Military rderof % bo^al be|ion
OF THE
United States.
OF TjlE DI^ICT OF
WAR PAPERS.
13
g eneral -tr ardee's x scapre from ^=ia\'ian.n.ah.'
PREPARED BY COMPANION
Brevet Brigadier General
E. A. CARMAN,
e U. S. Volunteers,
READ AT THE STATED MEETING OF MAY 3, 1893.

Jwdce's feap* ^vom Savannah.
.On the I4th day of November, 1864, General Sherman con centrated at Atlanta 60,000 veteran infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with which he proposed to inarch into the heart of Georgia, and thence to Savannah, making " Georgia howl" and "smashing things to the sea." This army was divided into two wings: the right, commanded by General O. O. Howard, comprising the Fifteenth Corps, under General P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seven teenth Corps, under General Frank P. Blair, Jr. ; and the left wing, under General II. W. Slocum, consisting of the Four teenth Corps, General J. C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, General A. S. Williams. In addition to these two infantry wings, General Kilpatrick led a cavalry division of 5,500 men. About 70 to 75 guns were allowed and a pontoon-train was as signed to each wing of the army. Ample supplies of ammuni tion were carried in good wagon-trains, also forty days' rations of bread, sugar, and coffee, and a double allowance of salt to be used on the 5,000 head of cattle with which the army was to start, and such other fresh meat as might present itself or be con fiscated on the march. These two columns filed out of Atlanta on the 14th, taking different roads, and cut a swathe through Georgia 40 to So miles wide, living on the sweet potatoes, chickens, turkeys, sheep, hogs, and beef of the country, and feeding the transportation on the corn, dry fodder, and growing grass, closing in on Savannah, December loth, with an increase of 10,000 mules and horses, and the herd of beef cattle increased from 5,000 to 10,000.
Beyond a very brilliant engagement at Griswoldville, near Macon, in which General C. C. Walcott, of the Fifteenth

Corps, defeated Wheeler and some infantry supports, there was but little fighting of the infantry. Kilpatrick and Wheeler had some running fights and two or three spirited engagements, but Wheeler was pressed steadily back, and as the army neared Savannah he drew off to the north and crossed the Savannah River above the city and then moved down the Carolina side opposite. Kilpatrick followed him to the river, and, after the infantry moved up to the city defences, fell to the rear, which he guarded.
The Confederate line of defence ran from the Savannah River on the north to the Little Ogeechee River on the south, a dis tance of about thirteen miles. General Gustavus W. Smith with about 2,000 Georgia militia held from the Savannah River almost to the crossing of the Central Railroad, a front of about two miles and a half.
Lafayette McLaws held from the left of Smith's line to a swamp near the Daly farm, three miles and three quarters, with a veteran command of North Carolina, South Carolina, Ten nessee, Kentucky, and Georgia troops, numbering about 3,750 men, while A. R. Wright with 2.700 men, veterans, militia, local reserves, dismounted cavalry, workmen from the arsenals, and other irregular troops, held from McLaw's left to the Little Ogeechee, a distance of about seven miles.
The line was well planted with ai'tillery. Every effort was made, by the erection of batteries and infantry entrenchments, by digging rifle-pits and constructing substantial covers, by fell ing trees in its front and by flooding all approaches, to render this line as formidable as trie labor and materials at command would permit. How well the work was done can be judged when we remember that for ten days it kept Sherman's army of 60.000 men at bay.
Considering that the line was thirteen miles long, and held by

less than 9,000 men, scarcely more than a skirmish-line, it must be conceded that had Sherman massed for a determined assault, he could at almost any hour or on any day, during the siege, have carried it. With a veteran, well-seasoned army of more than six times that of the Confederates, and this Confederate force composed in great part of detailed workmen, reserves, militia, and others unused to action, it seemed then strange, and seems so still, that Sherman should have contented himself with sittingdown before these lines, erecting strong defensive works and counter batteries, engaging in artillery duels, and feeling for weak points da}- after day ; after the capture of Fort McAllister, making arrangements for the transportation of heavy guns with which to shell Savannah over the heads of its defenders, and finally suffering the entire garrison to withdraw by pontoonbridges and canal banks to the South Carolina shore. It does not become your companion to criticise General Sherman, but historical truth is superior to military rank, and I cannot but believe that had he indicated that energy which was his characteristic, had he listened to the suggestions of some of his subordinate officers, or had he permitted the officer next to him in rank, General Slocum, to carry out his intention, the proba bilities are that he would have captured Ilardee and the entire Confederate garrison of Savannah with the loss of less than too men, and, in conjunction with that splendid achievement of Gco. H. Thomas at Nashville, have then and there practically ended the war. I believed at the time it could have been done with a division. I believe so still.
In his official report General Sherman says that the enemy's position was so well covered and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled by heavy artillery, that to assault appeared to him unwise, especially as he had so successfully

brought his army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could siirelv attain the same result liv the operation of time.
Therefore, he instructed Slocum and Howard, his army com manders, to closely invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in front, whilst he gave his personal attention to opening communication with the fleet which was off the coast. Fort McAllistcr, on the Ogeechec River, was all that stood between Shcrmans right and the fleet, and this fort was carried by a brilliant assault of Ha/ens divis ion of the Fifteenth Corps on the afternoon of December 13111. On the 14111 Sherman met General Foster, commanding the dis trict of Pocotaligo. north of Savannah, on the coast, threat ening the Charleston and Savannah Railroad and the Confed erate line of communication into South Carolina. He also met Admiral Dahlgren. He says in his official report: "I explained to him [Dahlgren] how completely Savannah was invested at all points save only the plank road on the South Carolina shore, known as the Union Causewav, which I thought I could reach from my left flank across the Savannah River. I ex plained to him that if he would simplv engage the attention of the forts along Wilmington channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, I thought I could carry the defences of Savannah by assatilt as soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from Hiltoii Head." In his conversation with General Foster he told him of his intention to throw a force across the Savannah River, which would prevent the escape of Hardee or the garrison ; meanwhile, with the heavv guns, he would throw shells into the heart of Savannah, four miles distant from the point where he proposed to mount them.
On the I fth he returned from his visit to Foster and Dahlgren on the fleet, and from General Howards headquarters wrote to General Slocum, inquiring if he could close the naviga tion of the Savannah River above the city and get a force over

the river to threaten the Union Causeway; to which Slocum promptly responded that he could, and, still later in the day, after a conference with some of his officers, who had been across the river, proposed throwing a division or the entire Twentieth Corps across;' and thus seal the fate of Savannah. Sherman shrank from the risk, and would permit but one brigade to be crossed, and the movements of the brigade, my own, were paralyzed the next three days by conflicting orders, of which more a little later on.
On the next morning Sherman received an order from General Grant to establish a base on the coast, fortify and leave it to his artillery and cavalry, with enough infantry to protect them, and move his armv by water to Virginia. This was a great dis appointment to Sherman and threatened to upset all his plans, and did, for a .time, paralyze his efforts. He communicated immediately with Grant:
" If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifica tions, would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenues of supply. The enemy has made two desperate attempts to get boats from above to the city, in which he has been foiled, General Slocum (whose left flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the first boat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats and capturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and a crew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Island and the upper end of Ilutchinson's Island, and has a brigade on the South Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one of his corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of plan made necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things in stain quo."
Sherman mistakes when he says that Slocum had a brigade on the South Carolina shore on the i6th; such was not the

case. Orders were given for crossing, but countermanded, and the necessary boats and intrenching tools directed elsewhere.
Meanwhile reconnaissances in the front of the Twentieth and Fourteenth Corps developed the fact that there were some favorable points for assault, General Davis, commanding Four teenth Corps, reporting that five points in his front had been well reconnoitred and pronounced accessible to an attacking party. There were some Confederate veterans in front of Davis. but we can scarcely admit the doubt that the two divisions of Absolom I5aird and William P. Carlin could have broken their line.
In front of the Twentieth Corps (its left flank on the Sa vannah River) were 2.000 Georgia militia, holding two and a half miles. Who doubts that the 12.000 men of that corps that had fought at Antietam. Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, Lookout Mountain. Resaca. Peach-Tree Creek, and Atlanta could have walked over this Georgia militia at some point of its weak line ?
I am aware that the fields were low and cut up with ditches, but all this had been admirably provided for by the manufactur ing of fascines. ladders and stringers, and making such other provision as was necessary. As to the probabilities of successful assault bv the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps on the right, I knew not; I speak only of what came within my own observa tion.
General Shcrman admits the chances of success. He says; " Having carefully considered all the reports of division com manders. I determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as my heavy ordnance came from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender."
This he did on the i/th, informing Hardee that he had " for some days held and controlled every avenue by which he could be supplied." to which Hardee would not consent, and he

denied Sherman's assertion that he held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrison could be supplied, retorting that he was in free and constant communication with his department.
Upon receiving Hardee's refusal to surrender, Sherman con cluded that there was nothing to be done but to assault, and yet he did not wish to do that, as the ground was difficult, and as all the previous assaults of his military career had proved so bloody and disastrous he concluded to make one more effort to surround Savannah on all sides so as further to excite Hurdee's fears, and, in case of success, to capture the whole of his armv. He had completely invested the place on the north, west, and south, but there remained to Hardee on the east the use of the old dike or plank road leading into South Carolina, and he supposed that Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river, which, however, was not on that day a fact.
His bridge was not completed until two days later. On the 16th he wrote Grant that he had a brigade in South Carolina threatening the plank road, and in the same letter said that it was a disused wagon-road that he could easily get possession of, but did not deem it worth the risk of making a detachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the main armv. On the 17th he had informed Hardee that he controlled his communications; on the next day wrote Grant that General Foster had assured him that he had a force on that very road, near the head of Broad River, which proved not to be the case.
In his Memoirs, General Sherman thus writes: " On examin ing my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, be longing to General Foster's command, might be moved from its then position at Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach this plank road, fortify and hold it, at some risk of course, because Hardee could avail himself of his central

IO
position to fall on this detachment with his whole army. I did not want to make a mistake like'Balls' Bluff' at that period of the war; so. taking one or two of my personal staff, 1 rode back to Kings' Bridge, leaving with Generals Howard and Sioctim orders to make ;:1I possible preparations, but not to at tack, during my two or three days absence."
It would appear from this that Sherman was not entirely convinced of the fact that Foster commanded this road near the head of Broad River, for surely he would not have moved him from it to Bluffton, from which he could make an effort to reach this very road, at much risk from Hardee's force at Savannah. Sherman took steamer, made his arrangements with Foster and started on his return, expecting to be back in his lines on the 2Oth. but was buffeted by wind and tide, and did not make land until the morning of the 2ist, to learn that Hardee had escaped with his army from Savannah by the plank road, which had not been closed. Sherman was greatly disappointed, and confessed as much to Halleck, to whom he wrote on the 24th: "I feel somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape, but really am not to blame." " I moved as quickly as possible to close up the Union Causeway, but intervening obstacles. were such that, before I could get troops on the road, Hardee had slipped out." General Grant had written to Sherman on the iSth : "If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole South." On the 26th Stanton wrote to Grant: " It is a sore disappointment that Hardee was able to get off his fifteen thousand [there were but ten thousand] from Sherman's sixty thousand. It looks like protracting the war while their armies continue to escape." Grant made no criticism of Sherman, but others did criticise, and Sherman and Slocum came in for some inconsiderate cen sure, as did also the commander of the brigade across whose

II
front Hardee, on the night of December 2Oth, moved 9,000 men, 47 guns, and his wagon-train; and, as I was that brigade commander, I propose to tell briefly how Hardee "slipped out."
I commanded the Second Brigade, First Division, Twentieth Army Corps. The corps was commanded by Brigadier General A. S. Williams, of Michigan, familiarly known as " Pap Williams," and the division commander \vas Brigadier General N. J. Jackson. I had five regiments: the Second Massa chusetts, commanded by Colonel William Cogswell. a splendid soldier, now an able and leading member of Congress; the Third Wisconsin, Colonel William Hawley, now dead; the io7th New York, Colonel N. M. Crane, now a banker of Hornellsville, New York; the I5oth New York, Colonel John H. Ketcham, for many years a member of Congress; and my own regiment, the Thirteenth New Jersey, Major F. II. Harris, now president of a large insurance company at Newark, New Jersey. These were all veteran regiments, and their com manders had few equals and no superiors in the service. The brigade numbered about 1.700 men.
As the army closed in on Savannah on the gth, I had the advance, which was resumed early next morning until I struck the Savannah and Charleston Railroad, which I stopped to destroy, when the brigade whose turn it was to lead passed me and continued on the dirt road to Savannah, but was soon brought to a halt by artillery on the line surrounding that city. While engaged in destroying this railroad, I sent out Captain Henry A. Gildersleeve with his company of the 1501)1 New York, to feel out in the direction of the Savannah River, and incidentally to do a little foraging on the river plantations, where I anticipated some good picking, for it had been three full long days since we had had any turkeys for our mess, and chickens

12
had given out that morning. As Gildersleeve neared the river, he saw a small steamer, the despatch-boat Ida, ascending it in the direction of Augusta. He moved cautiously, yet rapidly, to the reeds and cane-brake fringing the bank, and as she came nearly abreast fired into her. brought her to, and took thirteen prisoners, among them Colonel Clinch, of Hardee's staff, bear ing despatches to a gunboat fleet above, and four officers of the Confederate navy.
Unfortunately, Gildersleeve burned the boat, fearing that he could not hold it against the gunboats should they come down.
Gildersleeve's report was so flattering as to the great quantity of rice that could be obtained on the river plantations, and on the islands lying in the river, that on the next day, under direc tion of the corps commander, Colonel Hawley of the Third Wisconsin was, with his regiment, ordered to Argyle Island to secure the rice in the mills and in stack, and to make a reconnoissance on the South Carolina shore. He crossed two com panies to the island that afternoon, and was about crossing the remainder next morning, when the Confederate navy was re ported coming down the river--three gunboats: the Macon, carrying four 64 pdrs. and two 32 pdrs.; the Sampson, carry ing two 32 pdrs: and the tender Resolute.
We had learned from our prisoners of the Ida that these gun boats were up the river, and to provide against their descent batteries were put in position on the nth, among them Winnegar's New York battery of rifled guns, about six miles above Savannah, on the Tweedside plantation and opposite the lower end of Onslow Island, lying between the Georgia shore and Argyle Island. The battery was supported by the Twentysecond Wisconsin, of the Third Division, Twentieth Corps, and when the steamers were reported the Third Wisconsin men also went to the support of the guns by ranging themselves behind

the dike, prepared to pick off the naval gunners. The river is very tortuous at this point and with many channels. As the boats rounded the point of Onslovv Island Winnegar opened on them with his four guns; they replied with 32 and 64 pound shells, but in a half-hour Winnegar had disabled one of them, and the three started to return up the river. In turning about in some confusion in the narrow and crooked channel, one of the boats ran into the tender Resolute and crippled her so badly that she became unmanageable and drifted down close to the shore of Argyle Island, and her officers and crew were about to take to small boats, when a squad of Third Wisconsin men rose up from behind the dike on the island, rushed through the canebrake, waded nearly to their necks in water, stopped the escape in the small boats by a single shot, by which a Confederate officer was wounded, clambered on board the vessel and took possession of her--men, breakfast and all. The prisoners taken were five naval officers and nineteen men, and there fell into our hands 20 rifled Whitney muskets, some flour,"bread, bacon, rice, vinegar, several bags of coffee, and some Scotch whiskey. The boat was towed over to the Georgia shore, repaired the same day, and put in use as a picket boat and a tug to move barge-loads of rice from the islands. It was with reference to this capture and that of the Ida on the loth that Sherman wrote so exultingly to Secretary Stanton on the I3th, "We have already captured two boats on the Savannah River, and prevented their gunboats from coining down," and referred to it three days later, in his letter to Grant, as "two desperate attempts to get boats from above to the city, in which he [Hardee] has been foiled."
After accomplishing this feat of capturing one vessel of the Confederate navy with a company of foragers, and repulsing two heavily armed gunboats with a light battery, and boarding

14
and taking another vessel with a squad of Wisconsin skir mishers, our men felt equal to any occasion, but were re strained, for the time being, by the more prosaic duty of threshing and hulling rice on Argyle Island, for the army at that time had eaten up everything but fresh beef. The sweet potatoes, bacon, sheep, hogs, and poultry were a memory only. While engaged in this dutv, Colonel Hawlev sent detachments across Back River into South Carolina, pene trating some distance inland, securing some horses, mules, hogs and poultry, and obtaining information that it seemed to be un occupied and unguarded.
This information, i-eceived daily from the I2th to the ifth, was promptly conveyed to corps headquarters, and presumably laid before Sherman. But the Confederates soon ascertained that our troops were foraging on that side of the river, and Wheelers cavalrymen began to show themselves; so that when, on the morning of the I5th. two companies were sent over to drive the Confederate sharpshooters off. Hawlev was obliged to reinforce them with three companies, with which he succeeded in pushing Wheelers men back ; but as the force was increasing he deemed it prudent to withdraw, and ask for reinforcements, which were immediately sent him. the Second Massachusetts, Colonel Cogs well, being detached for the purpose. Either from the reports sent in by Hawlev. or governed by other information. Sherman had already looked to the occupation of the Carolina side of the river; for after a visit to General Foster on the 141)1, in which his plans and intentions were freely given, Foster tele graphed from IIilton Head to General Halleck:
His [Shermans] army closely invests Savannah on the south side of the Savannah River, and a force which will take position on the north side of that river will prevent the escape of II .rdee or the garrison. Argvle Island, in the Savannah River,

15
is held by our troops, who have captured two steamers on the river at that point. General Shennan will without doubt capture Savannah and all its garrison and armament."* He telegraphed to General Grant also :
" General Sherman is perfectly sure of capturing Savannah. * * * To prevent the escape of Hardee and the garrison, General Sherman intends to throw one division across the Savannah River at Argyle Island, to hold the river-bank oppo site the city. I am also to hold the railroad and stage-road in my present position between the Coosawhatchie and Tulliminy Rivers." f
Having captured Fort McAllister, General Sherman now turned to his design of completely investing Hardee, and on the 15th wrote to General Slocum, commanding the left wing of the army:
" Now, if you can close the Savannah River to navigation and also get a force over the Savannah River to threaten in flank any dirt road, leading out of Savannah, between the city and Coosawhatchie, the investment of the city will be complete and the enemy will have no escape."
Slocum immediately replied: "I think lean safely place a force on the Carolina side of the river and gradually work my way down and opposite the city."
That afternoon I had ridden to the river, where Hawley, with the Third Wisconsin, had crossed over to the island, and where he had been reinforced with the Second Massachusetts, and Haw.ley gave me some details of his movement that dav on the South Carolina shore, and suggested that with the two regiments he could recross the Back River and hold Ix.ard's plantation, nearly a mile inland, against any force of cavalry that could probably
* Official Records of the Rebellion, Volume XLIV, p:ige 714. t Official Records, Volume XJLIV, pnge 713.
\

i6
be brought against him. He drew a rough sketch showing the dikes, roads, and canals over which he had advanced. As he had received his original instructions from the corps commander, I proposed that he make a report directly to that officer.
I returned to the Georgia shore and rode down to my tent, where I arrived shortly after dark, to find awaiting me a message from General Williams to come to his headquarters. It was hut a step and I walked over, when Williams told me the purport of the letter from Sherman, and asked what I knew of the situation on the South Carolina shore and the feasibility of crossing and manoeuvring troops there. I told him that there were boats enough in the river to cross' a brigade every hour; that from what I had seen, and from what Hawley had told me, troops could be handled quite readily, and I showed him the rough sketch, on which was the Union Causeway, which Hawley thought could be reached bv a brigade, and suggested that Haw ley could give him more information should an extended move ment be thought desirable. Just at this time an officer came in with Hawley's report, which was apparently just the kind of a report that Slocum wanted, for he had already proposed a similar movement to Sherman. He finally said to Williams (in that quiet, gentlemanly way of his, which had not the least suggestion of profanity), "D--n it'. Let us take this plank road and shut these fellows in," and then, turning to me, said : " Carman, get your whole brigade ready to go over in the morning to the island and then to the South Carolina shore." And Williams gave me verbal instructions to go as far into the country as possible and take a strong line to be occupied by the whole corps, which, in all probability, would follow me im mediately.
Orders were given to Hawley to cross the two regiments on the island early in the morning, and the quartermaster depart ment was directed to collect all the small boats for my crossing.

With the rough sketch made by Hawley, and aided by a coast survey map, one of Slocum's staff made a rough map and enclosed it in this letter of Slocum to Sherman, dated 9 P. M. that day, December 15 :
" I have two regiments o.i the South Carolina shore, north of Clydesdale Creek; to-morrow morning the remainder of the brigade, three additional regiments, will endeavor to take the line from Clydesdale Creek to a point on the Savannah River opposite to Cvuger's Island with orders to intrench on that line and feel forward towards the causeway road. With your con sent I will try to place a division on the line marked 2 on the inclosed diagram. It will be necessary to move with some
caution on that side; and to render the position entirely .safe it may be necessary to throw an entire corps over, with instruc tions to intrench strongly. There are many points in front of our present position that can be guarded by a good picket-line. If a portion of the line now held by Davis can be held by Gen-

eral Howard, or In- the troops under General Foster, the Twentieth Corps can be spared, and will seal up that side of the citv and be in a position to shell every portion of it. I shall go no further than to send a brigade over to take the line marked i, until I hear from you ; but I have no fear of placing a corps on that side; and this done, the fate of the city is sealed. I think Foster's command might be of use in the swamps on this side if placed behind the line already established. I think there are points on the left of my line from which the city can be shelled with those heavv guns to more advantage than on the right of the line. The point held by Carlin, where Mower was. is within three miles and a half of the city, but there are points nearer the river quite as close, and from which the citv can be seen. Please give me vour views as to the propriety of attempt ing to throw one entire corps over. We can send supplies via Argyle Island, which is held by us. The enemy hold the lower part of Hutchinson's Island, and command the whole island with their batteries on this side.
"They also send a small gunboat up to a point between Cruger's Island and Hutchinson's. at a point marked B. She has one heavy gun and gives us some annoyance. She is just out of range of our field-guns." *
But Sherman. for some reason, had changed his mind about closing up the avenue to Hardee's escape, and replied about midnight:
"For the present do not send more than one brigade, and. instead of threatening south towards the Union Causeway. rather let it threaten eastward towards the road running up to wards Augusta on the east side of Savannah River, seeming threatening in flank movement of troops attempting to escape from Savannah."t
* Official Records. Volume XLIV, page 719. *Officinl Records, Volume XLIV. page 720.

This was a keen disappointment to Slocum, who, from the 12th, had this movement constantly in mind, had set his heart upon it, and who judged that it would be authorized. When I moved out of the investing line next morning, being relieved by Colonel Dustin's Brigade of the Third Division, and was march ing past corps headquarters, Williams stopped me and said, " Go ahead just as though the whole corps is to follow, for I think Sherman will yet change his mind and permit Slocum to send us all over." In his usual fatherly manner, he cautioned me not to get caught, and I replied that if I could get across two regiments I could fortify and hold myself against all the cavalry that Wheeler could bring to the field, and that with such officers as Cogswell and Hawley to lead the advance on the two principal dikes I could reach that Union Causeway, a plank road mostly, tear up the planks, burn the bridges on it, cut it crosswise and damage it to such an extent that the Con federates could not use it, under the fire of my brigade, which I proposed to place behind one of the dikes commanding it--this, of course, assuming that Wheeler had not increased his foi'ce of the day before.
I took with me part of the division pioneers, and before noon had marched four miles, crossed to the island and united mv bri gade of five regiments on the east side of Gibbon's plantation, fac ing the Carolina shore. The two regiments on the island had been unable to cross to the South Carolina shore early in the morning as intended, from the fact that during the night the small boats assigned for the purpose had been diverted to the use of General Geary, who had some troops on Hutchinson's Island, south of me, and the tide ran too low to admit the use of large rice barges. An additional reason was that General Joe Wheeler had lined the South Carolina shore with his cavalry skirmishers. Ilardee was very uneasy about his communications, and when

20
he heard, in the afternoon of the day preceding, that the Wiscon sin foragers and skirmishers had landed on that side of the river and gone some distance into the country, he advised Wheeler to drive them back, " that it was all-important that they should be driven off," and General Pierce M. B. Young, with 500 men, was sent to reinforce Wheeler, with orders to drive the enemy back at all hazards; but Hawley had retired, so Young moved down to the dikes and opened with musketry, and a section of artillery, farther back, shelled my brigade on the island, killing one man. The long-range rifles of my men were more than a match for Young's carbines, and he was driven away with some loss.
To meet the Confedarate artillery, I brought over from the Georgia shore a rifled gun of Winnegar's battery, which was put in position, and soon drove Wheeler's two guns to the shelter of some rice stacks. Works were thrown up for the gun, and the infantry found shelter behind the plantation dikes and a collec tion of negro quarters. During the afternoon and while the artillery duel was in progress, General Williams, the corps commander, came over and, after dodging some of Wheeler's shots on his way along the dike, informed me that Sherman had heard from Grant; that all was uncertainty at headquarters, and that for the present I make no effort to cross, and mean while to examine further up the island for an additional crossing, as he thought more men would be sent over.
Williams returned before dark, and about 9 o'clock I received a written order from him to cross my command to the South Carolina shore, commencing the movement before daylight, and occupy a position near the river, not attempting to advance far into the country.*
I began my preparations by sending for the boats, then on the
* Official Records, Volume XLIV, page 734.

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Georgia side of the island," but soon received an order from my division commander, countermanding the first order and direct ing me to send over a force of 90 or 100 men in small boats to effect a lodgment, if possible, and feel the enemy's position, but not to take over more men than could readily be brought back, should Wheeler prove too strong for me; and still later on cante a verbal order from division headquarters that I might support the skirmishers with two regiments.* I sent one of my staff back with a line to the corps commander asking if, in case I succeeded in getting a lodgment with the skirmishers and two regiments, I was to follow my original instructions to cross the entire brigade without further orders, or to act on my own judgment. I did not wait for his reply, but ordered over another gun from Winnegar's battery on the Georgia shore, and determined to cross my whole brigade as rapidly as possible, which I thought much more safe than sending a detachment to feel an enemy, whom I could plainly see from the rice barn, which overlooked the other shore for miles. The order in which the crossing was to be made was written out, two axes and twenty shovels were assigned to each regiment of the brigade, and the large rice barges were floated around near the place of crossing, when I was made aware of the fact that Geary had not only kept the small boats he had taken the night before, but had succeeded in securing nearly all the remainder to use, in case of need, between his left on the Savannah River and his two regiments on Hutchinson's Island.
It was just coming light when my staff officer returned from headquarters with the message that I had best cross but one regiment only, until such time as Sherman would permit a movement in force. I concluded to cross nothing, for I was not disposed to risk one regiment, and I so informed General Wil-
* Official Records, Volume XL1V, page 734.

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liams, \vho approved my action. The iyth and i8th were passed in long-range skirmishing across the stream, artillery duels, etc., during which a gunboat ran up from Savannah and threw a few 64-pound shells or " bake-ovens," as they were called, onto the island, hurting no one, though striking the plantation negroes with terror. During the morning of the i jth I reconnoitred the eastern part of the island and found one or-two favorable points of crossing above the one I held; one of these was at Hayward's plantation, a mile beyond Izard's.
In the afternoon I crossed the river and rode down to the corps headquarters to report and to get some explanation of the many conflicting orders of the night before. I explained the situation, told Williams he could easily cross a division in three hours at two different points, and again suggested that he send my brigade across at the point I held opposite Izard's, cross another above at Hayward's or Manigault's, and hold one in reserve on the island, and that nothing could stop him from reaching the Union Cause%vay and holding it, or destroying it, for four or five miles, if he did not care to hold it. He replied that Shermay had just summoned Hardee to surrender, and pending his answer nothing w.ould be done, but indicated that should Hardee decline, a return to the movement on the South Carolina side of the river would probably follow. I mounted my horse and was about to return, when Slocum. who had his headquarters tent but a few steps distant, saw me and sent an orderly requesting me to come over, which I did. and saw Sherman sitting under a tent-fly. I dismounted and repeated what I had already told Williams, and again suggested that a division be sent over immediately; and to the objection that no means were available for crossing it, I gave a guarantee that there were then boats enough on the Georgia shore to land two brigades on the island before midnight, and I had enough collected to put my brigade from the island to the

23
other side in two hours. Sherman feared the gunboats up the river and the gunboat Savannah below. I said that those above, or one at least, were disabled; that I did not think they could pass our rifle-gun batteries on shore, and, as they had open decks, the men on the island could pick off all their gunners: and as to the gunboat Savannah, it was only on very high tide that she could venture up so far, and even then she was under fire from Geary's batteries.
I don't remember that he made any reply, and of course my rank did not permit me to press the matter, though I thought a great opportunity was being lost.
Sherman now concluded to strike this road, which had attracted so much attention, farther to the north and thus cut off Hardee--a move that was not much relished by some his officers, who had marched with 60,000 men across Georgia to flush the game for Foster's coast-guard to bag; so, on the afternoon of the iSth, when my orders to cross were renewed, coupled with the original conditions--to go slowly and "not to go far into the country"--Williams explained to me confidentially and very suggestively that all distances were relative, and that if any ground wei'e taken it must be held.
At daybreak on the igth, Hawley and Cogswell crossed their two regiments in small boats and drove Wheeler from Izard's plantation ; the Thirteenth New Jersey followed in support. I ordered the io7th and I5oth New York regiments to get ready to follow, and crossed in a small boat to see Hawley and Cogswell forging ahead along the dikes, driving everything ahead of them; finally the contest became severe and stubborn, the Thirteenth New Jersey was added to the front line, and again Wheeler was pushed back, and by noon these three regiments had fought their way nearly two miles, when there was a tem porary check, for Wheeler had received reinforcements of infan-

24
try and artillery and disputed every step. My instructions were reached when I had sent over two regiments, and exceeded when I crossed with the third ; but receiving word from Hawley on the left front that he was hard pressed, I sent orders for the io7th New York to follow immediately and the I5oth New York to come over right after.
As fast as the companies landed they were double-quicked to the front, pressed Wheeler still further back, and by two o'clock the whole brigade except three companies of the i5Oth New York, left to guard the island and camp and the two guns, was on the South Carolina shore, holding a line nearly two and a half miles long, front and flanks well covered, and securely resisting Wheeler's persistent attempts to dislodge it. A Confederate historian of the "Siege of Savannah," writing of this affair, says: "The righting along the rice dams was obstinate and bloody. As the retention of this route was essential to the safety of the troops engaged in the defence of Savannah, all General Wheeler's available forces, assisted by Young's troops and such of the South Carolina light batteries as could be spared from points along the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, were concentrated for its protection."
I notified my corps commander that I had crossed the whole brigade and established it firmly on the South Carolina shore, and that I needed intrenching tools if I was to remain there, as I was forced from many places behind the dikes by the rising waters, the enemy having opened the canal gates and let in the high tide to a depth of 8 to 20 inches, and only the high spots were above water, and to these my men clung, and on them I proposed to fortify.
There were some interested Confederate spectators to this contest on the dikes. Beauregard was in Savannah, and in the morning had come out with Hardee and joined Wheeler at

25
Cheves, to see what the force on the island looked like, that was reported to him as menacing his line of retreat. They climbed into a rice mill just as skirmishing was the most severe ; ami as the successive companies were rushing to the front and swelling the fight, Beauregard turned to Hardee and Wheeler, and said: "Gentlemen, this is not a demonstration; it is a real attack on our communications, and is going to be reinforced. You must get out of Savannah as soon as possible."
He then rode off north to Hardeeville to hasten Taliaferro with troops to that point, and Hardee returned to Savannah and issued orders for a retreat that night, while Wheeler proceeded to destroy all the bridges on the plantation that I had not reached and that he could,1 and collected his men behind barricades at the head of the principal dikes and drew up his guns at different points on the Union Causeway, covering them with works for protection against musketry. I had not reached the causeway, but had given the enemy a good scare. As soon as night came I crossed the two guns from the island and ran them out to the front, where they were put under CogswelPs orders, who built works for them and used them to advantage next day. I was informed that an assault would probabby be made on the main lines around Savannah in the morning; that Foster's troops were or would be on the causeway from Bluffton, on the east, during the day also; that I could have no help, and had already gone faster and farther than intended, and was directed to watch the effect of the assault and the approach of Foster from the east, but to make no effort to advance, unless I saw a good opening, such as would be presented by a retreat, etc. That night I entrenched at all points, kept the reserves well in hand, and waited for daylight. It appears from Confederate reports that Hardee could not complete his bridges that night, and the evacuation was deferred twenty-four hours, so he ordered

26
McLaws " to send a light battery to Wheeler, who was pressed bv the enemy on the other side of the river," and at 6 P. M., same day. he wrote to Wheeler that he, had ordered 650 more infantry and six guns, and would send more ; that Taliaferro had been ordered down to Hardeeville, which by the map seems to be about three miles from Wheeler's position; and almost despairingly said : " The road to Hardeeville must be kept open at all hazards ; it is my only line of retreat. Fight the enemy at every step if he attempts to advance, and keep me informed of all his movements."* Wheeler, also, was solicitous and requested help, despatching Hardee and Beauregard that he had been attacked by overwhelming numbers, and had suffered severely. The morning of the 2Oth was foggy and raw, with a strong east wind. As the fog cleared away, Cogswell discerned to the left a body of horsemen, and directed a shot at it from one of the guns he had put in position during the night. The effect of that one shot was to set this cavalry flying in every direction and to make such a commotion in the Confederate lines as the small boy produces when he throws a stone against a hornets' nest; and it developed the fact that there were more troops in our front than there had been the day before. To Wheeler it was a surprise that artillery had been crossed and was commanding the road, and he again notified both Beauregard and Hardee that an attack in force was imminent. But he had nothing to fear from me. I had about 1,500 men, on a disconnected line of over two miles, against his 2,700, and was bound by orders to look east for Foster's attack on the road, and have my ears open to the south to catch the heavy roll of artillery and the cheers of the assaulting column in front of Savannah. All morning I watched and listened, but saw and heard neither.
Save an occasional picket shot on my own line, and Cogswell's
Official Records, Volume XLIV, page 968.

27
gun practice on whatever he saw that was worth firing at, which were answered by Wheeler's guns, matters were quiet. It was an enforced quietness, both by orders and the high tides, which at this season of the year prevail, and which now flooded the whole country to the depth of S to 20 inches, leaving only the raised dike and a few other spots above water. Toward noon I was informed that no assault would be made on Savannah that day; that Slocum had notified Sherman's head quarters that he was ready, but was answered,that Sherman had not yet returned from Broad River, whither he had gone to shut up this plank road against which I was demonstrating, and I was instructed to make a reconnoissance from my right, which I did by collecting twelve companies from the various reserves. I moved as far as my orders required to get the information asked for, and then made one more effort, by a dash up a broad dike, to get the road in my front, but was stopped by a canal, the bridge over which had been burned, and which was com manded by some infantry, who gave me a warm reception.
From the loft of a barn on my line I could see wagons, family carriages, men and women on foot, singly and in groups, moving north along the road. Hardee had finished his pontoonbridge, and the non-combatants were leaving the city, all of which I promptly reported. The stream of fugitives and the number of carriages and wagons increased as the day wore on, and soon convinced me that Hardee intended slipping out that night, and I so reported and sent a staff officer to say that it was not yet too late to stop it. Word came that Sherman had not yet returned, and that he had left orders that no offensive move ments be made in his absence. In the middle of the afternoon several bodies of armed men were seen moving across our front; these were fired into by our artillery, and presently I observed what I took to be three regiments moving up from Savannah ;

28

these stopped over towards my right and began to fortify; then

came a battery, which went into position just off the road. I

was now satisfied that Wheeler had at least 3,000 men and 12

guns in my front (he had more), and made no further effort to

get the road, nor did I again ask for more men. I was some

what distrusted, and still more so when, a little later, the Con-

O



'

'

federate uavv took u hand in.

As I came out of the barn from the loft of which I had seen

these movements on the right, one of my men said, " Colonel, I

see some black smoke down the river toward Savannah; it

looks like a big fire there." I climbed a ladder to the top of a

rice stack and looked in that direction, and soon saw that the

smoke was moving, and presently saw the top of a smokestack

over the point of land which shut out the sight of the hull of the

boat. - Soon two or three heavy guns were heard on the Georgia

shore from Gearv's batteries, on the -main line of investment,

and I thougc"> ht I %vas about to witness a fiOght between shore batteries and the Confederate gunboat or ram Savannah.

Almost immediately a puff of light smoke was seen and a 64-

pound shell came screeching over, and landed square among the

few negro huts and rice stacks where I had my headquarters and

reserves, exploded and killed one man and mangled another,

and tore up things generally. As this point was evidently a

target. I moved my six reserve companies to a more sheltered

position. Some of the men sought the cover of the rice stacks.

The first shot was quickly followed by another, which landed

in front of one of the companies, throwing nearly or quite a ton

of soft, oozy black mud right into their faces and making of

them one of the most ludicrous sights I have ever seen.

After these two splendid line shots, the Confederate gunboat

fire was wild, the remaining thirty shots being sent everywhere,

some of them clear over our line and into that of our enemy,

29
one of them falling into a detachment of Wheeler's cavalry on our left and sending it whirling out of range. The boat did not remain long, as she could only stay on very high tide. It was her last effort; that night she was abandoned, blown up and sunk.
As darkness came on, the head of Hardee's column crossed the pontoon-bridge at Savannah and took up the line of march. The wind set from that direction and we could hear the rumb ling of wheels as all night long they toiled on. It was too dark to see them, but we knew that they were going. I reported the fact as soon as I was convinced of it, but was instructed not to risk interference with the movement, as they would be cut off from above. Toward morning I received a circular order which had been sent to division commanders in front of Savannah, that it was reported that Hardee would probably attempt to retreat, and to feel the line with skirmishers. I knew that he had already gone. In the morning, far to my left I could see his rear of column resting by the roadside, and in my front a strong rear guard watching me.
Almost at the same hour Hardee, from his headquarters at Hardeeville, six or eight miles distant, telegraphed to Jefferson Davis : " On the igth the enemy forced a landing on the South Carolina shore, so near my communications that to save the garrison it became necessary to give up the city." *
And this, companions, is how Hardee escaped from Savannah on the night of December 20, 1864, by a narrow causeway road that any time from the 12th to the I5th was at the mercy of a brigade; which could have been seized and utterly demolished by a brigade on the 15111 or i6th had such orders been given, and that could easily have been taken and held by two brigades on the iSth or igth; a division would have made it a dead cer-
" Official Records, Volume XLIV, page 974.

30
tainty. Confederate historians agree that a division could have carried it, and General Wheeler has assured me that two bri gades, fighting as mine did on the igth, would have driven him from position.
And yet at no time from the nth to the 2ist, a period of eleven days, was an order issued by anybody to take this road; the most that was done was to order a demonstration by a skir mish-line, supported by one or two regiments, and these were '' not to go far into the country."
General Sherman was anxious to save life, and depended too much on the ability of General Foster to close this road some miles to the north ; but, as he says, he did not move quick enough, and Hardee slipped out. Some two or three years be fore Sherman's death, I was conversing with an army friend in the lobby of the Fifth Avenue Hotel, New York city. Sher man. approaching, joined in the conversation and said : "Well, Carman, we didn't catch Hardee, did we? But it is all right, anyhow; the war ended all right, and just as it ought." And so. companions, it did. Few there were who made no mistakes, and let us rather overlook those that were made, rejoice that it ended all right, and give every man who fought beside us for " Old Glory " and country his meed of praise.
NOTE.--In these operations on the South Carolina side of the river and the withdrawal on the2ist of December, which was closely pressed by Wheeler, Colonel John H. Ketcham, of the i5Oth New York, was severely wounded, and 2 enlisted men killed and 12 wounded.