11 With Kilpatrick around Atlanta."
A PAPER READ BEFORE THE WISCONSIN COMMAXDERY, M. O. L. L. U. S., DECEMBER isr, 1886.
CAPT. GEORGE I. ROBINSON,
COMMANDER OF THE CHICAC.O BOARD OF TRADE BATTERY.
MILWACKKE: 1SS8.

With Kilpatrick around Atlanta.
BY GEORGE I. ROBIXSON.
It is natural for a soldier to become warmly attached to the command with which he serves, particularly if such com mand is conspicuous for gallantry, and is uniformly success ful in its movements and operations ; and a feeling of mutual and self confidence is engendered, and a sort of espritdtt corps established, tending greatly toward an invincibility on the part of the command endowed with these feelings.
Such were the feelings conspicuously possessed by nearly every man, by every company, by every regiment and by every brigade forming the Second Division of Cavalry, Army of the Cumberland, with which it was my fortune to serve some two and a half years during the war.
The remark is perhaps not unfamiliar to many of you who may have heard it during the earlier days of the war, when a body of cavalry was coming from the front, or was going to the rear: " There is fighting in front, the cavalry is going to the rear," and I sometimes shared in a measure the same opin ion until, after becoming attached to a cavalry command, I had the opportunity of learning more definitely for what pur pose these seeming retrograde movements were made, which I found were almost invariably for the purpose of warding off an attack upon the cracker line of the army, or a blow at some important depot of supplies, or to frustrate some threat ened flanking movement on the part of the enemy ; and the occasion, too, when these somewhat uncomplimentary re-

marks were made, was at a time when the Army of the Cum berland, at least, had but a small proportion of mounted troops, and it seemed to be generally expected that a regi ment of cavalry on an expedition of the kind, should accom plish what not less than a brigade of infantry would have been thought of being sent to accomplish, when the only superiority that should have been considered, was, that the cavalry, being mounted, could reach the destination more quickly, and then fight, mounted or as infantry, as the circum stances and occasion demanded ; and the fact should not be overlooked that the principal object for the mounting of troops was for the more rapid transit, and not that a man on horse-back was better prepared for effective fighting, and while there were many conspicuous battles of mounted troops, and many brilliant cavalry charges, the fact also is, that in the large majority of the severe cavalry battles, the fighting was principally done on foot or acting as infantry, and one of the most familiar commands before going into action was " Pre pare to fight on foot, dismount;" and when this command rang down the column or along the line, we knew at once, that in the opinion of the commanding officer, it was an oc casion demanding the most effective execution in the use of the carbine or musket.
One brigade of this division was composed wholly of mount ed infantry, drilled and disciplined as infantry before being mounted, was only partially armed with sabres (usually the two flank companies), and of course always prepared to fight on foot, yet no more so than the other brigades which were recruited and drilled as cavalry, and at the same time was equally efficient in mounted movements, excepting a general sabre charge. And yet probably one of the most daring, gal lant and effective sabre charges (for its size) in the Depart ment of the Cumberland during the war, was made by four companies ol the seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry led by

Lieut. Col. White, at Plantersville Church, Alabama, on April ist, 1865, the detail of which was not here intended; but I may mention incidentally, however, that they dashed against, and broke through, Forrests rebel lines, rode over and cap tured his battery of four guns, kept up a running fight for some distance with Forrest and his escort, wounding Forrest twice with the sabre, then, wheeling to the left, again cut their way out with a loss of one officer (Capt. Taylor) and sixteen men.
But it was not my purpose to review the cavalry opera tions in the Department of the Cumberland during the entire war, as there were a number of different campaigns, in each of which the operations of the cavalry would furnish data and material for an article more or less interesting, perhaps, if en trusted to some one better qualified to detail and describe it.
My object at this time is more particularly to describe one incident in the operations of the cavalry, according to my recollection, dimmed as it may be by the accumulation of the dust of twenty-two years, and known as the Kilpatrick . raid around Atlanta.
The second division of cavalry, Army of the Cumber land, was at this time commanded by Brig. General Kenner Garrard, a graduate of West Point Military Academy, and formerly colonel of a New York infantry regiment in the Army of the Potomac. It consisted of three brigades and the Chicago Board of Trade battery.
The first brigade, commanded by Col. R. H. G. Minty, of the fourth Michigan cavalry, was composed of the fourth regulars, fourth Michigan and seventh Pennsylvania cavalry.
The second brigade, commanded by Col. Eli Long, of the fourth Ohio, was composed of the first Ohio, third Ohio and fourth Ohio cavalry, and the third brigade, commanded by Col. A. O. Miller, was composed of the seventeenth and

seventy-second Indiana, and the ninety-eighth and one hun dred and twenty-third Illinois mounted infantry. The three brigades were armed with the Spencer repeating rifled carbine and musket, and the rebels used to say of them that they loaded Sunday and kept firing the balance of the week.
With the rebel army then driven within the defenses of Atlanta, General Sherman was impatient to destroy Hoods communications, and he who was familiar with the tempera ment and disposition of Gen. Sherman, knew that his impa tience and effort never relaxed till his object was attained.
The Georgia Central road between Atlanta and Augusta had been broken ; some twenty miles of the road and two ex tensive bridges near Covington had been effectually destroyed by this division alone, and now to reach the Macon and Western was the object of his impatient desire. Two cavalry expeditions had been sent out for this purpose ; the 1st divis ion under Gen. E. M. McCook from the right, and a second expedition under Gen. Stoneman from the left, both of which were conspicuous failures, Gen. Stoneman and a large part of his command being captured.
Gen. Kilpatrick, with the third division, was now in the rear guarding our own communications, and the second divis ion was the only organization of mounted troops at the front that had not been more or less shattered by disaster and failure on some raiding expedition; but Gen. Sherman, proba bly more disgusted than disheartened, or with a disposition to reduce his cavalry and increase his infantry, ordered the division into the trenches on the north east front of Atlanta, relieving the twenty-third corps, which was thrown to the extreme right. This was on or about the 1st of August, 1864, and here the division did duty as infantry for a couple of weeks, undergoing the shelling and firing from the rebel works in common with the balance of the army in line, doing picket duty, furnishing and relieving its own skirmishers, re-

pelling sorties of the enemy, and making them in turn, no less valiantly than the infantry on its either flank, and as readily and handsomely as if this were its accustomed mode of warfare.
During this time Kilpatricks division was ordered to the front and encamped at Sandtown, some twenty or more miles west of our present location, and on the right and rear of the right flank of our army and south of the Chatahoochee. On the morning of the I5th of August, the second division was relieved from duty in the trenches and encamped at Peach Tree Creek a few miles to the rear, and a heavy foraging detail was sent out to the left for a supply of long forage, which usually consisted of sheaf-oats and corn-fodder, return ing late the evening of the same day. The scouts reporting a threatening demonstration by the rebel cavalry under Wheeler on our left, the division was ordered out the same night to intercept him, making one of those choppy, halting, march-a-little, halt-a-little, night marches, the tediousness and unpleasantness of which is so familiar to nearly all old soldiers. Skirmishing with the rebel cavalry during most of the following day, they gradually fell back behind the right wing of their army, and at night we withdrew and returned to our camp on Peach Tree Creek.
The desire or determination to break the Macon & Western R. R., the only line of rail communication now left to the rebel army, had evidently taken a fresh hold of Gen. Sherman, and he called his division commanders of cavalry to him to get their views of the feasibility and probability of success in again making the effort. As related in my pres ence some time afterward by an officer of the division staff, when discussing the matter, and why General Garrard, the then ranking division commander, was not sent in command of an expedition for the purpose, it was said that at the con ference he had expressed the opinion that, owing to the

8
ability of the enemy to quickly concentrate a combined heavy force of infantry and cavalry at almost any point on the road, it would be useless to undertake it with anything less than our entire mounted force, and our experience up to this time, and subsequent events, proved that his judgment was pretty nearly correct.
When Kilpatricks opinion was asked he said (as I was told) that if he could have the second division with his own he could reach the road and effectually destroy at least twenty miles of it.
This was the kind of talk and confidence that Gen.Sherman, for such an emergency, liked to hear, and Kilpatrick of course was the man to command such an expedition, but there was an impediment in the way of the second division reporting to Kilpatrick, which was, that the commander of the second division (Gen. Garrard) was the ranking officer and could not be ordered to report to his junior, to obviate which, two brigades of the second division, with four guns of the Chicago Board of Trade battery, were ordered to report to General Kilpatrick at Sandtown. In obedience to this order, about midnight of the 18th the 1st brigade(Mintys) and 2d brigade (Longs), with four guns of the battery, all under command of Col. Minty, left their camp at Peach Tree Creek and started on the march westward in rear of the army.
Probably very few except at headquarters knew what the object of the movement was, and as during the entire cam paign up to this time (except while in the trenches), we had been so frequently transferred from one flank to the other, usually having an all night march of it, many supposed it was a resume of the same maneuvers, and not until we had re ported to Gen. Kilpatrick early in the forenoon of the igth did we begin to discover, through the nature of the orders pertaining to forage, rations, unservicable horses, etc., that some extended and rapid movement was contemplated, al-

though before leaving camp I had suspected something of this nature, as I was directed to take only the limbers of my caissons, which was an unusual occurrence
To conform to the orders received after reaching Kilpatricks headquarters, required a close and minute inspection of all animals and material, the proper distribution of rations and what little forage we had, so that there was little or no rest for either men or officers during the day, and about sun down we were greeted by that familiar, but now unwelcome call, by the headquarters bugler, quickly followed by brigade and regimental buglers throughout the camp; " boots and sad dles," which was smothered before half finished by the groans of thousands of disappointed troopers, who now quickly real ized that their anticipation or desire for a comfortable nights rest and sleep was beyond even hope, and the expression of many a man as he braced his knee against his horses ribs and drew tight his saddle girth, was certainly more expres sive than elegant, and when all was ready and waiting the call to mount, occasionally a man, to give more forcible ex pression to his disappointment and disgust, would go back and set fire to the little bunch of straw or sunburned grass that he had gathered for a bed for the purpose of making his nights rest more comfortable and enjoyable.
We did not have long to wait, for the call " to horse" was quickly followed by the " mount; " headquarters sounded the " forward,1 and the combined force, now numbering prob ably about 5,500 mounted officers and men, took up the line of march on the road leading southward, the third division, now commanded by Col. Murray, having the advance.
It was a bright, beautiful moonlight night, the road was unusually good, but as far as my own men were concerned, they were too sleepy to enjoy a night inarch under these Otherwise favorable conditions. Discussions on the general conduct of the war and upon the probable object of our pres-

10
ent movement ended early that evening, and by 9 oclock, and for several hours afterward, you might have ridden up and down the column (of the battery at least) and not found a half-dozen men, aside from the drivers of the wheel teams, but what were soundly asleep, and up and down the column of the second division, as far as we could hear, the clicking of the sabre-scabbards against the stirrup, the jingle of the fly ing ends of the traces of the artillery harness, the dull rattle of the wheels of the gun carriages and limbers, and the low pattering of the horses hoofs on the hard dirt road, were about the only sounds to break the otherwise almost breath less silence. A human voice was seldom heard along this part of the column, except when semi-occasionally, a man would, by the miss-step or sudden lurch of his horse, become half aroused, when you would hear him yawn and utter the self-addressed expression: " My God, how sleepy I am."
Thus the night wore on and we marched on, the column probably covering a distance on the road of from four to five miles. About 10 oclock, perhaps, the march became of that choppy nature (halt-a-little and march-a-little), and occasionally I thought I could hear skirmishing in front, but it was too far off and too feeble to cause any disturbance to the sleepy troopers and artillerists two or three miles to the rear, and they continued to sleep soundly in their saddles. My only precaution was to take a couple or more additional orderlies to ride up and down the column, and when the head of the column started from one of those frequent short halts, to have these orderlies see that the horses started, or start them and let the men sleep.
Finally in the early morning, when the moon had gone down behind the trees, and with one of those early morning and obscuring fogs hugging the earth, the head of column struck the Atlanta and West Point R. R. near Red Bank,, driving in a rebel outpost or picket, and moved on until the

battery was astride the railroad, one section south of it and the other to the north of it, and the column again halted, and the first brigade of our division commenced tearing up the track, piling up the ties and firing them, and soon had a mile or two well ablaze, when suddenly a battery, followed by musketry, opened from the left flank, and the shells went crashing through the trees over our heads. The first one was sufficient to waken every man then asleep, and to bring him quickly to the realization that there was business on hand requiring immediate attention. The column quickly closes up, the battery goes into position on the first suffi ciently open ground south of the railroad, and points for the rebel battery, which had now ceased firing; the division forms on its flanks by simply wheeling " fours, left into line," and the fourth Michigan is sent forward into the darkness of early dawn, made darker by the smoke and fog, to feel the enemy, and soon drove them back to their supports, and the column resumed the march, now well closed up and every man wide awake. Following the course of the road, which now turned more to the east or southeast, the head of column soon develops a considerable force of rebel cavalry and a four gun battery in our front, which proved to be Ross* and Fergusons brigade of Wheelers cavalry. Mintys divis ion was now ordered in advance and moved forward at the trot, formed in line on the right^and left of the theVoad, thre%v a line of skirmishers well to the front and moved forward mounted, the battery keeping on the road. The skirmishers were soon engaged and those of the enemy gradually fell back, when our line, reaching the crest of a slight elevation, found their main line occupying a ridge beyond and behind hastily constructed barricades, their battery commanding the road, and it promptly saluted us with a couple of shells which however went over us, doing no damage. Their salute was promptly acknowledged by the two guns of our battery now

in position on the road, our cavalry dismounted to fight, my other two guns were ordered up and went into position in the field a few yards to the left of the road. A few well directed and well timed shells from us, and their battery withdrew, quickly followed by their cavalry, leaving only a strong skir mish line to check our advance. Our line remounted and moved forward to find them as strongly posted on another ridge less than a mile further to the front. Almost the same maneuvers were resorted to, and the enemy again withdrew and our men again mounted and moved forward, to find them similarly posted further to the front. After several repetitions of this, Col. Minty decided to move forward dismounted, and this it should be remembered always reduces the fighting force some twenty to twenty-five per cent.
The enemy, however, made such seemingly slight resist ance until they reached the Flint River, that I was under the impression that they were seeking to draw us into a position where, sooner or later, we might expect music from a much larger band.
At the crossing of the Flint River they made quite a de termined resistance until they got their artillery across and well posted to cover the crossing, when they again fell back across the river and attempted to tear up the bridge, but they were too late; we were close upon them, and two of our guns quickly in position on our skirmish line commanded the bridge and swept it before the rear of their column had much more than cleared the further end of it. Their battery, well posted on the high ground beyond, now opened on us, but doing no serious damage, their shells flying high and only starting a commotion among our lead horses in the rear, and causing them to seek shelter in the nearest favorable posi tion. My other two guns, under Lieut. Bennett. were imme diately ordered up, and posted on a high knoll to the left of the road and opened on their battery from this position. I

then withdrew my two guns from the road and put them in position on the left of the two on the ridge, and soon silenced their battery, and it withdrew.
From our present position we could see over the top of the timber beyond the church spires in Jonesboro, the rail road station, evidently several miles in the distance.
We continued to shell the woods in which the enemy was posted beyond the river, and under the cover of our shelling, one of our regiments (I think the fourth Michigan) was formed in column dismounted to charge the bridge, which it promptly did and deployed on the other or east side, and was quickly followed by another regiment, I think the Seventh Pennsylvania.
I said to Col. Minty, who happened to be near me, that I thought if the enemy had any additional force it should have shown itself there, that I believed we had had got them already scared, and with his permission I would move two of my guns across and on to the skirmish line. He readily assented, I moved them across, went into battery and ad vanced the pieces by hand, with the skirmishers, using shell or canister, as the circumstances seemed to demand. What had become of the enemys artillery we did not know, as it didnt show itself again that afternoon. Our line now moved forward boldly, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers and two guns of the battery on the skirmish line. The resistance was not strong except, when occupying a favorable defensive position, the enemy would seem disposed to make a deter mined stand, but were soon driven from position by a few effective shots from the battery and the advance of the line of seven-shooters.
The road on which we were moving we found led us di rectly to the railroad depot, and about five oclock we had them crowded back to the edge of the town, where they had taken position, with line of battle trending from northeast to

4
southwest, their flanks extending considerably beyond the town in either direction. We found the depot and adjoining warehouses defended by an outlying line of hastily con structed barricades, extending northward some distance be yond the elevated water tank, and southward across the road on which we were approaching, and manned by a considera ble force of dismounted cavalry, who now seemed disposed to make a stubborn resistance to our further approach. The most annoyance that we were then receiving was from that part of their force located under and around the water tank, and I directed a shell at it which went through it near the bottom, and the water from it compelled them to vacate its immediate vicinity.
The freight depot was quite an extensive structure, with a small dome or tower in the centre of the roof, resembling more, however, the ventilators we often see on barns through the country in the northern states.
I then directed a shell, with short fuse, at the roof of the depot, which struck it near the centre and well down near the eaves and exploded inside, and the little tower seemed to jump bodily about ten or fifteen feet into the air and then rolled down the roof and dropped to the ground. A cloud of smoke soon rose through the aperture in the roof, fol lowed by flame, and the depot was soon ablaze, which quick ly spread to the adjacent warehouses and a train of cars on the further side, all of which we afterwards learned were filled with commissary stores and the household goods of refugees.
The force behind the barricade and adjacent buildings were now making it quite uncomfortable for us, but with the aid of a few shells from our battery and a rapid advance of the line of " Spencers," it quickly fell back into and across the town, occupying a slightly elevated position, with their .line extending from east to west, facing north.
The principal part of the town consisted of a row of stores,

dwellings and shops on each side of the railroad, with a road or street on each side between the railroad and rows of build ings. The two guns in the rear under Lieut. Bennett were now directed to take position a short distance to the right and rear, where he could get an oblique fire on the enemys line, and commence shelling them. The two that were at the front, were moved down the road south of the depot and west of the railroad, as close to the enemy as the nature of the ground would permit, and commenced shelling them from this position, supported at the time by the skirmishers in ad vance of our main line.
A few shells down the main street and railroad, and the cen ter of their line broke, and Bennetts firing on the right had equally good effect on the enemys left, and they fell back in haste and disorder, hurried the more by the continued shell ing from our guns.
It seemed to me that then was the moment to quickly and rapidly follow them, but our cavalry was then dismounted and the lead horses some distance to the rear. Seeing Col. Minty close by, I said to him, that if he would support me I would put my two guns in position on the ridge in the town, which the enemy had just vacated, to which he replied, " go ahead, the fourth Michigan will be with you in a moment."
We quickly limbered to the front and went forward at the gallop, the cannoneers mounting the limber-chests and the trails of the pieces, and went into position at the spot just vacated by the center of the enemys line, and again com menced shelling the rear of his column down the road. Thus these two gun-detachments were the first Yankee troops to enter the town. A few dismounted rebels left behind, took refuge in the buildings on our right and front and let into us pretty lively from the windows for a moment or two, but a couple of shells sent crashing through the buildings soon silenced them, and the 4th Michigan coining up we ceased

i6
firing. Noticing the telegraph office just to the right of my pieces I stepped in and found the instrument at work, the operator evidently having had a sudden call elsewhere.
The message then on the wire was interpreted by a Yankee soldier who claimed to have been a telegraph operator, and was said to be advices that Cleburnes division of infantry and Martins brigade of cavalry were en route to re-enforce Ross and Ferguson. Acting on this, Kilpatrick sent a force well up the road toward Atlanta, to tear up the road, and a force was distributed along the road in the intervening section to tear it up and destroy it, but it now commenced to rain, and it did rain as if it had been husbanding a six months supply for this particular time, and unmindful of a reserve for any future occasion. Wet railroad ties would not burn, and cold iron rails refused to bend, so that the best that could be done was to tear up the track, throw the rails to one side and scat ter the ties, which however, could be relaid and repaired about as quickly as we had torn it up ; a mile or two, per haps, were thus torn up. While this was being done, Kil patrick called a council on the verandah of a house where I was seeking shelter from the pouring rain.
It was there decided to try to get below or south of the rebel cavalry, and if successful in such a movement we would have them between ourselves and Atlanta, when we could defend ourselves sufficiently to permit us to destroy quite a piece of the road in our rear, and fall back and repeat this operation, and thus, perhaps, destroy a considerable portion of the road ; but, as we all know, the best laid plans sometimes miscarry, and this was one of the times when the hoped-for result failed to be realized. The theory was advanced that by drawing off to the eastward the enemys cavalry would follow us, when by making a circuitous route southward we could strike the road further south, and having

the enemy then in our rear we could turn on and fight them and gradually fall back as planned.
We could now hear the whistle of the locomotives away up the road in the direction of Atlanta, and this plan was quickly decided upon and the movement made to put it in attempted execution.
It was now perhaps about 10 oclock at night, and the col umn was formed with first brigade (Mintys) and one section of the battery in the advance, then the third division and .the second brigade (Longs), with one section of the battery iii the rear. This was a formation of the column and a separ ation of our division, one brigade in front and the other in rear of third division, that nearly every officer of the division took quiet exception to, and concluded that in what fight ing was to be done we had got to do the most of it, and while the division was always ready, but never spoiling for a fight, when there was fighting to be done, the different brigades always liked to be together and supported by each other.
Thus formed, the column moved eastward toward McDonough. The rain had now nearly ceased, the night was, however, very dark, the roads muddy and the low places full of water, but the march was kept up as rapidly as these con ditions would admit of, but in the early morning we found that the rebel cavalry was close upon our heels, and the second brigade would occasionally be pretty warmly en gaged in the rear of our column and the entire command would be halted and prepared to support it if found necessary.
This day, August 2ist, was mostly occupied with this style of marching and fighting, and from Jonesboro during the night and day we had covered a distance of perhaps eighteen to twenty miles, and now, in the afternoon, were again approaching the railroad at Lovejoy, about eight miles below Jonesboro.

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It was about four oclock in the afternoon, and the col umn was moving briskly westward on the road, with heavy woods on each side, when the advance guard marched squarely upon Cleburnes infantry in line of battle, lying down and ready to receive it. It was quickly driven back on the main column, which advanced to its support. The col umn soon halted and I could hear brisk skirmishing in front. Suddenly I heard the command repeated down the column in front of me, " Fours, left about," and that part of the col umn faced to the rear. Supposing some retrograde move ment to be made, I faced my battery to the rear, which, as the road was narrow, had to be done by unlimbering. Our second brigade had now been ordered up, and was coming up at the trot, and Lieut. Bennett joined me with his section. By this time the column had again faced to the front, and was slowly moving forward, but before making any further movement with the battery, and in absence of orders or in structions, I rode hurriedly forward toward the front to view the situation, and found the head of the column skirmishing briskly, but still tumbling back in considerable disorder, and the nature of the ground on each side of the road near the head of the column being of such a nature as to make it very difficult for our force to deploy into line. The situation looked somewhat serious, and I was a little apprehensive of a stam pede, unless a rallying point could be fixed, and I hurried back to the battery, determined to get it into position at the first opening, believing that if I could demonstrate to the di vision that I was prepared and ready to help them, they would rally to our support and make the best fight possible. A short distance to the rear, and on the left of the road, was a cornfield some four hundred yards long and about half as wide, that seemingly had recently been cleared up and cut out of the woods, and was enclosed by a heavy rail fence. This was the place, and the four guns were put in position in

about the centre of it, and commenced firing in the air. Im mediately the cavalry raised the cheer, and I felt better.
The command was heard from the line officers, " prepare to fight on foot;" the men dismounted and quickly formed ir. line just beyond the upper or west end of the corn field, ex tending across the road and into the woods to the right, the lead horses going hurriedly to the rear. The enemy ad vanced and were met by a withering fire from our men, but still confidently pressed on, and our line gradually fell back and formed line on the flanks of the battery, uncovering its front so that the guns could now be used with some effect. The rebel line presented itself at the upper end of the corn field, with the battle flags and mens heads showing above the corn, gave us a volley and with one of those demoniac rebel yells made a rush forward. We gave them a double charge of canister from each piece, followed in quick succession by others of the same sort, and our front xvas quickly cleared of both corn and rebels, and we changed from canister to shell.
One great disadvantage experienced in rapidly working the guns of the battery was that the ground was so soft that at every discharge of the pieces the recoil would send the wheels into the ground half way to the axle, and required that they be lifted out after every discharge.
We had now slackened our firing, but still continued shell ing the woods in our front, although at longer intervals, when suddenly the rebels came out of the woods and in position under the fence along the road on my right and let us have it, seemingly with a confidence that they had us within their grasp, and it looked a little that way to me, for this first revealed to me that my flanks were not protected and that my support had fallen back. One of my guns had broken down and the limber been sent to the rear, but I quickly changed front to the right by drawing back my right piece and Tunning forward the left, and again gave them

JO
canister, and splinters, rails and rebels flew promiscuously in our front, and that flank was soon cleared when we discov ered that we were being fired into from the woods on the left, now almost to our rear, but not with so much of a force, and we drew back our left piece and opened on them in that direction and soon drove back the comparatively small force that had moved down there under cover of the fence, woods and standing corn.
I had received no orders to go into action, and had no orders to fall back, but now having a temporary breathing spell, and my men reporting ammunition nearly gone, one man killed, a number of others badly wounded, a number of horses shot and one gun hanging by the trunions beneath the axle, I concluded to get out of that cornfield with what there was left, and so fell back and went into position on line with the cavalry a short distance beyond the east end of the cornfield.
Col. Minty coming up I explained to him my condition, that I had left one gun in the cornfield and asked for a de tail to help pull it off, and save it if possible. Capt. Burns (of Col. Mintys staff) called for volunteers for the purpose, and every man of the division, both cavalrymen and battery boys, was ready and eager to go.
The enemy evidently was considerably punished, as they had not followed us up, and in pulling the disabled gun off, we were fired at only by some skirmishers or sharp shooters in the distance.
I had the piece dismounted and loaded into my ammuni tion wagon and the gun-carriage destroyed. My killed and wounded were all taken care of, the dead buried, and the wounded made as comfortableas possible in the ambulances.
You perhaps ask where the third division was during this time. They were not far off, and were in line faced to the rear confronting the rebel cavalry which had followed us

2t
during the day and had now closed in behind us, formed in line in a good position, evidently determined to prevent our escape, and firing had already commenced in that direction.
Our position did look a little critical, for the nature of the ground was such that, to get out of there, we had either to cut through the infantry in our front, or the cavalry in our rear, and it was decided to cut through the cavalry if possible, and preparations were quickly made for that effort.
While they were being made the enemys artillery opened on us, and I was directed to put two guns in position to en gage it, and sent Lieut. Bennett in charge, who by the way was a reliable and gallant soldier in any emergency.
Completing arrangements and instructing my sergeant the movements he should make with the limbers, wagon and am bulance in case we succeeded in cutting our way through, I joined Bennett with the other gun, and found that he had already disabled one piece of the rebel battery, so that we were now equal in number, they having three and we three.
The cavalry were now preparing for the charge, and the second division was placed in front to lead it, the first brigade in advance, each regiment in column of fours, right in front, the Fourth Michigan in the centre, the Seventh Penn sylvania on its right and the Fourth Regulars on its left, with an interval of perhaps a hundred and fifty yards between the regiments. Behind the first brigade was formed the Second (Longs) in close column of regiments, with regimental front; and Col. Murrays division was formed seemingly in line further to the left and rear.
From our position with the battery we could plainly see the enemy on the ridge beyond, a distance of perhaps half a mile, who were hurriedly converting the fences into a rail barricade. Between them and us were two rail fences stand ing intact, and while the intervening space was unobstructed by timber or trees, the uneven surface was badly furrowed by

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scores of wash-outs. The sinking sun now for a moment showed itself from behind the clouds that had obscured it during the day, and shed a glow of brilliancy upon the death-dealing panorama around us. The skirmishers become more warmly engaged and the artillery fire more rapid, both seemingly encouraged to more desperate efforts by the in creased brilliancy upon the scene.
Col. Minty rides to the front and center of the first bri gade and gives the command, " Draw, sabre!" and as the twelve hundred blades leaped and swung into the air, the flash of sunlight upon each one of them seemed to reflect the courageous countenance and confident expression of him who now more tightly grasped its hilt, as he squared himself in his saddle and pressed more firmly into the stirrups.
The skirmishers were pushed forward to the first fence, and instructed to throw it down and push on to the next one. When they reached the first fence and commenced throwing it open the command, " Forward ; trot" was given, and with that enthusiastic and inspiring cheer they moved up the in cline of the ridge that had partially concealed them from the enemy, and as they reached the top of it and passed the line of the position occupied by the battery, the bugle sounded the charge ; again the wild and inspiring cheer was given, and with sabres swinging high in the air they dashed for ward, with seemingly increased speed at every bound, leap ing the wash-outs and fences, overtaking and running over the rebel skirmishers before they could reach their own sup ports, and their main line broke and attempted to run just as the charging force was reaching them, but it was too late, for the charging force, on the full gallop, was now among them, cutting right and left. The gunners of their battery took flight or were sabred at their pieces, and the guns fell into our possession, one of which was brought off by using the only spare limber that I had with me; (the others, following

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instructions, having gone hurriedly down the road, and when we reached there the battery was too far in advance to then be halted.)
The dismounted rebel force in our front had been ridden over, sabred and scattered, but the horse-holders in their rear abandoned their lead horses and endeavored to get away with the one they were riding, and for several miles to our front as we looked from ridge to ridge of the undulating country and through the clearings between the timber we would see a Johnnie or a number of them at the full gallop, with one or several blue coats close behind and after him.
I had been frequently thrilled, as I presume you have also, my companions, by the reading and recital of " The Charge of the Light Brigade " at Balaklava, which now came vividly to mind notwithstanding the responsibility and natural diversions of the moment, and its grandeur, its gallantry and its gravity, so prettily discribed in the poetic picture, now seemed to be in process of being enacted in our very presence with all of its terrible reality, save that of failure and disaster.
We soon found the road almost blocked with stampeded rebel wagons, ambulances and caissons, but it was no time to gather in that sort of plunder, and as I pulled out to pass the caissons of their battery, the drivers of which were negroes, now paled white with fear, I stopped a detail with axes, dis mounted the darkies, shot the horses and cut down the wheels, and had hardly finished it when the rear guard came up and an officer said to me, " For Gods sake, Robinson, hurry along out of here, the rebs have reformed and are close upon us 1"
There was no disposition to waste any time in gathering in war material or securing prisoners, yet it did seem to me that if the third division had charged or followed in line in stead of moving by the flank in columns of fours, at least five hundred to a thousand prisoners might have been gathered

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in and made to swim Cotton river, which we had to do the next day without them, and probably many of them were among the fellows that we were that night and the next day trying to get away from, although the principal force follow ing us was a division of infantry that we afterwards learned had been sent to get to the rear of us while we were facing the railroad, and had only succeeded in getting to our rear while we were facing and moving in the other direction.
Our own forces had of course become considerably scat tered, and after moving eastward several miles the command was halted for the purpose of gathering it together, and again it began to rain (or rather to pour), and in the reformation of the column, Col. Longs brigade, with the battery, now of three guns, was placed in the rear to cover the retreat, and before the column had hardly got stretched out on the road we were attacked by this rebel infantry and a battery, and we had to make a determined fight for the protection of the bal ance of the command.
Here Col. Long was wounded, and while aiding in repel ling a charge, one of my guns burst, and in another one a shell became wedged about half way down the bore, and we could neither ram it home or blow it out, and had to send the piece to the rear, leaving me only one serviceable, and ammu nition for that nearly exhausted. Leaving this in charge of Lieut. Bennett, I rode forward, seeking to find Col. Minty, to request of him that Kilpatricks battery be sent back to re lieve me, but not finding him readily I rode back and found that Longs brigade, having exhausted its ammunition, was be ing withdrawn, and as we pushed on we soon found Mintys brigade in position ready to take our place in covering the retreat.
We marched on till nearly midnight, and then bivouacked in an open field. It was raining in torrents, and mud every where, and then we began to realize our almost exhausted

condition, and what men were still living were nearly dead; for, up to this time, since leaving Sandtown, we had had no opportunity to make even a cup of coffee, and haJ subsisted alone oa the wet, steaming mush and musty hard tack from the haversacks and saddlebags while on the move.
We were on the move early the next morning, without breakfast, everything and everybody drenched through and through. Soon we came to Cotton river, ordinarily an in significant, shallow stream, but now bank-full and running like a mill race.
It was not wide, but still with the rapid current very diffi cult to swim, and every animal must swim to cross it. The cavalry, by entering well up above the crossing, succeeded in striking the landing on the other side with a few excep tions, and these were carried down stream. The first of the headquarters wagons that attempted to cross was carried down stream mules, wagon and driver in one tumbling mass, and was soon lost to sight.
The situation now looked serious for the ambulances filled with wounded men. Some men were sent across with axes and felled a tree into the stream from the further side and one was felled to meet it from the side we were on, and on these I sent men back and forth with the end of my picket ropes, which, by hitching to the ends of the poles, enabled us to easily pull ambulances, horses and all across the stream, and although several of the ambulances were overturned, none of the occupants were lost. The advantage in getting the battery across, was the having eight horses to both pieces and limbers, as by the time the wheel horses had to swim the lead horses would get footing toward the other side, and we had no ammunition worth protecting.
Gen. Kilpatrick now ordered all the wagons destroyed on the west side of the river. I had but one wagon and in it was my dismounted gun I had saved thus far, and feeling

26
sure that I could easily get it across by using my picket rope, I asked the privilege of attempting it and was met with the reply: " Damn the gun ! destroy the wagon." I retorted that I would dam the river by throwing the damned gun into it.
I was then on the east bank of the stream and immedi ately went across with some of my men, dumped the gun from the wagon and into the river, cut down the wagon and set fire to it, and have frequently, though mentally, damned Kilpatrick from then till now, at the same time conceding to him many conspicuous and good qualities as a cavalry com mander ; but on this expedition the officers and men of the second division, all thought that he showed too much partiality and didnt give the third division half a chance.
After getting the command well across we felt compara tively safe from any molestation from the rear, and as we would soon be approaching our lines to the eastward of At lanta, there was a possibility that we might strike a force in our front sent out to intercept us, but satisfactorily, to us, this did not occur.
Soon after noon we halted in the vicinity of good forage; cleaned, rested and fed the animals, and prepared coffee for the first time since starting from Sandtown, and I dont re member of dark, strong, army camp-kettle coffee ever tasting better or having a more exhilerating effect than at this par ticular time. We rested here a couple of hours and then re sumed the march toward Lithonia, a station on the Atlanta and Augusta railroad near which we went into camp late that night, and the next day reached our former camp at Peach Tree Creek, and thus ended the Kilpatrick raid around At lanta, which will ever be remembered by the survivors of it.
The total loss of our forces I dont remember positively, but think in the two brigades of the second division it was about 225 and in Kilpatricks division less than 20.

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We had not accomplished as much as we had hoped to, nor as much as had been promised by Kilpatrick, but as his promise was based upon the condition that he could have the second division with his own, a failure to do more could of course be excused for the reason that he did not have the sec ond division, but only less than two-thirds of it, and the re gret that the third brigade was not with us, was frequently expressed by both officers and men of the two brigades that he did have.
Possibly it may be inferred from some of the foregoing re marks that a slight ill-feeling was aroused on the part of the second division toward the commander of the expedition, and this I will not attempt to deny or conceal, but the rough edge of its perhaps unwarranted irritation was very largely smoothed by a couple of incidents during and at the close of the expedition, the first being at the crossing of Cotton river, where, as an ambulance containing some of my wounded men was crossing the stream and nearing the landing, it was being overturned by the current, .Kilpatrick, then standing on the bank of the river, called to men near him to jump in and save those wounded men, and coupling his command with his own actions, he jumped into the stream and in water up to his armpits grasped the ambulance and helped convey it safely to the shore; a little, but still gallant and humane act, deservedly meriting the applause and commendation which it received from those who witnessed it. And again, after reaching the lines of our army, and before taking leave of the division, he had it drawn up and very prettily complimented and thanked it for its conduct during the expedition, and as he turned from the battery, remarked, " You will hear from me further."
We did. When he was selected for the command of the cavalry that was to accompany Sherman on his contemplated march to the sea, our division was ordered to swap horses with the division of Kilpatrick, which literally was, to take

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all of his unserviceable horses and give him sound and serviceable ones instead. And imagine my surprise, when at about the same time the battery under my command was ordered to report to Gen. Kilpatrick.
My surprise was coupled with even greater disappoint ment and regret, for our attachment for the second division had become very warm and firmly welded by the mutual participation in the many scrapes and scapes of the almost constant campaigning of the previous eighteen months, and I was persuaded to seek a revocation of the order, and on ap plication to Gen. Thomas the order was revoked and the battery permitted to remain with the division of which it had so long been apart; but, in the light of subsequent experience and subsequent history, I have sometimes re gretted it, for to have marched with Sherman through Georgia and accompanied him through the Carolinas, and finally, to have participated in that grand exhibition and passed in review before the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy at the Nations Capitol, with victory on every banner, satisfaction beaming from every countenance, and rejoicing at every hand, must be a proud recollection to every partici pant now living, and the envy of the thousands, who, by force of circumstances, were not permitted the enjoyment of that privilege.
P 33S