are those from the Divine Will or agency, from human actions, and from surrounding circum stances.
1. How does the Divine agency operate to control the actions of men ? Is it by a power exerted directly upon the Will ? Calvin maintains that, in the regeneration of the soul, God "produces the Will." In another place he says, "He moves the Will." Paul declares that "it is God that worketh in you, to will and to do of H is good pleasu re.'' Here, both the willing and the doing are said to be wrought fn us. He does not produce the willing any more than the doing by a direct omnipotent energy on the Will, but in spires in us the desire, from which it follows that we will and do of his good pleasure. He touches the heart, awakens the right affection towards Him, and thus the Will, follow, ing the law of the mind, executes the pleasure of the soul. In conversion God draws the sinner to Christ and His service. Says our Saviour, "No man can come unto me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." But this drawing is not a violent dragging or constraint of the Will, but a sweet attractive influence upon the heart; and the affections thus graciously drawn become impulses to holy action. The motive to volition, in this case, is not an immediate Divine energy upon the Will but the Divinely awakened affection of the heart.
2. How do the actions of our fellow-men operate to pro duce action in us ? We are, undoubtedly, subject to in fluences from those by whom we are surrounded. The

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voice of maternal entreaty turned Coriolanus from the gates of Rome. The wail of distress prompted Sidney to an act of noble self denial. The example of Leonidas aroused his three hundred Spartans to face destruction at Thermopylae. The eloquence of Patrick Henry pursuaded the colonies to arm in defence of their liberties. But, in every case, the influence did not operate directly upon the Will, but through the medium of the sensibility. Filial love in the heart of the stern Roman ; pity in the soul of the noble soldier; enthusiastic courage in the hearts of the Spartans, and patriotic ardor in the bosoms of the Ameri can colonists, were the respective impulses to action. Thus che immediate motive to volition is not human in fluence, but emotion, an affection of the sensibility.
3. Do external events and surrounding circumstances constitute motives to action ? They are sources of feel ing, but they exert no immediate influence on the Will. A house on fire may 'cause a man to leap from a third story window, but it would be a remote cause, and not a motive to volition. If no fearp or feeling of any kind were awakened, he would make no effort to save himself. The motive to action is the feeling. The discovery of a gold mine attracts thousands to the scene; but the moving cause is the love of gold excited in the breast. Without this avaricious feeling no volition would be produced.
The diabolical act of the "dynamite fiend," which caused the frightful disaster at Bremerhaven, has been already alluded to. Now, on the motive theory of President Ed wards, it was the insurance on the Mosel, that prompted the crime. On the theory maintained in this discussion, the immediate impulse or motive to volition was the feeling of cupidity, the greed of gain in the heart of that debased monster, and the insurance was only a remote influence to the Will. It was not money, but the love of money in the bad heart, which determined the volition towards the exe cution of the monstrous crime. Not one man in a million
4

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would have been influenced to do such an act by mere money. Only one whose heart is fearfully corrupted by avarice would be capable of it.
And so every event or circumstance influences action only indirectly, by first addressing the understanding and then awakening the sensibility. It is the dominant emo tion determining the volition.
Thus external influences of whatever kind, whether from God, from man, or from circumstances, operate to produce action through the medium of the sensibility, which thus, in every case, is the seat of the motive.
Thus it is not enough to say, that the Will is determined by the strongest motive. We must localize and character ize the motive. We must know its nature,"and where it is be found. Thus we have found that the controlling force of volition is not the direct agency of God, nor the actions of men, nor the influence of circumstances, nor anything exter nal to the soul. We have found, also, heretofore, that there is no motive to volition in mere intellect. But it is a sub jective force that determines'the Will, and that is the power of emotion--a power residing in the sensibility.
Here is a motive specified and localized, and thus is phi losophy simplified. Here is, we t'liink, the true psychol ogy ascertained.
And, if our theory enables us to furnish the true expo sition of conscience and faith, to harmonize psychology with revelation, and, above all, to show that the ultimate appeal of philosophy must be to the inspired Word of God, then, in the law of the Will enunciated, we have not stated simply an abstract principle, nor proposed merely a juster philosophy of the soul, but we have established a great truth, fraught with the profoundest practical momen every thoughtful mind.

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SECTION XII.
THE THEORY OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE \V[LL.
Philosophers, who deny that the Will is governed by motives, or causes, extraneous to itself, maintain that it possesses a self-determing energy, or the uucontrolled power to originate its own volitions. This position is held by some able metaphysicians, and by the great body of Arminian. Theologians. Among the distinguished advo cates of this theory are Cousin, in France, Tappan, of New England, and Bledsoe, a Southern writer of high reputa tion and superior ability.
Cousin ascribes to the Will an absolute and undeter mined power to act as cause. "This cause, in order to produce its effect, has need of no other theater and no other nstrument than itself. It produces it directly, without anything intermediate, and without condition: * * * being always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do what it does." Mr.Tappan contends that all cause lies ul timately in the Will, a power which is self-moved. Mr. Bledsoe denies that volition is the effect of anything; whether motive or mind, it is the action of an independent agent, the Will: "The mind puts forth its volitions with out being efficiently caused to do so--without being im pelled by its own prior action, or by the prior action of anything else. The conditions or occasions of volition being supplied, the mind itself acts in view thereof, with out being subject to the power or action of any cause whatever."
These views agree in making the Will exempt from the operation of any impelling cause--an autonomy, or inde pendent power, with inherent capacity to do or refrain, at its own uncontrolled option.
This theory is objectionable for the following reasons : First, it contradicts one of the acknowledged intuitions of the mind--a universally recognized first principle of thought: namely, the principle of causition. The law of

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causation is, every event has a cause, or every begun ex istence, or every occurring phenomenon, is the effect of some preceding energy, called a cause. An event or phenomenon without a cause, is inconceivable by the mind. And, therefore, philosophers have ever placed causality among the categories of thought, the intuitive truths of the mind--truths that are self-evident, necessary and universal. To say that volition, an act of the Will, can take place without a cause, is to state what the con scious mind pronounces impossible. When an act has been performed, it is legitimate to ask why it was done ? The answer is, according to this theory, the mind so willed it. Why did the mind so will ? To this there is no an swer, and can be none, for there is no law governing the Will--it wills thus, or the opposite, without motive. But this does not meet the demand of the inquiring soul, which is ever curiously prying into the springs of actions, and the causees of unexplained phenomena. This demand of universal reason is seen in the child whose faculties are just unfolding, and in the untutored savage, as truly as in the mature philosopher. A little child sees a watch, ob serves the motion of the wheels, hears the ticking of the little machine, and instantly exclaims, ' What makes it do so ?" In this curiosity to know the cause, he is on a level with the philosopher. Indeed, he is a philosopher, bent upon the discovery of causes, and you leave him unsatis fied and thirsting, until you have assigned a cause. It is this yearning of the soul after a cause, which gives so ready an entrance to the idea of a God into the mind, and which, in the breast of the ignorant, ascribes all strange and unexplained occurrences to the direct agency of God. The mind must rest in something, and hence it seeks the simplest solution of the mystery, in the Great First Cause. Now, the operation of the Will is no excep tion to the rule, that the mind demands a cause of every phenomenon. If I see a man do anything whatever, the motive for which is not apparent, I cannot avoid the men-

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tal inquiry, why did he so ? A man commits suicide. On every hand, from the youngest to the oldest, the ques tion springs up spontaneously, why did he take his life? To recur again to the Bremerhaven horror: the German press pronoun :ed Thomassen's crime the natural outgrowth of American civilization; and while Americans residing in Germany were indignant at this aspersion, and while thoughtful minds are asking for "a psychological cause," the autonomists say, there is nocause ; he willed it, that is all. They ignore the avarice in his "heart"--which the Bible declares to be "desperately wicked"--and would have us believe that he contrived that infernal scheme without a motive. But the question of universal reason, why ? will not down at the bidding of autonomists. Now, it does not avail against this inexorable fact of our con sciousness and experience, to draw a distinction between the relation of cause av.d effect, and that of agent and ac tion. If by this equivocal word, action, is meant the op eration, or putting forth of power, then the're must be a cause for that operation. A machine may have power to act, but its action is never self-produced. The powers of nature act, but their action is always the effect of some antecedent energy. If action signifies the product or re sult of the operation of the power, it is palpably caused by that operation. And in all such cases, the question is ever coming up: Why? Why? Why?
We repeat, then, that the hypothesis of the self-deter mining power of the Will contradicts one of the universally acknowledged maxims of reason, that every event must have a cause.
Secondly, the theory under review is contravened by all analogy. Everything in the material universe is admitted to be subject to this relation of cause and effect. All ac tion, motion, existences and phenomena, occurring in the physical creation, are produced by anterior power or force. And not only in nature, but in mechanics, in civil'society, in mind, and in morals, we witness the operation of

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causes, and can find no event without its cause, either known or sought for. Even the advocates of the view under consideration, admit that the understanding and the sensibility, with the states and acts of each, are deter mined---even necessitated. The Will alone is exempt from the dominion of causality, and its acts alone are selfcaused. It is, then, an anomaly in a double sense, being the solitary exception to a sweeping law, and exempt from the control of all law. Is a theory unsupported by a single analogy---nay, with which all analogy is at vari ance--likely to be true ?
Thirdly, it is contrary to observed facts. In the course of this discussion, we have adduced a great variety of ex amples, demonstrative of the principle that men act in obedience to incentives lying in the sphere of the sensibil ity. In every case, it was clearly established, that the vo lition was prompted by feeling--such as appetite, self-love, pity, benevolence, ambition, patriotism, fear, love, av arice, feeling of obligation, desire to please God, etc. We have investigated simple and common-place actions, as well as rare and important deeds, and, in each instance, \ve have traced the volition to a determining emotion.
We have searched the range of conscious experience, the sphere of observation, the record of current events, the pages of history, the volume of revelation, and have found the Will ever acting in obedience to extraneous in centive. There are cases which, at the first glance, seem to point to the intellect--the judgment--as the source of power over the volition; but the impelling cause or in ducement to action is an intervening emotion, which the test of scrutiny always discovers. Indifferent or trivial actions may often appear almost entirely motiveless; but in proportion to the feebleness or absence of induce ments, are also the feebleness and absence of the voluntary element. We maintain that the observed facts and phe nomena of the Will form a broad basis of inductive de monstration,- establishing the truth of our theory, while

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not one action has ever clearly appeared to be inspired by the undetermined Will.
Strange autonomy this, which in all history has not per formed a solitary independent exploit, but has forever sub mitted to the dictation of alien powers; which never exercises its vaunted prerogative of sovereignty, but pays unvarying tribute to foreign authority! It is vain to say that the Will can do otherwise than it does. It Is vain to arrogate powers that are never exercised. Nothing can be more ridiculous than the claim of an individual to kingly authority, who is, and ever has been, a private citizen.
Advocates of the autonomous Will cannot establish their hypothesis by induction. That hypothesis asserts that the Will has power to do otherwise than it does. In the very nature of things, it is impossible to prove this from " the facts of nature," because Ihe doctrine asserts what is contrary to facts. To affirm that the Will can do what it does not do, is to affirm what can never be known to be true--a purely conjectural and ideal conception. Thus, we can never, by "dissecting," "anatomizing" or questioning nature, arrive at the autonomy of the Will. And, according to Dr. Bledsoe, any other method is un scientific ; " it anticipates, but does not interpret nature." And according to Bacon, "it is the fparent of error, and the calamity of every science."
Induction, therefore, the argument from observed facts, is against the hypothesis of the self-determining power of the Will. We have, in every volition, one condition uniformly present--an impulse of the sensibility--and this, by the rule of inductive science, must be the cause.

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SECTION XIII.
"THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY."
The system of philosophy which maintains that the volitions, like all other phenomena, mental and physical, are due to causes, has been characterized as " the scheme of necessity," and its advocates as "necessitarians."
The relation of cause and effect, it is argued, is the re lation of necessity, the two being conjoined not simply by the bond of succession, as antecedent and consequent, but by the strong bond of irresistible power. It is essential to a cause that it produce an effect, and nothing is a cause from which an effect does not inevitably result. If, there fore, the human volitions are caused, they are necessitated and the resulting actions are likewise necessitated. There fore, man is under the rigorous pressure of a constraint from which he cannot escape, being held fast by the ada mantine chain of necessity.
In order to avoid this humiliating disability--this help less bondage to despotic necessity--the alleged logical consequence of the doctrine of caused volition--a theory is proposed, by which the Will is regarded as loosed from the dominion of causes, the volitions being produced solely by the inherent energy of that power. This is the hypothesis which, as a convenient designation, not involving oppro brium, we have denominated the scheme of autonomy.
This scheme has already been impugned, as violative of the intuitive principle of causality, as at variance with all analogy in nature, as unsupported by facts, and as inca pable of inductive demonstration. Its merits will be fur ther discussed as this investigation proceeds. For the present, let us glance at " the scheme of necessity."
Are the volitions necessitated ? If so, what then ? The answer of the autonomist is, that human liberty is a myth, accountability an illusion, and virtue and vice empty names.
It is not our purpose to deny the philosophic necessity

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involved in the causal relation. We may be, in some sense, creatures of necessity. The autonomist assures us that our feelings and thoughts are all necessitated. But to attempt to follow out the " implexed series and concate nation of causes " is to wander in hopeless perplexity in the mazes of metaphysical speculation. Yet while our reason admits causation, our consciousness proclaims freedom. And we affirm that the causation of volition, or of any mental phenomenon, is not followed by the revolting con sequences alleged by the autonomist. We shall show that it does not impair freedom, subvert moral agency, nor contravene accountability. How responsibility is compat ible with the causation of the mental acts, is a metaphysical problem--one of those mysteries pertaining to the human soul, especially in its relations to the incomprehensible Deity, which reason cannot solve. But autonomy offers no escape from the difficulty; for, as will hereafter appear, the same dread sphynx lurks, an unwelcome intruder, in that vaunted refuge for harassed minds.
The truth is, we must be content to leave some mys teries unexplained. "Now we know in part: hereafter we shall know even as we are known."
To reject a proposition as false, because it is incompre hensible to our minds, or appears contradictory to our limited understanding, is the height of folly and arrogance. Who can comprehend the eternity ot God? Who can reconcile that awful attribute with our necessary notions of finite duration ?
To those not versed in science, what principle appears more impossible and self-contradictory than the paradox of the " interference of light"--namely, that two rays of light meeting each other, under certain conditions, should produce darkness ? What mental contradiction is there greater to him than that well known fact in physics, that two encountering waves of sound meeting produce silence? There are thousands of mysteries and paradoxes in mate rial nature; and shall we be surprised to meet them in

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that confessedly most occult and inaccessible o.r sublunary realms, the human soul ? Especially in its relations to the unsearchable Deity, we may expect to find difficulties that defy the utmost efforts of reason to resolve. The one now before us--the reconciliation of necessity with ac countability--is the Gordian Knot of philosophy, to un tie which seems beyond the capacity of the human intel lect. But, however this may be, we find the very same difficulty in the scheme of autonomy.
While, therefore, we shall not deny that we are creat ures of necessity, in a sense, nor attempt to solve the problem referred to, we shall suggest the sphere in the mental constitution, where the vexed question might, were our powers equal to the task, find its complete answer; where, perhaps, in the future, a full and satisfactory ex plication of the intricate mystery will be possible. And subsequently, it will be our part to show that, however necessity may oppress the human mind, it does not in fringe man's birthright of freedom, nor subvert his distinct moral agency and thorough accountability. And, fur thermore, it will be our purpose to demonstrate that the self-same evils imputed to "the scheme of necessity"--nay, far greater and more insurmountable evils--are chargeable to the scheme of autonomy.
We maintain that causation everywhere prevails in the universe of God--in the material creation, and in the world of mind. Not only are external phenomena sub ject to causes, but our spiritual acts and states--our voli tions, our emotions and our thoughts. But an important distinction is to be drawn between physical phenomena and psychical phenomena--between the operation of ' causes in matter and in mind. This distinction grows out of the difference in the nature of matter and of mind. Matter is essentially inert, insensate, impotent. Mind is essentially active, conscious, potential. The one submits passively, blindly, helplessly, to whatever forces may act upon it. The other is aroused by causes, but possesses

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an inherent energy, a dynamic force of its own. There is, consequently, a vast difference between physical neces sity, and psychical or mental necessity.
Let us illustrate: A rope-walker attempts to cross Niagara river on a rope stretched over the great falls. Midway the passage he loses his balance, is precipitated to the bottom of the chasm, and is dashed to pieces on the rocks. He is found dead. Now, here is a series of physical events produced by causes, and bearing all the features of rigid, blind necessity. Beginning with the physical act of walking, we go through the several se quences of losing his balance, descending to the bottom of the gorge, the force of the impact, the mangling of the body, the destruction of life. We have not mentioned all, if any, of the causes in this series. But, if we could search them out, we should find that each sequence fol lowed its cause with an obedience which was, in the highest degree, compulsory. The cause, in every case, was psychical force acting upon inert, stolid matter.
But behind the first step in this series of physical events, was a chain of mental phenomena. There was, first, the resolution to walk the rope--a volition of the mind. This, upon our theory, was caused by some impulse of the sen sibility---say mercenary feeling. Here the relation is di rect, the ruling emotion--desire of gain--prompting the volition, and the volition following with unvarying cer tainty. Yet there is an obvious difference between the relation of two active psychical principles, and the " hooks of steel" with which physical forces lay hold of dead matter. The necessity which impelled the funambulist to obey the mercenary motive, although just as certain in its influence, was entirely dissimilar to that necessity which caused his unsupported body to descend from the rope, and death to ensue upon the frightful contusion of his frame. The relation is that of certainty; the necessity is spychcal and not physical.
But while the relation of the Will to the Sensibility is

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thus direct and determinate, that of the latter to the Intel lect, or to any known cause, is undeterminate and incon sequent. Of all the mental factulties, the Sensibility is incomparably the most spontaneous, active and free. Our emotions come and go without any apparent cause; they flit hither and thither, as if they knew neither law nor limit; now, like the trade-winds, they flow in a steady, helpful current; now, like the tornado, they rage with lawless and destructive violence. They are the very source of freedom in action; for the actions obeying the volitions execute, in every instance, the supreme pleasure of the soul. Surely a power like this is not subject to the same adamantine necessity as insensate and inanimate mat ter. Matter cannot feel; the Sensibility is quick with a spontaneous \'ivacity and susceptibility, pleasurable or painful, happy or miserable. Our emotions are neces sitated, yet not like the fall of a stone, or the movements of a machine.
This phenomenal character of the Sensibility justifies us in making a broad distinction between physical necessity or compulsion, and psychical necessity or certainty; and in pointing to this department of our spiritual nature as the realm where all the vexed problems of necessity, liberty . and responsibility may find their possible resolution.

SECTION XIV.
FREE AGENCY.
It has been charged that the subjection of the Will to . extraneous influence subverts the free agency of man. If the Will be bondman to an external power, how is man free ? If this external power be an agency outside of the human soul, bearing directly upon the Will, there is force in the imputation. There is plausibility in it, as directed against the views of Calvin; and even respecting the motive theory of Edwards, it suggests some difficulty. If God bends or produces the Will by the immediate exertion

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of omnipotence, it is hard to escape the conclusion that man is a vassal. If external circumstances, or motives lying without the soul, usurp direct control of the voli tions, it would seem that he is held fast by the bond of necessity. He is not free to do otherwise than as these external forces impel him.
It must -not be forgotten that, besides the Will, man possesses two other great spiritual faculties, each of which is endowed with various and potent energies. The sensi bility is awakened upon the exercise of the intellect, but so great is the variety and mobility of the emotional power, that many of its impulses can neither be traced nor ac counted for, but are like the wind, which "bloweth where it listeth," yet is ever subject to law. In this almost in finite diversity, volatility and elasticity of the emotions, there is ample verge and scope for the largest liberty imaginable. And we hold, that it is not in the Will that human freedom is to find its range, but in the sensibility, which, though not exempt from the influence of causes, is so constituted that the feelings, affections and desires are as free as the roving winds. The currents of the atmos phere are set in .motion by causes which, in general, are well understood, and yet what science will enable us to calculate the rise, the direction, the velocity and the force of every wind, from the gentle breeze to the devastating cyclone ? The winds are the very emblems of wild and riotous freedom, and yet the feelings and desires are more free than they.
The essence of freedom is not in willing anything what ever; but in willing in accofdance with one's own pleasure or desire. Hence, a free agent is one who does as he pleases. When a being has the power to do as he pleases, he pos sesses, not absolute liberty indeed, but the utmost liberty of which a creature, subject to law, is capable. The angels .enjoy no higher or more enlarged freedom. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable that God Himself should have the

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power to do otherwise than is conformable to His high and holy pleasure.
Our theory is, that human volition is always in obedience to the dominant feeling or desire. Thus it is plain that, in the absence of coaction--physical coercion or restraint-- man always does as he pleases. When the noble Sidney resigned the flask of water to his fellow-sufferer on the battle-field, he did as he pleased. When Macbeth assas sinated Duncan, he did as he pleased--executing the im pulse of ambition, the dominant desire of his breast. Abra ham did as he pleased when he made ready to sacrifice his son--that is to say, it pleased him to obey God rather than to carry out the natural desires of his heart. And Moses acted in accordance with the prevailing- desire of his breast when he renounced the glittering attractions of the Egyptian court, and identified himself with the despised slaves of the quarry.
Here is a man who has contracted the fearful vice of intemperance. Appetite commands unceasing indulgence. But he suddenly awakes to a realization of his peril. A new set of desires spring up and contend for the mastery, until the despot passion is crushed. Love of family, dread of ruin, self-love, and perhaps the love of God, in spired by Divine grace, all rise up and throttle the mon ster appetite, and he resolves--he wills--to stop, now and forever, the fatal indulgence. He ha? acted freely; aye, he is conscious of a higher freedom than he knew before; and yet his liberty does not consist in absolutely willing thus or otherwise, without incentive, but in the execution, by the Will, of the p-evailing desires of the heart.
When the penitent turns to God, he does as he pleases. But a change has come over his spirit. He now pleases to do that which before he found pleasure in opposing. A nobler pleasure has overmastered and replaced his former selfish inclinations.
In all these cases, and in every case, the man is con scious that he acts freely, because he does that which he

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pleases to do. And no reasoning from causes, or "neces sity," or the "implexed series of events," can persuade him that he has been coerced to do otherwise than his own pleasure dictated. He may have acted hastily, impru dently, or basely, or he may have performed wise, hu mane and holy actions, but he has done what, at the time, he most desired to do. Man does sometimes seem to be driven on by passion or appetite, but, after all, it is his pleasure of desire, rising to tumult or to violence, which urges him, and he does as he pleases.
Now, he has acted from causes, and, therefore, is not absolutely free ; but a more ample liberty he does not want--nay, he cannot clearly conceive of a wider range of freedom.
It will be seen that this view of the Will places man within the paie of the Divine control. His heart--the seat of the emotions--is open to Divine influence, and, there fore, his actions are controllable by the Deity, though in such a way as not to infringe his essential liberty. Man always does as he pleases, but he very often does the pleasure of God in doing his own: It is God working in him, through his affections, so that he wills and does of God's own pleasure. Thus is brought about the harmony of man's will with that of God. It is only thus that the Divine agency and the human endeavor are made recon cilable. It is only thus that God retains power over man, without impairing his essential liberty.

SECTION XV.
AUTONOMY A SCHEME OF LICENTIOUSNESS.
The contrary hypothesis--that of the autonomy of the Will--is as destructive of true, rational liberty as the most inexorable scheme of necessity, and more disastrous in its results. It is not liberty, but licentiousness, and naturally tends to anarchy.
By this theory, the Will, as has been said, is an anom-

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aly in creation. It stands alone in all the universe of God, without a peer.- Moreover, it occupies a solitary position of independence by the throne of the Creator Himself. God is independent; the human Will is independent. The Will cannot control God, and, just as logically, God cannot control the Will. And this is the autonomist's avowed position. It is a conclusion irresistibly following from his premises. And shocking though it is, he does not hesitate to declare that God did not prevent man from sinning, because HE COULD NOT! Man by his constitution was made absolutely free and independent of all exterior control, and was. therefore, placed beyond the reach of the Divine omnipotence. As a moral Governor of the world, then, God is helpless, is impotent to control the world He has made, and cannot prevent the moral anarchy of the race which He has brought into being. And-with the tremendous moral gravitation downwards, already be gun, what ray of hope is there for man, that he will escape remediless ruin, utter and irretrievable moral chaos ?
The licentiousness of the scheme of autonomy, and its certain tendency to anarchy, are objections more fatal to it than the charge of destroying human liberty is to the scheme of necessity itself. The most extreme necessitarian view--even if it make man an automaton--does not give a prospect half so gloomy and forbidding as this licentious scheme. For if every human action be produced by an im mediate irresistible energy from without, we know that God holds the end of the chain, and whatever evils may present themselves to our short-sighted vision, all will most surely come out right in the end. But if human vo lition be independent of God, then man is loosed from his safe anchorage, and not only is there no certainty of a pros perous issue, but, with his inherent proclivity to evil, his destruction is morally inevitable. And carried to its ulti mate conclusion, this principle would work not only moral and social chaos, but havoc and ruin in the physical crea tion itself.

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It has been shown that our theory of the Will neither makes man a machine, nor cuts him loose from God's control; but leaves him the highest freedom conceivable in a creat ure, and yet keeps him a subject of the moral government of the Creator.
Autonomy, however, places him at the mercy of a ca pricious and unbridled Will, and severs him from the in fluence of that all-wise and merciful Sovereign, in whom, as we fondly hope,i"we live and move and have our being."
It is, therefore, a scheme of licentiousness more to be dreaded than the most unmitigated bondage conceivable, under the rule of the divine Maker and Governor of the universe.

SECTION XVI.
MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Is a man a moral and accountable agent ? Do his actions possess a moral character--that is, are human actions com monly called good, really virtuous, and those called bad, really vicious ? And, hence, do men, when they commit evil deeds, incur guilt and responsibility ?
The conscience is the ground and proof of human ac countability. Without this faculty, we could neither know the right, nor feel moral obligation. It decides on the moral character of an action, and pronounces man in nocent or guilty. Its tribunal is erected in every bosom, and its reproaches for the violation of its sacred impulses are felt by every human being. Its judgments--its voice of approval or condemnation--are evidences of a future reckoning. As we judge ourselves, so we judge others, and are judged by them. We -blame our fellow-beings when they do evil, and incur guilt in their estimation when we go astray. It is, therefore, the unanimons ver dict of mankind, that we are moral and responsible agents.
What our own consciences proclaim, the Bible emphat ically affirms. It declares that God will bring every work

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into judgment, and that He hath appointed a day wherein He will judge the world in righteousness.
But autonomists contend that moral agency and ac countability are impossible, unless the Will be loosed from the influences of intrinsic causes. They argue that, if the Will be not absolutely independent, the volitions are necessitated, and, hence, human actions have no moral quality--are neither virtuous nor vicious. It follows, therefore, that there is no guilt nor responsibility attaching to the agent. But this conclusion is absurd, and, hence, the Will is independent, and sovereign in its determina tions.
The fundamental postulate on which this argument rests is, that moral agency and accountability are incompatible with necessity. Is this assumption true? A representa tive autonomist, and one of the ablest and most candid of the class, * repeatedly asserts that the states, of both the intellect and sensibility are necessitated. He says: ''The understanding, or intelligence, is necessarily deter mined ; all its states are necessitated as completely as the movements of a machine." Again he says: "Every state of the sensibility is a passive impression, a necessitated phenomenon of the human mind." But do not these i itellectual and sentient states possess a moral character ? What says the Scripture? Concerning the wickedness of man before the flood, it states that God saw that ''every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." As here imagination and thoughts, which are intellectual exercises, are connected with the heart, the seat of the sensibility, the idea is conveyed that both in tellectual and emotional states were corrupt. Christ de clares that evil affections are the very essence of crime; lust is adultery, and anger is murder. And the apostle says. "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." The autonomist says that imagination and thoughts--states of the intellect--and lust and anger and hate--states of the sensibility--are necessitated. Upen his reasoning, there-

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fore, they are hot wrong--that is blameworthy or vicious. Yet the Bible says they are evil, and some of them are crimes, the darkest in the catalogue of iniquities.
Are men r&ponsible for the acts and states of these pow ers, which the autonomist says are necessitated? Christ says, '' Whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment"--thus clearly indicating accountability. The Bible teaches that every thing shall be brought into judgment, even our secret thoughts.
Not only Scripture, but our own consciences condemn the indulgence of impure lusts and imaginations, ot malig nant thoughts and passions, and there is the idea which we cannot repress, that we are accountable for them.
Now, what becomes of the assumption, that necessitated acts and states have no moral character, and that the con trary teaching abolishes the distinction between virtue and vice? What becomes of the alleged incompatibility, the irreconcilable contradiction, between necessity and accountability ? If to teach that the volitions are caused, or necessitated indeed, destroys accountability for men's actions, does not the doctrine that the thoughts and affec tions are necessitated destroy accountability for impure imaginations and unholy passions ? Thus the hypothesis, on which the argument of the autonomist is built, proves to be contradictory to Scripture and conscience, or else to himself.
Since, then, this difficulty meets us in any view we may take of the Will, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion that there is no incompatibility between causation, on the one hand, and moral and accountable agency on the other.
To unravel the tangled web of causes, and reconcile these apparently conflicting principles, may be above the power of the limited humaa faculties ; but as, in the almost boundless range of the sensibilities, there is ample room for an immeasurable liberty, so in the variableness, buoy-

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ancy and spontaneity "of the emotions, there may be scope for the full play of accountability.
According to the autonomist, our emotions are necessi tated. We admit them to be subject to causes. But the Scriptures affirm that we are responsible for them. And if we trace the responsibility of our acts, both mental and overt, to their original impulses in the soul, we shall find its springs in the emotional part of our nature. Here are the great moral Nile sources, which explorers have vainly endeavored to discover in the Will. Human guilt or inno cence is truly tested by the feeling of the heart, and not by the physical action. Even in human law, murder is the taking of life from malicious or corrupt intent. The heart- motive is the criterion of criminality in the moral judg ments of men. The Bible is emphatic in its teachings as to the real test of character and conduct.
An action apparently good may be done from an evil feeling--a bad motive. The alms-giving of the Pharisees had no virtue, because it was prompted by selfish desire of human applause. The feeling being wrong imparted its moral hue to the outward action. The responsibility, therefore, did not attach to the act nor the volition, but to the emotion from which the volition sprang. This is the more evident where conduct proceeds from a mixed mo tive--a combined emotion--that is, where the emotion prompting it is made up of good and evil elements. An act by which a fellow-being is benefited, for example, giving bread to the hungry, or money to a charitable insti tution--is, in one sense, a good act, even when it proceeds from selfishness, for it accomplishes good. It is no less a good act, when it proceeds partly from a good, and partly from a bad feeling. But its moral character, its innocence or guilt, does not depend on the effect, but the cause--not on the good it accomplishes, but on the motive which prompts it. And the evil motive will condemn us, while the good motive will justify us. We are responsible for the emotion, whether good or bad.

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Even wrong thoughts and imaginations derive their moral character from the feelings which prompt them ; for all bad thoughts are the suggestion and offspring of cor rupt emotions. The imagination riots in scenes and pleas ures that are forbidden, but its revels are the fruits of unholy desires in the heart.
Thus the sensibility seems to be the very "head and front" of all man's moral offending and, hence, is the seat of moral accountability.

SECTION XVII.
AUTONOMY DENIES MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
The charge of subverting moral and accountable agency, brought against the "scheme of necessity," may be re torted upon the system of autonomy with redoubled force. It has just been seen that, by the same argument employed by the autonomist to prove that the doctrine of caused volition destroys accountability for human actions, his own theory is proved to destroy accountability for impure pas sions and unholy desires. Between overt acts and emotions of the heart, responsibility attaches more especially, in deed, exclusively to the latter. Therefore, his argument bears more heavily against his own scheme, for it allows the emotions to be all necessitated.
But there is a special vulnerability of the scheme of au tonomy to the charge of denying moral responsibility.
If by the mental constitution neither God nor conscience have any control of human actions, it is hard to see how these actions can acquire any moral character. The Will commands right or wrong actions.not because it obeys or dis obeys God, or the vicegerent of God in the soul; for by its very nature, it is placed aloof from conscience and from its Maker. An agent entirely beyond the power of God, and independent of the obligations and restraints of the moral faculty, cannot be said to be a moral agent. Still less is he a responsible agent. By his creation, he is insulated

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' from all aioral forces; therefore he cannot be amenable to moral law. Just as reasonably may the acts and policy of an independent State be subject to the control, authority and dictation of a foreign power, as for the autonomous Will to be held responsible to laws of which it was created independent.
And between the two alternatives--an agency subject to the control of God and of conscience, and an agency inde pendent of both--the two conditions being supposed equally irresponsible--surely no rational being could hesi tate to choose. The one is the irresponsibility of subjec tion to causes that would infallibly bring forth good results; the other, the irresponsibility of subjection to a whimsical and capricious power, a condition which offers a dreary prospect to the race--for every man a '"fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation."
But such is not the alternative to which we are held. In the place of an independent and irresponsible Will, we have this power acting in obedience to the dictates of sen sibilities that are under the control of an all-wise and mer ciful Creator.

SECTION XVIII.
DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY.
In the discussion of the "scheme of necessity," our at tention was confined to the realm of second causes. Events and their causes--phenomena and causation--were con sidered philosophically. But reason, as well as revelation, affirms an Intelligent First Cause--a personal Creator-- from whom not only every chain of causes and effects pro ceeds, but who holds it in His'firm grasp, vigilantly super vises its endless succession, and suffers not a link to be formed which is not subject to the control of His infinite wisdom and almighty power. Every existence in the universe, mental and physical, animate and inanimate, angelic and human, rational and brutal, is under the sleep-

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less care and perpetual sway of that Mind of transcendent wisdom, and subject to the guidance of that Hand of sur passing skill. Through the chain of second causes, He works out His eternal purposes ?.ni plans, the forces of nature being His workingmen, and the intelligence of created minds the agents of His power.
It is impossible to conceive of the Supreme Being, without regarding Him as the Governor, as well as the Crea tor of all things. And this governance must extend to all and every part of the universe. No being, or power, or agent of any description, can possibly exist independent of Him. Body, soul and spirit; angel, demon and man; animal, vegetable and mineral; air, ocean and land ; sun, planet and meteor; deluge, lightning and tempest; atom, monad and cell; nay, all things, all forces in the bound less creation, are held in the hands of the eternal, almighty and supreme Ruler of the universe. While, therefore, second causes are forever working, God is forever working through them. Revelation everywhere procla'ms and as sumes this absolute and universal dominion of the Deity, a fact which answers to the demand of our highest reason.
Men, then, are agents and instruments of God in carry ing out His purposes. But'herethe question again meets us, "If this be so, what becomes of human claim to liberty?" If, in everything we do, we are executing the Divine plans, .ow are we either free or responsible ? We answer, as b.v i.>re, that in the secret and mystic operation of the emo tional power, there seems to be hints of a solution of the problem. If we could fathom its vasty depths, and pry fully into all its subtle working, we might pick up the clew that would lead the way out of this intricate labarynth. Here it would seem that freedom has an unrestricted play, and responsibility the most ample range. It is here that God's working and man's doing come together. The Sen sibility receives the Divine touch, immediately the spring of human action responds, and the Will issues its com mands. Where the Divine agency terminates, and human

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agency begins, or, to speak more accurately, where the t\vo meet for co-operation, and how the conjunction is ef fected, we cannot tell. It is a hidden mystery, like that of the junction and co-operation of sense and spirit in the process of perception. How do we see ? is a question of ten asked. Not with the eye alone, for without the soul the eye, though perfect in its structure, would be useless, Not with the mind alone, for a material organ is necessary as an instrument of vision. We see with both the mind and the eye--the one being as essential as the other. But how can spirit and nerves act together, where is the point of junction, what is the link of connection, and how do mind and matter, so essentially different, combine to pro duce the effect of vision ? These, and a thousand other questions connected with our spiritual 'and material com position, have ever baffled the skill of the acutest philoso phers, and they will ever remain a mystery to us in our present state. As the mind acts, and the body acts in har mony with it, so God acts within us, and we act in har mony with Him. As the soul sees through the eye, its instrument of vision, so God effects His purposes in human affairs through the necessary instrumentality of men, As the sensorium--the assemblage of material organs and nerves--is the sensitive medium through which the soul perceives external objects, so the Sensibility is the sensitive, spiritual medium through which God excites men to action. The bond of connection in each case is insciutable, the process mysterious, but the facts are un deniable.
There seem to be two spheres of Divine operation in the concerns of mankind. One is the ordinary domain of every-day human affairs--the domain of history; the other, the extraordinary sphere of special intervention -- the sphere of religion. In the one, second causes hold their regular sway, subject to such interruptions and dislocations as may seem good to the all-wise Mind. In the other, the Divine Spirit interposes and brings man into immediate

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relations with his Maker. The operation of the former has been considered under Necessity; that of the latter, under Regeneration. All men are subject to the one; only those whom God chooses are brought under the su pernatural influence of the other. Every creature is an agent of God, through second causes: only the elect are His agents, through His Spirit.
In both spheres--nature and religion--there is liberty, and in both accountability. Man does as he pleases in his every-day life and relations ; the regenerate man does as he pleases in the service he renders to God and His Son. And when a man does wrong in the ordinary moral relations of society, he is conscious of a feeling of guilt; so, when he violates the duties of religion, he is sensible of moral guilt and responsibility.
Pharaoh was an instrument of Jehovah in the accomplish ment of His purpose, the deliverance of the Israelites. " Even for this purpose have I raised thee up, that I might show my power in thee." Yet that hard-hearted tyrant conceived that he was acting out only his own pleasure, and thwarting the will of the God of the Hebrews, in re fusing to release the people of Israel. Nevertheless, he was accomplishing the Divine purposes in his very disobe dience. Doubtless the hardening of Pharaoh's heart was the influence of second causes operating on his sensibilities by natural laws.
Saul of Tarsus was an agent of God, to manifest His saving power, and to bear the gospel to the Gentiles. But God, through the direct power of the Holy Spirit, touched his heart, changed the current of his thoughts and affec tions, and brought him to the feet of that Jesus whom he was persecuting. Though conscious that he had suddenly become the subject of some mysterious transformation, he gladly acknowledged the grace that subdued him, and joyfully gave himself to the service of his new Master, and to the preaching of that faith he had endeavored to destroy.
Pharaoh Hid as he pleased; Paul did as he pleased ; yet

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both executed the will of God, and were instruments of His purposes.
Human effort is not the less necessary because Divine agency is exerted through man. There is a mysterious co-operation between the infinite power of the Deity and the limited but active power of the human soul. The husbandman must plough, and sow, and nurse, and tend, and reap, or the harvest will never come. Yet in all his work he is absolutely dependent upon the Divine agency in nature. So the soul must " work out (its) salvation with fear and trembling," conscious that "it is God that worketh in (it) both to will and to do of His good pleasure."
This co-operation of Divine and human agency is the law of our history. It is necessary to recognize it; it is not essential to comprehend it. God works; we must work. If he did not work, we could not; or, if we could, our work would be useless. If we do not work, neither tem poral weal nor eternal salvation is possible, because we are His instruments for both. It is the height of folly and impiety to plead the Divine agency as an excuse for inac tion on our part.

SECTION XIX.
AUTONOMY SETS AT NAUGHT THE DIVINE INFLUENCE IN
REGENERATION.
The Scriptures declare the necessity of a special Divine influence in the moral reformation of man. Regeneration, or the new birth, is effected by the Holy Spirit operating on the individual heart. This truth, is incorporated into the systems of most Christian theologians, and taught in the creeds of most Christian organizations.
But autonomy denies, or practically nullifies, this Divine influence. If the Will be absolutely sovereign over its volitions, originating them without determination by any extraneous influence, then Divine grace does not renovate the soul at all, or is defective in operation and practically

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unavailing. Many merely philosophic autonomists, recog nizing the incompatibility of the Christian doctrine of re generation with absolute freedom of the Will, totally dis card that doctrine of the Scriptures.
The Arminian theologians, however, admit the necessity and reality of the Holy Spirit's work in regeneration, but, at the same time, maintain the entire sovereignty of the Will.
Let us, first, advert to the remarkable position of Dr. Bledsoe.
This writer holds that the intellectual and emotional natures are the exclusive spheres of the divine operation, admits the supernatural illumination of the intelligence and the creation of the new heart, but contends that, with this, the effect of Divine grace ceases, and that man's agency begins with volition. While the Intellect and Sen sibility are the regions of the Spirit's gracious action, the Will is the free and uninvadible realm of human agency. The Intellect and Sensibility are regarded as subject to causes, all their states necessitated, and, therefore, they present an open field for the operation of the Divine in fluence. But the Will, constitutionally independent, maintaining a complete autonomy, is not subject to the control of foreign influence from any quarter.
Let us consider the possible practical consequences of this hypothesis. Dr. Bledsoe admits the "absolute de pendence of the soul upon the agency of God. The first effect of grace is to "flash the light of truth" into the un derstanding ; " the second effect of the Divine power in the new creation is 'a new heart."" He goes on to say, that God, having- done this, "may well call on us to 'workout our salvation with fear and trembling, for God worketh in us to will and to do of his own good pleasure;' We have seen that the state of the Wili, that a volition is not neces sitated by the intelligence or by the sensibility; and, hence, it may 'obey the heavenly vision,' or it may resist and 'do ' despite to the Spirit of grace.' If it obey, then the vivi-

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fying light and genial shower have not fallen upon the soul in vain."
We pause for a moment, to call attention to the admis sion, that the Divine influence may, on this view, be in vain. God has wrought on the soul, renewing both intel lect and heart, yet the influence may be nugatory, since the disobedient Will may completely neutralize it.
But this is not the worst view of this most remarkable theory of regeneration. Let us suppose a case--for, on the doctrine, it is supposable, and probable in many in stances of an individual, on whose understanding the spirit has shed its illuminating flood, and whose heart has been renovated by the same Divine power, but whose Will, selfdetermined and independent, decides to "disobey the heavenly vision," and to " do despite to the Spirit of grace." What a spectacle would a man, thus affected, present? The unnatural conjunction of holiness of heart with wick edness of IFe--the inconsistent and grotesque union of a pure spirit with debauched conduct--a regenerate soul with a career of vice and crime. While his heart is aflame with love to God. his lips blaspheme that holy name which an gels utter with adoring awe. While his bosom is overflow ing with sweet and heaven-born charity, his life is a pitiless record of wanton cruelty and murder. His heart white, his hands black, he stands a moral monster, more revolt ing than the "gorgous and chimeras dire" of fable.
Is there any escape from this dilemma on the foregoing premises ? There is nothing to hinder the thorough reno vation of the heart and understanding; the state of these are necessitated, and the Divine power may carry on its work of regeneration, in harmony with the laws of the mind. But the Will is absolutely free ; the Spirit cannot touch that; there is, therefore, nothing to prevent this in dependent power from antagonizing perpetually with the impulses of the renewed heart. Let the capricious Will so decide, and the moral monstrosity already described is the result The man is only partially reformed, the work

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is useless--nay, a wretched failure, a miserable abortion. No such marplot is that glorious Spirit of perfect wisdom, holiness, goodness and power, whose office is to "con vince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment."
The Christian autonomist, we know, will shrink from such a conclusion with horror. He will agree that such a product is not only unnatural, but impossible. But if unnatural, it is because it is contrary to some natural law, that the volitions should be so directly antagonistic to the dictates of the renewed heart. And that law is the one already enunciated, that the volitions are determined by the predominating emotions. If the conclusion is impos sible, it is not because it does not logically follow from the premises, but because those premises are unsound and fallacious. If impossible, it is because the Will cannot successfully resist the holy impulses of regenerated affec tions. It is its nature, it is its law, that it obeys the dom inant sensibilities of the soul.
But another view of the autonomous Will, as related to regeneration, is that adopted by perhaps the majority of Arminians. It is something like this: The influence of the Holy Spirit is necessary to regeneration, and is offered to all men, but it may be accepted or rejected at the option of the individual. The power is present, the grace is offered, but it rests with the Will whether it shall effect its work.
According to this view, the Will stands at the threshold of the soul, a sort of janitor or sentinel, with discretion to admit or reject the heavenly Messenger. If the gracious offer be rejected, and the door kept barred, the soul re mains uncleansed and unsaved. That man is beyond God's power. But what if He be admitted ? The work of re generation goes on, but, as in the case before considered, its effect is confined to the head and the heart--the Will, by its constitution, remaining intact. Although it kindly permits the regeneration of the intellect and sensibility, it reserves to itself the privilege of refusing, if it see proper,

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to co-operate In the work; and thus we are brought to the possibility just described--the unnatural coalition of a pure heart and an unholy life. It is evident that, if the heart be regenerated, and yet the Will have power to antagonize the holy emotion wrought by Divine grace, regeneration is in that case a failure. A man may be at ihe same instant regenerated and unconverted, a saint and a sinner--at once white in heart and black in life--a moral monster. The very thought is shocking to our sense of fitness and of truth. It is contrary to nature, and violates a law of nature. What law? The law that the volitions are de termined by the ruling emotions of the heart. If the heart be corrupt, the life will, naturally, and by a moral neces sity, be corrupt. If the heart be pure and loving, the life will abound in deeds of purity, and overflow with streams of benevolence.
Thus it appears that autonomy restricts the efficacy of the Divne influence, and thus practically nullifies it. Upon this view the grace of God may effectually purify the heart, but at the same time fail to reform the life. There is, indeed, no certainty that it will ever be more than a partial and defective means of renovation.
And whatever fetters the most dire "scheme of neces sity " may impose upon the spirit, it is far preferable to a scheme that leaves man at the mercy of a capricious Will, renders nugatory the most thorough work of the Spirit, and exhibits to the universe the spectacle of a product which is nothing less than a moral monstrosity.
On the autonomic premises, prayer for Divine preserva tion, and deliverance from actual disobedience and practical transgression, is utterly unavailing. I may cry ever so earnestly to God, " Lead me not into temptation," "Keep back thy servant from presumptuous sins," yet I entreat a Being who has no power to answer my prayers. He could not prevent the rebellion of Lucifer, He could not restrain our first parents from disobedience, He cannot keep me from sinning. To such an impotent Deity it is

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useless to address my prayers, for at last it depends alto gether upon my own free and undetermined Will. If any prayer can avail, it must be addressed to this god within my own breast. This "kingly will," this deified nature within me, is the sole arbiter of my destiny ; and, if it so decide, can forever thwart the united prayers of the church, frustrate the loving purpose of the High and Holy One, and render practically useless the patient, renewing work of the Holy Ghost.
These.conclusions, so absurd in themselves, only serve to show the egregious sophism of autonomy--the falseness of the premise from which they inevitably result.

SECTION XX.
THEODICY.
The charge is often brought against' 'the scheme of neces sity," that it impeaches the Divine holiness, by making God the author of sin. The argument is as follows: If God necessitates human actions by controlling the Will, either directly by His immediate omnipotent energy, or indirectly through the medium of causes, men are absolved from guilt, and the blame of every wicked act rests upon Him. Thus "the scheme of necessity " makes God the author of sin.
Before proceeding to vindicate our theory from this im putation, we shall show that the argument applies with equal force, at least, to the scheme of autonomy, as to any scheme of necessity. And we shall hereafter prove that autonomy is far more vulnerable to the charge of dishon oring the Divine perfections, than any of the systems which it opposes.
Let us now try autonomy by the foregoing argument, and see whether it relieves the Divine Being of the blasphe mous imputation. The autonomist admits, yea insists, that the sensibilities are all necessitated. Not only are they subject to cause, but are controlled by an irresistible

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necessity. And as all causes originate with God, He ne cessitates the emotions. Thus, when anger, Iiatred, avarice, hist, pride are cherished in the soul, they are necessitated by the Divine Being. But each and all of the above affec tions are vicious, unholy, sinful. Therefore, men are ab solved from guilt, and the blame of every wicked passion and unholy desire rests upon Him. Thus the scheme of autonomy does not escape the odium sought to be fastened by its advocates upon the doctrine of caused volitions, but if their argument be valid, it, equally with that doctrine, makes God the author of sin.
Is it'possible to construct ^_Theodicy--a theory which shall so explaiu the order of things as completely to ex onerate the Divine Being from any complicity in the sins of men? Several attemps have been made, notably by Leibnitz, by Bledsoe, and by Edwards--the first a rigid necessitarian, the second an autonomist, the third maintain ing the determination of the Will by objective motives or influences. We have shown above, that the autonomic scheme does not vindicate the Divine glory, being itself exposed to the very objections it brings against the neces sitarian scheme. The methods of Leibnitz and Edwards both assume that moral evil is essential to the perfection of the universe and the glory of God. Leibnitz contends for the "privative" or negative character of evil, only holiness and goodness having positive character. While, therefore, God directly produces what is good, there are certain necessary negatives of good, which are evil. Ed wards compares good to the direct effect of the sun's rays, and evil to the effect of the deprivation or absence of his beams. Thus,"as warmth and light are produced by the sun, so holiness is the positive production of the Creator; and as cold and darkness are merely negative conditions, arising from the absence of the sun's rays, so sin, or moral evil, is a negative condition, due to the absence of the Divine influence. Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that God does not directly cause sin to exist, \m\. permits it for

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wise purposes, by withdrawing, at His sovereign pleasure, the Divine influence from men.
There can be no doubt that, if God permits sin, or chooses that it shall be, the existence of sin must be es sential to His glory and the perfection of the universe. The Bible clearly teaches that deeds, in themselves wicked, are permitted, or decreed, in order that great ultimate good may be brought to pass. The deliverance of the people of Israel was accomplished through the obduracy of Pharaoh, of whom it is said that God "hardened his heart." "For this cause have I raised thee (Pharaoh) up, that I might show my power in thee." The greatest good to the human race that can possibly be conceived--namely, their salvation--was made possible by the greatest crime ever committed, namely, the crucifixion of the Son of God. " Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and with -wicked hands'\i3.ve crucified and slain." As Edwards says, "It is certain that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and glorious ends, ordered the fact which they committed who were concerned in Christ's death; and that therein they did but fulfill God's designs." It appears, then, that God did purposely^ and knowingwhat would come to pass--by His "determinate counsel and foreknowledge"--withdraw His holy influence from these men, and thus leave them to their own lusts " to do what His hand and His counsel determined before to be done."
Now, if the existence of moral evil is necessary to the greatest good of the universe and the glory of God, it is obvious that the ordering and determination and control of this evil should be in the hands of the all-wise and all-merciful Sovereign, rather than left to the unreasoning caprice and unbridled whim of human volitions. If the Will be independent of God, then He cannot prevent, or control, or obstruct, or eradicate sin. It must take its course, obedient only to the caprice of the short-sighted
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Will of frail mortals. Such is not the constitution of tne . world.
Still, however plausible and correct this explanation may be, it does not give us any clue to the solution of the problem that lies behind all theories of optimism, namely, if our sinful actions and mental states be necessitated, how can the Divine Being be exonerated from complicity in them ? This brings us back to the connection between Divine and human agency, the compatibility of causation, and free moral and responsible agency. Let it be borne in mind that whatever may be the truth as regards " ne cessity," man is endowed with essential liberty, capacity of guilt and accountability. These find their source and range in the sensibility, which, although subject to causes, possesses a marked character of spontaneity, activity, va riety and buoyancy. We have indicated this sphere of the soul as the possible key by which these difficult and apparently contradictory problems of our nature may find their explication.
If man is free to do as he pleases, then whatever he doesis his own act; whatever he wills is his own volition ; whatever he feels is his own emotion; whatever he thinksis his own thought. But his feelings seem eminently his own, and we express that ownership, or liberty, when we call it his pleasure--when we say he acts or does as he pleases. The fact that an emotion is caused, does not make it any less his pleasure, or the disposition of his soul. His emotions, then, are his own, and not God's emotions. When he hates, it is man that hates, not God -r so when he loves God, it is man loving God and not God loving himself. So volition and action, following emotion, is his action and not the action of God;. The sin, there fore, is man's sin and not God's. Man is the sinner, and God is the high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity, "'Let God be true, and every man a liar,"

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SECTION XXI.
' AUTONOMY ASPERSES THE DIVINE PERFECTION.
In the last section, the argument of the autonomist, by which he reasons that "the scheme of necessity " makes God the author of sin, was turned against his own system. It was shown that, if the necessitation of sinful acts im pugns the holiness of God, by making Him blameable for the sins of men, the necessitation of unholy thoughts and desires involves Him in equal censure. But autonomy maintains that these are necessitated ; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it charges the Almighty with sin.
We shall now prove that this theory dishonors God, by disparaging the*Divine wisdom and purity, limiting the Di vine omnipotence, and impeaching the Divine righteous ness.
First, autonomy disparages the Divine wisdom and goodness. It is only necessary to revert to the last section but one, to see that this scheme makes it possi ble for the Will to render null and void the thorough regeneration of the heart by the Spirit of God. It also presents, as a possible product of regeneration, a moral amalgamation of the most inconsistent, revolting and mon strous character. The bare contemplation of that possi bility, for a moment, is in the highest degree offensive to our moral sensibilities, especially because a scheme bear ing such iruits reflects upon the wisdom and goodness of the Author of regeneration. Such a product is not the design of "the. wise and only Potentate," nor the Jwork of the Spirit of wisdom and truth.
Secondly, the scheme of autonomy places a limit to the omnipotence ;of God. .It makes the bold and shocking avowal that God does not prevent sin, BECAUSE HE CAN NOT! ! If this is not to "limit the Holy One of Israel," in respect to an essential attribute, we do not see how it is possible to cast any aspersion at all upon that Divine per fection. It plainly excludes the almighty agency from the

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moral -world, and so restricts it in the human soul that it is practically useless. The only sphere in which it allows the Divine power full play is the world of matter. Thus it seems to reduce the omnipotence God to brute force. The Creator is made to appear a physical Ruler, govern ing through the laws of matter, but is denied the greater glory of a moral Sovereign. Such is not the sacred Maj esty of heaven.
And what is the assumption on which it is deemed nec essary to divest the Supreme Monarch of so large and im portant a part of this glorious attribute ? It is held, that for God to control the volition is to deprive man of f; ee and moral agency; it is to necessitate virtue or holiness, and vice or sin, and thus to abolish the distinction between moral good and moral evil. It is assumed that a good action, if necessitated, has no moral quality at all, and that a bad action necessitated possesses no vicious character. Let us try the scheme of autonomy by this assumption.
The affections of the Sensibility, according to the autono mist, are necessitated. Anger, hatred, lust and pride are all affections of the Sensibility. Therefore, it follows, upon the postulate of autonomy, that anger, hatred, lust and pride are not sinful. But this contradicts Scripture and reason. The Bible denounces hatred as murder, and lust as adultery. Conscience also condemns them as wrong, and reproaches us as guilty if we indulge them. The au tonomist, then, must yield his principle that the sensibili ties are necessitated, or abandon the assumption that necessitation deprives an act of its moral character. The dilemma is an iron-clad one. He must surrender one, or the other. He dares not give up the causation of the sen sibilities--the lo<>ic of that, if not atheism, is treason to both philosophy and Christianity. He must, therefore, yield the assumption that acts caused, or necessitated, are destitute of moral quality.
Because the autonomist cannot explain how necessitated acts can be sinful or holy, he rushes to the conclusion that

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God is excluded from the moral government of the uni verse. To control the volitions, in his view, implies a contradiction; therefore, the question lies without the sphere of omnipotence. As omnipotence cannot make two and two five, or anything but four, because it is a contradiction; so omnipotence cannot make necessitated acts holy or sinful, because the autonomist cannot see or explain how necessity and moral agency are compatible. Now we ask, which is the greater contradiction to suppose our moral acts to be caused, or necessitated; or to sup pose that God cannot govern the creatures His own hand has formed, and that His dreadful attribute of omnipotence is practically restricted to the narrow domain of the mate rial world ? We may find the former alternative hard to explain--a knot for the intellect--one of a thousand mysterious paradoxes; but the latter is so shocking to our moral sense as to paralyze credulity itself. The scheme of autonomy, therefore, asperses the Divine perfection, by limiting the omnipotence of God.
Thirdly, the autonomist seems to cast a reproach upon the Divine justice and goodness, in that he charges the omniscient and omnipotent Creator with so constituting the world that the practice of moral evil should be forever impreventible and uncontrollable by Him. We have shown that the theory maintained in this treatise does not make God the author of sin. Man sins freely and con sciously; and his conscience condemns him, while it points to a solemn reckoning in the future. It pleased God to create man with a capacity to sin. This proves that He, in His unerring wisdom, deemed the existence of moral evil essential to the highest well-being of the world, and to the proper illustration of His own glory. There fore, Jn bringing into existence a race that would violate His moral law, He did what was supremely right, what was absolutely best.
But it is one thing to permit moral evil to exist, nay to declare that it shall come to pass, and another thing to so

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order all things that it shall forever be without the pale of the Divine control. A man is justified in purchasing and using a horse known to be mettlesome, if he takes effect ual means to keep him under his control, and thus make his dashing, fiery spirit serve important ends. But he would be highly culpable to attach that horse to a vehicle which benrs his wife and children, and leave him, without curb, rein, or bit, to dash madly withersoever his wild impulses might carry him. Sin, under the control of the in finitely wise, powerful and benevolent Sovereign, may and will work out happy and glorious results. But this mis chievous force, unless controlled by a power greater than the human soul, will run to every excess of riot and mad ness, involving the universe in hideous chaos and ruin* Does not a scheme which implies consequences like this reproach the almighty Creator with cruelty and injustice ?

SECTION XXII.
RESUME OF THE ARGUMENT.
It may be well, at this place, to review and sum up the points of our discussion.
I. The human soul is endowed with three grand charac teristic powers: the Intellect, or the power of knowing and thinking ; the Sensibility, or the power of feeling; and the Will, or the power of resolution or decision.
II. The Will is a. cardinal power, distinct from both thinking and feeling; its special characteristic being that of commanding to action.
III. The Sensibility bears a directrelation to the Intellect, no emotion being possible without an antecedent intellec tion. But the relation is so indeterminate that we are un able to pronounce the intellection to be the cause of the emotion; and so great is the variety, activity, elasticity and mobility of the sensibilities, that they seem to arise spontaneously, as if not subject to causes. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from the dominion of causation.

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IV. The Will is directly related to the Sensibility, being ^subject to its immediate sway; the volition, in every case, .being determined by the dominant volition. This is the law of the Will.
V. This law was abundantly illustrated by a large num ber of well attested facts from history, in which it was evident that the dominant emotion governed the volitions, and hence the actions.
VI. As, at first view, some actions seem to be dictated by the intellect, or judgment, inquiry was made into them, and it appeared that the true incentives lay in the Sensi bility. Duty is a feeling of obligation.
VII. As many actions are prompted by conscience, this important faculty was subjected to analysis, and it was found that it contained an emotional element--the feeling of moral obligation being the true impulse to volition.
VIII. The Scriptures were then consulted, and their testimony, both doctrinal and historical, sustained the the ory that actions are prompted by the prevailing emo tion of the heart As the righteous deeds of Scripture characters were ascribed to faith, this grace was consid ered and found, like conscience, to be complex in its nature, containing an intellectual and emotional element, of which the latter, love to- God, was theimpnlseto action.
I.. An inquiry was then instituted into Regeneration, as taught in the Scriptures, from which it appeared that it is the mysterious and miraculous process by which the Holy Spirit {produces those convictions of the Intellect and emotions of the heart which infallibly lead to obedience or practical righteousness. The product of regeneration is evangelical faith, a compound of intellectual belief and holy affection, the latter impelling the volitions to holy conduct. The effect of regeneration is to bring the will of man into harmony with the will of God, and to restore conscience ,to its normal supremacy in the soul.
.. Some actions of a doubtful sort, such as are of a mechanical, indifferent and reluctant nature, were then

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brought under consideration, from which it appeared that, though the emotional impulse might be unobtrusive or obscure, it nevertheless was the only incentive to the effort.
XI. Having thus, by a general induction from the ob served facts of history and consciousness, corroborated by the testimony of Scripture and the opinions of eminent phi losophers, arrived at the law above enunciated, other the ories of the Will came under review. First, the position of Edwards, that "the volitions are determined by the strongest motive as viewed by the mind," was examined. It was suggested that this view, propounded by the great metaphysician at a remote period in the history of psy chology, was founded upon an imperfect analysis of the eoul, and did not assign a sufficiently clear and definite cause of yolition. It did not characterize or localize the motive, which, upon our theory, is the predominant emo tion--a motive characterized and localized as an affection of the Sensibility.
XII. The theory of the self-determination of the Will-- or the scheme of autonomy--was then discussed and con demned, on the following general grounds: first, that it contradicts one of the acknowledged intuitions of reason, that every event or phenomenon must have a cause; sec ondly, it is opposed to all analogy; thirdly, it is contrary to observed facts in history and experience; fourthly, it is incapable of inductive demonstration--the only true method of establishing any principle or law of matter or mind.
XIII. As autonomists object to the doctrine of caused volitions, on the ground that it makes us creatures of ne cessity, and deprives us of liberty, moral agency and ac countability, "the scheme of necessity"" was next consid ered, and a broad distinction made between physical necessity and psychical or mental necessity. While neces sity is characteristic of physical causation, mental causation is marked rather by certainty. Of all the human powers, the Sensibility is the most spontaneous, active and free;. and hence, it is reasonable to suppose that here, if any-

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where in the soul, the vexed problems of necessity may find their solution.
XIV. It was then demonstrated that, notwithstanding this subjection to causes, man possesses the highest free dom conceivable in a creature--the liberty to do as he pleases; and that in the Sensibility are verge and scope for the most ample freedom, these powers, by their activity, variety and mobility, being comparable to the wind, which, though subject to causes, " bloweth where it listeth."
XV. The charge of destroying human liberty, imputed by autonomists to the scheme o-f necessity, was retorted upon their own theory--it being shown that autonomy is not true, rational liberty, but a scheme of licentious ness, with a certain tendency to anarchy.
XVI. The imputation that the "scheme of necessity" subverts moral agency and accountability was then repelled, and it was demonstrated that, on the autonomist's own premises, his scheme was no less obnoxious to the charge than the most rigid necessitarian view, and that moral agency and accountability had their sphere not in the Will, but in the Sensibility. This power being the incentive to volition, it also imparted its moral quality and accounta bility to the outward act.
XVII. It was next shown that autonomy, besides being liable to the charge. of destroying accountability, on the same ground as alleged against the scheme of necessty, was especially vulnerable to the accusation, inasmuch as it -pronounces the Will independent of God and moral obli gation, and thus exempts it from His moral government and the restraints of conscience. Being thus a constitu tional autonomy, it is not amenable to the judgment of alien powers.
XVIII. The doctrine of the supremacy and universal rule of the Deity over, and in, all terrestrial events, was then maintained. At the same time, the free co-operation of the human agency with the Divine was established.

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XIX. Autonomy was impugned as rendering unavailing the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, and making prayer an ineffectual service.
XX. The theory of this treatise was vindicated against the charge of making God the author of sin, while it was shown that the scheme of autonomy was exposed to the same charge by parity of reasoning. An attempt was made to show that only upon the views here maintained can anything like a satisfactory theodicy bee onstructed.
XXL The bill of impeachment against the scheme of autonomy was concluded with the charge that it asperses the Divine perfections, by disparaging the Divine purity and wisdom, limiting the Divine Omnipotence, and censur ing the Divine justice and goodness.

SECTION XXIII.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SENSIBILITY.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the Sen sibility is invested with a profound, peculiar and sacred importance. There is no department of our nature on which depend interests of such vast moment for time and eternity. The great practical questions of life--duty, suc cess, happiness, influence and character--and above all, the high and holy concerns of religion, are directly and inti mately related to the emotional part of man's constitution.
The following considerations prove the transcendent im portance of the Sensibility.
1. The emotions are the immediate springs'of human, actions. Everything man does, whether great or small, important or trivial, public or secret, good or Lad, wise or foolish, is done under the influence, and by the prompting, of some transient emotion, some overmastering passion, or some ruling desire. All human transactions find their true explanation here. The history of the world is the history of the human heart. In a latent corner of some individual heart was born the feeling, which, ripening into desire, aroused the energy of a Will, -by whose command the entire face

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of history has been changed. In the throbbing heart of Caesar was born that restless ambition, which laid the foundation of the mightiest empire the world ever saw. No greater events have marked the annals of modern times than those created by the ambitious spirit of Napo leon. All startling revolutions have had their birth in restless bosoms, where lust of power, or indignation against wrong, or love of liberty, has burst into flame, firing other hearts, until a people have risen up in their might to overturn the established throne, or to
" Crush the tyrant while they rend the chain."
And the minor events that make up the calm, steady stream of history, are the outcome of the passions and desires that are ever rolling and surging in the unseen depths of the human heart. The bad passions of men--lust, avarice, ambition, hatred, revenge and every form of selfishness-- have been the poisonous dragon's teeth, from which have sprung up a baleful crop of woes, in the shape of tyranny, rapine, cruelty, murder and war, with the attendant horrors oi famine, pestilence, poverty, and a horde of individual and social vices. All the black and revolting crimes that have stained the page of history and disgraced humanity, are the outgrowth of the emotions of the human heart.
On the contrary, pure and virtuous feelings have been the good seed, whence golden harvests have grown, to bless the world, dignify man, and promote the peace, hap piness and progress of the human race.
Love of conquest and power gave to history the names of Alexander, Ca2sar and Napoleon, who marked the earth with the blood of slaughtered millions. Inhumanity pro duced a Nero, a Caligula and an Alva; fanaticism a Cathe rine de Medici, a Philip II., and the bloody Mary; love of money a Judas, a Bacon and a Belknap. While, on the other hand, the path of history is radiant with the illustri ous names and pure deeds of great'and good men, whose virtues have redeemed humanity and illustrated the glory of Christianity. That holy affection, inspired by Divine

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grace in the heart of the Christian, has renovated individ ual character, reformed society, purified the stream of his tory, and turning it from its former corrupt channels in the dark hollows and noisome fens of crime and cruelty, have sent it leaping and sparkling along the sunny plains and smiling vales of purity and peace.
If, then, virtue and vice are the offspring of the Sensi bility; if the state of the heart--the prevalence of good or bad affections, of holy emotions or corrupt passions--is the true source of human action, and the fountain-head of all history, what a sacred and awful importance belongs to the emotional department of our nature!
2. But, secondly, the Sensibility is the seat of human freedom. Man is essentially free, but not because of a free intelligence or a free Will. Without emotion, his God-like reason would render him a passive and uninter ested spectator of the changing events and scenes of life. It is only by the Sensibility that he is moved to roam abroad, an active, free and eager participant in the grand drama of history. Without emotion, the Will would for ever lie dormant, in helpless apathy, or blindly follow the momentum of external forces, or, if endowed with inde pendent energy, would make man a thing of blind caprice, of motiveless whim, or of defiant and reckless mischief. Liberty consists in doing as one pleases--this pleasure of the soul originating and disporting itself in the sphere of the Sensibility. Yet, as liberty, to be genuine, must be subject to law, so the Sensibility, where freedom resides, is subject to the dominion of causes, under the ceaseless care and control of the infinitely wise, benevolent and powerful Deity.
If, then, without emotion, man would be a cipher, a slave, or a mere agent of mischief, how important is that power which prompts him to be ever active, to do ever the behests of his own pleasure, and which is so consti tuted that, with the most generous freedom, he is ever

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under the efficient government of supreme Wisdom, Love and Power!
3. Again, the Sensibilityis the chief realm and source of man's moral agency and accountability. This has already been amply demonstrated. Good emotions, rational de sires, pure affections, as they incite to good, virtuous and holy actions, lend their moral complexion to the conduct, and pronounce man innocent and just. But corrupt affec tions, base desires and malignant passions, as they impel to vicious conduct, impart their dark hue to the behaviour, and render man guilty and responsible.
It may be said that certain actions posses a vicious qual ity irrespective of the spirit that actuates them, while many deeds are in themselves good, which do not proceed from worthy motives in the heart. True, theft is an injury to the person defrauded, if committed by an idiot, mad man, or brute. But evidently it is, in such cases, no vice. To take life wrongs the victim, as well when done by accident, as when done from malice, or a cold-blooded cruel, disposition. But there is no guilt where there is no corrupt motive or inclination to do wrong, and hence no responsibility. So some actions are, in themselves, good --that is, accomplish good results. Alms giving is always helpful, always promotes the welfare of the beneficiary. But if it be done from selfishness, it carries no virtue with it.
The essence of virtue and guilt is the disposition which prompts the action, and the possession of that spirit ren ders a man virtuous or guilty, though no overt deed be the result. The Sensibility, therefore, derives additional im portance from the fact that it is the sphere and source of moral agency and responsibility.
4. The Sensibility is also the chief basis of character. The heart is the true index of the man; and he who is most deeply read in the human heart, has the most thorough knowledge and is the best judge of human nature. A good man is one who has a good heart; a bad man is one

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who has a bad heart. A righteous man is one who loves God and takes pleasure in conforming to the Divine will and law. A wicked man is one destitute of this holy af fection, and who hates the person and service of God.
Different phases of character arise from the habitual pre dominance of different phases of the Sensibility. A miser ly or avaricious man is one whose soul is dominated by one absorbing passion--the love of money. An ambitious man is one whose heart is imbued with desire of power or fame. A proud man is one who cherishes pride--a feeling of the heart.
A vain man is one whose predominant passion is love of display or admiration. A selfish man is ruled by self-love, to which all other feelings yield subservience. An impul sive man is one whose emotions are quick, strong and gener ally unstable. Even the man usually characterized as selfwilled, derives his peculiar trait as much from the vigor of his Sensibilities as from the tenacity of his Will. Indeed, constancy of Will is, for the most part, associated with strength and depth of feeling. It is not a turbulent or de monstrative feeling that distinguishes the obstinate or selfwilled man from the impulsive man, but rather a deep, strong, hidden undercurrent of emotion, which in its steadiness and force imparts energy to the Will. A posi tive character is one of marked power of emotion, while one destitute of this, is a negative character. Some men are distinguished by what is called an intellectual character, from persons of mere Sensibility. And yet, without emo tion, there can be no action, and hence no criterion of char acter. The impulse to action, in such men, is an elevated, rational Sensibility, appropriate to, and corresponding with, the judgments and conceptions of an acute, vigorous and enlightened understanding.
5. The Sensibility is the foundation of success or failure. A man of sluggish or torpid Sensibility will be slow and feeble in action; while quick and lively emotions prompt to activity and energy in business. A due regulation of

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these emotions is a necessary condition of success. While dull Sensibilities engender indolence, excessive impulsive ness endangers success.
As prosperity is intimately connected with a virtuous life, and adversity with vicious indulgence, it is evident that a man who would gain permanent success, must culti vate the purer affections, and restrain the corrupt propen sities of his nature.
6. The Sensibility is the source ot power and influence. An individual with a feeble emotional nature, will be a fee ble man among men. The nearer his Sensibility ap proaches zero, the nearer he will approach the status of a social cipher. His power will be nothing, his whole char acter negative. In every position and office, the man of power is the man of powerful emotion.
The statesman or soldier, who would achieve triumph, and leave his impress upon the world, must possess strong, active, steady courage, and an ambition that rises with the occasion. Napoleon possessed both, and hence the mighty influence and power he had. Cromwell was a man that to courage and ambition added religious zeal--the three forms of emotion combining to create an irresistible influence, which enabled the great Commoner to mould men and events at his will.
The power of the orator is due more to the energy of the feelings than to the extent and jvigor of the intellect. " In the most eloquent passages of the great orators of an cient or modern times, it is not so much the irresistible cogency and unrelenting grasp of the terrible logic, that holds our attention, and casts its spell over us, as it is the burning indignation that exposes the sophistries, and tears to shreds the fallacies of an opponent, and sweeps all argument and all opposition before it, like a devouring fire."* Such emotional power was the very soul of the eloquence of Demosthenes, of Burke, of Henry and of Clay.
Dr. Joseph Haven.

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The power of poetry is derived more from the fire of aroused emotion, the frenzy of lofty passion, the sublime elevation of feeling, than to the beauty cf imagery or the charm of diction or the melodious, rythmical flow of the verse. True these are important elements of poetry, but the spirit which animates the thought, the ideality, the expression, the form, is the ecstacy and exalted fervor of the poet's soul, the " fine frenzy" in which alone lies the magic of his power.* Take from Milton and Shakes peare and Byron the feeling that exalts their verse, and their master-pieces would be but the cold marble statue, as compared with the breathing, glowing form of a living man. Yea, there is feeling in the best forms of sculpture, and a statue, which is a true work of art, speaks in every feature of the face the sentient soul of the artist.
The power of woman, so universally felt and acknowl edged, is the power of Sensibility--the influence of the heart--in which she so far surpasses the sterner sex. The power of the mother, in moulding and directing the infant mind, committed to those gentle hands by a wise Creator; the power of the wife in softening the asperities of the rougher companion, and reforming the evil tendencies of a husband grown wayward by long indulgence, and the absence of restraint; the power of the sex in social life, commanding homage and devotion, is the irresistible power of the heart, by which woman is forever a queen.
And may we not any, with reverence, that the power of the Gospel is heart-power, coming, as it does, from the great heart of the Father, rendered availing by the blood that flowed from the. great heart of the Son, and made effectual by the loving offices of the Holy Spirit ? Yea, God, in His character of Supreme Monarch of worlds, governs the universe by love; "for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust"
7. The Sensibility is the fountain of human happiness
According to Jlilton, poetry is " simple, aeusaous and pusionale,"

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or misery. Under this head, we cannot refrain from quot ing the following impressive language of Dr. Thomas Brown:
"We might, perhaps, have been so constituted, with respect to our intellectual states of mind, as to have had all the varieties of these, our remembrances, judgments and creations of fancy, without our emotions. But without the emotions that accompany them, of how little value would the mere intellectual functions have been ! It is to our vivid feelings of this class we must look for those ten der regards which make our remembrances sacred, for that love of truth and glory and mankind, without which to animate and reward us in our discovery and diffusion of knowledge, the continued exercise of judgment would be a fatigue rather than a satisfaction; and for all that delight ful wonder which we feel when we contemplate the admir able creations of fancy, or the still more admirable beauties of the unfading model, that model which is ever before us, and the imitation of which, as has been truly said, is the only imitation that is itself originality. By our other mental functions we are mere spectators of the machinery of the universe, living and animate; by our emotions, we are ad mirers of nature, lovers of man, adorers of God. * * *
"Inthis picture of our emotions, however, I have pre sented them in their fairest aspects; there are aspects which they assume, as terrible as these are attractive; but even terrible as they are, they are not the less interesting objects of our contemplation. * * * In the list of our emotions of this formidable class, is to be found every pas sion which can render life guilty and miserable; a single hour of which, if that hour be an hour of uncontrolled do minion, may destroy happiness forever, and leave little more of virtue than is necessary for giving all its horror to remorse. There are feelings as blasting to every desire of good that may still linger in the heart of the frail vic tim, who is not yet wholly corrupted, as those poisonous
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gale? of the desert, which not merely lift in whirlwinds the = \r\ds that have often been tossed before, but wither even the few fresh leaves, which, on some spot of scanty verd ire, have still been flourishing amid the general ster ility-"
In the approval of a good conscience, there is a sweet satisfaction, a solid happiness, which can arise from no other source. It is a well-spring of joy,
"A. perpetual feast of nectared sweets Wiiere no crude surfeit roigns."
While, on the other hand, the voice of accusing con science is a source of mental anguish, for which the pleas ures of sense have no antidote. "It is a fire in the bones, burning when no man suspects, but him only who is doomed to its endurance; a girdle of thorns worn next the heart, concealed, it may be, from the eye of man, but giving the wearer no rest, day nor night." Remorse is the worm that dies not, tae fire that is never, quenched. If its torments are so terrible in this life, how unspeakably fearful must they be in the world of woe !
But the approval of conscience and the remorse that follows upon disregard of its warnings, are feelings--the one of pleasure, the other of pain. They have their seat in the Sensibility. How important the power which en folds in its bo.som our happiness or misery, for time and eternity!

SECTION XXIV.
CULTURE OF THE SENSIBILITY.
If upon the Sensibility hang such high and holy interests --our history, our responsility, our character, our success, our influence, our destiny--no duty is more solemn or im. perative than that which binds us to the proper culture and regulation of this power. And yet, how do we overlook its importance in even our well-meant efforts at self-discip line ! How little weight is attached to the cultivation

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ol the emotions in the nursery and by the fire-side; how much too little in the training of the schools ! In compari son with the Intellect, the heart, the source of such wonder ful power, is regarded as a matter of small moment in our systems of education.
But the question meets us, ate the Sensibilities suscepti ble of regulation and culture ? If produced .by causes, if subject to the law of necessity, can they, in any way, be brought under our control ? Do they not arise in obedi ence to forces so far beyond our reach, as not to come within the scope of any voluntary methods of education?
We maintain that the emotional powers, as well as those of the Intellect, are susceptible of high cultivation and im provement. By proper appliances, they maybe educated, trained, improved and regulated. As perception, memory, imagination, reason--intellectual faculties--are confessedly subjects of culture, so the powers of-the Sensibility may be cultivated for the great purposes of their creation.
The fact that both reason and Scripture pronounce man responsible for the state of his affections, is a proofthat, to some extent at least, they are subject, to voluntary regula tion.
But does not this imply the power of the Will over the Sensibility, and does it not refute the doctrine that the voitions are determined by the emotions? That the Will does have an influence on the emotions is not denied. The very idea of the cultivation of these powers involves voluntary action of the mind. I cannot take a single step in the education of my feelings, without first putting forth the resolution to do so--an exercise of the Will. I must not only will to cultivate them, but I must resolve upon the requisite act, at each stage of the process. Moreover, through the entire proceedure, the attention must be held to it, by a strong and persistent exertion of the Will. But none of these resolves or volitions are self-produced--none are arbitrary and causeless operations of the Will. Be hind each volition there lurks a feeling--some desire or

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obligation--which spurs the Will to the resolution; other wise, no such resolution could exist. To resolve to con trol or cultivate the Sensibility, without a motive, is incon ceivable.
But does the Will act directly upon the emotions, at its own option arousing the feelings to activity, and stimulat ing them to violence, or commanding the temper and re straining the passions by its own immediate energy ? In other words, are phases of emotion, or activities of the Sensibility, ever produced by the direct force of the Will ? To this; we think, a negative answer must be given. We cannot, by sheer Will-effort, create any given emotion, or even produce any given phase of feeling. I canr ot awaken love by simply willing it. I cannot indulge hate, revenge, fear, joy or hope, by a mere effort of Will.
But cannot we check or suppress our feelings, command our temper and restrain our passions by the Will ? Let us see. I am conscious that the feeling of anger is rising in my breast. If it gain supreme sway, dominating all other feelings, it will prompt the Will to some overt action. It will find expression in some abusive or threatning word, or menacing gesture, or injurious blow. It will seek an outlet in the contemptuous " Raca!" the passionate "Thou fool!" or the murderous shot or thrust. But before it thus gains the ascendency and openly exhibits itself, a thought occurs to me which awakens a different feeling. I remember that this passion has previously gotten me into trouble--has either brought me into disgrace or danger. Or I have observed these bad effects in the case of another person. The feeling of pjlde or fear is born, and imme diately a conflict with the rising passion ensues. The strong er feeling overbears the weaker. If pride of character, scorning to be brought into a disgraceful position, be stronger than anger, the passion will yield. If fear of danger gain the mastery, the angry feeling will succumb. Or suppose, as the passion swells in my heart, the thought that anger is wrong comes to my mind, then the emotional

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conscience--the feeling of moral obligation--arises to dis pute the field with the original possessor. If the new foe prove the stronger in the grapple, the other will yield, and all expressions of passion will be restrained. It is ev ident, that these new emotions are the conquerors, and not the Will. And these emotions are born of certain thoughts-- intellections--that have arisen in the mind. These intel lections have entered through some principle of sugges tion or association, independent of the Will.
This leads us to inquire what the Will does in the culti vation of the Sensibility. Its office is indirect--namely, to employ the necessary means for accomplishing the object.
What then are the means and methods for the due edu cation and regulation of the emotional nature ? In re ference to this, the following considerations are offered:
1. In the first place, the Sensibility may be cultivated by the proper improvement of the intellectual faculties. It is emphatically true, that to educate the heart we must first educate the head. Our Sensibilities are awakened by our intellections--our feelings arise out of our thoughts. This has been iterated from time to time in this discussion. And though a given thought does not always awaken to a given feeling--our emotions, desires and affections being uncertain, inconstant and variable--yet the relation is such, that the habitual exercise of a certain character of thought will secure the prevalence of a certain character of feeling. The office of the Will; then, is to adopt such methods of educating the Intellect as will give right and safe directions to the thoughts, as habits oj the mmd. Let us apply this principle to some of the faculties of the Intellect.
'1 he imagination is one of the most active and powerful of these faculties, and, in its influence on the Sensibilities, one of the most important. By its proper training--that is, by exercising it on certain subjects--it calls into play the purest and noblest emotions of the soul. It may be educated to frame lofty ideals of things earthly, and holy

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ideals of things heavenly; to range amid sublunary scenes of unpolluted, innocent and rational enjoyment, or rising on bolder vying, to sweep in lawful excursions, amid the ideal glories of the upper world. The habitual crea tion and contemplation of noble images like these, tend to exalt the spirit, and to foster habitual emotions, pure, re fined and elevated.
On the other hand, to accustom the imagination to revel in scenes of impurity and debauchery, is to develop and stimulate the base and corrupt propensities of the heart.
The higher powers of judgment and reason are noble capacities of the Intellect, and may, by proper cultivation, prove valuable means of training the Sensibility to noble tendencies. The habitual employment of the mind in seeking truth, in rational investigation, in lofty contem plation, tends to the production of habitual states of pure and elevated feeling.
Above all, the correct education of the ethical judgment-- the intellectual element of conscience--is one of the most effective means of promoting correct habits of emotion. Let the conscientious/a^fw^ be habitually right, and the moral impulses will be habitually right. Let one take pains to educate his conscience so as to secure nice and accurate discriminations between right and wrong, and the emo tional power of this faculty will maintain its rightful as cendency, and it will rarely happen that appetite and pas sion can prevail over the moral instincts of the soul.
Thus the proper culture of the intellectual powers is a necessary and valuable instrumentality in the right regu lation of the emotional nature.
2. In the second place, the Sensibility may be duly cul tivated by keeping proper objects before the attention, and by excluding hurtful objects and images from the thoughts. One who habitually contemplates pure and right things-- whether they be objects of sense, discerned by the bodily organs, or ideas of imagination, or subjects of reason-- will be likely to have habitually right feelings; and the

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prevalence of these proper emotions will be in propor tion to the frequency or constancy of these pure con templations. Let no corrupt spectacle come before the eye, no harmful sound or speech be uttered to the ear, no fan cied scene of pollution be presented to the imagination, and the emotions will not stray after such unfamiliar im proprieties. In the education of children, the greatest care is necessary to guard them, in their tender years, from the contamination of objects, pictures, spectacles, associations and literature, that naturally tend to kindle corrupt passions in the heart. Lascivious pictures, licen tious theatrical and spectacular exhibitions, and dissolute companions, suggest base thoughts, by which the Sensibil ities are polluted and the moral nature degraded.
And so with respect to self-reformation ; if one has con tracted .debasing habits of mind, it should be his task to divert his thoughts from their accustomed pernicious chan nels, and to dwell in contemplation upon subjects pure and noble and rational. Habits of right thought thus es tablished, will naturally be followed by habitual states of right emotion.
3. The Sensibility is most properly and effectually ^reg ulated by religious culture. Religion is pre-eminently the renovation of the heart--the inspiration of new and holy affections and desires. This is the work of the Holy Spiritf and His power and grace must be sought with faith and prayer, under the teaching of Divine truth. Aside from the direct, supernatural mfluence of the Spirit, the occu pation of the mind with the sacred themes of revelation, the frequent reflection upon the Divine character, the con templation of the scenes and employments of heaven, and the elevation of the mind in the holy atmosphere of prayer, (if we could suppose them possible without Divine influence,) would naturally tend to sustain the emotions in a state of heavenly exaltation. Yet the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary, and in seeking this grace, the Will is employed. We are to put forth volitions, by

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asking, seeking and knocking at the door of Divine Mercy. Thus the Will, not by the exertion of its power directly
upon the feelings, but by its resolution to adopt the means necessary for the purpose, is employed in the task of cul tivating the Sensibility. To this it is impelled by some antecedent desire, and thus we are kept, in accordance \vith the laxvs of our constitution, within the sphere of Divine control. We are not abandoned to a capricious, arbi trary Will for the determination of our destinies. And yet that Will is endued with a native energy, potential for the purposes for which it was created. To this subject we direct attention in our final section.

SECTION XXV.
THE ENERGY OF THE WILL.
Before concluding this treatise, an inquiry of interest and pertinence merits some consideration. Is the Will, which we have found to be subject to the law of causation, endowed with any intrinsic energy? Does it possess any power of its own, independent of the motive which de termines its action ? Or is it driven cnward in blind and pas sive submission, inert and impotent, like insensate matter, unless impelled or sustained by the moving force ?
The Will is a psychical agent, a power of the soul, and hence, unlike a stolid, material substance, it has an essen tial activity. We know the intellectual faculties to be caused; yet we call them powers, implying that they possess some potential energy. Thus memory, imagina tion and reason are powers of the understanding, having in themselves an under!ved forceful activity. We speak likewise, of the emotional powers, which, as we have seen, are characterized by a quick and lively energy. It would seem to be a fair inference from analogy, that the third great department of the soul--the Will--is invested with the attribute of power.
It is often convenient to compare the powers and act's

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of the mental faculties to material forces and operations But there is no physical analogy which will perfectly ex plain psychical powers and phenomena. We have already likened the Will to certain agents in external nature, which possess an inherent dynamic energy, not apparent in the causes which produce them. Fire is the effect or result of chemical action--of heat acting upon certain constituent elements of matter. But has not fire a potential energy not to be discovered in the cause which produces it ? Its power to consume everything combustible and to fuse the most obdurate metals ; the terrific fury and sweeping havoc of the great conflagration: all give evidence of an energy peculiar to this agent ? Steam is the effect of heat applied to water--in other words, it is water in the form of vapor, the change being effected by heat. But has steam: no intrinsic energy ? The force with which it drives the most massive machinery, "propels the colossal man of war and draws the most ponderous train with a swiftness which the fleetest horse cannot rival; the terrible force with which it bursts the most heavily-plated boilers, scat tering destruction on every side--these give token of an inherent potency, which we do not discern in the produc ing causes.
But even these may be explained by the -physicist so as to give to these dynamical agents the character of bor rowers of force. In the caloric, wh'ich kindles the fire and raises the steam, which burns in the one and lies enveloped in the other, we have the source of their terrific power.
But to the Will itself there seems to belong a measure of energy, giving it tenacity, elasticity and strength. And yet we hold, that the greater portion of constancy and steadfastness it exhibits is due to the bracing it receives from the Sensibility. As has been before said, even selfwilled and obstinate men are distinguished by strength and energy of feeling.
Inflexibility of character, as contrasted with pliant, plas tic and vacillating natures, is frequently superinduced by the prevalence of some species of Sensibility, which sus-

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tains the resolution, and gives to the purpose its pro

verbial stability. The various feelings of courage, pride,

duty and religious faith have sustained men against dan

gers, difficulties and discouragements, which have broken

the spirit of those whose purposes were not backed by

these stout and vigorous emotions. It was courage, or

military ardor, that upheld the immortal six hundred at

Balaklava, who, fearless,

while

" Rode into the valley of death," " Cannon to right of them,

Cannon to left of them, Cannon in front of them, Volleyed and thundered."

It was pride that prompted and sustained the heroic act

of Mutius Scaevola, who, in the presence of the overbear

ing Porsena, thrust his right hand into the fire upon the

altar, and held it steadily in -the flame until it was con

sumed.

It was patriotic duty that supported the firm purpose

of Regulus to submit to degradation, torture and death,

rather than counsel dishonor to Rome.

It was the fervor of religious faith that prompted Cran-

mer to place his offending hand first into the fierce flame,

and calmly to hold it there while suffering other tortures,

until the devoted member dropped from his shoulder.

And yet, in all these instances, there are indications of

a tenacity inhering in the Will itself. This power, after being

determined to action, seems to brace or nerve itself to a

firm and inflexible consistency, which withstands every as

sault made npon it. It holds out with a steadfast and

stubborn strength of resistance, which defies opposition,

scorns danger and suffering, and justifies the encomium of

the Roman Poet:

'' Justum et tenaeem propositi virum, Non civium ardor prava jubentinm, Nbn vnltus instantis tyranni,

Si fractns illabatnr orbis Impavidum terient ruinae."

APPENDIX.
In the second section of this work credit was given to M. Cousin for the present three-fold classification of the mental powers, Intellect, Sensibility and Will. This, how ever, seems to be a matter of doubt. Cousin distinctly main tains that "voluntary activity, sensibility and intelligence, or reason," constitute the powers of the soul; and adds that this classification " is now generally adopted, and makes the foundation of the psychology of our times."
Hamilton ascribes the trichotomy to the German philos opher, Kant. The author has just received the following from Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, author of a. profound and valuable work on the Human Intellect. Says President Porter: " It is not easy to answer the ques tion asked in your letter. Hamilton misstates--or rather incorrectly states--Kant's merit in respect to the three-fold classification. Kant's division of the powers, or faculties, is this: Denk (Thinking); Gefiihls (Feeling); and Bestrebungs Vermogen (Endeavor Faculties)--this last answer ing to Desire, rather than to the Will, or Free-Will. And yet Kant in his Ethics, as does Hamilton, incidentally re cognizes Will as something distinguished from Desire. But Locke made the same distinction between Desire and WilL Reid followed him. The old division into Understanding and Will seems to have very tenaciously made itself felt, long after it was abandoned in the application. Psycholo gists have been few and far between in English Literature; but T. C. Upham formally adopted the three-fold classifi cation, taking it in effect from Dugald Stewart."
President Porter adopts the three-fold division, precisely .as employed in this treatise.