Opinions of the Attorney General 1972

OPINIONS
of
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
1972
ARTHUR K. BOLTON ATTORNEY GENERAL
}col THE HARRISON COMPANY, PUBLISHERS
178-180 Pryor Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
OFFICIAL OPINIONS. 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PREFACE TO UNOFFICIAL OPINIONS ................. 307 DIGESTS OF UNOFFICIAL OPINIONS .................. 308 TABLE 1. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS CITED ................................. 363 TABLE 2. GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS CITED ................................. 363 TABLE 3. GEORGIA LAWS CITED ...................... 365 TABLE 4. GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED
SECTIONS CITED .................................... 377 INDEX ................................................. 393
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ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF GEORGIA HENRY P. FARRER ............................... 1868-1872 N.J. HAMMOND ................................. 1872-1877 ROBERT N. ELY .................................. 1877-1880 CLIFFORD L. ANDERSON ........................ 1880-1890 GEORGE N. LESTER .............................. 1890-1891 W. A. LITTLE ..................................... 1891-1892 1. M. TERRELL ................................... 1892-1902 BOYKIN WRIGHT ................................ 1902-1902 JOHN C. HART ................................... 1902-1910 HEWLETT A. HALL ............................... 1910-1911 THOMAS S. FELDER ............................. 1911-1914 WARREN GRICE ................................. 1914-1915 CLIFFORD WALKER ............................. 1915-1920 R. A. DENNY ..................................... 1920-1921 GEORGE M. NAPIER ............................. 1921-1932 LAWRENCE S. CAMP ............................. 1932-1932 M. J. YEOMANS .................................. 1933-1939 ELLIS G. ARNALL ................................ 1939-1943 GRADY HEAD .................................... 1943-1945 EUGENE COOK .................................. 1945-1965 ARTHUR K. BOLTON ............................. 1965-
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ARTHUR K. BOLTON The Attorney General

LEGAL STAFF OF DEPARTMENT OF LAW DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1972

NAME
Bolton, Arthur K. Hill, Harold N., Jr. Andrews, Gary B. Bailey, David J. Bartee, William F., Jr. Beasley, Dorothy T. Bennett, Roberts 0. Bomar, RobertS. Boyd, Thomas H. Brown, William B. Buckland, Lauren 0. Castellani, Robert J. Chambers, Richard L. Coleman, J. Robert Davis, G. Thomas Davis, Wiley H. Durham, Bryant L. Evans, Alfred L., Jr. Gault, Richard S. Gordon, Marion 0. Greene, Thomas W. Grindle, B. Dean, Jr. Hallman, F. Edwin, Jr. Harris, W. Hensell, Jr. Hinchey, John William Jones, Carl C., III Joy, William C. King, David L. G., Jr. Kirkley, Dorothy Y. Langham, Don A. Macintyre, Daniel 1., IV Matson, Roland F. Michael, H. Perry Moister, Roger W., Jr. Odom, Donn L.

TITLE
Attorney General Executive Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General Attorney
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Deputy Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General

v

Legal Staff-Continued

NAME

TITLE

Owen, H. Andrew, Jr. Palmour, Frank M. Perry, J. Lee
Poythress, David B.
Ruskaup, Larry D. Shell, Robert H. Spivey, Verley J. Stanton, Courtney W. Stone, Glenna L. Sweeney, Timothy J. Talley, James B. Tripp, David A. Walden, John C. Yancey, Wayne P.

Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Assistant Attorney General Attorney

VI

FOREWORD It is the duty of the Attorney General, when required to do so by the Governor. to give his opinion in writing on any question of law connected with the interest of the State or with the duties of any of its departments. Ga. Code Ann. 40-1602 Par. I. To avoid requiring the Governor to endorse requests for opinions originating with the departments of the State. the Attorney General receives such requests directly from the department heads. Opinions rendered to the Governor and to the heads of departments are classified as "official opinions." In addition to "official opinions," the office of the Attorney General renders "unofficial opinions," to other state officers (e.g. legislators. district attorneys) and to county and municipal attorneys on questions involving the general laws of the State. Each "unofficial opinion" bears the following notation: "The views expressed herein are the completely unofficial views of the writer only, and should be considered as information only." In the interest of economy and in order to avoid confusion. the "Unofficial Opinions" have been digested and separated from the "Official Opinions." These digested opinions follow the "Official Opinions" herein, and are preceded by a Preface to Unojjicial Opinions, more fully explaining the treatment of such opinions. The "Official Opinions" are serially numbered, showing the last two digits of the year of rendition, followed by a hyphen, then the number of the Opinion as rendered that year. Therefore, for 1971 we have: "711," "71-2," etc., and for 1972 and each following year we begin a new series: "72-1 ," "72-2," etc. The "Unofficial Opinion" numbers are preceded by the letter "U," Thus, "U71-1," "U71-2," ... "U72-1," "U72-2," etc., refer to "Unofficial Opinions."
Vll

OFFICIAL OPINIONS of
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1972

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OPINION 72-1
To: Chairman, Georgia Real Estate Commission

January 3, 1972

Re: Real estate brokers; escrow accounts not subject to
attachment.

Every licensed real estate broker in the State of Georgia is required to maintain an account in a banking institution in Georgia into which he must deposit all escrow and deposit funds coming into his possession as a result of any activities as a real estate broker. Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia No. 520-3-.04. You have asked whether or not such escrow accounts are subject to attachment.
When earnest money for the sale of property is turned over to a real estate broker to be held by him during the pendency of a conditional sales contract, an escrow agency is created in the broker. McGinley v. Chappas, 91 Ga. App. 418 (1955); Carter v. Turbeville, 90 Ga. App. 367 (1954). The real estate broker is then an agent for both the seller and the purchaser of the property and occupies a fiduciary relation to each ofthe parties. Fulton Land Co. et al. v. Armor Insulating Co., 192 Ga. 526 (1941). Title to real or personal property, including money, remains in the depositor until the conditions ofthe escrow are properly performed. 30A C. J. S. Escrows, 9. Thus, no title ever passes to the escrow agent.
In attachment cases only property of the defendant can be attached. Ga. Code Ann. 8-201. This property must be physical property or a debt owed to the defendant which is definite or capable of being made definite without contingencies. Camp v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 220 Ga. 832 (1965). The very nature of escrow agreements involves the existence of contingencies.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that escrow accounts of real estate brokers are not subject to attachment in cases in which the broker is a defendant inasmuch as the money in such accounts is not the property of the broker nor does it constitute a debt free from contingencies.

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OPINION 72-2
To: Director, Georgia Department of Public Health

2 January 5, 1972

Re: Mass gatherings; convention of the National Campers and Hikers Association as subject to statute.

This is in response to your recent request for my official opinion as to whether the proposed convention of the National Campers and Hikers Association in Colquitt County, Georgia, during July, 1974, will be subject to the 1971 Mass Gatherings statute (Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 252-8, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-12A).
The Mass Gatherings statute, supra, is applicable, by definition, to any event likely to attract 5,000 or more persons and to continue for 15 or more consecutive hours. From information gained from you and also from a supplied copy of the National Campers and Hikers Association's National Convention Policy, I have learned that the proposed convention will last more than four consecutive days, likely from seven to 10, and will be attended the whole time by an estimated 35,000 individuals. Also, upon inspection, it does not appear that this convention falls under any of the expressly-provided exceptions in the statute.
Based upon the foregoing, and applying the rule of statutory construction that a statute couched in plain and unambiguous language needs no interpretation (Central of Georgia Railroad Co. v. Tucker, 99 Ga. App. 52 (1959)), it is my official opinion that the proposed convention of the National Campers and Hikers Association in Colquitt County, Georgia, will be subject to the 1971 Mass Gatherings statute.

OPINION 72-3 To: Director of Corrections

January 5, 1972

Re: Custody by the State Board of Corrections of individuals convicted of crime who are under the age of 17.

This is in response to your letter wherein you requested my opinion on the question of whether or not the State Board of Corrections can properly assume custody of two convicted felons

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who are under the age of 17. As I understand the factual situation, your department has
recently received two sentences directing that the named individuals be committed to the custody of the Department of Corrections for service of the respective punishments. Both sentences involve imprisonment in excess of one year, but neither one is a sentence based on a conviction for a capital felony. The personal history sheet attached to each sentence indicates that both felons are under the age of 17. Although your office is cognizant ofa law which directs that all misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 years shall be committed to the custody of the Department ofFamily and Children Services, a question has arisen as to the constitutionality of this provision and you are therefore concerned about the proper disposition of these sentences.
As a general rule, the legislature has designated the State Board of Corrections as the sole agency for the reception and assignment of all convicted misdemeanants and felons. Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1399, as amended by Ga. Laws 1969, p. 602 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-309 (b)). Notable exceptions to this general provision concern individuals convicted of misdemeanors who, under certain conditions, must be placed in a county institution and, under other conditions, may be placed in such facilities in the discretion ofthe trial court. Ga. Laws 1964, p. 485, as amended by Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 236, 241 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506). Finally, and the exception that concerns this opinion, is that set forth in Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 996, 997 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209 (a) (5)) which provides that the Division for Children and Youth is designated the exclusive state agency:

"For the acceptance and incarceration of all misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 years; provided, however, that those felons convicted of a capital felony shall only be sentenced into the custody of the State Department of Corrections. All other persons under the age of 17 years found to be guilty or convicted ofa misdemeanor or felony, other than a capital felony by any court in Georgia shall be committed for an indefinite period of time to the custody of the Division for Children and Youth of the State Department of Family and Children Services."

This provision clearly limits the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections with respect to the described class of convicts. Without the constitutional question referred to above, this would

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control your question and prohibit your department from accepting the two 16-year-olds.
The more serious question raised by your inquiry concerns the possibility that Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 996, 997 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209 (a) (5)) might violate the provision of the Constitution of the State of Georgia which provides that the superior courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases where an offender might be subjected to loss of life or confinement in the penitentiary. Ga.
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3901). Cases construing this provision have held, when certain juvenile court Acts were under judicial review, that no Act ofthe legislature could withdraw the jurisdiction of a superior court to try an offender within the age of accountability under law (i.e., 14) for crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary. See e.g., Jackson v. Balkcom, Warden, 210 Ga. 412, 414 (1954); Mills v. State, 56 Ga. App. 390,391 (1937). In this context, an examination of Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 996, 997 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209 (a) (5)) reveals that the matter of conviction for misdemeanors or felonies is presupposed; in other words, the Act treats individuals who have already been convicted by a court of a particular crime and concerns only the manner in which these particular convicts shall be punished. As to the particular punishment which may be imposed following conviction of a crime, the matter is peculiarly within the province of the legislature and not the judiciary. See e.g., Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 816-21 (1929); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 125 (1874). The legislature, then, has exclusive jurisdiction in the matter ofdictating how crimes shall be punished. The provision under consideration does no more than this, for it merely sets apart a defined class of offenders and directs how they shall be punished for the offense; in doing this, the power of any superior court to try an individual under the age of 17 for any given crime is in no way affected. This Act is like, in this respect, the Act which provides that the Director of Corrections and not the sentencing court designates the place of confinement of any individual within -its jurisdiction. Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1399, as amended by Ga. Laws 1969, p. 602 (Ga. Code Ann., 77-309 (b)); see also Mathis v. Scott, 199 Ga. 743, 746-7 (1945). It is also akin to earlier laws concerning the power ofthe State Board ofCorrections which allowed the youthful convict to be transferred from the custody of the State Board of Corrections to the custody of the State Department of Public Welfare or its successor the State Department of Family and Children Services. See Ga. Laws 1937, p. 758; Ga. Laws 1943, p. 566 (both now repealed). See generally Ga. Laws 1956, p. 161 (Ga. Code

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Ann. Ch. 77-3); Ops. Att'y Gen. 1945-47, p. 430. It is, therefore, my official opinion that the Act providing for the
custody ofconvicted misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 is not unconstitutional and that the Department of Family and Children Services is the agency to which the two individuals described in your letter must be committed.

OPINION 72-4
To: Director, State Highway Department

January 13, 1972

Re: State Highway Department; disposal of surplus right-of-way acquired from another agency.

This is in response to a recent request by Mr. J. E. Brown, Right-of-Way Engineer, for clarification on the law pertaining to the disposal of surplus right-of-way.
The specific case regards land condemned by Fulton County for the Atlanta Expressway System in an area where much of the property had been previously deeded directly to the state. Fulton County deeded the condemned property to the State Highway Department and was reimbursed for it. The specific question is "If a portion of the above property is declared surplus, should the Highway Department proceed on the basis of acquisition by deed or by condemnation?".
Both the state and the counties have the power of eminent domain. Ga. Code of 1933, 36-101, 36-103, Ga. Laws 1894, p. 99, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 36-202). The acquisition of property by deed is not an exercise ofthe power of eminent domain. See Op. Att'y Gen. 70-63, a copy of which is enclosed. Since title was conveyed to the Highway Department by deed between the parties for adequate consideration and not by the condemnation decree of a court, the Highway Department technically acquired the land by deed.
However, this does not settle the question of disposition under Ga. Laws 1969, p. 492 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-2901 to 95-2907). This Act deals with the acquisition and disposition of rights-of-way by the State Highway Department in advance of present need, and states in part:

"When, in the opinion of the department, changed conditions

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have made continued ownership by the department ofproperty acquired for highway rights-of-way or maintenance or construction of roads no longer necessary for such purposes, the department may sell such land at public sale: Provided, that the original owner whose property has been so acquired by the exercise ofeminent domain, or his successor in interest, shall have the first right to purchase such property at a price not in excess of that finally paid under the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 492, 494 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-2907).

The last half of the quoted sentence is remedial rather than punitive in nature. It is conducive to the public good in that it protects a person's property interest which has been taken over his objections; this is so even though the condemning authority takes in fee simple. For this reason, the statute must be construed liberally. See Willis v. Fincher, 68 Ga. 444, 445 (1882); Shumate v. Williams, 34 Ga. 245, 251 (1866); Bailey v. Lumpkin, 1 Ga. 392, 404 (1846); Lears v. Seaboard Air-line Railway, 3 Ga. App. 614, 618 (1907); cf Moore v. Baldwin County, 209 Ga. 541, 545 (1953).
Although the quoted section of the statute deals with the state's disposal of property, it emphasizes how the property was taken from the original owner. The primary concern is that the property was condemned, the condemning authority being irrelevant, and will now not be used for a public purpose. It is equitable that the original owner have first right ofpurchase since his property could not have been condemned originally were the taking not for a public purpose. Ga. Code of 1933, 36-101, 36-102.
It is my official opinion that for the purposes of "The Act to Authorize the Acquisition of Property for Management, Construction and Maintenance of Rights-of-Way by the State Highway Department in Advance of Present Need" (Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 492 to 494, Ga. Code Ann. 95-2901 to 95-2907), when the state acquires property by deed from a party which acquired the property by eminent domain, the state must dispose of the property as if acquired by eminent domain.

OPINION 72-5 To: Supervisor of Purchases

January 14, 1972

Re: State purchasing contracts with cooperatives.

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In response to a request by the Supervisor of Purchases in 1956, the Attorney General issued an official opinion that the state may not participate in a particular cooperative since it would in effect be pledging the aid of the state to a private company. The opinion was based on the cooperative's requirement that a member must buy stock in the cooperative and that each member may further be required to pay additional charges over and above the cost of equipment purchased through the cooperative in order to provide the necessary operating expenses of the cooperative. The Attorney General decided that this method of operation offended the state's constitutional provision against pledging the state's credit. Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 635.
The cooperative has recently amended its charter to allow nonmembers to utilize the services of the cooperative. These nonmembers are designated "contract patrons," Since the cooperative no longer requires stock ownership or the possibility of further assessments to provide the necessary operating expenses, the amendments remove the objections set forth in our official opinion dated July 25, 1956 and cited above.
However, we believe it advisable to point out several apparent problems with a state agency utilizing the services of this cooperative.
The Supervisor of Purchases is the person whose duty it is to contract for the purchase of all supplies, materials and equipment required by the various state agencies. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 503, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 40-1902). Therefore, although a state institution may decide to apply to this cooperative for "contract patron status," state law still requires that all purchases be made through your office. Bids for contracts are awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into consideration the quality of the articles to be supplied and conformity with the standard specifications which have been established and prescribed, the purposes for which the articles are required, the discount allowed for prompt payment, transportation charges and the date or dates for delivery specified in the bid. Ga. Laws 1939, pp. 160, 165-166, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-1910); Rules and Regulations of the Supervisor of Purchases, Art. 7, Sec. 1.
From the materials forwarded to us it appears that this cooperative operates by granting a "patronage refund" at the end of each year. Although it is not necessary to go into the manner in which this refund is computed, it is interesting to note that the refund is only awarded annually and it is further interesting to

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note that it is not necessarily awarded in cash, but may be paid in certificates of equity or other evidences of indebtedness, or services, or any combination of these.
It follows that when awarding a contract, the Supervisor of Purchases would not be able to consider a possible "patronage refund" which might be granted in the future, but must award the contract based upon the bid submitted at the time the contract is to be awarded. The cooperative's bid would be treated as any other competitor's bid and would be bound by the same restrictions as any private supplier's bid.
Thus, while the objections of the 1956 Attorney General's opinion have been met by the charter amendments of the cooperative, acceptance into the cooperative as a ''contract patron" does not authorize any state agency to use this cooperative without complying with the various Georgia laws on purchasing.

OPINION 72-6
To: Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles

January 18, 1972

Re: State Board ofPardons and Paroles; need for majority to grant reprieve.

This responds to your recent request for an official opinion on the question whether a single member of the Board of Pardons and Paroles may act to grant a reprieve without the knowledge and agreement of the other members of the board. It is my understanding that this question arises out of the practical difficulty sometimes experienced in situations where an inmate suffers a personal loss of a member of his family on a weekend or during other times when the membership of the board is dispersed.
Subject to certain exceptions where a unanimous vote ofall three members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles is required, the granting of clemency, pardon, parole, or other relief is required to be accomplished by a majority vote of the board. Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 189 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-513). The power to grant a reprieve is "relief from sentence" within the statutory meaning. Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 187 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-511). It is further provided that two members constitute the quorum necessary for the transaction of the board's business, subject to the exception, not

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here involved, where the business must be transacted by the unanimous vote of all three members. Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 186 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-506).
It is clear from these statutes that a quorum of two members of the board must be present in order to grant a reprieve to an inmate. Further, the law provides that two members of the board must concur in order to grant an inmate a reprieve. The law thus reinforces itself, and is only susceptible to the opinion that a reprieve cannot be granted, even under the most limited circumstances, upon the vote and action of a single member of the board.

OPINION 72-7
To: Executive Secretary, Regents of the University System of Georgia

January 20, 1972

Re: State building contracts; exemption of contractors from payment of local building permit fees.

This responds to your request for an opmwn as to whether municipalities and counties legally may require the payment of building permit fees by contractors for the construction or repair ofbuildings for the state or any ofits agencies or instrumentalities.
I am of the opinion that the answer to your inquiry should be in the negative since the construction of such buildings is-as much as their repair would be-"wholly a matter of state concern." City ofAtlanta v. State, 181 Ga. 346 (1935). Requiring of the state or its independent contractors the purchase of a permit for the construction or repair ofbuildings or other capital improvements ofeither the state or any ofits agencies or instrumentalities would unduly impede the functions of state government. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1963-65, p. 493. The latter opinion is affirmed insofar as it supports the opinion expressed herein.
The payment by such contractors (or their subcontractors) of municipal and county business license taxes is to be distinquished from the subject-matter of the present opinion upon the basis stated in my opinion to you dated July 27, 1971 (Op. Att'y Gen. 71-140), that is, that the payment of business license fees by the state's independent contractors does not impair or impede state governmental functions.

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OPINION 72-8 To: Judge, Superior Courts

Jaunary 25, 1972

Re: Judges of superior court emeritus; eligibility; questions as to payment into fund for service in capacities other than judge.

This is in response to your letter of January 12, 1972, in which you requested my opinion on two questions concerning retirement under the Superior Court Judge Emeritus program. The substance of your questions and my opinion is outlined below.

1. After having served 16 years as city court solicitor, two years, four months as district attorney and two years, 10 months as a superior court judge, am I eligible for retirement under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a, and, if not, what is the earliest date I would be eligible for retirement?

Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a, based upon Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362, establishes the following relevant requirements for appointment to judge of the superior court emeritus:

a. The judge must be in his 19th year of service. b. The judge may include prior service as a district attorney or solicitor of a city court in computing the 19 years of service. c. The judge must have served at least four years as superior court judge.

The statute is clear that service as solicitor ofa city court and as a district attorney can be counted for the total years ofsuch service. In your case that total allowable service exceeds the required 19 years.
The third relevant requirement is that you must have served four years as a superior court judge. Ga. Code Ann. 24-2620a provides that when computing the number ofyears necessary to be eligible, the entire year in which a judge becomes eligible shall be computed as a part of the required number, although actually he only served for a part of the year. Since you are not yet in your fourth year ofservice as a superior court judge, it is my opinion you are not now eligible for appointment as judge of superior court emeritus. However, there is no limitation in the statute on the

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minimum period of time which must be worked in that fourth year to meet the four-year requirement. The statute merely provides for serving "part ofa year." Thus, it would appear that one day ofwork as a judge in that fourth year would suffice. Consequently, since you will complete three full years of service as a superior court judge on March 31, 1972, it is my opinion that you will have met the statutory minimum period of service if you work one day after March 31, 1972.

2. Are there any provisiOns of the law which require contributions, at this time, for the years of service as solicitor of the city court?

Ga. Code Ann. 24-2609a and 24-2610a establish requirements for participation in the retirement fund. In relevant part, they provide that:

a. The judge must begin making contributions within 90 days of taking office as superior court judge. b. The judge must make contributions from the date of the beginning of his service as a judge.

Section 24-2610a includes a provision that if a judge has previously paid into the Solicitors General Retirement Fund and now claims that time as a solicitor general toward his superior court judge retirement, the Solicitors General Fund Trustee shall transfer the judge's contributions to the Superior Court Judges Retirement Fund. However, I am unaware of any provision in the Act which provides that contributions must be made for service as a city court solicitor. A previous Attorney General's Unofficial Opinion provided that a superior court judge who had been both a city court solicitor and a superior court judge and had paid the statutory amount of his salary since becoming a judge was eligible for retirement as a judge emeritus. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 93.
Therefore, it is my opinion that there is no provision which requires the contribution, at this time, for your years of service as solicitor of the city court.

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OPINION 72-9
To: Director, Department of Public Safety

January 26, 1972

Re: Railroads; train crews not required to remain at scene of collision involving personal injuries.

I write in response to your recent request for my opinion as to whether railroad train crews are required by Georgia law to stop or remain at the scene ofa railroad-motor vehicle collision in which personal injury occurs.
As you are aware, this question, as it relates to railroad-motor vehicle collisions wherein only property damage occurs, has been answered in the negative in my opinion of March 10, 1970 (Op. Att'y Gen. 70-32). Examination of the applicable statutes, which were previously considered in the referenced opinion, reveals no basis for distinguishing the duties ofa railroad train crew involved in a collision resulting in personal injury from the duty of a crew involved in a collision wherein only property damage occurred. Accordingly, it is my opinion, based on the foregoing considerations, that railroad train crews are not required by state law to stop or remain at the scene of a railroad-motor vehicle collision involving personal injury.

OPINION 72-10 To: The Adjutant General (Georgia)

February 1, 1972

Re: Assistant Adjutant General for Air; incentive pay not authorized.

You have requested an opinion regarding the propriety of the Assistant Adjutant General for Air of the Department of Defense of the State of Georgia receiving incentive pay for hazardous duty involving aerial flight.
The Assistant Adjutant General for Air is entitled to:

"... receive the pay and allowances of a Brigadier General as now or hereafter provided by law for an officer of equivalent rank in the regular armed forces of the United States." Ga.

13 Laws 1971, p. 84 (Ga. Code Ann. 86-206).

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The federal law relative to the receipt ofthe incentive pay reads in pertinent part as follows:

"A member of uniformed service who is entitled to basic pay is also entitled to incentive pay . . . for the performance of hazardous duty required by orders." 37 U. S. C. 301.

Under this law a member of the armed forces will not get incentive pay for performance of hazardous duty unless such duty was performed pursuant to orders.
It is my understanding that neither the Adjutant General nor the Assistant Adjutants General are under military orders. Each position is an appointive one and the duties entailed are set forth in statute. In the absence of military orders, it is necessary to look to the duties as delineated by state law to determine if the performance of such hazardous duty is "required by orders."
It is the duty of both Assistant Adjutants General "to assist the Adjutant General in the discharge and performance of his duties." Ga. Laws 1971, p. 84 (Ga. Code Ann. 86-206). There is no distinction made between the two Assistant Adjutants General as to their duties nor is there even any requirement that the Assistant Adjutant General for Air be an aviator. The duties ofthe Adjutant General are primarily administrative and do not include participation in aerial flight. Ga. Laws 1955, pp. 10, 24 (Ga. Code Ann. 86-205).
Job specification No. 72196 of the State Merit System pertains to the Assistant Adjutants General. Again there is no requirement that either position be held by an aviator or that either Assistant Adjutant General participate in aerial flight.
It is therefore my opinion that the Assistant Adjutant General for Air is not required by orders to perform hazardous duty and is not entitled to a salary equivalent to the pay and allowances of a brigadier general who also receives incentive pay.

OPINION 72-11 To: State Treasurer

February 2, 1972

Re: Emeritus officers; social security employer contributions.

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This is in response to your letter of January 27, 1972, in which you requested my opinion as to whether the State Treasurer should pay the employer's contribution for social security of a superior court judge emeritus or district attorney emeritus who is now employed elsewhere.
I am unaware of any statute authorizing you to pay the employer's share of social security payments for either a superior court judge emeritus or a district attorney emeritus who has retired from his official position and is now employed elsewhere.

OPINION 72-12
To: Director, State Department of Family and Children Services

February 7, 1972

Re: State Department of Family and Children Services; acceptance ofcounty funds donated for day-care and other services.

You have requested my official opinion as to whether the State Department of Family and Children Services may accept public funds donated by counties for the provision of day-care and other social services to welfare applicants, recipients and potential recipients.
As you are no doubt aware, this question was probably prompted by the enactment of Ga. Laws 1970, p. 451 (see Ga. Code Ann. 99-209, 99-2916) which created an exclusively state and federally funded welfare program and abolished the obligation ofcounties to fund any part of public assistance. However, this law did not repeal, specifically or otherwise, the several other provisions which authorize voluntary grants to the department from any source, including counties. Such provisions are:

"The State Department shall have the right and authority to accept gifts or donations with full power to execute in connection with such gifts and donations for welfare purposes as may be prescribed by the donors thereof." Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 355, 361 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-123). "The [Division for Children and Youth] is hereby authorized and empowered to receive, accept, hold and use on behalfofthe state, and for purposes provided for in this chapter, gifts,

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grants, donations, devises and bequests of real, personal and mixed property of every kind and description." Ga. Laws 1963, pp. 81, 117 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-217). "The State Department of Family and Children Services ... is empowered and authorized to administer, expend and disburse funds appropriated to it and allocated to it by ... the respective counties ofthe State ... for the purpose of distributing old age benefits and all other benefits provided for in this Chapter." Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 355, 357; 1943, p. 203; 1960, p. 85 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-103). "All funds appropriated or allocated to the State Department ... by the ... fiscal authorities of the respective counties ... are hereby declared to be funds provided for public purpose and all appropriations provided for herein ... may be expended and distributed by the State Department for the purposes provided for under the terms of this Chapter." Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 355, 367 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-132).

These provisions evidence the manifest intent of the General Assembly that the Department, or the Division for Children and Youth, would continue to be able to accept donations from any source and use such funds for the purposes authorized by the welfare laws. Therefore, since the General Assembly has not specifically repealed these provisions, and because repeals by implication are not favored (Morris v. City Council ofAugusta et al., 201 Ga. 666,672 (1946)),lconcludethat the department may accept public funds donated voluntarily by counties for the provision of day-care and other social services to welfare applicants and other authorized recipients.

OPINION 72-13 To: State Treasurer

February 17, 1972

Re: State Treasurer; authority to correct error made in administration of District Attorneys Emeritus Retirement Program.

This is in reply to your letter of February 9, 1972, in which you asked my opinion on the following question:

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"During the legally required six-month period following the appointment of a district attorney in 1965, an error was made by the former State Treasurer in the computation of the military service credit of the individual appointed. Does the present State Treasurer have the authority to waive the six-month provision to make the proper correction?"

As I understand the facts in this matter, the district attorney in question made application for credit for his military service in a timely manner. Therefore, he is entitled to all credit authorized by the statute and, if an error was made in calculating the amount of credit to which he was entitled, I am unaware ofany statute which would prevent you from rectifying that error.

OPINION 72-14 To: State Treasurer

February 17, 1972

Re: District attorneys emeritus; military service occasioned by World War II is creditable.

This is in response to your letter of February 9, 1972, in which you requested my opinion on the following question:

"In the computation of credit given a district attorney for service in the armed forces ofthe United States occasioned by one of the national emergencies from July 17, 1943, through January 21, 1946, what is the number of years to which the district attorney is entitled, provided he is fully willing to pay the maximum contributions into the District Attorneys Emeritus Retirement Fund?"

Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909a, based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780, as amended, provides in relevant part:

"Provided, further, that in computing years of service as a solicitor general, credit shall be given for service in the armed forces of the United States occasioned by only one of the national emergencies of either of the following: World War I, or World War II, or Korean conflict, upon payment into the retirement fund of the maximum payments provided

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hereinabove for each year or fraction ofyear of such service in the armed forces . . . whereupon the solicitor general shall receive a credit of one year for each year or fraction of year of such service for which contribution into the fund has been made ...."

Therefore, as long as the district attorney's service in the armed forces was occasioned by, or began during, the national emergency of World War II, the entire length of such service may be used in computing credit. In response to your specific inquiry, the district attorney entered the service during the national emergency occasioned by World War II and is entitled to three years ofcredit.

OPINION 72-15 To: Secretary of State

February 18, 1972

Re: Securities; warrants issued for purchase of common stock not exempt from registration where listing upon New York Stock Exchange is conditional rather than absolute.

This replies to your letter requesting my opinion as to whether certain warrants are securities exempt from registration within the purview of Section 5 (f) of the Georgia Securities Act, as amended. Ga. Laws 1957, p. 134 (Ga. Code Ann. 97-106()). As I understand the facts of the example presented, application would be made by the issuer of the warrants, to the New York Stock Exchange, to list the warrants in question, and approval of the exchange for listing thereon would be forthcoming upon notice of issuance, subject to the condition that there be presented evidence of satisfactory underwriters' distribution to the exchange consonant with the distribution standards of the exchange. I understand that the warrants would probably become fully listed upon the New York Stock Exchange approximately two months after the offering is completed.
That the warrants in question are "securities," within the meaning of the Georgia Securities Act, is clear. Section 1 (i) of the Act provides in part: " 'Security' shall mean any note, stock, treasury stock, ... or warrant ...." Ga. Laws 1957, p. 134 (Ga. Code Ann. 97-102 (i)).
In considering whether the warrants in question are securities exempt from registration within the Georgia Securities Act, it

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should be noted that, where a provision of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean what has been clearly expressed and no occasion for construction exists. Forrester v. Continental Gin Co., 67 Ga. App. 119 (1942). The critical language of the "listing exemption" of the Georgia Securities Act, Section 5(f), provides that the registration requirements of the Act are inapplicable to securities "... fully listed, or regularly approved for full listing upon the issuance thereof, upon the New York Stock Exchange ...." (Emphasis added.) It has been judicially noted that " ... Webster'sdefinitionoftheword 'full' is 'complete,' 'entire,' ... 'mature,' 'perfect' ...." Quinn v. Donovan, 85 Ill. 194, 195 (1877).
It is thus apparent, in light of the language of the Georgia Securities Act, that the warrants in question would not, upon issuance, be "regularly approved for full listing,'' since such "full listing" is conditioned upon the presentation of evidence of satisfactory distribution consistent with the rules ofthe New York Stock Exchange. Thus, upon issuance, the warrants would not be approved for that complete, perfect listing contemplated by the Georgia Securities Act.
Additionally, the term "listed,'' relating to Securities and Exchange Commission practices, means "admitted to full trading privileges upon application by the issuer or its fiscal agent ....; and includes securities for which authority to add to the list on official notice ofissuance has been granted." 17 CFR 240.3b-1. Under this definition, the warrants described can never be "fully listed" in view of the condition imposed before final approval; i.e., the evidence ofsatisfactory distribution prior to the date on which the registration statement pertaining to such warrants becomes effective with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Uniform Securities Act of 1956, apparently recognizing this disqualification, has expressly exempted warrants from the registration requirement. Uniform Securities Act, 402 (a) (7). Georgia has not adopted the warrant exempting provision, apparently with the intent and to the result that the sale of warrants in this state would necessarily require registration.
Therefore, it is my opinion, based upon the foregoing, that the warrants herein considered would not, upon issuance, be "regularly approved for full listing" upon the New York Stock Exchange, and would thus not be "exempt securities" within the meaning of the Georgia Securities Act of 1957, as amended.

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OPINION 72-16 To: State Superintendent of Schools

February 18, 1972

Re: Minimum Foundation Program of Education; authority of State Board of Education to make requirements for daily attendance calculations.

This is in answer to your letter ofFebraury 8, 1972, in which you request our opinion on the legality of a State Board of Education policy relating to the inclusion or exclusion for purposes ofaverage daily attendance calculations of those high school students who spend a portion of their school day taking courses in colleges, universities, or vocational-technical schools. You state that in order to avoid duplication of financing, the State Board of Education has adopted a policy whereby a pupil who is enrolled more than halftime at his resident high school will be included in average daily attendance while one who is enrolled less than half time in high school will not.
In answering your question, I might start by observing that although various funding calculations under the Minimum Foundation Program of Education (MFPE) Act, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 3, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-6), are based upon the number of pupils "in average daily attendance" in a school system, see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 32-611, 32-612, neither the MFPE Act nor any other school law with which I am familiar appears to define just how may hours a student must be present in school in order to be included in average daily attendance. In the absence ofa statutory definition, it would seem that the matter is left to the discretion of the State Board of Education by Ga. Code Ann. 32-603, the relevant portion of which provides:

"The State Board of Education shall adopt and prescribe all rules, regulations and policies required by the provisions ofthis .Chapter, and shall adopt and prescribe such other rules, regulations. and policies as may be reasonably necessary or advisable for the proper implementation, enforcement and carrying out of provisions of this Chapter ...."

In light of the foregoing, it is my opinion that it is within the lawful discretion ofthe State Board ofEducation to define the time a pupil must be in school in order to be counted for purposes of

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average daily attendance calculations. [For further clarification see Op. Att'y Gen. 72-37, infra.]

OPINION 72-17 To: State Treasurer

February 18, 1972

Re: District attorneys emeritus; eligibility for appointment.

This is in response to your letter of February 8, 1972, in which you requested my opinion as to whether a district attorney who has served in that capacity and paid into the District Attorneys Emeritus Retirement Fund for 19 years must be 65 years of age before he is qualified to retire as a district attorney emeritus.
Georgia Code Ann. 24-2902a, based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780, as amended, establishes the requirement that a district attorney must have at least 19 years of service to qualify as an emeritus. There is no provision in the Act establishing an age requirement in the fact situation you have presented.
Therefore, it is my opinion that if a district attorney has served 19 years in that capacity, he is eligible to retire as a district attorney emeritus regardless of his age.

OPINION 72-18 To: State Treasurer

February 25, 1972

Re: State Treasurer; resignation; appointment to fill vacancy; final statement of accounts to Comptroller General by departing Treasurer.

This is in response to your letter of February 21, 1972, in which you asked my opinion on certain questions concerning the resignation of and successor to a State Treasurer. Following are your questions and my opinion on each.

"1. Should the State Treasurer resign in the second year of his elected term prior to the date specified by law for the closing of entries for the primary elections ofthat year, would his successor be appointed by the Governor until the date ofthe general election of that year or for the entirety of the

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unexpired term? If it is your official opmwn that the appointment would be only until the date of the general election ofthat year, would a successor to the remainder of the unexpired term be elected in that general election?"

Ga. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. XIII (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3013), provides that the Governor has the power to fill an office vacated by resignation unless the law provides another manner of replacement. Such appointee "shall continue in the office until the successor is commissioned, agreeably to the mode pointed out by this Constitution, or by law in pursuance thereof."
I am unaware of any law establishing another method of replacing a State Treasurer who resigns. Therefore, the Governor has the authority to make such appointment.
Both the Constitution [Art. V, Sec. II, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3101)] and the statute providing for the election of State Treasurer (Ga. Code Ann. 40-901, as amended by Ga. Laws 1961, p. 133) establish that the Treasurer shall be elected for the same term as the Governor. When a term of office has been established, an appointing official has no authority to limit the appointee to a period of time less than the term established by law. Conley u. Brophy, 207 Ga. 30 (1950).
Therefore, since there is no provision in the law providing for mid-term elections to replace resigned State Treasurers, the Governor's appointment of a State Treasurer would be for the remainder of the unexpired term.

"2. Would the requirement for the statement to the Comptroller General of the accounts of a State Treasurer who resigned within 10 days of the resignation be satisfied if the State Treasurer submitted his resignation to the Governor 10 days prior to the date of his intended departure and so stated his accounts to the Comptroller General at the close ofbusiness on the day of his departure?"

In this regard, Ga. Code Ann. 40-1303, based upon Ga. Laws 1876, p. 128, provides:

"If the Treasurer shall resign or shall be removed, he shall, within 10 days thereafter, state his accounts to the Comptroller General, and deliver the books, papers, and money of the treasury to his successor, taking his receipt therefor ...."

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A "resignation" of a public office must be made with intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by an act of relinquishment. Patten u. Miller, 190 Ga. 123 (1940). The resignation becomes fully effective at the time the employee leaves the office.
In the factual situation presented in your question, the Treasurer would state his accounts and deliver the books, papers and money at the close of the day he has taken the last step of his resignation. This is clearly within the 10-day period.

"3. Should the Governor fail to name a successor to a State Treasurer who resigned by the effective date of his resignation, who would succeed to the duties of the State Treasurer upon the statement ofthe accounts of the resigned Treasurer to the Comptroller General?"

While the Constitution and statutes give the Governor the authority to appoint a replacement Treasurer, no time is stated within which the appointment must be made. Consequently, it is conceivable that an office might remain unfilled after the departure of the office holder.
The statute provides that the Governor may exercise general superintendence over the office of State Treasurer. Ga. Code Ann. 40-1302, based upon Ga. Laws 1876, p. 128. It is my opinion that the Governor has the authority and the responsibility to either appoint a replacement or to exercise his general superintendence over the office to insure the functions of the office are carried out in accordance with the law.

OPINION 72-19
To: Director, State Highway Department of Georgia

March 3, 1972

Re: State Highway Department; outdoor advertising permits.

In your correspondence of February 17, 1972, you request an official opinion as to whether outdoor advertising permits may be issued for "multi-zoned" areas, especially those zoned for advertising and some other purpose.

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When issuing permits for outdoor advertising devices, the

Highway Department must be guided by the Outdoor Advertising

Control Act (Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., p. 5, Ga. Code Ann. Ch.

95-20A) and not the local zoning ordinances. The Act is clear in

stating that general advertising devices can be erected only in

"zoned commercial or industrial areas" or "unzoned commercial or

industrial areas." Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess.,pp. 5, 9. Theseterms

are clearly defined and exclude outdoor advertising structures,

agricultural activities and activities conducted in a building

principally used as a residence. Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 5,

8, 9.

Section 2(h) (Ga. Code Ann. 95-2002a(h)) of the Act defines

"zoned commercial or industrial areas" as "... those areas which

are zoned for industrial or commercial activities pursuant to state

or local zoning laws or ordinances as part of a comprehensive

zoning plan." Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 5, 8. This does not

indicate an area zoned solely for industrial or commercial activity,

but any area zoned to allow for industrial or commercial activity

therein.

Mr. Herbert Porter of your Traffic and Safety Division has told

me telephonically that the specific areas of question are those in

Chatham County zoned "Residential-Agriculture-Sign" and

"Agriculture-Business" and those in Lowndes County zoned

"Highway Farm (Advertising)." This opinion deals only with those

three, since other cities or counties may have zoning areas of the

same name, but which include different uses.

It is my official opinion that outdoor advertising permits may not

be issued for signs to be erected in areas of Chatham County zoned

"Residential-Agriculture-Sign" or in areas of Lowndes County

zoned "Highway Farm (Advertising)." However, since commercial

activity may be carried on "... pursuant to state or local zoning

laws

" in areas of Chatham County zoned

"Agriculture-Business," outdoor advertising permits may be issued

for signs to be erected in that area.

OPINION 72-20
To: Director, Southern Office, The Council of State Governments

March 6, 1972

Re: Council of State Governments; tax exemption.

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This is in response to your letter of recent date with respect to correspondence your office received from the Joint City-County Board of Tax Assessors of Atlanta as to local tax liability of the Council of State Governments.
As you pointed out, this general subject has been treated in an official opinion of former Attorney General Eugene Cook, dated August 10, 1959 to Mr. Dixon Oxford, then Revenue Commissioner. This opinion was not published. However, the wording of that opinion is sound and the principles discussed therein are correctly applied. Therefore, the former opinion is approved. I have enclosed a copy of the referenced opinion and am unaware of any reason it would not be of equal application to the present situation.
[The subject Opinion follows:]
Opinion of August 10, 1959 To: State Revenue Commissioner

This is in reply to your letter of July 21, 1959, in which you request my official opinion as to the state and local tax liabilities of the Council of State Governments which is locating its Southern Regional Office in Atlanta. Ga. Code Ann. 47-1110 provides:
"The Council of State Governments is hereby declared to be a joint governmental agency of this state and of
the other states which cooperate through it."
This declaration and the obvious relationship ofthe Council to the Georgia Commission on Interstate Cooperation and its work, as shown by the complete text ofthe Act approved March 8, 1937 (Ga. Laws 1937, p. 708), indicate legislative intent that the Council's work be viewed as governmental at the state level. Accordingly, its property is in the nature of public property (Williamson v. Housing Authority of Augusta, 186 Ga. 673), and its purchases of tangible personal property and services under the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act are the equivalent of purchases by the State. (Section 3(d)).

OPINION 72-21 To: Director of Probation

March 9, 1972

Re: State Board of Probation; cases m which investigations authorized.

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This letter is in response to your request for my opinion as to whether the State Board ofProbation can require administratively an investigation of a defendant in every case where commitment to the state penal system is the disposition.
Those individuals found guilty of an offense against the laws of this state and sentenced to serve time in any penal institution of this state, with one exception not relevant here, are committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections, e.g., Department of Corrections, Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1399, 1400 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-309(b)), said department having exclusive control over the operation of the state penal system. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 170, as amended by Ga. Laws 1969, p. 598 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-307).
A defendant may come under the jurisdiction of the state probation system in only one oftwo ways: (1) where the court elects to place him in the custody ofthe state probation system pursuant to Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 27, 31, as amended by Ga. Laws 1958, pp. 15, 20; Ga. Laws 1960, p. 1148 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2709 et seq.); or (2) where the State Board of Pardons and Paroles elects to release a prisoner on "probation" pursuant to Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 189 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-514). See also Woodall v. State, 122 Ga. App. 653 (1970).
Absent some type of custody or authority acquired pursuant to one of the aforementioned procedures, the State Board of Probation would have no authority to require an investigation of a defendant or inmate. It is therefore my opinion that the State Board of Probation has no authority to require, administratively, an investigation of a defendant in every case where commitment to the state penal system is the disposition.

OPINION 72-22
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

March 9, 1972

Re: Real estate brokers; experience required before examination.

You have inquired regarding the propriety of allowing an individual who once held a real estate salesman's license for at least three years but has since let it expire to take the real estate broker's examination without accumulating three years more experience.

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The law pertaining to your inquiry is found in Ga. Code Ann. 84-1409, as amended by Ga. Laws 1965, p. 629; 1968, p. 277, and reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Before any individual may be granted a broker's license he must have had a real estate salesman's license in this state for at least three years, and must have been engaged in the real estate business for such period of time, . . ."

As can be seen from the above, there is no requirement that the three years' experience be immediately preceding the application for the broker's license.
Thus, an individual who has held a real estate salesman's license for three years and had three years' real estate business experience should be allowed to take the broker's examination even though the three years' experience were not immediately preceding the date an application was filed for the broker's examination.

OPINION 72-23 To: Superintendent of Banks

March 10, 1972

Re: Sale-of-Checks Act; compliance by bank holding companies.

You have requested our opinion on whether a bank holding company must register under the Georgia Sale-of-Checks Act ifthe holding company will have no offices, telephones, officers or employees located in Georgia. The sale of these particular traveler's checks is presently being conducted by a national bank, but the bank holding company has a plan in which the bank will discontinue its present traveler's check operation and the holding company will commence the issuance of its own traveler's checks, which will be payable through the bank and will be sold under a consignment arrangement to banks, savings and loan associations and possibly other qualified consignees.
The holding company contends that it will not be doing business in Georgia and it also contends that the Georgia Act makes no specific mention of traveler's checks.
Except for banks and telegraph companies, no person may engage in the business of selling or issuing checks without having first obtained a license under the Georgia Sale-of-Checks Act. Ga.

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Laws 1965, pp. 81, 83, Section 3 (Ga. Code Ann. 13-2203). The holding company says that it is not "doing business" in Georgia within the meaning ofthis requirement and has cited a case for this proposition. Bank of America v. Lima, 103 F. Supp. 916 (D.Mass. 1952). However, the Massachusetts law involved in the Lima case did not specifically provide for the case of a nonresident which engages in business through an affiliate or agent whereas Georgia law specifically provides that "any nonresident who engages in this state in the business of selling or issuing checks through a branch, subsidiary, affiliate or agent" must comply with the licensing requirement. Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 81, 83, Section 3 (Ga. Code Ann. 13-2203). While this is not the only distinction between the Massachusetts situation 20 years ago and the situation you present to us, it is sufficient to show that the citation supplied by the holding company is not persuasive.
Further, while the Georgia Act makes no specific mention of traveler's checks, the definition of "check" would clearly include any arrangement such as traveler's checks. Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 81, 82, Section 2(a) (2) (Ga. Code Ann. 13-2202(a) (2)).
Doubtless, as the holding company suggests, the holding company is financially responsible and has a great deal of experience in this area. However, the Act makes no exception to licensing requirements on these grounds and it is therefore our official opinion that a bank holding company must comply with the Georgia Sale-of-Checks Act if it wishes to issue traveler's checks in Georgia.

OPINION 72-24 To: Governor of the State of Georgia

March 14, 1972

Re: Bail; authority ofbondsman from foreign state to arrest bond jumper and remove him from Georgia.

This letter is in response to your request for an opinion as to whether, under the laws of Georgia, a bondsman from a foreign state may enter the State ofGeorgia, take custody ofa bond jumper and return him to the jurisdiction of the proper court in that foreign state without using extradition procedures. I understand that included within the foregoing issue is the collateral question of whether it would be proper for a Georgia sheriff to effect the arrest on behalf of the bondsman.

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The bondsman's rights, in the absence ofstatute, derive from the common law, and include all the powers of pursuit into another state, arrest, and detention. No process is needed, as the bondsman's powers arise, not from the powers ofthe state, but from the relationship of the principal and the bondsman. Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 21 L.Ed. 287, 290 (1873); Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1931); United States v. Trunko, 189 F. Supp. 559 (U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. W.D. 1960). See, further, State v. Lingerfelt, 14 S.E. 75 (N.C. 1891); Crain v. State, 90 P.2d 954 (Okla. 1939); Golia v. State, 135 A.2d 137 (Del. 1957), cert. den., 2 L.Ed.2d 539; McCaleb v. Peerless Insurance Company, 250 F. Supp. 512 (U.S.D.C., D.Neb. 1965).
Since the State of Georgia has no statute regulating bondsmen from foreign states, it is my opinion that a bondsman may enter the State of Georgia and return the principal to the jurisdiction of the proper court of such foreign state without using extradition procedures.
The same result does not obtain in a determination of whether a Georgia sheriff may aid the bondsman in effecting the capture. The sheriff, as a law enforcement officer of this state, may effect an arrest either under a warrant, or without a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence, or the offender is endeavoring to escape, or for other cause where there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. Ga. Code Ann. 27-207. When a bondsman from another state requests a Georgia law enforcement officer to aid him in capturing the bond jumper from that foreign state, I am of the opinion that such a request would not meet any ofthe requirements ofGa. Code Ann. 27-207, as stated above, which give the sheriff the authority to arrest.
If the sheriff, in his capacity as a law enforcement officer ofthis state, undertakes to arrest an individual under circumstances which do not meet the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 27-207, as stated above, it is an illegal arrest. Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Company, 63 Ga. App. 880 (1940). Such illegal arrest may subject the sheriff to liability for false imprisonment. Ga. Code 26-1308, as based upon Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1282. See also Gordon u. Hogan, 114 Ga. 354 (1901).
As a practical matter, unless the fugitive from a foreign state commits some criminal act in Georgia, a Georgia court will not issue a warrant for his arrest except pursuant to the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 726, 737 (Ga. Code Ann. 44-401 et seq.), in which case the sheriff is then required, under extradition procedures, to deliver the fugitive before the

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proper Georgia court where said fugitive has the right to contest his extradition by writ of habeas corpus. If the sheriff fails to deliver the fugitive before the proper court, and instead delivers him up to the foreign bondsman, he will be subject to criminal prosecution under Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 726, 729 (Ga. Code Ann. 44-9901).
The only circumstance under which a sheriff may arrest a fugitive from a foreign jurisdiction without the necessity of following the procedures required by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act would be where the sheriff, acting in his personal, individual capacity, desired to enter into an agency relationship with the bondsman, and effected the arrest on behalf of the bondsman under the common-law principles discussed above. Coleman v. State, 121 Ga. 594 (1904).
With the above principles of law in mind, it is my additional opinion that a sheriff is not in any way required to effect the capture of a bond jumper from a foreign jurisdiction unless he is either ordered by duly issued warrant to do so, in which case he would be required to follow proper extradition procedures, or, he desires to effect the capture of the fugitive in his individual capacity as agent for the bondsman.

OPINION 72-25 To: State Treasurer

March 17, 1972

Re: District attorneys emeritus; creditable service as assistant district attorney; legislative service.

This is in reply to your letter of February 21,,1972, in which you requested my opinion on three questions concerning the district attorney emeritus program. Outlined below is the substance of each of your questions, together with my opinion.
1. May a district attorney credit service as an assistant district attorney towards eligibility for appointment as district attorney emeritus?
Georgia Code Ann. 24-2902a, based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780, establishes the relevant rules concerning service as an assistant district attorney being used toward appointment as a district attorney emeritus. That section specifically provides that service as an assistant district attorney may be credited as long as the assistant district attorney was performing the duties of a district

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30

attorney in the prosecution of cases in both the superior and city court, and that such service as an assistant was immediately prior to appointment or election as district attorney. Further, that, prior to appointment as a district attorney emeritus, the majority oftime must have been as a district attorney.
2. May a district attorney credit service as a member of the General Assembly of Georgia towards appointment under the district attorney emeritus retirement program?
The requirements for appointment as a district attorney emeritus are set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 24-2902a and 24-2909a. Basically, and with certain restrictions, service as the following may be credited:

(a) District attorney (b) Solicitor of a city court (c) Assistant district attorney (d) Assistant to a district attorney (e) Member of the Armed Forces during World War I, World War II, or the Korean Conflict (f) Judge of a city court (g) Service in the General Assembly not to exceed three years 1
Prior to Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220, the statute did not authorize crediting of service as a member of the General Assembly. Under the 1972 amendment, however, such service, not to exceed three years, became creditable, provided payment was made within six months of the effective date of the amendment (March 16, 1972).
3. Should either of such kinds of service be creditable, must a district attorney pay into the fund for such service?
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220, granting creditable service for membership in the General Assembly specifically requires payment into the fund for such service. The statute establishing requirements for payment into the fund does not specifically state that service as an assistant district attorney or as an assistant to a district attorney must be paid. However, the statute does provide:

" ... as to solicitors general who may hereafter be elected or appointed, they must make payments to the said retirement fund, as herein provided, for the entire period of 19 years and

1. At the time of the issuance of this opinion therewas no provision for crediting General Assembly service. The opinion has been edited to reflect the change made by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220.

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until retirement...." Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 780, 782 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909a).

This statutory language, coupled with requirements stated later in Code 24-2909a, that military service or service as a judge of a city court must be paid before credit can be received toward retirement seems to point out the legislative intent that all service toward retirement as a district attorney emeritus must be paid.
Therefore, it is my opinion that service as an assistant district attorney which is to be credited toward retirement as a district attorney emeritus must be paid in the manner prescribed in Code 24-2909a and 24-2910a, and that service in the General Assembly must be paid for according to Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220.

OPINION 72-26
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

March 17, 1972

Re: Applicants for license to practice medicine; academic qualifications; internship prior to graduation.

You have requested my official opinion on two questions pertaining to the Medical Practice Act as follows:

(1) Must an applicant for a medical practice license be a graduate of an approved medical school before he is eligible to take the examination given by the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners? (2) Does the Medical Practice Act disqualify an internship taken by an applicant prior to graduation?

The Medical Practice Act clearly indicates that an applicant for a license to practice medicine must have graduated from an approved medical school before he is eligible to stand the regular examination given by the board. For example, Ga. Code Ann. 84-907, as amended by Ga. Laws 1970, p. 301, requires that applications from candidates to practice medicine must be accompanied "with proofthat the applicant is a graduate ... [ofan approved medical school]." A subsequent sentence in this same Code section provides that "Any such graduate ... shall be eligible

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to stand any regular examination given by the board for a license to practice medicine in this state."
It is therefore my official opinion that an applicant for a medical practice license must be a graduate of an approved medical school before he is eligible to stand the examination given by the Composite State Board of Medical Examiners.
The second question I am told is prompted by this typical factual situation: A medical student completes his academic studies in December, immediately begins an internship, graduates the following June and then applies for a medical practice license. The question is whether that portionoftheapplicant'sinternship taken prior to his formal graduation can be counted toward the "one year of training as an intern" requirement for a medical practice license. See Ga. Code Ann. 84-907.
Although the Medical Practice Act clearly provides that an applicant must be a "graduate" before he can take the examination, no provision of the Act requires that an internship be taken after formal graduation. The only pertinent provision relating to internship merely provides that once a year's internship is completed and all other requirements are met, the applicant shall be eligible to receive a license. See Ga. Code Ann. 84-907. This provision does not make the formal graduation ceremony a precondition to beginning an internship; it is also interesting to note that the Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed. Unabridged) definition of "intern" is not a "graduate" as such but one who "upon completion of the required course ofstudy serves in a hospital in preparation for independent practice."
However, it should likewise be noted that the Board ofMedical Examiners is given statutory authority to approve or disapprove all internship programs, see Ga. Code Ann. 84-907, and this authority could be reasonably exercised to disapprove any internship program accepting persons not academically prepared to practice medicine as an intern.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the provisions of the Medical Practice Act do not disqualify an internship taken prior to graduation; however, the board may exercise its authority to disapprove internship programs accepting persons not academically prepared to practice as an intern.

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OPINION 72-27
To: Executive Director, Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council

March 21, 1972

Re: Peace Officer Standards and Training Act; North Georgia Mountains Authority security personnel do not qualify.

This is in response to your inquiry as to whether security officers of the North Georgia Mountains Authority which were authorized by an Act approved on March 31, 1971 (Ga. Laws 1971, p. 315, Ga. Code Ann. 99-3203) are required or eligible to be certified as peace officers under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act (Ga. Laws 1970, p. 208, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92A-21).
The Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act is applicable only to "peace officers." The Act defines that term at Section 2(d) (Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 208, 209, Ga. Code Ann. 92A-2102(d)) as "any officer or member of a law enforcement unit employed full time by the Department of Public Safety, a municipality or county, who has the power of arrest, and who is responsible for the enforcing of criminal laws of this state or its political subdivisions...."Though the security officers ofthe North Georgia Mountains Authority do have the power ofarrest they fail to meet the definition of peace officer on two other grounds.
Firstly, the security officers are not responsible for enforcement of the criminal laws of the state or its political subdivisions. The Act authorizing the hiring of the security officers empowers them "to exercise such of the police power of the state as may be necessary to maintain peace and order and to enforce any and all lawful zoning, user, and personal conduct regulations." This is not a responsibility "for the enforcing of criminal laws of this state or its political subdivisions" such as is detailed in the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.
Secondly, the security guards of the North Georgia Mountains Authority are not employed by "the Department of Public Safety, a municipality or a county." The North Georgia Mountains Authority is none of these but, rather, is a "body corporate and politic... which shall be deemed an instrumentality of the State of Georgia, and a public corporation...."(Ga. Laws 1968, p. 297, Ga. Code Ann. 99-3201.)
The Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act is clear and unambiguous concerning what law enforcement officers are to

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be subject to its provisions. I have previously rendered opinions that members of the University of Georgia Police Department, guards at county public works camps, special deputies, bank guards and special police, and civil defense auxiliary police are not covered by the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act because they fail to meet the statutory definition of peace officer. Op. Atty. Gen. U71-43, dated March 12, 1971; Op. Atty. Gen. U71-59, dated April 20, 1971; Op. Atty. Gen. U71-128, dated November 12, 1971; Op. Atty. Gen. 70-179, dated October 23, 1970; Op. Atty. Gen. 70-181, dated October 26, 1970.
Thus it is my opinion that security officers of the North Georgia Mountains Authority are neither required nor authorized to become certified under the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.

OPINION 72-28
To: State Director, Department of Veterans Service

March 23, 1972

Re: Homestead exemption for persons over 65; nonservice connected pensions received by World War I veterans as affecting income requirements.

This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask whether income received by World War I veterans from the Veterans Administration, which is designated as a pension based on disability of nonservice origin, must be included in the computation in determining whether or not the income requirement for increased homestead exemption for certain persons over 65 has been met.
The 1968 amendment to Ga. Constitution, Art.VII, Sec. I, Par.IV (Ga.CodeAnn. 2-5404) (Ga. Laws 1968, p.1690), provides, in part, as follows:

"Each person who is 65 years of age or over is hereby granted an exemption from all state and county ad valorem taxes in the amount of $4,000 on a homestead owned and occupied by him as a residence if his net income, together with the net income ofhis spouse who also occupies and resides at such homestead, as net income is defined by Georgia law, from all sources, including any federal old-age, survivor or disability insurance

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benefits or benefits received from any retirement or pension fund when such benefits are based on contributions made thereto by such person or his spouse, does not exceed $4,000 for the immediately preceding taxable year for income tax purposes." (Emphasis added.)

An examination of the above provision shows that the General Assembly did not intend to exclude from the computation those items not included in gross income for income tax purposes; otherwise, the words "from all sources" would not have been used nor would reference have been made to certain benefits not included in gross income. See Op. Att'y Gen. 69-113. To construe the amendment as requiring that only income which is included in gross income for income tax purposes be considered in determining whether a person is entitled to the increased exemption would render the words "from all sources" surplusage. In Undercofler v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 114 Ga. App. 739 (1966), at page 742, the court stated:

"All words of a statute are to be given due weight and meaning. [Citations omitted.] Courts should not so interpret a statute as to make parts of it surplusage unless no other construction is reasonably possible. All the words of the legislature, however numerous, ought to be preserved, and effect given to the whole, if it can be done."

Since the 1968 amendment grants a tax exemption, it should be kept in mind that an exemption from taxation must be strictly construed and unless the language under which the exemption is claimed clearly and distinctly shows that such was the intention of the General Assembly there is no exemption. Any ambiguity in an alleged exemption from taxation must be construed in favor of the state and against the taxpayer. Cherokee Brick & Tile Company v. Redwine, 209 Ga. 691 (1953).
Therefore, it is my opinion that nonservice connected pensions received by World War I veterans from the Veterans Administration must be considered in determining whether a person meets the income requirements for the increased homestead exemption.

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OPINION 72-29
To: Director, State Highway Department

March 23, 1972

Re: Motor vehicles; over-weight or over-size vehicles; allocation of penalties.

This is in reply to a request for an official opinion determining the method to be employed in computing the amount due the State Highway Department in each criminal case in which a fine is imposed upon a defendant convicted ofoperating an over-weight or over-size motor vehicle. The infractions under consideration are misdemeanor criminal offenses which may be punished by fine or incarceration, or both. Ga. Laws 1941, p. 449, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-9921).
The General Assembly has prescribed that funds received by various courts as the result of convictions for the operation of motor vehicles which are over-weight or over-size shall be distributed as follows:

"... One-half of all money ansmg from such fines and forfeitures shall be remitted by the clerk of the court in which said case is disposed of to the treasurer of the State Highway Department of Georgia, who shall convey same into the general fund ofthe state treasury...." Ga. Laws 1941, p. 449, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-9921).

A fine is a sum of money payable by a person convicted of a criminal offense as punishment for the offense committed. A determination of guilt authorizing the imposition of a fine may result from the verdict of a jury, the determination of a judge sitting without a jury, or upon a guilty plea, as such pleas are the legal equivalent of a jury verdict of guilty. Carter v. State, 204 Ga. 242 (1948); Horne v. State, 211 Ga. 873 (1955).
Cash bonds are common in criminal offenses arising under the traffic laws. In such cases, cash bonds may be forfeited by the court and the proceeds thereof "shall be applied and distributed as any fine would be." Ga. Laws 1953, p. 331 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-511). Thus, the funds which are due and payable to the State Highway Department may be generated by the imposition ofa fine or by the forfeiture of a bond.

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In criminal and quasi-criminal cases, amounts prescribed by statute are to be paid to the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund. Moreover, "the sum provided for shall be paid to the secretary-treasurer before the payment of any costs or any claim whatsoever against such fine or forfeiture." Ga. Laws 1950, p. 50, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 78-909). Payments into the Ordinaries Retirement Fund are predicated upon provisions which are identical to those relating to the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund. Ga. Laws 1959, p. 354 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-1716a).
Payments into the Superior Court Clerks Retirement Fund arise in two ways. Firstly, the clerk is required to make a contribution to the fund out of his private income. Ga. Laws 1952, p. 238 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2738). Secondly,

"In all criminal and quasi-criminal cases for violating State statutes tried in any court in Georgia ofwhich the clerk of the superior court is clerk, wherein a fine is collected in an amount of $5 or more, or wherein a bond is forfeited in said amount, the sum of $1.50 for each such case each year shall be paid to the board quarterly ...." Ga. Laws 1970, p. 177 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2739).

A provision which is virtually identical to that applicable to clerks of superior courts is applicable to sheriffs and requires payment into the Sheriffs Retirement Fund of Georgia. Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1203 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2810a).
Provisions relating to payments into the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund and into the Ordinaries Retirement Fund require that the payment be made before the payment of costs. As to those retirement funds, it appears that the General Assembly has drawn a plain distinction between court costs and the payments which must be made into those retirement systems. Therefore, it appears that payments which are to be made into the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund and into the Ordinaries Retirement Fund should not be treated as part of court costs.
No similar distinction was drawn by the General Assembly in the statutes relating to contributions to retirement funds for superior court clerks and sheriffs. While neither statute dealing with the retirement fund precisely identifies the source of the contribution to be made to each retirement system as a result of a specific case, both statutes require contributions from the private incomes of sheriffs and clerks and contributions, in certain instances, as a

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result of a particular case. Thus, it appears that contributions which are to be made to each retirement system as a result of a particular case are not contributions to be made from the private incomes of either officer but are, rather, contributions to be made from some source of money generated as the result of a particular case. Whether the contribution which is to be made as the result ofthe disposition ofa particular criminal case is an item of"costs" or is a charge against the fine must now be determined.
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court held that

"The term 'costs,' as applied to proceedings in a court of justice, has, in the acceptation of the profession, and by the practice of all courts in Georgia, a well understood meaning. It includes all charges, fixed by statute, as compensation for services rendered by officers of the court in the process of the cause." Davis v. The State, 33 Ga. 531, 533 (1863). (Emphasis added.)

None of the statutes relating to the retirement systems under consideration requires or authorizes payment to the particular officer of a sum ofmoney as compensation for a service performed. Rather, each statute requires that the payment be made directly into a retirement fund. It is my opinion that contributions to the retirement systems are not embraced within the word "costs" as that term is used in the setting ofcriminal proceedings. Therefore, it is my opinion that such contributions are statutorily created charges against the fine itself.
The word "costs," as shown above, refers to a fee imposed by an officer of the court as compensation for services rendered in a particular case. Costs are payable by a defendant upon final conviction. Ga. Code Ann. 27-2801. Moreover, costs in a criminal case are not to be taxed against the state. Yarbrough v. State, 31 Ga. App. 484 (1923); Sigman v. Austin, Sheriff, 112 Ga. 570 (1900).
As the contributions to the retirement systems under consideration appear to be statutorily created charges against fines, rather than items of"costs" which could not be taxed against the state, it is my opinion that the amount due the State Highway Department by virtue of Ga. Code Ann. 68-9921 from each individual case is to bear its proportionate share ofretirement fund contributions which may be properly paid in each such case. For your further guidance, you should bear in mind that contributions to the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund are to be made in

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all criminal and quasi-criminal cases when a fine is collected or a bond is forfeited in a prescribed amount. Ga. Code Ann. 78-909. Contributions to the Ordinaries Retirement Fund are to be made when a fine is collected or a bond is forfeited in a criminal or quasi-criminal case disposed of in the court of ordinary. Ga. Code Ann. 24-1716a. Contributions to the Ordinaries Retirement Fund could not properly be imposed against that portion of the fine to which the State Highway Department is entitled unless the case is disposed of in the court of ordinary. Contributions to the retirement fund for superior court clerks may properly be imposed against that portion of the amount due the State Highway Department only when the clerk is the clerk of the court in which disposition of the case is made. Ga. Laws 1952, p. 238 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2739). Statutes creating particular courts frequently designate the clerk of the superior court of the county in which the court is located as the clerk of the court created by that particular statute. A portion of the contribution to the retirement fund for sheriffs may properly be imposed against that amount due the State Highway Department only in those instances in which the particular case is disposed ofin a court in which the county sheriff also acts as sheriff. Ga. Laws 1963, p. 630 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2810a).
It is my opinion that the portion ofthe fine or bond forfeiture due the State Highway Department in cases involving the operation of motor vehicles which are either over-weight or over-size must bear its proportionate share of contributions which may properly be made to the retirement systems treated herein. Further, it is my opinion that court costs cannot lawfully be charged against that portion of fines due the State Highway Department in cases involving the operation ofmotor vehicles which are either over-size or over-weight. As a practical observation, I should think that most of these over-size or over-weight cases involve solvent individuals and probably involve commercial concerns from which the cost of the prosecution could be collected. At any rate, court costs are to be paid by the convicted defendant and cannot under any circumstances constitute a lawful charge against the sum due to the state.
You have also asked whether there is a time limit within which funds must be transmitted to the State Highway Department when fines are collected or bonds are forfeited in cases involving the operation of motor vehicles which are either over-weight or over-size. The statute which prescribes that one-half of such fines or bond forfeitures shall be paid to the treasurer of the State

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Highway Department is silent with respect to the time within which the payment is to be made. Ga. Code Ann. 68-9921. However, one-half of the fine collected, whether by imposition of a fine or forfeiture of a bond, is the property of the State Highway Department from the moment the fine is collected or the bond is forfeited.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the portion payable to the State Highway Department is payable and collectible immediately upon the defendant's payment of his fine or the forfeiture -of his bond. As a practical matter, it would be appropriate for the State Highway Department to prescribe intervals ofuniform application throughout the state within which such sums shall be paid to the department.

OPINION 72-30 To: State Treasurer

March 29, 1972

Re: State Treasurer; removal from State Depository Board by 1972 Reorganization Act.

This responds to your letter dated March 13, 1972, requesting an opinion as to whether or not Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, removes the State Treasurer as a member of the State Depository Board. Although the answer to your question is not entirely free from doubt, I am of the opinion that the better construction ofthe Act would cause the question to be answered affirmatively.
With certain exceptions not here applicable, Section 408B of the Act transfers the "functions of the State Treasurer and the Treasury Department" to the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services and provides that "Any reference in Georgia Laws to the State Treasurer or the Treasury Department relating to the functions transferred to the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services in this Section means the Fiscal Division created in Section 408A of this Act." (Emphasis added.) Your inquiry thus reduces itself to a question of what functions of the Treasurer are transferred by Section 408B of the Act. Section 408B appears to have been intended by the General Assembly to operate as a residual clause transferring to the Department of Administrative Services all functions of the Treasurer not transferred elsewhere by otherSections ofthe Act or

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left with the Treasurer because of constitutional limitations upon the power of the General Assembly. Since no other Section of the Act transfers the Treasurer's function of serving on the State Depository Board, and no constitutional limitation is involved, it would seem to follow that this function would be transferred under Section 408B.
A literal reading ofSection 408B would indicate that the function of serving on the State Depository Board is to be transferred from the Treasurer, a state official, to the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services, a nonperson and a mere internal subdivision of an agency. I am of the opinion, however, that a court would not adopt such a view ofthe Section and would, instead, conclude that the function is to be transferred from one person to another, that is, from the Treasurer to the Director ofthe Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services. Although the Act provides in Section 408A that the Director ofthe Fiscal Divisionshallbe appointed by the StateDepository Board,this would not appear to conflict with his obligation to serve on the Depository Board after being appointed Director of the Fiscal Division.
The foregoing analysis leads me to the opinion that the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972 removes the State Treasurer as a member ofthe State Depository Board and substitutes in his stead the Director of the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services.

OPINION 72-31 To: State Treasurer

March 29, 1972

Re: State Treasurer will cease to be constitutional officer if proposed constitutional amendment is ratified; expiration of term in that event.

This responds to your letter dated March 22, 1972, in which you state your belief that this office has given the Governor an official opinion that your term as State Treasurer cannot be diminished by the adoption of a constitutional amendment abolishing the office ofTreasurer. If such an opinion has been given, you ask for a copy. If not, you ask for an opinion as to the date on which your term of office as State Treasurer will expire if a proposed constitutional amendment is ratified this November.

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This office neither has given such an opinion nor, in my opinion, would such view of the law be correct. Quite to the contrary, I am of the opinion that the people of Georgia have the power by amending their Constitution to shorten the term of both a constitutional state office and the term of the current officeholder.
The proposed amendment removing the Treasurer as an elected constitutional officer (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1545) does not itself provide for its effective date. Accordingly, I am ofthe opinion that if ratified it will become effective on January 1, 1973, and that the term of the present State Treasurer will expire effective that date. Ga. Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann.
2-8104).

OPINION 72-32 To: State Revenue Commissioner

March 30, 1972

Re: MARTA; sales tax provisions not enforceable where activity sought to be taxed occurs outside taxing jurisdiction.

This is in response to your request for an opinion as to the validity of certain provisions of resolutions of Fulton and DeKalb Counties, respectively, dated December 29, 1971, adopting a local sales and use tax under Section 25 of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act, Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2243, as amended by Ga. Laws 1971, p. 2082. Those provisions, designated Article IV, Sections 5(a) (1) and 5(a) (3) in each resolution, read in pertinent part as follows:

"*** For the purposes of this resolution, the Rapid Transit
Sales Tax is a retail sales and use tax upon the retail purchase, retail sale, rental, storage use or consumption of tangible personal property:
"(1) The Rapid Transit Sales Tax is deemed to be a 'point of sale' tax pursuant to which all retail sales are, regardless ofthe residence of purchaser and place of delivery, consummated at the place of business of the retailer.
* * * *
"(3) All retail sales of goods and services by retailers located in the County to persons outside of the County and any other county levying a Rapid Transit Sales Tax are taxable."

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For the reasons set forth herein, it is my opinion that quoted subparagraphs (a) (1), and (a) (3) of Article IV, Section 5 are invalid to the extent they extend the reach of the tax to sales taking place outside Fulton and DeKalb Counties.
First, the resolutions impose a tax "upon the retail purchase [and] retail sale." In this respect, the subject-matter of the tax imposed by the resolutions is identical with the subject-matter of the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sale and Use Tax Act as it has read since 1960. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360, as amended by Ga. Laws 1960, p. 153 (Ga. Code Ann. 92-3402a). Indeed, Article I, Section 2, and Article I, Section 5 (a) of the resolutions employ the introductory language ofSection 2 ofthe state sales and use tax Act as amended in 1960, and Article III, Section I, expressly incorporates the existing provisions of that Act.
Since 1960, the sales tax imposed by the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act falls on the sale transaction itself with dual and separate liability imposed on both the purchaser and seller. Grantham Transfer Co. u. Hawes, 225 Ga. 436, 442 (1969); Newscopters, Inc. u. Blackmon, 125 Ga. App. 130 (1971); Hawes u. Phillips, 122 Ga. App. 714, 717 (1970); Undercofler u. Capital Automobile Co., 111 Ga. App. 709, 712 (1965). The tax imposed by the resolutions of Fulton and DeKalb Counties falls on the same activity.
"Sale" under Section 3 (b) the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act, and consequently under Article Ill, Section 1 of the resolutions, is defined as "... any transfer of title or possession, or both...." Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a (B).
The quoted provisions of the resolutions, designated Article IV, Sections 5 (a) (1) and 5 (a) (3), extend the reach of the tax to sales made by a retail outlet located in the taxing jurisdiction where the sale, i.e., transfer of title and possession, occurs outside those jurisdictions. A tax is thus imposed on sales even though the taxable activity does not take place within the taxing jurisdiction.
Those provisions are in conflict with Ga. Constitution, .Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III (Ga. Code Ann. 2-103). It is fundamental that a jurisdiction may not impose a tax upon persons, property or activity which are not within that jurisdiction. See Suttles u. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 506 (1942); cf. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N Y. u. City of Columbus, 194 Ga. 795 (1942); City ofPomona u. State Board ofEqualization, 347 P. 2d 904 (Cal. S. Ct. 1959); White u. City of Decatur, 144 So. 873 (Ala. S. Ct. 1932). The quoted provisions of the resolutions of Fulton and DeKalb Counties are in conflict with that principle.

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It is my official opinion, therefore, that for the foregoing reasons the quoted provisions of the respective resolutions of Fulton and DeKalb Counties, designated Article IV, Sections 5 (a) (1) and 5 (a) (3), are invalid and unenforceable to the extent they extend the reach of the tax to sales outside their jurisdictions. The remaining provisions of the resolutions effectively impose a sales and use tax and the quoted provisions are severable from that imposition under Article IV, Section 7 of the resolutions.
Duly adopted resolutions by Fulton and DeKalb Counties, in conformity with Section 25 of the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority Act, ofa different nature could possibly produce a different result from the opinion expressed herein. See Journal of the Senate, 1971 Reg. Sess., p. 1329, Journal of the House, 1971 Reg. Sess., p. 1274; see Oxford v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 215 Ga. 616 (1960).

OPINION 72-33
To: Director, Department of Public Safety

April 5, 1972

Re: Motor vehicle inspection; revocation of authorization for out-of-state inspection stations.

This replies to your letter in which you requested an official opinion on two questions. First, whether the Department of Public Safety may refuse to issue a certificate of inspection and approval for a motor vehicle registered in Georgia after an official fleet inspection station located outside ofGeorgia has found the vehicle satisfactory. Second, whether the Department of Public Safety must recognize a motor vehicle inspection made by another state on a vehicle registered in Georgia and operating on Georgia highways but based in another state.
These questions arise because of a former practice in which the Department of Public Safety authorized certain public bus companies to maintain official fleet inspection stations outside of Georgia. These stations have issued official certificates of inspection and approval for company motor vehicles upon satisfactory inspection. At this time, there is no known present or past administrative or statutory authority for this practice. The Department of Public Safety now finds it difficult to control the manner in which official inspections are conducted in these

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out-of-state inspection centers and to supervise the certification of the mechanic-inspectors.
Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 616, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726 (a)), authorizes, in part, the Director of Public Safety to require that every motor vehicle registered in Georgia be inspected once each year and that an official certificate of inspection and approval be obtained for the motor vehicle. The busses under discussion, if registered in Georgia, are subject under this statute to an annual inspection and the requirement of obtaining a certificate of inspection and approval. (Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 557, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1502 (1)
(a)).
Ga. Laws 1963, pp. 333, 334 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726.1), provides comprehensively for the appointment, supervision and control of an official inspection station. Under this statute, permits known as "certificates of authorization" shall issue from the Director of Public Safety when he is satisfied that a station is properly equipped and has competent personnel to make inspections and adjustments and when he is satisfied that the inspections will be properly conducted. Before issuing a certificate of authorization, the director shall also require that an applicant seeking a certificate of authorization possess either a valid garage owner's liability insurance policy or an indemnification bond to compensate for any damage done to a vehicle during an inspection. The statute does not authorize expressly or forbid expressly the establishment of an official inspection station outside of Georgia. The statute indicates that the director must revoke or require the surrender of any certificate of authorization which is held by an inspection station not in accordance with the statutory requirements governing how such certificates shall issue or when the director is unable to supervise or inspect an official inspection station for its proper equipment and the manner in which inspections are being conducted. Whenever such circumstances arise, the revocation and surrender ofa certificate ofauthorization should be accomplished pursuant to Ga. Rules & Regs. 570-5-.34. If a decision were made to revoke and require the surrender of a certificate of authorization for a fleet inspection station located outside of Georgia, motor vehicles registered under Georgia law would still be required to obtain a certificate of inspection and approval from an official inspection station.
Your second question raises issues of both Georgia and federal law. The federal law on this question, since there is presently no federal statute dealing with inspections, consists of the

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interstate-commerce clause ofthe United States Constitution as it has been interpreted by the courts. The United States Supreme Court has historically granted states wide latitude in making safety regulations for their highways, even when such regulations created a significant restriction on interstate commerce using the highways. See South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U. S. 177 (1937). The only state highway safety regulation which has ever been struck down by the United States Supreme Court as violative of the commerce clause was a regulation requiring a particular type ofmud flap for trucks which would have been illegal under the highway safety regulations of certain other states. Thus, any reasonable safety inspection standards which the State of Georgia might wish to impose upon interstate busses registered in the State of Georgia would be permissible under federal law as presently construed.
The Georgia courts have held that under the Georgia Constitution the legislature has a virtually unlimited authority to regulate the use and safety of the public highways under its police power. Dennis v. State, 226 Ga. 341 (1970). The legislature has delegated a portion of this police power to the Director of the Department of Public Safety: "The director shall once a year require that every motor vehicle, trailer and semi-trailer registered in this state be inspected and that an official certificate of inspection and approval be obtained for each such vehicle...." Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 616, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726). (Emphasis added.) Thus, the only prerequisite to the director's power to require safety inspection is registration in the state. It is immaterial that they also operate in other states or are primarily based in other states.
In summary, it is my official opinion that the Director of the Department of Public Safety must revoke and require the surrender of a certificate of authorization when the certificate was not issued in accordance with the statutory requirements or when the director is unable to supervise and inspect the stations as provided by statute. The director also has a right to require every bus registered in the State of Georgia and operating on the highways ofGeorgia to be inspected and have an official certificate of inspection.

OPINION 72-34
To: Chairman, Georgia Public Service Commission

April 5, 1972

Re: Public Service Commission; procedure for utility rate changes.

You have inquired as to the effect of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137, on pending matters before the Public Service Commission.
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137, makes important changes in the procedure for regulating public utilities. Under previous law, a regulated utility seeking to change its rate structure or service policies was required to obtain the approval of the Public Service Commission before such change could go into effect. See Ga. Code Ann. 93-307, as amended by Ga. Laws 1967, p. 650; 93-309; Commission Rules, pp. 10-16. The 1972law, however, allows a regulated utility to propose changes to its jurisdictional rates, charges, regulations or service policies upon 30 days advance notice to the commission and to the public. For good cause shown, the commission may allow changes to be effected with less than 30 days notice. The commission may allow the proposed change to go into effect, or it may initiate hearing procedures. Pending such hearing and final decision, and within the 30-day notice period, the commission may suspend the effective date of the proposed change for up to five months. If the commission has not approved or modified the proposed change within five months, the filing will be automatically effective. However, in cases of proposed increases in rates, the utility is required to refund to its customers any excess charges not ultimately found justified by the commission. A surety bond is required ofthe utility to ensure faithful performance ofthis refund obligation.
The Act of1972 was signed by the Governor and became effective on March 8, 1972.
The questions you raised with respect to the effect ofthis Act are as follows:

(1) Is the Act retroactive; and, if so, when does the 30-day period begin to run on applications submitted to the commission prior to March 8? It is noted that a number of proposed tariffs had been pending for longer than 30 days on March 8, and in many cases only a few days remain before the expiration of 30 days.

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(2) How is House Bill 1179 (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137) affected by an order of the Federal Price Commission which placed a "freeze" on rate increases by privately owned utilities until March 25, 1972?
(3) Does House Bill 1179 apply to contract and common motor carriers as well as power utilities?

My discussion and opinion on these questions is presented as follows:
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137, Applies to Pending Applications. As a general rule, newly enacted laws prescribe only for the future, and unless a statute either expressly or by implication shows that the legislature intended that it should operate retroactively, this general rule applies. Anthony u. Penn, 212 Ga. 292, 293 (1956); 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, 4. The primary interest supporting this principle is the protection of vested interests; and for a retroactive law to impair vested interests, such as a contract right, is to violate both the State and Federal Constitutions. Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. III, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-302); U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IX, Par. III (Ga. Code Ann. 1-128).
Nevertheless, laws may apply retroactively when they do not impair vested rights and where intended to do so by the General Assembly. See Ga. Code Ann. 102-104; and Focht u. Am. Cas. Co., 103 Ga. App. 138, 140 (1961). The Georgia courts have generally held that in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, a law which only changes the procedure or remedy for vindicating a right applies to cases pending at the time of enactment. Turman u. Mabry, 221 Ga. 153 (1965); Scott u. Oxford, 105 Ga. 301, 303 (1962); Pritchard u. Savannah R. Co., 87 Ga. 294, 299, 301 (1891). This rule does not apply when application to pending cases would either create or destroy a substantial procedural right. See Bauer International Corp. u. Cagles, Inc., 225 Ga. 684 (1969); Focht u. Am. Cas. Co., supra.
In my opinion, the Act of 1972 merely changes the procedure for effecting modifications in utility rates, schedules, service policies and other jurisdictional functions of regulated utilities. Just as before the 1972 Act became effective, a regulated utility is still required to obtain the approval of the commission for implementing jurisdictional changes, such as rate increases. The only real difference is that by inaction rather than action the commission can allow a new rate or service policy to become effective. It is true that the time within which the commission can finally act has been limited to a total of six months, but this is no

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barrier to the retroactive operation of a statute, as in the case of shortening the time for taking an appeal. See 4A C. J. S. Appeal and Error, 430; see also Conyers v. Luther Williams Banking Co., 36 Ga. App. 52 (1926) (dicta). In cases where an increase in rates is proposed, even after six months has elapsed without a decision, the commission can compel a refund of rates subsequently found excessive. H. B. 1179, Section 1. Based on this authority and reasoning, it is my official opinion that House Billll79 is remedial only and was therefore applicable to matters pending before the
commission at the time of enactment. The 30-Day Notice Period Began To Run On March 8, 1912, For
All Pending Applications.
Even though Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137 is retroactive, this determination does not answer the question of when the 30-day notice period began to run on all applications pending before the commission. For example, some applications had been filed more than 30 days before March 8, 1972; does this mean that the notice period has already run with respect to these applications? What about those applications filed less than 30 days prior to March 8, but with only a few days left to run if the time period begins as of the date of filing? These are questions not easily answered under Georgia law although certain general principles are applicable.
A rule of statutory construction codified as Ga. Code Ann. 102-104 provides in part as follows:

"Laws looking only to the remedy or mode of trial may apply to contracts, rights and offenses entered into or accrued or committed prior to their passage; but in every case a reasonable time subsequent to the passage of the statute should be allowed for the citizen to enforce his contract, or protect his right. " (Emphasis added.)

Retroactive laws shortening the previous time for taking an appeal have been generally construed to allow a "reasonable time" for appealing pending judgments, usually allowing the new time period if the old time period would not be extended. See 4A C. J. S. Appeal and Error, 430; see also 82 C. J. S. Statutes, 416. It is clear that a new time period cannot be applied retroactively where the time for taking an appeal would thereby be expired and a vested right destroyed. See Conyers v. Luther Williams Banking Co., 36 Ga. App. 52 (1926). Therefore, in order to give certainty and fairness to this "reasonable time" principle, most courts have held

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that the newly enacted time period should apply to pending cases from the effective date ofthe new law, provided the new time limits are not thereby made longer than under previous law. See Annotation, 81 A. L. R. 2d 418, 425. Since the time for acting on applications before the Georgia Public Service Commission was previously unlimited, the above principles indicate that the 30-day notice period on all matters pending before the commission on March 8, 1972, should begin on that date, the date the 1972 law
became effective. It is therefore my official opinion that a 30-day notice period from
March 8, 1972, on all pending applications would provide a "reasonable time" for protection of all rights concerned and is consistent with recognized principles of statutory construction, should the matter come to the courts for decision.
Effect of Federal Price Commission Regulations on the Act of
1972.
The regulations of the Federal Price Commission are codified in Chapter III, Part 300 ofthe Federal Register. Presumably, they are valid regulations and as such have all the force and effect offederal law. See Pub. Utilities Comm. ofCalif. u. U.S, 355 U.S. 534,542-43 (1958).
On February 11, 1972, the Federal Price Commission announced a "freeze" on "all price increases by privately-owned public utilities which were not legally in effect on February 9, 1972." 37 F. R. 3094. This "freeze" order was later extended by the Price Commission until March 25, 1972. 37 F. R. 5104; see also 37 F. R. 5701. The "freeze" order, however, did not by its terms affect state procedures for allowing utility rates to go into effect; it merely froze all proposed price increases "not legally in effect" on February 9, 1972. 37 F. R. 3094.
The 30-day time period for all pending applications before the Georgia Public Service Commission began to run on March 8, 1972. These pending applications will become effective pursuant to the provisions of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137, if the Price Commission "freeze" is no longer in effect and if the proposed rates or tariffs are otherwise consistent with federal regulations. In other words, the procedure for implementing utility rate increases is now on two levels; before a utility tariff increase can be implemented it must first meet the requirements of state law and the Georgia Public Service Commission; secondly, the proposed tariff increase must comply with any applicable regulations of the Federal Price Commission.
Therefore it is my official opinion that even though the Federal

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Price Commission "freeze" order is applicable to tariffincreases by regulated utilities, it does not toll or suspend the effective date of the 30-day notice period and other provisions of the 1972 Act.
The 1972 Act Applies To Contract Motor Carriers And Common Carriers As Well As Power Utilities.
The 1972 Act amends Ga. Code Ann. 93-307 which is a broad grant of jurisdiction to the Georgia Public Service Commission. Under this Code section the Georgia Public Service Commission is granted general superviSIOn of common carriers and transportation companies as well as power utilities. Section 1 ofthe 1972 Act begins with the following sentence:

"93-307.1. (a) No change shall be made by any person, firm or corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'utility') subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission in any rate, charge, classification or service subject to the jurisdiction ofthe commission, or in any rule or regulation relating thereto...." (Emphasis added.)

Thus, the Act clearly was intended to apply to "any person, firm or corporation" (referred to as a "utility" [The word "utility" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., to include transportation companies providing service to the public as well as power companies.] for the purpose ofeasy reference) "subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission." Since motor contract and common carriers are made subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission by Ga. Code Ann. 93-307 and Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 68-5 (Motor Contract Carriers) and 68-6 (Motor Common Carriers), (both Chapters being primarily based upon Ga. Laws 1931, Extra. Sess., p. 99), I conclude that these classes of regulated utilities are likewise covered by the 1972 Act.

OPINION 72-35
To: Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles

April 7, 1972

Re: State Board of Pardons and Paroles; no jurisdiction to act on Georgia sentence of prisoner held by federal authorities.

This is in reply to your request for my opinion in which you

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inquire whether an individual who is presently serving a federal sentence in a federal prison, and who has received a Georgia sentence imposed to run concurrently with the federal sentence, is within the jurisdiction of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles for parole consideration.
It is my understanding that the individual concerned was sentenced by a Georgia court on a plea ofguilty to serve nine years. This sentence was expressly stated to be served concurrently with a federal sentence of seven and one-half years previously imposed upon the individual. The prisoner has been and is presently confined in a federal penitentiary, where, it is reported, his conduct is exemplary. The State of Georgia has filed a detainer with the federal prison authorities pending the expiration of the Georgia sentence or the prisoner's release by federal authorities.
Your letter makes reference to my opinion of May 19, 1971, wherein I determined that the power of the board to consider parole does not extend to an individual who is not within the confines of a jail, prison, or public works camp of this state (Op. Att'y Gen. 71-97), and you inquire in substance whether the rationale ofthat opinion is applicable in the instant circumstances. The opinion you reference concerned the eligibility for parole consideration of a person who is at liberty on bond pending consideration by a federal court of his writ of habeas corpus. That opinion contained an exhaustive history of pardon and parole power and concluded that the individual concerned was not eligible for parole consideration in the absence ofhis confinement in a state penal institution. Particular attention should be given to the quoted language therein from Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185 to 195 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 77-5). The rationale of that opinion is equally applicable to the instant case wherein the individual concerned is incarcerated in a federal prison where he is serving a Georgia sentence concurrently with a federal sentence. In order to be eligible for parole consideration, an individual must be confined in a state penal institution.
Therefore, it is my opinion in the case about which you inquired that the board does not have jurisdiction to act upon the Georgia sentence so long as the individual is not within the confines of a jail, prison, or public works camp of this state.

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OPINION 72-36
To: Chancellor, University System of Georgia

72-36 April 7, 1972

Re: Chang.e in age of majority; effect upon Policies of the Board of Regents.

Your office has inquired concerning the effect the legislation which lowers the age of majority in the State of Georgia from 21 to 18(Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193) will have on certain Policies of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia which policies utilize the age 21 as a standard. A particular interest was expressed in the effect this law will have on the policy pertaining to resident classification ofstudents for tuition purposes. Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Chapter 550-17.
There are two sections of this Act that are directly applicable to the University System. Section 8 pertains to resident status of students for tuition purposes and, simply stated, asserts that a student does not automatically attain residency status upon his reaching the age of majority. Section 9 reaffirms the power of the Board of Regents and the institutions of the University System to promulgate ru1es and regulations by which they are governed. Neither section exempts the University System from the operation of the Act, nor do they provide any special consideration or power to the University System beyond that it already possesses. These sections only provide that the lowering of the age of majority does not vitiate the authority of the Board of Regents in these circumstances.
To determine the effect this Act will have on the University System and the Policies of the Board of Regents in the absence of a clear indication in the Act itself, it is necessary to examine the intent of the legislation.
The intent ofthe Act is clearly set forth in Section 10 as follows:

"It is the intention of this Act to reduce the age of legal majority in this state from 21 years of age to 18 years of age for all purposes so that all persons who have reached the age of 18 shall have all the rights, privileges, powers, duties, responsibilities and liabilities heretofore applicable to persons who were 21 years of age or over. To further carry out this intention, the word 'twenty-one' and the figure '21' are hereby

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stricken where the same appear in all laws of this state referring to the required age for majority and the word 'eighteen' and the figure '18' are hereby inserted in lieu ofsaid word and figure."

Such sweeping language reflects a desire to completely eliminate the 21-year-old standard in the State ofGeorgia and replace it with the age of 18.
It is my opinion that this legislation has the effect of changing the Policies of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia in such a way that the age 18 will replace 21 as a standard wherever the latter should appear in the Policies. There are two grounds upon which this opinion is based.
Should the University System maintain 21 as an age standard for such purposes as determining residence, this would obviously thwart the intention ofthe Act which is to provide persons who are 18 years old with the same "rights, privileges, powers, duties, responsibilities and liabilities" previously available only to those 21 and over.
The other basis for this opinion rests in the fact that the General Assembly specifically directed that all laws of the state in which 21 was utilized as a standard because it was the legal age of majority should be amended to change 21 to 18. The Policies of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia are promulgated pursuant to their authority "to make reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary for the performance oftheir duties." Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 7, 24 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-121). When such regulations are the result of proper action of an administrative board and are based on a specific grant ofauthority, they have the force and effect of state law. See Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc., et al. v. State Board ofExaminers in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364 (1963). Thus, these Policies are "laws ofthis state" such as are affected by this recent legislation.
It is conceivable that there are situations in which the 21-yearold standard is used for reasons unrelated to the age of majority. (See the exceptions delineated in Section 10 of the 1972 Act.) In these situations, the 21-year-old standard would be unaffected by this law. However, I have been unable to find such situations within the Policies of the Board of Regents.
The particular policy about which you have inquired is clearly altered by the Act. This policy sets the age 21 as the standard by which it is determined whether or not to use a student's parents' domicile or his own domicile for purposes of determining whether

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to charge him resident or nonresident tuition. Evidently such a standard rests on the precept that it is the duty of parents to support their children until they attain the age ofmajority. See e.g. Logue v. The State, 94 Ga. App. 777 (1956); Ga. Code Ann. 74-105; 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child, 50.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the 21-year-old standard found in the Policies of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia pertaining to resident classification of students has been changed to an 18-year-old standard by Act No. 862 of the 1972 Session of the General Assembly.

OPINION 72-37 To: State Superintendent of Schools

April 13, 1972

Re: Minimum Foundation Program; discretion of State Board of Education in determining attendance.

This is in answer to your letter of April 6 in which you ask whether a student may be counted for "average daily attendance" purposes ifhe is not physically in attendance in a public school. In posing the question, you refer to our official opinion of February 18, 1972 (Op. Att'y Gen. 72-16) in connection with the problem of the inclusion or exclusion from such calculations of those pupils who spend a portion of their school day taking courses in vocational-technical schools, colleges or universities. Noting that while many funding calculations of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 3, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-6) are based upon the number of pupils "in average daily attendance" in a school system, neither that Act nor any other school law appeared to define just how many hours a student must be present in school to be included in the calculation, we concluded in that opinion that under Ga. Code Ann. 32-603 it was within the discretion ofthe State Board ofEducation to define the time a pupil must be in school to be counted.
The question you now ask is in essence whether this discretion can lawfully be exercised so as to include in average daily attendance a student "not physically in attendance in a public school." Actually, this question is a striking example of the problem which seems simple but really isn't. It needs no lengthy analysis of the law to show that the board's discretion must be exercised in a manner which is reasonable in light of the relevant

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statutory objectives or guidelines. Since the purpose of average daily attendance calculations is to allocate funds on the basis of how many children there are to be educated, it would seem obvious that inclusion of a pupil who has no real connection at all with a public school and its organized instructional program would be nothing more than a fraudulent padding of the rolls. It is unthinkable either that the State Board of Education would authorize such a thing or that a court would fail to strike the purported authorization as unreasonable if it did.
On the other hand, it does not necessarily follow that a pupil must be physically present in a particular public school building for the entire school year in order to be included in its average daily attendance reports. It is not at all difficult to envision a school, as a part of its regular educational program and curricula, placing some of its students in a learning situation at some other location. One can even conceive of the possibility of a student spending his entire school day elsewhere (e.g., in a college, vocational center, business, industrial or agricultural enterprise, etc.) for lengthy periods of time while still remaining under the direct supervision of the public school faculty and while still fully engaged in the school's educational program.
The difficulty in attempting to define precisely what would be within and what would be without the pale of "reasonableness" on the part of the State Board of Education in the exercise of its discretion lies in the infinite number of possible factual situations. It goes without saying that when we speak of a pupil being includable if he is engaged in the public school's educational program and curricula (whether it is offered in the school building or elsewhere), we are speaking ofsubstance and not form. The mere keeping of his official records or a paper or "administrative" inclusion will not suffice. Obviously, it would be highly inappropriate for two state institutions simultaneously to be receiving public funds based upon the 100 percent inclusion of the same pupil. Nor would it be proper or reasonable for a school system to include in its average daily attendance a pupil who spends his full time in college and who realistically speaking is a college student being instructed by the college faculty rather than a high school student instructed by high school teachers-whether or not his records are kept in the high school for administrative or other purposes.
In conclusion, it can only be said that the drawing of line so as to prevent a school system from including a pupil which it is in fact not itself educating, and yet not stifle the opportunities for

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educational innovation and cooperative programs between different educational institutions, is a matter which addresses itself peculiarly to the State Board of Education. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 32-603. All the law requires is that the State Board's exercise of its discretion be reasonable in light of the statutory intendment that state funds allotted to a local school system should be related to the number of pupils the system is actually educating itself.

OPINION 72-38 To: Governor, State of Georgia

April 14, 1972

Re: Early Childhood Development Act; discretion of the State Board of Education and limitations upon use of state funds.

This is in answer to your letter of April 4 concerning the responsibility and authority placed upon the State Board of Education under the Early Childhood Development Act, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 722. More specifically, you have asked for our advice on nine questions which for purposes of clarity I shall restate and respond to individually.

1. What is the purpose of this Act?

Section 2 of the Act states its purpose in very general language. It is to provide for "a sound program of early childhood development"-supplementing the resources which parents have available "to meet the mental, physical and emotional needs of their children." The only stated specifics are that the programs must include (but are not limited to) the following services for children whose parents voluntarily seek the same:

(a) the testing, diagnosis, and treatment of physical or mental handicaps of children from one to three years of age, (b) educational programs for children five years of age and (c) educational programs for children three to five years ofage who have physical or mental handicaps.

2. Does the Act contemplate a program that would qualify for federal funds under Title IV of the Social Security Act?

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This is an exceedingly difficult question to answer. Whether or not the state's program will qualify for federal funds under Title IV of the Social Security Act will obviously depend upon whether its contents meet the requirements of federal law and regulations-as interpreted by appropriate federal officials. While Section 3 ofthe Act requires the State Board of Education to adopt a state plan for "a comprehensive Early Childhood Development Program," neither this nor any other section of the Act either defines "early childhood development"1 or affirmatively requires the State Board to adopt only such a plan as will qualify for federal fiscal assistance. In the absence of any such mandate, it would seem to me that the precise content of the plan (provided that it meets the three minimum requirements previously mentioned) is left to the discretion ofthe State Board of Education. Section 3(a)(2) of the Act declares:
"The State Board shall have authority to establish criteria and standards for approval oflocal school system programs ofEarly Childhood Development."
About the most that can be said of the Act's "contemplation" of federal funds under Title IV of the Social Security Act is that it apparently contemplates at least the possiblity that such funds might be made available in support of Georgia's early childhood development programs. Section 3(a)(l) authorizes (but does not require) the State Board of Education to make grants of federal funds available to local school systems for the maintenance ofearly childhood development programs, and Section 3(b) requires the State Board to maintain close liaison with other state and federal agencies. Language in Section 5(b), however, on its face seems to preclude the use ofstate funds for certain social or day care services which are contemplated by rules and regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare pursuant to the Social Security Act (more to be said about this later).
1 As already noted, Section 2 of the Act (see also Section 4) merely indicates that the plan must provide for (a) the testing, diagnosis and treatment of physical or mental handicaps of children from one to three years of age; (b) education programs for children five years of age; and (c) education programs for children three to five years of age who have physical or mental handicaps. But this is a minimum and not a maximum limitation.

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3. What services may be authorized under the Act?
As already pointed out, the Act, while specifying three services which must be included in the "comprehensive early childhood development program," does not restrict the State Board of Education to these three items. In the absence ofspecific maximum limitations, it is my opinion that the State Board of Education possesses an extremely broad discretion as to what services or activities it may authorize to be included in a plan, the only limitation being that any service or activity must bear at least some reasonable relationship to the accomplishment ofthose broad purposes and objectives of the Act which we have set forth in our response to question one. It must be carefully noted, on the other hand, that the question ofwhat may be authorized in a plan is quite distinct indeed from the question of what may be supported with state funds, with local funds or with federal funds.
4. Who is eligible to receive the services authorized by this Act?
Again, the Act is quite general. With the exception of the three mandatory activities we have already mentioned (which cover differing classes of children in age groups one through five), there are no specific age limitations. Consequently, it is my opinion that the question of who may be made eligible addresses itself to the broad discretion of the State Board of Education, which while it must include the children within the specified age groups for the mandatory services, could also, if it so desires, include anyone who could reasonably be said to be in "early childhood" for either these services or any other services it decides to include in the plan.
5. Are there any restrictions on what services may be provided as part ofan Early Childhood Development Program under this Act?
While the discretion of the State Board of Education in formulating and implementing a state plan for early childhood development is extraordinarily broad, it cannot be said to be without any limitation whatsoever. As we have just stated in our answer to question 4, services must be limited to those which confer benefits upon those who can reasonably be said to be in their "early childhood." Clearly, for example, the State Board of Education could not include an advanced course of mathematics for adults

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in the state plan. Additionally, as pointed out in answer to question 3, a proposed service or activity may not properly be included in the plan if it does not bear at least some reasonable relationship to those broad purposes and objectives of the Act to which we have referred in our answer to question 1. Finally, we must repeat what we have already said about the very important distinction between those services which may be authorized for inclusion in a state plan and those services which may be funded with state funds, with local funds and/or with federal funds. As we will point out in some detail in our answer to question 7, the Act does contain certain fiscal limitations respecting the use of state funds.

6. Is the State Board ofEducation required or authorized to work with other state agencies or federal agencies in planning or developing or implementing an Early Childhood Development Program?

Section 3(b) of the Act requires the State Board of Education to:

"maintain close liaison with other State and Federal agencies, advising local school system boards of education of available funds and fund sources and procedures for applying for and securing such funds."

As I see it, this provision pretty well speaks for itself. While the State Board of Education may, if it so desires, consult with other state and federal agencies concerning "planning, developing and implementing" early childhood development programs, it is only required to maintain close liaison with such agencies, advising local school systems of available funds, fund sources, and procedures for applying for and securing such funds.

7. Does the Act prohibit the furnishing of child care services in connection with a comprehensive Early Childhood Development Program?

We have already several times mentioned the fact that the question of what services or activities may be authorized by the State Board of Education for inclusion in a comprehensive early childhood development plan is quite different from the question of

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whether a particular service or activity may be funded with state, local or federal monies. There would be hardly anything unusual, for example, about the state providing a particular child service which is authorized and funded by state law yet not within the contemplation of Title IV of the Federal Social Security Act and consequently not eligible for federal funds.
While the discretion ofthe State Board ofEducation to authorize the inclusion of "child care services" or virtually anything else reasonably related to the Act's broadly stated objectives is plain, the Act does contain, with varying degrees of clarity, certain limitations on the use of state funds for specified services and activities. 2
The first and probably least clear fiscal restriction is that contained in Section 4 of the Act. Subsection (a) of this section reads:

"Early Childhood Development programs established and maintained by local school system boards of education shall be administered in accordance with regulations and procedures established by the State Board of Education. These programs shall provide:
(1) testing, diagnosis, and treatment of children less than three years of age who have physical and mental handicaps;
(2) educational programs for children five years of age and for those children three to five years ofage, inclusive, who have physical or mental handicaps."

Subsecton (b) then provides:

"Local school system boards of education, with the approval of the State Board of Education, may utilize state funds and state fund grants to match federal funds to the extent allowed by federal law or federal regulations, only for the purposes enumerated in Section 4 (a) above and may not use such State funds to establish child day care centers, nor to support or purchase services from an existing day care center." (Emphasis added.)
2We hasten to add that the Early Childhood Development Act's limitation on the use of state funds for specified activities in no way precludes implementation of such activities (if they are otherwise authorized) through the use of available federal or local funds.

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To what part of Section 4 (a) does the term "enumerated" in 5(b) refer? According to Black's Law Dictionary, "Enumerated," p. 629 (4th Ed. 1951):

"This term [enumerated] is often used in law as equivalent to 'mentioned specifically,' 'designated,' or 'expressly named or granted.'..."

It would be entirely possible for a court construing this language to hold that it means the state funds cannot be used for anything other than the three specified mandatory services. Yet it is equally true that this interpretation, while not in the least illogical or improbable, would very drastically curtail the ability of the State Board of Education to achieve the stated purposes and objectives of the Act (i.e., a comprehensive early childhood development plan). While words are usually accorded their ordinary signification, Ga. Code Ann. 102-102(1), they are not so construed when to do so would defeat legislative intent. E.g., Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118, 120 (1914); Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30(1) (2) (1936). We consequently think that the better interpretation is that the phrase "enumerated in Section 4 (a) above" refers to the early childhood programs (which are also mentioned "generally" therein) as well as to the three specifically mentioned services and activities which must be included in any such program. Certainly, it cannot be disputed that the General Assembly could have used clearer language if it desired to wholly prohibit the use of state funds for anything other than the three services which must be included in a childhood development plan. Consequently, looking at the beneficial purposes of the Act as a whole, we think that the better view is that the expenditure of state funds is not necessarily limited solely to the three mandated services.
As to the prohibition of the use of state funds for social services and day care services, however, there appears to be neither ambiguity nor room for alternative interpretations. As we have already seen, the final portion of Section 4(b) flatly states that a local school system:

"... may not use such state funds to establish child day care centers, nor to support or purchase services for an existing child day care center."

Unlike the situation respecting the word "enumerated" and the

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question of what it refers to, there is little which can be said to be unclear about this language. It is a flat prohibition! Moreover, even if it were less clear than it is, Section 5 of the Act declares:

"(a) Except as herein provided, no state funds appropriated to implement or administer the programs authorized by the provisions of this Act, including grants of state funds as authorized by the provisions of this Act shall be used or utilized, either directly or indirectly, to provide social services or day care services; to support or purchase services from existing child day care centers or to otherwise support or establish child day care centers. "(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, no state funds appropriated to implement or administer the programs authorized by the provisions of this Act, including grants of state funds as authorized by the provisions of this Act shall be used or utilized, except as herein authorized, to provide social services or day care services as contemplated by the rules and regulations ofthe U.S. Department ofHealth, Education and Welfare promulgated pursuant to the Social Security Act, including but not limited to, Sections 220, 220.18 and 220.51 of said regulations."

In concluding that this prohibitory language says what it means and means what it says, we do not overlook the modicum of uncertainty which is presented in Sections 5(a) and 5(b) [but not in Section 4(b)] by the phrases "except as herein provided" and "except as herein authorized." Any possible confusion here would seem to be superficial only. In point of fact, the use of state funds for these specified services or activities is not expressly authorized anywhere else in the Act. Any possible contention that there might be an implied authorization in those provisions referring to "comprehensive early childhood development plans" generally, is negated by the fact that in any situation of this sort, that which is stated specifically always takes precedence over and controls that which is stated generally. E.g., Kiser & Company v. Doyal, 51 Ga. App. 30, 33 (1935). Then too, the fact that any such contention strains beyond the breaking point is also seen in the fact such an interpretation would in effect nullify the prohibitory language completely. A construction which would render entire paragraphs ofa statute meaningless is not likely to be sanctioned by the courts. See, e.g., Falligant v. Barrow, 133 Ga. 87, 92 (1909); Mitchell v.

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Union Bag & Paper Corporation, 75 Ga. App. 15, 17 (1947). In summary, while the answer to your question of whether the
Act prohibits the furnishing of child care services in connection with a comprehensive early childhood development program is, in the strict sense, NO, the money to implement such services must be derived wholly from federal, local, or private sources. State funds cannot be used for these services. It is perhaps ofimportance to note by way of illustration that it would be quite possible to operate a comprehensive early childhood development program providing for 10 services, two ofwhich are ineligible for state funds under state law, if federal authorities agree to the "two" being supported wholly by federal or local funds, with all required state matching funds for the plan as a whole being used to fund only those eight other services for which state funds can lawfully be expended.

8. What assistance or services should the State Board ofEducation provide for local school system boards of education who desire to establish an Early Childhood Development Program?

As we have already pointed out, Section 3 ofthe Act requires the State Board ofEducation to adopt a state plan for a comprehensive early childhood development program and gives the State Board broad authority to establish criteria and standards for approval of local school system programs ofearly childhood development. How the State Board of Education goes about doing this is a matter which addresses itself to the discretion of the State Board of Education. Section 3(b) requires only that the State Board of Education keep local school boards advised as to what funds are available, the fund sources, and the procedures to be used in applying for and securing such funds.

9. Does the Act contemplate a program that would not qualify for federal funds?

In answer to question 3, we said that about the best that can be said ofthe Act's contemplation regarding federal funds under Title IV of the Social Security Act is that it apparently contemplates at least the possibility that federal funds might be made available. The negative pregnant of this is that the Act also contemplates at least the possibility of a state program which would not qualify for federal funds.

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OPINION 72-39
To: Director, Department of Transportation

April 14, 1972

Re: Reorganization; change of name of "Director, State Highway Department" to "Director, State Department of Transportation."

This is in response to your inquiry of recent date requesting my advice as to the appropriate title of your office.
Ga. Constitution, Art. V,Sec. XI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3506), as amended, creates the State Highway Board and requires that the board shall elect a director of the State Highway Department who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the State Highway Department. This same provision ofthe Constitution then requires that the General Assembly define by law the powers, duties, qualifications and compensation of the board and of the director. The powers and duties ofthe office ofDirector ofthe State Highway Department have been previously defined by the General Assembly pursuant to this constitutional provision. See Ga. Laws 1950, p. 62, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1602 (e); 95-1620 (b); 95-1621) and see also Ga. Laws 1961, p. 517 (Ga. Code Ann. 36-1303 (6)).
The Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, creates the Department ofTransportation and provides that the Department head is the State Highway Board and the Chief Executive Officer of the Department is the Director (Section 2001). Section 2003 of the ExecutiveReorganization Act of 1972 provides that the position of Director of the State Highway Department of Georgia and its functions are continued; the position is then renamed Director of the Department of Transportation.
The Executive Reorganization Act of 1972 is therefore in harmony with the Georgia Constitution as it pertains to the newly created Department of Transportation since the office of Director of the State Highway Department is continued, the change being in name only. The correct designation ofyour office is now Director of the Department of Transportation and all official acts of your office must be executed under this name.

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OPINION 72-40
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

April 14, 1972

Re: Emergency vehicles; colors of flashing lights regulated; law enforcement vehicles restricted to blue lights.

Your letter of April 10, 1972, requested my opinion on whether House Bill1651 passed in the 1972 session ofthe General Assembly will make it illegal for law enforcement vehicles to continue using red warning lights on or after the effective date ofJanuary 1, 1973.
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1092, signed by the Governor April 6, 1972, places restrictions on the use of warning lights on vehicles, to be controlled by the Department of Public Safety, and provides that violation of the Act shall be punishable as for a misdemeanor. The Act reserves certain colored warning lights for use by specified emergency vehicles only. Thus in Section 1, the Act specifies that "flashing or revolving blue lights" are to be used only on "motor vehicles belonging to any federal, state or local law enforcement agency." Section 2 ofthe Act restricts the use of red warning lights to "vehicles belonging to fire departments, ambulances and motor vehicles belonging to a public utility corporation" designated by your department as an emergency vehicle. Section 3 provides for the use of amber colored warning lights on all other vehicles certified by your department as "having a proven need" for emergency warning lights.
Thus I would agree with you, and it is my official opinion, that Section 2 of the subject Act would effectively prevent any law enforcement vehicle from being equipped lawfully with red warning lights on or after January 1, 1973, and that all law enforcement vehicles will be restricted to the use of blue warning lights, only, after that date.

OPINION 72-41 To: Comptroller General

April 18, 1972

Re: Insurance companies; status of securities deposited; insolvency of foreign companies.

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You have requested my opmwn whether you may properly release to the domiciliary receiver of the Maine Insurance Company securities in the amount of $35,000 currently on deposit in this state. The securities were originally deposited in 1962 by the American Mercury Insurance Company for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements for a license to write various lines of insurance in Georgia, including accident and sickness insurance. In 1966, American Mercury reinsured its entire business with Maine Insurance Company and assigned all its assets to Maine, including the deposited securities. Thereafter, American Mercury ceased writing business in Georgia; the company has no insurance in force in Georgia at this time, and there are no judgments, suits, or claims outstanding against that company.
The Maine Insurance Company has never been licensed in Georgia; however, in September 1969, it purchased the accident and health business of the Prudence Mutual Casualty Company, which was licensed in Georgia between 1962 and June 1967. Prudence Mutual, an Illinois corporation, also had securities on deposit in Georgia which are the subject of an ancillary receivership pending in Fulton County, Georgia. At this time, it is impossible to determine the extent, if any, to which Maine Insurance Company may be liable on policies issued in Georgia by Prudence Mutual and assumed by Maine.
The Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maine, as domiciliary receiver of the Maine Insurance Company, has requested release of the $35,000 security deposit made by American Mercury Insurance Company and subsequently assigned to the Maine Insurance Company. Maine has adopted the Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act, Laws of Maine 1969, p. 655 (Ch. 132 4363).
The central issue is whether the assets of Maine, on deposit by virtue of their acquisition of American Mercury, may be regarded as the assets of Prudence Mutual for purposes of the latter firm's ancillary receivership in this state. In my opinion, they may not.
All Code references herein are to Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289, codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 56.
It would seem possible that Prudence Mutual could have been required to increase the amount of its securities deposit up to $100,000 under the authority contained in Ga. Code Ann. 56-310. If this had been done after the accident and health business of Prudence Mutual had been acquired by Maine and after the nonliability of American Mercury had been established, the net effect may well have been to compel Maine to assign to Prudence

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Mutual the securities then on deposit in Georgia in the name of Maine. Whether this would have occurred is a matter ofconjecture, turning upon the business judgment of Maine and the nature of that company's relationship to Prudence Mutual. The important consideration is that it never did occur- and you have so advised me- prior to commencement of the ancillary receivership of Prudence Mutual in Georgia; hence the securities in question were never elevated to the status of a "special deposit," that is to say, "a deposit made pursuant to statute for the security or benefit of a limited class or classes of persons ...." See Ga. Code Ann. 56-1401. (Emphasis added.)
The deposits required of foreign insurers by Ga. Code Ann. 56-310 are such "special deposits" inasmuch as they are "for the protection of the insurer's policyholders in Georgia and others in Georgia entitled to the proceeds of its policies." Ibid. See Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters v. South Georgia Ry. Co., 57 Ga. App. 699 (1938). Of course, only such special deposits (along with other assets pledged as security for specific claims) may properly be the subject of an ancillary receivership. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1403(3).
It follows that the securities in question may not be regarded as the assets of Prudence Mutual for purposes of the ancillary receivership, and they should be released to the domiciliary receiver of Maine Insurance Company.

OPINION 72-42
To: Director, Fiscal Division, Department of Administrative Services

April 19, 1972

Re: Superior court judges emeritus; service in the Student's Army Training Corps during World War I is creditable toward appointment.

This is in response to a request from the Honorable Bill Burson for my opinion as to whether the late Edwin A. McWhorter was eligible for Superior Court Judge Emeritus status and full retirement upon his death.
As I understand the facts in this matter, Judge McWhorter served as a superior court judge for 17 and a fraction years and served for two months and 11 days in the Student's Army Training Corps during 1918. Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a, based upon Ga. Laws

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1945, p. 362, as amended, requires 19 years of service to be eligible for superior court judge emeritus, and permits crediting of a full year service for fractions ofa year spent in the Armed Forces ofthe United States if such service was occasioned by the national emergency ofWorld War I. The statute (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2620a) also provides that the entire year in which a judge would become eligible may be computed as part of the required number, even though he has served only part of the year.
Therefore, if Judge McWhorter's two months in the Student's Army Training Corps in 1918 was service in the Armed Forces, he would have had sufficient service to be eligible for appointment as a superior court judge emeritus upon his death.
According to a "Statement of Service" provided by the Adjutant General of the Department of Army, Judge McWhorter was inducted into the Army of the United States on October 1, 1918, served with the Student's Army Training Corps, and was honorably discharged on December 11, 1918. A review ofan extract from Army Pamphlet No. 20-212, June 1955, entitled "History of Military Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775-1945" indicates that the Student's Army Training Corps was a program established during World War I under the Selective Service Act. Students who volunteered for the Training Corps enlisted in the Army and were then granted furloughs to continue their academic studies and were also required to participate in military instruction and drill plus intensive training at summer camps.
Judge McWhorter was actually inducted into the Army under the provisions of the Selective Service Act, and such service was occasioned by the national emergency of World War I. Therefore, such service would be creditable as a full year toward qualification for superior court judge emeritus.
Since Judge McWhorter had 18 and a fraction years creditable service, he would have been eligible for superior court judge emeritus if he had made the proper payments in accordance with the Code, and his widow would be eligible for certain benefits if the judge had exercised the proper option under Ga. Code Ann. 24-2610a.l.

OPINION 72-43
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

April 21, 1972

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Re: Escape; reimbursement of costs for trials of escapees from state prison facilities.

In your letter of April 7, 1972, you asked for a ruling on the interpretation of Ga. Code Ann. 77-403 (Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 572, 573). That statute reads as follows:

''The State Department of Corrections (now Offender Rehabilitation) is hereby authorized and directed to reimburse the clerk of the court for court costs incurred by the court for which he is clerk in trying a defendant for the crime of escape from state prison facilities, and to reimburse the sheriff of the county wherein the trial takes place for the expense of transporting the defendant from the place of detention ofsuch defendant to court for trial and return from the court to such place of detention, such reimbursement to be at the rate of 10 cents per mile."

According to correspondence you have had with at least one court clerk, the issue in question seems to be whether the statute limits payment of specific court costs in the limited area covered by it (escapees from state institutions) to court clerks only, or if costs also should be paid to district attorneys, justices of the peace and sheriffs.
Long standing decisions of the Georgia courts have defined the term "court costs" as including "all charges, fixed by statute, as compensation for services rendered by officers of the court in the progress ofthe cause." Davis v. State, 33 Ga. 531 (1863). In Leonard v. Eatonton, 126 Ga. 63 (1906), the Georgia Supreme Court cited an old maxim that "in the absence ofstatutory authorization, no right to or liability for costs exists." In Walker v. Sheftall, 73 Ga. 806 (1884), that court said "acts providing for court costs and salaries are to be strictly construed, and neither can be increased by construction and in any direct manner beyond the amount specified by law...."
It is true that district attorneys, sheriffs and clerks are all "officers ofthe court" but their compensation must, as noted by the courts, be controlled by the statutes, strictly construed.

"All officers charging costs, and extracting its payments from the pocket ofthe citizen, must always show the authority ofthe law to do so." Stamper v. State, 11 Ga. 643 (1852).

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Under the old statutes fixing fees for district attorneys (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2904) and sheriffs (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2823), those officials would be entitled to the fees fixed therein for duties performed in the courts in relation to escapees from state institutions. These sections have been superseded by later statutes placing these officials on salaries. See Ga. Laws 1964, p. 310 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2826) as to sheriffs; Ga. Laws 1968, p. 992 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2924) as to district attorneys, who were phased out of the fee system under a formula provided therein.
The General Assembly, in passing the new Ga. Code Ann. 77-403 in 1971, might seem to have made a general exception to these statutes removing district attorneys and sheriffs from the fee system where escapees from state institutions are involved. The fact that the wording of both the title to and the body of the Act specifically limits payments of court costs to "the clerk of the court," most of whom remain on the fee system under Ga. Code Ann. 24-2727 (Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 497, 498), and that a specific exception was made as to sheriffs allowing them reimbursement for mileage for transporting defendants in these cases, indicates no such general exception was intended.
Ga. Code Ann. 24-2727 (cited above) provides in part that the costs paid to clerks for superior court criminal cases shall be $3 for service in entering and docketing bills of indictment, and so forth, and $10 for services in cases where the defendant is tried or pleads guilty, and so forth. Thus a clerk normally would be authorized to collect $13 for each escapee tried in his court.
Since, as noted above, district attorneys have been removed from the fee system, and Ga. Code Ann. 77-403 in my opinion makes no provision for them, the district attorneys who were no longer on the fee system on or after the effective date of Ga. Code Ann. 77-403 would not be entitled to reimbursement under it.
As for justices of the peace, their fees are fixed by Ga. Code Ann. 24-1601 (Ga. Laws 1877, pp. 83, 84 as amended), and services performed by them in relation to escapees, if any, covered by this statute would be compensible.
As I have emphasized, statutes related to compensation of court officials for services in the courts must be strictly construed. Thus, con~truing Ga. Code Ann. 77-403 together with other controlling statutes, it is my official opinion that the section in question limits payment of court costs in cases related to escapees from state institutions to those actual costs incurred by the clerks ofcourts in which such escapees are tried. In addition, it allows reimbursement

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to the sheriffs of the counties in which the trials take place only for the expense of transporting the defendants to and from their places of detention.

OPINION 72-44 To: Director, State Merit System

April 21, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; group health insurance; contracts by State Personnel Board.

This is in response to your letter of April 14, 1972, in which you asked my opinion of whether the State Personnel Board is authorized to enter into a contract with an organization to have them act as administrator for the board should the board decide to change from an insured to a self-insured health insurance program.
Ga. Code Ann. 89-1203, based upon Ga. Laws 1961, p. 147, provides that the State Personnel Board is empowered and authorized to establish a health insurance program for state employees and to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the program.
Ga. Code Ann. 89-1206 authorizes the board, in its discretion, to establish a self-insured plan in whole or in part and also authorizes the board to enter into contracts with any corporation licensed to transact accident and health insurance business in Georgia, and, if the board so desires, to designate one or more such corporations as the administering corporation.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the board is authorized to enter into a contract with a corporation licensed to transact accident and health insurance business in Georgia to have the corporation administer a self-insured group health program for state employees.

OPINION 72-45
To: Director, Department of Transportation

April 28, 1972

Re: Reorganization; authority of the Department of Transportation to act as sponsor of the State Airport System Planning Project.

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This is in reply to your letter of April 14, 1972, requesting my opinion concerning the authority of the Department of Transportation to act as sponsor of the State Airport System Planning Project. This project was transferred to the Department of Transportation from the Department of Industry and Trade by virtue of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972 (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015), and by virtue of an Executive Order signed by the Governor on April 1, 1972. This project is funded by the Federal Aviation Administration and therefore requires certification of local counsel as outlined in the Planning Grant Program Guide published by the Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration.
After reviewing the applicable Georgia statutes (Ga. Laws 1962, p. 694 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2107 (i) and 40-2110)); Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Section 2005, it is my opinion that:

(1) The Department of Transportation is a legal entity and qualifies as a "planning agency."
(2) The Department ofTransportation is legally empowered to provide the type of planning assistance or perform the type of planning work proposed in the application.
(3) The Department of Transportation is empowered to receive and expend federal funds and to provide or obtain and expend other funds for the above purposes.
(4) The Department of Transportation is empowered to contract with the United States for the purposes of receiving and expending federal funds.

OPINION 72-46 To: Commissioner of Public Safety

April 28, 1972

Re: Drunken driving; Implied Consent Law; "alcolyzer" or screening tests.

You ask our opinion regarding the legal status ofthe preliminary screening test procedure being used in the enforcement and administration ofthe Georgia Implied Consent Law(Ga.Laws1968, pp. 448 to 452; Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625, 68-1625.1). We have

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reviewed the law, as well as a number of the administrative hearing transcripts in those implied consent cases in which we have been involved due to court appeals being taken.
It appears that frequently police officers, as well as motorists, are confused about the legal effect ofthe alcolyzer test administered on the scene. Due either to the basic misunderstanding ofthe motorist or to the unclear explanation given him by the arresting police officer, and undoubtedly contributed to by the intoxicated condition of some drivers, the test is often mistaken for the chemical test required by law. (Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 448 to 455, Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625, 68-1625.1.)
This, of course, is wrong since the law requires a blood or breath test capable of producing analysis of the weight of alcohol in the person's blood, and the alcolyzer is only a qualitative and not a quantitative test. As we understand it, the alcolyzer test can only indicate whether a person's blood contains an amount near enough to the .10 percent weight of alcohol which under Georgia law constitutes a presumption of intoxication, so that he should be required to take the blood test or the intoximeter (breath) test at an authorized location and by an authorized individual. The alcolyzer does not measure what that quantitative amount is or even accurately indicate that it is above or below .10 percent.
Thus, the following facts should be made clear and unequivocal to all police officers throughout the state, and by them to all motor vehicle operators who are suspected, when stopped, ofbeing under the influence of intoxicating liquor:
(1) The alcolyzer test ("balloon test"; "on-the-spot test"; "screening test") is not required by the law to be administered by the officer or to be taken by the driver; its utilization is permitted by the Rules and Regulations of the Department of Public Safety (Rule 570-9-.06[2]) as a matter of convenience to the motoring public so that the suspected driver will not be put to the trouble and inconvenience of a trip to the police station or hospital for the purpose of a statutory chemical test unless the alcolyzer confirms the arresting officer's initial, reasonably caused belief. In other words, the alcolyzer operates to benefit the suspected driver: if he is not intoxicated but merely appears so to the observer, the alcolyzer test result will avoid a trip for a statutory chemical test. If the alcolyzer test is positive, of course, the officer's observation is confirmed and his insistence that a trip be taken for a chemical test is justified.
(2) In offering the alcolyzer test, the officer should clearly explain that it does not constitute the statutory chemical test but

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that if its result is negative, the driver will not be required to take the statutory chemical test. The officer should also clearly explain that if the alcolyzer result is positive, the driver will be required to take the statutory test and that if he refuses that test, he will suffer a six-month license suspension. (The terminology in the statute, with respect to the information to be given the driver, should be scrupulously adhered to. See especially Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625(e), 68-1625.1.)
(3) Refusal to take the alcolyzer test cannot result in suspension of a driver's license; ifthe driver refuses, the officer should simply go on to the next step and insist that the statutory chemical test be taken.
(4) If the driver refuses on the scene to agree to take a statutory blood test at the hospital or a statutory breath test at the police station, he should again be confronted with the opportunity and alternative when he actually arrives at the station and the test is then immediately available.
In order that police officers throughout the state may be fully apprised of their responsibilities in this regard, we urge that the contents of this letter be disseminated to chiefs of police for distribution to each individual police officer. The officers should be cautioned, in addition, to fully apprise the suspected driver of the requirements of the Implied Consent Law and ascertain that the driver does not confuse those requirements or consequences of refusal with the utilization of the alcolyzer as a mere screening device.

OPINION 72-47
To: Director, Department of Transportation

May 1, 1972

Re: Certified public weighers for firms supplying highway materials to state.

By correspondence of March 23, 1972, you requested my opinion concerning the feasibility of utilizing certified public weighers, licensed by and under the Commissioner of Agriculture, in processing weight tickets at metropolitan Atlanta asphaltic concrete-mixing plants. You indicated that these individuals would be employed by a contractor furnishing this material on highway construction projects let by the Department of Transportation or

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these individuals would be employed by an independent producer which might be furnishing this material to a contractor on the project let by the Department of Transportation. Under present procedure, the Department of Transportation furnishes an observer in the scalehouse of each plant who observes the contractor's or producer's employee as the latter weighs each truckload of material and records the gross, tare, and net weight on the weight ticket. The department's employee signs the ticket and thereby indicates his validation of the weights shown thereon. Upon delivery at the job site an employee of the Department of Transportation on the site signs all copies and retains one copy of each ticket for departmental records.
The proposed change in procedure would involve licensing employees of the producer or contractor as certified public weighers by the State Department of Agriculture pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 112-2, as based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1179. The Department ofTransportation would remove its observer from the scalehouse and the certified public weigher would certify the weight of each load of material.
You have requested my official opinion in answer to several questions which have arisen in your consideration of this change in weighing procedure.

QUESTION NO. 1

1. Would the State Department of Transportation relieve a contractorofany and all liability to perform under his contract or under the standard specifications by allowing a contractor, or a producer furnishing materials to a contractor, to utilize a certified public weigher in recording individual load weights and by requiring departmental inspectors to sign each weight ticket when the material is received at the job site?"

Section 350 of the Standard Specifications of January 1, 1966 as amended, Vol. I, Construction of Roads and Bridges, deals with hot mix asphaltic concrete construction. As I understand the Standard Specifications which are incorporated into contracts let by the Department of Transportation, the contractor is responsible for a finished product of a properly constructed highway. The proper mixture and weight of concrete as incorporated into the construction of a highway remains the responsibility of the contractor throughout the construction. The present procedure of

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placing an inspector employed by the Department of Transportation at the scene of the weighing of the concrete has provided an extra precautionary check on the weighing of the concrete. Such inspectors who are employed by the department are permitted to inspect the weighing of the concrete pursuant to Specification No. 350.05 but there is no requirement that such an inspector be on the job. As I understand the effect of the signature placed upon the weight ticket by the inspector who is employed by the Department ofTransportation at the construction site, such a signature indicates only that the concrete was received and in no way indicates that the material is free from defect or that it is accurately weighed. Under Specification No. 5.09 of the 1966 Specifications, defective work or material may be condemned by the project engineer at any time before final acceptance of the work. Again, this indicates that the department is only required to pay for a finished product that complies with contractual specifications.
In answer to your question, it is my opinion that the contractor is not released of any or all of his liability but the liability would remain the same. The weight ticket should be drafted in such a way as to indicate that acceptance of the concrete product at the site in no way indicates that the Department of Transportation is accepting the weight as being accurate. Upon removal of the employee of the Department of Transportation from the weighing site, the duty ofdetermining the proper weight will be placed upon the certified public weigher. Ga. Code Ann. 112-204. The contractor will continue to be responsible for a finished product which must comply with the Standard Specifications of the Department of Transportation.

QUESTION NO. 2

2. "If the State Transportation Department personnel calibrate plant scales of the contractor or producer will this conform to the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 112-109 recognizing the facts that (1) departmental personnel are not directly employed by the State Department ofAgriculture, and (2) that the procedures and personnel of the department will have been approved by the Department of Agriculture and approval stamps of the Department of Agriculture will be affixed to the scales upon satisfactory calibration?"

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Ga. Code Ann. 112-109, based upon Ga. Laws 1941, p. 510, makes it the duty of the State Commissioner of Agriculture, his deputies or inspectors at his direction, to"... inspect, test, try, and ascertain . . ." if weighing devices are correct. Any person inspecting or calibrating weights and measures, therefore, would have to be a "deputy or inspector" under the direction ofthe State Commissioner of Agriculture. The only instance in which the commissioner, his deputy or inspector would not be required to inspect weights would be in a situation in which inspection is "otherwise provided by law."
The question, therefore, becomes one of whether or not a person who is an employee ofthe Department of Transportation could, at the same time, be a "deputy or inspector" within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 112-109. It is my opinion that it was not the intent ofthe legislature of Georgia that the Commissioner of Agriculture deputize employees of other divisions of state government to perform the duties of inspection required by Ga. Code Ann. 112-109. The duty to inspect is specifically placed upon the Department of Agriculture as a separate entity by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 112-2.
It is my understanding that one of the main reasons for eliminating the highway inspector on the job and substituting a certified public weigher employed by the contractor or producer is to reduce the number of highway personnel required for the weighing procedures of this asphaltic material. In that regard, it would seem foolish to eliminate one type of personnel and at the same time create a new need for personnel of the Department of Transportation to inspect and calibrate the weights prior to their use. The statutory duty to inspect and control weights should remain upon the Department of Agriculture as employees of the Department ofTransportation are not deputies or inspectors ofthe Commissioner of Agriculture.
QUESTION NO. 3
3. "Should the department enter into a memorandum of understanding with the State Department of Agriculture to insure that the legal aspect ofthe proposal will not compromise the position of either state agency or the position of the State Transportation Department with respect to its position to a contractor working on a project let by the department?"

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It is my opinion that such a memorandum of understanding is not necessary. The duties of the Department of Agriculture concerning supervision of weights and measures and certified public weighers are described in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 112-2. At the same time, there should be a contractual provision between the Department of Transportation and the contractor which requires the contractor to provide certified public weighers certified by the Department of Agriculture for the weighing of asphaltic concrete.
QUESTION NO. 4
4. "Must each individual be individually licensed and bonded as a certified public weigher?"
The Office of the Attorney General by an opinion dated March 23, 1956, interpreted Ga. Code Ann. 112-205 which requires a $1,000 surety bond payable to the Commissioner of Agriculture "for the benefit ofpersons, firms, or corporations issuing a certified public weigher's certification of any weight or measure of any commodity or thing...." The 1956 opinion indicates that a bond of $1,000 is required of each certified public weigher whether employed singly or as one of a group of certified public weighers. I find no reason to disagree with the 1956 opinion which can be found inOps. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 9. Ga. Code Ann. 112-203 makes provision for application for a license permit from the Commissioner of Agriculture by any person who desires to be a certified public weigher. The language of Ga. Code Ann. 112-203 clearly indicates that each person must apply individually as a certified public weigher and that each person must be individually appointed as a weigher, at which time a license permit shall be issued "authorizing the applicant to weigh, measure and record any/all commodities."
QUESTION NO. 5
5. "Can highway contractors or material producers employ certified public weighers or have present employees licensed and bonded as certified public weighers?"
Ga. Code Ann. 112-201 provides as follows:

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"Who may be licensed and known as certified public weighers.- Any person who shall weigh, measure, or record the indications or readings of weighing or measuring and declare the weight, measure, reading or recording to be the true weight, measure, reading or recording of any commodity, article or product, may be licensed under the provisions of this Chapter and shall be known as a certified public weigher of Georgia. (Acts 1949, p. 1179.)"
It is my opinion that the "any person" designation indicates that certified public weighers can be employed by highway contractors or material producers. The duties of a certified public weigher are specified by statute. See Ga. Code Ann. 112-204. Furthermore, a surety bond is required of any certified public weigher or of the firm or corporation " ... who shall have their employees or agents designated as certified public weighers ...."
QUESTION NO. 6
6. "Can a certified public weigher use equipment which has not been calibrated and approved by the State Department of Agriculture?"
It is my opinion that a certified public weigher cannot use weighing devices or equipment which have not been approved, calibrated and certified by the Department of Agriculture without violating the law. Ga. Code Ann. 112-207 deals with the use of untested weights and measures and reads in its entirety as follows:
"Use of untested weights and measures.-lt shall be unlawful for any certified public weigher to use any weights, measures, reading or recording device, which has not been tested and approved by the State Director ofWeights and Measures, or his assistant, deputy or inspector, in accordance with the 'Weights and Measures Act.' (Acts 1949, pp. 1179, 1182.)"
QUESTION NO. 7
7. "What are the current legal penalties for violations of weights and measures laws with respect to the individual certified public weigher?"

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Chapter 112-99 of the Georgia Code deals with crimes concerning weights and measures. Section 112-9901, based upon Ga. Laws 1865-6, p. 231, provides penalties for selling or buying of false weights and measures. Section 112-9902, based upon Ga. Laws 1941, p. 514, provides penalties for violation of standard weights and measures law. The following three sections are based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1179. Section 112-9903 provides penalties for issuance of false weight, etc., or otherwise violating Chapter 112-2. Section 112-9904 provides penalties for requesting a certified public weigher to weigh an article falsely or to issue a false certificate. Section 112-9905 provides penalties for refusal of a certified public weigher to surrender his seal upon termination of his license or for malfeasance in office.

QUESTION NO. 8

8. "What are the available penalties both statutory and regulatory, available to the State Department of Transportation against its contractors, or producers furnishing material to its contractors, for violation of weights and measures laws?"

Ga. Code Ann. 112-9904 provides penalties for requesting a certified public weigher to weigh an article falsely or to issue a false certificate. Likewise, Ga. Code Ann. 112-9902 makes a general provision for violation ofany ofthe standard weights and measures laws and makes provision of penalties therefor. If a contractor or producer indemnifies the certified public weighers employed by such producer or contractor or in the alternative posts a surety bond in the sum of $1,000 per weigher for the benefit of third parties, the Department of Transportation could go against the bond if misdealing is shown on the part of the employer or the employee and the department is harmed thereby. It is also my understanding that the department would be able to withdraw a contractor or producer from a bidder's list for future letting of contracts because of previous misconduct.

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OPINION 72-48 To: Secretary of State

May 1, 1972

Re: Elections; calculation of number of signatures needed on nomination petition for U. S. Senator; pauper's oath by candidate in lieu of qualifying fee.

You have requested our official opinion on the application ofthe nomination petition requirement to the upcoming election to fill the unexpired term of the late Honorable Richard B. Russell. The question is whether the five percent requirement relates to the number of electors as shown by the registration figures for 1966 (the last time Senator Russell ran) or the registration figures shown for 1968 (the last time aU. S. Senator was elected from Georgia). You also wish to know whether an independent candidate for this office could file a pauper's affidavit and avoid paying the required qualification fee.
As to the first question, it is our official opinion that each of the two U.S. Senate offices is a separate office and to compute the five percent figure, the total number of electors eligible to vote at the last time that particular office was filled is the proper figure. See U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. III (Ga. Code Ann. 1-107 to 1-113). This conclusion is reached by the plain terms of the law which require "five percent ofthe total number ofelectors eligible to vote in the last election for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking." Ga. Code Ann. 34-1010 (b), as based upon Ga. Laws 1970, p. 347; 1971, p. 602. In this case, it would be the total number of electors eligible to vote in 1966 for the office of U. S. Senator.
On the second question, a three-judge federal court in Georgia has decided that ifa nomination petition candidate is unable to pay the required qualifying fee, the candidate may execute a pauper's affidavit and be afforded the opportunity to run. Georgia Socialist Workers Party u. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970). We see no reason why that ruling would not control the situation you present.

OPINION 72-49
To: Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles

May 2, 1972

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Re: Reorganization; effect upon State Board of Pardons and Paroles as to employment of personnel.
This is in response to your letter of March 27, 1972, in which you asked my opinion as to whether Section 9 ofGa. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 186 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-509), remains in effect after the Reorganization Bills have become law to the extent that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles could appoint and discharge employees required in the performance ofthe board's quasi-judicial functions.
Section 12 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069, passed in the 1972 General Assembly and approved by the Governor on April 6, 1972, provides that the Pardons and Paroles Board and its quasi-judicial functions, as provided in the Georgia Constitution, are continued. Further, that the board is assigned to the Department ofOffender Rehabilitation "for administrative purposes only as prescribed in Section 105 of the Executive Reorganization Plan of 1972."
Section 8 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, which was approved by the Governor immediately prior to Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069, provides that Section 3 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, shall be deemed to be Section 105 of the Executive Reorganization Plan of 1972.
Therefore, the definition of assignment for administrative purposes only as stated in Section 3 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, is applicable as the definition to be used in Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069.
Section 3 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, provides, in pertinent part, that:
"(a) An agency assigned to a department for administrative purposes only in this Act shall:
(1) Exercise its quasi-judicial, rule-making, licensing or policy-making functions independent of the department and without approval or control of the department.
* * * (3) Hire its own personnel, if authorized by this Act, by the Constitution or by statute, or ifthe General Assembly provides or authorizes the expenditure of funds therefor. (b) The department to which an agency is assigned for administrative purposes only in this Act shall: (1) Provide record keeping, reporting, and related administrative and clerical functions for the agency.
* * * (3) Provide staff for the agency subject to the provisions of
(a) (3)."

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Therefore, if the State Board of Pardons and Paroles is authorized to hire personnel for its quasi-judicial functions by virtue of either:

1. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, 2. the Constitution, 3. a statute, 4. appropriation of funds by the General Assembly for hiring its own personnel,

then the board may continue appointing and discharging employees engaged in that function.
The board has been given the authority to appoint and discharge employees required to carry out the activities of the board in Section 9, Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 186; Ga. Code Ann. 77-509. There are no provisions of either Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, or Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069, which specifically repeal or are in direct conflict with that statutory authority as to the board's quasi-judicial functions.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles may hire and terminate employees required in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.

OPINION 72-50
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

May 5, 1972

Re: Motor vehicles; bumper standards.

This is in reply to your request for my opinion as to whether the standards set forth in Section 2 of the Automobile Manufacturer's Safety Warranty Act of1971, Ga. Laws 1971, p. 373, Ga. Code Ann. 68-1824, are applicable to certain "all purpose" or "multi-purpose" vehicles. Generally speaking, it is my understanding that the vehicles in question are vehicles involving variations of the so-called carryall and combining the passenger-carrying features of the traditional stationwagon with
the sheet metal of the particular manufacturer's standard

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light-truck line(s). These vehicles may or may not incorporate some or all of the mechanical features of the light truck, such as suspension, braking, transmission, etc. It is specifically understood that your request for my opinion does not involve the so-called crew-cab variations of vehicles which are obviously trucks in the fullest sense of that word.
Section 1 ofthe enactment in question defines the term "private passenger automobile" as "a four-wheeled motor vehicle designed principally for carrying passengers not for hire, for use on public roads and highways and not designed for use principally as a dwelling or for camping." Ga. Laws 1971, p. 373, Ga. Code Ann. 68-1823.
As you are aware, there was an attempt during the 1972 session of the General Assembly to redefine the term "private passenger automobile" so as to automatically exclude from its coverage multi-purpose vehicles of the type involved in your inquiry; however, the proposed amendatory legislation failed to receive final action. Therefore, your inquiry must turn on the law as presently written, the key to which is to be found in the term "designed principally for carrying passengers not for hire, for use on public roads and highways...."
It is my opinion that as presently written the law is not ambiguous and does not require any construction beyond the plain
n1. meaning of the words employed within the statute. Ga. Code
102-102 It is my opinion that any motor vehicle meeting other requisites ofthe Act which is principally designed for use on public roads and highways and the carrying of passengers not for hire is a "private passenger automobile" within the coverage of the Act even though it might have subsidiary multi-purpose functions which do not fit within the definition.
The application of the legislative standard to each individual design will turn on a finding of fact. I recognize that the nature of vehicles involved necessarily establishes difficult factual questions for ultimate resolution; however, this difficulty is an inescapable adjunct to the sound application of unambiguous legislation to sometimes ambiguous situations.
While I cannot give you an opinion which would automatically classify or declassify these vehicles from coverage under the Act, I can call your attention to certain factors which I feel the Act contemplates being examined in the resolution ofthe fact question underlying its application. Firstly, it is clear that the criteria is one of principal design intention. Such intention is necessarily a subjective one on the part of the manufacturer. While subjective

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within the manufacturer's structure, such intention may be objectively manifested by conditions and events which are susceptible of objective measurement. For instance, the subjective design intention will be manifested in the manufacturer's market contemplation as revealed by its advertising, specifications, etc. The mode of merchandising and the area of use appeal addressed in merchandising each individual design may be measured in concluding whether the manufacturer has designed the vehicle principally for carrying passengers or whether the pass'enger-carrying capacity of the vehicle is strictly subsidiary to other functions not within the definition.

OPINION 72-51
To: Chairman, Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council

May 8, 1972

Re: Age of Majority Act; effect of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193, upon Peace Officer Standards and Training Act.

This is in response to your letter of March 31, 1972, asking whether Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193, which was signed into law on March 10, 1972, changes the minimum age qualification for certification as a peace officer from 20 to 18.
The statute in question, the "Age of Majority Act," is a broad Act affecting many areas of the law. Some areas it affects directly (e. g., the minimum age for entering binding contracts, executing deeds and entering into marriage are explicitly set at age 18). Many other areas of the law are affected by the more general provisions of the Act. There are three general sections which bear on the question you ask. Section 1 amends the Georgia Code to declare that the age of legal majority is now 18 years rather than 21. Section 13 ofthe Act is the customary provision that "all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed." The most sweeping section of the Act is Section 12 which reads as follows:

"It is the intention of this Act to reduce the age of legal majority in this state from 21 years of age to 18 years of age for all purposes so that all persons who have reached the age of 18 shall have all of the rights, privileges, powers, duties, responsibilities and liabilities heretofore applicable to persons

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who were 21 years of age or over. To further carry out this intention the word "twenty- one" and the figure "21" are hereby stricken where the same appear in all laws ofthis state referring to the required age for majority and the word "eighteen" and the figure "18" are hereby inserted in lieu of said word and figure. Nothing in this Act shall be construed, however, to change the provisions of any general or local law relative to the required age to qualify for holding public office."

Since this Act does not specifically refer to the age requirement of the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, as prescribed by Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 208, 212 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-2108), it must be determined if, by these general sections, the legislature expressed an intent to lower the age from 20 to 18 in this Act. Section 13 of the Age of Majority Act is operative only in case of conflict between that Act and prior existing law. Ifthere is any such conflict, it will have to be found in either Section 1 or Section 12. It is important to note this point that both Section 1 and Section 12 are concerned not with age in general, but with age of majority. Thus it is important to understand what is encompassed in the concept of "majority."
In the common-law tradition of England and many American states, the terminology "infancy" has been used to mean any age less than the age of majority. The common law concept of infancy has been summarized as follows: "Infants have various privileges and various disabilities; but their varied disabilities are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by their own imprudent acts." (1 Blackstone, Commentaries, 469). A somewhat more modern statement of the same concept is: "[T]he disabilities ofminors are really privileges which the law gives them, and which they may exercise for their own benefit." King v. Cordrey, 34 Del. 418, 177 A. 303 (1935). Thus, the purpose and function of the concept of minority is to limit the power of the immature and inexperienced to dispose ofproperty, bind themselves by contract, and take other actions of a civil nature, which, if unwise, could work to the serious detriment of the minor. Thus, it can be seen that the traditional concept of "majority" does not apply to all age limitations, but only to those limitations on the infant's power to take binding actions of a civil nature.
"The words minor, infant, and child are used interchangeably in Georgia statutes and cases." 15EncyclopediaGeorgiaLaw, Infants, 4. Despite this lack ofprecise terminology, it is clear that Georgia law does distinguish between the various purposes that age

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limitations may serve. Many of the age standards of Georgia law are clearly within the common-law concept of majority. The power to own and convey property and to make binding contracts are two such limitations which are expressly affected by the Age of Majority Act. Others, such as the capacity to sue and be sued in his own name, are clearly affected by the general provisions ofthe law. There are, however, numerous other age distinctions made in Georgia law which do not relate to the traditional concept of majority. Laws regulating child labor, statutory rape, and cruelty to children are designed to protect children from adults, not from their own unwise actions. Another category of age limitations not related to the traditional concept of majority are those qualifications designed to protect the public from the immaturity and inexperience of youth. Age limitations relating to such things as drivers licenses, voting franchise and qualifications for public office are examples of this type of age limitation. The question which must be answered is whether the Georgia legislature in passing the Age of Majority Act intended to reduce all age limitations to a maximum of 18, or only those within the traditional concept of majority.
The legislative history ofthis Act provides some indication ofthe legislative intent behind it. Senate Billll, 1972 Session, the basis for this Act, as originally introduced into the Senate, simply amended Code 74-104 by striking the numeral "21" and inserting in its place the numeral "18" so as to make that section read:

"Age of majority - the age of legal majority in this state is 18 years; until that age all persons are minors."

The Senate Committee on Judiciary proposed an amendment to Senate Bill 11 which added at the end of the amended Code 74-104 the following: "All persons 18 years of age or older shall have all the duties, powers and privileges as a person 21 years of age or older." This amendment was approved by the Senate as a whole, and the bill passed the Senate for the first time in this amended form.
Senate Billll was considered by the House ofRepresentatives in the form ofa floor substitute which was significantly different from the bill passed out by the Senate in both form and concept. This floor substitute, with certain floor amendments which are of no relevance to this present inquiry, was the bill which passed the House, and the Senate adopted the House version without further

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amendment. The mandate to change age 21 to age 18 in Georgia law was significantly less sweeping in the House version. Significantly deleted in the House version was the language of the Senate Judiciary Committee amendment giving "all persons 18 years of age or older ... all the duties, powers and privileges as a person 21 years of age or older." Section 1 of the House version of Senate Bill 11, the version which was enacted into law, makes the same provision as to Ga. Code Ann. 74-104 as did the version of Senate Bill 11 which was originally introduced. If the concept of the Senate Judiciary Committee amendment survived anywhere in the law as it was enacted, it was in Section 12 of the Act.
Although Section 12 contains some rather broad language it contains a restriction of particular significance. The last sentence of Section 12 ofthe Act reads as follows: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed, however, to change the provisions of any general or local law relative to the required age to qualify for holding public office." Certification as a "peace officer" is probably not a "public office" within the contemplation of this language, but this exception for public officers indicates that the legislature did not have in mind lowering the age for those qualifications which were designed to protect the public from the immaturity and inexperience ofyouth. Thus, reading the Act as a whole, and noting that it is the age of "majority" which is affected by both Section 1 and Section 12, and noting that qualifications for office are specifically excluded in Section 12, it seems reasonable to conclude that the legislative intent was limited. The primary purpose of the Act was to lower the age at which the state grants the power to take binding actions of a civil nature such as are encompassed within the traditional concept of infancy.
The age qualification ofthe Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, Ga. Laws 1970, p. 208, seems clearly to be an age qualification designed to protect the public, not one designed to protect the underaged from themselves. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the age of 20 rather than 21 was chosen, for if the concern of the legislature in passing the Peace Officers Standards and Training Act had been to protect the minor from himself, it seems likely that they would have chosen age 21, the age till which the minor has traditionally required this protection.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the age limitation of the Georgia Peace Officers Standards and Training Act is not a standard which relates to the concept of majority, but a standard laid down for the protection ofthe public. It is also my opinion that

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the Age of Majority Act does not relate to this 20-year age limitation which is designed for the protection of the public. I therefore conclude that the age qualification under the Peace Officers Standards and Training Act is not lowered from age 20 to age 18 by the Age of Majority Act.

OPINION 72-52 To: State Superintendent of Schools

May 10, 1972

Re: Education; funds for the handicapped; question as to whether state money may be distributed by counties to private schools.

This responds to your request for an opinion respecting whether or not it would be lawful for the State Board of Education to pay over to the Houston and Fulton county boards ofeducation certain sums appropriated to the State Board ofEducation to provide funds to the Houston and Fulton county boards of education for payment to certain designated private schools.
As you have pointed out, the General Appropriations Act approved March 19, 1971, Ga. Laws 1971, p. 111, has been amended, inter alia, by Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 26, 29, as follows:

"Provided that of the above appropriated amount, relative to Grants for Instruction and Services to the Handicapped, the sum of $50,000 is designated and committed solely for the purpose of providing funds to the Houston county board of education for equal payment to the Houston County Speech and Hearing School and the Happy Hour School for Exceptional Children. "Provided that of the above appropriated amount, relative to Grants for Instruction and Services to the Handicapped, the sum of $50,000 is designated and committed solely for the purpose of providing funds to the Fulton county board of education for payment to the Elaine Clark School for Exceptional Children, for the Foundation for Children with Acute Multiple Handicaps, Inc."

I am of the opinion that the State Board of Education would not commit any illegality by paying these funds to the Houston and Fulton county boards of education; however, preliminary legal

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research has not established the existence of any clear constitutional authorization pursuant to which the Houston and Fulton county boards of education may pay the appropriated sums over to the respective private schools in the manner contemplated in Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 26, 29. The Constitution of Georgia does
authorize educationai grants "to citizens of the state." Ga. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. XIII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-7502). See, generally, Wright u. Absalom, 224 Ga. 6 (1968). Accordingly, I believe you should caution the Houston and Fulton county boards of education that "Before an officer can be required to pay out public money, or be justified in doing so, those who demand its payment should be able to show a clear provision of law which entitles them to receive it." Freeney u. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142 (1) (1933).

OPINION 72-53
To: Comptroller, Georgia Ports Authority

May 11, 1972

Re: State Ports Authority; sale of property.

This is in reply to your letter asking whether the Georgia Ports Authority can sell approximately five acres of undeveloped property at its Garden City Terminal which is a part of the Savannah Port and Terminal Facilities and was previously known as the Old Quartermaster Medical Depot. You state that the property was subject to a lien created by a Trust Indenture, dated October 1, 1950, securing Series 1950 Bonds issued by the authority and that you have contacted the trustee who indicated that the lien created by the 1950 indenture has been extinguished. The authority has statutory authorization to sell the property in question provided certain conditions are satisfied. Ga. Code Ann. 98-220 (Ga. Laws 1949, p. 778) provides, in part, as follows:

"The Governor is hereby authorized to convey for and in behalf of the State title to lands and improvements known as the medical depot site in Chatham county, Georgia, adjacent to the Savannah River.* * *The authority shall have the power to sell any portions of land and/or improvements thus conveyed as are not required for port or warehouse operation or for the future expansion and/or improvement of the operation of a system of State docks: Provided, that any moneys received

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incident to such sales shall be utilized by the authority for the further expansion, construction and improvement of the existing facilities located at the Medical Depot site in Chatham county on the Savannah River."

Ga. Code Ann. 98-223 (b) (Ga. Laws 1958, p. 714), which is cumulative of the above Code section, provides, in part, as follows:

HThe authority... may sell or otherwise dispose ofland and any improvements thereon acquired by the authority pursuant to law and which the authority may determine is not required for port or warehouse operations or for the future expansion and improvement of the State system of docks, including property which is suitable for industrial development. Any such property may be sold, leased or otherwise disposed ofupon such terms and conditions as may be provided by resolution of the authority. The proceeds of any such sale shall be used by the authority for the purposes provided by law: Provided, however, that any sale of land . .. as provided under the section shall be first approved in writing by the Governor, the State Auditor and the Attorney General." (Emphasis added.)

The lien on the Savannah Port and Terminal Facilities created by the 1950 indenture has been extinguished, because payment for all ofthe Series 1950 Bonds has been provided for. However, all the revenues (monies) arising out of the ownership ofthis property and not required pursuant to the provisions of the 1950 indenture were pledged pursuant to the terms of a trust indenture, dated December 1, 1961, securing the Series 1961 Bonds issued by the
authority. Even though the revenues from these facilities were pledged, the facilities are not part of the leased property under the 1961lease securing the Series 1961 Bonds so it does not appear that
705 of the 1961 indenture would prohibit the sale of the portion of the facilities in question provided the proceeds from the sale at fair market value are handled pursuant to the terms of the 1961 indenture.
Since the revenues from the property have been pledged under the 1961 indenture, there would have to be a determination as to whether the proceeds from the sale of the property can be placed in the Georgia Ports Authority Operating Account 1961 so as to comply with the 1961 indenture and still be used for the further expansion, construction and improvement of the existing facilities

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at the medical depot site as required by Ga. Code Ann. 98-220. This would require the concurrence of the trustee under the 1961 indenture. In this connection, it is noted that the 1961 indenture provides that, after the requirements of the operating account are met and at specified times, the monies remaining in the operating account' shall be transferred to the ~Georgia Ports Authority
Development Fund 1961." If the monies in the development fund are not required for the payment of principal, interest or paying agents' fees, such monies may be used to make additions and improvements to facilities owned and operated by the authority for the benefit of the state in promoting and increasing the flow of
trade. Therefore, it is my official opinion that the authority is
authorized to sell the property in question, provided the property is not required for port or warehouse operation or for future expansion and/or improvement of the operation of a system of state docks, the sale is first approved in writing by the Governor, the State Auditor and the Attorney General and the proceeds from the sale are utilized by the authority for the further expansion, construction and improvement of the existing facilities located at
the medical depot site.

OPINION 7254
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

May 12, 1972

Re: Attorneys at law; representation of persons before Department of Public Safety in license suspension matters.

This is in reply to your letter of April 18, 1972, requesting a ruling on whether a law clerk from Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Inc. can be allowed to represent a client before a Department of Public Safety, Driver Services Division, hearing officer in a hearing on the suspension of a driver's license, under the Safety Responsibility Act.
The Georgia Constitution and laws long have provided that any person may be represented by himself or by counsel at any legal proteeding against him. At the same time, the state laws also have made it illegal for anyone other than duly licensed attorneys ~~to practice or appear as an attorney at law, for any person other than himself . . .or to render legal services of any kind in actions or

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proceedings of any nature...." (Ga. Code Ann. 9-402) (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 191)). Ga. Code Ann. 9-401, based upon Ga. Laws 1931, p. 191; 1937, p. 753, defines the practice of law, in part, as "any action taken for others in any matter connected with the law ...." Ga. Code Ann. 9-9903 (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 191) provides that violation of these provisions is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine not exceeding $500.
The Georgia Supreme Court has spoken on this issue:

"The practice oflaw, as that term is commonly used, embraces much more than the conduct of litigation. The greater, more responsible, and delicate part of a lawyer's work is in other directions. Practicing law, according to the laws and customs of courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use oflegal knowledge or skill." [Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511 (1931)].

Therefore, it is my opinion that the general rule on the instant question proposed by you is that no one other than the person whose driver's license is in question, or a duly licensed attorney employed by him, may appear at a Department of Public Safety hearing on his behalf.
However, the General Assembly by Ga. Laws 1967, p. 153 (Ga. Code Ann. 9-401.1, as amended), has provided one limited exception in which certain duly certified, third-year law students not yet licensed to practice law may render legal services to indigent persons, without charge to said persons. Such law students must, however, be working through "an approved legal aid agency," as set out in the Act cited above. I would further point out that the law in subsection 6 severely limits the activities ofsuch students.

When a third-year law student has been authorized to practice legal aid under the provisions of this section, he shall, to the extent involved in his participation in the legal aid agency, have the authority to practice law as if he were admitted and licensed to practice in this state except that all pleadings and other entries ofrecord must be signed by a licensed attorney and, in the conduct of a trial, a licensed attorney must be present. " (Ga. Code 9-401.1 (6)). (Emphasis added.)

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You are further cautioned that the Act places strict controls on what agencies may qualify under it, and makes certain other provisions, including that the certified third-year student must be registered with the superior court in the county in which the agency is authorized to act. Therefore, it is my opinion that while persons appearing before your hearing officers on the issue of drivers license revocations generally must either represent themselves or be represented by licensed attorneys employed by them, when such persons are indigents they may be accompanied by certified, third-year law students working through an approved legal aid society, who may offer them legal advice during the hearings. Since such proceedings are administrative hearings, and not trials, it is also my opinion that such certified law students may appear at the hearings without licensed counsel accompanying them.

OPINION 72-55
To: Director, Department of Natural Resources

May 15, 1972

Re: Payments by ordinaries to retirement funds from fines or forfeitures arising from game and fish violations.

This is in response to your letter of April 4, 1972, in which you requested my opinion as to whether an ordinary should make payments to the peace officers, ordinaries and sheriffs retirement funds from fines paid for violations of game and fish statutes.
The General Assembly has prescribed that funds received from fines and forfeitures imposed by the courts for violations of the wildlife laws:

"shall be used, except as otherwise provided herein, first, to pay the proper officers of the trial court as prescribed by law. The money remaining after said officers have been compensated shall be remitted promptly by the clerk of the court in which the case was disposed of to the county treasurer of the county in which said fine is assessed, who shall deposit said funds in the general funds of the county, but to be allocated to the said county school board for school purposes." Ga. Laws 1955, pp. 483, 491 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-117).

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The question raised in your request for an opinion is identical to that answered in a recent opinion prepared by this office, a copy of which is attached for your information. That opinion discusses the payment of money from fines and forfeitures for violations of motor vehicle statutes by court clerks to the various retirement funds. The principles expressed in that opinion are applicable and are adopted here. [See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-29.]
In briefsummary ofthe application ofthose principles, payments are to be made to the Peace Officers Annuity and Benefit Fund and the Ordinaries Retirement Fund in the amounts specified in Ga. Code Ann. 78-909, based upon Ga. Laws 1950, p. 50, as amended, and 24-1716a, based upon Ga. Laws 1959, p. 354, before the payment of costs for the violations of the game and fish statutes.
Payments are also to be made to the Sheriffs Retirement Fund provided that the county sheriff also acts as sheriff of the court of ordinary. Payments to this fund should be deducted from the fines in the amount specified in Ga. Code Ann. 24-2810a (Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1203).

OPINION 72-156
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

May 16, 1972

Re: Employees Retirement System; employment of regular (as distinguished from disability) retirees by counties without loss of benefits.

This is in reply to your letter of April 25, 1972, in which you requested my opinion as to whether retired members of the Department of Public Safety who might be elected as full-time paid
county officials would be entitled to continue receiving full retirement benefits from the Employees Retirement System.
Prior to 1971, the relevant statutory provision stated that a retiree's benefits would be suspended if he was employed by any state department, or any agency, or any political subdivision which was supported in whole or in part by state funds regardless of the source of such funds. Ga. Laws 1969, p. 1015.
In 1971 the statute was amended so that the suspension of benefits applied only if the retiree was employed by any state department or agency, eliminating the 11policital subdivision"

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clause. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 338 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2505 (1) (c)). Therefore, it is my opinion that retirement benefits from the Employees Retirement System would not be suspended ifa regular retiree was elected to a full-time paid county office.
However, if the retiree is retired under the disability provisions of the statute, the performance of duties as a county official could raise a question as to the extent of his disability and to the continuance ofhis benefits. For example, the provisions ofGa. Code Ann. 40-2505 (3) (b) granting special disability benefits to certain Department of Public Safety employees provides for a retirement benefit during the retiree's life or length of disability. Ga. Code Ann. 40-2505 (5) provides that if a retiree on disability allowance is engaged in or able to engage in a gainful occupation, the amount of his pension may be modified.
Therefore, the question ofcontinuation ofbenefits ofa person on disability retirement would depend upon the circumstances in each particular instance.

OPINION 72-57 To: Governor, State of Georgia

May 16, 1972

Re: State Court of Gwinnett County; qualifications of solicitor.

In your letter of May 12, you requested an opinion on the qualifications for the office of solicitor of the State Court of Gwinnett County. There is an apparent conflict between a provision in Ga. Laws 1967, p. 2377, which requires that the solicitor reside in the county for two years prior to taking office and a provision of Ga. Laws 1970, p. 679, which does not mention residency.
The 1970 Act is a general law providing for the organization of the trial courts of the state below the superior court level. The State Court ofGwinnett County is covered by the Act according to Section 2. The Act creating the State Court of Gwinnett County and the amendments to it are local Acts. Ordinarily, a later general Act does not repeal a prior local Act by implication. See Nash u. National Preferred Life Insurance Co., 222 Ga. 14 (1966). However, where the intention of the legislature to repeal a prior Act is manifest, that intent will be recognized. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102
(9).
One of the stated purposes of the 1970 Act is to

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"promote the just and prompt disposition of litigation by:
* * * (b) Amending certain laws with respect to the said courts to conform them to the laws set forth in this Act, to the end that each said court may be a harmonious part of the trial courts
ofthe State ofGeorgia." Ga. Laws 1970, p. 679. See Editorial Note beginning of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 24-21A.
Section 13 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2112a) provides for repeal of any provision in local Acts creating the lower courts which conflict with the later statute. The clearly stated goal of the statute is to establish a uniform system of lower state courts, eliminating the disparate provisions of the several local Acts originally creating them. In Section 12 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2111a) the General Assembly established the qualifications for judges and solicitors of such courts. In keeping with the goal of uniformity, Section 12 should be construed to repeal by implication inconsistent provisions ofthe local Acts. It would be possible to interpret Section 12 to provide minimal requirements only, allowing prior local Acts to impose further restrictions. In view ofthe comprehensive nature of the more recent Act, however, the better view is that it covers the whole subject-matter of qualifications for the offices of solicitors and judges ofstate courts. See Collier u. Mitchell, 207 Ga. 528 (1961). See also Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-4401).
It is, therefore, my opinion that the solicitor of the State Court of Gwinnett County need only meet the requirements established in Section 12 of Ga. Laws 1970, p. 679, i.e., that he be a member of the State Bar of Georgia and engaged in the active practice of law for three years prior to taking office.

OPINION 72-58
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

May 16, 1972

Re: Reorganization; general discussion of merit system status of division directors after reorganization.

This is in response to your letter of April 28, 1972, in which you requested my opinion on several questions regarding merit system coverage of division directors in the reorganized governmental

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structure. I have repeated your questions below, together with my opinion on each question.
It should be noted that in several of your questions, you refer to a person being transferred by the Act. To my knowledge, there is no provision in the Act specifying the transfer of certain individuals, nor providing that certain officers in existing departments will fill certain positions in new departments. Therefore, I have assumed that when you use that expression, you are referring to a situation in which an individual has already been selected and transferred to a new position.
All the question,s involve an interpretation or application of Section 2501 ofGa. Laws 1972, p. 1015, the Reorganization Act of 1972.
That Section states:

"Classification of Positions. The position of, or person occupying the position of, head of department or division director ofany agency created by the transfer offunctions shall be inthe unclassified service as defined in the Acts governingthe State Merit System, except for the Director of the Personnel Division of the Department of Administrative Services, the official of the Department of Human Resources in charge of Vocational Rehabilitation, and the Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Department of Natural Resources who shall be in the classified service. The position of head of department or division director of any agency created by the transfer of functions shall be new positions. The State Personnel Board shall adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with this Act to effectuate the transfer of positions and personnel and the classification of such positions."

Question 1: If a person occupied a position in the Classified Service and was transferred by the Act into a newly-created department and heads a division in that department, is he within the Classified Service?
The statute provides that the division director of an agency created by the transfer of functions shall be in the unclassified service (with the exception of three division directors specifically named in the statute). In this situation the entire department was created by a transfer offunctions. Therefore, the division directors in the department would be in the unclassified service unless they

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are heading one of the three divisions specified in Section 2501. Question 2: If a division director occupying a position in the
Classified Service is transferred by the Act into a newly-created department and heads a division in that department, does his position of division director remain in the Classified Service?
This question is not entirely clear. If the question concerns the status of the individual who has been transferred into a newly-created department where he is now the division director, he is, of course, in the unclassified service. If your question concerns the classified service status of the position of division director in the old department which has been vacated, and assuming that the functions of the old division are unaffected by reorganization, it is my opinion that that old position remains in the Classified Service by virtue of Section 31 of the Reorganization Act.
Question 3: If a person was a division director occupying a position in the Classified Service and was transferred by the Act into a newly-created department but does not head either the department or a division in that department, does he remain in the Classified Service?
Since the person in your question is not now heading an agency created by the transfer of functions, his status in the merit system remains the same.
Question 4: If an entirely new division is created from functions transferred under the Reorganization Act, in a department which existed prior to reorganization and the other division directors of that department were in the Classified Service, is the director of the new division in the Classified Service?
No. The status of other division directors in a department is irrelevant. The question is whether a specified division director is heading an agency created by the transfer of functions. If so, he is in the unclassified service.
Question 5: If functions are transferred to a division of a department which existed prior to reorganization, and the transfer results in a revised organizational structure for the division with an increased level of duties and responsibilities for the division director, does the director of such division remain in the Classified Service if his position was classified prior to the transfer?
This question is difficult to answer since it depends upon the factual situation. One of the purposes of placing division directors of new divisions in the unclassified service was to permit the department manager, who normally also heads a newly-created department, the opportunity to observe the performance and to have the discretion to shift management personnel as necessary to

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effect the greatest degree of managerial effectiveness. Consequently, ifthe functions transferred into an existing division are substantial, and have the effect of significantly altering the division's task, organization and responsibility, then, in effect, a new division has been created by reorganization and the division director should be in the unclassified service. On the other hand, if the transferred functions do not, in fact, make such a significant and substantial change in the existing division, then the division should remain in the Classified Service. The facts ofeach situation will have to be reviewed to make a determination as to the status of the director. [This determination would be made by the State Personnel Board. Op. Att'y Gen. 72-81, infra.]
Question 6: If a department having division directors in the Classified Service was continued by the Reorganization Act and received additional functions by transfer, are the previously classified division directors whose functions are unaffected by reorganization then placed in the unclassified service?
No. Since the divisions were unaffected by reorganization, the division directors remain in Classified Service.

OPINION 72-59
To: Director, Parks and Recreation Division, Department of Natural Resources

May 17, 1972

Re: State contracts; agreement under which state parks were to lease golf carts for over one year was void as violative of State Constitution.

This is in response to your letter of May 10, 1972, wherein you requested an opinion as to whether or not a certain lease agreement between E-Z-Go Car Division, Textron, Inc., and State Parks Department, State of Georgia, a copy of which was attached to said letter, is a valid contract.
An examination of said contract reveals that on March 1, 1971, the state agreed to lease for a period of 52 months (terminating June 30, 1975) 30 electric golf cars for rental to players at the golf course located at Hard Labor Creek State Park at a minimum rate of $6 per 18 holes for a consideration from the state to the corporation of 60 percent of the gross rental revenue of said cars collected by the state payable on the lOth of each month

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(commencing April 10, 1971). The answer to your question is found in an official opinion to the
Honorable Jimmy Carter, Governor of the State of Georgia, dated May 28, 1971 (Op. Att'y Gen. 71-103), holding that a publishing contract creating state liability for over a year is in violation ofGa. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5601). Note especially the following quotation from that opinion:

"'The policy of the Constitution is not only against the incurring ofliability to be discharged in the future for services rendered concurrently with the liability incurred, or previous thereto, but it is equally against the incurring of a liability which is to be discharged in the future, notwithstanding that it depends upon the performance ofsome service to be rendered in the future.' City Council of Dawson u. Dawson Waterworks Company, 106 Ga. 696, 712, 32 S.E. 907, 913 (1899)."

I conclude that the golf-cart contract is not valid.

OPINION 72-60
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

May 18, 1972

Re: Motor vehicles; inspection; used car dealers not required to inspect vehicles withunexpiredcertificates;out-of-state certificates.

This is in reply to your letter of April 18, 1972, requesting my official opinion on the construction of Ga. Laws 1971, p. 515, Section 126 (e), which has been codified as Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726.6. As you stated, the law provides:

"No dealer engaged in the business of selling new or used motor vehicles shall sell at retail any vehicle required to be inspected by this Article, unless there appears on said vehicle an unexpired certificate."

You wondered if this section would require automobile dealers "to reinspect a vehicle prior to selling same ifthere appears on said vehicle a valid unexpired inspection sticker from another state that has an inspection program similar to the inspection program

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in this state." You also noted that under your present rules "an out-of-state resident moving into the state with a valid inspection certificate is allowed to operate said vehicle without reinspection until the certificate expires," and added "the same situation exists under a private sale of a vehicle from another state brought into this state and allowed to operate until the expiration of the inspection certificate."
The Georgia Motor Vehicle Inspection Act gives you, as Director (now Commissioner) of the Department of Public Safety, the authority "to make and promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to implement and carry out the provisions of this Act." Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726, based upon Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 616, as amended. As you have noted under the past and current laws and the rules and regulations established by you, new residents having automobiles which have had current, valid inspection stickers affixed to them, have been allowed to operate their automobiles until the expiration of the inspection certificates. You will note that the 1971 Act in question here says only that the vehicles in question must have affixed "an unexpired certificate." (Emphasis added.) The Act does not say such a certificate must be a Georgia certificate.

"In construing statutes, a word will be given its usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended." Parrish v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 238 (1958). See Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (1).

The Georgia and federal courts long have held that:

"Statutes must be construed to effectuate the legislative intent." Postmaster-General of United States v. Early, 25 U.S. 136 (1827). See also Sharpe v. Lowe, 214 Ga. 513, 518 (1958).

The Georgia courts also say that:

"All statutes are to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law and their meaning and effect is to be determined in connection with the common law and the Constitution and with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts." Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714 (1951).

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The clear and expressed intent of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Inspection Act is to promote safety on the roads of this state and not to raise revenue. Therefore, since the 1971 Act does not expressly require motor vehicles sold in the state to have a Georgia inspection certificate, and since under your current rules and regulations you have not been requiring such, it is my opinion that Section 126 (e) of Ga. Laws 1971, p. 515, does not require a change in your existing regulations.

OPINION 72-61
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

May 18, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; misbehavior by jail inmates; effect upon good time allowances.

This is in reply to your letter of April 27, 1972, requesting my official opinion on the question cccan the sheriffs or Department of Offender Rehabilitation take jail credit away from inmates who have misbehaved in the jails prior to their being sent to a correctional institution?"
As you know, the law generally governing good time allowance and deductions therefrom is covered by Ga. Code Ann. 77-320 (Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 178, as amended), which provides in part that ccthe State Board of Corrections shall formulate rules and
regulations providing for extra good time allowances, in addition to the statutory good time" provided in the statute. Subsection (b) of that statute provides that the good time computation shall begin ccupon receipt of a prisoner by any prison or county public works
camp operated under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections...." Subsection (c) of that Act provides the formula for
deducting from the prisoner's earned good time when he misbehaves. It provides in part that nthe wardens of the various penal institutions above referred to (any prison or county public works camp operated under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections)" shall notify you in writing of any punishment imposed or other disciplinary action taken against any prisoner under their custody. Based on such reports and other information contained in the prisoner's record, you or one ofyour assistants then makes the appropriate deduction from the

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prisoner's good time allowance. The only exception to the statute cited above appears to be in Ga.
Code Ann. 77-333 (Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1110, 1113, as amended), which relates to prisoners already convicted and sentenced to your jurisdiction on one or more offenses who are being held in temporary custody in a county jail pending final disposition of any pending indictment, accusation or information against them. Subsection (f) of that statute provides that during such temporary custody, the sentence being served by the inmate on his former conviction ''shall continue to run and good time shall be earned by the inmate to the same extent that the law allows for any other inmate serving under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections."
Ga. Code Ann. 77-201 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 493) also provides for good time allowances for misdemeanor offenders confined in county facilities under the jurisdiction of the county, based on the same formula used by the State Board of Corrections, but that section would not apply to the instant question.
Ga. Code Ann. 27-2530 to 27-2532 (Ga. Laws 1970, p. 692) provides that convicted criminals shall be given full credit for each day they spend in confinement awaiting trial, which shall be applied toward their sentences, but makes no mention ofgood time allowances.
Therefore, construing these statutes together, it is my opinion that with the limited exception ofGa.Code Ann. 77-333 relating to temporary custody ofconvicted inmates in county facilities, good
time allowances and deductions therefrom can only be computed when inmates are under the jurisdiction and control of the institutions operated by the State Department of Corrections. The answer to your question then, again, with the limited exception of Ga. Code Ann. 77-333, would be that sheriffs or the Department of Offender Rehabilitation cannot take jail credit away from inmates who have misbehaved in jails prior to their being sent to correctional institutions.

OPINION 72-62 To: Insurance Commissioner

May 22, 1972

Re: Insurance; contract by eyeglass dealers to replace lost or damaged eyeglasses at nominal cost is contract of insurance.

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You have requested my opmwn whether two contracts denominated "Continuing Contact Lens Service Agreement" and "Continuing Prescription Eyeglass Service Agreement" amount to contracts of insurance within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 56-102, based upon Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289. The first does not; the second does.
The contact lens agreement provides that the "issuer," presumably an optometrist or optician, will provide duplicate sets of contact lenses and perform related ancillary services, such as adjustment, fitting, and lens polishing, for a stated monetary fee during the life of the agreement. The agreement is effective for a period of one year from the date of issuance, presumably the date of the patient's visit to the issuer's office. Although there is a small charge for this "agreement" by the optometrist or optician, it is clear that this exchange is an integral part of an underlying transaction between the patient and the issuer, and that the purpose of the agreement is to induce and encourage continued patronage by the patient. The agreement may be cancelled by the issuer's giving written notice thereof and "making any refund due on a prorata basis."
The relationship existing by virtue of this agreement does not entail the assumption of or the actuarial distribution of a loss risk, which is an essential ingredient in any contract of insurance. Ga. Code Ann. 56-102. South Georgia Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Harrison, 183 Ga. 379, 188 S.E. 529 (1937). Rather, this agreement partakes of the nature of an option to purchase a combination of goods and services at a set fee for a stated period of time. There is simply no "risk" involved, and the patient may purchase as many duplicate sets of contact lenses as he desires at the stated price. Hence, this agreement does not constitute a contract of insurance, and this is true regardless of the nature of the business relationship existing between the issuers ofthese agreements and the optical laboratory which is promoting their use.
The terms of the eyeglass agreement are similar to those of the contact lens agreement in providing that replacement glasses and the related ancillary services will be made available for a stated fee throughout the life of the agreement. In addition, however, the eyeglass agreement provides that the issuer will "make any repairs to damaged or broken glasses, the patient to pay the first $5 for each repair or replacement made thereon." This provision amounts to an express undertaking by the issuer to indemnify the patient against a potential loss of uncertain amount, with the proviso that $5 will be "deducted" from the value of the coverage.

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It is well settled in this state that a contract of insurance may provide for indemnification through the rendering of goods and services rather than through the payment of a monetary sum. Benevolent Burial Association v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 181 S.E. 829 (1935). See South Georgia Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Harrison, 182 Ga. 60, 184 S.E. 875 (1936). Furthermore, although the benefits of the eyeglass agreement are ostensibly provided free ofcharge, it is clear that the obligation placed upon the issuer is a part of the consideration provided by him in his underlying transaction with the patient; the fee paid by the patient is in exchange for everything which the optometrist or optician gives him, including the insurance. Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E. 2d 676 (1938). See Ops. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 435. Hence, the quoted provision of the eyeglass agreement does amount to a contract of insurance within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 56-102.
A second significant difference between the agreement~ is that the contact lens agreement applies to the replacement of "duplicate contact lenses ... regardless of the number of lenses duplicated during the year ...," whereas the eyeglass agreement applies to the replacement of "lost glasses." The unconditional right of the patient to require an unlimited number of duplicate contact lenses obviates the question of risk in the contact lens agreement and suggests that the optometrist or optician issuing the agreement will stipulate a replacement fee which will at least roughly approximate the actual replacement cost. On the other hand, the eyeglass agreement gives the patient only the right to require one duplicate set of eyeglasses at a time, conditioned upo_n the previously owned spectacles being "lost." Therefore, if the stipulated replacement fee for "lost glasses" were set so low as to bear no reasonable relationship to the actual replacement cost, the net effect of the agreement would be to insure against the risk of the loss, the bulk of the premium having been charged to the patient in the optometrist's or optician's initial fee. Cf., Benevolent Burial Association, Inc. v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 181 S. E. 829 (1935). Thus the stipulation of an unreasonably low replacement fee in the eyeglass agreement could result in a contract of insurance.

OPINION 72-63
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

May 24, 1972

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Re: Public officers and employees; moving and relocation expenses.

This is in response to your recent request for my opinion as to whether a state department could defray an employee's moving and relocation expenses when that employee is permanently transferred to a new geographical location at the direction of his department.
It is a common practice for private employers who require their employees to relocate to pay the moving and associated relocation expenses incurred in the geographic move. Normally, such expenses are paid when the move is at the direction ofthe employer and not requested by the employee, and frequently will be paid only for relatively high level managerial and professional employees.
However, I am unaware of any statute which specifically authorizes the payment of such relocation expenses for state employees. Therefore, unless the expenses can be construed to be part of the employee's "compensation," there would not appear to be justification for payment.
lt has generally been held that the term ((compensation" relates only to payment for services rendered and not to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred by an employee. Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Mason, 209 Ga. 364 (1952); Hoppe v. State of Washington, 469 P. 2d 909 (Wash., 1970); 67 C. J. S. Officers, 91.
Consequently, it is my opinion that moving and relocation expenses are not part of "compensation" to be set by the State Personnel Board or any other state employer. Further, in the absence of statutory authority, an employee may not have his moving expenses paid, even though the move is made at the request of the state.
Ifthe State Personnel Board desires to recommend such a statute to the General Assembly, our office will be pleased to assist in preparing such a recommendation.
[As to use of authorized federal funds by state agency for moving expenses of employees, see Op. Att'y Gen. U72-53, infra.]

OPINION 72-64
To: Director, Department of Transportation

May 26, 1972

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Re: Highways; bridge maintenance and closing; compliance by state with federal requirements.
Mr. Emory Parrish has requested an official opinion answering certain questions posed by the Federal Highway Administration concerning whether Georgia law permitted the state's meeting federal requirements for bridge maintenance on the federal-aid system. The majority of questions deal with the closing of bridges which do not meet the minimum load requirements of 23 C.F.R. 25.3. To facilitate answering, each question will be answered specifically after a general discussion of the laws pertaining to highway maintenance and closing.
Bridges may be a part ofcity streets, county roads or the state-aid highway system. In each case the street or road is defined as including bridges (Ga. Code Ann. 102-103; Atlanta & W. P. R.R. v. Atlanta, B. & A. R.R., 125 Ga. 529, 545 [1906]), unless a different meaning is apparent from the context (Ga. Code Ann. 102-103). Therefore, to answer the questions ofthe Highway Administration, the laws pertaining to streets and roads must be examined.
Cities are responsible for injury or damage resulting from negligently built or maintained streets. See Ga. Code Ann. 69-303; Mayor of Montezuma v. Wilson, 82 Ga. 206 (1888); Macon v. Harrison, 98 Ga. App. 769 (1958). Additionally, a municipality is liable for injuries or damages resulting from defects in the streets if it has actual notice of the defects, or if such defect has existed for sufficient time for notice to be inferred in time to repair it or give warning of its existence. Mayor of Montezuma v. Wilson, supra; Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 353 (1969); McKay v. Atlanta, 80 Ga. App. 797 (1950).
Neither the state nor a county is amenable to suit for any cause of action unless its prior consent is given. State: Cunningham v. Macon & R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 3 S. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992 (1883); Fleisher v. Duncan, 195 Ga. 309 (1943); McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga. App. 565 (1966). County: Ga. Code Ann. 23-1502; see Taylor v. Jenkins County, 116 Ga. App. 718 (1967). This consent must be by statute or other proper authority. Ga. Code Ann. 23-1502; Fleisher v. Duncan, supra.
Counties are not liable for injuries received by a traveler in consequence of defects in a county public road not caused by a defective bridge. Salter v. Decatur County, 15 Ga. App. 687 (1914); seealso Hardin v. Southern Ry., 300 F. 417 (5th Cir. 1924); Purser v. Dodge County, 188 Ga. 250 (1939). However, the state may pay

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for damages or injuries caused by a defective state-aid road in a
county. See Ga. Laws 1963, p. 624 (Ga. Code Ann. 47-504 to 47-509); cf. Trice v. Wilson, 113 Ga. App. 715 (1966). Ga. Laws 1888, p. 39, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1001), states that the counties shall be primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of any defective bridges. See Grady County v. Banker, 81 Ga. App.
701 (1950). When the bridge is on a state-aid road, the Department of Transportation becomes responsible for the damages. Ga. Laws 1919, p. 249, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1710).
To help avoid the possible liabilities outlined above, each jurisdiction is charged with the maintenance ofthe raods under its supervision. In the interest ofthe health and general welfare, cities may improve their public streets as necessary. Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 140, 143 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-312); see also Ga. Laws 1927, p. 321, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 69-4). The counties are charged to the degree that "the board [of Commissioners] shall . . . make general plans, specifications and requirements prescribing the manner and style in which the public roads of the county shall be constructed and repaired ...."Ga. Code Ann. 23-913 (brackets added). The wording for the state is even stronger in that "It shall be the duty of the State Highway Board to institute and carry out efficient and equitable plans for maintenance [and] for improvement ... on the designated state-aid roads ...." Ga. Code Ann. 95-1714 (brackets added).
With the authority to maintain the roads, there is necessarily implied the authority to temporarily completely or partially close the road while repairs are being made. See Trammell v. Matthews, 84 Ga. App. 332, 338 (1950); Doby v. W. L. Florence Constr. Co., 71 Ga. App. 888 (1944). This does not imply the permanent closing of the road; however, each jurisdiction may permanently close a road if specific statutory guidelines are followed.
In the interest of the health and general welfare, city oflicials may " ... improve, open, close, or extend public streets ...." Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 140, 143 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-312); see Campbell v. Columbus, 224 Ga. 279 (1968). There is no other criterion necessary as long as it can be shown that the closing was to promote the health and general welfare of the citizens.
In order for the county to close permanently, or abandon, a road, a written application must be made with the county ordinary or other county authorities having charge of county affairs. Ga. Code Ann. 95-207. Then all persons, their overseers or agents, residing on the land through which the road runs, must be notified in writing " ... personally or by leaving notice at their most notorious

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places of abode, that they may put in their claim for damages or be forever after estopped." Ga. Code Ann. 95-203. Although the ordinaries or commissioners have the sole right to discontinue public roads (Ga. Code Ann. 95-801), they cannot lawfully do so except in the manner prescribed by law. Swiney v. DeKalb County, 102 Ga. App. 731 (1960); Wellmaker v. Lamar County Advisory Bd., 43 Ga. App. 816 (1931). Abandonment by mere nonuse does not work a forfeiture of the right to the use of the road. Barham v. Grant, 185 Ga. 601 (1938).
The abandonment by the state of a state-aid road is covered by Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 62, 66, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1609 (c)). This section states that " ... the State Highway Department shall have the right to substitute, relocate and abandon any or all of the State Highway System mileage in building new roads or bridges or in improving the State Highway System roads and bridges, keeping in view only the control points as shown by the present State Highway System." The department is required to give due consideration to, but not be controlled by, the wishes of the counties before abandoning the road. The controlling criterion is that new state-aid mileage be built or the overall system improved. Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 62, 66, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1609 (c)). The provisions of notice followed by the counties are not required of the state. Calfee v. Jones, 54 Ga. App. 481 (1936).
In the case ofroad abandonment, persons damaged by the closing may sue for the amount of their damages. See Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-301); Richmond County v. Sibert, 105 Ga. App. 581 (1962); cf. Dougherty County v. Hornsby, 213 Ga. 114 (1957). However, this does not go to the authority ofthe jurisdiction to abandon the road.
The state and the counties may effectively close some routes to certain portions of traffic by posting maximum weight limits on bridges. Ga. Code Ann. 95-906 gives county officials the right to " ... ascertain and determine the maximum load or weight that can, with safety, be transported over any bridge and its approaches other than those on state-aid roads, and to post on any such bridge a legible notice showing the maximum amount which has been so ascertained such bridge or its approaches can carry with safety." Ga. Code Ann. 95-1723 gives the Department of Transportation the authority to do the same with bridges on state-aid roads. Both sections make it unlawful to drive or otherwise bring onto such bridge or its approaches a load in excess of the posted weight. This effectively closes the route to all traffic over the maximum weight. Cf. Brantley v. Baldwin County, 81 Ga. App. 485 (1950); Abott Inv.

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Co. v. Jefferson County, 77 Ga. App. 761 (1948). Finally, the Department ofTransportation is authorized to take
the necessary steps, by appropriate resolutions, to secure the full benefit of the federal-aid program. Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 62, 66, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1609 (m)). This section would allow the state to use the bridge inspectors in the manner now prescribed by the Federal Highway Administration.
The first question of the Federal Highway Administration asks: "Are there any sections of the Georgia law, highway or other, which conflict with or will otherwise prevent the state, a county, or city responsible for maintenance of a segment ofthe F-A system from meeting the federal requirements as specified in the above stated references?" The references referred to are 23 C.F.R. 25 (National Bridge Inspection Standards) and the AASHO publication "Manual for Maintenance Inspection ofBridges 1970." These references include the latest minimum standards for bridges on federal highways and set out inspection procedures, frequency of inspections, qualifications of inspectors, and a standardized reporting system. It is my official opinion that there is nothing in the Georgia laws which would prevent the state, a county or city from meeting the federal requirements, except as outlined more specifically below. The second question stated: "Section 4, item 4.7, of the AASHO manual states in part, eThe minimum loading to be used is three tons. If the structure will not carry such a loading safely it should be closed to traffic.' Ifthe state, a city or a county chose as a matter of policy to close bridges which cannot be rated for three tons or more, is there any legal reason why they could not do so?" Because of the nature of question 4, post, I understand this question to refer to a temporary closing while the bridge is strengthened to meet the three ton minimum requirement. Based on the discussion above, where it was concluded that the state, a county or a city could temporarily close a bridge for repairs, it is my official opinion that such a jurisdiction could choose as a matter of policy to close bridges temporarily which cannot be rated for three tons or more. Question 3 asks: eels there any legal reason why the state, a county or city could not close a bridge if it became unsafe for any reason?" Again assuming a temporary closing, it is my official opinion that the state, a county or city could, for the reasons outlined in the answer to question 2, supra, close a bridge if it became unsafe. Question 4 states: "Suppose a large number of bridges on the

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F-A system were declared unsafe in a given period and there were insufficient funds available to replace or repair them. This implies that the state, a county or a city would have to close routes on a more or less permanent basis. Would this situation affect the answer to No.2 and No.3 above?"
It is my official opinion that the facts outlined in question 4 would change the answers to questions 2 and 3, supra, as those questions relate to the state and to counties. Before the routes could be permanently closed, the state and the counties would have to follow the statutory requirements or procedures applicable to them for the closing of public roads. Such a situation may also make the state, the counties and the cities responsible for damages to real property resulting from the closing of the public roads.

OPINION 72-65 To: Insurance Commissioner

May 26, 1972

Re: Insurance; representatives of hospital service nonprofit corporations, nonprofit medical service corporations, or fraternal benefit societies; no need for written examination.

You have asked our official opinion as to whether or not an Act of the 1972 session ofthe General Assembly (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 489) has the legal effect of requiring certain agents to be licensed by your office pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 56-8 of the Insurance Code, based upon Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289, and officially codified as Ga. Code Ch. 56-8.
The Act in question amends Ga. Code Ann. 56-BOla by striking a previous exception to the definition of the term "agent." The former exception excepted from the definition ofthe term "agent" any representative of a hospital service nonprofit corporation or a nonprofit medical corporation as defined and regulated by Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 56-17 and 56-18, or the representative of any fraternal benefit society as defined and regulated by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 56-19. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 489 to 490.
You asked whether this amendment is legally effective to now require these agents to take a written examination and be licensed pursuant to Ch. 56-8 of the Insurance Code.
As you point out, the Insurance Code itself provides that it does not apply to: (a) hospital service nonprofit corporations [except as provided in Chapter 56-17], (b) nonprofit medical service

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corporations [except as provided in Chapter 56-18] or, (c) fraternal benefits societies [except as provided in Chapter 56-19]. Ga. Code 56-108 (1), (2). This provision oflaw relating to the coverage of the Insurance Code was not specifically amended by the 1972 amendment. In addition, the Insurance Code specifically provides that no written or other examination shall be required of any individual seeking to be named as a licensee to represent a fraternal benefit society as its agent. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1929 (4) (c). This Chapter contains specific provisions on the licensing of agents representing fraternal benefit societies and it was not specifically amended by the 1972 amendment in question.
Before these agents could be required to take a written examination, the above provisions of law must be repealed or amended in some way. The 1972 amendment did not specifically amend these provisions and although repeals oflaw by implication are permissible under our Constitution, the Supreme Court of Georgia has held time and time again that repeals by implication are not favored and before a court will presume a repeal by implication, the provisions of the later Act must be so repulsive to the former as to be irreconcilable with it. That is, the later Act must be clearly and indubitably contrary to the existing law. Brinkley v. Dixie Construction Company, 205 Ga. 415, 54 S. E. 2d 267 (1949); Atlantic Log & Export Co. v. Central Ry. Co., 171 Ga. 175 (1), 155 S. E. 525 (1930).
In our opinion, the mere amending of the definition of the term "agent" would not work a repeal by implication of the other sections of the Insurance Code cited above which specifically provide that the Insurance Code does not apply to the agents in question and that the agent for a fraternal benefit society need not take a written or other examination. These sections can easily be construed together without doing violence to any of them and although it is possible to argue that the sponsor of this legislation "intended" to require these agents to take a written examination, we simply cannot ignore the clear provisions oflaw which were not specifically repealed and which continue to control the situation.
It is therefore our official opinion that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 489, does not require representatives of hospital service nonprofit corporations or nonprofit medical service corporations or fraternal benefit societies to take a written examination before being licensed.

115 OPINION 72-66
To: Insurance Commissioner

72-66 May 30, 1972

Re: Insurance; extension of coverage to persons upon basis of use of particular credit card not authorized.

You have requested my opinion whether a proposed plan of life insurance, to be offered by an automobile credit card company to its cardholders, will violate Ga. Code Ann. 56-713 (1), Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 405, which provides that "No insurance company shall issue, or cause to be issued, any policy ofinsurance ofany type or description upon life, ... whenever such policy of insurance is to be furnished or delivered to the purchasor or bailee of any property ... as an inducement to purchase or bail said property. . . ." In my opinion, it will.
The credit card company intends to purchase a group insurance policy which will provide to those cardholders qualifying for its benefits coverage of $1,000 in the event of accidental death in an automobile and $10,000 in the event of accidental death in a common carrier. In order for a cardholder to qualify for this coverage his monthly account statement must indicate "no payment delinquencies and a new balance of $10 or more." The credit card company has not explained precisely the meaning of the term "new balance." It does not refer to the unpaid balance remaining after all pending transactions have been computed, but rather seems to refer to the amount of charges incurred by the cardholder during the preceding billing period. Thus, a cardholder must purchase during each billing period at least $10 worth of the goods and services merchandised by the credit card company and its affiliates in order to acquire and maintain the insurance coverage. It follows inescapably that the proposed insurance will be offered as an inducement to purchase goods and services by use of the credit card and that this plan falls squarely within the prohibition of Ga. Code Ann. 56-713 (1).
The stated purpose ofthe plan is to encourage a cardholder to pay his indebtedness promptly. The corollary, fatal, requirement is that the cardholder incur a specified amount of indebtedness per billing period; a cardholder who does not use his card does not qualify for the coverage. The fact that a cardholder who does qualify may decline the insurance and receive in lieu thereofa cash rebate of six cents per billing period does not alter the essential

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requirement that the cardholder buy property in order to qualify for either benefit.
One other aspect of the plan merits attention. All the holders of a particular brand of credit card do not appear to constitute a permissible group for which a group policy of life insurance may be issued. Under Ga. Code Ann. 56-2701 (2), Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 694, all of the debtors of a single creditor may be the subject of a group life insurance policy, but the proceeds must be payable to the creditor for the purpose of reducing or extinguishing any unpaid indebtedness. That is clearly not envisioned in the proposal of the credit card company, nor does the plan fit any of the other types of group life insurance described in Ga. Code Ann. 56-2701.

OPINION 72-67 To: Director, Department of Defense

May 30, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; accrued annual leave for nonmerit-system employees.

This is in response to your letter of May 24, 1972, in which you asked my opinion ofwhether a department could pay accumulated annual leave ofup to 45 days to a nonmerit-system employee upon his retirement. You stated in your letter that your department has a long-standing personnel policy ofaffording the same benefits and privileges to nonmerit-system employees as are afforded to merit system employees.
A department can establish personnel policies concerning compensation and benefits for nonmerit-system positions in the department. On May 4, 1972, Governor Jimmy Carter, in a memorandum to all agency heads, has urged the adoption of rules consistent with the merit system rules to avoid discrimination against nonmerit-system employees as to leave benefits.
I am unware of any law which prevents you from establishing a personnel policy which conforms to the State Personnel Board policies established for merit system employees, including payment of accrued annual leave.
Therefore, since your policy is identical to the State Personnel Board policy and since State Personnel Board Regulation B. 209a provides that an employee being separated by retirement shall be entitled to receive all pay for accrued annual leave not in excess of 45 work days, it is my opinion that upon retirement of a

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nonmerit-system employee, you can pay accrued annual leave not in excess of 45 work days.

OPINION 72-68
To: Executive Secretary, State Medical Education Board

June 2, 1972

Re: Medical scholarships; an applicant for a medical education scholarship loan must be a citizen of the United States.

You have asked two questions with respect to the eligibility ofan alien to apply for a scholarship from the State Medical Education Board pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-30, as based upon the
amendment to Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (5)) proposed by Ga. Laws 1951, p. 861, as amended. The first question is whether an applicant must be a citizen of the United States in order to qualify for a medical education scholarship loan. If so, the second question is whether the alien must be a United States citizen at the time he submits an application for a scholarship with the board.
The pertinent provision concerning eligibility ofan applicant for a medical education loan is as follows:

"It shall be the duty of the board to receive and pass upon .. . all applications for loans or scholarships made by students who are bona fide citizens and residents of the State ofGeorgia and who desire to become doctors of medicine and who are acceptable for enrollment in a qualified four-year medical school." (Ga. Code Ann. 32-3005.) (Emphasis added.)

Thus, an applicant must be a "citizen" as well as a "resident" of Georgia in order to qualify.
Under the Georgia Constitution, one must be a citizen of the United States in order to be a citizen ofthis state. Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-125).
Therefore, an applicant must be a citizen of the United States in order to qualify for a medical education scholarship loan under Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-30.
With respect to your second question, it does appear from the literal language ofGa. Code Ann. 32-3005 that the applicant must

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be a citizen at the time he submits his application to the board. Apparently, this can work a hardship in some cases since the Medical Education Board requires that all applications be submitted a certain number of days prior to the date of decision. However, the board is given authority to prescribe "rules and regulations" pertaining to applications for scholarship loans, Ga. Code Ann. 32-3005, and I know of no reason why the board could not adopt a rule allowing an applicant who, except for citizenship, is otherwise qualified at the time of applying to "re-submit" his application after acquiring citizenship during this time period with retroactive effect (nunc pro tunc). See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 81-1201, allowing amendments nunc pro tunc to certain judicial processes when "such an amendment will clearly be in furtherance of justice."

OPINION 72-69
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

June 2, 1972

Re: Department of Public Safety; compensation by Federal Government of officers for special duty in drug control.

You advise us that the office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement, a division of the United States Department of Justice, has been recently created to place new emphasis on the enforcement of already existing laws regarding the abuse of various forms of drugs. The office will concentrate its efforts in a few selected geographical areas of the nation and the city of Atlanta and the surrounding metropolitan area has been selected as an area where this type of accelerated enforcement is needed.
The approach to the enforcement of drug laws which has been adopted by the Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforcement is that it will attempt to put together teams consisting of members of various federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The Department of Public Safety has received a request from the office to contribute two men to the program. At a later date, the office hopes that additional manpower could be contributed by the department.
All state and local law enforcement officers who are assigned to this task force will receive a percentage of their base salary from nonstate funds allocated for this program. The officers assigned

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from your department will remain on the payroll of your department and the additional compensation will be payment for the overtime hours which they will work in the program. It is expected that the additional compensation will be in lieu of compensatory time, time and one-half or any other method of compensating for overtime work.
You have requested our opinion on the legality of members of your department being compensated for additional work done in this manner.
We are unaware of any law which would prohibit the payment of additional compensation for additional work done in the program briefly outlined above. Georgia law does prohibit a member of the Uniform Division of the Department of Public Safety from rece1vmg any costs, emoluments or other compensation other than his salary (except for a legal reward as otherwise provided in the law), but it is clear that the additional compensation will be part ofthe officer's salary for additional work done for the program. Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 338, Section 15 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-246). We do not believe that participation in this program would be an "office of profit or trust under the Government of the United States" as prohibited by Georgia law, primarily because participation would not be an "office" within the meaning ofthat law. Ga. Code 89-101 (4); Op.Att'y Gen. 70-137, for a discussion on the term "office of profit or trust."
It is therefore our official opinion that members of the Department of Public Safety may receive additional salary for additional work done for the Drug Abuse Law Enforcement Program.

OPINION 72-70
To: Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

June 6, 1972

Re: Reorganization; Commissioner of Natural Resources replaces Director of State Parks Department as member of Jekyll Island-State Park Authority.

This is in reply to your letter asking who replaces the Director of State Parks as a member of the Jekyll Island-State Park Authority under the provisions of the "Executive Reorganization Act of 1972" (Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1052).
The "Jekyll Island-State Park Authority Act" provides, in part, as follows:

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ccThe authority shall be composed ofthe Secretary ofState, the
Attorney General, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the State Auditor, and the Director of the Department of State Parks. " Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 152, 153, as amended by Ga. Laws 1957, pp. 608, 609 (Ga. Code Ann. 43-604a). (Emphasis added.)

The ccExecutive Reorganization Act of 1972" (Section 1503) transferred all functions of the Department of State Parks, Historic Sites and Monuments (sometimes referred to as Department of State Parks) to the Department of Natural Resources and provided that any reference in Georgia Laws to the Department of State Parks means the Department of Natural Resources. Additionally, the position of Commissioner of Natural Resources was created with the direction to execute the functions vested in the Department of Natural Resources.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the provision in the ccJekyll Island-State Park Authority Act" making the Director of State Parks a member of the authority was changed by the ccExecutive Reorganization Act of 1972" so that the Commissioner of Natural Resources is now a member of the authority.

OPINION 72-71
To: Chairman, Georgia Public Service Commission

June 7, 1972

Re: Public Service Commission; fee for registration of interstate motor carriers.

You have inquired as to whether the Public Service Commission may under revised regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) continue to charge a fee of $25 for the registration of motor carriers engaged solely in interstate commerce.
Under state law, interstate motor carriers are required annually to obtain a license or identification stamp from the Georgia Commission for each vehicle operated within the state. Ga. Code Ann. 68-525 (a), 68-633 (b), based upon Ga. Laws 1931, Extra.

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Sess., p. 99, and Ga. Laws 1931, p. 199, respectively. Such licenses or identification stamps are obtained from the commission upon payment of a $25 fee per vehicle, except that vehicles domiciled in states having reciprocity with Georgia may pay a fee of$1. Ga. Code Ann., !d.
On December 15, 1971, a regulation promulgated by the ICC became effective which established a maximum fee of $5 which state commissions could charge interstate motor carriers for annual licenses or identification stamps. 45 C. F. R. 1023.33. An amendment to this regulation, however, stated the following:

uThe prescription ofthe maximum fee of$5 for the issuance of such identification stamp or number shall not preclude a state from imposing an additional fee in a reasonable amount to be paid to a state commission prior to the issuance of such stamp or number if such additional fee shall be used solely for defraying the cost of the regulation of carriers by highway operating within the borders ofsuch state and the enforcement of laws pertaining thereto." [36 F.R. 3417 (Feb. 24, 1971).] (Emphasis added.)

In my opinion, the ICC authorization of fees in excess of $5 for "regulation ofcarriers by highway operating within the borders of [the] state and the enforcement of laws pertaining thereto" is not restricted to the Public Service Commission. For example, the Department of Public Safety in Georgia is also charged with the enforcement of laws ~~regulating the use, ownership and control of motor vehicles or for offenses committed upon the highways of the state." Ga. Laws 1937, p. 322 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-242). Under the Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015 (Section 1604), the functions of the Public Service Commission relating to the performance of safety inspections of motor vehicles were transferred to the Department of Public Safety. In addition, the Director of the Department of Public Safety is authorized to issue regulations and enforce laws with respect to the licensing ofdrivers of motor vehicles when in use for the transportation of persons or property for compensation. Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401. This enumeration is not meant to be exhaustive; there may well be other state agencies or authorities which could likewise be reasonably said to be involved in the "regulation of carriers by highway operating within .... [the] state and the enforcement of laws pertaining thereto."

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The State Constitution and budget laws require that the $25 fee collected by the commission from interstate carriers be remitted
into the general state treasury. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. III (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5503); Ga. Code Ann. 40-423, based upon Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17. From the state treasury, specific appropriations are made to the Public Service Commission, the Department of Public Safety and possibly other departments which in turn perform the regulatory and law enforcement functions described by the ICC Regulation. See, e.g., Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 111, 135, 142. Moreover, the costs properly allocable to such functions of these state agencies would very likely be substantial.
Therefore, I conclude that the $25 fee required to be charged by the commission for the regulations of interstate motor carriers is not inconsistent with ICC Regulation 45 C.F.R. 1023.33, provided it can be demonstrated as suggested above that at least $20 of such fee is "used solely for defraying the cost ofthe regulation ofcarriers by highway operating within the borders of [this] state and the enforcement of laws pertaining thereto."

OPINION 72-72 To: Director, Legislative Budget Office

June 7, 1972

Re: Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees of General Assembly; transfer of funds.

You have requested our official opinion on whether the Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees of the General Assembly may approve a transfer of funds between object classes of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to allow the department to acquire a building to use as an office and central warehouse. This transfer, together with an allotment from the Governor's emergency fund, would provide sufficient funds for the department to acquire the building. Part of the floor space of the building would be used as office space and part would be used as a central warehouse. The warehouse would store and dispense commodities such as food, consumable supplies, clothing, bedding, etc. At the present time these commodities, once purchased, are stored at several locations throughout the state.
The department firmly believes it will be able to achieve substantial economies if it is able to acquire this building and warehouse its goods in a central location. You have requested our

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opinion on whether the proposed transfer by the subcommittees violates the provisions of the Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees law. You further inquire whether the proposed transfer would violate the law concerning the use of the Governor's emergency fund.
In response to the first question, the Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees will not allow a transfer of any funds

"... for use in initiating or commencing any new program or activity not currently having an appropriation, or which would require operating funds or capital operating funds beyond the biennium in which such transfer is made." Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 722,724, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 47-516); Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 111, 160-61, Section 75) (1971-73 General Appropriations Act).

A previous opinion of this office discussed the same law as applied to a request by the Department of Public Safety to construct a warehouse building at its headquarters. In that opinion we discussed the meaning of the terms "program" and "activity" and decided that ifthe function or activity ofwarehousing material currently had an appropriation in that department's budget, then the construction of the warehouse would be part of that activity and would not be a new program or activity. Op. Att'y Gen. 70-68.
Similarly, it does appear that the present Department of Offender Rehabilitation budget contains appropriations for the warehousing of commodities. Since warehousing commodities is a program or activity currently having an appropriation, then it is our opinion that the acquisition of a building so as to effect a central warehousing operation would not be a new program or activity, but rather would be a different method of completing a budgeted "program or activity."
Further, it appears that the transfer of funds is sufficient to finalize the acquisition of the building and therefore no further operating funds or capital outlay beyond the biennium would be required by the transfer. Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 722, 724, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 47-516).
A similar restriction applies to allotments from the Governor's emergency fund. Georgia law prohibits any allotment of money from the fund for a purpose which creates a continuing obligation for. the state. Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-408). Since the acquisition will be completed with the funds presently transferred, and there will be no additional liability accruing to the state because of this purchase, it is our official opinion that the

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emergency fund law will not be violated. We realize that the acquisition ofthe building may result in some
additional expenses to the state in future years. However, while it might be preferable and indeed prudent to expend additional amounts to maintain the building in the future, by no means is it required or a legal continuing obligation on the state to do so. Hence, we do not believe that the acquisition of this building would violate the laws cited above.
As you know, any transfer between object classes under this law must be approved by at least 11 members of the two subcommittees sitting jointly for that purpose. Any proposed tranfer is therefore subject to stringent control in each instance. Ga. Laws 1967, pp. 722, 724, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 47-516).
It is therefore our official opinion that the Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees may approve a transfer of funds to allow the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to acquire a building for use as an office and central warehouse.

OPINION 72-73
To: Chancellor, University System of Georgia

June 8, 1972

Re: University System of Georgia; disposal of surplus property; retention of proceeds by Regents.

You have recently requested an opinion regarding the propriety of a policy of the Regents of the University System of Georgia [hereinafter "Regents"] of selling surplus property and retaining the proceeds from such sale. It is my understanding that this request was precipitated by a directive from the State Budget Officer that all proceeds from the sale of surplus property of the Regents be turned in to the state treasury.
There is nothing in the Budget Act that directly pertains to surplus property and the disposition thereof. Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-4). There is a section that provides that unexpended appropriations shall lapse back into the state treasury. Ga. Code Ann. 40-420. However, the question that has been posed by your office deals strictly with the proceeds from the sale of surplus property and the disposition of these funds. Such funds would not be classified as unexpended appropriations; consequently, this law would not be applicable to your inquiry.

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The disposition of surplus property is the responsibility of the Supervisor of Purchases. Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1148 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-1941 to 40-1944). In order to fulfill his responsibilities, the Supervisor of Purchases is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations required to carry out his duties. Ga. Code Ann. 40-1943.This law is silent also as to the disposition ofthe proceeds from the sale of the surplus property.
Surplus property is the subject ofanother law that authorizes the Regents to dispose of surplus property of the University System. Ga. Laws 1935, p. 168 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-141 to 32-143). This law is entitled "Disposal of Property" and reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Section 1. That all properties owned or held by the Regents ofthe University System of Georgia pursuant to Title 32 ofthe Code of Georgia of 1933 which has heretofore been declared to be the public property of this state, may be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of by said Regents subject to the approval of the Governor, whenever the Board of Regents of the University of Georgia may deem such sale, lease, or other disposition to the best interest of the University System: provided, that the Board of Regents shall first determine that such property can no longer be advantageously used in the University System .... "Section 3. That the proceeds arising from any such sale or lease of any such property shall be used for the support of the University System and its branches or for the payments ofany debts thereof as the Regents may determine." Ga. Laws 1935, pp. 168, 169 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-141 and 32-143).

From the above discussion, it is obvious that the only law relevant to this consideration that addresses itself to the proceeds from the sale ofsurplus property provides for the retention ofthese proceeds by the Regents. Unless this law has been repealed in any way, it remains the basis by which the Regents dispose of surplus property.
Neither the Budget Act nor the law pertaining to the disposition of surplus property by the Supervisor of Purchases expressly repeals the law authorizing the Regents to dispose of personal property and retain the proceeds from the disposition. Repeals by implication are not favored in Georgia, and a statute will not be construed as repealing a prior statute unless the two are so

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repugnant and irreconcilable that they cannot stand together. E.g., Cornwell v. Atlanta Trust Company, 177 Ga. 303 (1933). The law of Georgia is clear that statutes in pari materia should be construed harmoniously whenever possible. Ryan v. Commissioners of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730 (1948); (Ga. Code Ann. 102-102).
In construing the three statutes together, I find that neither the Budget Act nor the law pertaining to surplus property is in irreconcilable conflict with the law under which the Regents have disposed of surplus property. The Regents are provided the means through which they might dispose of surplus property, but the ability to determine what is surplus and the authority to retain the proceeds remains with the Regents. Since there is no law that requires the Regents to submit the proceeds from the disposition of this surplus property to the state treasury, once the Supervisor ofPurchases has disposed ofthe property, he must, in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. 32-143, remit the proceeds to the Regents for the support of the University System and its branches.
The only other method by which proceeds from the sale of surplus property might be affected would be through a duly promulgated rule by the Budget Director or the Supervisor of Purchases. Although both of these officers have the authority to promulgate rules and regulations, Ga. Code Ann. 40-404, 40-1943 (the latter section being based upon Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1148), they can only do so via the narrowly defined limitations imposed by the General Assembly, for to do otherwise would be an improper delegation of legislative authority. See e. g., Bentley v. State Board of Medical Examiners of Georgia, et al., 152 Ga. 836 (1921); Glustrom v. The State, 206 Ga. 734 (1950); Southern Cooperative Foundry Co. v. Drummond, 76 Ga. App. 222 (1947). Obviously, they cannot promulgate a rule or regulation that is contrary to a law enacted by the General Assembly. Thus, any rule that seeks to direct the disposition ofthe proceeds from the sale of surplus property belonging to the Regents would be of no force and effect, since the General Assembly has provided through a general law the proper disposition of such funds. Ga. Code Ann. 32-143.
It is my opinion that the practice now followed by the Regents of maintaining the proceeds from the sale of surplus personal property is authorized by the Georgia law.

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OPINION 72-74 To: Secretary of State

June 9, 1972

Re: Elections; incumbency may be indicated on a primary ballot even if the number of the district has changed or its boundaries have been revised by reapportionment.

The recent reapportionment altered most of the Georgia Senate and House of Representatives legislative districts. You have requested our official opinion on whether or not the incumbency ofthe members ofthe General Assembly now holding office should be indicated on the primary ballot if the number of the legislative district has changed or if the boundary of the district has been revised.
The Georgia Election Code prescribes that the incumbency of a candidate seeking party nomination for the public office he then holds shall be indicated on the primary ballot. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1102 (c), based upon Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., pp. 26, 97.
An incumbent is defined as one who is in present possession of the office; one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of the office. Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn. 588,370 S. W. 2d 829,839 (1963); see also "incumbent," Websters Third New International Dictionary (1961). Technically, it might be argued that the present incumbents cannot claim incumbency in the August 1972 primary to nominate candidates for election to the 1973 General Assembly because most of the districts will have different numbers or different boundaries in the reapportioned 1973 General Assembly. The reapportionment plans themselves provide that they are effective for the primaries and elections of 1972 for the purpose of electing the members to take office in 1973. Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 22, 60, as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 250 (House) and Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 69, 88, as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 237 (Senate). See Ga. Code Ann. 47-101, 47-102.
It becomes necessary to interpret the Election Code to answer your question and it is the cardinal rule ofstatutory interpretation that one interprets the law to carry into effect the legislative intent and purpose. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9), Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464 (1), 62 S. E. 2d 209 (1950).
Certainly the main purpose for the incumbency provision is to aid the elector in identifying the candidates. Regardless ofwhether incumbency is an advantage in today's politics, this purpose would

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be thwarted if as a result of a technical change in the district number or a revision in the boundary lines, no one could be listed as the incumbent.
Another provision of the Election Code dispenses with the requirement of a nomination petition if the candidate is "an incumbent qualifying as a candidate to succeed himself if, prior to the election at which he was originally elected to the office for which he seeks reelection, such incumbent accompanied his notice of candidacy with a nomination petition." Ga. Code Ann. 34-1002 (c) (iv), based upon Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 347, 354. Ifwe ruled that a present member of the General Assembly was not an incumbent, because ofreapportionment, the plain intent ofthis law would also be thwarted by a technical adhesion to revised numbers and boundary lines and an incumbent, in the real sense of the word, would be forced to gather another nomination petition.
It is our opinion that the better application of the incumbency provision would allow the present incumbent to be so listed on the primary ballot, even ifhis district number has been changed or the boundary has been revised by reapportionment. It is possible that a district might have two incumbents in it because of shifts in the boundary; if this occurs, we believe that both candidates are entitled to have their incumbency indicated on the primary ballot.

OPINION 72-75
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

June 12, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; retention of prisoner records.

This is in answer to your recent letter requesting my opinion on how long your department should retain the various records on inmates of state prison institutions.
I can find no law specifying how long these records should be maintained, or that they even must be kept at all. Therefore the question is primarily an administrative one.
I would point out, however, that prison inmates who receive alleged personal injuries while in state institutions sometimes are inclined to attempt legal action. Ga. Code Ann. 3-1004 places a two-year statute of limitations on personal injury tort actions, running from the time the alleged cause of action arises, and the same limitation would apply to actions brought under the Federal

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Civil Rights Statute. Therefore, you should maintain any records related to possible tort action for at least two years after a possible tort occurs.
Of course, you should maintain the records of any prisoner released from your custody on parole at least until the expiration of the term of his sentence, and those of inmates who escape until they are brought back and serve their terms.

OPINION 72-76 To: Secretary of State

June 15, 1972

Re: Insurance companies; certificate of incorporation not dependent upon date of approval of charter application.

All statutory references herein are to Ga. Code Title 56, as based upon Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289.
You have requested an official opinion on whether the Secretary of State may grant a certificate of incorporation to an insurance company if the approval of the Insurance Commissioner is dated after the expiration of the statutory deadline within which the Insurance Commissioner must act. Apparently, doubt exists whether the approval ofthe Insurance Commissioner came within 45 days of the date the application was received by him as provided by Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505 (3).
The Insurance Code provides as follows:

"When the certificate of the ordinary as to the fact of publication of the application for charter and the certificate of the commissioner as to his approval of the application for charter shall have been received in the office of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall issue to the corporation, under the great seal of the state, a certificate of incorporation." Ga. Code Ann. 56-1506 (2).

The Insurance Code further provides:

"The Secretary of State shall record the application for charter, the certificate of approval of the commissioner, the certificate of the ordinary as to publication and the certificate of incorporation, in a book to be kept by him for that purpose."
Ga. Code Ann. 56-1506 (3).

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The above provisions of law do not place any burden or duty on the Secretary of State to ascertain that the approval of the commissioner was givenwithinthe 45-daylimit. The45-daylimitwas inserted to protect the applicant from too long an investigation by the commissioner and we hesitate to rule that a law intended to benefit an applicant should now be interpreted to his detriment.
If there exists any legal risk with incorporating an insurance company based on a certificate of approval given out of time, the risk falls on the insurance company and not the Secretary ofState. If the company elects to bear this risk, and we are assured that the company so wishes, then it is our official opinion that you can issue a certificate of incorporation based upon receipt of the publication proof from the ordinary and the approval by the commissioner. As noted above, the application for charter, the approval, the certificate of the ordinary as to publication and the certificate of incorporation are all recorded in a book to be kept by you for that purpose. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1506 (3).

OPINION 72-77
To: Commissioner, Department of Banking and Finance

June 16, 1972

Re: Building and loan associations; charter approval by Secretary of State not affected by Reorganization Act.

You wish our opinion on whether the Secretary of State's function relating to prior written approval under the Georgia Banking and Loan Act is a function of chartering these associations or a function in his capacity as the supervisory authority of these associations.
Your question is prompted by the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972 which transfers to your department all functions of the Secretary of State relating to state building and loan associations except the functions related to the chartering or liquidation of these associations. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1045-1046, Sections 1104-1105.
The Georgia Building and Loan Act requires the Secretary of State to give his written approval before a superior court may grant any new charters to any state chartered association or any

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renewal or any amendment to any existing charter of a state chartered association. Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess. pp. 307, 311, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 16-412).
Under the Building and Loan Act, the written approval of the Secretary ofState is a condition precedent to the grant ofa charter to a state association. Further, any charter granted without this written approval is specifically declared to be null and void. Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess.,pp.307, 311, Section 6 (Ga. Code Ann. 16-412). No one doubts that this prior approval is part of the overall regulatory function, but it also inheres specifically to the function ofchartering an association, an area left to the Secretary of State. Since the function related to the chartering of these various associations is retained by the Secretary of State, it is our official opinion that he is the proper person to grant the prior written approval required by law.

OPINION 72-78 To: Commissioner of Agriculture

June 16, 1972

Re: Agricultural Commodity Commissions may provide group health insurance and pension coverage for employees.

This is in response to your request for an official opinion as to whether the Georgia Agricultural Commodity Commissions are authorized to participate in or provide health insurance and pension plans for their employees.
The Georgia Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act, Ga. Laws 1969, p. 763 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 5-29), which provides for the creation of such commissions as public corporations and instrumentalities of the state, authorizes each commission to fix the compensation of its employees and provides for the payment therefor from funds of the commission. Each such commission operates on assessments received from producers of the affected commodity, and no appropriated funds are received by any commission. In additiontootherpowersconferred,each commission is authorized by Section lO(g)ofthe Act(Ga.CodeAnn.5-2909(g)) to exercise the powers and authority conferred by law upon corporations.
In view of the above powers granted to the commissions, it is my opinion that in fixing the compensation for services of employees, the commissions may participate in or provide health insurance

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and pension plan coverage for such employees. Although the providing ofsuch programs is a policy matter for determination by the commissions, I should point out that in view ofthe requirement that each commission's continued existence is subject to a producer referendum each three years, with the consequent uncertainty of duration, the acquisition of a pension plan would seem to be an inadvisable undertaking.
Since the Commissioner of Agriculture is designated as trustee to receive and disburse funds of each commission, it appears that you, as trustee, could enter into a group health insurance agreement on behalf of those commissions desiring to participate, with appropriate accounting between the commissions.

OPINION 72-79
To: Commissioner, State Department of Public Safety

June 19, 1972

Re: Drivers license suspensions from convictions in municipal courts.

This is in response to a letter from your department on May 31, 1972, requesting an opinion on the jurisdiction of the municipal court ofMacon to try driving under the influence cases. Your letter also asked for an opinion on whether the Department of Public Safety is empowered to revoke drivers licenses on conviction tickets received from such courts.
The specific question on the jurisdiction of the Macon municipal court to try driving under the influence cases has been settled by the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, the decision on which was handed down in the January term this year. That court ruled that an Act approved March 16, 1955 (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 736 et seq., Ga.Code Ann. 68-1680, 68-1681) empowered cities and local authorities, in counties with a population of 108,000 or more, to adopt traffic regulations not in conflict with the State Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 556, Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 68-15 to 68-17) as city ordinances, violations of which ordinances may be tried in city or recorders' courts ofsuch municipalities. The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, at Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625, makes it a violation of state law to drive an automobile while intoxicated. The legislation in question also specifies that an

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accused under such city ordinances may elect to be tried in a state court, when the offense with which he is accused also is a state offense.
The court added that the General Assembly was empowered to pass said Act, which has been codified as Ga. Code Ann. 68-1680, 68-1681, by a 1954 constitutional amendment empowering the legislature to grant "home rule" to municipalities. See Ga. Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. I, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8301).
Therefore, under the statute and the ruling of the Supreme Court, the municipal court of Macon, and other similar courts obtaining jurisdiction under the authorization of 68-1680 and 68-1681, unquestionably are empowered to try violations of city ordinances enacted in compliance with said sections.
The statute and the ruling previously discussed are not in conflict with Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-4102), which provides in part:

"The court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants, try cases, and impose sentences thereon on all misdemeanor cases arising under the act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, and other traffic laws, ... in all counties ofthis state in which there is no city or county court, provided that the defendant waives a jury trial. Like jurisdiction is also conferred upon the judges of the police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges for offenses arising under the Act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of1937, and other traffic laws ofthe state within their respective jurisdictions."

That constitutional provision, and Ga. Laws1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 558 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-501, 92A-502, 92A-503 and 92A-504), which provide the statutory implementation ofsaid provision, have been discussed in several cases including Gibson v. Gober, 204 Ga. 714 (1949) and Hannah v. State, 97 Ga. App. 188 (1958). Those cases held that judges of the police courts of incorporated cities and municipal court judges, or judges of the courts of ordinary, have jurisdiction to try state traffic offenses only in those counties in which there is no city or county court. It is emphasized, however, that those decisions dealt with state traffic offenses, and not with municipal ordinances enacted under the authorization of Ga. Code Ann. 68-1680 and 68-1681.
The Supreme Court noted in Gordon, supra, that Ga. Code Ann.

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68-1681 says, in part:

"A conviction for the violation of an ordinance adopted pursuant to this Act shall be considered a prior conviction for all purposes under this Act and under the Act to create the Department of Public Safety of Georgia, approved March 13, 1937, and the several Acts amendatory thereof." (Emphasis added.)

The power of your department to suspend drivers' licenses for conviction of driving under the influence, and other traffic offenses, is derived from Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 349; 1951, pp. 598, 605, codified in Ga. Code Ann. Title 92A. Note especially Ga. Code Ann. 92A-434, based upon Ga. Laws 1939, p. 135; 1943, p. 196, which says in pertinent part:

"The director may in his discretion revoke the license of any operator or chauffeur upon receiving the record of such operator's or chauffeur's conviction of any of the following offenses:
* * * "(2) driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs;"

The question, then, is, under this authority, can your department revoke drivers' licenses of those convicted for such violations enacted as city ordinances under the authority of Ga. Code Ann. 68-1680 and 68-1681, as well as those convicted under state laws. I think that question must be answered in the affirmative. To do otherwise would be a clear violation ofthe equal protection and due process clauses of the State and United States Constitutions.
"Equal protection of the laws...includes the right to be tried and punished in the same manner as others accused of crime are tried and punished.... Persons under arrest are entitled equally with other persons under arrest to a trial by due process, and when found guilty, they are subject to the same punishments." Lynch v. U.S., 189 F. 2d 476. (Emphasis added.)
In the language of Ga. Code Ann. 68-1680, the legislature said

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it was being adopted . . . "in order to insure complete uniformity and to expedite enforcement . . ." of the traffic laws. To treat defendants tried in state courts differently from those tried in municipal courts, by subjecting the former to the possibility of losing their drivers licenses while shielding the latter from that possibility for the exact same violations, would not "insure complete uniformity," treat the former "in the same manner as others accused of crime are tried and punished," or make them "subject to the same punishments." In addition, one who elected to exercise his right provided in the Acts in question to be tried under the state law rather than the city ordinance would subject himself to a more severe punishment than one who elected to be tried in a municipal court under a municipal ordinance. Therefore, it is my opinion that your department does have the power to revoke the drivers licenses of persons convicted of offenses described in Ga. Code Ann. 92A-434, whether such convictions arise in a state court or in a municipal court empowered to enforce similar municipal ordinances under the authority of Ga. Code Ann. 68-1680 and 68-1681.

OPINION 72-80
To: Commissioner of Banking and Finance

June 20, 1972

Re: Commissioner of Banking and Finance; authority to delegate duties to subordinates not implied in Reorganization Act.

You have requested our opinion on whether the Commissioner of Banking and Finance may authorize anyone in the Department of Banking and Finance to act for the department on those matters which previously required the personal action of the Superintendent of Banks.
As you point out, the Reorganization Plan transferred all functions ofthe Department ofBanking and the Superintendent of Banks to the Department of Banking and Finance. The plan further specified that any reference in Georgia laws to the Department ofBanking or the Superintendent ofBanks means the Department of Banking and Finance. Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1045, Section 1103.
As commissioner, you are the public officer who has supervision and control over the Department of Banking and Finance.

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Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, /d., Section 1101. The Supreme Court of Georgia has held as follows:

"In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires on the part of the officer the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion; and unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another." Horton v. The State, 112 Ga.27,28, 37S.E. 100 (1900), quoting from Mechem on Public Offices and Officers.

The Supreme Court went on to say that where the act is of a purely mechanical or ministerial nature, it may be properly delegated to another unless expressly prohibited. However, where the law expressly requires the act to be performed by the officer in person, it cannot, though ministerial, be delegated to another. Horton v. The State, supra, at p. 28.
The principle remains as valid today as it was in 1900. Mobley v. Marlin, 166 Ga. 820(3b), 144 S.E. 747 (1928); Op. Att'y Gen. 66-159; see also, 67 C.J.S. Officers, 104, 151; 43 Am. Jur. Public Officers, 461.
Banking law allows the Assistant Superintendent ofBanks to act as the superintendent only when there is a vacancy in the office of superintendent. Ga. Laws 1913, p. 135 (Ga. Code Ann. 13-303). There is no explicit statutory authority for the superintendent [now commissioner] to delegate his authority to make any decision involving the exercise ofjudgment and discretion. For an example of the statutory authority to delegate, see the Georgia Insurance Code, 56-213, based upon Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 303, which specifically authorizes the Insurance Commissioner to delegate any authority, power or duty vested in him by any provision of the Insurance Code so long as the deputy is acting in the commissioner's name and by his delegated authority.
You inquire as to whether it would be possible to imply a right to delegate authority because the Reorganization Act states that the Department of Banking and Finance replaces the Superintendent of Banks and the Department of Banking in Georgia banking laws. We are of the opinion that this statement cannot be construed so broadly. The Reorganization Act is concerned with the reallocation of functions and responsibilities within a reorganized executive department rather than an

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authorization to delegate authority from the commissioner to his sundry assistants. You will agree that the Reorganization Act language concerning the Department ofBanking and Finance does not clearly authorize the commissioner to delegate his duties involving judgment and discretion and we hesitate to decide so important a question on the strength of possible inferences drawn from a highly complicated and extremely long piece of legislation such as the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972.
Of course, you may continue to delegate those duties which can be termed purely mechanical or ministerial. See Op. Att'y Gen. 66-159 cited above for a good discussion of this area. Should you want assistance in drafting legislation to allow you to delegate your authority, let us know and we will be happy to help you.

OPINION 72-81
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

June 21, 1972

Re: Merit system; status of deputy department heads after reorganization.

This is in response to your letter of June 1, 1972, in which you requested my opinion on specific questions dealing with the effect of the reorganized government structure on the classified status of deputy department heads in certain factual situations. I have provided a general statement on the situations and have repeated your questions below, together with my opinion on each question.
The basic thrust of your inquiry is whether Section 2501 of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1069, has the effect of changing the classified service status of deputy department heads from that determined under the 1971 State Personnel Board Act (Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-22).
Section 31 of the Executive Reorganization Act provides that the rights of each state officer or employee which may have existed prior to the Reorganization Act will continue unless changed by the Reorganization Act. Therefore, if a position was in the classified service under the State Personnel Board Act, that position remains in the classified service unless changed by the Reorganization Act.
Section 2501 of the Reorganization Act provides:

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"The position of, or person occupying the position of, head of department or division director of any agency created by the transfer of functions shall be in the unclassified service as defined in the Acts governing the State Merit System, except for the Director of the Personnel Division of the Department of Administrative Services, the official of the Department of Human Resources in charge ofVocational Rehabilitation, and the Director of the Environmental Protection Division of the Department ofNatural Resources who shall be in the classified service. The position ofhead of department or division director of any agency created by the transfer offunctions shall be new positions. The State Personnel Board shall adopt rules and regulations not inconsistent with this Act to effectuate the transfer of positions and personnel and the classification of such positions."
The above-referenced section does not specifically designate that deputy department heads of agencies created by the transfer of functions will be in the unclassified service.
However, I think the intent of the statute concerning the placement ofcertain positions in the unclassified service is obvious. Apparently, the General Assembly intended to provide that the top-level line management positions created by reorganization should be unclassified to insure the greatest possible degree of management flexibility and to permit the department head to shift management personnel as necessary to meet the needs of the newly-created department structure.
Assuming a fact situation in which a department's responsibilities are significantly changed by reorganization so that new divisions are created, there is no question but that the division directors of the new divisions are removed from the classified service by virtue of Section 2501. Assuming further that these new division directors report through a deputy department head to the department head, the deputy's line management responsibilities have changed significantly by reorganization. He is part of the top management of the department and is subject to the same rules concerning classified status under the Reorganization Act as those governing both his immediate subordinates (the division directors) and his immediate superior (the department head). To hold otherwise would frustrate the intent of the statute.
Another factor to be considered is the inexact science of

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designating titles of division directors and deputy department heads. While the position of department head of an agency is clearly defined, there is no such clear definition for the positions of deputy department head or division director. To my knowledge, the only such definition was in the proposed Section 104 of the Executive Reorganization Plan of1972. That section was deleted by the House and is not part of the law.
Thus, there is no clear statutory distinction or definition of the responsibilities between the two positions. Consequently, there are likely to be factual situations in which a person titled a "deputy department head" may actually be performing as the head of a group of people who constitute a division and, perhaps, should more properly be classified "division director."
Many problems concerning the application of Section 2501 are not specifically answered in the statute. Rather, the statute provides that the State Personnel Board shall adopt rules and regulations to effectuate the transfer of positions and personnel and the classification of such positions. This language spells out that the legislature intended the Personnel Board to be involved in making the kinds of close determinations of factual situations which may be involved in your questions. Of course, such determinations cannot, and should not, be made by the State Personnel Board without background information and recommendations from the affected departments.
In response to the specific inquiries in your request for an opinion, and in light of the foregoing general discussion:

"1. Is the deputy director of a department newly created by the Reorganization Act in the classified or the unclassified service?" In my opinion, he is in the unclassified service.
"2. Does the Reorganization Act affect the status ofa deputy department head in a department not affected by transfer of functions due to reorganization whether or not the deputy department head was previously in the classified or the unclassified service?" No. If the department was unaffected by reorganization, it is clear that the rights of the deputy department head are governed by Section 31 ofthe Reorganization Act, and remain unchanged.
"3. If functions are transferred to a department by the Reorganization Act and the deputy department head occupied a position previously in the classified service, does the transfer

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of functions place him in the unclassified service?" As stated in the discussion above, if the functions and responsibilities of the deputy department head are substantially affected by reorganization, then he would be in the unclassified service. Such a determination would be made by the State Personnel Board.
"4. Several departments have requested high level staff positions answering directly to the department head. These staff functions are not divisions in that they are not first line organizational units answering to the department head, yet they act for the department head in specialized situations. Are such positions covered by the provisions of the Reorganization Act or the provisions of Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45?" High level staff positions are not included within the provisions of Section 2501 which deals with line management positions. Consequently, I believe these positions are unaffected by the Reorganization Act and subject to the State Personnel Board Act of 1971 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-22).
"5. In your opinion of May 16, 1972 [Op. Att'y Gen. 72-58], in reply to a question on the classified or the unclassified status of a division director in a department which existed prior to reorganization and to which functions were transferred as a result of reorganization, your answer was that the actual situation would determine the placing of the division director in the classified or the unclassified service depending on whether the functions are'... substantial and have the effect of significantly altering the division tasks, organization, and responsibility. . .'. Are we correct in assuming that the application of these criteria rests with the State Personnel Board?" As outlined above, it is my opinion that the decision of such criteria are within the province of the State Personnel Board.

OPINION 72-82
To: Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Teachers Retirement System

June 23, 1972

Re: Teachers Retirement Act; clerical personnel employed by county and regional libraries as mandatorially covered.

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning Ga.

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Laws 1972, p. 176, which expanded the coverage of the Teachers Retirement System to include clerical personnel in county and regional libraries.
A conceivable conflict exists in the Act between the language in the title and the application ofSection 1 ofthe Act. The title states that the clerical personnel may become members ofthe retirement system, which might imply a choice on the part of the prospective members; while the Act provides that the definition of "teacher" shall include the clerical personnel. All "teachers" are required to be members unless employed in a system where there is a local retirement fund. Ga. Code Ann. 32-2903 and 32-2922, Ga. Laws 1943, p. 640.
The Georgia Constitution provides that no law shall pass which contains matter different from what is expressed in the title of the law. Ga. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1908). Therefore, if there is in fact a serious conflict between the matters covered in the title and in the law itself, the law is unconstitutional. The general purpose of this constitutional provision is to give notice of the subject of the Act. The title may not be misleading, but need only indicate the general contents and scope of the Act. Williamson v. Housing Authority ofAugusta, 186 Ga.673(1938); 82C.J.S. p. 364. The language of the title should be reasonably construed in light of general legislative intent. A construction of the title which would make the Act unconstitutional should not be given unless the objection is serious and a conflict plain and clear.
Therefore, the question is whether the use of the word "may" in the title is in such conflict with the body of the Act that the entire statute is unconstitutional.
The Georgia statute defines "may" as follows:

"May ordinarily denotes permission and not command. Where the word as used in a statute concerns the public interest or affects the rights of third persons it will be construed to mean 'must' or 'shall'." (Ga. Code Ann. 102-103.)

Thus, there are situations in which "may" is permissive and other situations in which it is mandatory, and a determination of the intent ofthe General Assembly in promulgating the Act would be helpful.
In attempting to determine the intent of the General Assembly in using "may" in this instance, it must be remembered that, with

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irrelevant exceptions, all other categories of persons eligible to participate in the Teachers Retirement System are required to be members. This includes all regional and county librarians.
It would indeed be unusual for the General Assembly to intend that persons employed as librarians would be required to be covered by the retirement system while their subordinate clerical personnel in the same library may become covered only if they so desire. A more rational explanation of the General Assembly's intent was that they merely extended the category of membership under the same conditions as the librarians to all clerical personnel in the libraries.
This apparent intent leads me to the conclusion that there is not sufficient conflict to render the statute unconstitutional and that the clerical personnel in county and regional libraries are members of the Teachers Retirement System under the same terms and conditions as all other members.

OPINION 72-83 To: Insurance Commissioner

June 23, 1972

Re: Insurance companies; refunds for overpayment of premium taxes not authorized.

You have requested my opmwn whether you, as Insurance Commissioner, may lawfully make cash refunds to insurers which, because oftheir failure to take proper abatements and credits, paid to the Department of Insurance amounts exceeding their actual liability for the insurance premium tax imposed by Ga. Code Ann. 56-1303, based upon Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 505. In my opinion you may not.
There is no general statute in Georgia affording a taxpayer a remedy for the recovery of taxes illegally or erroneously assessed. State Revenue Comm'n v. Alexander, 54 Ga. App. 295, 187 S.E. 707 (1936). Rather, it is the well settled rule, stated in Ga. Code Ann. 20-1007, that:

"Payments of taxes or other claims, made through ignorance of the law, or where the facts are all known, and there is no misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception, or fraudulent practice used by the other party, are deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered back, unless made under an urgent and

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immediate necessity therefor, or to release person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of person or property. Filing a protest at the time of payment does not change the rule."

In the circumstances presented, it does not appear that the taxes were paid under duress within the contemplation of this statute. See Strachan Shipping Co. v.Mayor of Savannah, 168 Ga. 309, 147 S.E. 555 (1929). Nor does the Insurance Code contain an express refund authorization which would remove the premium tax from the operation of the quoted rule. See Oxford v. Shuman, 106 Ga. App. 73, 126 S. E. 2d 522 (1962); State Revenue Comm 'n v. Alexander, 54 Ga. App. 295, 187 S.E. 707 (1936); Ops. Att'y Gen. 1957, p. 314.
I am aware that Ga. Code Ann. 56-1301, which imposes certain filing, license, and miscellaneous fees upon insurance companies, provides in part that, "The commissioner shall promptly pay all fees and licenses and taxes collected under this section into the state treasury" and further authorizes the commissioner to "refund amounts which are illegally or erroneously collected." In my opinion, this refund authorization cannot be construed as extending to the premium taxes imposed by Ga. Code Ann. 56-1303, and this is true even though the fees imposed by Ga. Code Ann. 56-1301 may not technically constitute "taxes." Whether the General Assembly intended the refund provisions in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1301 to extend beyond its stated scope of "this section" is not open to speculation. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that where the words of a statute are plain and unequivocal, they may not be made the subject of judicial construction. Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, 187 S.E. 371, 106 A.L.R. 498 (1936).
It is my opinion, therefore, that you may not properly make cash refunds to insurers for overpayments of their insurance premium taxes.

OPINION 72-84
To: Chairman, Georgia Public Service Commission

June 27, 1972

Re: Public Service Commission; no jurisdiction over corporation which furnishes electricity and steam to limited number of other industrial corporations.

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This is in reply to your letter of June 8, 1972, in which you requested an opinion as to whether the Public Service Commission has jurisdiction over a corporation which furnishes electricity and steam to a limited number of other industrial corporations.
Under Ga. Code Ann. 93-304 the authority ofthe Public Service Commission "... shall extend to ... gas and electric light and power companies ... furnishing service to the public." (Emphasis added.) This authority is further detailed in Ga. Code Ann. 93-307, as amended by Ga. Laws 1967, p. 650, where it is stated:

"The Public Service Commission shall have the general supervision ofall ... gas or electric light and power companies within this state."

It has been generally recognized that under these provisions of Georgia law, the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission is restricted to those electric and gas companies which serve the public. As noted in a previous opinion, there exists no Georgia authority for a precise application of "service to the public" as contemplated by Ga. Code Ann. 93-304; consequently, it is necessary to examine the facts of each individual case. See Op. Att'y Gen. 69-27.
In determining whether a business renders such public service as to qualify as a public utility, it is necessary to examine such factors as the extent of the service, whether the operation holds itself out as ready to serve the public generally, and whether in other ways the business has conducted itself as a public utility. See Clark v. Olson, 177 Wash. 237, 31 P.2d 534 (1934); and Op. Att'y Gen. 69-27. In a recent Georgia decision, it was held that a corporation was engaged in service to the public although it supplied electricity to only one customer, the owner of a large commercial-residential building complex. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 228 Ga. 347 (1971). In this case, however, the court was careful to note that the complex housed some 16,000 tenants, thus having a substantial impact on the "public." The court also took cognizance of the fact that the corporation was engaged in negotiations to supply similar service to other customers.
Applying these principles to the facts as stated in your letter, the corporation in question is not engaged in "service to the public" pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 93-304. The corporation furnishes

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electricity and steam to a total of three other corporations which are engaged in general manufacturing operations; thus, the power supplied does not serve a substantial segment ofthe public. In fact, the corporation charter limits the corporate purpose to providing electricity and steam to two designated businesses. The corporation has no evident intention of expanding its service to other customers. These factors demonstrate that the corporation is not providing "service to the public" and, therefore, is not within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.

OPINION 72-85
To: Director, Game and Fish Division, Department of Natural Resources

July 13, 1972

Re: Alligators; law prohibiting sale of products from, not applied to caiman.

This is in response to your recent memorandum requesting my opinion on whether the 1971 Act of the General Assembly prohibiting the sale of"alligator products" would also apply to the sale of products made from the hides of caiman. This Act is found at Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 236-9 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-226, as amended), and provides in Section 3, inter alia, that "[l]t shall be unlawful for any person to sell or offer for sale any alligator product in this state." "Alligator product" is defined in Section 1 of this Act as meaning ". . . any reptile commonly known or classified as an alligator or crocodile."
Your memo provides certain information in aid of my opinion. You advise that, scientifically, reptiles commonly known as alligators or crocodiles are divided into three biological families: alligatoridae, crocodylidae and gavialidae. Further, that the family alligatoridae contains various species including the American alligator, Chinese alligator, caiman and yacare; while the family crocodylidae contains the various species of crocodile. I have also determined that these families are included within the order crocodilia under the zoological class reptilia.
As you know, this law is a criminal law providing that the sale or offer for sale of any alligator product in this state is a misdemeanor. The cases in this state are legion holding that in the interpretation of the law, criminal statutes will be strictly construed. See, e.g., Pacolet Manufacturing Co. v. Weiss, 185 Ga.

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287 (1937); Pritchett v. State, 51 Ga. App. 228 (1935). In construing this statute strictly according to its language, I am persuaded to the conclusion that the prohibition extends to the family species American alligator and not the entire family of alligatoridae, thus excluding application of the law to caiman.
By way of illustration, let me refer to another class ofvertebrate animal. The class mammalia contains the order carnivora, the flesh-eating animals. Within the carnivora is the family felis containing the various species of cats such as the tiger, lion, leopard, etc. The lion, tiger and leopard relate to each other in the same fashion as the alligator, crocodile and caiman. Surely it could not be seriously contended that a strictly construed criminal statute specifically applying to lions and tigers would also apply to leopards and panthers.
Additionally, I have learned that this law, originally introduced as House Bill 234 in the 1971 General Assembly, specifically extended this prohibition to caiman, making illegal the sale of caiman products aswell as products made from the hides ofalligators or crocodiles. By Senate amendment the words "or caiman" were deleted from the Act, leaving the Act expressly applicable to only alligator and crocodile products.
I realize that the exclusion of the sale or offer for sale of caiman products from the prohibitions ofthe statute will create inexorable problems in the enforcement of this law. Because ofthis I remind you that my office will be available to assist you in drafting any amendment to this law you deem advisable. I trust the foregoing has been fully responsive to your inquiry.

OPINION 72-86
To: Acting Commissioner, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation

July 14, 1972

Re: Honesty in government. Payments should be make to Medical Research Foundation of Georgia for vocational rehabilitation services rendered by full-time faculty members of Medical College of Georgia, rather than to such faculty members.

You have requested my opinion whether the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation ofthe Department ofHuman Resources may properly pay a faculty member of the Medical College of Georgia for medical services rendered to a client ofthe division, or

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alternatively, whether the division may make such payments to the Medical Research Foundation of Georgia. In my opinion, the division may not lawfully make payment directly to the faculty member; the division may make such payment to the foundation.
The relevant statute is Ga. Code Ann. 89-913, which provides in part:

"It shall be unlawful for any full-time appointive state official or employee to contract to buy from or sell to the State of Georgia any real or personal property, goods or services, or any combination thereof, when such purchase or sale would benefit, or be likely to benefit, such official or employee."

A faculty member of the Medical College of Georgia is an employee of the state. Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602, 176 S.E. 673 (1934); Op. Att'y Gen. 69-335. There can be little question that the receipt by such faculty member of a fee from the Division ofVocational Rehabilitation for medical services rendered to a client of the division would amount to the sale of professional services to the state. Such transaction falls squarely within the prohibition of the statute. Ops. Att'y Gen. 71-49; 69-467. The fact that such faculty member may fully intend to remit any fees received by him to a charitable organization does not exempt the transaction from the letter ofstatute. See Op. Att'y Gen. 67-413.
An entirely different situation exists when a faculty member renders private medical attention to a client ofthe division, and the division remits payment, not to the faculty member, but to the Medical Research Foundation of Georgia. In that case, the transaction is exempt from the letter and spirit of the statute because of the purely charitable nature of the foundation. The foundation is an unincorporated association of faculty members of the Medical College of Georgia, organized on October 1, 1958. The Articles of Association provide in part:

"The Foundation is organized and shall be operated exclusively for charitable, scientific, and educational purposes, consisting of medical research, either by expending its funds directly in carrying on medical research, or in projects in which the foundation and the Medical College of Georgia are jointly interested, as well as by contributions to the Medical College of Georgia. No parts of the income or funds of the Foundation

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shall inure to the benefit of any member of the Foundation.
"

This language in the governing document of the foundation would seem to preclude the possibility of any benefit accruing to the faculty members involved, either individually or collectively, and thus to remove the transaction from the prohibition of the statute.
This conclusion is subject to two qualifications. First, it presupposes a factual determination that the foundation is abiding by the language quoted above from its governing document. The foundation presumably is, and wishes to remain, a tax-exempt private foundation within the meaning of26 U.S.C. 509, and this suggests the foundation will adhere to its statements of charitable purpose. However, inasmuch as the foundation is neither an independent corporate entity nor a charitable trust whose activities are subject to review by the Attorney General, under Ga. Code Ann. 108-212, 108-1109 (based respectively on Ga. Laws 1962, p. 527 and Ga. Laws 1971, p. 430), it would appear that the quoted commitments to charitable purpose are not enforceable by any parties outside the foundation, although they may be enforceable by the foundation members inter sese. Thus, the foundation could conceivably abandon, in whole or in part, its charitable function, and if, as a consequence, any material benefits were to become available to any foundation member, then the transaction described above would fall within the prohibition ofthe statute.
The second qualification is that a factual determination must be made that the foundation is not acting merely as a conduit for funds received. This situation would obtain if the foundation were contributing substantial portions of its funds to the college and if salaries ofthe faculty members were based upon the college's total income for a given fiscal period. In that case, the funds received by the foundation from the division of Vocational Rehabilitation would be passed to the college, only to be received back again by faculty members in the form of "salaries." This, of course, would violate both the letter and the spirit of the statute. See Op. Att'y Gen. 71-49.
Although the civil and criminal sanctions imposed for violation of Ga. Code Ann. 89-913 are aimed primarily at the offending state employee, you are entirely justified in requiring that parties undertaking to contract with the division disclose all information necessary to determine the capacity in which they act and the
legality thereof.

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To: State Auditor

OPINION 72-87

July 17, 1972

Re: Superior court judges; audit of accounts.

You have requested our official opinion on whether the State Auditor is the proper person to audit the monthly expense statements of superior court judges.
Georgia law allows to judges of the superior courts reimbursement ofvarious travel expenses when a judge is required to be in any county other than the county of his residence in the discharge of judicial duties. That same law further requires the judges to submit monthly detailed and certified statements of the items of expense as authorized by the law to the State Auditor and the State Auditor is directed to audit each statement and approve same for payment if found correct. Ga. Laws 1945, p. 1199, as amended by Ga. Laws 1963, p. 415 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2606.1).
We have found no law which would repeal this provision, either expressly or by implication; it is therefore our official opinion that the State Auditor is the proper person to audit the monthly expense statements of the superior court judges.

OPINION 72-88 To: Secretary of State

July 18, 1972

Re: "Age of Majority Bill" has effect of lowering age at which an individual can be licensed as a securities salesman from 21 to 18.

The Regulations of the Commissioner of Securities provides that an individual cannot be licensed as a securities salesman who has not attained the age of 21. Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia 590-4-1-.04. You have sought our opinion on whether ofnot that regulation was altered by the "Age ofMajority Bill," Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193.
Enclosed are two opinions (Ops. Att'y Gen. 72-36, 72-51) recently issued by this office pertaining to the effect of the "Age ofMajority Bill." You will note that in Op. Att'y Gen. 72-36 the conclusion was

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reached that regulations of various agencies of the state were affected by Section 10 of the bill and the age 21 was changed to 18 in those regulations in which 21 referred to the age ofmajority. Op. Att'y Gen. 72-51 further considers the connotations ofmajority and states that majority, among other things, represents the age at which an individual is no longer subject to various civil disabilities such as the right to bind himself in a contract.
It is my opinion that the 21-year-old requirement imposed upon persons seeking a license to sell securities arose from the fact that persons under that age were incapable of binding themselves contractually. Thus, the age requirement in that regulation related directly to the age of majority and has now been changed to 18 by the "Age of Majority Bill."

OPINION 72-89
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

July 18, 1972

Re: Records Management Center; transfer of records to, not required when material needed by compiling agency.

This is in response to your letter of July 6, 1972, requesting an official opinion as to whether you are required to surrender the records of State Examining Boards to the Records Management Center.
Pursuant to the Georgia Records Act, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1267, a State Records Management Center was created primarily for the purpose of providing (according to Section 2 (e) of the Act):

"storage, processing, servicing, and security of public records that must be retained for varying periods of time but need not be retained in an agency's office equipment or space."

It is further provided in Section 4 of the Act that the State Department of Archives and History has authority to regulate the management of state records; but this regulatory power is not unlimited.
It is clear under Section 6 of the Georgia Records Act that the Records Management Center may not obtain custody of records which are determined by an agency head to be necessary for the

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performance of his statutory duties. This section provides as follows:

"Nothing in the Act shall be construed... to compel the removal of records deemed necessary by them [the agency heads] in the performance of their statutory duties."

The Joint-Secretary is head ofthe Examining Boards Division of the office of Secretary of State; an "agency," as defined in Section 2(c) of the Georgia Records Act, includes any division of state government. It is within the authority of the Joint-Secretary to determine which records are necessary for the performance of his statutory duties.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Joint-Secretary is not required to surrender to the Records Management Center any records he deems necessary for the performance of his statutory duties.

OPINION 72-90 To: Secretary of State

July 18, 1972

Re: Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972 not applicable to subdivided land located outside of Georgia.

The Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972 (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 638) imposes upon developers of subdivided land the requirement that they obtain a certificate from the Secretary of State prior to offering for sale any land in the State of Georgia. You have sought an opinion as to whether or not this Act applies to subdivisions located outside the state but offered for sale to residents of the state. It is my opinion that it does not.
This opinion is issued in spite of certain language in the Act which might indicate a contrary interpretation. Section 18(d) reads as follows:

"The offering for sale as an agent, salesman, or broker for a subdivider, developer, or owner of subdivided lands or a subdivision, wherever situated, which is being offered for sale within this state without first complying with this Act [shall be unlawful]."

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If the language, ~~wherever situated," implies that the Act applies to out-of-state land as well as in state land, it is inconsistent with what I consider the general intent conveyed by the Act as a whole.
If there is an apparent conflict or inconsistency between different sections of an Act, every effort should be made to reconcile them in such a way as to conform to the legislative intent in enacting the law. Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 242 (1958). One method by which legislative intent is determined is through an examination of related laws since the legislature is presumed to know all pertinent laws existing at the time legislation is enacted. Spence et al. v. Rowell et al., 213 Ga. 145 (1957).
In 1971 the Out-of-State Land Sales Act was passed. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 856 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-58). This Act requires compliance with certain regulations and registration with the Securities commissioner by any person who sells, in Georgia, land that is located outside the state. This Act and the Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972 are similar in the requirements imposed upon land sales in Georgia. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that statutes relating to the same subject-matter are construed together and harmonized wherever possible. Ryan u. Commissioners ofChatham County et al., 203 Ga. 730 (1948). Thus, in order to determine the applicability of the Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972 (hereinafter the "1972 Act"), it is necessary to consider it in light of the existence of the Out-of-State Land Sales Act (hereinafter the "1971 Act") as well as examine its own provisions which tend to indicate the legislative intent.
Considering the two laws together, it would appear that they apply to two different things. Even the names of the Acts indicate their different applicability. Although it might be argued that "Georgia" is no more than legislative identification, when considered in conjunction with the 1971 Act, the term "Georgia" appears to be a point ofdistinction delineating that this Act applies to Georgia land whereas the 1971 Act applies to out-of-state land.
A consideration of the evil to be remedied is another means by which legislative intent is determined. Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (1936). The obvious purpose of this Act is to impose controls on developers who sell land to residents of Georgia. By means of the 1971 Act, developers of the out-of-state land were already subject to regulation by the state, but developers of land in Georgia were not. Since the developers of Georgia land were not subject to

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regulations, it is their activity to be regulated by the Act, not the developers of out-of-state land who were already regulated.
Whenever a law is unclear, the reasonableness of the construction is a proper consideration. Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. Wright et al., 124 Ga. 596 (1905). To consider the 1972 Act applicable to out-of-state land developers reaches unreasonable results. The out-of-state developers would have to file two similar applications, pay two filing fees, receive two certificates from the Secretary ofState, and post two bonds in order to do business in Georgia. The unreasonableness of such a requirement needs no amplification.
Finally, the entire Act itself should be examined to determine the legislative intent and resolve any apparent inconsistencies. Such an examination reveals several provisions which indicate the Act applies only to land located in Georgia.
In Section 3(1) there is a requirement that a certificate of compliance from the Area Planning and Development Commission be obtained by certain developers. Not all states have such commissions, and those that do usually do not utilize that particular name. Also, Section 21 sets forth Georgia law as containing standards to be applied by these commissions. An out-of-state planning commission certainly would not be expected to apply Georgia law to zoning land in their own state.
The on-site inspection provisions of Section 10 set a limit of $50 per inspection for expenses incurred in the inspection. This limited amount assures no inspections beyond the state line and indicates the Act applies only to Georgia land.
Finally, Section 22 of the Act reads as follows:

"Nothing contained within this Act shall be deemed or construed to affect in any way or repeal the Out-of-State Land Sales Act, . . . "

To interpret this Act as applying to out-of-state land would be to affect the 1971 Act because it imposes a greater burden and additional requirements on those supposedly regulated by that Act.
Thus, a reading of the 1971 Act in conjunction with the 1972 Act and an examination of the general thrust of the latter Act compel the conclusion that the Georgia Land Sales Act of 1972 is not applicable to land developments located outside of Georgia.

72-91
OPINION 72-91
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

154 July 20, 1972

Re: Drivers license suspension under Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law where judgment in favor ofinsurance company not paid.

This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether or not the Bureau of Safety Responsibility should issue orders suspending drivers licenses on the basis of unsatisfied judgments which are obtained by insurance companies and arise out of a motor vehicle accident.
As I understand the facts, your department has not interpreted the Safety Responsibility Law as going beyond the owner, operator, and/or injured party, and therefore has not suspended the license of a judgment debtor when the judgment arising out of a motor vehicle accident subject to the provisions of that law is obtained by an insurance company, i.e., an insurer of an owner, operator, and/or injured party. Further, you have received several notices of unsatisfied judgments in which the plaintiff was an insurance company and you are at this time being pressed by the insurance companies to process those unsatisfied judgments by ordering the driver's license of the judgment debtor suspended.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act requires the Director of the Department of Public Safety, upon the receipt of a certified copy ofan unsatisfied judgment forwarded to the director, pursuant to the request of the judgment creditor or his attorney, to suspend the driver's license and registration or nonresident's operating privilege of the person against whom the judgment was rendered, except as otherwise provided by the Act. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 568, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-605(e) (1) and (e) (2) (a)). The unsatisfied judgment referred to in this section is any judgment rendered in an action at law arising out of a motor vehicle accident, to which no appeal has been entered or motion for new trial filed. ld. (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-605(e)(1)). The Act doesnot define judgment creditor as being limited to an owner, operator, and/or injured party, and the term should not, therefore, be interpreted as precluding an insurer ofan owner, operator, and/or injured party from processing an unsatisfied judgment provided the judgment was rendered in an action at law arising out of a

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motor vehicle accident. Therefore, it is my official opinion that the Department ofPublic
Safety should issue orders of driver's license suspension based on the unsatisfied judgments obtained by insurance companies, i.e., insurers of owners, operators, and/or injured parties.

OPINION 72-92
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

July 20, 1972

Re: Superior court reporters not eligible for state employees health insurance.

Your letter ofMay 26, 1972, requested an opinion on the question of whether the court reporters of the superior courts of the state are eligible for inclusion under the State Employees Health Insurance Plan.
The laws creating the State Health Insurance Plan define a covered employee as "a person who works full-time for the state and receives his compensation in a direct payment from a department, agency, or institution of the state government...." See Ga. Laws 1961, p. 147, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 89-1201).
Under the Georgia Code the compensation ofthe reporter in civil cases is a fee to be paid by the parties to the suit. Ga. Laws 1876, p. 133, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-3103). The compensation ofthe reporter in criminal cases is paid from county funds wherein such criminal case is tried. Ga. Laws 1876, p.. 133, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-3104). Both of these Code sections have been supplemented by local laws providing for fixed salaries for court reporters, such salaries to be paid from the general treasuries of the ;various counties. Likewise, reporters emeritus are also paid from county funds. See Ga. Laws 1952, p. 79 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-3105a). Only contingent expenses and travel allowances are authorized by law to be paid from state funds. See Ga. Laws 1961, p. 354, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-3107).
Therefore, the court reporters for the superior courts would not be full-time state employees receiving their compensation in a direct payment from state funds.
Based upon the foregoing, it is my opinion that such court reporters are not eligible for inclusion under the State Employees Health Insurance Plan.

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OPINION 72-93 To: Director, State Board ofCorrections

July 25, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; inmate transporatation by chartered bus is permissible.

This is in answer to a letter of January 17, 1972, from David E. England, Consultant, State Board of Corrections. Mr. England asked if the Board of Corrections may transport inmates, in general, and inmate athletic teams, in particular, by chartered public bus. He indicated a lack of large-scale transportation facilities at some institutions prompted his question. As I understand his inquiry, it goes only to the method of transportation permissible - not to the propriety of an activity or trip itself.
An earlier opinion concluded that "any safe mode of transportation" would be acceptable for prisontransportation. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 382 (unofficial). The present rules of your board provide that "[W]hen an inmate is transferred he shall be transported in an automobile or a closed vehicle and not in the rear of an open truck." Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, 125-2-2-.05 (e). An inmate being transferred can be restrained (Ga. Code Ann. 77-311, based upon Ga. Laws 1956, p. 161), though he cannot be attached to a moving vehicle. Rules, supra, 125-2-2-.05 (f), and adequate rest and food stops must be made. Id.
I have found no provisions which would prohibit chartered bus transportation for inmates. An administrative organization has implied power to do what is reasonably necessary to fulfill its express responsibilities. Railroad Commission of Georgia u. Macon Railway and Light Co., 151 Ga. 256, 258 (1921). Presumably the proposed method of transportation is reasonable. Accordingly, it is my official opinion that it also is permissible.

OPINION 72-94
To: Acting Commissioner, Department of Human Resources

July 26, 1972

Re: Juvenile offenders; commitment to Division of Children and Youth up to age 18.

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Your letter of July 13, 1972, requested an opinion on the age at which an individual may be committed by a court to the Division of Children and Youth.
Pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 24A-101 et seq., officially codified in Ga. Laws 1971, p. 709, a system of juvenile courts has been established in the State of Georgia. These courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over an action concerning any child who is alleged to be delinquent, unruly or deprived; who is alleged to be in need oftreatment or commitment as a mentally ill or mentally retarded child; or who is alleged to have committed a juvenile traffic offense as provided by Ga. Code Ann. 24A-3101. Under Ga. Code Ann. 24A-401 a "child" is defined as one:

"Under the age of17 years, except that as ofJuly 1, 1973, and thereafter, it shall mean any individual who is under the age of 18."

This provision clearly limits the jurisdiction ofjuvenile courts to those individuals under 17 years of age until July 1, 1973, when jurisdiction will extend to those under the age of 18.
Ifat the conclusion ofits adjudicatory hearing the juvenile court finds that a child is a delinquent and in need of treatment or rehabilitation, the court may commit the child to the State Division of Children and Youth under Ga. Code Ann. 24A-2302; but a juvenile court cannot commit an individual unless he is properly within the jurisdiction of the court. Until July 1, 1973, only those under age 17 may be committed to the Division of Children and Youth by juvenile courts.
It is clear, however, that under Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, an individual under 18 who is convicted of a felony (other than a capital felony) or a misdemeanor is still to be committed to the Division of Children and Youth. This legislation provides:

"for the acceptance and incarceration of all misdemeants and felons under the age of 17 years; provided, however, that those felons convicted of a capital felony shall only be sentenced into the custody of the State Department of Corrections. All other persons under the age of 17 years and commencing on July 1, 1972, under the age 18 found to be guilty or convicted of a misdemeanor or felony, other than a

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capital felony by any court in Georgia, shall be committed for an indefinite period of time to the custody of the Division for Children and Youth... "

This provision applies to those under 18 who are convicted or found guilty by any court; for example ifan individual who is under age 18 is convicted of a noncapital felony in a county or superior court, he is to be committed to the Division of Children and Youth; such commitment results even though the individual is not a "child" as defined by Ga. Code Ann. 24A-401. It should be noted that the language "any court" does not refer to a juvenile court, since juvenile courts do not actually convict for crimes, i.e., felonies or misdemeanors.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that an individual may be committed to the Division of Children and1 Youth in one of two ways:
(1) Pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 24A-2302 a child (one who is under age 17 and after July 1, 1973, one who is under age 18) may be committed by order of a juvenile court; or
(2) Pursuant to Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, an individual who has been convicted or found guilty of a crime other than a capital felony is to be committed by any court ifhe is under the age of 18.

OPINION 72-95 To: Commissioner of Agriculture

July 27, 1972

Re: Economic poisons; mildew resistant paint, as.

This is in reply to your request for my official opinion as to whether or not a certain brand of roof, barn and fence paint is subject to the registration and other requirements of the Georgia Economic Poisons Act, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 5-15, as based upon Ga. Laws 1950, p. 390.
The brand of paint in question bears in large print on the front label ofthe cans in which it is sold the legend, "Mildew Resistant." In smaller print on the front label is the legend, "resists mildew and fumes." The back label bears in large print the statement, "Durable, Mildew Resisting Protection Recommended for Farm Use." Also on the back label, in smaller print, is the statement, "Note: This paint resists mildew only on the paint film itself."

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The Georgia Economic Poisons Act defines the term "economic poison" as:

". . . Any substance or mixture of substance intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any... fungi ...." Ga. Code Ann. 5-1502 (A).

It is further provided in Ga. Code Ann. 5-1502 (H) that the term "fungi" includes mildews. Department of Agriculture Regulation No. 40-11-2-.02 (3) provides:

... Substances which have recognized commercial uses other than uses as economic poisons shall not be deemed to be economic poisons unless such substances are: ... (b) Labeled, represented, or intended for use as economic poisons, ..."

It is my opinion that the label in question clearly represents that the paint will provide mildew protection on painted surfaces, and under the above-cited regulation and statutes the paint is within the definition of an economic poison. It consequently is subject, as labeled, to the registration and regulatory provisions of the Georgia Economic Poisons Act. The limited disclaimer on the back panel of the label does not dispel the representation that the paint is a mildew preventive in view of the prominence of the mildew resistant claims on the label and the relatively obscure placement and phrasing of the disclaimer.
I have also given considerationto thedistributor's contention that under the federal regulatory interpretations of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act the paint would be exempt. Interpretations ofsimilar provisions in the federal Act are persuasive but not binding in construction of the Georgia Act. However, the finding herein would not be affected by the federal interpretation, which exempts paints which are treated to protect the paint itself and bear no claims for protecting painted surfaces or other objects by preventing or destroying fungi, inasmuch as it is my opinion that the representations on the label in question constitute such claims.

OPINION 72-96 To: Director, State Board ofCorrections

August 3, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; inmate publications may accept paid advertising.

Your letter of December 9, 1971 requested my opm10n on whether it is legal for an inmate publication to solicit and accept paid advertising. I understand that the publications are primarily for in-house circulation and that their editorial content is of particular interest to the prison population. Materials usually are purchased with prison-store profits, and both editorial and production work is done by inmates. It is also my understanding that the members of each institutuion have access to an approved list of outside publications, both national and local.
The essential restrictions on competition between Georgia prisons and private enterprise are contained in the following provisions:

"[P]risoners shall not be hired out to private persons or corporations...."Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 177, as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 577, 579 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-318 (a)). "No goods, wares or merchandise ... produced ... wholly or in part, by inmates ... shall be sold in this State to any private person, firm, association, or corporation ..." Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 177, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 77-318 (b)).

Implicit in these restrictions is a distinction between a sale of goods and the use of inmate labor in a service industry. Cf., Op. Att'y Gen. 70-156.
The phrase "goods, wares or merchandise," as previously set out in context, should be construed in its ordinarysense. Ga.CodeAnn. 102-102 (1). This means such chattels as are ordinarily the subject of traffic and trade. Weyerhaeuser Co. u. State Tax Commission, 244 Ore. 561, 419P. 2d 608,610 (1966). In a commercial sense, a sale ofgoods connotes the passing oftitle in movable things, for a price. Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 156, 173-174 (Ga. Code Ann. 109A-2-105, 109A-2-106). These descriptions do not cover an advertising transaction, which is more of a service whose purpose is to give public notice. Cf. Montford u. Allen, 111 Ga. 18, 19 (1899). As opposed to a sale of goods, it is a contract for "work, labor and

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materials." See e.g., Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Manufacturing Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D. S. C. 1970); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Sheridan, 53 F. R. D. 642 (S. D. N. Y. 1971); Lovett v. Emory University, 116 Ga. App. 277, 278 (1967).
Hence, I conclude that the restrictions on the sale of goods produced by inmates do not prohibit the proposed advertising. I have also concluded that the advertising would not be a prohibited "hiring out" of inmate labor. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 577, supra. The real thrust of this prohibition is against actual use of inmates in a civilian business. In the proposed transaction, inmates would not be "hired out." Instead, outsiders, in effect, would be allowed to participate in an internal means of prison communication.
To the extent that any private service would be performed by inmates, it is my opinion that it would be permitted by a proviso contained in the 1972 amendment:

"... [I]nmate trainees enrolled in any vocational, technical or educational training program authorized and supported by the State Board ofCorrections may repair or otherwise utilize any privately owned property ... as well as any other property... in connection with ... any such training program so long as the repair or utilization contributes to the inmates acquisition of ... vocational, technical, or educational skills." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 577, 579.

Preparation ofadvertising space for an inmate publication might involve a minimal use of private property (e.g., advertising mats and copy) in performing a service for private persons, but it also would promote "acquisition of . . . vocational, technical or educational skills."
It is hard to imagine any real commercial effect outside the institutions as a result of the proposed advertising. The inmate population would not appear to be a substantial factor in marketing plans, and advertisers probably would consider their expenditures more in terms of good will, rather than spending to be charged against an advertising budget at the expense of conventional publishers. Certainly, the in-house publications would not compete for readership outside the institutions, and approved publications will continue to circulate inside.
Accordingly, it is my official opinion that advertising as described would violate neither the letter nor the policy of the law which limits the scope of prison commerce. Rather, it would

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promote the self-reliance required of the system, Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 170 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-307 (a)), in an authorized program of rehabilitation. Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1399, 1403 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-319).

OPINION 72-97
To: Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles

August 9, 1972

Re: State Board of Pardons and Paroles; effect of U.S. Supreme Court capital punishment decision.

Following the public announcement of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to the constitutionality of certain death sentences (see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972)) you requested my opinion as to how this decision affects the responsibilities of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.
The essential question of the status of the persons under death sentence presently in Georgia is in the hands of the Judicial Branch of government, presently at the federal level. The State of Georgia has filed a motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of the United States. This motion is addressed to all 13 cases which were directly affected by the Supreme Court's June 29, 1972 decision.
Regardless of the outcome of the state's motion for rehearing, these cases will necessarily have to work their way back down the judicial system to the courts in which they originated. In almost every case with several singular exceptions the final judicial action in each and every case will be taken by the original sentencing court.
I believe that the course of pending litigation will clarify this status considerably. It is my opinion that the board continues to have the very same responsibilities and powers with respect to persons under sentences ofdeath in the State ofGeorgia that it had prior to June 29, 1972.
[See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-115, infra.]

163
OPINION 72-98
To: Director, Department of Public Safety

72-98 August 11, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; educational leaves with pay prohibited.

This is in reply to your request for an opinion as to whether the Department ofPublic Safety may authorize educational leave with pay for state employees wishing to further their education.
The rules and regulations effectuating the State Merit System of Personnel Administration have the force and effect of law and are binding upon the state departments which are covered by the merit system. Ga. Code Ann. 40-2203 (b), as based upon Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45. The employees ofthe State Department of Public Safety are included under the coverage ofthe merit system as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 40-2201. [See former Ga. Code Ann. 40-2214, Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 1140, 1141].
The applicable section of the merit system rules and regulations concerning educational leave is as follows:

"Par. B. 701. A permanent, working test, or, if the conditions of employment warrant it, a provisional employee may be granted a leave of absence for educational purposes in accordance with the provisions set forth for leave of absence without pay or contingent leave ofabsence without pay, except that the leave may be granted equivalent to the period of attendance at the institution. Such leave shall be without pay except that the employee may be granted a stipend or other legally authorized financial payment if there are funds available for that purpose .... " (Emphasis added.)

First, it should be noted that these educational leave regulations only contemplate a stipend or financial payment from funds available for that purpose, and not the payment ofthe employee's regular salary. Second, the regulations contemplate an educational leave accompanied by some type of financial payment only when such payments are legally authorized. It would appear that there is no provision authorizing the appointing authority to approve the grant of an educational leave with regular salary payments.
Based on the foregoing, it is my official opinion that an employee

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may not receive his salary while on educational leave. To the extent that this opinion is in conflict with Ops. Att'y Gen. 1963-65, p. 697, such opinion is superseded.

OPINION 72-99
To: Chairman, Georgia Public Service Commission

August 14, 1972

Re: Public Service Commission; delegation of authority to subordinate body prohibited where judgment and discretion required.

Recent legislation has imposed a 30-day notice requirement prior to any change taking effect that is subject to the jurisdiction and control of the Public Service Commission. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 137. The motor common carrier industry is subject to this law and must submit schedule changes to the commission 30 days prior to the effective date of these changes. Opinion to BenT. Wiggins dated April 5, 1972 (Op. Att'y Gen. 72-34). This law also provides that "the commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect without requiring the 30 days' notice." You have asked if it is lawful for the commission to allow the Transportation Staff to receive, consider and act upon bus schedule change requests in less than 30 days without any action by the commissioners prior to the effective date of the change. It is my opinion that they cannot.
The General Assembly has vested the commission with the power to regulate the common carrier industry. Ga. Code Ann. 68-603, based on Ga. Laws 1931, p. 199. Such a grant of authority to certain public officials whose duties are clearly set forth in the law is a proper delegation by the legislature. Bohannon v. Duncan, 185 Ga. 840 (1938); Maner v. Dykes, 55 Ga. App. 436 (1937). However, the authority vested in these officials is to be exercised by them and not by some employees or other individuals. See Levine v. Perry, et al., 204 Ga. 323 (1948). Administrative officers and bodies cannot surrender their powers or delegate their authority which under the law may be exercised only by them. 73 C. J. S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, 57.
Such limitations on the subdelegation of authority generally apply only to discretionary acts. The Georgia Supreme Court favorably cites Mechem on Public Offices and Officers as follows:

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"In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires on the part ofthe officer the exercise ofjudgment and discretion, the presumption is he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion; and unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him he cannot delegate his duties to another." Horton v. The State, 112 Ga. 27, 28 (1910).
The court goes on to say, however, that the performance of ministerial duties can properly be delegated if not specifically prohibited by law.
The duties you wish performed by the Transportation Staff, as described in your letter, are discretionary inasmuch as a decision must be made by that staff in regard to the desirability of the requested change. Further, the decision would go into effect prior to the commission's taking any official action or issuing an order on it. Therefore, the delegation ofsuch duties as you have described would result in an unlawful subdelegation. See K. Davis, Administrative Law, Chapter 9.
This is not to say that the commission cannot delegate to the Transportation Staff such duties as investigation and research of requested changes. The staffcan fully consider a request and make recommendations to the commission, but the final decision before any change goes into effect must be that of the commission. The Supreme Court of a sister state addresses such delegation as follows:
"The rule that requires an executive officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion in making an order of such nature does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates directed by him to investigate and report the facts and their recommendation in relation to the advisability of the order, and also to draft it in the first instance. [Cases cited.] It suffices that the judgment and discretion finally exercised and the orders finally made by the [executeve officer are] his own." School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Adams, et al. v. Callahan, 237 Wis. 560, 576, 297 N. W. 407, 415 (1941).
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the Public Service Commission cannot delegate to the Transportation Staff of the commission the authority to decide on bus schedule change

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requests when such decision would go into effect prior to the commissioners making the final decision.

OPINION 72-100
To: Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

August 14, 1972

Re: Reorganization; effect upon membership of Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority with regard to Director of State Parks and Director of State Game and Fish Commission.

This is in reply to your letter asking who replaces the Director of State Parks and the Director of the State Game and Fish Commission as members ofthe Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority under the provisions of the "Executive Reorganization Act of 1972," Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015.
The "Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority Act" provides, inter alia, that:

"The authority shall consist ofnine (9) members as follows: The Secretary of State, the Director of the State Game and Fish Commission, the Director of the Department of Industry and Trade of the State of Georgia, the Director of the State Parks Department, the President of the Upper Chattahoochee Development Association, and four additional members to be appointed by the Governor...." Ga. Laws 1962, p. 736, as amended by Ga. Laws 1964, p. 731, Ga. Laws 1969, p. 397.

With respect to the membership of the Director of the State Parks Department, the "Executive Reorganization Act of 1972" (Section 1503) transferred all functions oftheDepartment of State Parks, Historic Sites and Monuments to the Department of Natural Resources and provided that any reference in Georgia laws to the Department of State Parks means the Department of Natural Resources. Additionally, the position of Commissioner of Natural Resources was created to execute the functions vested in the Department of Natural Resources.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the Commissioner of Natural Resources replaces the Director of the Department of State Parks as a member of the Lake Lanier Islands Development

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Authority. See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-70, dated June 6, 1972, relating to the membership of the Jekyll Island-State Park Authority.
With respect to the membership of the Director of the State Game and Fish Commission, the Reorganization Act transferred to the Department of Natural Resources the operational, field, and administrative functions ofthe State Game and Fish Commission. However, the State Game and Fish Commission created in Art. V, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3301) continues in existence and assumes the functions of establishing the general policies of the Department of Natural Resources (Section 1527 of the Reorganization Act). This is in contrast to the situation previously discussed where all functions of the Department of State Parks were transferred to the Department of Natural Resources.
Prior to the Reorganization Act the State Game and Fish Commission appointed a director who served as a member of the Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority. It is apparent that this was a policy function which the Reorganization Act continued in the State Game and Fish Commission.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the State Game and Fish Commission is authorized to appoint a representative to replace the Director of the State Game and Fish Commission on the Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority. This representative may be the Director of the State Game and Fish Division of the Department of Natural Resources which would be consistent with the membership of the authority prior to the Reorganization Act and would fully effectuate the legislative intent.

OPINION 72-101 To: Director, State Board ofCorrections

August 15, 1972

Re: Statutes; where two statutes are in conflict, the one last approved will govern, regardless of effective dates. Custody of certain juvenile offenders discussed.

[For parallel opinion on similar question see Op. Att'y Gen. 72-124, infra.]
This responds to your recent request for an opinion with regard to the conflict between Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, and Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251.
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, provides in pertinent part as follows:

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"(c) Any person adjudicated guilty of a misdemeanor for the first time, who was on the date that the misdemeanor was committed, between the ages of 16 and 18 years old, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or confined exclusively under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections for a period not to exceed 12 months."
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, provides in pertinent part that the Division for Children andYouth is hereby designated an exclusive state agency:
"(5) For the acceptance and incarceration of all misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 years; provided, however, that those felons convicted of a capital felony shall only be sentenced into the custody of the State Department of Corrections. All other persons under the age of 17 years and commencing on July 1, 1972, under the age of 18 found to be guilty or convicted of a misdemeanor or felony by any court in Georgia shall be committed for an indefinite period of time to the custody ofthe Division for Children and Youth ofthe State Department of Family and Children Services."
In light of the two above-quoted statutes you requested an opinion as to which of these statutes has priority.
The law existent prior to the 1972 regular session ofthe General Assembly provided that all misdemeanants and felons, other than capital felons, under the age of 17 years were to be confined exclusively to the custody of the Division of Children and Youth. Ga. Laws 1969, p. 996 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209); see Op. Att'y Gen. 70-34. Those misdemeanants and felons 17 years of age or older could, under the appropriate statutes, be confined under the custody of the State Board of Corrections.
Both of the statutory provisions under consideration here were enacted during the 1972 regular session ofthe General Assembly. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, dealing with custody by the Department of Corrections, was approved by the Governor on March 28, 1972. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, dealing with custody by the Division of Children and Youth, was approved by the Governor on April 7, 1972. There is a direct conflict between the two new statutes to the extent that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, vests exclusive custody of first offender misdemeanants, 16 or 17 years of age, in the Department of Corrections.

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The determination as to which of the two statues in question has priority is based upon three general rules ofstatutory construction, to-wit: An existing statute is repealed by implication only to the extent ofan irreconcilable conflict, Adams v. Cowart, et al., 224 Ga. 210 (1968); while the repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, it occurs when a later Act "is clearly and indubitably contradictory of and contrary to the former Act, and the repugnancy is such that the two cannot be reconciled." Mayor and C of Athens v. Wansley, et al., 210 Ga. 173, 177 (1953). The later Act will be that Act which sets out the last expression of the legislative will. County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).
The last expression of the legislative will is determined not by the effective date of the legislation but by reference to the date upon which the legislation in question is approved by the Governor, County of Butts v. Strahan, supra, the approval of the Governor being, in most instances, the last act necessary to fulfill the legal requirements of statutory enactment. See Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 1604 (3rd edition).
The conflict between the two statutes is clear and irreconcilable. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, was approved on the later date and would
therefore be controlling to the extent of any conflict with Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600.
In accordance with the above rules of construction, it is my official opinion that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, which vests exclusive
custody over all 16 or 17-year-old misdemeanants in the Division of Children and Youth, takes priority over Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, to the extent that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600, vests exclusive custody of 16 and 17-year-old first offender misdemeanants in the Department ofCorrections. This priority results from the fact that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, repealed by implication those contradictory and repugnant provisions of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 600.
In practical application, then, the current state of the law as between these two statutes may be outlined as follows:
(a) Those persons who are 16 or 17 years of age at the time they are convicted or found guilty ofa felony (other than capital felony) or misdemeanor (whether it be a first misdemeanor or not) are to be committed exclusively to the custody ofthe Division ofChildren and Youth.
(b) Those persons who are 18 years of age on the day their first misaemeanor is committed are to be committed exclusively to the custody ofthe Department ofCorrections. Commitment under this provision would be direct commitment to the Department of Corrections and un!ler no circumstances could a first offender misdemeanant under the age of 19 be committed directly to the custody of a locally maintained incarceration facility.

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OPINION 72-102
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

August 17, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; release benefits both upon parole and upon termination of sentence when parole revoked.

This is in reply to your request for my official opinion in which you inquire whether an inmate who has been paroled, conditionally released, or released on probation and who has received the benefits specified by Ga. Code Ann. 77-317 (Ga. Laws 1969, p. 600), and who is returned to prison for violating the conditions of his release, is again entitled to receive the same benefits upon the completion of his sentence.
Subsequent to your request for my opinion, the legislature has amended the statute regarding prison release benefits. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 602. The pertinent language of the 1972 law provides that release benefits are given "[w]hen a prisoner ... is discharged upon completion of his sentence, or is conditionally released or paroled ...." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 603, 604. (Emphasis added.) The word "or" can be construed as authorizing the benefits either when the prisoner is released early, or when he is finally discharged, but not on both events. The word "or" may also be construed as instructing that the benefits are to be given both when released early and when discharged after reconfinement.
The answer to your inquiry, then, turns upon the construction of the word "or." In general, statutory words are taken at their ordinary meaning, Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (1), and the cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the true intention of the legislature. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9); Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (1936); Georgia Paper Stock Co. v. State Tax Board, 174 Ga. 816 (1932).
"Or," in its ordinary sense, is disjunctive, i.e., an alternative conjunction. Georgia Paper Stock, supra, at 818-819. "Or" should be construed, however, to mean "and" where the conjunctive sense is necessary to give effect to the legislative intent, as manifested by context and circumstances. Comer u. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 176 Ga. 651 (1932); Clay v. The Central Railroad & Banking Co., 84 Ga. 345, 348 (1889); Accord, Fennell v. State, 218 Ga. 418 (1962) (dictum).

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In an earlier opinion, I concluded that the 1969 statute was intended to alleviate hardships which prisoners encounter on re-entry into free society. Op. Atty. Gen. 69-245. This policy would apply to a second release as well as a first-probably more so, since the question itself presupposes an inmate who was unsuccessful in his first attempt to make the social adjustment to freedom.
The 1972 amendment reinforces such an argument. Before, release benefits included a $25 cash payment. This amount is now a minimum payment, which the board, in its discretion, may increase up to $150. The change can be read only as an increased awareness of the difficulties possibly faced by an inmate upon his release. In another change, a prisoner "who has participated in a work release program" will not receive release benefits unless the board considers "it appropriate according to the financial needs of such prisoner." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 602, 603-604. Here, I find an implied recognition that even a prisoner who has had partial freedom and some income may need release assistance. It is, therefore, my opinion that an inmate who has been paroled, conditionally released, or released on probation and upon his release has been given benefits pursuant to the 1972 law or its predecessor, Ga. Code Ann. 77-317, and who has been returned to prison for violation of the conditions of his release, is again entitled to receive benefits under the Act upon the completion of his sentence, provided he is otherwise qualified.

OPINION 72-103
To: Secretary-Treasurer, Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund

August 17, 1972

Re: Firemen's Pension Fund; majority of trustees needed to take action.

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the number of trustees required to approve actions ofthe Board ofthe Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund. More specifically, you inquired whether a decision requires a majority of the total board or a majority of the board members present at a meeting to be binding.
There is no specific requirement in the Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund Law, Ga. Laws 1955, p. 339 (Ga. Code Ann. 78-1001 et seq.) which establishes a number ofboard members required to transact business.

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The general rule adopted by statute in Georgia is as follows:

"A joint authority given to any number of persons, or officers,
n may be executed by a majority of them, unless it is otherwise
declared." Ga. Code Ann. 102-102, 5.

We are unaware of any Georgia judicial precedent specifically involving the situation you have posed. However, in 1970, the Georgia Supreme Court interpreted the above statute and ruled as follows:

"There is no specific provision of the charter ofthe town fixing the number of votes required to pass a valid ordinance. The trial judge applied the rule of statutory construction in Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (5), as follows: 'A joint authority given to any number of persons, or officers, may be executed by a majority of them, unless it is otherwise declared.' He held that it required a majority of those to whom the power to govern was given to pass a lawful ordinance, which would be four aldermen, or in the event of a tie, three aldermen and the mayor. Stevenson v. State, 69 Ga. 68, 73; Roby v. State, 74 Ga. 812 (2); City of Blakely v. Singletary, 138 Ga. 632 (2) (75 S. E. 1054)." Aliotta v. Gilreath, 226 Ga. 263, 265 (1970).

Thus, the court has taken the position that agreement of a majority ofthe joint authority is required before binding action can be taken.
Therefore, it is my opinion that a majority ofthe members ofthe board of trustees must agree on action to be taken before that action is binding.

OPINION 72-104
To: Director, Fiscal Division, Department of Administrative Services

August 17, 1972

Re: Secretaries of superior court judges and district attorneys; method of compensation.

This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the interpretation of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 617, providing for the

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employment and compensation of secretaries for superior court judges and district attorneys. You have posed the question of whether the salary authorized by the Act must be paid directly to the secretaries, or whether the salary can be paid to the county government to reimburse them for the salaries they might pay to the secretaries.
As I understand the background, Fulton County is currently employing secretaries for the superior court judges and the district attorney. These secretaries are now eligible for the Fulton County Employees' Retirement Program and for federal social security. However, if they were to be paid out of the state treasury, the secretaries would lose their eligibility for both these benefit plans.
The 1972 statute authorizing the employment and payment of judges' secretaries provides in relevant part:

"each superior court judge is hereby authorized to employ a secretary. Said secretary shall be compensated in an amount to be set by the superior court judge commensurate with industry salaries in the community for similar work. An amount not to exceed $6,000.00 per annum for the salary ofthe secretary as herein provided and fixed shall be paid in equal monthly installments by the State Treasurer from funds appropriated or otherwise made available for the operation of the superior courts. Secretaries employed hereunder shall possess such qualifications as shall be determined by the judge employing said secretary and shall serve at the pleasure ofsaid judge. Said secretary shall perform such duties and services as shall be prescribed by the judge." Ga. Laws 1972, p. 617. (Emphasis added.)

The section dealing with the secretaries of the district attorneys is substantially the same.
This Act is significantly different from the statute authorizing the employment and payment of assistant district attorneys in certain counties. The assistant district attorneys' statute provides:

". . . which assistant district attorney shall be compensated $12,500 per annum from state funds, in equal monthly installments, by the State Treasurer...." Ga. Laws 1970,p.716. (Emphasis added.)

It obviously was the intent of the General Assembly, m

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authorizing the employment ofsecretaries, to insure that superior court judges and district attorneys were provided with adequate assistance so they could accomplish their official tasks in an efficient manner without being burdened by clerical problems. It obviously was not the intent to penalize those secretaries by causing them to lose existing retirement benefits through the application of the new law.
Since the statute merely authorizes the payment of salaries, and does not specify that the payment must be made directly to the secretaries from the State Treasurer (as is true in the case of the assistant district attorneys), I see nothing improper with paying the appropriate amount to the county, who will then see that that amount is passed on to the secretaries.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the State Treasurer can reimburse the county for salaries they pay to the secretaries of superior court judges and district attorneys provided, of course, that all the requirements and provisions of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 617, are met.

OPINION 72-105
To: Chairman, State Board of Pardons and Paroles

August 19, 1972

Re: State Board of Pardons and Paroles; duties reqmrmg discretion and judgment not to be delegated to subordinates.

This letter is in reply to your request for my official opinion in which you inquired whether the authority ofa member ofthe State Board of Pardons and Paroles under Ga. Code Ann. 77-518 (Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 187, 188) may be delegated to a board employee. That section provides:

"If any member of the board shall have reasonable grounds to believe that any parolee or conditional releasee has lapsed into criminal ways, or has violated the terms and conditions of his parole or conditional release in a material respect, such member may issue a warrant for the arrest of such parolee or conditional releasee. Said warrant, ifissued by a member ofthe board, shall be returned before him and shall command that the parolee or conditional releasee be brought before him, at which time he shall examine such parolee or conditional

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releasee and admit him to bail conditioned for his appearance before the board, or, if he is not admitted to bail, commit him to jail pending a hearing before the board, as herein provided. All officers authorized to serve criminal process, all peace officers of this State and all parole supervisors or parole officers shall be authorized to execute said warrant. Any parole or probation supervisor, when he has reasonable ground to believe that a parolee or conditional releasee has violated the terms or conditions of his parole or conditional release in a material respect, shall notify the board or some member thereof, and proceedings thereupon be had as provided herein." Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 192; 1965, pp. 478, 479; 1970, pp. 187' 188.

The Supreme Court of Georgia has considered one instance of an attempted delegation of authority by a state political unit. In Levine v. Perry, 204 Ga. 323 (3) (1948), the plaintiffsought to enjoin commissioners from creating a planned police commission. In ruling against the authority of the county commissioners to delegate certain statutory powers, the court said: "All of the foregoing power conferred by law upon the commissioners involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, and such powers cannot be delegated by county commissioners." Ga. Code Ann. 77-518 similarly involves and, in my opinion, requires the exercise of judgment and discretion by the individual board member. The necessity to judge or evaluate is apparent in the determination of "reasonable ground for belief' and in considering the circumstances bearing upon the issuance of the warrant and the admission to bail.
I further note that Ga. Code Ann. 77-518 specifically provides that any parole or probation supervisor who has reasonable ground to believe that a parolee or conditional releasee has violated the terms of his release "shall notify the board or some member thereof, and proceedings thereupon be had as provided herein." The section also provides that all parole supervisors and officers are authorized to execute the board member's arrest warrant. Therefore, almost certainly if the board had the power to delegate Ga. Code Ann. 77-518 authority, that authority could not, consistent with due process, be delegated to a pardon or parole official, who under the same section could initiate proceedings against a suspected violator, make the determination that a violation had probably occurred, issue the arrest warrant, execute the arrest warrant, and finally, determine that the violator would

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not be admitted to bail. Due process requires that the decision to issue a warrant be based on a judgment of probable cause by a neutral and detached official. Shadwick u. City of Tampa, 407 U.S.345,32 L.Ed.2d 783,788 (1972). I am not inclined to believe that a parole officer or probation supervisor, who might of necessity assume the role of a witness against a suspected violator, and who has the authority to execute the arrest warrant of a suspected violator under Code 77-518, meets the criteria of a neutral and detached official. See Collidge u. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971).
In any event, it is my official opinion that the authority vested in the members of the board, under Code 77-518, to determine whether a parolee or conditional releasee has lapsed into criminal ways or has violated the terms and conditions of his release, and upon an affirmative determination to issue a warrant for the arrest of such a parolee or conditional releasee, involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the member of the board concerned and as such may not be delegated to anyone.

OPINION 72-106
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

August 19, 1972

Re: Reorganization; effect upon Department of Public Safety; expenses of Public Safety Board members.

This is in response to your letter of August 3, 1972, asking whether Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 325, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-102 [1972 Rev.]) allows your department to pay the expenses of Department of Public Safety Board members when they are attending board meetings or otherwise attending to the business of the department.
You also raised the question as to whether the travel expenses of such members could be paid if they use automobiles belonging to a unit of local government.
The law in question reads as follows:

"Compensation of members - None of the members of the Department of Public Safety shall receive any salary or compensation for the discharge oftheir duties, other than their salaries as officers of the State of Georgia, except such

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legitimate expenses as may be incurred. " Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 324-5, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-102).

The "members of the Department of Public Safety" referred to in that section relates to those members listed in the former law unofficially codified as Ga. Code Ann. 92A-101 (1972 Rev.). Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 324, as amended, Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 196, 197. They were Governor, Attorney General, Adjutant General, chairman or executive officer of the State Highway Department, Comptroller General, and two members selected by the Governor from among the sheriffs and peace officers of the state.
However, the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, Section 18, created a new, nine member Board of Public Safety. The new board is composed of the Governor, Attorney General, Corrections Director, one representative each of the Sheriff's Association, ofthe Association ofChiefs of Police, and ofthe District Attorney's Association, and three members from the state at large who are not to be employees of the state or of local governments.
Section 1603 of the Executive Reorganization Act, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1059, also transfers all of the functions of the Department of Public Safety established byGa.Laws 1937, p. 322, as amended, except its policy-making functions, to the new department created by the 1972 Act. The policy-making functions are transferred, at Section 1609 of the Act, to the new Board of Public Safety.
There is no question, then, under the wording of Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 324-5, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-102 (1972 Rev.)), which was not amended by the Reorganization Act, that members of the new Board of Public Safety may be reimbursed for "such legitimate expenses as may be incurred" by them in carrying out their official duties on the board.
As to your question of whether those board members who are employed by local government units may be reimbursed for using motor vehicles, in their state duties, which belong to their local governments-that would depend on the factual situation in each case, i.e., whether or not such a board member, himself, had incurred "legitimate expenses" while using the locally owned motor vehicle. If such a board member were required by his local government unit to bear the expenses for the use of the car while on state business, then that would be a legitimate expense for which he could, and should, be reimbursed. If, however, he has free use of the vehicle, even on his state business, then he has incurred

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no legitimate expense for which he could legally be reimbursed.

OPINION 72-107
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

August 21, 1972

Re: Department of Public Safety; funds collected for reinstating drivers licenses must be paid into state treasury; not earmarked.

This replies to your letter of June 19, 1972, in which you requested that I render an official opinion stating whether the Department ofPublic Safety should receive credit for certain funds collected pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 92A-615.2 and deposited into the state treasury.
Your question addresses itself to the fees collected under Ga. Laws 1963, p. 593 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-615.2) in connection with reinstating licenses which were revoked pursuant to the Safety Responsibility Law. It is my understanding that the department has always deposited the funds collected pursuant to this Code section into the state treasury as required by Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-423). You now desire to know whether the department's budgetary allotment should be credited with the amount of such deposits. The appropriation of funds necessary to operate the various departments and agencies of the State of
Georgia is controlled by the Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IX. It provides that all appropriations are to be made by a biennial General Appropriation Bill or by a supplementary appropriation Act. It also provides,

"... [T]he appropriation for each department, officer, bureau, board, comm1sswn, agency or institution for which appropriation is made shall be for a specific sum of money, and no appropriation shall allocate to any object, the proceeds of any particular tax or funds or a part or percentage thereof."
Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6204).

The final sentence of Ga. Code Ann. 92A-615.2 provides: "The fees paid pursuant to this section shall be expendable receipts to be used only by the director towards the cost of administering the provisions of this chapter." It is quite apparent that this statutory

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provision cannot act as an appropriation of funds to the Department of Public Safety.

"[T]he purpose ofthe section on 'Appropriation Control' ... was to end the practice ofallocating or earmarking particular taxes for the use by any specific department, and to require the General Assembly to appropriate from the general fund specific amounts for each fiscal year for the support of each department or agency." Gregory u. Hamilton, 215 Ga. 735, 737 (1960).

Whatever was the intended meaning of the last sentence of Ga. Code Ann. 92A-615.2, it is obvious that under the Constitution of the State ofGeorgia as it has been construed by the Supreme Court ofGeorgia it cannot operate as an appropriation ofany funds to the Department of Public Safety.
Any statute which attempted to earmark the receipts from certain revenue sources as an appropriation to a certain agency would be struck down as unconstitutional. Cf., Gregory u. Hamilton, supra; State Ports Authority u. Arnall, 201 Ga. 713 (1947). Although both ofthese decisions were rendered prior to the latest amendment to the Appropriations Control section of the Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IX (Ga. Laws 1962, p. 752, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 2-62), the amendment does not change the Constitution in any way which is material to the consideration of the question you ask.
It is thus my official opinion that the funds which the Department of Public Safety has received pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 92A-615.2 and deposited with the state treasury were not appropriated to the Department of Public Safety, and the department cannot receive any credit therefor.

OPINION 72-108
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

August 21, 1972

Re: Drivers licenses; numerous questions relating to new classification system established by laws enacted in 1972.

This is in response to your recent letter posing various questions

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relative to the new drivers license classification law, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1078-1081, passed by the General Assembly this year. That new law, which becomes operative January 1, 1973, is a substitute for Section 2 of Art. IV, Ga. Laws 1937, p. 322, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401 (1972 Rev.)), relating to the classification of drivers licenses.
However, in asking for the above ruling, you set out nine specific questions, several of which embrace other sections of the law relating to drivers licenses which were not amended, at least directly, by Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1078-1081, but which are necessarily affected by it. I will answer the questions below, in some cases individually and in others by combining related questions.
The old license classification law (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401 (1972 Rev.)) provides generally for three classes oflicenses-the learner's class, the operator's class, and the public-chauffeur's class.
The new Act, however, will provide for five classifications-class one, which generally is the same as the present operator's class; class two, for motorcycle operators; class three, for operators of motor vehicles 80 inches or wider, designed to carry more than 10 passengers and used as common or contract carriers; class four, for operators of trucks weighing 24,000 pounds gross weight or more; and class five, for operators of tractor-trailer trucks.
Your first two questions ask what fees shall be charged for the new license classifications, both regular and learners' licenses. The new Act makes no reference to fees. The fees for the old classifications are controlled by Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 346, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-415), which was not amended this year. That Act sets out the fee for a learner's license or renewal thereof as $1.50 per annum; for an operator's license or renewal thereof as $2.50 for a two-year license and $5.50 for a five-year license; and for a chauffeur's license or renewal thereof as $4.50 for a two-year license and $10.50 for a five-year license.
Of course, under the new classifications there will be no such thing as either an operator's" license or a ~~chauffeur's" license. The new class-one license encompasses the former operator's license. The new class-three, class-four, and class-five licenses are all now included within the old chauffeur's license." Therefore, it is my opinion that the legislature intended that the fee to be charged for a class-one license be the same as the old operator's license, and that the fee to be charged for those licenses falling in classes three through five be the same as the old chauffeur's license.

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That leaves only the new class two, or motorcycle driver's license, which was included by definition in the old classification section (Code 92A-401) at subsection (6), but for which no specified fee was provided under Ga. Code Ann. 92A-415. Under the old law, a motorcycle driver was required to have only an operator's license. Therefore, it is my opinion that the fee to be charged for the new motorcycle-class (class two) license should be the same as that charged for the old operator's license.
The fee for a learner's license of $1.50 per annum would not be changed by the new Act.
Your third query is: "What shall be the date of expiration of each class license and how will that be determined?"
That question is controlled by Ga. Laws 1935, pp. 135, 139, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-408), which generally provides that all licenses, except the "honorary" or veterans' licenses, expire on the birthday of the holder of the license. It is my opinion that the new classification law will not affect that provision.
Your fourth question asks if photographs should be required for all learners' permits, and, if so, can an exception be made for class-two (motorcycle) learner permits which require only a 30-day waiting period before the applicant can receive a regular class-two license. In the latter instance, you note that the 30-day period would not provide sufficient time for processing a temporary license, complete with a photograph. The current law dealing with photographs on drivers licenses is contained within the law unofficially codified from Ga. Laws 1935, p. 135, as Ga. Code Ann. 92A-408, which gives you the authority and power to require a photograph on a driver's license. The wording is discretionary, not mandatory. It and other portions of the driver's license law give you the authority to establish rules and regulations not in conflict with statute, to carry out the law. It is, therefore, my opinion that your question number four can be answered administratively, through regulations established by you and your board, since the law authorizes but does not require such photographs.
Your fifth question asks if the Department of Public Safety would be required to give credit for the fee paid for a learner's license toward the issuance of a regular license. As noted, the new classification law makes no reference to fees. The current section relating to fees makes no references to such credits. It is my understanding that under the current laws and regulations you do not give such credit on a learner's permit. Since there is no change in the current fee statutes, it is my opinion that you can continue that practice.

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Your sixth question asks, if an applicant for a class three, four or five license is self-employed, then what "evidence ofsatisfactory driving experience" would be required before he could receive a full license for these classes. The Act in question provides, in subsection (b) of quoted Section 2 that, among other requirements, an applicant for a class three, four or five license must, within six months after obtaining it, "present evidence ofsatisfactory driving experience in the type of vehicle or vehicles which he has been licensed to drive." Again, since nothing in the Act and related laws spells out exactly how this is to be done, and since you are given the authority to implement the Act with rules and regulations, this would be an administrative decision. I might suggest that you could require the applicant to sign an affidavit relating to his experience, including that he has regularly operated the class of vehicle in question and that he has not been cited for any traffic violations related to that operation; and reporting any motor vehicle accidents in which he has been involved while operating said class of vehicle.
Your seventh question asks what shall be the minimum age for a license in all classes, and for learners' permits in the various classes. The Act, in subsection (a) of quoted Section 2, reads:

"No person shall operate any motor vehicle unless he shall possess a valid license permitting the operation of such motor vehicle. No license shall be issued to any applicant under 16 years of age, except a learner's permit at 15 years of age."

This would seem to say that applicants for regular licenses in all classes must be at least 16 years old, and that a 15 year old could obtain a learner's permit in all classes. However, Section 1 (subsection (b) of quoted Section 2) requires that applicants for a learner's permit to operate motor vehicles within classes three, four or five shall hold a class-one license. That section further provides that to hold either a class two, three, four or five license, the applicant "shall have satisfactorily completed" the requirements for a class-one license. Therefore, it is my opinion that a 15 year old could not receive a learner's permit for a class three through five license. That subsection further says:

"With reference to a class two license, a learner's permit shall be issued therefor for a period of 30 days. After such period of time the applicant shall return to the issuing agency and prove

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that he is able to operate a class two vehicle in compliance with rules established by the Director of the Department of Public Safety."

There appears to be no prohibition in the Act against issuing a learner's permit in the motorcycle (class two) classification to a 15 year old. However, as noted in the language cited above, the Act does require that before an applicant to operate motor vehicles within classes two, three, four or five can receive such a license, he must have satisfactorily completed the requirements for a class one license. Therefore, before an applicant can receive a full class-two license, he must be at least 16 years old. As indicated, the minimum age for obtaining any full license, one through five, would be 16 years.
Your eighth question asks: "Can the Department ofPublic Safety issue a motor vehicle license for a validity time of other than four years?"
The Act in question does nothing to affect the period of time for which a license can be issued. This question apparently relates to a separate Act passed by the General Assembly this year (Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1076-1077), which, beginning January 1, 1973, will require a visual acuity test of all motor vehicle drivers every four years. That Act, which creates a new Section 5A of Article 4, Ga. Laws 1937, p. 322, reads in subsection (a) of the quoted section that "no license shall be issued by the director to be effective for a period in excess offour years." Section 2 ofthat Act declares that "all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed."
The only provision in the drivers license laws as to the period of time for which drivers licenses may be issued is again contained in the fee section (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-415), cited above. As noted, that section, with the exception of learners' permits and veterans' licenses, provided only for a two-year or a five-year operator's or chauffeur's license. Since the General Assembly did not amend that section, and since Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1076, cited above, will prohibit the issuance of a license beyond a four-year period, that would leave only a two-year license classification. Therefore, the posture of the law as of January 1, 1973, will be that you will be limited to issuing only a two-year license.
Your final question asks if holders of class one licenses will be permitted to tow trailers, such as "utility and camper trailers." The current law requires no special driver's license, beyond an operator's license, for towing such trailers, although I understand that there are certain other regulations requiring special braking

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equipment for trailers beyond a certain weight limit. The Act in question also makes no provision for a special license to tow such trailers. Therefore, the holders of class one licenses apparently would be permitted to tow them.

OPINION 72-109 To: Superintendent of Banks

August 21, 1972

Re: Credit unions; power of Superintendent of Banks to disapprove bylaws limited to bylaws prohibited by statute.

This is in response to your letter of August 2, 1972 in which you requested my opinion as to the authority of the Superintendent of Banks to disapprove bylaw amendments for state chartered credit unions. In particular you asked whether you might disapprove a bylaw amendment which would permit former employees of the Education Department, who were transferred by reorganization, to retain their membership in the department's credit union.
Pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 25-104, the Superintendent ofBanks has the responsibility of determining the validity of bylaw amendments:

"No amendment to the bylaws [of a credit union] shall become operative until copy thereof, with the approval of the Superintendent of Banks indorsed thereon, has been filed with the Secretary of State."

It is further provided in Ga. Code Ann. 25-127, based upon Ga. Laws 1967, p. 595, as follows:

"The Superintendent of Banks shall pass upon ... every proposed amendment to the bylaws of a credit union, within 30 days after the same is submitted to him by the Secretary of State, and shall, within that time, advise the Secretary ofState in writing of his approval or disapproval of such application or amendment. He shall state the reasons for his disapproval of any such application or amendment."

Although these provisions of the Georgia law give the Superintendent of Banks the discretionary authority to pass upon

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bylaw amendments, this authority is not without limitation. It has been held in Georgia that an administrative official, such as the Superintendent ofBanks, may not use his discretion to determine what the law is, but only to determine the facts necessary to apply the law. Forrester v. Culpepper, 194 Ga. 744 (1942). As noted in a previous opinion of the Attorney General, if an application for a credit union charter is in order and is not inconsistent with the terms of the Act, then the Superintendent of Banks cannot arbitrarily decline the application. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1948-49, p. 434.
The particular bylaw amendment proposed by the Georgia State Department of Education Credit Union does not violate any provision of the Georgia Credit Union Act. Under Ga. Code Ann. 25-108, the membership of any chartered credit union is open to those who are elected to membership, pay their entrance fee, and comply with the credit union's bylaws. There is no statutory requirement that membership be limited according to the individual's place of employment. The statute allows the credit union to have complete control over its membership. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1948-49, p. 434.
Considering the statutory right of a credit union to control its membership, it is my official opinion that the Superintendent of Banks may not disapprove a bylaw which fully complies with the Georgia Credit Union Act. The Superintendent may only disapprove those bylaws which do not conform to the Georgia Act.
If you are concerned about someone borrowing money from two different credit unions without either knowing about the other, the credit unions could request information on a membership application which would elicit whether the applicant belongs to or owes money to another credit union.

OPINION 72-110
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

August 21, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; retroactive pay increases of merit system employees not authorized.

This is in response to your request for an opinion as to whether a merit increase can be paid retroactively when the agency claims they have forgotten to grant an increase on a certain date and, sometime later, desires to pay the increase on a retroactive basis.

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The General Assembly has granted the State Personnel Board the authority to establish a pay plan for all employees in the classified service of the merit system. See Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2203). Pursuant to this authority, the State Personnel Board has established regulations concerning salary advancements. (Merit System Regulation A. 300.)
These regulations provide, in essence, that salary increases for employees shall be based on performance and length ofservice, and are granted at the discretion of management. They are not "automatic" increases which must be granted at certain times. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (2) (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (2)) provides:

"The General Assembly shall not grant or authorize extra compensation to any public officer, agent or contractor after the service has been rendered or the contract entered into."

Therefore, ifthe management of an agency had the discretion to grant a merit increase and, for some reason did not exercise that discretion, any attempt to make retroactive payment would be granting extra compensation to a public officer or agent after the service had been rendered and would violate the Constitution.
Therefore, it is my opinion that an agency may not pay a merit increase retroactively.

OPINION 72-111
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

August 23, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; state tax revenue could be spent for scholarships for inmates under certain conditions.

This responds to your request for my opinion with regard to the State of Georgia's restrictions on gratuities and the effect of those restrictions upon the use of state funds for scholarships for inmates.
The State of Georgia can raise revenue for educational purposes and for operation of state institutions. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5501 (1), (2)). This authority is limited by the prohibition against gratuities: "The General

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Assembly shall not ... grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person .... " Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402)).
The gratuities clause in turn is qualified by a series ofexceptions, these exceptions dealing primarily with educational programs. For example:

"The General Assembly is ... authorized to appropriate funds to any ... state agency for the purpose of being used to obtain funds from the Federal Government for educational scholarships ... loans and other educational purposes and all such ... state agencies shall be authorized to use the funds so appropriated and the funds received from the Federal Government for the purposes authorized anddirected by the Federal Government ..."Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (lOA) (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (lOA)).

A program of inmate scholarships could be conducted under this provision if the General Assembly appropriated matching funds for an available federal program. Cf., Ops. Att'y Gen. 68-268; 67-89.
The General Assembly also "is authorized to provide by law for grants or scholarships to citizens of Georgia" who attend colleges and universities in the state which are not a part of the state university system. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (14) (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (14)). There is nothing in the literal language of this provision to prohibit administration of a portion of such scholarships through the Board of Corrections, if the General Assembly so provided. However, this probably would be an unintended and awkward application of Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (14). Like the remaining educational exceptions to the gratuities clause, it is implemented by an agency in the educational sphere, the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Authority. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 906 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-39). Thus, in addition to considering its own program (under matching federal funds, supra) the Board of Corrections may wish to consult other state agencies, which administer college financing programs for all citizens. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-31, based upon Ga. Laws 1965, p. 210 (state scholarships); Ch. 32-33, based upon Ga. Laws 1965, p. 217 (educational loans); and Ch. 32-39 above referred to (private college grants).
The Attorney General has previously issued an opinion that the Board of Corrections and the Board of Regents can conduct college-level classes within the prisons, with the Board of

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Corrections paying the cost. See Op. Att'y Gen. 69-267; Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1399, 1403 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-319 (a)). The gratuities clause was not considered in that setting. I have assumed that the present problem concerns actual attendance at a college or university, as a regular student. This is possible because of newly enacted provisions regarding special leave. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 342 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-342 to 77-344), as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 579.
In accordance with the above discussion, it is my opinion that the restrictions on gratuities provided in the Georgia Constitution would not be applicable ifthe General Assembly appropriates state funds for a matching-federal-funds program for inmate scholarships. As indicated above, the Department of Corrections may wish to consult with other state agencies administering scholarship programs.

OPINION 72-112
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

August 23, 1972

Re: License fees received by the state examining boards are to be paid into state treasury, subject to general appropriation by the General Assembly.

This is in reply to your letter of July 31, 1972, in which you requested my opinion as to whether license fees paid to the state examining boards must be held for the exclusive use ofsuch boards.
The general law governing the office ofthe Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards, provides as follows:

"The expenses and salary of the secretary and the expenses and salaries incident to the work of his office shall be paid out of the fees remitted to the State Treasurer .... Any and all balances on hand at the end of each year shall be maintained in the state treasury for the use and maintenance ofthe several examining boards and the office of the joint-secretary." Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 35, 37 (Ga. Code 84-101).

It will be noted from the above quoted provision that the fees collected by the various state examining boards are to be remitted

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to the State Treasurer. This same general requirement holds true in the Acts regulating particular examining boards. See, e. g., Ga. Laws 1919, p. 125; 1950, p. 238, codified respectively as Ga. Code Ann. 84-312, 84-806.
However, because the license fees are remitted to the State Treasurer as required by law, the only method by which an examining board may acquire the use of these funds is pursuant to an appropriation by the General Assembly. In Ga.~ Constitution, Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XI (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1911), it is provided as follows:

"No money shall be drawn from the treasury except by appropriation made at law."

It is further provided in Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-413) that:

"All expenditures ofthe state and ofits budget units ofmoneys drawn from the state treasury shall be made under the authority of Appropriations Acts, which shall be based upon a budget provided in this Chapter, and no money shall be drawn from the treasury, except by appropriation made by law pursuant to Article Ill, Section VII, Paragraph XI[ 2-1911] of the Constitution of Georgia."

Thus, it is clear that funds for the use of the Examining Boards must be appropriated by the General Assembly. Moreover, the General Assembly is limited in the method by which such funds may be appropriated. Under Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6204), all appropriations must be for a specific sum of money, and "no appropriation shall allocate to any object the proceeds of any particular . . . fund or a part or percentage thereof." This provision ofthe Constitution invalidates any state statute which attempts to allocate the proceeds from
license fees for the use of a particular examining board. The purpose of this constitutional provision is simply to require the General Assembly to make a yearly appropriation of a specific sum of money for each department or agency. Gregory v. Hamilton, 215 Ga. 735 (1960). The provision gives the General Assembly the constitutional prerogative of appropriating funds received from the examining boards in any manner it deems proper.
In conclusion, it is my opinion that license fees received by the state examining boards must be paid into the state treasury and

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that such fees are not required to be appropriated or allocated for the use of such boards.

OPINION 72-113
To: Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

August 23, 1972

Re: Health insurance for public employees; the employer contribution paid by the state to the county health department employees health insurance plan is confined to the plan established by statute.

This is in response to your request for an opinion as to whether the employer contribution for the health insurance plan for county health department employees, which is paid by the Department of Human Resources, could continue to be paid by the state if county health department employees were to be included in a new health insurance program for all county employees.
By Ga. Laws 1967, p. 738, a health insurance plan for employees of county boards of health was devised (Ga. Code Ann. 89-1501 et seq.). This plan provides in essence that the State Personnel Board shall develop a health insurance plan for full-time employees of county health departments and shall contract with appropriate insurance carriers to provide the coverage. The plan established a separate experience-rated group and a separate health insurance fund for the covered employees.
The health department employees paid into this fund through a withholding plan from their salaries. Originally the county boards of health and the State Department of Public Health shared the employer contribution. However, a 1972 amendment to the plan provided that the employer share would be paid entirely by the State Department of Human Resources as a part of the state's financial assistance to the county boards of health. Both the original Act and the 1972 amendment were quite specific that the state shall contribute "to this health insurance fund." (E.g. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 348, 349.) (Emphasis added.)
The 1972 General Assembly also established a new concept in the health insurance area by providing that the State Personnel Board could contract with counties to provide a health insurance program for all county employees (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 726). Under the provisions of this Act, Fulton County and the State Personnel

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Board are now considering a health plan for Fulton County employees which would be administered by the state. The employer share of this plan would be paid by the county. This plan would be experience-rated and administered entirely separately from the existing plan for employees ofcounty health departments. In addition, the employer contribution would probably be for a different amount than that paid under the county health department employee plan.
The question has now been raised as to whether the state contributed employer share to the county health department plan could be applied to the plan for all county employees if the county health department employees were included in the general plan.
In my opinion it could not. These two plans are entirely separate, being established by different experience-rated groups and probably, different amounts of employer contributions. The General Assembly, in both the original and amended county health department plans, made it clear that the state's contribution was to be paid into that sp~cific fund and not into any other health insurance program.

OPINION 72-114
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

August 28, 1972

Re: District attorneys; authority to transmit on Police Radio Service frequencies assigned to Department of Public Safety.

This letter replies to your request ofJuly 25, 1972, for an official opinion concerning whether or not district attorneys of the State of Georgia can utilize the radio frequencies assigned to the Department of Public Safety by the Federal Communications Commission. It is my official opinion that district attorneys are authorized to use these frequencies, but can only use them for communications essential to official police activities.
It is my understanding that the Federal Communications Commission has assigned to the Georgia Department of Public Safety two radio frequencies for use by base and mobile radio stations. I also understand that the Department of Public Safety has entered into cooperative agreements concerning these frequencies with certain police and sheriffs departments throughout the state to enable these local law enforcement

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agencies to better coordinate with the Department ofPublic Safety. You now want to know if a district attorney, under the laws ofthe State of Georgia, is a person authorized by the applicable F.C.C. regulations to use these radio frequencies.
The Rules and Regulations of the Federal Communications Commission allot certain frequencies to "Police Radio Service." It is on such frequencies that the Georgia State Patrol Radio operates and upon which the district attorneys wish to operate.
The F.C.C. regulations provide:

"Authorizations for stations in the Police Radio Service will be issued only to states, territories, possessions and other governmental subdivisons including counties, cities, towns and similar governmental entities." 47 C.F.R. 89.301.

The regulations authorize cooperative use of radio frequencies

"provided all persons sharing in the use ofa station are eligible to hold licenses to operate the particular type of station shared." 47 C.F.R. 89.13.

The Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XI (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 2-46) establishes the office of district attorney as an office in the judicial branch of the state government. A district attorney is an agent of the state and as an agent of the state would be authorized to operate stations in the Police. Radio Service. Consequently, the Department of Public Safety would be authorized to enter into a cooperative use agreement with a district attorney.
The Federal Communications Commission's Regulations not only regulate the persons who may use the radio frequencies here under consideration, they also regulate the types of communications which may be transmitted over these frequencies:

"Stations in the police radio service are authorized to transmit communications essential to official police activities of the licensee." 47 C.F.R. 89.303.

This limitation on the content of communications would be fully applicable to any district attorney who utilized the frequencies alloted to the Department of Public Safety.
It should be noted at this point that usage of these frequencies

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is not authorized for all "law enforcement" purposes. It is specifically reserved for "police" activities. The following definitions in the F.C.C. regulations should be noted:

"Police Radio Service. A Public Safety Service of radio communications essential to official police activities. Local Government Radio Service. A service of radio communications essential to official activities of states, possessions, and territories, including counties, towns, cities, and similar governmental subdivisions." 47 C.F.R. 89.3 (a).

The duties of a district attorney in Georgia are set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 24-2908. They involve basically representing the State ofGeorgia before grand juries and in court in criminal prosecutions and other legal matters. Ifthe performance ofsuch duties as these were to require radio communications, it is the "Local Government Radio Service," not the "Police Radio Service" which would be the appropriate radio network.
It is thus my official opinion that the district attorneys of the State ofGeorgia cannot use the Department ofPublic Safety Police Radio Service to transact their business as district attorneys. District attorneys, if allowed to utilize the Police Radio Service frequencies of the Department of Public Safety, could utilize these frequencies only in the furtherance of "official police activities," and not in the furtherance of governmental activities.
To briefly recapitulate, it is my official opinion that district attorneys of the State of Georgia would be eligible to operate stations on the Police Radio Service frequencies ofthe Department of Public Safety, but they would only be authorized to transmit communications essential to official police activities.

OPINION 72-115
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

August 28, 1972

Re: Capital punishment; decision of Supreme Court of United States not to affect duties of Board of Corrections with reference to sentences.

This responds to your request of August 16, 1972 seeking my

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advice on the present and future administrative handling of the prisoners presently assigned to "death row" at Georgia State Prison. It is my understanding that your request is framed in terms of the announced decision of the Supreme Court of the United States with respect to the imposition and execution of death penalties. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972).
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was rendered on June 26, 1972, and within the time provided by the rules of that court, the States of Georgia and Texas, together with the district attorney of the city of Philadelphia, filed motions for rehearing and possible reconsideration of the court's five-to-four decision. This motion for rehearing will not receive action until after the Supreme Court reconvenes in October.
As you are probably aware, there are 13 cases involving the imposition of death penalties by courts of this state pending before the United States Supreme Court on our motion for rehearing. Twelve of these cases were taken to the Supreme Court of the United States following a decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The 13th case involved a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. As this last case involved a death sentence which had already been invalidated under the Witherspoon ruling of 1968 (see Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)) the blanket inclusion of this case within the Supreme Court's decision on the several-hundred cases pending from around the country was probably an oversight, since the court's action was to invalidate a sentence which had already been declared invalid.
Regardless ofthe ultimate outcome in the Supreme Court ofthe United States, all the cases in question will have to work their way back down the appellate structure. In each and every case, final action will be taken in a trial court of general jurisdiction, normally the original sentencing court. This process should establish a sentence certain for each capital felon involved.
We understand that there are a number of other prisoners presently under death sentence who are not included in the 13 cases before the Supreme Court ofthe United States. The action of the Supreme Court will not constitute an adjudication in their particular cases. It will constitute precedent for a judgment by a trial court of general jurisdiction restating such sentence as the final outcome of the 13 cases may mandate. Pending a judicial alteration of sentence, it is my opinion that the warden ofGeorgia State Prison still holds all prisoners originally received for execution under the authority of that law regulating the custody

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of persons under death sentences. Ga. Code Ann. 27-2514, 27-2518.
In this regard, I call your attention to my previous opinion respecting the proper place of confinement for death-sentenced prisoners whose execution dates have been stayed and for whom no new execution dates have been set. Op. Att'y Gen. 71-188. I understand that this opinion will cover all death-sentenced prisoners presently in the custody of the warden, Georgia State Prison.
As I indicated in my previous opinion, the concept of"death row" is a colloquial expression having no particular legal import. There is no requirement within the law that persons being held under death sentences, whose execution dates have been stayed and for whom no new execution dates have been set, be segregated or isolated from the other prisoners. These prisoners "should be maintained instead in the general prison population ifpossible, but with security measures consistent with their status as death-sentenced prisoners." Op. Att'y Gen. 71-188. The only legal impediment to your administrative discretion in the handling of these prisoners is that they may not be transferred from the custody ofthe warden, Georgia State Prison, to any other custodian ofany institution maintained under the State Board ofCorrections for the assignment of state prisoners.
I do not anticipate that any effort will be made pending resolution of our motion for rehearing to reset execution dates on the prisoners within your custody. This being the case, the legal, custodial status of these inmates remains as before.
[See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-97, supra.]

OPINION 72-116 To: Governor of Georgia

August 29, 1972

Re: Early Childhood Development Act; financing matters.

You have requested my official opinion concerning the Early Childhood Development Act (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 722), particularly the meaning of certain terms contained therein andthe means of financing the several aspects thereof.
As stated to you in my official opinion dated April 14, 1972 (Op. Att'y Gen. 72-38) the Act provides that an "early childhood development program" shall include, but shall not be limited to:

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(1) testing, diagnosis and treatment of physical or mental handicaps of children from one to three years of age;
(2) education programs for children five years of age; and (3) education programs for children three to five years ofage who have physical or mental handicaps. (See Section 2 of the Act.)
It is clear, as I stated to you earlier (Official Opinion 72-38, dated April 14, 1972), that an early childhood development program is not limited to these three categories. State funds may be expended for these three purposes and for other early childhood development programs.
The facts presented are as follows: A local school system using state funds, employs teachers and teachers' aides in an educational program for five year: olds and for physically or mentally handicapped three to five year olds. The specific question presented is whether these state funds may be used to "match" federal funds for an early childhood development program for children five or under who are not handicapped; i.e. can federal funds be used for purposes other than those three required by the Act?
The described expenditure of state funds is clearly authorized by Section 4 (a) of the Act. Thus, the question relates solely to "matching" and the use of federal funds.
Section 4 (b) provides that local boards ofeducation may use state funds, and may use state funds to match federal funds, only as provided in Section 4 (a) [to-wit: for early childhood development programs], and may not use such state funds to establish, support or purchase services from, child day care centers. Clearly, state funds expended pursuant to Section 4(a) may be used to match federal funds for early childhood development, except that state funds may not be used to establish, support or purchase services from, child day care centers.
Section 5(a) of the Act provides that state funds shall not be used, either directly or indirectly, except as provided by the Act, to provide social services or day care services. Section 5 (b) provides that no state funds shall be used, except as authorized by the Act, to provide social services or day care services.
I am firmly convinced, and it is my official opinion, that (1) state funds may not be used to establish, support or purchase services from, day care centers, but that (2) state funds may be used for

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early childhood development purposes as provided in Section 4 (a) of the Act, and that (3) such state funds may be used to match federal funds as authorized by federal law and regulations. That is to say, there are no restrictions on the use of federal funds in the Early Childhood Development Act, provided such federal funds are used for early childhood development purposes.
My official opinion (Op. Att'y Gen. 72-38) to you dated April 14, 1972, particularly the answer to question 7, is reaffirmed, and your question is answered in the affirmative.

OPINION 72-117
To: Director, Department of Transportation

August 31, 1972

Re: State Department of Transportation; sponsorship of a1r demonstration projects.

By letter of August 15, 1972, you have requested an official response to the following two questions:

(1) Is the Department ofTransportation authorized to act as administrator of an air demonstration service project where the project is funded by a federal commission under a contract between the federal commission and a private airline?
(2) May the Department of Transportation sponsor an air demonstration service project with state funds?

The Coastal Plains Regional Commission is a federal commission of which Governor Carter is a co-chairman. The commission was created to plan and induce the accelerated economic development ofa region which covers nearly 80,000 square miles in Georgia and the Carolinas. The commission is authorized to do the following:

"(2) initiate and coordinate the preparation of long-range overall economic development program for such regions;
* * * "(5) promote increased private investment in such regions." Public Works and Development Act of 1965, Title V, P. L. 89-136, 79 Stat. 552, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (1965).

The scope of the commission's activities covers the counties in

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approximately the southern half of Georgia. Specifically, it includes all the counties below a line formed by the northern boundaries of Richmond, Jefferson, Glascock, Washington, Wilkinson, Twiggs, Bibb, Crawford, Taylor, Marion, Chattahoochee, and Muscogee Counties.
Your first question is whether the Department ofTransportation has the statutory authority to administer a demonstration service funded by the commission.
If there is no specific statutory authority, the Department of Transporation will be precluded from acting as a conduit for federal monies by Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402):

"The General Assembly shall not by vote, resolution, or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association."

Without specific authority, administering this demonstration project would be a gift of the Department of Transportation's services to the federal government.
Before reorganization, the Aviation Unit, which is now under the Department of Transportation, was a division under the Department oflndustry and Trade. Ga. Code Ann. 40-2107, based upon Ga. Laws 1949, p. 249, as amended, describes the duties and powers of the board of commissioners of the Department of Industry and Trade as follows:

"(i) To plan for and establish a long term policy in regard to the establishment, development, and maintenance of aviation and aviation facilities in the state; to promote and encourage the use of aviation facilities of the state for air
commerce in the state and between the state and other states, and foreign countries; to cooperate, counsel and advise with the Aeronautics Advisory Board [now abolished] and the State Highway Board in regard to the planning, construction,
development and maintenance of airports, landing fields, and air navigation facilities in the state; to cooperate, counsel, and advise municipalities and other political subdivisions of the state, and with other departments, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies or establishments, whether federal, state, or local, or public or private, for the purpose ofpromoting and obtaining coordination in the planning for, and in the

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establishment of, development, maintenance and protection of a system ofair routes, airports, and landing fields in the state, and ofother aviation facilities in the state." [Emphasis added.]

Regarding the transfer of these powers, Section 2005 of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, at 1015 states:

"The functions ofthe Department oflndustry and Trade and the Board ofCommissioners ofthe Department oflndustry and Trade relating to airports, aviation, landing fields, other aviation facilities, air routes and air markers provided for in Ga. Laws 1949, p. 249 as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2107) [see above] and Ga. Laws 1965, p. 105 (Ga. Code Ann. 11-304, 11-305 [based upon Ga. Laws 1965, p. 105]), are transferred to the Department [ofTransportation]. ..." [Material in brackets added.]

Thus, the Department of Transportation is now vested with the statutory authority of Ga. Code Ann. 40-2107.
In response to your initial question, it is my official opinion that the language of Ga. Code Ann. 40-2107 above authorizes the Department of Transportation to act as an administrator of the project funded by the Coastal Plains Regional Commission where the parties obligated to each other under a contract are the commission and a private airline carrier. This opinion in no way authorizes the Department of Transportation to contract with the federal government, any federal commission, state municipality, political subdivision, or private corporation. The department is only authorized to "cooperate, counsel, and advise municipalities ..."and serve in these same capacities with the federal commission.
In response to your second question, there is a statutory prohibition against the Department of Transportation sponsoring an air demonstration project funded solely by state monies. Ga. Code Ann. 95-1620, as amended by Ga. Laws 1967, p. 382, states:

"(a)... the Director of the State Highway Department [is] hereby expressly prohibited from making or contracting any debts or entering into any contract for which it does not have funds on hand to pay at the time of making said debt or entering into said contract; ..."[Material in brackets added.]

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This office has previously decided that funds derived from motor fuel taxes cannot be used to construct and maintain airports on lands leased from the federal government. See Op. Att'y Gen. 69-277. Similarly, these funds could not be used to sponsor an air demonstration project. Assuming there are no funds available, it is my official opinion that the Department ofTransportation could not sponsor an air service project. As indicated in the 1969 opinion above, a special legislative appropriation or some other source of funds would have to be found for such expenditures.

OPINION 72-118
To: Acting Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources

August 31, 1972

Re: Age of Majority Act; effect upon consent to voluntary sterilization or abortion.

You have requested my opm10n as to whether the "Age of Majority" Act (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193), which lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 years of age, now permits individuals 18 years ofage or older to voluntarily procure an abortion or undergo a sterilization procedure.
The "Age of Majority" Act was intended to reduce the age at which an individual attained full legal capacity and thereby shed his civil disabilities. It was not intended, in my opinion, to necessarily affect all existing laws setting an age qualification of 21, unless such laws were tied directly to the age of majority, see Section 10, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 193, 199. For example, in my memorandum opinion to the ordinaries of Georgia (5-15-72), it was determined that the General Assembly intended to retain the pistol permit age at 21, regardless of the fact that the age of majority was lowered to 18. For a general discussion of the Age of Majority Act, see Op. Att'y Gen. 72-51. The standard for making this determination is whether the reference to age 21 in a prior law was tied to the traditional age of majority, in which case it is now lowered to 18, or, whether because of an apparent legislative intention to prolong protection against the inherent dangers of immaturity or inexperience of youth, an age qualification was established at more than 18 years. In the latter instance, a qualification age of 21, or any other age, would not be reduced by the 1972 "Age of Majority" Act. Cf. constitutional age

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requirements for Governor, established at 30 years (Ga. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. VI, Ga. Code Ann. 2-3006), and age qualifications for other constitutional officers established at 25 years (Ga. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. II, Par. IV, Ga. Code. Ann.
2-3104). Applying the foregoing standards to the laws providing for
voluntary sterilization, I have determined that the age qualification established therein at 21 is tied to "legal" capacity or majority and is, therefore, reduced to 18 years by the "Age of Majority" Act of 1972.
One of the stated purposes of the "Voluntary Sterilization Act" (Ga. Code Ann. 84-931 et seq.) is "to set forth the conditions under which such sterilization is authorized as to consenting persons and as to persons not legally competent': see Ga. Laws 1970, p. 683. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized references to "consenting" and "legally" competent persons is a strong indication that the General Assembly was concerned with the traditional legal age for consent purposes (or majority) rather than actual maturity. A further indication ofthis intent is found in the body of the Voluntary Sterilization Act which allows sterilization when "requested by any person 21 years of age or over, or less than 21 years of age, iflegally married. "Ga. Laws 1970, p. 683 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-932). (Emphasis added.)At common law and under Georgia statute law, the act ofmarriage is effective to emancipate or confer full "legal" or consensual capacity upon a child just as effectively as if he had reached the age of 21. See Irby v. State, 57 Ga. App. 717 (1938); Ga. Code Ann. 20-201 as amended by Ga. Laws 1966, p. 291; 1969, p. 640; Ga. Code Ann. 29-106 as amended by Ga. Laws 1966, p. 291; 1969, p. 640; Stubbs, Georgia Law of Children, 92, 95. By incorporating this principle in the Voluntary Sterilization Act, the General Assembly evidenced its intent that the right to procure a sterilization operation was and should be tied to the traditional age of legal majority.
The laws restricting abortions in Georgia are found in the Criminal Code. See Ga. Code Ann. 26-1201, 26-1202, as officially codified from Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1277. See also Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1432 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-9925a). In none of these laws is there an explicit requirement that the woman patient be 21 years ofage, or ofany minimum age. However, the right to consent to an abortion, or other medical operation for a child, has been that of the legal parent, guardian or custodian of the child until majority or emancipation. See Ga. Code Ann. 74-105 to 74-108; Stubbs, Georgia Law of Children, 97-101. Accordingly, since the age of majority, and consequently, the age of emancipation from legal

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custody and control of the parent has been reduced to 18 years of age by Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 193, 194 (Ga. Code Ann. 74-104), I conclude that a person 18 years of age or older may consent to an abortion.

OPINION 72-119
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

September 5, 1972

Re: Professional examinations; veterans' preferences not retroactively applied.

Any applicant, taking an examination administered under the auspices of the Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards, except for the Board ofAccountancy, shall receive additional points on his examination score provided he is a veteran and fulfills certain other requirements. Ga. Laws 1960, p. 1172, as amended; Ga. Code Ann. 84-108a et seq. You have asked if applicants, who took an examination and received their scores prior to the effective date of the Act, can have veterans' preference points applied to those scores. It is my opinion that they cannot.
"Laws prescribe only for the future." Ga. Code Ann. 102-104. The settled rule of statutory construction is not to give laws retrospective operation unless their language imperatively requires it. Eibel v. Forrester et al., 194 Ga. 439 (1942). There is no language in the Veterans Preference Act to indicate its retrospective operation. To the contrary, each section of the Act utilizes the verb "shall" which not only expresses what is mandatory but also implies an element of futurity. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.
Therefore, the Veterans Preference Act is not applied retrospectively, and the additional points for which provisions are made in that Act can only be applied to those scores of examinations taken after March 24, 1960, the effective date of the Act.

OPINION 72-120
To: Chancellor, Regents of the University System of Georgia

September 5, 1972

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Re: University of Georgia; extension of the university health service program to the spouses ofstudents and to their dependents.
You have requested an opinion on the question ofwhether or not the University of Georgia may extend its health service program to the spouses of students and to their dependents.
In order to answer your inquiry, it is first necessary to examine the constitutional and statutory powers of the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia. Pursuant to the Ga. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6701), the Board of Regents is vested with the control and management ofthe University System of Georgia. In Ga. Code Ann. 32-121, based upon Ga. Laws 1931, p. 724, the board is empowered as follows:
" ... to exercise any power usually granted to such corporation, necessary to its usefulness, which is not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this State."
The Supreme Court of Georgia on numerous occasions has interpreted these powers to be rather broad in scope. In State of Georgia v. Regents ofthe University System of Georgia, 179 Ga. 210 (1934), the court recognized the corporate nature of the Board of Regents and noted that the board could do those acts necessary for the usefulness of the corporation which did not conflict with the laws of the state. Included in the decision of the court was the following language:
"So long as the board does not exercise its powers capriciously or arbitrarily, or so as to thwart the purpose of the legislature in establishing a system of univeristy education, the board itself must determine what is necessary for the usefulness of the system . . . . The powers granted are broad and comprehensive, and, subject to the exercise of a wise and proper discretion, the regents are untrammelled except by such restraints of law as are directly expressed, or necessarily implied."
Another significant decision dealing with the powers of the Board of Regents is Villyard v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 204 Ga. 517 (1948), in which it was held that the Regents could maintain a laundry and dry-cleaning establishment for the

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use of students, faculty and other individuals associated with a state college. In its opinion the court pointed out that in other jurisdictions a variety of enterprises have been held reasonably related to the education, welfare, and health of student bodies. Among these enterprises were the following: cafeterias which were operated primarily for the student body, but which also served the faculty, and occasionally parents and visitors (Goodman v. School District, 32 F. 2d 586 (1929); Hempel v. School District, 186 Wash. 684, 59 P.2d 729 (1936)); rental of school property for opera, public dance, or community purpose, in competition with private business (Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900 (1932); Young v. Board of Trustees, 90 Mont. 576, 4 P.2d 725 (1931)); operating a store for the purpose ofselling books and other student supplies to university students and professors upon a cost basis (Long v. Board of Trustees, 24 Ohio App. 261, 157 N.E. 395 (1926)); operating a university press for work done outside of that done for the university, the earnings being incidental to its use for university purposes (Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931)); operation of a university infirmary (Davie v. Regents of University ofCalifornia, 66 Cal. App. 689, 227 P. 243 (1924)); manufacture and distribution of hog-cholera serum to farmers at cost (Fisher v. Board ofRegents of the University ofNebraska, 108 Neb. 666, 189 N. W. 161 (1922)). It is clear from a reading of the Villyard decision that the court was cognizant ofthe many needs ofan educational institution and that the Board of Regents has the implied power to meet these needs.
The real question which must be answered in regard to the extension of the university health service program to the spouses of students and to their dependents is whether such an extension furthers the univeristy's educational purpose; and as noted in State of Georgia v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 179 Ga. 210 (1934), this question is for the determination of the Board of Regents so long as it does not act capriciously, arbitrarily, or in a manner to thwart the educational purpose of the university system.
Considering the large number of university students who are married, it seems apparent that the provision ofhealth care service to spouses of students and their dependents would in a number of ways further the educational purposes ofthe University. Obviously a student with illness in his household may be unable to devote the necessary attention to his academic pursuits. The provision of health care service to such individuals would also serve as an important factor in controlling sickness and disease among the

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student population; a contagious virus or other illness among the immediate families of university students could have substantial impact upon the general health of the university community. The importance of such health care service is particularly important since you have indicated that it would be provided pursuant to an endorsement from the local medical society asking the university to help relieve them of this patient load.
It should be realized that the value of health care service to student spouses and dependents may extend beyond the realm of university health. At a time when universities often compete for the brightest students, both at the gradute and under-graduate level, a comprehensive health service program would serve as a significant inducement for prospective students.
In conclusion it is my opinion that the extension ofthe university health service program to the spouses of students and to their dependents would further the educational purposes of the University of Georgia. Such an extension could not be classified as arbitrary or capricious. The Board ofRegents is clearly empowered to authorize such an extension of services.
It might be argued that the university program would be unlawful since it might compete with the private medical community. This argument, however, contains no merit. In Villyard v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 204 Ga. 517 (1948), the Supreme Court of Georgia specifically held that a state activity which was otherwise lawful would not be held invalid on the ground that it was competitive with private business.

OPINION 72-121
To: Chairman, State Commission on Compensation

September 7, 1972

Re: Reorganization; effect upon the scope of coverage of the State Commission on Compensation.

This is in reply to a request from the Executive Director of the State Commission on Compensation for my opinion as to the extent to which the reorganization statutes enacted in 1972 by the Georgia General Assembly have altered the list of state officials and board members included within the provisions of the Act creating the State Commission on Compensation (Ga. Laws 1971, p. 103, Ga. Code Ann. 89-716 et seq.).

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As you know, a comprehensive list ofthe state officials and board members included within the provisions of the Act creating the commission was attached to my opinion of June 2, 1971 (Op. Att'y Gen. 71-104). Reorganization has indeed made revision ofthis list necessary.
Section 5 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-720) of the Act creating the Compensation Commission provides that the commission shall make a study ofthe compensation currently being paid by the state to all constitutional state officers including members of the General Assembly and all full time heads of state agencies, authorities, boards, bureaus, commissions, committees and departments whose compensation is set by the Constitution, by law or by an Act of the General Assembly.
Section 10 of the Reorganization Act, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, contains three sentences concerning salaries of state officials, as follows:

1. "The heads of departments continued by this Act shall be compensated as presently provided by law."
2. "The compensation of the heads of departments created by this Act shall be determined by the General Assembly."
3. "Compensation for unclassified positions within any agency created by this Act shall be established by the official in charge of the agency unless otherwise provided by law."

The Reorganization Act of 1972 had the effect of continuing certain departments in existence while creating other departments and transferring some functions to newly created departments and other functions to continued departments.
Those officials and board members whose positions were either continued or unaffected by the reorganization statutes and which continue to be included within the provisions of the Act creating the State Commission on Compensation are as follows:

Governor (Reorg. Act Sec. 201) Lieutenant Governor (Reorg. Act Sec. 301) Adjutant General (Reorg. Act Sec. 902) Commissioner of Agriculture (Reorg. Act Sec. 501) Attorney General (Reorg. Act Sec. 1401) State Auditor (Reorg. Act Sec. 601) Comptroller General (Reorg. Act Sec. 801) Commissioner of Labor (Reorg. Act Sec. 1301)

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State Revenue Commissioner (Reorg. Act Sec. 1701) State Superintendent of Schools (Reorg. Act Sec. 1002) Secretary of State (Reorg. Act Sec. 1801) State Board of Pardons and Paroles (1972 Act 1490, Sec. 12) State Treasurer (Reorg. Act Sec. 2101) (however it should be noted that a constitutional provision before the voters in November will abolish the position of State Treasurer) Director of Veterans Service (Reorg. Act Sec. 2301) Members of the Public Service Commission Justices of the Supreme Court Judges of the Court of Appeals Judges of the Superior Courts District Attorneys Members of the General Assembly Speaker of the House President Pro Tern. of the Senate Speaker Pro Tern. of the House Secretary of the Senate Clerk of the House

As you recall, in my opinion of June 2, 1971, I stated that the members of the various boards and commissions which are provided for in the Constitution are subject to the Act creating the Commission on Compensation, and the compensation paid to such members should also be the subject of study by the commission. The reorganization statutes have not affected the inclusion ofthese boards and commissions. They are as follows:

[References are to Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, unless otherwise indicated.] State Board of Education (Reorg. Act Sec. 1001) State Medical Education Board (Reorg. Act Sec. 2205) Board of Regents (Reorg. Act Sec. 2201) State Board of Corrections (Sec. 10 of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069) State Personnel Board (Reor g. Act Sec. 7a) Board of commissioners of the Department of Industry
and Trade (Reorg. Act Sec. 702)
State Game and Fish Commission (Reorg. Act Sec. 1527) Veterans Service Board (Reorg. Act Sec. 2301) State Highway Board (Reorg. Act Sec. 2002)

A discussion of those departments, officials, and board members

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affected by reorganization follows: Department of Transportation.-The Reorganization Act
"created" the Department of Transportation (Reorg. Act Sec. 2001). The Act expressly provides that the "department head" is the State Highway Board, and the department director is the chief executive officer, not the head of the department (Reorg. Act Sec. 2001). The position of Director of the Highway Department was "continued" and renamed Director of the Department of Transportation. The position of director would not, however, be included within the provisions of the Act creating the State Commission on Compensation as it is presently written since the director is no longer the "head" of the department.
Department of Natural Resources.-The Reorganization Act created the Department of Natural Resources and the position of commissioner (Reorg. Act Sec. 1501). The Game and Fish Commission was continued as a policy making body (Reorg. Act Sec. 1527). The position of Director of the Game and Fish Commission, as such, has been abolished. Although not expressed (as in the case of the Department of Transportation), it appears that the commission is, by definition, the head of the Department of Natural Resources (Reorg. Act Sec. 1C4), and the commissioner is (like the Director of Transportation) the chief administrative officer (Reorg. Act Sec. 1C8). This being so, the compensation ofthe commissioner is to be set, pursuant to the third sentence of Section 10, by the official in charge of the agency, to-wit: the Game and Fish Commission.
The Reorganization Act transferred all of the functions of the Department of State Parks to the Department of Natural Resources (Reorg. Act Sec. 1503). Consequently, the position of Director of State Parks, as such, was abolished.
Department of Public Safety.-Although there was, before reorganization, a Department of Public Safety, the Reorganization Act created a new Department of Public Safety (Reorg. Act Sec. 1601), transferring to it the functions of the old Department of Public Safety (Reorg. Act Sec. 1603), thereby abolishing the old department (Reorg. Act Sec. 30).
The position ofCommissioner ofPublic Safety was created as the chief administrative officer of the department (Reorg. Act Sec. 1602). The Board of Public Safety is a policy making board (Reorg. Act Sec. 18). The board appoints and removes the commissioner, subject to approval of the Governor, and the commissioner supervises the department subject to policy established by the board (Reorg. Act Sec. 1602). Thus, as in the case of the

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Department of Natural Resources, the board is, by definition, the head of the department, and, for the same reasons, the commissioner is not within the coverage of the Act creating the State Commission on Compensation.
Department of Human Resources.-The Department of Human Resources is not expressly created by the Reorganization Act (see Sec. 1201) or by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069, although the latter Act states that the department was created by the Reorganization Plan (Sec. 2). The Board of Human Resources is the policy making body (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069, Sec. 4). The Reorganization Act created the position of Commissioner of Human Resources as chief administrative officer of the department. The commissioner is to be appointed by the Board ofHuman Resources subject to approval of the Governor (Reorg. Act Sec. 1201). Thus, by definition (as with the Department of Natural Resources), the board appears to be the department head, with the commissioner as chief administrative officer. Therefore, the salary of the commissioner would be set by the board pursuant to Sec. 10 of the Reorganization Act and the position is not within the coverage of the Act creating the Commission on Compensation.
Department of Administrative Services.-The Reorganization Act created the Department of Administrative Services with a commissioner, appointed by the Governor, designated as the "department head" (Reorg. Act Sec. 401). There is no board. Thus, the second sentence of Section 10 is directly applicable; that is, the compensation of the commissioner is to be determined by the General Assembly. It follows, therefore, that the position of Commissioner of the Department of Administrative Services is within the coverage of the Act creating the Commission on Compensation.
All ofthe functions ofthe Office of Supervisor of Purchases and the Supervisor of Purchases were transferred to the Department of Administrative Services (Reorg. Act Sec. 402). Consequently, the position of Supervisor of Purchases has been abolished.
Department of Banking and Finance.-The Department of Banking and Finance was created by the Reorganization Act (Reorg. Act Sec. 1101). The Act expressly provides that the commissioner, appointed by the Governor, is the department head (Reorg. Act Sec. 1101). Again, there is no board. According to Section 10 of the Reorganization Act, the commissioner's compensation is to be determined by the General Assembly. Thus, the position of commissioner is included within the Act creating the Commission on Compensation.

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Department of 'Offender Rehabilitation.-The Department of Offender Rehabilitation was not created by the Reorganization Act, but by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1069. This Act provides that the position of Director of Corrections is to be continued and that the Director of Corrections shall serve ex-officio as the Commissioner of Offender Rehabilitation. The salary of the Director of Corrections is set by law, Ga. Laws 1966, p. 121 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-305). Therefore, the position ofDirector ofCorrections continues within the purview of the Commission on Compensation. Act No. 1490 also continued the State Board of Pardons and Paroles, assigning it to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation for administrative purposes only (Sec. 11). The State Board of Probation was abolished and its policy making functions were transferred to the Board ofOffender Rehabilitation. Consequently, the position of Director of Probation was also abolished.
Summary
Two new department heads are added to the list:
Commissioner of Administrative Services Commissioner of Banking and Finance
Six positions are dropped as a result of reorganization:
Director of Game and Fish Commission Director of State Highway Department Director of Probation Director of State Parks Director of Public Safety Supervisor of Purchases
Two of the above positions deserve special comment. Both the position of the Director of State Highway Department and the Director of Public Safety are positions whose salaries have traditionally been set by the legislature and heretofore have been a subject of the commission's recommendations. While reorganization has technically changed the structure of their departments, the positions remain basically the same and the incumbents continue in a somewhat similar position as before reorganization. In addition, statutes remain on the books which might be construed to set their salaries. Consequently, the commission might wish to call the attention of the General Assembly to this situation and perhaps make an unofficial recommendation concerning the salaries for these positions.

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Both the positions ofthe Commissioner ofNatural Resources and the Commissioner of Human Resources have also been created by the Reorganization Act. These are entirely new positions whose salaries are to be set by their governing boards.
I am enclosing a revised list of officers and board members who in my opinion are subject to the provisions of the Act as it is presently written.

STATE COMMISSION ON COMPENSATION Revision as of September 7, 1972

(Revised list of state officials included within the provisions of the Act creating the commission-citations are to the Code of Georgia Annotated) Governor- 2-3001; 40-105 Lieutenant Governor- 2-3007; 40-109 Adjutant General - 86-204 Commissioner of Agriculture- 2-3101; 5-105 Attorney General - 2-3101; 2-4501; 40-1612.1 State Auditor- 40-1802.2 Comptroller General - 2-3101; 40-1404 Director of Corrections - 77-305 Commissioner of Labor- 2-3101; 54-105 Members of the Board of Pardons and Paroles - 2-3011; 77-503 Members of the Public Service Commission - 2-2703; 93-208 State Revenue Commissioner - 92-8402 State Superintendent of Schools - 2-6601; 32-510 Secretary of State- 2-3102; 40-504 Commissioner of Administrative Services- 40-3548 Commissioner of Banking and Finance - 40-3596 State Treasurer - 2-3102; 40-901 Director of Veterans Service - 78-409 Justices of the Supreme Court - 2-3701; 24-4005 Judges of the Court of Appeals - 2-3708; 24-3503 Judges of the Superior Courts- 2-3801; 24-2606 District Attorneys- 2-4601; 24-2922 Members of the General Assembly- 2-1301; 47-107 Speaker of the House- 2-1802; 47-107 President Pro Tern. of the Senate - 2-2001; 47-107 Speaker Pro Tern. of the House - 2-2001; 47-107 Secretary of the Senate- 2-2001; 47-210 Clerk of the House- 2-2001; 47-210

(Additional constitutional boards, members of which are covered by the Act)

State Board of Education - 2-6501; 32-407 State Medical Education Board - 2-5402; 32-3002 Board of Regents- 2-6701; 32-111 State Board of Corrections- 2-3401; 77-302 State Personnel Board- 2-8201; 40-2202 Board of Commissioners of the Department of Industry and Trade 40-2104

2-3505;

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State Game and Fish Commission- 2-3501; 45-107 Veterans Service Board- 2-3501; 78-403 State Highway Board - 2-3506; 95-1602

OPINION 72-122
To: Deputy Director, Employees Retirement System

September 7, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; retirement rights vested by statute cannot be taken away by subsequent statute.

This is in response to your request for an opinion as to the amount of creditable service toward involuntary separation which should be granted to a certain member.
As I understand the facts in this matter, the member became entitled to prior service credit under the provisions of Ga. Laws 1971, p. 93, Ga. Code Ann. 40-2503 (approved March 12, 1971), for certain time he spent in the military service. On July 5, 1972, the member applied for retirement benefits under the involuntary separation provision of the retirement statute. If the member can count his military service granted under the above Act, he will be eligible for retirement; if not, he does not have sufficient creditable service.
The problem arises because Ga. Laws 1971, p. 96, Ga.CodeAnn. 40-2505.1 (approved March 18, 1971), provided that any service which might be authorized by Ga. Laws 1971, p. 93, cannot be used to qualify the member for involuntary separation retirement benefits.
This office has taken the position that if a benefit is granted by one retirement statute, it applies to all employees then working and covered by the retirement system and cannot be taken away by a later statute. (Op. Att'y Gen. 71-5; Op. Att'y Gen. U72-36.)
This same position has been followed by the Georgia appellate courts who have held that unilateral attempts by an employer to reduce the benefits of a retirement program amounts to an impairment ofa contract in violation ofboth the United States and the State Constitutions. Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719 (1936); Bender v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108 (1950); Burks v. Board of Trustees, 214 Ga. 251 (1958); Webb v. Whitley, 114 Ga. App. 153 (1966).
Therefore, it is my opinion that the member who obtained prior service credit under Ga. Laws 1971, p. 93, is entitled to use that

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credit for all purposes which were authorized by the retirement statute when that Act was approved, notwithstanding the fact that Ga. Laws 1971, p. 96, attempted to restrict the provisions of the earlier law.

OPINION 72-123 To: Secretary of State

September 8, 1972

Re: Elections; qualification as candidate in special election for United States Senator.

You have requested our official opinion on the proper procedure to qualify for the unexpired term for U.S. Senator to fill the balance of the term of the Honorable Richard B. Russell. All statutory references herein are to the Georgia Election Code, Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, as amended, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 34.
The upcoming election for the unexpired term is a special election as defined by the Georgia Election Code. Ga. Code Ann. 34-103 (ab). This special election is specifically required to be held at the same time as the general election by the Georgia Election Code and is not to be confused with the general election for the full six-year term. Ga. Code Ann. 34-803.
To be eligible for a place on this special election ballot, a candidate need only file notice of his candidacy at least 15 days prior to the special election and pay the prescribed qualifying fee. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1002(b). Ofcourse, federal court decisions have placed some limitations on the qualifying fee requirements and we have previously prepared for you certain forms which will assist you in qualifying any candidate who cannot afford the qualifying fee. Jenness v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N. D. Ga. 1970); affirmed 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Stoner v. Fortson, (C.A. No. 16271, N.D. Ga.).
You are aware that a candidate in a special election may not have his party affiliation listed on the ballot unless he has been nominated in a special primary held by that political party. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1314. A candidate who wishes to have his political body affilitation listed on the ballot would have to comply with the certification requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 34-1001 (2) except that the Election Code dispenses with the requirement of a nomination petition. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1002(c).
It is therefore our official opinion that a candidate for the

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unexpired term of U.S. Senator qualifies for the special election by filing notice of his candidacy at least 15 days prior to this special election.

OPINION 72-124
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 18, 1972

Re: Statutes; where two statutes are in conflict, the one last approved will govern. Custody of certain juvenile offenders discussed.

This is a response to your letter of August 16, 1972, requesting my opinion concerning a possible conflict between Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209 (a) (5)) and Ga. Laws 1972, p. 592 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-345 et seq.).
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, is a substitute for subparagraph (5) of Section 9A (Ga. Code Ann. 99-209 (a) (5)) of the Children and Youth Act, Ga. Laws 1963, p. 81, which subparagraph (5) was added to the Act by Ga. Laws 1969, p. 996. The substituted subparagraph (5) passed this year was intended primarily:

"[T]o provide that a person under the age of 17 and commencing on July 1, 1972, under the age of 18 who is convicted of a felony while under commitment to the Division for Children and Youth, the division may petition the court and, in the discretion of the superior court judge, be sentenced to the Department of Corrections as provided under law for adults; (and) to provide the procedure relative to punishment for an escapee...." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1251, 1252.

Your concern over this Act, however, relates to that portion of the Act which provides that the Division of Children and Youth is the exclusive agency:

"For the acceptance and incarceration of all misdemeanants and felons under the age of 17 years: Provided, however, those felons convicted of a capital felony shall only be sentenced to the custody of the State Department of Corrections. All other persons under the age of 17 years and commencing on July 1,

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1972, under the age of 18 found to be guilty or convicted of a misdemeanor or felony, other than a captial felony by any court in Georgia shall be committed for an indefinite period of time to the custody of the Division for Children and Youth. ... "Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1251, 1252. (Emphasis added.)

With the exception of the change in the age to 18 effective July 1, 1972, that portion tracks the previous subparagraph (5).
Ga. Laws 1972, p. 592 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-345 et seq.), known as the Georgia Youthful Offender Act of 1972, creates a Youthful Offender Division of the State Board of Corrections and provides for "an alternative penalty (for those defined as "youthful offenders") in addition to all other penalties provided by law," i.e., it allows a court sentencing a youthful offender convicted of violations of criminal laws to elect to sentence the youthful offender to the custody of the new Youthful Offender Division, rather than the custody of the Department of Corrections, for certain "treatment" and "correction," including conditional and unconditional release, as outlined in the Act.
The Act defines a "youthful offender" as "all male and female offenders who are 17 but less than 25 years of age at the time of conviction." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 592, 593.
Section 15(a) of this Act provides that:

"In the event of a conviction of a youthful offender the court may: (a) If the offender is under the age of 21, without his consent sentence the youthful offender indefinitely to the custody of the Division for treatment and supervision pursuant to this Act until discharged; the period ofsuch custody not to be in excess ofone year in the case ofa misdemeanor or six years in the case of a felony. If the offender is 21 years of age but less than 25 years of age he may be sentenced in accordance with this subsection only if he is sentenced thereto in writing. No youthful offender shall be sentenced more than twice under the provisions of this Act." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 592, 598.

Your primary concern is with Section 15(b) of the Youthful Offender Act, which reads:

"If the court shall find that the youthful offender will not derive [benefit] from the provisions ofthis Act, then the court

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may sentence the youthful offender under any other applicable penalty provision provided by law." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 592, 598.

You feel there may be a conflict between the above-quoted section and that section of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, also quoted above.
As noted, both Acts under consideration here were passed during the 1972 regular session of the General Assembly. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 592, was approved by the Governor on March 28, 1972. Ga. Laws 1972, p.1251, was approved by theGovernoronApril 7,1972. There is a conflict between these two newActs to the extent that Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 592, 598, allows the sentencing court to sentence those youthful offenders falling in the 17 and 18 year old age bracket, and not charged with a capital felony, to the custody of anyone other than the Division for Children and Youth.
As noted in a previous opinion to you dealing with a similar matter:

[See two paragraphs beginning with "[t]he determination as to which of the two statutes in question has priority is based upon. . ." in Op. Att'y Gen. 72-101.]

The conflict between the two statutes here, as in that opinion, appears to be clear and irreconcilable. Since Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251 was approved by the Governor subsequent to the approval by him of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 592, the former would be controlling to the extent of the conflict cited above.
It is, therefore, my official opinion that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1251, which provides that all youths under 18 who are not charged with a capital felony, convicted of a misdemeanor or felony, are to be committed to the custody of the Division for Children and Youth, would take priority over Ga. Laws 1972, p. 592, to the extent that 17 and 18 year olds are concerned.

To: State Auditor

OPINION 72-125 September 18, 1972

Re: Statutes; error in numbering will not invalidate Act. Workmen's compensation trust fund authorized to retain interest earned prior to 1972 Act.

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You have inquired whether the erl'oneous numbering ofa section of Georgia law relating to workmen's compensation renders that section invalid; in my opinion it does not. The state workmen's compensation self-insurance law was passed in 1969 and contained four sections. Ga. Laws 1969, p. 234 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-926). In 1970, the law was amended by striking Section 2 thereof. Ga. Laws 1970, p. 541. Finally, in 1972, by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 350, the General Assembly undertook to amend the law by "adding a new section immediately following Section 2, to be designated Section 2A." In my opinion, this error in numbering does not defeat the validity of the amendment. In construing a statute, the court will not give literal effect to statutory language containing obvious clerical errors which render the statute meaningless. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9). Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E. 2d 551 (1949).
Your second question relates to the scope and application of the 1972 amendment, which provides in part:
"In order to finance the continuing liability established with other agencies of State Government, the Workmen's Compensation Trust Fund is hereby authorized to retain all moneys paid into the fund as premiums on policies ofinsurance and all moneys received as interest and all moneys received from other sources as a reserve for the payment of such liability and the expenses necessary to the proper conduct of such insurance program administered by the fund."
Your specific question is whether the interest earned by the fund during fiscal1971 and fiscal 1972 prior to the effective date of the amendment should be funded to the state treasury's successor, the Department of Administrative Services, Fiscal Division, or may be retained by the trust fund. The interest amounts to approximately $31,356 and was earned upon a principal which included an appropriation of $400,000 by the 1971 General Assembly.
A literal reading of Ga. Code Ann. 92-3502 would suggest that the accrued interest should be paid over to the state treasury's successor. That statute provides in pertinent part, "[A]ll moneys collected from any sources or on any account, to which the state is entitled, not otherwise directed, shall be paid into the state treasury."
This language, however, must be read in the context of the

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specific provisions of the 1969 Act authorizing the self-insurance program, as well as generally accepted practices of the insurance industry. The original Act required the Supervisor of Purchases to "initiate a sound program of self-insurance for workmen's compensation," and to "determine the amount and extent of. . . necessary reserves." (Emphasis added.) This implicit authorization to establish and maintain a separate reserve fund is in keeping with generally accepted practices of the insurance industry. Cf, Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81 (1957). In Georgia law, the term "insurance" is defined as "a contract which is an integral part ofa plan for distributing individual losses whereby one undertakes to indemnify another....," Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 293, Ga. Code Ann. 56-102 [emphasis added], and such plans almost universally consist of the creation and maintenance of a reserve fund to meet actuarially computed liabilities. Conversely, the failure to maintain such a fund, by regular, premium-like contributions and by the accumulation of earnings and interest, would ultimately result in the state "indemnifying" the full extent ofeach loss at the time of its occurrence by direct appropriation, and, of course, such a situation is at odds with the fundamental idea of a self-insurance program.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the 1972 amendment did not change the law, but merely stated explicitly the legislative intent that the workmen's compensation trust fund be authorized, from its inception, to retain the interest earned upon its holdings.

OPINION 72-126
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 20, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; transfer of female inmate who is under death sentence.

By your letter ofSeptember 15, 1972, you asked whether it would be proper to transfer Hollis Wingo Morgan to the Georgia Rehabilitation Center for Women. She is under a sentence ofdeath, but the date of execution has now passed since the Governor has ordered a suspension of the execution until the Supreme Court of the United States acts on the petition for rehearing filed in a number of other Georgia death penalty cases. Consequently, there is no need for Mrs. Morgan to remain at the institution at which

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the death penalty can be carried out. According to your letter, she is in need ofmedical attention which could be performed at Central State Hospital, which is also at Milledgeville.
It is my opinion that it would be proper to transfer her to the women's prison. In the first place, the law provides that "Women prisoners shall be removed from proximity to the men's prison, ..." Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 173, as amended. (Ga. Code Ann. 77-010 (c)). Since there is now no set date for execution, and it is not imminent, there is no need for Mrs. Morgan to be kept at Georgia State Prison, which is the penal institution at which electrocutions are designated by the commissioner (formerly director) to take place. Ga. Laws 1924, pp. 195, 197, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2512).
With respect to her medical problems, the board is empowered generally to "provide for the classification and segregation of prisonerswithrespect to.. . diseased inmates...."Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 173, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 77-310 (a~). According to the rules and regulations adopted by the board, inmates who are ill or injured "shall receive any needed medical or hospital attention required at the institution or in the local hospital, at Georgia State Prison, at Eugene Talmadge Memorial Hospital, or elsewhere if required." Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Rule 125-2-9-.07(a). Since you have determined that medical attention would be required at Central State Hospital because of its proximity to the women's prison, such would be authorized.
I wish also to point out that transferring Mrs. Morgan to the warden of the Georgia Rehabilitation Center for Women places additional responsibilities there, since the law provides that the agency having physical custody of a prisoner is responsible to maintain such prisoner in statutorily specified ways. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 171, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 77-309 (e)). The immediate responsibility in this regard would be of course in the warden.

OPINION 72-127 September 21, 1972
To: Chairman, Georgia Ports Authority

Re: Georgia Ports Authority; financing of container-handling facility.

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This is in response to your request for my opinion relative to the financing of a second container-handling facility at Garden City Terminal. It is my understanding that the Georgia Ports Authority contemplates borrowing the money and securing the loan by a lien upon all receipts from the operation of the proposed second container facility, such pledge to be expressly subject to and subordinated to Georgia Ports Authority Trust Indenture, Series 1968.
I have caused the provisions of the 1968 Trust Indenture to be reveiwed, and it is my opinion that such revenues can be pledged provided the lien does not have priority to, or be on a priority with, the lien established under the Trust Indenture. To this effect the following language, or language similar thereto, should be used in the securing agreement:

"The pledge ofrevenues contained herein is subject to all the terms, conditions and provisions of any Trust Indenture or lease agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by the Georgia Ports Authority or its successors securing any outstanding bonds heretofore or hereafter issued by the Georgia Ports Authority, and any provision of this agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, nothing in this agreement shall, in any way, impair or diminish the rights and interests of the holders or trustees of any bonds heretofore or hereafter issued by the Georgia Ports Authority or its successors."

OPINION 72-128
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 22, 1972

Re: Reorganization; practices concerning collections by circuit probation supervisors as unaffected.

This is in response to your request for an official opmwn regarding the effect of the reorganization plan on collections operations transferred from the old State Probation Department to the Community-Based Services Division of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation.
When read together, Sections 12, 13,14 ofGa.Laws 1972, pp.1069, 1073-1074 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-35162.4 to 40-35162.6) consolidate all administrative activities concerning pardons, paroles, and

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probation within the Community-Based Services Division. Section 12 strips the State Board of Pardons and Paroles of all active duties in those areas. Section 13 abolishes the State Board of Probation and transfers its functions to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation. Section 14 creates the Division of Community-Based Services within that department to perform duties formerly carried out by the Boards of Pardons and Paroles and Probation.
In my opinion these sections preserve the basic working of the state-wide probation system (see former Ga. Code Ann. 27-2702 et seq., based upon Ga. Laws 1956, p. 27; 1972, p. 604), while rearranging its administrative hierarchy. Their manifest purpose of streamlining administration would not seem to comprehend an effort to alter the day-to-day operations of circuit probation supervisors.
This interpretation is bolstered by language in Section 14 which expressly states that nothing in the Act should be construed as changing the "relationship between judges and probation supervisors prescribed in the State-wide Probation Act, Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 27,28 et seq." Since Ga. Laws 1956, p. 27, as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 604, prohibits probation supervisors from making collections except upon court order arising out of a criminal proceeding, their activities in this regard should be considered part of "the relationship between judges and probation supervisors." Consequently, the reorganization plan has no effect on collections. Past practices should be continued.
Note, however, that Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 604, 614, amended Ga. Laws 1956, p. 27, to require that all bank accounts opened by probation supervisors to facilitate their collections and disbursement duties be listed in the name of the "State Board of Probation," apparently a misnomer for the old State Probation Department. Under Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1069, 1074, all references to the "State Board of Probation" are to be read as referring to the Department ofOffender Rehabilitation except where inconsistent. It would seem within the purpose of this statute that references to the "State Probation Department" (or "Office") should be read to mean the "Community-Based Services Division ofthe Department of Offender Rehabilitation," the corresponding agency under the reorganized structure. Similarly, all references to the "Director of Probation" should be read as "Director of the Community-Based Services Division".

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OPINION 72-129
To: Chairman, Georgia Real Estate Commission

September 22, 1972

Re: Georgia Real Estate Commission; authority to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of fair housing laws.

You have recently requested an opinion regarding proposed rules and regulations ofthe Georgia Real Estate Commission pertaining to fair housing. In 1968 an opinion was rendered by this office in response to the request of whether or not the "commission is charged with the duty to become involved in the administration, implementation, and enforcement of [the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII-Fair Housing]." Op. Att'y Gen. 68-212. The conclusion reached in that opinion was that the commission was not made responsible by that federal law for its implementation, administration, or enforcement. That opinion did not address itself to the question ofwhether or not the commission had the authority to adopt fair housing rules, and therefore, that question went unanswered.
A recent memorandum from this office dated September 5, 1972, has stated the position of this office in regard to the adoption of such rules by the commission. That memorandum indicated the willingness of this office to undertake the defense of such rules, should it become necessary, and the feeling that a persuasive argument could be made in support ofthe commission's authority to promulgate such rules to protect the citizens of Georgia. See Ga. Code Ann. 84-1404 and 84-1417, based upon Ga. Laws 1925, p. 325, as amended.

OPINION 72-130
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 25, 1972

Re: Sentence and punishment; computation of credit on sentence where inmate erroneously discharged and rearrested.

This letter is in reply to your request for an opinion as to whether

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the time spent between a prison inmate's erroneous discharge and his subsequent arrest and incarceration should be credited toward the inmate's sentence.
As I understand the facts, the inmate was sentenced in Fulton County on September 20, 1962, to a term of 10 years. This sentence was later commuted to be computed from June 14, 1962, and was not imposed to run consecutively to any other sentence. Crediting the inmate with statutory and extra good time toward his sentence, the inmate was discharged from Department of Corrections custody on April 13, 1968, as having completed service of the Fulton County sentence. Subsequently, on December 22, 1971, the department learned for the first time that the inmate had been sentenced on June 11, 1962, in DeKalb County, to a prison term of 20 years. On the basis of the DeKalb County sentence, the department reassumed custody ofthe inmate from DeKalb County officials.
I further understand that during the period between April 13, 1968, and December 22, 1971, the inmate spent a total of one year and 28 days in federal custody for offenses unrelated to the Fulton or DeKalb sentences.
You specifically inquire whether the inmate should be given credit toward his sentence for the time spent between April 13, 1968, the date he was erroneously discharged from state custody, and December 22, 1971, the date he was returned to state custody. You further ask, in the event the inmate is to be credited with the time, whether he should also be credited with the statutory and extra good time he would have earned had he remained in state custody and maintained a clear record.
The DeKalb County sentence was imposed on the inmate prior to the imposition of the Fulton County sentence. Despite the fact that the department was totally unaware of the existence of the DeKalb County sentence, it cannot be questioned that the entire period of time that the inmate spent in the department's custody, ostensibly in service of the Fulton County sentence, must also be credited toward the DeKalb sentence.
As to the period from his erroneous release until the reassumption of custody by the state, however, the general rule is that mere lapse of time, without imprisonment or other restraint contemplated by the law, does not constitute service of sentence. Anderson v. Carall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923). Before applying this general rule to the period of time spent by the inmate beyond the confines of the state, the question might arise as to whether the inmate should be credited with the time spent in federal prison.

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During the period of federal incarceration, the State of Georgia apparently had no knowledge that the inmate had an unexpired Georgia sentence to serve, much less a federal conviction and sentence. The state, therefore, can hardly be considered as having yielded jurisdiction of the prisoner to the Federal Government. Even if the state had released custody of the inmate to the federal authorities for the purposes of trial and resulting service of sentence, the state would not thereby have waived its right to the exclusive jurisdiction of the inmate and the right to require from him the service of his Georgia sentence. See Montos u. Smith, 406 F. 2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1969). In the absence of an express provision in the state sentence to the contrary, service of a sentence for a federal offense cannot satisfy a sentence for a state offense. See Grimes u. Greer, 223 Ga. 628 (1967). Therefore, under the facts presented, the time spent by the inmate in federal custody is not creditable toward the DeKalb County sentence.
Dispensing with the rationale that the federal incarceration might constitute a partial service of the DeKalb County sentence, the remaining question is whether the approximately three years and eight months after the inmate's erroneous discharge, during which time he was not under any state restraint, can be credited toward his DeKalb sentence. Georgia law is well settled that where a sentenced prisoner is released from custody by reason of a void court order, prior to the completion of the service ofhis sentence, his sentence is not reduced by the period during which he was not in confinement. Brown u. Clarke, 172 Ga. 524 (1931); Aldredge u. Potts, 187 Ga. 290 (1938). In the facts presented by your request, the inmate was not set at large by reason of a void court order, but rather because the department had no knowledge of the sentence in question. I am unable to draw a distinction between an erroneous release upon a void court order and an erroneous release upon the absence of knowledge of the second and uncompleted sentence. In both circumstances, the release was unauthorized; in one instance, the result of an error of law, and in the other, the result of an error of fact. In either event, where the inmate has been erroneously discharged and has remained at liberty, he has not, in the contemplation of the law, been serving the sentence imposed upon him. See Neal u. State, 104 Ga. 509 (1898).
I am not unaware of case law to the contrary, and I am not convinced that there are not circumstances where a sentence would continue to run after an erroneous release. White u. Pearlman, 42 F. 2d 788 (lOth Cir. 1930) (inmate erroneously released even over the inmate's protest that a mistake was being

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made). Under the facts you present, however, I am of the opinion that the inmate's DeKalb County sentence did not continue to run after his erroneous discharge upon completion of the Fulton County sentence. It is, therefore, my opinion that the inmate should not be given credit for the time between April 13, 1968, the date of his erroneous discharge, and December 22, 1971, the date he was returned to state custody. This opinion renders an answer to your second question, concerning the crediting of statutory and extra good time, unnecessary.

OPINION 72-131
To: Commissioner, Department of Banking and Finance

September 25, 1972

Re: Bank holding company; legality of establishing nonbanking subsidiaries.

A bank holding company, wholly owned by a national bank in this state, has recently received the permission of the Federal Reserve Board to establish two nonbanking subsidiaries. One wholly owned subsidiary would operate a mortgage banking business while the other is to be a factoring subsidiary. The holding company proposes to establish these subsidiaries in various cities throughout the state without regard to whether the parent bank has majority-owned affiliates at the same locations.
You have requested an opinion on whether the establishment of such nonbanking subsidiaries violates Georgia's prohibition on branch banking (Ga. Code Ann 13-203, as amended by Ga. Laws 1970, p. 954). In my opinion, it does not.
The Federal Reserve Board has already ruled that the establishment of mortgage banking and factoring subsidiaries is appropriate under Section 4(c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, as amended (BHCA), 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq. In making this ruling, the board was required to consider whether or not the entry of the bank holding company into nonbanking activities violated any state or federal law. In Whitney National Bank in Jefferson v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Co., 379 U. S. 411 (1965), the Supreme Court emphasized that the Federal Reserve Board has exclusive jurisdiction of all issues involved in applications by bank holding companies for expansion. This includes the scrutiny of possible conflicts with state prohibitions on branch banking. The

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only appeal from this decision is to the Court of Appeals as provided in Section 9 of the Act.
Although the Federal Reserve Board has jurisdiction of all issues raised by an application, the states may restrict expansion by bank holding companies by legislation. Section 7 of the BHCA reserves this right to the states in the following terms:

The enactment by Congress of this chapter shall not be construed as preventing any state from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof."

Therefore, the state could limit or prohibit the acquisition or establishment of nonbanking subsidiaries by a bank holding company. No state has yet exercised this jurisdiction. See "The 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments and State Influence on Banking Structure," 89 Banking L. J. 318, at 321, n. 8 (1972).
Georgia Code Ann. 13-207 based upon Ga. Laws 1960, p. 67, regulates the expansion of banking facilities by a bank holding company but does not mention nonbanking activities. Therefore, the creation ofnonbanking subsidiaries is controlled by Section 4(c) (8) of the BHCA which requires Federal Reserve Board approval of an application based on certain statutory criteria.
Thus, it is clear that Georgia has no direct prohibition on the entry ofbank holding companies into nonbanking businesses. Your inquiry is concerned with the possible indirect effect of the branch banking restrictions found in Ga. Code Ann. 13-203. This issue has not yet been finally resolved by the courts although some commentators take the position that branch banking laws can place no restriction on holding company growth. See, e.g., "Are Branch Banking Limitations Applicable to Approved Bank Holding Company Operations?," 82 Banking L. J. 283 (1965). Other commentators, however, suggest that holding company expansion and branching restrictions may be interrelated so that branching restrictions are applicable even where the requirements of the BHCA are met. The emerging view of the federal courts seems to be that branch banking laws may limit holding company growth only where (1) there is an attempt to expand banking facilities and (2) the holding company structure is used to evade a state's branch banking law. See, e.g., Jackson v. First National Bank of Cornelia,

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430 F. 2d 1200 (5th Cir., 1970); cert. denied, 401 U. S. 947 (1971). The proposed mortgage banking and factoring subsidiaries are
nonbanking activities and, in my view, are not included in Ga. Code Ann. 13-203 which restricts branch banking. The purpose of prohibiting branch banking as stated in Section 1 ofGa. Laws 1960, p. 67, is "To prevent the extension of statewide banking by any institution and to encourage the normal growth of banking units in the local communities. (Emphasis added.) Ga. Code 13-201 defines bank, in traditional terms, as "Any moneyed corporation authorized by law to receive deposits of money and commercial paper, to make loans, to discount bills, notes and other commercial paper, to buy and sell bills of exchange, and to issue bills, notes, acceptances or other evidences of debt, and shall include incorporated banks, savings banks, banking companies, trust companies, and other corporations doing a banking business, ...." The subsidiaries proposed by the bank holding company do not have such powers and are not banks even.though they will perform some services also provided by the parent bank. Since these subsidiaries are not "banks," their creation violates neither the letter nor spirit of the law prohibiting branch banking. Therefore, a bank holding company may establish nonbanking subsidiaries if approved by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the BHCA.
You have also inquired about the legality of out-of-state bank holding companies establishing nonbanking subsidiaries within Georgia. The above analysis also answers this inquiry. Georgia has not prohibited the establishment ofnonbanking subsidiaries by an out-of-state bank holding company. Such interstate activities are permitted under the BHCA and are legal in Georgia if the requirements of that act have been met. See 89 Banking L. J. at 323. Therefore, an out-of-state bank holding company may establish nonbanking subsidiaries in this state.

OPINION 72-132
To: Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

September 25, 1972

Re: State contracts; review of federal-state agreement for development of Trotters Shoals Lake Project.

Please refer to your memorandum of September 20, 1972, wherein you request a review of the proposed agreement between

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the United States 'of America and the State of Georgia for recreational development at the Trotters Shoals Lake Project; said agreement being attached hereto and made a part hereof. In particular, you request advice and assistance on the following matters related thereto:
(1) Are the provisions of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 910 et seq., dealing with approval of certain state contracts, applicable to the subject agreement?
(2) If so, would the Budget Bureau's statements concerning the subject agreement, as contained in its letter ofSeptember 12, 1972, prevent you from executing same?
(3) Do the terms ofthe subject agreement conflict with any state constitutional or statutory provisions?
(4) Ascertain, if possible, the maximum cost sharing obligation of the state under the terms of the subject agreement.
(5) Does the subject agreement commit the state to develop all areas outlined in Design Memorandum 7?
(6) Suggestions for modification of the subject agreement. A. The provisions ofGa. Laws 1972, p. 910 et seq., are applicable to the subject agreement.- Section 1 of the above Act, inter alia, provides that all contracts by which the state is obligated to, or may become obligated to, expend more than $5,000 shall be voidable by the state unless approved by one of certain agencies, among which is the Bureau of the Budget. Section 2 of the Act authorizes the Bureau of the Budget to exempt, by rule or regulation, certain contracts and classes ofcontracts from the requirements ofSection 1. Section 3 of the Act expressly exempts certain contracts. Under the terms of the subject agreement, the state is obligated to pay or contribute in kind 50 percent of the separable first costs ofinitial recreational development and 50 percent ofthe separable first costs of future recreational development (Article 3. Consideration and Payment). 'I'he state's share of such costs is currently estimated to be $4,852,100 [Article 3a; Article 3b (2)]. Furthermore, the subject agreement does not fall within those classes of contracts exempted under Sections 2 and 3 ofthe Act (see August 1, 1972, Memorandum to all Agency heads from Tom Linder, Jr., Director, Office of Planning and Budget). Therefore, based upon the above, it is clear that the provisions of said Act are applicable to the subject agreement. B. The Budget Bureau's statements concerning the subject agreement neither render it voidable norprevent you from executing same.-Section 2 of Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 910,911, provides that the Bureau of the Budget shall approve all contracts provided for by

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Section 1".. .if such contract is authorized by the Appropriation Act, ...."
After review ofthe subject agreement, the Budget Division ofthe Office of Planning and Budget, by letter of September 12, 1972, issued the following statement:

"The expenditures required by this contract do not appear to be within the funds appropriated to your Department for Operating Expenses. The legality of this agreement and your authority to enter into same are matters which are outside the province ofthis office and, therefore, have not been considered in this review. "We regret that we cannot approve the encumbrance of funds from your existing budget for the purpose of entering into the above named agreement." (Emphasis added.)

While it is true the above letter disapproves the agreement as to your existing budget, it is my opinion that, inasmuch as the agreement does not obligate the state to expend funds in the period covered by the current Appropriation Act (see Article 3a (2)], such action on the part of the Budget Bureau is void of legal effect.
As a general rule, agreements which fiscally obligate the state for a period longer than a year are invalid. Barwick v. Roberts, 192 Ga. 783 (5) (1941). Therefore, in most cases, state agreements which obligate the state to expend funds will do so on the basis of funds authorized in the Appropriation Act. As noted above, such is not the case with the subject agreement.
In my opinion, it was not the legislature's intent to have Section 1 contracts reviewed by the Budget Bureau prior to the appropriation year in which the state first becomes obligated to expend funds pursuant to the terms thereof. This is in line with a rule ofstatutory construction which mandates that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it meaningless, the intention of the legislature should be construed so as not to render the statute absurd and ineffective. Oxford v. Carter, 216 Ga. 821 (1961).
Therefore, any statement ofapproval or disapproval rendered by the bureau prior to that time is of no legal import. Consequently, the September 12, 1972 disapproval of the subject agreement as to your existing budget neither renders it voidable nor prevents you from executing same.
C. The terms of the subject agreement do not conflict with any

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state constitutional or statutory provisions.- In substance, the subject agreement between the State of Georgia and the Federal Government provides for the acquisition .of land and the construction of facilities for recreational development in the Trotters Shoals Lake area. Both undertakings will be in accordance with a plan mutually agreed upon between the parties, and each party will pay or contribute in kind 50 percent ofthe first costs of initial and future recreationaldevelopment(Articles 2and 3). Payment by the state may be immediately in cash, may be in kind, or may be on an installment basis over a period not exceeding 50 years (Article 3). Said payment must be made within 50 years of the first use of the initial facilities [see Article 3a(2)].
Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5601) prohibits the contracting of a debt by, or on behalf of, the state except to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or defend the state in time ofwar. "Debt" as used in such provision has been construed as the incurring of a fiscal liability, not to be discharged by taxes levied within the year in which the liability is undertaken. City of Dawson v. Dawson Water Works, 106 Ga. 696 (1899). Therefore, as a general rule, a contract which fiscally obligates the state for a period longer than one year is invalid. Barwick v. Roberts, 192 Ga. 783 (5) (1941).
However, Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5901) creates an exception to the above rule. Said provision provides in relevant part as follows:

"The state, state institutions ... may contract for any period not exceeding 50 years, ... with any public agency, ... for the use ... of any facility or services of the ... public agency, ... provided such contracts shall deal with such activities and transactions as such subdivision (e.g., state or state institutions) are by law authorized to undertake." (Matter in parenthesis added.)

In applying this constitutional provision to the subject agreement, three questions arise:
(1) Does said agreement fiscally obligate the state for a period not exceeding 50 years?
(2) Is the Department of Natural Resources, through which said agreement is entered into, authorized by law to undertake development of recreational facilities?
(3) Does the term "public agency" include the United States

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Government? In answer to question 1, Article 3 of the subject agreement
obligates the state to pay 50 percent of the recreation development over a period not exceeding 50 years. Therefore, the 50-year restriction appears to be satisfied.
With regard to the authority question, Section 1503 of the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1052 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-35131) transfers all functions of the Department of State Parks to the Department of Natural Resources. Among the powers transferred to the department are those of cooperating with the United States Government in matters relating to the acquiring, planning, establishing, developing, improving or maintaining any park, parkway or recreational area. Ga. Code Ann. 43-124 (e), based upon Ga. Laws 1937, p. 264, as amended. Likewise, the department is given broad power to acquire by purchase, lease, agreement or condemnation, such land within the state as it may deem necessary or proper to the extension of the State Park System, Ga. Code Ann. 43-124(b), and to provide and maintain adequate recreational facilities, Ga. Code Ann. 43-124 (h).
Therefore, it is my opinion that the Department of Natural Resources has ample authority to undertake development of recreational facilities.
Finally, in determining whether or not the term "public agency" includes the United States Government, one must resort to the rule ofstatutory construction which mandates that in the construction of a statute, the legislative intent must be determined from the construction of it as a whole. Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240 (1958).
In construing the provision as a whole, it is persuasive to note that it provides, inter alia, for 50-year contracts between "state institutions" as well as between a state institution and "any public agency."
It seems quite reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not intend to limit the term "any public agency" to those agencies created by the state. The term "state institutions" would have been sufficiently broad to cover both categories of contracts had this been their intent.
Therefore, based upon the above and a review of the entire agreement, it is my opinion that said agreement falls within an exception to the "debt" limitation imposed by the State Constitution, and the terms ofthe agreement do not conflict with any state constitutional or statutory provisions.

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D. Under the terms of the subject agreement, the state is obligated to pay or contribute in kind 50 percent of the separable first costs of initial recreational development and 50 percent of the separable first costs of future recreational development.- Under the terms of the subject agreement, the state is obligated to pay or contribute in kind 50 percent of first costs of initial and future recreational development (Article 3). The state's share of first costs for initial development is estimated to be $1,871,000 (Article 3a) and for future development, $2,981,100 [Article 3b(2) ]. The Federal Government is obligated to pay or contribute in kind an equal amount for first costs of initial and future development and agrees to pay 100 percent of the joint costs of the project allocated to recreation ("joint costs" being defined as those costs other than first costs for initial and future development).
The state's share of the first costs of initial development may be paid in cash, in kind or in 50 consecutive annual installments within 50 years ofthe first use ofthe initial facilities [Article 3a(2)]. If the installment method is used, the interest rate will be based upon the rate in effect for the government fiscal year in which project construction is initiated [Article 3a(4)].
While not specifically set out in the agreement, the above arrangement would probably apply as to payment of first costs of future development.
E. Under the terms of the subject agreement, the state would be committed to share in the costs ofpurchasing those areas designated in Exhibit B and shown on Plate Nos. 1 and 2 of Design Memorandum 7. Development of such areas must be pursuant to a mutually acceptable Plan of Recreational Development and Management.- Under the terms of the subject agreement, the state would be committed to share in the costs of purchasing those areas designated in Exhibit B. However, such areas must be purchased in accordance with a plan mutually agreed upon between the parties (Article 2b). Any changes which the state desires in the areas to be purchased should be negotiated prior to execution.
With regard to development of recreational facilities, the subject agreement expressly states that the types and quantities of facilities which the government and the state will construct will be subject to a mutually acceptable Plan ofRecreational Development and Management.
F. Modification of subject agreement.- After the meeting in your office on September 22, 1972, this office met with L. C. Fowler, District Counsel, Army Corps of Engineers, in order to discuss

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possible modification of several provisiOns of the subject agreement. Pursuant to this meeting, the following changes were agreed upon:
(1) Insert at the end of the first sentence of Article 2a the words : .. in accordance with a plan mutually agreed upon by the parties."
(2) Insert at the end of the first sentence of Article 2b the words " ... in accordance with a plan mutually agreed upon by the parties."
(3) Insert at the end of the first sentence of Article 3a(2) the words "... in cash or in kind, or in the alternate, repayment may be made in 50 consecutive annual installments."
(4) Strike the last sentence of Article 3a(2). (5) Insert at the end of the first sentence of Article 3b(2) the words"... in accordance with a plan mutually agreed upon by the parties." (6) Strike the wording after the word "hereunder" in the first line of Article 6a and substitute in lieu thereof the words"... each party agrees to comply with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations, including but not limited to the provisions of the Georgia Water Quality Control Act (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 416, as amended); 40 U.S.C. 276 a-a(7); 40 U.S.C. 327-330; and Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 3." The attached agreement reflects the above changes. Based upon my review of the law and the subject agreement, I have certified same as a binding legal obligation on the State of Georgia.

OPINION 72-133
To: Chairman, Georgia Public Service Commission

September 25, 1972

Re: Public Service Commission should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over the safety of railroad employees.

You have requested my opinion on the question of whether, in general, the Public Service Commission may assume and exercise jurisdiction over the safety of railroad employees while working in railway yards, and whether, in particular, the commission may prohibit the use of a certain type of "air hose wrench" by railroad employees.

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It is well settled that the commission has only such powers and jurisdiction as the legislature has expressly, or by fair implication, conferred upon it. See Georgia Public Service Commission v. Albany, 180 Ga. 355 (1935); Georgia Public Service Commission v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 205 Ga. 863 (1949). Therefore, I have reviewed the Code provisions pertinent to this inquiry, which are as follows:

" Jurisdiction of commission.- The Public Service Commission shall have the general supervision of all ... railroads, . . . and while it may hear complaints, yet the commission is authorized to perform the duties imposed upon it of its own initiative and to require all common carriers and other public service companies under its supervision to establish and maintain such public service and facilities as may be reasonable and just, either by general rules or by special orders in particular cases, . . . said commission shall have authority to examine into the affairs of said companies and corporations and to keep informed as to their general condition, their capitalization, their franchises, and the manner in which their lines, ... are managed, conducted and operated, not only. with respect the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by this service to the public and their employees, but also with reference to their compliance with all provisions of law, orders of the commission and charter requirements. * * * " (Ga. Code Ann. 93-307.) "Further powers.- The Public Service Commission shall have power and authority ... to prescribe rules with reference to spurtracks and sidetracks with reference to their use and construction, removal or change... to order and compel the operation ofsufficient and proper passenger service when in its judgement inefficient or insufficient service is being rendered to the public or any community... to prescribe rules and penalties covering and requiring the prompt receipt, carriage and delivery of freight...." (Ga. Code Ann. 93-308.) "Inspection of railroads by commission.- The Public Service Commission, upon complaint made, shall inspect, by its members, or through an agent, any railroad or any part of any railroad in this state, and if the same is found in an unsafe or dangerous condition, it shall require the same to be put and kept in such condition as will render travel over the same safe and expeditious ...." (Ga. Code Ann. 93-316.)

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See also Ga. Code Ann. 93-504.3, based upon Ga. Laws 1952, p. 76, authorizing the commission to promulgate rules concerning safety at railroad crossings.
The above Code sections were considered by the late Honorable Attorney General Eugene Cook, in 1953, with respect to whether the commission had authority to regulate the spacing between tracks in railroad yards so as to promote employee safety. The conclusion was as follows:
"Generally speaking, the Public Service Commission is not concerned with the internal affairs of the railroad corporation and disputes between the railroads and their employees concerning safety regulations which do not in any way affect the public. We do not believe that the general supervision over railroads and the authority given the commission over railroads to require them to maintain such public services and facilities expressly or by reasonable implication gives the commission authority to adopt the rule[s]." (Op. Att'y Gen. 1953, pp. 496, 498).
The former Attorney General also advised the commission to await a clear legislative or judicial mandate before assuming jurisdiction over railroad employee safety.
I agree with the conclusion of this former opinion; but I would like to note other reasons which tend to support its continuing validity.
First, from the time the above Code sections were enacted, the commission has, to my knowledge, never adopted nor enforced rules concerning railroad employee safety. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that a uniform course of practice over a period of years is evidence ofthe correct interpretation of the law. See Rice and Williams v. Johnson, 20 Ga. 639 (1856); McLendon v. Crenshaw, 59 Ga. 350, 351 (1877); and Temple Baptist Church v. Terminal Company, 128 Ga. 669, 680 (1907), wherein it was held as follows:
"This court, and all other courts, will recognize the practice of co-ordinate departments of government, and allow the construction placed by the officers in such departments upon statutes, and even the Constitution, to be operative where there is room for construction. The long-continued practice of the Executive or the Legislative Department will be treated as

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persuasive authority by the courts, and has, in numerous cases, been followed . . . ."

Second, with respect to the commission's general supervision over motor contract carriers and common carriers, the General Assembly has granted explicit authority to "promulgate rules designed to promote safety" oftruck drivers and employees as well as the driving public. Ga. Code Ann. 68-521, 68-522, based upon Ga. Laws 1931, Extra. Sess., p. 99, and 68-627, 68-628, based upon Ga. Laws 1931, p. 199. As a result, the commission has adopted an extensive body of safety regulations controlling these types of common carriers. The inference is that if the legislature had intended to confer similar jurisdiction over railroad employees, it would have so explicitly provided. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Third, the field of employee safety is extensively provided for by other state agencies and under authority not administered or enforced by the Georgia Public Service Commission. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 54-1 based upon Ga. Laws 1937, p. 230 (Department ofLabor); Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 66-4 (injuries to railroad employees); Ga. Code Ann. 18-106, 18-605, based upon Ga. Laws 1890-1, p. 185 (working hours of railroad employees). This is not to mention the far reaching federal legislation in this area. See, e.g., Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), and Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
In summary, the statutory language conferring jurisdiction over railroads upon the commission is broad and ambiguous, and this is not to say that an attempt by the commission to assume jurisdiction over the safety ofrailroad employees would necessarily be struck down by the courts. See 1953 Opinion, supra. However, I strongly believe that if the General Assembly had intended to confer such jurisdiction, it would have done so in more explicit terms, as it did for other subjects ofutility regulation. Moreover, this is a field that would no doubt blossom into major proportions in terms of regulation and litigation.
Therefore, I would advise the commission, as did my predecessor, that it should await a more positive mandate from the legislature or the courts before it attempts to assert jurisdiction and adopt and enforce regulations concerning the safety of railroad employees.

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OPINION 72-134
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 28, 1972

Re: Sentence and punishment; credit on sentence for time spent in an institution for treatment or examination of disability; retroactive effect of statute.

This is in reply to your request for my official opinion as to whether Ga. Laws 1972, p. 742, would allow a credit against sentence for time spent in institutions or facilities for treatment or examination of mental or physical defect to be computed from a date beginning before July 1, 1970.
This statute amends Ga. Laws 1970, p. 692 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2530 to 27-2533), which this department considers as having no retroactive effect. See Op. Att'y Gen. 70-85. Unlike the original Act, however, the amendment was expressly given retroactive application to all those criminal defendants "confined, in connection with or resulting from an order entered in the criminal proceedings for which sentence was imposed, in an institution or facility for treatment or examination, on or after July 1, 1970." Ga. Laws 1972, p. 742 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2535). The question raised is whether inmates already so confined on that date should only be allowed credit for that portion oftheir confinement extending from July 1, 1970.
The statute in question is remedial in nature, since it was designed to remedy the injustice that occurred when a defendant might be required to spend more time in confinement than that set by law as necessary to satisfy the rehabilitative interests of the state. It is a canon of construction that remedial statutes "are to receive an equitable interpretation, by which the letter of the Act is sometimes restrained and sometimes enlarged, so as to more effectually meet the beneficial end in view ...." Executors of Henderson v. Alexander, 2 Ga. 81 at 85 (1847). Here the legislature saw the need to limit the retroactive effect of the statute in order to serve administrative convenience. Yet this incidental purpose would not be defeated by construing "July 1, 1970," in Section 4 to refer only to the class benefited by the Act and not to the computation of the credit allowed in Section 1. This would not burden those charged with administering the Act, since it would not increase the class ofbeneficiaries. Yet it would ensure that no

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members of that class derive a lesser benefit than others. The language of the Act is consistent with the above
interpretation: in defining the credit allowed, Section 1 states that credit should be given "for each day spent in confinement." Ga. Laws 1972, p. 742 at p. 743. It is, therefore, my opinion that those confined for treatment or examination on July 1, 1970, should receive a credit against their sentences for the entire period ofsuch confinement.

OPINION 72-135
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

September 29, 1972

Re: Driving schools; a corporation which offers driving instructions to licensed drivers is not subject to and need not comply with the provisions of The Driver Training School License Act.

This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether or not the National Professional Truck Driver Training School is subject to, and must comply with, the provisions of The Driver Training School License Act, Ga. Laws 1968, p. 436 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92A-11).
As I understand it, the National Professional Truck Driver Training School is a corporation engaged in the business of giving instructions for hire in the specialized field of truck driving to licensed drivers.
The Act in question provides as follows:

"Necessity for licenses.-No person shall operate a driver training school or engage in the business ofgiving instructions for hire in the driving of motor vehicles or in the preparation of an applicant for examination given by driver's license examiners for a driver's license or permit, unless a license therefor has been secured from the department." Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 436, 437 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-1102). (Emphasis added.)

The word "or" in the foregoing Code section is a disjunctive particle, and as defined by Bouvier's Law Dictionary:

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"Its ... natural meaning where used as a connective, is to mark an alternative and to present choice, implying an election to do one of two things . . . "
See Georgia Paper Star Company v. State Tax Board, 174 Ga. 816, 819 (1932) and Fennell v. State, 218 Ga. 418, 422 (1962).
Therefore, the Code section would appear to place the requirement ofobtaining a license not only upon those who operate or are employed by a "driver training school," but also upon those persons who "engage in the business of giving instruction for hire in the driving of motor vehicles" regardless of whether such conduct is done in connection with a "driver training school" and regardless of whether such instruction is given to persons already licensed to drive. Such an interpretation is supported by the general rule of construction of all statutory enactments that "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art, or words connected with a particular trade, or subject matter .... " See Ga. Code Ann. 102-102(1).
However, it is also a general rule of statutory construction that the intention of the legislature must be effectuated when it is ascertainable. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102(9); Moore et al. v. Baldwin County et al., 209 Ga. 541, 545 (1953). It is apparant, upon review of the title of The Driver Training School License Act and the Act itself, that the legislature intended that the Act be applicable only to those persons who operate "Driver Training Schools," as the same are defined in the Act, and instructors employed thereby. The title of the Act reads as follows:
"An Act to regulate driver training schools; to provide for their licensing and licensing of an instructor of a school; to provide for qualifications, insurance requirements, bond requirements, the renewal of licenses, registration fees and disposition of the moneys received; to provide for penalties for violations; to provide for an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes." Ga. Laws 1968, p. 436.
Driver training school is defined as:
"Any person, partnership, or corporation g1vmg driving instruction to 10 or more persons per calendar year for the

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purpose of meeting requirements for licensed driving of motor vehicles in Georgia." Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 436, 437 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-1101 (b)).

The schools with which the Act is concerned, then, are those schools which give driving instruction to those persons desirous of meeting the requirements for obtaining a Georgia driver's license.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that a corporation engaged in the business of giving instruction for hire in the driving of motor vehicles to persons who are already licensed to drive is not subject to the provisions ofThe Driver Training School License Act. Under the facts you have provided, National Professional Truck Driver Training is such a corporation and would not be subject to the provisions of the Act.
However, this opinion is based on the facts and law as now implemented. On July 1, 1972, a new law went into effect which provides for different classes of drivers licenses and places additional testing requirements on persons desirous of operating trucks and certain other classes of motor vehicles. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1078-1081 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401). Pursuant to that law, drivers licenses issued after January 1, 1973, must be issued in accordance with the additional requirements. Should National Professional Truck Driver Training revise its program of instruction for the purpose of assisting prospective licensees to meet the additional requirements, it could be subject to the provisions of The Driver Training School License Act. Until that occurs, however, the opinion will have to stand as written.

OPINION 72-136
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

September 29, 1972

Re: Age of Majority Act does not affect requirement that holder oflearner's drivers license be accompanied by licensed operator of 21 years or older.

This is in response to your request for an opinion on whether or not the "Age of Majority" Act (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193), which lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 years of age, has any effect on an existing law (Ga. Laws 1959, pp. 318, 319, Ga. Code Ann. 92A-405) which requires that the holder of a learner's

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driver's license shall, at all times, be accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur who is 21 years of age or over.
The "Age of Majority" Act was intended to reduce the age at which an individual attained full legal capacity and thereby shed his civil disabilities. It was not intended, in my opinion, to necessarily affect all existing laws setting an age qualification of 21, unless such laws were tied directly to the age of majority, see Section 10, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 193, 199 (Ga. Code Ann. 74-104.1). For example, in my memorandum opinion to the Ordinaries of Georgia (5-15-72) it was determined that the General Assembly intended to retain the pistol permit age at 21, regardless ofthe fact that the age of majority was lowered to 18. The standard for making this determination is whether the reference to age 21 in a prior law was tied to the traditional age of majority, in which case the age limitation would now be lowered to 18, or, whether because of an apparent legislative intention to prolong protection against the inherent dangers of immaturity or inexperience of youth, an age qualification was established at more than 18 years. In the latter instance, a qualification age of 21, or any other age, would not be reduced by the 1972 "Age ofMajority" Act. Cf.Constitutional
Age Requirements for Governor, established at 30 years, Ga. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. VI (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3006) and
age qualifications for other constitutional officers established at 25 years, Ga. Constitution, Art. V, Sec. II, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2- 3104).
Applying the foregoing standards to the law which requires the holder of a learner's driver's license, at all times, to be accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur who is 21 years of age or over, I have determined that the age qualification established therein at 21 is not tied to "legal" capacity or majority and is not, therefore, reduced to 18 years by the "Age of Majority" Act of 1972.
The law which requires that the holder of a learner's driver's license shall, at all times, be accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur who is 21 years of age or over, makes no reference to the age qualification in terms of "legal capacity." Ga. Laws 1959, pp. 318, 319 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-405). That is an indication that the General Assembly was concerned with actual maturity rather than the traditional legal age of consent. That conclusion is strengthened by the legislative history of the law pertaining to learner's driver's licenses. Up until1959, the law contained no age requirement at all, but required that the holder of a learner's driver's license be accompanied by a "licensed operator or chauffeur." Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 343; 1943, pp. 196, 201; 1951,

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pp. 598, 600; 1957, pp. 103, 106; 1958, p. 268. Since the General Assembly was apparently not concerned with the traditional age ofmajority in the original enactment and subsequent amendments governing the issuance of learner's driver's licenses, it would be illogical to assume that the 1959 enactment requiring a learning driver to be accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur who is 21 years of age or over was tied to the traditional age ofmajority. The logical assumption is that the 1959 Act is expressive of an apparent legislative intention to prolong protection against the inherent dangers ofimmaturity or inexperience ofyouth in an area posing significant risks to the driving public and the youths themselves.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the "Age ofMajority" Act has no effect on the requirement that the holder of a learner's driver's license shall, at all times, be accompanied by a licensed operator or chauffeur who is 21 years of age or over. If you require further assistance regarding this question, please contact this office.

OPINION 72-137
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

September 29, 1972

Re: Statutes; clerical error in Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act has no legal effect.

You have requested my opmwn as to whether an apparent contradiction in Section 5 of Article 9 of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Ga. Code Ann. 77-514b, based upon Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 938, 947) will have any effect on the enforcement of that Act.
The Section in question reads as follows:

"It shall be unlawful and mandatory upon the warden or other official in charge of a penal or correctional institution in this state to give over the person of any inmate thereof whenever so required by the operation of the Agreement on Detainers." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 938, 947. (Emphasis added.)

A cardinal rule in the construction of a legislative enactment is to ascertain the true intention of the General Assembly in passing the enactment. Plantation Pipeline Company v. City of Bremen,

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227 Ga. 1 (1971); Ga. Code Ann. 102-102(9). In construing a statute, the legislative intent must be determined from a consideration ofthe statute as a whole and apparent conflicts must be reconciled, if possible, so as to make them consistent and harmonious with one another. Undercofler v. Capital Automobile Co., 111 Ga. App. 709, 716 (1965).
Applying these rules ofconstruction to the act in question, I have concluded that the General Assembly did not intend to declare an act which has been declared mandatory and which obviously is an absolute necessity to the implementation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers unlawful.
A stated purpose of the agreement is to provide for cooperative procedures which party states may utilize to encourage expeditious and orderly disposition ofcharges against a prisoner and detainers based on untried indictments, informations, and complaints in other jurisdictions. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 938, 939. The basic procedure for effecting the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges is a transfer of custody to the state in which the charges or detainers originated. /d. at 943. Therefore, the language in Section 5 of Article 9 of the agreement declaring a transfer of custody required by the agreement mandatory and unlawful is clearly not consistent with the legislative intent expressed elsewhere in the Act. Accordingly, Section 5 of Article 9 should not be construed as declaring the mandatory act of transferring custody unlawful. The logical construction is that the General Assembly intended Section 5 of Article 9 to declare that a transfer of custody required by the Agreement is lawful and mandatory.
Therefore, it is my opinion that the apparent contradiction in Section 5 ofArticle 9 ofthe Interstate Agreement on Detainers will have no effect on the enforcement of that agreement.

OPINION 72-138
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

October 2, 1972

Re: Sentence and punishment; prisoners convicted of misdemeanors of a high and aggravated nature can earn no more than four days of good time per month.

This is in answer to your request for an official opinion regarding the amount of good time allowed an inmate sentenced under Ga.

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Laws 1970, pp. 236, 241 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506.1). Ga. Laws 1970, p. 236, singles out certain criminal activities and
designates them "misdemeanors ofa high and aggravated nature," carrying harsher penalties than ordinary misdemeanors. The purpose of the legislation was to impose special sanctions on those found guilty of conducting enterprises commonly associated with organized crime.
Section 11 of the Act contains the following statement: "A person sentenced for a misdemeanor ofa high and aggravated nature shall be entitled to only four days per month good time allowance." Ga. Laws 1970, p. 236 at 241 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506.1). It is entirely consistent with the purpose stated above to interpret this as providing a further distinction between ordinary misdemeanors and misdemeanors ofa high and aggravated nature. Consequently, the word "only" should be read as negating any implication that good time allowances for persons sentenced under Ga. Laws 1970, p. 236, should be computed in the same manner as for persons convicted of ordinary misdemeanors. (See Ga. Laws 1964, p. 493; Ga. Laws 1956, p. 161, as amended by Ga. Laws 1961, p. 127; 1964, p. 495, and 1968, p. 1399. These sections allow prisoners convicted of ordinary misdemeanors to receive "extra good time" in addition to the statutory allowance of four days per month.) Any other interpretation would render the word "only" superfluous and would thus violate the canon of construction that requires all words ofa statute "to be given due weight and meaning." Falligant v. Barrow, 133 Ga. 87 at 92 (1908). It is, therefore, my opinion that no prisoner convicted of a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature should be allowed any "extra good time."

OPINION 72-139
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

October 2, 1972

Re: State Board of Chiropractic Examiners; authority to determine educational qualifications of applicants for renewal of license.

This is in response to your request for an official opmwn concerning a recently amended section of Georgia law, Ga. Code Ann. 84-521, based upon Ga. Laws 1971, p. 260, which provides that a chiropractor's license may be renewed only on condition that

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the board,

"has satisfactory evidence that applicant for renewal attended the two day educational program as conducted by the Georgia Chiropractic Association or its equivalent as approved by the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners in the year preceding
"

I understand from you that the Georgia Chiropractic Association held a two day educational program in Albany during April 1972, but has taken the position that such program satisfies only 70 percent of the board requirements.
Without considering the relative authority of the Georgia Chiropractic Association and the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, it seems clear to me that the board has authority to approve the two day April session as meeting the statutory educational requirements. Also, the statute requires only that the applicant provide "satisfactory evidence" ofhis attendance at such session, and I know of no reason why the board could not accept an applicant's affidavit or personal certificate that he attended and participated in such educational session.

OPINION 72-140
To: Executive Secretary, Regents ofthe University System of Georgia

October 3, 1972

Re: Board of Regents; contract for operation of Northwest Branch Experiment Station.

This is in reply to your letter stating that the Board of Regents is considering constructing a livestock pavillion in Calhoun to be operated as the Northwest Georgia Branch Experiment Station under the overall supervision of the University ofGeorgia College of Agriculture for the purpose of providing educational assistance and programs to the farmers and livestock growers in that area of the state. You further state that it is proposed to finance the facility with bond proceeds by including the project under the lease dated November 1, 1967 between the Georgia Education Authority (University) and the Board of Regents securing the Georgia Education Authority (University) Series 1967A Bonds.

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246

The question asked is "whether the Board of Regents on behalf of the University of Georgia may lawfully enter into a contract with officials of Gordon County for its operation. I am assuming, of course, that this type facility may properly be classified as a project under the terms ofthe Act creating the 'Georgia Education Authority (University)'."
The Georgia Education Authority (University) Act, Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1009 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-103a) provides, in part, as follows:

"(b) The word 'project' shall be deemed to mean and include one of a combination of two or more of the following: ... and facilities of every kind and character deemed by the authority necessary or convenient for the efficient operation of any unit which is a part of the University System of Georgia.
"(c) The word 'unit' shall mean any institution, school, academy, university or experiment station at any particular location which forms a part of the University System of Georgia."

The above definition of a project in the Authority Act is broad enough to include the facility in question where the authority deems the facility to be necessary or convenient for the efficient operation of any unit which is a part of the University System of Georgia. Therefore, your assumption that the facility may be classified as a project under the Authority Act is correct.
As to whether the Board of Regents may enter into a contract with the county for the operation of the facility, Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5901) provides, in part, as follows:
"(a) The state, state institutions, any city, town, municipality or county of this state may contract for any period not exceeding 50 years, with each other or with any public agency, public corporation or authority now or hereafter created for the use by such subdivisions or the residents thereof of any facilities or services of the state, state institutions, any city, town, municipality, county, public agency, public corporation or authority, provided such contracts shall deal with such activities and transactions as such subdivisions are by law authorized to undertake."

The 1967 lease contains provisions prohibiting the Board of Regents from assigning or subletting projects covered by the lease.

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However, this would not preclude the Board of Regents from entering into an agreement with the county for the county to operate the facility for the Regents. The county attorney should be consulted as to the authority of the county in this matter.
Therefore, it is my official opinion that the Board of Regents is authorized to enter into an agreement with the county for the operation ofthe facility but the Regents cannot assign or sublet the facility.

OPINION 72-141 To: Governor, State of Georgia

October 4, 1972

Re: Building Administrative Board; size; interpretation of statute contingent on appropriation.

You have requested my advice on the following situation. The General Assembly of 1971 passed legislation to amend the State Building Administrative Board Act (Ga. Laws 1969, p. 546 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-60)) so as to increase the membership on the board. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 242 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-6002). That Act provided that the operative sections would not become effective until "funds are made available by appropriation by the General Assembly to carry out the provisions of said sections." The State Building Administrative Board is an agency under the Examining Boards Division ofthe Secretary of State, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-60, and the office of the Secretary of State is the "budget unit" for which separate appropriations are made for the Examining Boards by the General Assembly. See Ga. Code Ann. 40-402 (1) (8), based upon Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17.
The budget report for 1970 shows that the Secretary of State requested $1,230,095 to operate the Examining Boards Division, including the State Building Administration Board, for Fiscal Year 1970-71 (page 115). However, the Governor recommended $1,248,200, which amount was actually appropriated by the General Assembly. Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 32, 54. You state that you have been unable to find any specific reference to the State Building Administration Board in any of the Appropriation Acts and no reference in the budget documents subsequent to such amendment. However, you mentioned that this increased appropriation for Fiscal Year 1970-71 indicates that the General Assembly intended to make additional funds available to the

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Building Administative Board prior to the 1971 amendment. The resulting question is whether Sections 1 and 2 of the 1971
amendment, increasing the size of the board, were effective when passed because of the prior 1970 Appropriations Act which did in fact make the necessary funds available to operate the expanded Building Administration Board. In my opinion, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1971 Act did become effective when passed because the. necessary implementing funds were available.
The first and most important rule of statutory construction is to "look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly." Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9). Thus, in construing the terms establishing the effective date of the 1971 Act, i.e., when "funds are made available by appropriation by the General Assembly ...," we should strive for a reasonable construction, that is, one which will attribute to the General Assembly an intention to pass the Act, and which will not defeat the purpose of the legislation. Board of Tax Assessors of Decatur Co. u. Catledge, 173 Ga. 656 (3) (1931). Furthermore, in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly, reference to prior statutes relating to the same subject-matter is appropriate, and all such statutes, in pari materia, should be read together as if they were one law. Ryan u. Commissioners of Chatham Co., 203 Ga. 730, 731-32 (1948).
Applying these pertinent rules of construction to the 1971 Act, it is apparent that the General Assembly was concerned primarily that funds be available to operate the expanded Building Administrative Board, rather than the enactment of a specific Appropriation Act to trigger the increase in board membership. As mentioned above, the 1970 Appropriations Act did in fact make funds available to the pertinent "budget unit", i.e., the Secretary of State Examining Boards Division, to operate the Building Administrative Board as increased by Sections 1 and 2 of the 1971 amendment. Therefore, I conclude that Sections 1 and 2 of Ga. Laws 1971, p. 242, increasing the size of the State Building Administration Board, became effective when passed by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor on March 29, 1971.

OPINION 72-142 To: State Superintendent of Schools

October 5, 1972

Re: Photocopies of instruments; use in litigation.

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This is in answer to your letter ofSeptember 29, 1972, requesting an opinion as to whether certain agreements and notes in connection with teacher scholarships may be retained through the process of microfilming.
Ga. Code Ann. 38-710, based on Ga. Laws 1950, p. 73, provides as follows:

"Any photostatic or microphotographic or photographic reproduction ofany original writing or record which may be or has been made in the regular course of business to preserve permanently by such reproduction the writing or record shall be admissible in evidence in any proceeding in any court ofthis state, and in any proceeding before any board, bureau, department, commission or agency of the state, in lieu of and without accounting for the original of such writing or record. Any enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction shall likewise be admissible ifthe original ofsuch reproduction is in existence and available for inspection under direction of the court or the agency conducting the proceeding."

It would seem to me that microfilm copies of the scholarship agreements and notes (copies of which you furnished with your letter of September 29) would be admissible under this Code provision. On the other hand, I have been unable to locate any judicial decision construing the above Code provision with specific reference to the sort of notes and agreements in question. For this reason, and through an abundance of caution in consideration of the substantial sums of money involved, I think the safest course of action would be to retain the original instruments until such time as the precise question has been adjudicated by the courts.
Obviously, it will be easier to destroy the bulky originals in the event of a favorable decision than it would be to resurrect the same in the event the decision is unfavorable.

OPINION 72-143
To: Chairman, Georgia Historical Commission

October 9, 1972

Re: Historical Commission cannot accept a gift without gaining complete control over the gift.

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You have inquired in regard to the propriety of the Historical Commission accepting a gift of a pre-Revolutionary War cannon upon the condition that the cannon can never be moved from a certain location. It is my opinion that such a conveyance does not constitute a valid gift, and the cannon would be considered only a loan to the Historical Commission.
"To make a valid gift, there must be a present intention to give, and a complete renunciation of right, by the giver, over the thing given." Guest v. Stone, et al., 206 Ga. 239, 241 (1949). If the donor of the cannon retained the right to determine the location of the cannon, he would not have completely renounced his right over the thing given, and there would be no valid gift.

OPINION 72-144 To: Governor, State of Georgia

October 11, 1972

Re: State patrol; use of Department of Public Safety personnel as body guards for Governor beyond the state.

You have requested my opinion as to the legality of the state paying for the expenses incurred by the state troopers who traveled with you to the National Democratic Convention in Miami.
This will also confirm my discussion with your legal counsel, Bill Harper, relative to this same subject had not long after you took office.
Code 92A-302a, based upon Ga. Laws 1968, p. 475, provides as follows:

"The Director of the Department of Public Safety shall be authorized to employ such number of security guards as may be necessary to keep watch over and protect the Governor, the Executive Department at the state capitol or at such other place as the Executive Department may be removed, the Executive Center or other residence of the Governor of the State of Georgia, and such other state property as may be directed by the Governor."

It is my opinion that the word "Governor" in the provision "to

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keep watch over and protect the Governor" refers to the person of the Governor. That is to say, the Governor's security guards are, in effect, his body guards, and it is their duty to provide security for the Governor. In order to perform this duty, it is necessary for such guards to be with the Governor wherever he may be, both within and without this state, and regardless of whether the Governor is on official business or on a trip for his personal relaxation.
In view of the above, it is my opinion that the expenses incurred by the state troopers who travel with you as your security guards are properly chargeable to the state.

OPINION 72-145
To: Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Teachers Retirement System

October 12, 1972

Re: Teachers Retirement System; status of teachers on loan to Federal Government.

This is in response to your request for an official opinion as to whether the Board of Trustees of the Teachers Retirement System could, by regulation, authorize membership service for a member who is on loan to the Federal Government under the provisions of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970.
Title IV of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, P.L. 91-648, provides for the temporary assignment of personnel between the Federal Government and state and local governments. One ofthe purposes ofthe Act is to increase the efficiency offederal and state governments by providing for the free exchange of personnel between the governments without a loss in benefits to the loaned employees.
5 U.S.C.A. 3374 establishes the general guidelines concerning the assignment of state employees to the federal government. It specifically provides that the state employee shall not be eligible for the federal retirement program and further provides that, if need be, the Federal Government will pay the employer's share of any retirement, life insurance and health benefit plans concerning the loaned employee.
The statute also provides that the President may make regulations for the administration of the law. 5 U.S. C. A. 3376. The regulation in 5 C.F.R. 334.105 concerning the administration

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of the law provides that, before an assignment is made, the federal agency and the state or local government, or the institution of higher education, shall enter into a written agreement which records the obligations and responsibilities of the parties as specified in the Federal Personnel Manual.
The relevant section of the Federal Personnel Manual provides in Paragraph 4-2:

"A state employee detailed to an executive agency remains a
state government employee for most purposes. * * * "

In the instant situation, and pursuant to 5 C.F.R. 334.105, an agreement was entered into between the Director of the Federal Bureau ofPrisons and the Comptroller ofGeorgia State University on June 5, 1972. The agreement provided that a certain member of the Georgia State faculty would be loaned to the Bureau of Prisons for one year to assist in the design and implementation of a training program for prison employees. The agreement specifically provided that the individual would remain a state employee on loan to an executive agency, and that the individual would retain all his rights and benefits relating to his employment including his retirement benefits. The federal agency agreed to deduct the employee's share of the retirement contribution from his pay check to forward that amount to Georgia State. In addition, the federal agency agreed to make payment to Georgia State for the employer's share of the retirement contribution. The terms of this agreement were clearly within the above-referenced federal statute and accompanying regulations.
The Georgia Teachers Retirement System statute defines a "teacher," inter alia, as "any teacher or supervisor of teachers or clerical employee employed and paid by the Board ofRegents ofthe University System of Georgia." Ga. Code Ann. 32-2901 (5), based upon Ga. Laws 1943, p. 640, as amended. Ifa member is a ''teacher" then he is entitled to membership service during his employment.
The Georgia statute also provides that the Board of Trustees of the Teachers Retirement System shall determine in doubtful cases whether any person is a "teacher" (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2901 (5)) and provides that the board shall fix and determine by appropriate rules and regulations how much service in any one year is equivalent to one year's service (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2904 (1)).
Laws pertaining to the granting of pensions are to be liberally construed. City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576 (1944).

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This certainly appears to be a case in which the board could exercise its discretion in determining whether the loaned employee is a "teacher" within the definition of Ga. Code Ann. 32-2901 (5). There is no question but that he is still considered to be employed by Georgia State University and merely on loan to the Federal Government.

OPINION 72-146
To: Commissioner, Department of Banking and Finance

October 13, 1972

Re: State banks; purchase of correspondent funds constitutes borrowed money within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025.

A state bank makes a market in correspondent funds by buying cash reserves from its rural correspondent banks and then selling them to larger banks, usually in other parts of the country. You have asked whether the bank's purchase of correspondent funds constitutes borrowed money within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025, based upon Ga. Laws 1919, p. 135, as amended. In my opinion, it does.
Georgia law places limits on both the amount of a state bank's indebtedness (Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025) and the amount of its outstanding loans (Ga. Code Ann. 13-2013). The General Assembly has classified the purchase and sale of correspondent funds as a debtand loan.1 This is apparent in the exceptions to Ga. Code Ann. 13-2013 and 13-2025. By Ga. Laws 1969, p. 603, a new exception was added to Ga. Code Ann. 13-2013 so that the sale of correspondent funds was wholly excepted from the loan limitation. Until that exception was made, then, the law prohibited the unlimited sale ofexcess funds. There has been no analogous change in Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025, the debt ceiling. Reading the two statutes together, the current law regarding correspondent funds is that a bank may sell funds without limitation but may only buy them within existing debt limits. There is a debt exception for "liabilities incurred for the purpose of maintaining the reserves" required by state or federal law. Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025 (7).

1. Banks treat the acquisition of correspondent funds as a debt on their books and pay daily interest on the amount acquired.

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However, this would apply only to the bank's own need for reserves and not to its market-making activities to increase the reserves of other banks.
It is evident that making a market in correspondent funds does not involve the ~risks normally associated with incurring debt. If the market-making bank is unable to either purchase or sell funds, it can cease making a market without damage to its assets. The General Assembly apparently considered the lack of risk from the sale of correspondent funds when it abolished the loan limitation in 1969. However, the probable logic behind the statutory amendment could not nullify the existing debt limitation contained in an unambiguous statute. Therefore, it is my opinion that the purchase of correspondent funds by a market-making bank constitutes borrowed money within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 13-2025 so that the debt ceiling set by that section is still applicable to state banks.

OPINION 72-147
To: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources

October 13, 1972

Re: Aid to families with dependent children; assignment of court-ordered support.

The Division of Family and Children Services of the Department of Human Resources is beginning a new Child Support Recovery Program on a project basis in Fulton County. The program's purpose is to enforce the support obligation of absent parents whose children are receiving AFDC grants. As part ofthe program, an AFDC parent may voluntarily assign a judgment for support to the state in return for a stabilized grant. You have asked whether the assignment feature of the program is valid under state and federal law. In my opinion it is.
Georgia law specifically permits the assignment of a judgment. Ga. Code Ann. 110-901 states "Any plaintiff or transferee may, bona fide, and for a valuable consideration, transfer any judgment to a third person, and in all cases the transferee of any judgment shall have the same rights, and be subject to the same equities and to the same defenses as the original plaintiff in judgment was."
The two usual proceedings in which a court orders child support are divorce actions and URESA (Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act) suits. In each, the parent having custody, usually

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the mother, is the plaintiff. Divorce petitions are brought only by the husband or wife in his or her own name. Custody and support are decided as collateral issues in the action so that the children are not plaintiffs even when they, but not the mother, are granted support. Ga. Code Ann. 30-116, based upon Ga. Laws 1946, p. 90. Similarly, the person having custody of a minor may bring the suit pursuant to URESA without being appointed as a guardian ad litem. Ga. Code Ann. 99-912, based upon Ga. Laws 1958, p. 34.
The mother, then, is technically the plaintiff and may transfer the judgment as provided by Ga. Code Ann. 110-901. However, the transfer by a parent of a child support judgment without resulting benefit to the child would be inconsistent with the parent's duties as natural guardian of the child and his property. Ga. Code Ann. 49-102. Such a transfer would be void. For example, the Supreme Court has held that divorced parents cannot agree to modify a court ordered support decree where the modification would deprive the child of support to which he is entitled. Glaze v. Strength, 186 Ga. 613 (1938). Therefore, Georgia law permits the assignment of court ordered support if the assignment benefits the child. The contemplated child support recovery program developed by the Division of Family and Children Services accomplishes this by stabilizing the family income and supplementing it when the support is actually paid by the absent parent. Additionally, such a plan is endorsed by Ga. Code Ann. 99-908 (a) (URESA) which states, in part:

"Whenever the state or political subdivision thereof furnishes support to an obligee, it has the same right to invoke the provisions hereof as the obligee to whom the support was furnished for the purpose of securing reimbursement of expenditures so made and obtaining continuing support..."

Under Georgia law, then, the assignment feature of the Child Support Recovery Program is permissible.
The legality ofan assignment ofa judgment is a state rather than federal law question. However, all aspects ofthe state AFDC plan must comply with the Social Security Act. The Child Support Recovery Program appears to comply since the federal Act requires the state to develop a program for recovering funds from those legally obligated to support an AFDC child. 42 U.S.C. 602 (a) (11) (17). The proposed plan will supposedly be more effective in achieving this goal than the current program.

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Therefore, it is my opinion that the assignment ofa court ordered support judgment, as part ofthe Child Support Recovery Program, is valid under applicable state and federal law and may be implemented immediately.

OPINION 72-148
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

October 14, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; right of privacy; release of names to communities in need of recreational assistance.

In your request for the opinion contained in this letter, you described a proposal to enhance the effectiveness of the inmate recreational program of the State Board of Corrections. Under the plan, your staff would make referrals to local, community recreation officials, indicating that a released inmate has recreation skills which might be helpful to the community.
Your concern was that this would, in effect, "publicize an inmate's criminal record." You asked whether the plan might be illegal for that reason, and, if so, whether the plan could be implemented legally under signed authorizations from the inmates.
The State Board ofCorrections has been "authorized to institute a program of rehabilitation which may include academic ... and vocational training ...."Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1399, 1403 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-319). Since the main goal ofrehabilitation is successful return of the inmate to a useful life, it would be a reasonable exercise of authority under this statute to report to appropriate persons an inmate's progress in the field of recreation.
However, your caution is well-warranted. Even during his confinement, the inmate "has all the rights of an ordinary citizen which are not expressly or by necessary implication taken from him by law." Westbrook v. State, 133 Ga. 578 (1909) (dictum). This extends to the right of privacy, Ops. Att'y Gen. 1945-47, p. 437, a right ofcitizenship recognized by a leading decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1904).
The exact nature of the right to privacy has not been fully settled, particularly in a "matter of public interest." Compare Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161 (1956) with Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1904); see also, Op. Att'y Gen.

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71-173 (media access to condemned inmates). In a situation somewhat analogous to our topic, the Supreme Court has held that a creditor does not violate the right of privacy in notifying an employer of his employee's debt. Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682 (1957).
A reading of these decisions tends to indicate that the proposed referrals are permissible. However, in similar situations where the law was unsettled, the advice given state officials by myselfand my predecessors has been to take the precaution ofobtaining a waiver. See Ops. Att'y Gen. 66-178; 1958-59, pp. 6, 7; 1945-47, p. 437; see also Op.. Att'y Gen. 68-500.
The right to privacy may be waived. Cf Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13 (1931); Pinkerton National Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159 (1963) (dictum); see Ga. Code Ann. 105-1803. Inmates have the capacity to conduct their personal legal affairs. See Ops. Att'y Gen. 69-299, 69-149, 69-21.
Since consent would in all probability be legally effective, and since consent probably is necessary to a successful referral anyway, my advice is to avoid doubt by the added step offormalizing consent in a signed authorization. I have enclosed a tentative form.
Please note that this opinion is concerned with the legal issues raised by a situation in which your staff takes the initiative to disclose information about an inmate or released inmate, as appropriate to a job referral and with his consent. The opinion does not address itself to what portions of a prisoner's file are state records, and thus possibly open for "personal inspection" by Georgia citizens. Compare Ga. Laws 1959, p. 88 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2701) with Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 210, 211 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-533); see generally, Op. Att'y Gen. U71-9. My official opinion is that the proposed referrals, as described, are legally permissible with the inmate's signed authorization.

Authorization to Make Referrals
I,. . . . . . . ., give my consent to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation to refer my name and appropriate information to organizations or persons in the field of recreation. I understand that such referrals necessarily would indicate that I had been in a correctional institution. However, I also understand that their purpose would be to suggest that, even so, the skills I have attained in recreation might be helpful to the persons contacted. This consent is good until
. . . . . . .unless I notify the department otherwise.

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OPINION 72-149 To: Secretary of State

October 17, 1972

Re: Elections; write-in votes for presidential electors.

Statutory references to the Election Code are to Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 34.
You have inquired concerning the proper procedure to be followed by an elector who desires to cast his vote for presidential electors who represent candidates not listed on the general election ballot. You have further inquired as to who should be qualified as write-in candidates pursuant to Ga. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. VII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1201a), which reads as follows:

"No person elected on a write-in vote shall be eligible to hold office unless notice of his intention of candidacy was given 20 or more days prior to the election by the person to be a write-in candidate or by some other person or group ofpersons qualified to vote in subject election."

You wish to know whether the presidential electors or the presidential and vice-presidential candidates should file the notice of candidacy as required by the above Constitution provision.
As you know, the citizens ofGeorgia do not vote for the President and Vice-President; they only vote for presidential electors who in turn vote for the President and Vice-President. U.S. Constitution, Amend. XII (Ga. Code Ann. 1-812). See also, Ga. Code Ann. 34-1601. The function ofthe office of presidential elector is to vote for President and Vice-President. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1602. If a presidential elector who was elected by a write-in vote did not file the requisite notice of candidacy, he would not be eligible to hold office as a presidential elector and perform the duties attached thereto. Therefore, to be sure that the presidential electors, elected on a write-in ballot, are eligible to hold that office and vote for President and Vice-President, they should file the notice of candidacy as required by the Constitution of Georgia.
The Georgia Election Code is silent as to the proper procedure for casting a ballot for presidential electors who represent presidential

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and vice-presidential candidates other than those listed on the ballot. Provisions are made which enable voters to cast their ballots tor electors not listed in the voting machines. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1330 (e). However, similar provisions are not made for districts utilizing paper ballots. See Ga. Code Ann. 34-1319 (c).
It simply is impossible to state with absolute certainty, based on the Georgia Election Code, exactly what manner a voter should write in presidential and vice-presidential candidates of parties other than those listed on the election ballots. To be safe, though, it would be advisable to write in the names of all the presidential electors who represent the desired candidates. This is based primarily on the fact that the entire process of computing and certifying returns is directed toward the presidential electors rather than the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The superintendent is required to compute and certify write-in votes exactly as the names were written on the ballots. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1506. If the name of the presidential and vice-presidential candidate were written on the ballot, according to the above section, the superintendent must certify those names and not the names of the electors who represent them. The names of presidential electors and not the presidential candidates are certified to the Secretary of State. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1508. The Secretary of State in turn computes the votes for the presidential electors and certifies those to the Governor who issues certificates of election to the presidential electors. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1510 and 34-1511 (e).
Therefore, in light of the fact that the voters only elect presidential electors who in .turn elect the President and Vice-President, superintendents must compute write-in votes exactly as they appear on the ballot, and the entire process of computing and certifying returns is directed toward presidential electors, it is my opinion that the votes should write in the names of the presidential electors for whom they desire to vote in the event such names do not appear on the ballot.
Further, I do not think it is necessary for voters to write in the names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates themselves.

OPINION 72-150 October 23, 1972
To: Commissioner of Offender Rehabilitation
Re: Governor's emergency fund not used to assist county in building jail.

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A county has proposed a method to acquire funds for the purpose of constructing a new county jail as follows: the jail would be built on land donated by the county to the state if the Governor would be willing to provide some of the funds for the jail from his emergency fund. The transfer from the emergency fund would be processed through the Department ofOffender Rehabilitation. The state would then lease the land together with all improvements back to the county and the county would continue to operate the jail. Assuming that the proper state agencies approve this acquisition and lease, you wish our official opinion on whether the Department of Offender Rehabilitation could legally accept the transfer from the emergency fund and expend the moneys as outlined above.
In a previous opinion, this office has found that a transfer from the Governor's emergency fund may only be made to a state agency and this agency may only expend the funds for purposes consistent with the agency's enumerated powers and for which no continuing state obligation is created. Op. Att'y Gen. 69-51; Ga. Code Ann. 40-408, based upon Ga. Laws 1962, p. 17.
The Department of Offender Rehabilitation is the state agency under the 1972 reorganization which, among other things, administers the state's correctional institutions. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1069, 1074-1075, Section 15 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-35162.7, 77-508a). Nowhere in the Constitution or statutes ofthis state can we find any power of the department to construct or operate a county jail. County jails are the responsibility of the county governing authority. Ga. Code Ann. 91-701, 91-702, 91-706.
The State Board of Corrections does have authority to supervise county public works camps which detain prisoners assigned to them by the board, and in certain limited instances the board has the authority to lease a public works camp from a county, but only under specified conditions and by a specific procedure. Ga. Laws 1956, p. 161, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 77-312). However, this is quite a different situation from the one you have presented to us.
Since the purpose ofthe transfer from the Governor's emergency fund would be to aid in constructing a county jail and since the construction and maintenance of a county jail is not consistent with the department's enumerated powers, it is our official opinion that the department may not accept a transfer from the Governor's
emergency fund and expend the moneys as outlined above.

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OPINION 72-151 To: Secretary of State

October 25, 1972

Re: Elections; notice to be given and published by write-in candidates.

You request our official opinion on whether a write-in candidate must both file his notice ofintention of candidacy and publish the notice 20 or more days prior to the general election or whether the candidate may do only one of these steps prior to 20 days and the other subsequent to the 20-day deadline set out in the Constitution.
The Georgia Constitution provides as follows:

"No person elected on a write-in vote shall be eligible to hold office unless notice of his intention of candidacy was given 20 or more days prior to the election . . . as follows: In a state general election, to the Secretary of State and by publication in a paper of general circulation in this state; [here follows the method of qualification for county and municipal general elections]." Ga. Constitution, Art. II, Sec. VII, Par. I, proposed by Ga. Laws 1965, p. 765 and adopted November 8, 1966 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1201a).

An examination of the above provision reveals two facts:

1. The notice of intention of candidacy must be given 20 or more days prior to the general election; and
2. The notice consists of two steps-first, giving the notice to the proper official, and second, publishing the notice in the prescribed manner.

It is our opinion that the notice ofintention ofcandidacy includes both steps and by requiring that notice be given 20 or more days prior to the election, the Constitution intended that both of these steps would be completed 20 or more days prior to the election.
While the above interpretation is our opinion on the proper method to qualify as a write-in candidate, we caution that it is the prerogative of a court of law to decide the issue of whether or not

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a particular candidate properly qualified in a particular race. To this end, an election superintendent should record write-in votes as required by Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, officially codified in material part as Ga. Code Ann. 34-1322 (c), 34-1332 (d), 34-1336 (e), (g), 34-1338 (a) (iv) and, 34-1506, and defer to the court the question of whether a candidate has properly qualified. Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 34-17.

OPINION 72-152
To: Insurance Commissioner, State of Georgia

October 26, 1972

Re: Insurance Commissioner; authority over merger of companies; effect of rulings as to control.

All statutory references herein are to Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 56, and to Ga. Laws 1968, p. 516, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 22.
You have requested my opinion whether you are required by law to exercise approval authority with respect to the merger of a domestic stock insurer into a foreign stock insurer when the surviv-. ing corporation will be domiciled outside this state. In my opinion you are.
The statutory point of origin on this question is Ga. Code Ann. 56-1534, which provides, among other things, that the merger of insurance companies will be carried out in accordance with the procedures set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505 and in the general corporation law, ofwhich Ga. Code Ann. 22-1008 (b) (2) (A) is the section most germane to this issue.
The first referenced provision, Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505, sets out the procedures for original grants of insurance company charters and explicitly requires that the commissioner exercise approval authority over the charter application. Thus, this section would seem to require exercise of the same authority with respect to merger applications, regardless of the domicile of the surviving corporation.
One section of the general corporation law of this state deals specifically with the merger of foreign and domestic corporations. Ga. Code Ann. 22-1008. See also, Ga. Code Ann. 22-4403. It provides in effect that when the surviving corporation will be domiciled outside ofGeorgia but will retain a registered office here,

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as in the case at hand, the merging domestic corporation will follow the same procedures as if it were merging with another domestic corporation. This section, considered along with Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505, impels the conclusion that the commissioner is not divested of the statutory approval authority solely because the surviving corporation will be domiciled outside this state.
One other practical aspect of Ga. Code Ann. 22-1008 deserves attention. It provides that any such merger must be authorized by the law of the domicile of each corporation involved. Presumably, there are similar provisions in the laws of other states. It would seem that the process of multi-jurisdictional merger would be unduly hampered if, in a particular state, the public official exercising supervisory authority over specialized types of corporations, such as insurance companies, were not in a position to explicitly indicate whether a proposed merger complied with the law of that state.
In the case at hand, the only fact which might be regarded as obviating the need for approval ofthe merger pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505 (4) (5) is that it has already been approved pursuant to Ga. Code 56-3404 (d) as an acceptable acquisition of control by an insurance holding company. This is not tantamount to approval of the merger, itself, however; control may be acquired in a great many ways other than through corporate merger, see Ga. Code Ann. 56-3401, and the criteria for approval ofmergers and control acquisitions are not the same.
I have reviewed the petition for merger of Foundation Life Insurance Company and Founders Life Assurance Company of Florida, and in my opinion it is legally sufficient.

OPINION 72-153 To: Director, State Merit System

October 30, 1972

Re: Public officers and employees; political activity; correlation of federal Hatch Act with state statutes and rules and regulations of State Personnel Board.

This is in reply to your request for an opm10n concerning regulations and statutes controlling political activities of merit system employees. You have asked three specific questions which are paraphrased below, together with my opinion on each question.

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1. Is there a conflict between Georgia Act 918, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 387 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-934) and the federal "Hatch Political Activities Act," 5 U.S.C.A. 1501, et seq.?
The 1972 Georgia General Assembly passed Act 918 which provided in relevant part:
"Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, an employee of state government shall be authorized to run for and hold office in any government of any municipality having a population of 1,000 persons or less, according to the 1970 federal decennial census or any future federal census." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 387, 388 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-934).
The federal Hatch Act generally provides, inter alia, that state or local officers or employees whose principal employment is in connection with an activity financed in whole or in part by federal funds may not take an active part in political management or in political campaigns. There are certain exceptions which are not relevant here.
There is also a specific section of the Hatch Act which permits political activity in connection with an election where none of the candidates represents a party whose candidates received votes in the last presidential election (e.g., a nonpartisan election); or where there is a question not specifically identified with a national or state political party (e. g., constitutional amendments, referendums, etc.). 5 U.S.C.A. 1503.
Therefore, there is at least a potential conflict in that the Georgia law permits an employee to be a candidate for a governmental office in any municipality of 1,000 persons or less regardless of the partisan nature ofthe election while the federal law would prohibit such candidacy by a "covered" state employee unless the election was nonpartisan in nature.
2. Ifthere is a conflict between the state law and the federal law, which will govern?
When a conflict exists between valid federal and state laws, the federallawwill prevail. See Ga. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. I, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8001); Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Oneida, 209 Ga. 613 (1953).

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3. Does the 1971 statute which authorized the State Personnel Board to promulgate rules which will have the "force and effect of law" allow the Personnel Board to make rules in conflict with the 1972 statute granting state employees the right to run for political office in certain small municipalities?
The Georgia General Assembly established the State Personnel Board and authorized them to adopt and amend rules and regulations which after being approved by the Governor have the force and effect of law. The statute granting this authority to the State Personnel Board specifically requires rules and regulations defining and prohibiting improper political activity by state employees covered by the merit system. Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 45, 49-50 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-22).
Pursuant to this authority, the State Personnel Board adopted Rule 3.501 which prohibits any employee under the merit system from becoming a candidate for election to any public office.
In 1972, Act 918 was approved. That Act is quoted above in response to question one. It is important to note that the 1972 law provides:
"Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, an employee of state government shall be authorized to run and hold office ...." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 387, 388 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-934).
Act 918 also repealed all laws or parts of laws which were in conflict.
Consequently, the effect of the 1972 Act was to authorize state employees to run for and hold office in municipal governments having a population ofl,OOO persons or less. Further, the 1972 Act repealed the authority ofthe State Personnel Board to make a rule or regulation in conflict with the provisions of the Act.
I hope this discussion satisfactorily answers the questions raised in your letter. If I can provide you with further assistance, please advise.

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OPINION 72-154
To: Executive Director, Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation

266 October 31, 1972

Re: Education; scholarships to students attending nonpublic colleges and universities.

The 1971 Session of the Georgia General Assembly enacted legislation that provides for payment of a grant of $400 per academic year to each eligible student attending an approved, nonpublic institution ofhigher learning in Georgia. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 906 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-39). You have sought our opinion on the interpretation to be given to certain parts ofthe Act and on the constitutionality of the Act.
The section for which you desire an interpretation contains the definition of "approved institution." Approved institution is defined as "any educational institution of higher learning located in Georgia . . . which shall have an academic program not comprised principally of sectarian instruction or preparation of students for a religious vocation ...." Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 908. In interpreting statutes where ordinary language is used, the usual signification and meaning of words will be used. State of Georgia v. Camp, et al., 189 Ga. 209 (1939). You have expressed particular concern over the words "principally" and "sectarian."
Unfortunately, there is no clear cut definition of "principally" that could be applied with mathematical precision. Courts have generally relied upon terms equally as vague in trying to define the term. One court has held that "principally" is synonymous with "mainly" or "chiefly." Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Casualty Underwriters, Inc., 130 F. Supp. 56, 58 (D. Minn. 1955). Black's Law Dictionary uses such terms as "leading," "most important," "considerable," and "primary" in defining the word. The term has also been distinguished from "exclusively." Darlington, Inc. v. Federal Housing Administration, 142 F. Supp. 341, 349 (E. D. S. C. 1956).
The Supreme Court of Georgia has provided a better understanding of the word "sectarian." In reaching the conclusion that the Salvation Army is a sectarian institution, that court first decided that a religious sect is a body of persons, united in tenets and beliefs, with a common system offaith, and holding sentiments or doctrines distinct from other bodies. Bennett v. City ofLaGrange

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et al., 153 Ga. 428, 433 (1922). It then said that because the Salvation Army preaches the gospel of Christ and undertakes to disseminate doctrines and tenets of Christianity distinct from other Protestant doctrines, or Catholic, Jewish, or Mohammedan doctrines or the doctrines of other religions of the world, it is considered a sectarian institution. Jd. The term "sectarian" has been used to describe the activites of the followers of one faith as opposed to those ofthe adherents of another. Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N. W. 127, 130 (1936).
Therefore, in light ofthe above, my equally vague and ambiguous interpretation is that an academic program comprised principally of sectarian instruction is one in which the required curriculum is composed primarily of courses designed to teach a particular religious doctrine. The ultimate decision for each institution rests solely in the discretion ofthe Georgia Higher Education Assistance Authority. See Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 908.
You have further inquired regarding the constitutionality ofthis legislation. State-aid to private education has undergone careful judicial scrutiny as it is challenged under the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That Amendment reads in pertinent part as follows:

"Congress shall make no law reflecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ..." U. S. Constitution, Amend. I (Ga. Code Ann. 1-801).

This constitutional prohibition has been applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 u. s. 105 (1943).
The major developments in this area ofestablishment clause law began with a consideration of a New Jersey statute that provided free bus service to school children regardless of whether they attend public or private schools. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In writing for the majority in that case, Justice
Black stated that "no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions ...." Id. at 16. He reaffirmed Jefferson's understanding that the establishment clause erected a "wall ofseparation between Church and State." Id. In that case it was decided that the wall was not breached, and the New Jersey statute was upheld.
Since the Everson decision, the Supreme Court has struck down regulations requiring Bible readings in public schools, School

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District of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963); upheld a New York law providing textbooks to all students, regardless ofwhether they attend public or private schools, Board ofEducation ofCentral School District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1969); and struck down Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes which provided salary supplements to teachers in nonpublic schools. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). In these and related cases the Supreme Court developed a tripartite test by which statutes were to be measured in regard to the establishment clause. In order to overcome the establishment clause prohibition, a statute must fulfill each of the following requirements:

(1) It must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) The principal or primary effect of the statute must neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) The statute must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Lemon at 755.

If the statute adequately meets this test, it does not run afoul of the First Admendment establishment clause. In my opinion, the Georgia law adequately meets this test.
Section 1 of the Act sets forth the legislative purpose behind its adoption, and that purpose is definitely secular. That section reads in pertinent part as follows:

"This Act, therefore, is adopted as a means of providing higher education opportunities to citizens of this state in utilizing the educational facilities and resources of accredited private colleges and universities in this state more effectively." Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 907.

Thus, the purpose is to provide financial assistance to citizens who attend nonpublic colleges and universities in the state. Such assistance is provided to the end that fuller utilization of these institutions in the state will relieve the ever-increasing burden on the University System ofGeorgia and in turn result in relief to the taxpayers of Georgia. See Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 907. Such a purpose could hardly be interpreted as anything other than secular.
The second and third provisions of the test require a full consideration of how this law is administered. Initially, it should

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be delineated that the grant is to "each eligible student attending an approved institution of higher learning." Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 907. The grant does not go to the college but is strictly provided for the purpose of defraying the expense of a higher education to the student. The practical mechanics of administering the law involves the issuance of checks to each institution where the accounts ofthe students receiving the grants are given the proper credit. However, this method was adopted for practical and economical reasons. It simply is much easier and more economical to issue approximately 26 checks (the number of "approved institutions") than to issue some 8000 checks (the approximate number of eligible students applying). The colleges and universities do not receive any more tuition under this law than recieved prior to the law. The tuition and fees remain the same. The only difference is that the students do not incur the full expense of their education inasmuch as the state now pays part of this cost. Those institutions that are supported by various religious organizations must continue to receive that support for the colleges will not be receiving any more money than prior to the law. The burden on the supporting religious organizations is not altered in any way. Therefore, it should be evident that the primary effect of the statute will not be to advance or inhibit religion in any way.
The State Auditor is authorized by this law to examine each institution "for the sole purpose of determining whether such institution has properly certified eligibility and enrollment of students and credited grants paid to the behalf of such students." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 906, 909. This audit is only to ascertain that credit is going to the proper individuals. It in no way authorizes any investigation by the state into the ultimate utilization ofthe funds. Once the grants are properly credited, they are considered no different from any other tuition payments. Of further significance in this consideration is that the institution the grantee attends has been found not to have a program "comprised principally ofsectarian instruction." (See earlier discussion.) Thus, there is no need for any more extensive investigation by the state than the simple determination that the students to whom grants are made are in school and receiving proper credit. This hardly fosters excessive governmental entanglement with the various institutions, much less with religion.
The Georgia Constitution also establishes a "wall of separation between Church and State." It provides:

"No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury,

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directly, or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination of religionist or of any sectarian institutions." Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV(Ga. Code Ann. 2-114),

This section has been applied in striking down a contract between the City ofLaGrange and the Salvation Army, Bennett v, City of LaGrange et al., 153 Ga. 428 (1922); and in invalidating a contract between the City of Savannah and a Catholic hospital. Richter v. Mayor and Alderman of Savannah et al., 160 Ga. 178 (1925). However, a statute, such as the one about which you have inquired, has never been considered in light of this constitutional provision.
In my opinion, the Act providing grants to students who attend nonpublic colleges and universities is not prohibited by that constitutional provision. The General Assembly very carefully delineated that only students attending institutions which did not have principally sectarian programs would be eligible for the grants. Thus, the Act itself makes it impossible to provide public funds to students attending sectarian institutions and in turn impossible to aid, directly or indirectly, sectarian institutions.
Further, this Act was adopted pursuant to an amendment to the Georgia Constitution. That amendment provides as follows:

"The General Assembly is authorized to provide by law for grants or scholarships to citizens of Georgia who are students attending colleges or universities in this state which are not branches oftheUniversitySystemofGeorgia."Ga.Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402 (14)).

These two constitutional provisions, just as statutes in pari materia, should be construed together and reconciled if possible. See Ryan v. Commissioners of Chatham County et al., 203 Ga. 730 (1948). The two provisions are not in conflict and the latter in no way repeals the former. The latter provision allows the General Assembly to enact legislation designed to aid students attending nonpublic colleges and universities. It does not alter in any way the former provision that proscribed public aid to religion.
Since the Act does not conflict with the constitutional prohibition against aid to religion and also has specific constitutional authorization, it would not be considered unconstitutional. Cf. Daughtery et al. v. State of Georgia, 226 Ga. 758 (1970).

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Of course you are aware that an opinion from this office does not represent ultimate disposition of a constitutional question. Ultimate authority for determining the constitutionality of any law rests exclusively with the judiciary. Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-402); Calhoun v. McClendon, 42 Ga. 405 (1871). However, since all presumptions favor the constitutionality ofan Act ofthe legislature, it will not be set aside by the courts unless the alleged conflict is clear and palpable. Culbreth et al. v. Southwest Georgia Regional Housing Authority, 199 Ga. 183, 189 (1945).
Therefore, until there is an adjudication and a decision to the contrary, you should proceed on the premise that the law is constitutional. All provisions of the Act should be fulfilled by the designated parties including the distribution offunds to the proper recipients.

OPINION 72-155
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

November 2, 1972

Re: Department of Public Safety; mandatory retirement of employees.

This is in response to your request for an official opinion as to whether you, as Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety, have the authority to permit an agent of the Division of Investigation to continue working past his mandatory retirement age so that he can receive increased benefits. It is my understanding that the agent who is the subject ofyour inquiry has already completed over 26 years of creditable service toward retirement, and will be required to retire on November 30, 1972, unless you have the authority to extend his retirement date.
The statute establishing the retirement program for officers, noncommissioned officers and troopers ofthe Uniform Division of the Department of Public Safety, and officers and agents of the Division oflnvestigation provides that those employees must retire when they reach the mandatory retirement age. The only exception which would allow the employee to work beyond his mandatory age limitation is when an employee does not have 25 years ofcreditable service. In that event, the commissioner has the authority to waive the mandatory retirement age to permit the

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employee to complete 25 years. Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 138, 162 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2518).
Therefore, it is my opinion that an agent of the Division of Investigation who has completed 25 years of creditable service towards retirement and who has reached the mandatory age limitation may not have the mandatory age restriction waived by the commissioner.

OPINION 72-156
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

November 4, 1972

Re: Sentence and punishment; attempt by trial court to have prisoner serve portion of sentence with remainder suspended is void as to suspension.

This is in answer to your letter ofSeptember 19, 1972, requesting an official opinion as to whether a certain inmate's concurrent sentences of life imprisonment, "suspended upon defendant serving a sentence of 15 years," are valid.
Georgia statutes allow a trial judge to suspend execution of sentence and place a defendant on probation. Otherwise, "[i]t is not within the powers of the courts of this state to suspend the operation of sentences imposed in criminal cases." Wimbish v. Reese, 170 Ga. 64 (1929). That power is reserved for the Governor and the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. Ga. Constitution,
Art. V, Sec. I, Par. XI (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3011, 27-2701).~
Manifestly the judge in this case did not intend to place the defendant on probation. Thus, this case is governed by a long line of decisions such as Scott v. Griffin, 170 Ga. 368 (1930). There the defendant pleaded guilty to two misdemeanors and was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and to serve 12 months on the chain-gang, the latter to be "suspended" on payment of the fine. The Supreme Court held that the portion of the sentence which attempted to suspend the jail term was a ''nullity" and that the defendant had to serve his 12 months whether he paid the fine or not.
It is, therefore, my opinion that the inmate's sentences are valid. Any language purporting to suspend those sentences after 15 years is of no effect and should be disregarded.

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OPINION 72-157
To: Director, Division of Investigation, Georgia Board of Public Safety

November 10, 1972

Re: Witness fees; fingerprint experts employed by the Division of Investigation are entitled to witness fees under Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 502, 503.

This is in answer to your request for an official opmwn on whether fingerprint experts who are not sworn agents of the Division of Investigation are entitled to witness fees.
There are two separate statutes dealing with witness fees. One applies to witnesses in general and provides for a fee of$4 per diem plus eight cents per mile. (Except where issued on behalf of the state or a state agency, officer, political subdivision, etc., tender of one day's expenses plus mileage must accompany the subpoena for service ofthe subpoena to be valid.) Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 502, 503 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (d)). The other applies to "any member of the Georgia State Patrol, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, municipal or county police force or any deputy sheriff' required by subpoena to attend certain courts as a witness for the state during off-duty hours. (It allows a maximum of $8 per diem regardless of the number of subpoenas.) Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 434,435 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (h)). The question is whether the term "member" used in the latter statute covers unsworn fingerprint experts employed by the Division of Investigation.
The purpose of Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 434, 435 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (h)), is to ensure that witness fees are not denied certain officers in cases involving penal statutes when those officers are connected with the enforcement of those statutes in such a way that testimony at a trial during off-duty hours might nevertheless be considered within their regular duties and therefore already compensated for by their salaries. This type of connection would arise where officers are sworn to enforce the law and are given some power of arrest pursuant to that duty. Unlike those who merely render technical aid in the investigation ofa criminal case, sworn officers might reasonably be expected to render all possible aid toward securing a conviction. The purpose ofGa. Laws 1968, pp. 434, 435 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (h)), would, therefore, seem to require that the word "member" be interpreted to refer only to sworn law enforcement personnel.

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The use of the word Hmember" elsewhere in the Code indicates that that is the proper interpretation: Ga. Laws 1941, pp. 277, 278 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-302) gives "members" of the Division of Investigation "the same authority, powers and duties as are possessed by the members of the Uniform Division [of the Department of Public Safety] under the provisions of this Title." Since the "members" of the Uniform Division are sworn officers and their "authority, powers and duties" include responsibilities which could only be given to sworn officers, "members" as used in that statute must refer only to sworn officers.
It is, therefore, my opinion that the word "member" in Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 434, 435 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (h)), does not include fingerprint experts employed by the Division of Investigation. When those employees appear in court in answer to a subpoena they should receive $4 per diem plus eight cents per mile as provided by Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 434, 435 [Ga. Code Ann. 38-801
(d)].
If you have any further questions in regard to this matter do not hesitate to call upon this department for assistance.

OPINION 72-158 November 13, 1972
To: Insurance Commissioner

Re: Insurance companies; insolvency; Insurers Insolvency Pool not liable where insolvent company ceased doing business before creation of pool.

You have requested my official opmwn concerning the applicability ofthe 1970 Georgia Insurance Insolvency Pool Act to claims against two insolvent insurance companies, Citizens Casualty Company of New York and LaSalle National Insurance Company. In my opinion, the Insolvency Pool is not obligated for claims against either company.
In March 1970, the General Assembly passed the Georgia Insurance Insolvency Pool Act. Ga. Laws 1970, p. 700, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 56-34A. This statute became effective on July 1, 1970, and its stated purpose is:

"To provide a remedy for covered claims under property and casualty insurance policies when the insurer has become insolvent subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter and
is unable to perform its contractual obligations."

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Citizens Casualty Company of New York surrendered its license to write insurance in Georgia effective July 1, 1968, and it has not been a licensed insurer in Georgia since that date. It has never been a member ofthe Insolvency Pool and has never been subject to any assessment or other obligation imposed by the Insurers Solvency Board. On March 12, 1970, two years after the initial petition to determine insolvency was filed, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed a trial court decision on the facts and the law and then determined that Citizens Casualty Company of New York was and has been insolvent at all times since December 31, 1967. Stewart v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York, 308 N. Y. S. 2d 513 (1970). This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York on July 1, 1970. Stewart v. Citizens Casualty Company of New York, 314 N. Y. S. 2d 7 (1970). You have advised me that there are potential claims against Citizens Casualty Company of New York in excess of 2.5 million dollars.
LaSalle National Insurance Company surrendered its license to write insurance in Georgia effective September 29, 1969 and has not been a licensed insurer in Georgia since that date. It has never been a member of the Insolvency Pool and has never been subject to any assessment or other obligation imposed by the Insurers Solvency Board. On December 28, 1971, LaSalle National Insurance Company was declared insolvent by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. You have advised me that there are potential claims against LaSalle National Insurance Company in excess of $70,000.
The portion of the Insurance Insolvency Pool Act which determines what claims become the obligations of the Pool is Ga. Code Ann. 56-3406a, which provides in part:
"Obligations of the Insolvency Pool. -In the event of the determination of insolvency of a licensed insurer after the effective date of this Chapter, the coverage afforded by property and casualty insurance policies issued by such insurer shall, with respect to covered claims, ... become the obligation ofthe pool. The pool shall be deemed to be the insurer ... with all the rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer, and the pool is hereby authorized to investigate, adjust, compromise and settle covered claims, or to investigate, handle and deny noncovered claims." (Emphasis added.)

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The above emphasized terms are specifically defined in Ga. Code Ann. 56-3403a, which provides in part:
~~(a) 'Insurer' or ~company' means any corporation or organization licensed to engage in the writing of property or casualty insurance policies in this state ....
* * * "(g) 'Insolvent insurer' means any insurer which was licensed to issue property or casualty insurance policies in this state until determined insolvent by a court ofcompetent jurisdiction of the insurer's domiciliary state, and which adjudication was subsequent to the effective date of this Chapter."
From the facts given, it appears that neither of the companies involved was licensed to write insurance in Georgia at any time subsequent to the effective date of the Act, or at the time it was determined to be insolvent by the courts of its state of domicile. Hence, neither company qualifies, within the meaning of the Act, as an ''insolvent insurer" whose rights, duties and obligations may be exercised by the Pool, or as a "licensed insurer" whose obligations become those of the Pool.
Although this interpretation of the Act may appear somewhat technical, it is entirely consistent with the stated legislative intent and the underlying public policy. One indirect effect of the Act is to induce a degree ofself-regulation by the insurance industry, but such self-regulation is manifestly impossible with respect to a potentially insolvent insurer which has already surrendered its license to do business in this state. Another, more direct consequence of the Act is to provide an industry financed buffer between an individual policyholder and his insurer, in the event the latter does become insolvent. See Ga. Code Ann. 56-3410a. It would appear unlikely that the General Assembly intended to require the present insurance industry of Georgia to finance such a buffer with respect to every company which has ever written insurance in this state, especially since the ultimate cost of the insolvency pool program will probably be borne by those citizens who compose the current insurance market in this state.
It is therefore my official opinion that the Insurers Insolvency Pool is not liable for claims against the two named companies.

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OPINION 72-159 November 16, 1972
To: State Revenue Commissioner

Re: Ad valorem taxes owed by railroads and other public utilities to the City ofAltanta should be paid between July 1 and August 15.

This is in response to your recent inquiry as to whether Op. Att'y Gen. 65-24 also applies to taxes due the City of Atlanta by railroad and public utility companies under a local Act found in Ga. Laws 1955, p. 2088.
This Act provides as follows:

"All taxes due to the State ofGeorgia on taxable property in Fulton County and all taxes due to Fulton County and to the City of Atlanta may be paid in separate parts as follows: The taxes due the City of Atlanta shall be paid between July 1 and August 15; taxes due to the State ofGeorgia and Fulton County shall be payable between July and October 15. Any of said taxes not paid in full by the last day specified shall, notwithstanding any existing law, be in default, and shall bear the interest and penalties now or hereafter provided by law for taxes which are delinquent or in default and executions shall be issued therefor."

In Op. Att'y Gen. 65-24, the local Acts under question were not sufficiently broad to cover the railroads because they applied only to ". . . persons, companies, and corporations, who are by law required or directed to return any property for taxation to the officers of the several counties ..." and to " ... taxes shown to be due on returns filed by the taxpayer ..." Thus, those Acts only covered individuals and corporations who were required to return their property for ad valorem tax purposes directly to local authorities while railroad companies must make returns to the State Revenue Commissioner for purposes of county taxation. See Ga. Code Ann. 92-2701.
However, the local Atlanta Act presently in question avoids the problems discussed in Op. Att'y Gen. 65-24 because it applies to " ... all taxes due to ... the City of Atlanta ..." with no other limitations. (Emphasis added.) Under this statute if taxes are due to the City of Atlanta they should be paid by August 15 regardless of where the return is filed. Therefore, Op. Att'y Gen. 65-24 is not

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applicable to the Act currently under consideration. Under the general laws of Georgia, railroad companies are
required to pay ad valorem taxes to cities and counties on or before December 20. Ga. Code Ann. 92-2704, 92-2804. Also, the same laws applicable to taxation of railroads apply to the taxation of other public utilities. Ga. Code Ann. 92-5902. Therefore, a question is raised as to the constitutionality of the local Atlanta Act under consideration.
Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401) provides that " ... no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law."
However, this prohibition is not applicable where, subsequent to the enactment of a general law, a special law is passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 66 (1966).
In 1951 a resolution was passed by the General Assembly which proposed an amendment to Article VII of the State Constitution. This proposed amendment would allow the General Assembly, by general, local or special law applicable to Fulton County and its political subdivision, located wholly or partly therein, to prescribe when taxes, whether due to the state, Fulton County or any subdivision thereof, should be due. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 874. This amendment was ratified on November 4, 1952. See Note, "Local Amendments to Article VII" following Ga. Code Ann. 2-6301.
The local Act in question is based directly on legislation passed by the General Assembly pursuant to that constitutional amendment. Ga. Laws 1951, p. 3087, as amended by Ga. Laws 1953, Jan.-Feb. Sess., p. 2809; Ga. Laws 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 2733; and Ga. Laws 1955, p. 2088. Of course, it is also subsequent to the general laws on the subject which were passed in 1889 and 1890. See Ga. Laws 1889, p. 29; Ga. Laws 1890-91, p. 152 (see Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 92-27, 92-28).
Therefore, limiting my opinion on constitutionality to the issue of general versus local Acts, this local Act appears to be constitutionally sound. Based upon this assumption, it is my official opinion that ad valorem taxes owed by railroads and other public utilities to the City of Atlanta should be paid between July 1 and August 15.

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OPINION 72-160
To: Commissioner, Department of Offender Rehabilitation

November 16, 1972

Re: Prisons and prisoners; issue ofwork clothes in lieu ofbusiness suit to released prisoner.

This is answer to your request for an official opinion on whether Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 602, 603 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-317 as amended) can be interpreted to allow the Board of Corrections to furnish discharged, conditionally released, or paroled inmates with a suit of work clothes instead of a business suit.
The manifest purpose of Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 602, 603, is to help inmates who are leaving prison to get a new start. By providing them with new clothes, the Board of Corrections helps erase any outward markings of their prison experience and gives them the means to seek gainful employment.
The statute refers to "suitable wearing apparel appropriate for the season." What is "suitable" is left to the board's discretion. Given the purpose of the statute, it would seem proper for the board to take into account the desires of the individual inmate in determining the type of clothing "suitable" in his case.
There in nothing in the statute which would prevent the board from giving a particular inmate a suit of work clothes if he so desires. Although the mandatory items listed include a "tie," this alone would not indicate that business suits are required in all events. Moreover, the word "suit" when used without any qualifying adjective is certainly broad enough to include work clothes.
It is therefore my opinion that Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 602, 603 would permit the Board of Corrections to issue either work clothes or a business suit to inmates who are discharged, paroled, or conditionally released.

OPINION 72-161
To: Director, Purchasing and Supplies Division, Department of Administrative Services

November 17, 1972

Re: Purchasing and Supplies Division not required to inventory property of state authorities.

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You have requested my opinion whether the statute (Ga. Laws 1971, p. 400; 1972, p. 480, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 91-8A), which requires that your office establish a central inventory ofpersonal property "owned by the state and any office, department, board, bureau, commission, institution or other agency of the state," extends to personal property owned by independent state authorities. In my opinion it does not.
The above terms denoting subordinate units ofstate government appear elsewhere in Georgia law. In particular, such a list ofterms appears in Ga. Laws 1937, p. 503 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-1921), which specifically provides that they do not include authorities. Historically, the expression "department, institution and agency," which appears throughout Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-19 relating to your predecessor agency, the office of the Supervisor of Purchases, has not been construed as embracing state authorities.
This office has rendered an opinion, in a slightly different context, Op. Att'y Gen. 71-121, which concluded that the term "state agency" does not include an independent state authority. It is, therefore, my official opinion that the above quoted language does not include independent state authorities, and you are not required to establish an inventory of their personal property.
OPINION 72-162 November 17, 1972
To: Commissioner ofHuman Resources
Re: Reorganization; Governor may not assign the State Building Administrative Board to the Department of Human Resources for administrative purposes without further legislative action.
You asked our official opinion on whether the State Building Administrative Board (hereafter "board") may be attached to the Georgia Department of Human Resources for administrative purposes so as to coordinate its work with other units of the Department of Human Resources working on housing problems.
As you know, the board was established in 1969 and its enabling statute provides that the Joint-Secretary of the State Examining Boards shall serve as secretary to the board in all matters as set forth inCh. 84-1 ofthe Code ofGeorgia. Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 546, 549, Section 4 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-6004). The duties performed by the

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Joint-Secretary are quite similar to the duties performed by a department when an agency is attached to that department for administrative purposes. Compare Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-1 with the Executive Reorganization Act of 1972, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1020-1021, Section 3 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-3505). Under the definition of"reorganization" contained in the Act authorizing the Governor to reorganize, the proposed transfer would be a "reorganization." Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 4, 5, Section 1(b) (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-2, n.).
The 1971 Act authorizing reorganization was amended by the 1972 Reorganization Act to provide that whenever the Governor makes a proposal for reorganization, a bill must be prepared containing his recommendations for reorganization. The bill must be introduced to the General Assembly and receive the treatment as any other legislation which seeks to become law. No reorganization proposed by the Governor may become effective until the reorganization bill as introduced or as changed by the General Assembly becomes law. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1030-1031, Section 26; Ga. Code Ann. 40-3526; Ch. 40-2, n.
Since the transfer would be a "reorganization," it is our official opinion that the Governor may not assign the board to the Department of Human Resources for administrative purposes without further legislative action.

OPINION 72-163
To: Joint-Secretary, State Examining Boards

November 17, 1972

Re: "Lie detectors"; "psychological stress evaluators," which purport to determine veracity by voice modulations, not controlled by statutes relating to "polygraphs."

You have requested my opinion whether a device known as a "psychological stress evaluator," which purports to distinguish between truthfulness and deception based upon involuntary frequency modulations of the human voice constitutes a "polygraph" within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 84-5002 (d), as based upon Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1217. In my opinion it does not.
The cited provision of Georgia law defines a polygraph as "an instrument which combines a continuous permanent recording and means of measuring and recording at least two of the

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physiological reactions to emotions." All polygraph examiners in this state must be licensed. Ga. Code
Ann. 84-5005. The term ''polygraph examiner" is defined in Ga. Code Ann. 84-5002 (b) as:

"Any person who uses any device or instrument which records as minimum standards, permanently and simultaneously, the examinee's cardiovascular (blood pressure and pulse) and respiratory (breathing) patterns, in order to examine individuals for the purpose of detecting truth or deception. Such an instrument may record additional physiological changes pertinent to the detection of truth or deception."

Because the "psychological stress evaluator" measures and records only one physiological reaction to emotion, which is neither the cardiovascular nor the respiratory pattern of the examinee, it is my official opinion that this device is not a polygraph within the meaning ofthe statute, and that a person employing it need not be licensed as a polygraph examiner.
It is also my official opinion that this instrument does not constitute an "eavesdropping device" as that term is defined in Ga. Code 26-3003, officially codified from Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1328, which prohibits the possession, sale, and distribution of such devices.

OPINION 72-164 November 20, 1972
To: State Treasurer

Re: State bonds of Reconstruction Period, repudiated as fraudulent, are not valid obligations of state.

You have asked for my opinion as to the liability and obligation of the State of Georgia and the State of Georgia Sinking Fund under a bond issued under authority of an Act approved October 17, 1870,1 and designated "Uniform Series ofGold Bonds," Number 175, and dated November 1, 1870, endorsed by Governor Rufus B. Bullock.
1. The bond here is one of a series of bonds wherein the credit of the state was pledged for the building of certain railroads. The scheme was denounced as fraudulent by Ga. Laws 1875, pp. 27, 28. Many of the Acts authorizing the bonds will be found following Ga. Laws 1870, p. 273.

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In an Act approved February 27, 1877 (Ga. Laws 1877, p. 24) the General Assembly provided for a constitutional amendment which provided that neither the General Assembly nor any officer of the state could pay or recognize as legal the state gold bonds issued under the Act of October 17, 1870. The prohibition was thereafter incorporated in the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1877, Art. VII, Sec. XI, Par. I (Ga. Code of 1933 2-5901).
It is, therefore, my official opinion that the bond in question is not an official obligation ofthe State ofGeorgia or an obligation of the State of Georgia Sinking Fund which is under the administration of the State Treasurer.

OPINION 72-165
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

November 20, 1972

Re: Motor vehicle inspection stations; impracticability of roving unit carrying sufficient equipment to comply with law.

This is in answer to your request for an official opinion on whether companies with fleet station permits might perform vehicle inspections on their trailers "throughout the state without having a permanent location." As I understand the situation, this would be accomplished by means of mobile units which would travel from one location to another with the necessary inspection equipment on board.
The statutes (Ga. Laws 1963, p. 333, as amended) bearing on inspection stations do not specifically state that each such station must have clearly defined geographical boundaries. Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726.2 refers to "location designated" and Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726.3 speaks of an "official inspection station" as a "place." Those words are sufficiently ambiguous to comprehend some form of mobile unit. Still, they offer strong indication that the legislature probably contemplated inspection stations as buildings instead of rolling stock.
Moreover, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Public Safety for implementing the vehicle inspection laws do not seem to envision mobile facilities.
Motor Vehicle Inspection Reg. 570-5.02 (d) defines "fleet station" as "a motor vehicle dealership, garage, motor vehicle service

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station, or other establishment . . . owning a mm1mum of 15 vehicles subject to inspection" [emphasis added] and certified by the department for inspection of its own vehicles and no others. The words underlined above indicate a conception of an inspection station defined in fixed, geographical terms, even though the word "establishment" is conceivably broad enough to include a mobile unit.
The concept of inspection station is further delineated in Reg. 570-5.03, prescribing rules for minimum equipment and the space in which such equipment must be located. Among the mandatory items of equipment is a "lift jack," an item hardly suitable for transportation from place to place. Furthermore, all equipment must be located in a space "not less than 12 feet wide at any point nor less than 25 feet long at any point." Thus any mobile inspection unit would have to be at least 12 feet wide and 25 feet long with enough height for operation ofa lift jack on the inside. It is unlikely that any such unit could lawfully travel on public highways. See Ga. Laws 1941, pp. 449, 450, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-405).
Since the regulations require each station to meet the minimum requirements noted above, it would not be possible for a company to transport all other equipment to suitable spaces containing lift jacks: only when all components are integrated is a station a station. If part ofthe equipment were constantly shifting from one place to another, it would be virtually impossible for the Department of Public Safety to inspect the station to see whether it complied with state standards. See Ga. Laws 1963, pp. 333, 334 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726.1 (c)).
It is, therefore, my opinion that regulations now in force prevent the Department ofPublic Safety from certifying any roving unit as a "fleet station," unless that unit complies with minimum space and equipment standards without combining with any fixed facility.

OPINION 72-166
To: Director, Game and Fish Division, Department of Natural Resources

November 20, 1972

Re: Game and Fish Commission; delineation of salt and fresh waters for law enforcement purposes.

This is in response to your recent request for my official opinion

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on the question ofwhether the Game and Fish Commission has the authority to delineate by regulation the fresh and salt waters of this state for the purposes of law enforcement and licensing. I understand that because certain fishing licenses are required by law for salt-water fishing, and others for fishing in fresh water, this delineation is necessary to the determination of which licenses are required for whom and where they are required. For the following reasons it is my opinion that the commission has such authority.
The Game and Fish Commission is empowered by law to adopt all rules, regulations and methods of administration necessary for its efficient operation. (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. 45-110).) It is authorized to "regulate the manner, method, ways, means and devices of killing, taking ... and consuming wildlife ..." (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. 45-114 (3)). Wildlife is, of course, defined to include fish. (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 et seq.; Ga. Code Ann. 45-102 (3), both as amended.)
As you know, the State of Georgia is declared by law to have the ownership, jurisdiction over, and control ofall wildlife in the state. (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. 45-101.1 (a)). The taking of fish is a privilege and not a right, and it may be granted by the state under such conditions as the state sees fit to impose. Hanley v. State, 234 Ind. 326, 126 N. E. 2d 879 (1955). The fish in the public, and in most instances private, waters of the State of Georgia are held in trust by the state for the people and may be closely regulated.
Actually, pursuant to law, the commission could by regulation, if it so chose (and based upon a valid interest or reason), prohibit fishing in certain areas of, or all of, the salt and/or fresh waters of Georgia. It can fix open and closed seasons for the taking of all wildlife on a statewide, regional or local basis as deemed appropriate. (Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. 45-114 (2)). Already by regulation the commission has provided for certain fresh water commercial fishing licenses, "zoned" certain waters of the state for sport fishing only and closed a portion of the Savannah River to all fishing by any means. Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Regulations 260-3- .14, .21 and .25.
If the commission can designate areas for sport fishing only, commercial fishing only, and close entire areas of the waters of Georgia to all fishing, and I think it can, I see no prohibition against it delineating by regulation, for the purposes of law enforcement and the acquisition ofproper fishing licenses, between salt and fresh waters, and establishing a demarcation line for this purpose. It is my official opinion that it can do so.

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OPINION 72-167
To: Commissioner, Department of Natural Resources

November 21, 1972

Re: Contract between Department ofNatural Resources and other agencies as to sewage facilities on Skidaway Island; improvements by state restricted to those on state-owned land.

Please refer to your letter of October 30, 1972, wherein you request an official opinion as to the legality of a proposed agreement between the Department of Natural Resources and certain private parties for the construction of a master lift station and forced main on Skidaway Island. According to your letter, the Department of Natural Resources wishes to develop Skidaway Island State Park at Savannah, Georgia, but that such development depends upon the construction of an acceptable sewage system. The State Board of Regents is presently constructing a sewage treatment plant, and it is the desire of the Department of Natural Resources to enter into a cost sharing agreement with certain private parties to construct a master lift station and forced main to carry the state park's sewage to said treatment plant. The state's share ofthe cost for constructing such facilities would be 11 percent of the total cost or approximately $21,000. The lift station and forced main would be constructed on property owned by Chatham County and it is proposed that sometime in the future such property would be deeded to the state.
Since the material you furnished with the above letter did not include a draft of the proposed agreement, it is impossible for me to render a definitive opinion on the legality ofsuch an agreement. However, based upon the above facts, certain provisions ofthe law would appear to be applicable.
There appears to be no question that the Department ofNatural Resources is authorized to expend funds for the development ofthe State Park System. Section 1503 ofthe "Executive Reorganization Act of 1972," Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1015, 1052 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-35131) transfers all functions ofthe Department of State Parks to the Department of Natural Resources. Among the powers transferred to the department are those authorizing expenditures from available funds for the care, supervision, improvement and development of the State Park System. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 264, as

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amended (Ga. Code Ann. 43-124 (d)). This office has previously ruled, however, that the state must
own fee simple title to property before it may make permanent improvements thereon. Op. Att'y Gen. 66-79. That opinion dealt with the question of whether or not the State Game and Fish Commission could construct boat launching ramps on properties owned by counties or other political subdivisions of the state. Under the above stated facts, the proposed contract would appear to be governed by this prior opinion.
The results which you desire may be accomplished by the county deeding the property on which the facilities are to be constructed to the State of Georgia. Another possible alternative might be for the department to contract for the use of such facilities.
I realize that the above discussion enunciates only general principles oflaw which might apply in your situation. However, we will be happy to review any contract relating to the above upon being furnished a copy of same.

OPINION 72-168
To: Director, Game and Fish Division, Department of Natural Resources

November 22, 1972

Re: Motor boat control; boat operators, not necessarily the owners, must file the reports of accidents required to be submitted to the Department of Natural Resources.

This is in response to your recent question as to whether a certain boat owner is required to file with the Department of Natural Resources a report of an allision involving his boat.
You advise that recently an accident occurred whereby a boat came loose from its mooring and drifted into another boat causing damage in excess of$100 to each. One ofthe boat owners has filed a report ofthe accident with the Department of Natural Resources while the other has not. The filing owner has requested the department to obtain an accident report from the other owner, which report, you inform, is intended for use in contemplated legal action. You ask my opinion on whether this second owner must file a report.
Ga. Code Ann. 17-608 (b) (part ofthe Ga. Laws 1960, p. 235, the Georgia Motorboat Numbering Act) appears to control. It reads:

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"In the case of collision, accident, or other casualty involving a motorboat, the operator thereof, if the collision, accident, or other casualty results in death or injury to a person or damage to property in excess of $100 or such lower amount as may be set by the rules and regulations adopted by the commission, shall file with the commission a full description ofthe collision, accident, or other casualty, including such information as said agency may, by regulation, require." (Emphasis added.)
Your question focuses on whether, under the foregoing statute, the owners ofthese boats are required to file these reports since no one was actually operating the boats at the time of the allision.
A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation holds that in the interpretation of all statutes, the courts will seek to determine the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. (Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9).) However, a statute couched in plain and unambiguous langauge needs no further interpretation. Central of Georgia Railway Co. u. Tucker, 99 Ga. App. 52 (1959). In the interpretation of any particular word in a statute (such as operator here), the ordinary signification shall be applied to the word. (Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (1).) I feel this law is clear and plain, and applying the ordinary signification ofthe word operator, it is my opinion that the statute does not cover the instant situation and no report is required.
For example, assume a boat owner is pulling his boat on a trailer behind his car on a public road and the boat comes loose, slips off and causes in excess of $100 damage to a motor vehicle traveling behind it. This is an accident involving a motorboat but the boat is not being operated (as we normally use the word) at the time, and
1think it clear the owner would not have to report the accident to
the Department of Natural Resources under the statute in question. (Although he might under another law be required to make certain reports.) In other words, as I see it, only boats being operated on the waters ofthe state at the time ofan accident come under the purview of the statute and, in such cases, the operator, not necessarily the owner, must make the re2_ort.
My opinion is buttressed by the consideraion ofanother section of the same Act. Ga. Code Ann. 17-603 explains that the provisions of this entire Act are applicable to motorboats operating on the waters ofthe state. (The word operating, used here as a participle, seems to me to indicate present use.) Also, Ga. Code Ann. 17-602 (5) defines operate as meaning to "navigate or otherwise use a

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motorboat". This result will not leave the owner who filed the report (and is
contemplating legal action) without a method to obtain information about the accident from the other owner. He has a number of methods open to him under Georgia's Civil Practice Act should he choose to pursue his legal remedies.

OPINION 72-169 November 29, 1972
To: Secretary of State

Re: Banks and banking; the Secretary of State may not merge a nonbanking corporation with a banking company.

You have requested our official opinion on whether the Secretary of State can merge a nonbanking corporation with a banking company.
In 1968, the corporate law of the State of Georgia was substantially revised and a Georgia Business Corporation Code was adopted. Ga. Laws 1968, p. 565. In this revision, the General Assembly specified that a corporation which has received its charter from the Secretary of State, other than a bank or trust company, could merge or consolidate with a corporation chartered by the superior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Business Corporation Code. Ga. Code Ann. 22-4402, based upon Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 565, 810. This law was a recompilation of the existing law under the 1938 Corporation Act, Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 214, former Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 22-18. Ga. Code Ann. 22-1837. There can be little doubt that the specific intent ofthe law was to except banks and trust companies from the provisions allowing Secretary of State corporations to merge with superior court corporations. A prominent Georgia authority on the 1968 Business Corporation Code has agreed with this view. Kaplan's Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law 12-17, fn. 183 (1971).
A 1969 amendment to the 1968 general revision on corporation law explains that the 1968 provisions relating to Secretary ofState corporations (Part III of the revision) were intended to be merely a recompilation of existing statutes affecting and regulating these corporations and the 1968 revision merely complemented and

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supplemented the express provisions ofexisting statutes. That is to say, the 1968 revision was not intended to repeal any of the previous law regarding these Secretary of State corporations. Ga. Code Ann. 22-4801, based upon Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 152, 194-195.
According to Georgia banking law, banks may only merge with one another and this has been so since 1919. See Ga. Laws 1919, p. 135 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 13-14). By expressly providing the method with which banks may merge and specifically excepting banks from the general business corporation law concerning mergers, we glean that the General Assembly only wished banks to merge with other banks through the procedures specifically set out in the banking law.
At first blush, it might appear that a provision in the 1968 Georgia Business Corporation Act may be at odds with the above interpretations. Ga. Code Ann. 22-1006 provides that banks (together with other Secretary of State corporations), may merge and consolidate with superior court corporations "ifnot prohibited therefrom by the laws ofthis state under which the first mentioned corporations (in our case, banks) are organized." Ga. Code Ann. 22-1006 (a). Close reading ofthis section reveals the 1968law says that if Georgia law does not prohibit Secretary of State corporations from merging, then the 1968 Business Corporation Code gives these corporations the authority to merge. As pointed out above, the same 1968 revision specifically excepted banks and trust companies from the authorization to merge (Ga. Code Ann. 22-4402) and the banking law only allows banks to merge with other banking companies. We do not believe that the language contained in Ga. Code Ann. 22-1006 (a) is in any way inconsistent with or contrary to the express provisions of these laws.
The Constitution provides that all corporate powers and privileges to banks (and other specified corporations) must be issued and granted by the Secretary of State in such manner as
shall be prescribed by law. Ga. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XVII (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1917). In our opinion, law does not provide for the merger of a nonbanking corporation with a banking company organized under the laws of Georgia.

OPINION 72-170
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

November 30, 1972

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Re: Drivers licenses; review of proposed procedures to implement visual acuity examination requirements for veterans holding honorary drivers licenses.

You have requested an opinion reviewing certain procedures by which the Department of Public Safety ("DPS") proposes to implement new eye examination requirements for veterans holding honorary drivers licenses. Specifically, you have asked three questions, which I shall consider below.
Your first question concerns whether DPS may indicate that a veteran has passed his "visual acuity test" by issuing him a new license rather than stamping his old one. Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1076, 1077 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-410.1) provides that when a veteran who now holds an honorary license fails the visual acuity test, "his honorary license shall be stamped 'void' ...." Ifhe later passes the test "he shall be issued a new honorary drivers license." Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1076, 1077.
As I understand the situation you fear that your department will experience difficult problems in handling those veterans who pass the visual acuity test on their first attempt, since it is "virtually impossible" to make a notation to this effect on their original license cards. The new law states that such a veteran "may retain his honorary license in lieu of being issued a new license," Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 1076, 1077 (emphasis added), but the director shall note the date ofthe examination on the old card. This language "in lieu of' seems expressly designed to give continuing effectiveness to old honorary license cards at the exclusive option ofthe veterans who now hold them (providing, of course, that those veterans pass the test on the first try). Under this language you may only offer those veterans a new license. Those who agree to take a new license may retain their old ones stamped void. Ifany refuse a new license, you must note the date of examination on their cards, either by stamping it, by affixing a gum-backed seal, or by marking it in some other fashion. Of course, if any veterans who first pass the test later fail it, you must require them to accept a new license.
Your next question concerns whether in issuing new or duplicate honorary licenses the department may require a photograph ofthe veteran and use his social security number as his license number. You say that this is the DPS's current practice in regard to ordinary drivers licenses.
Ga. Laws 1964, p. 171 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-408) grants DPS authority to require the applicant's photograph on "any learner's license,operator's license, chauffeur's license ... or duplicate .... "

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"Operators licenses" are those for which "all persons not otherwise disqualified above the age of16, except public chauffeurs ...."may apply. Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322,342, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401). Since veterans honorary licenses would fall into this class, it would seem that DPS has authority to require photographs on all new or duplicate veterans licenses.
Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 546, 550 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-438) does not restrict this authority. That statute requires that suitable honorary cards be engraved, "conforming as far as practicable to the cards ... heretofore issued registrants for drivers licenses." The purpose ofthis statute is to make veterans licenses a kind ofspecial badge marking the state's appreciation. Requiring a photograph on license cards in no way conflicts with this purpose. Nor would there be any inconsistency ifyou used a veteran's social security number. The phrase "as far as practicable" indicates recognition of the values of adopting certain uniform procedures for all drivers licenses, and of the difficulties of departing from those procedures once adopted. All that the 1966 law demands is that veterans licenses continue to bear the same basic special markings they have always had. Under your power to "formulate rules ... for the issuance ... of licenses ...." (Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 322, 348, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-421)), you may, therefore, require a photograph and social security number on new or duplicate veterans licenses.
Your final question is whether DPS may now issue new or duplicate veterans licenses to be effective for four years. Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 553, 555 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-436) makes it the duty of DPS to issue an honorary license to each "veteran resident," which shall be valid "until ... suspended, or revoked, in accordance with the law. " This law was an amendment to Ga. Laws 1937, p. 322 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-401). However, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1076, expressly states that "[a]ny other provisions of[Ga. Laws 1937, p. 322] to the contrary notwithstanding ... [n]o license shall be issued by the director [after Jan. 1, 1973] to be effective for a period in excess of four years." Where honorary licenses are concerned, this simply adds new meaning to the phrase "suspended, or revoked, in accordance with the law" (Ga. Laws 1966, p. 553, Ga. Code Ann. 92A-436). Where a veteran fails a visual acuity test, his privilege to operate motor vehicles is terminated until he can satisfy minimum visual acuity standards. Thus honorary licenses should still be issued for an indefinite period and not for a fixed term of four years. However, their continued effectiveness should be expressly made subject to reexamination for visual acuity at stated
intervals from the date of issuance.

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OPINION 72-171
To: Commissioner, Department of Public Safety

December 1, 1972

Re: Drivers licenses; eye examinations; when provisions effective.

At its last session, the General Assembly passed an Act, the terms of which require that Georgia drivers, "after January 1, 1973," must pass an eye test every four years. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1076 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-410.1). Another provision of that Act sets a maximum duration of four years for drivers licenses. Id. You have asked when this four-year license provision becomes operative.
Although I was not directly confronting the issue at that time, I suggested in a recent opinion that the four-year license J>rovision becomes operative at the same time as the eye test provisions, i.e., after January 1, 1973. Op. Att'y Gen. 72-108. Having directly considered the issue, I reaffirm the earlier suggestion. Though the Act became "effective" on July 1, 1972, it is my opinion that its terms require you to implement the provision for a four-year, maximum duration for drivers licenses after January 1, 1973. It should be added, however, that you presently have authority to begin preparations for this change.
The effective date of an Act is determined in accordance with the following statute:

"Unless a different effective date is specified ... any Act ... becoming law ... after the first day of January, and prior to the first day ofJuly ... shall become effective on said first day of July ...." Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1364, 1365, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 102-111).

When the law makes a general provision, such as this one, for determining the effective dates of statutes, courts are reluctant to read a different effective date into a particular statute unless the different date is clearly intended. See In re Alexander, 53 Fla. 647, 44 So. 175 (1907); Fox v. McDonald, 101 Ala. 51, 13 So. 416, 422 (1893). However, courts also recognize a distinction between the

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effective dates of an Act and the date upon which its provisions become operative. See In re Hehl u. Gross, 35 App. Div. 2d 570, 313 N.Y.S. 2d 422 (1970).
The Act about which you have asked contains the following relevant language:

"Any other provisions of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, after January 1, 1973, the holder of a Georgia driver's license of any class shall be reexamined at least every four years by the Director for the purpose of ascertaining the holder's visual acuity. The director shall examine the licensee ... initially under the provisions ofthis section at the time the holder applies for a renewal of his license after January 1, 1973. No license shall be issued or renewed unless the applicant's visual acuity is correctable to 20/60 vision. No license shall be issued by the director to be effective for a period in excess of four years. The applicant may furnish the certificate of a licensed physician or optometrist certifying the visual acuity of each eye ...." Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1076.

This language does not clearly specify an effective date different from the general, statutory effective date ofJuly 1, 1972. However, the language does indicate you are to implement the fundamental provision of the Act, i.e., eye examinations, "after January 1, 1973." In other words, this provision becomes "operative" after that date, i.e., on January 2, 1973. Cf, Holt u. Richardson, 134 Ga. 287 (1910).
The provision is characterized further by a series of four sentences which explain when the tests are to be given, who is to give them, what the minimum standards are, and for how long the licenses are to be issued. In context, then, these four sentences characterize the basic requirement of eye tests. This suggests that, as a qualifying aspect of the visual acuity requirements, the four-year limit on driver's license terms becomes operative on January 2, 1973, along with the visual acuity requirements.
Such a construction would accord with a legislative intent to give your department time to make necessary administrative changes and to publicize the changes before a major new requirement for drivers licenses is implemented. See State Highway Department u. Gorham, 162 S.W. 2d 934 (Tex. 1942); In re Alexander, 53 Fla. 647, 44 So. 175 (1907).
Thus, it is my official opinion that Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1076, has

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become effective but that you are not to implement its four-year limitation on drivers licenses until after January 1, 1973. However, in the sense that the statute has become effective, you have an implied responsibility to prepare to implement those changes by the time they become operative.

OPINION 72-172
To: Director, Department of Transportation

December 4, 1972

Re: Jekyll Island roads to be incorporated into State Highway System.

By letter of November 9, 1972, Mr. Emory Parrish requested an opinion regarding whether certain sections ofroads now located on Jekyll Island might be added to the State Highway System, and, if so, what procedures should be followed to accomplish this. It is my official opinion that these roads not only may, but must, be added to the state system.
The Department of Transportation has the power and duty to "designate, improve, supervise, construct and maintain a system of state-aid roads." Ga. Code Ann. 95-1504. This state-aid system "shall consist ofsuch roads as have been, or may be, authorized by law and designated by the State Highway Board ...."Ga. Code Ann. 95-1711. The Highway Board makes this designation by written notice to the county road authorities ofthe county wherein the road lies. Ga. Code Ann. 95-1705.
The question then becomes whether the roads on Jekyll Island are authorized by law to be on the state system and, if so, whether they have been so designated by the board. The answer to the latter question is, of course, in the negative, so I will consider only the former.
The controlling statute here is Ga. Laws 1937, p. 264, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 43-126), which states, inter alia:

"The [Department of Transportation] is hereby authorized and directed to expend state highway funds in the construction, reconstruction, improvement, repair and maintenance ofroads within the boundaries of any land embraced within the state parks system, and to relocate, construct, reconstruct, improve, repair and maintain roads leading from the state highway to

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any land or other property embraced within the state parks system, and said roads shall become a part of the highway system of Georgia and be so designated."

If Jekyll Island is a part of the state parks system, the State Highway Board is required to designate the roads within its boundaries as being on the highway system of Georgia. The island was acquired by the state in the condemnation action of Georgia v. Jekyll Island Club, Inc., et al., filed in Glynn County Superior Court on June 6, 1947. It is now leased to the Jekyll Island State Park Authority for $1 per year. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 152, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 43-608a). Even though the island is controlled by a public authority rather than the Department of Natural Resources, for the purposes of road construction and maintenance it does fall within the definition ofthe state parks system. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 264; 1963, p. 630 (Ga. Code Ann. 43-123, 43-134). Therefore, the roads on the island are within the boundaries ofthe state parks system and the State Highway Board is required to designate them part of the highway system of Georgia.
This is not to say, or even imply, that Jekyll Island is a "state park" even though it is commonly referred to as Jekyll Island State Park. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 152 (Ga. Code Ann. 43-602a (c)).
A "state park" is defined as:

"All real property situated in the State of Georgia subject to the jurisdiction and control ofthe Georgia Department ofState Parks [now the Department of Natural Resources]." Rules and Regulations of Georgia 460-3-.01 (a). (Brackets added.)

Since Jekyll Island is subject to the jurisdiction and control ofthe

Jekyll Island State Park Authority rather than the Department of

Natural Resources, it is not a "state park" subject to the rules of

the Department of Natural Resources, but the land is within the

"state parks system" for road purposes. Ga. Code Ann. 43-123,

43-126.

.

The designation of these roads as part of the state system can be

accomplished by the passage of a resolution by the State Highway

Board adding them to the system. This must be followed by written

notification of the action to the Board of Commissioners of Glynn

County. Ga. Code Ann. 95-1705. It would also be advisable to

provide written notification to the Jekyll Island State Park

Authority.

Once the designation has been made, any work done in

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connection with the roads cannot proceed at the sole discretion of the Department of Transportation. Ga. Code Ann. 43-126 concludes:

"Such roads are to be relocated, improved, repaired and maintained in such manner as may be agreed upon between the commissioner and the [Department of Transportation]."

Since the passage of the Reorganization Act, the term "commissioner" means the Commissioner of the Department of Natural Resources or his authorized representative. Because Jekyll Island is controlled by an authority it would be advisable to obtain the additional approval of the Jekyll Island State Park Authority before any work is undertaken.
It is, then, my official opinion that the State Route 50 Extension and the State Route 50 Connector not only may, but must, be designated as part of the highway system of Georgia following the procedure established by Ga. Code Ann. 95-1705.

OPINION 72-173
To: Deputy Director, State Merit System of Personnel Administration

December 4, 1972

Re: Merit system; funds must be obtained by pro rata assessments from covered departments.

This is in response to your letter of November 13, 1972, requesting my opinion as to whether the State Merit System of Personnel Administration (hereinafter the merit system) can receive direct payment of funds from the Fiscal Division of the Department of Administrative Services for office renovation expenses, as opposed to receiving pro rata assessment payments from various departments covered by the merit system.
As I understand the factual situation giving rise to your request, you have been advised by the Office of Planning and Budget that federal revenue sharing monies are available for payment of the cost ofoffice renovations for the merit system. I further understand that you are desirous of obtaining direct payment of the monies, rather than obtaining the funds by pro rata assessments from the various departments covered by the merit system.

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The method offinancing the merit system is set forth in Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45, at page 49 (Ga. Code Ann. 40~2203 (d)), wherein it is stated that one of the duties of the State Personnel Board is:

"To establish an annual budget covering all the costs of operating the State Merit System of Personnel Administration, and the cost of administering such federal laws relating to personnel administration as the Governor may direct, including the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of1970, and determine an equitable basis of prorating said annual costs among the several departments covered by the State Merit System ofPersonnel Administration, provided that upon approval of such budget by the Governor, he shall be empowered to direct that the necessary pro rata share of the several assessed departments concerned be made available for expenditure by the State Personnel Board in the same manner as appropriated funds are expended by other departments of the state."

The above provision seems to establish the sole means by which the merit system may obtain operating funds, as I understand that the merit system receives no direct appropriation from the General Assembly and is not considered a "budget unit."
Although direct payment to the merit system might be a more practical manner for the merit system to receive such funds, it would seem to follow that even if the monies in question could be said to be available without further action or appropriation by the General Assembly, it cannot be overlooked that the General Assembly has in a procedural sense provided for but a single method of disbursing operating funds to the merit system.
Where, as here, the General Assembly has prescribed a specific method for the merit system to obtain operating funds, with this method being manifestly contrary to the method established for virtually all other departments of state government, i.e. direct appropriation, it must be assumed that the General Assembly was conscious of and intended this singular treatment. Accordingly, it is my official opinion that the State Merit System of Personnel Administration can obtain operating funds only through pro rata assessments among the several departments covered by the State Merit System of Personnel Administration.

299
OPINION 72-174
To: Director, Game and Fish Division, Department of Natural Resources

72-174 December 7, 1972

Re: State contracts; temporary improvement on property of another.

This is in response to the recent request from your office for my opinion on whether the Department of Natural Resources may place temporary boat-launching ramps on real property owned by Georgia counties. You advise the temporary ramps will be fashioned of prefabricated concrete logs, will be removable from the ramp sites when appropriate and can be transported to and from the sites with facility.
I have previously rendered an opinion holding that the Game and Fish Commission has been delegated by the General Assembly the authority to develop lands and waters for public hunting and fishing, including the construction of boat-launching ramps for access to fishing waters. Ga. Laws 1955, pp. 483, 490 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-114); Op. Atey Gen. 66-79. The Department of Natural Resources has now absorbed the functions of the commission. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015 et seq. The ramps may be constructed on lands and waters acquired by lease or other agreement. Ga. Code Ann. 45-114 (1).
I have also held, however, that the State of Georgia must have fee simple title to land before permanent improvements may be made thereon. Op. Att'y Gen. 66-79 andOps. Att'yGen. 1962, p. 398. This is for the reason that for the state to expend funds for permanent improvements on real property to which it does not hold fee simple title might result in the loss of such improvements by the state if the owner or reversionary-interest holder appropriates the property to uses other than for which the state funds were expended.Ops.Att'y Gen. 1952-3, p. 109. In such a case, the expenditure would result in a gift benefit or gratuity prohibited
by Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402). The pivotal word in this improvement restriction is permanent. I understand the department's planned temporary ramps to be portable and easily removable from the land on which they are placed.
The provisions ofGa. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001) provide, inter alia, that the state may contract

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for any period not exceeding 50 years with any county for activities and transactions authorized by law for the parties to undertake. These provisions would allow the state, through your department, to contract with various counties for the placement of these temporary ramps so long as the county has such authority (which must be determined on a case-by-case basis).
Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is my oflicial opinion that the Department of Natural Resources may contract with various Georgia counties to obtain sites for the establishment of temporary, easily removable boat-launching ramps on land owned by the county.
I trust the foregoing will assist you in the rendition of your official duties. My office will assist you in the fashioning of a form contract for the purposes outlined in this opinion, should you determine the project feasible.

OPINION 72-175
To: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources

December 14, 1972

Re: Georgia Records Act of 1972, effect upon records of adoption.

This is in reply to your request for an opinion on the effects of the Georgia Records Act, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1267 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-8B), on the records maintained by the Social Services Section of the Department of Human Resources under Ga. Code Ann. 74-419, Ga. Laws 1941, p. 300, as amended. The following opinion deals solely with those records, formerly maintained by the Department of Family and Children Services, and does not deal with those records referred to in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-17, as based upon Ga. Laws 1964, p. 499. Questions:

"1. The department is required to maintain records permanently under the Georgia Records Act of 1972. The Social Services Section must comply with the requirements of the Georgia Adoption Law (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 74-4). A third copy is maintained by the court. Which copy is to be considered the permanent record?"

The records acquired by the former Department of Family and

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~
Children Services pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 74-419 fall within Section 5 (a) (Ga. Code Ann. 40-805b (a)) of the Georgia Records Act.

"2. Does the Georgia Records Act take precedence over the Georgia Adoption Law with regard to the keeping of permanent records?"

I am unable to find any conflict between the two Acts.

"3. May the Social Services Section be relieved of its record keeping responsibilities defined in the Georgia Adoption Law? And may such responsibilities be transferred to the Records Management Office?"

Under Section 5 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-805b) ofthe Georgia Records Act, the Department of Human Resources is under a duty to develop a records management standard, subject to the approval of the State Records Committee. The department may not be otherwise relieved of its responsibilities under Ga. Code Ann. 74-419.

OPINION 72-176
To: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources

December 14, 1972

Re: Public schools; physical examinations for students.

This is in reply to your inquiry concerning several aspects of the implementation of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 214 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-445). That statute, effective September 1, 1973, requires, in sum, eye, ear, and dental examinations of students entering the first grade of public schools. Your questions will be answered seriatim:

1. Is the Department of Human Resources bound to implement the law in the absence of funding?

The responsibilities placed on the Board ofHuman Resources for implementation ofthe law are wholly administrative, consisting of

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the promulgation of appropriate regulations governing such examinations. The statute places on local boards of health the responsibility for making such examinations.
Following two prior opinions of this office, Ops. Att'y Gen. 69-174, 69-184, it is my official opinion that absent a showing (1) that there is a lack of funds and an inability to obtain them, and (2) that, as a result thereof, performance of the department's statutory obligations is impossible, the statutory obligations cannot be avoided. Considering the nature of the obligations imposed by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 214, it would appear that neither of those conditions could be demonstrated in this case.

2. Do local boards ofhealth bea; the funding responsibilities for personnel and facilities to make the required examinations?

The statute provides that the regulations adopted pursuant to it
". . . shall provide procedures for local boards of health to provide such examinations...." Ga. Laws 1972, p. 214.
It is my official opinion that the statute places upon local boards of health the responsibility for employing the necessary personnel and facilities for making the required examinations.

3. May regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act establish a fee for the use of facilities of the local boards of health in obtaining such examinations?
The statute contains no express authority for the regulatory establishment of a fee for utilization of county facilities in obtaining the required examination certificate. It is my official opinion, therefore, that such a fee may not be established by the Board of Human Resources by regulation. See Op. Att'y Gen. 67-276.
OPINION 72-177 December 18, 1972
To: Secretary of State

303

72-178

Re: Elections; absentee ballots; absence ofa notary public seal will not invalidate an absentee ballot of a physically disabled elector.

You wish to know whether the absence of a notary public seal on an absentee ballot for a physically disabled elector will invalidate the ballot.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has expressed great reluctance in invalidating affidavits because of a lack of a notary seal and the court has held that unless the notarial act is such as specifically requires a seal for its authentication under Ga. Code Ann. 71-108, as based upon Ga. Laws 1947, p. 1108, the affidavit will not be invalid. Collins v. The State, 206 Ga. 95 (1), 55 S.E. 2d 599 (1949). See also, Chappell v. Boyd, 56 Ga. 578, 581 (1) (1876); Jowers v. Blandy, 58 Ga. 379 (5) (1877). Notarizing an absentee elector's ballot is not one of the acts contained in Ga. Code Ann. 71-108 which specifically requires a seal for its authentication and it is therefore our official opinion that the absence of a notary seal would not invalidate the absentee ballot.

OPINION 72-178 December 21, 1972
To: State Revenue Commissioner

Re: Checks in hands of Revenue Commissioner; limitation of actions; destruction of records.

This is in reply to your inquiry concerning the period during which suit must be brought on a check and the legal requirements necessary to dispose of a check after such period has expired.
Early in this century, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a check was a simple contract in writing and, like any other simple contract, suit must be brought on it within six years. Byrd Printing Co. v. Whitaker Paper Co., 135 Ga. 865 (1910); Haynes v. Wesley, 112 Ga. 668 (1900). Of course, the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in 1962 by the Georgia General Assembly has changed many aspects of Georgia's commercial law. See Title 109A, Ga. Code Ann., as based upon Ga. Laws 1962, p. 156. However, there has apparently been no change in this concept for in 1969 the Georgia Court of Appeals reiterated that a check was a simple contract in writing, Matson v. Blayton, 119 Ga. App. 203, 205 (1969). Therefore, since the limitation of actions on a simple contract in writing is still six years, all actions upon a check must

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be brought within six years. See Ga. Code Ann. 3-705. On a check, the six-year period during which suit must be
brought begins to run either from the date of presentation and refusal to pay or the date of the check, where the drawer at the time ofdelivery ofthe check had no funds in the bank to his credit. Haynes v. Wesley, supra.
My opinion as thus far expressed applied only to the period during which suit must be brought on a check given for payment of taxes. The period during which suit must be brought on the tax liability will depend on the circumstances of each individual case.
As to the destruction of the check once the period for suit has expired, it is important to note that the Revenue Commissioner's power to destroy records was abolished in 1960. See Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 780, 782.1 Certainly a check would, at least, constitute a part of a record. However, the records of any department of state may be ordered destroyed, once the procedures set out in Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1267 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-8B) have been followed.

OPINION 72-179
To: Commissioner, GeorgiaDepartment of Human Resources

December 29, 1972

Re: Juvenile offenders; effect of constitutional amendment, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1544, on superior court's jurisdiction.

This is in reply to your request for an opinion on the effect which an amendment to the Ga. Constitution, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1544, ratified at the last general election, has on the jurisdiction of the superior courts over juvenile offenders.
The sole effect ofthe amendment was to add to the constitutional provision, Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-3901), vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the superior courts where the offender is subjected to loss oflife or confinement in the penitentiary, the phrase "... except in the case of juvenile offenders as provided by law .... "(Emphasis added.) It is apparent that the amendment was not intended to and does not have any effect other than to permit the General Assembly to create certain exceptions from the superior court's otherwise exclusive

1. Now superseded by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-8B. However, this did not restore the authority to destroy.

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jurisdiction. Until the General Assembly so acts, the amendment has no effect on existing law. Compare Jamison v. City ofAtlanta,
225 Ga. 51 (1969), with Henson v. Georgia Industrial Realty Co., 220 Ga. 857 (1965).

307
PREFACE TO UNOFFICIAL OPINIONS
In addition to the "Official Opinions" published in the first part of this volume, the Attorney General renders "Unofficial Opinions" to state officers other than department heads (e.g., to legislators, district attorneys) and to county and municipal attorneys on questions involving the general laws of the State.
The "Unofficial Opinions" as published herein have been digested in order to save time to the reader and expense to the State. Every effort has been made to set forth in each digest all points oflaw and all citations ofauthority contained in the original opinion.
A complete copy of each Unofficial Opinion is on file in the Attorney General's office under a number corresponding with that of the digested opinion here published. Copies of such complete opinions may be obtained from the office of the Attorney General. A nominal charge of one dollar ($1.00) for each copy must be made to cover photography and mailing. Check or money order for this amount should accompany the request.
Each "Unofficial Opinion" bears the following notation: "The views expressed herein are the completely unofficial views of the writer only, and should be considered as information only."

U72-1

308

DIGESTS OF UNOFFICIAL OPINIONS

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-1 (1/4/72)
Georgia Real Estate Commission; conduct of hearings and investigations: The Real Estate Commission is authorized to conduct investigations of licensees although such investigation may result in a contested case to be both heard and judged by the commission. The Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 338 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 3A-1) indicates that a state agency may have both investigative and hearing functions. The Real Estate Commission is governed by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-14, based upon Ga. Laws 1925, p. 325. The investigative functions are set forth in 84-1417 and in 84-1420, which also provides for a hearing. Under 84-1404 there are only three members of the commission, so it is obvious that the same persons will investigate and hold hearings. Admittedly, the case of In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1954), holds that no man shall be a judge in his own cause. On the other hand, most authorities uphold the placement of investigative and hearing powers in the same agency. See Davis, Administrative Law, 225 (1951); 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law, pp. 25, 339 (1965); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302 (1955); Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, et al., 333 U.S. 683 (1947); Smith v. State Board ofAccountancy ofKentucky, 271 S. W. 2d 875 (Ky. 1954). Distinguished from above holdings is Mack v. Florida State Board ofDentistry, 296 F. Supp. 1259 (1969); s.c., 430 F.2d 862 (1970).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-2 (1/7/72)
Ordinaries; fees in traffic violation cases: An ordinary having jurisdiction of traffic violations may enter judgment disposing of such a case where there has been a cash bond forfeiture. There being no specific statute regulating fees in such a case, the ordinary is entitled to a fee of $1 for passing the order and $1 for entering the same; that is to say, a total fee of $2. Ga. Code Ann. 24-1716 as amended by Ga. Laws 1971, p. 591. See also Op. Att'y Gen. U71-135. As to procedure in, and effect of, cash bond forfeitures, see Ga. Laws 1953, p. 331; 1962, p. 530 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-511).

309

U72-5

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-3 (1/7/72)
Baby sitting; nursery schools: There are no state laws regulating baby sitting on an individual basis. On the other hand if the operation of a nursery school is contemplated, the matter should be taken up with the State Department of Family and Children Services. See Ga. Laws 1963, p. 81 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-2).
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-4 (1/24/72)
Public roads; authority of municipalities as against that of counties: A county may not lawfully construct a county road through the corporate limits ofa municipality without the consent ofthe latter. While Ga. Code Ann. 23-601, 23-602, based upon Ga. Laws 1925, p. 152, provide for cooperation between cities and counties, they give the county no paramount authority. A municipal corporation is generally vested with authority over territory within its borders and this authority, as to roads or streets, cannot be ousted by the county. See Wood v. Shore, 160 Ga. 173 (1925); Almond v. Atlanta Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 108 Ga. 417 (1899); Marshall v. County of Floyd, 145 Ga. 112, 118 (1916), citing 1 Elliott, Roads and Streets (3d ed.) 503, and citing further, Blocker v. State, 72 Miss. 720 (18 So. 388) (1895). See further, Shore v. Banks County, 162 Ga. 185, 188 (1926). The case of Daniels v. City ofAthens, 54 Ga. 79 (1875), is distinguished from those above, since in that case there was an agreement between the city and county as to maintenance of a bridge. See Board of Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga. 542, 550 (1914).
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-5 (1/26/72)
Jury in superior court; number of jurors: It is provided by Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5101), that the General Assembly may prescribe "any number, not less than five, to constitute a trial or traverse jury, except in the superior courts." Applying the principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this indicates that the reduction in number ofjurors below 12 is not authorized for superior courts. While a jury of 12 is not specifically prescribed for superior courts by the Constitution, that

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was the number required by the common law prior to the adoption of the first Georgia Constitution. See Flint River Steamboat Co. u. Foster, 5 Ga. 194 (7) (1848). See also, 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, 124, 125. The case of Weiss u. Hood, 200 Ga. 795 (2) (1946) seems to imply that a jury of 12 is required in superior court, since it held that a jury of 11 was adequate only because of the agreement of the defendant in a criminal case. This view is bolstered by certain holdings under the Constitution of 1877. Under that Constitution (former Ga. Code Ann. 2-4501) the exception to the authority of the legislature to constitute juries of "not less than five" applied to city courts as well as to superior courts. This resulted in repeated holdings that parties were entitled to 12-man juries in city courts. See Mattox u. State, 115 Ga. 212 (2) (1902); Welbourne u. State, 114 Ga. 793 (1) (1902); Conyers u. Graham et al., 81 Ga. 615 (4) (1888); Monford u. State, 114 Ga. 528 (1901).
[See further, Op. Att'y Gen. U72-7, infra.]

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-6 (2/2/72)
State Merit System; coverage ofemployee ofGeorgia Real Estate Investment Board: Such an employee is within the classified service covered by the merit system. "Classified service" as defined in Ga. Laws 1971, p. 45 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-2201) includes all employees of state departments unless such employees are specifically excluded by other provisions oflaw. See Ga. Code Ann. 40-2201 (a). There is no exclusion as to Real Estate Investment Board employees. The Real Estate Investment Board is an "agency" and, therefore, for the purpose of the Merit System Act, has the status of a "department" under Ga. Code Ann. 40-2201 (C). As to power of the board to employ personnel, see Ga. Laws 1963, p. 34 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2803 (h)). Further, the 1971 State Audit Report Supplement lists the board as an agency. It follows that the board employee is included as to "classified service."

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-7 (2/4/72)
Jury in superior court; unanimous verdict: As was pointed out in Op. Att'y Gen. U72-5 supra, Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5101) must be construed in the light of the common law prior to the adoption of the first Georgia

311

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Constitution. Such an interpretation results not only in the conclusion that a superior court jury must consist of 12 persons, but, also, that to be valid, their verdict must be unanimous. The right to trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Constitution, must remain inviolate. Porter v. Watkins, 217 Ga. 73 (1961); Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194 (7) (1848). If the right is to be "inviolate," the verdict must have the same dignity as a commonlaw verdict, and such a verdict had to be unanimous. See 3 Blackstone's Commentaries, 379; 50 C. J. S. Juries, 6, Fn. 72; 42 Am. Jur. 2d, Jury, 13; Ga. Practice and Procedure, 19-4 (3rd ed.); Note, Ga. Bar J. (1953-4) 234, 236. As to case law, see Patton v. UnitedStates, 281 U. S. 276, 288, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930); Ponder v. State, 11 Ga. App. 60 (1912); Groves v. State, 162 Ga. 161 (1926);
Tilton v. State, 52 Ga. 478 (1874).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-8 (2/9/72)
Intoxicating liquor: Where a city is divided between two counties, one ofwhich has voted "wet" in a liquor referendum, and the other has remained "dry," the city cannot arbitrarily refuse to issue a liquor license in that portion of the city within the "wet" county. See Stephens, Mayor v. Moran, 221 Ga. 4 (1965).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-9 (2/11/72)
Motor vehicles; trailer tags: A company is in the portable electric sign business, in which it employs a number of "portable electric sign trailers." The question is as to whether license plates can be transferred from one trailer to another as the trailers are used. The answer is that they cannot. A license plate, under Ga. Code Ann. 68-214 (0, as amended by Ga. Laws 1969, p. 266, cannot be legally transferred from one vehicle to another except as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 68-214 (g). None ofthe provisions of said subsection (g) apply to the present situation.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-10 (2/11172)
Public school funds; expenditure to purchase automobile for county superintendent not authorized: Ifby "public school funds," state funds are meant, the purchase of an automobile for the

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superintendent is clearly prohibited by statute. Ga. Laws 1933, p. 106 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2001). On the other hand, if the question relates purely to county funds, some provision of law clearly authorizing their expenditure would be necessary to the legality of such expenditure. See Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142 (1) (1933). While Ga. Laws 1946, p. 73 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-1006), authorizes the county board of education to pay extra or "additional" compensation to the superintendent, the meaning of this Code section should not be stretched to allow furnishing of a car in lieu of additional monetary compensation.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION l.n2-11 (2/14/72)
Superior court judges emeritus; eligibility: Under the Superior Court Judges Emeritus Act, Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 24-26A), a superior court judge in his 12th year of service who is 70 years of age is eligible to retire at one-half salary under the provisions ofGa. Code Ann. 24-2602a and 24-2612a. This is upon the assumption that contributions have been made to the fund in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. 24-2610a.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-12 (2/18/72)
Eminent domain; venue of actions instituted by Groveland Lake Development Authority: Venue of eminent domain proceedings brought by this authority would be the county wherein the land lies, according to both Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-4902) and Ga. Code Ann. 3-203. A mere provision in Ga. Laws 1969, p. 572, which statute creates the authority, to the effect that "any action to protect any rights under the provisions ofthis Act shall be brought in the superior court of Fulton County ...." would not alter the above stated constitutional and statutory rule. Where a statute is subject to two constructions, one ofwhich will harmonize it with the Constitution and the other will render the statute unconstitutional, the former construction is generally to be preferred. Thomas v. The Board ofCommissioners of Chattooga County, 196 Ga. 10, 14 (1943).

313

U72-15

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-13 (2/21/72)

Water quality control: An individual who treats sewage and disposes ofthe same in the ground by means ofa sprinkling system, and not in the waters of the state, is, nevertheless, subject to the provisions of the Georgia Water Quality Control Act, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 416 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 17-5). He is particularly subject to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 17-503 (d), (f); 17-505 (13); and 17-510, although control is not necessarily limited to these sections.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-14 (2/25/72)
Constables; right of notary public ex-officio justice of the peace to appoint: According to Ga. Code Ann. 24-401, there shall be one elected justice of the peace in each militia district, and, under Ga. Code Ann 24-501, there may be one notary public ex-officio justice of the peace appointed by the superior court in each district. Ga. Code Ann. 24-801 provides for two constables in each militia district. Further, Ga. Code Ann. 24-807 provides in pertinent part that "if there are two constables to appoint, each justice shall appoint one." It follows that where the militia district has one elected justice of the peace and one appointed ex-officio justice of the peace, each should appoint one constable.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-15 (2/25/72)
Mobile homes in transit through counties; no requirement for location nor relocation permits from such counties: Ga. Laws 1971, p. 631 (Ga. Code Ann. 23-2708) permits counties to require persons using mobile homes as residences to obtain location permits from the tax assessors, and where a mobile home used as a residence is moved from one location within the county to another, a similar relocation permit may be required. The intent of this law, as indicated by Ga. Code Ann. 23-2710, is to aid the counties to check tax returns on mobile homes. This Act has no applicability to mobile homes in transit through counties wherein there is no intention to establish them as residences, and counties cannot require permits for mobile homes in transit.

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UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-16 (3/2/72)

Superior court clerks; demands for payment of costs: Under Ga. Laws 1963, p. 368 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2729), a clerk may demand payment ofcosts for preparing the transcript ofa pauper's affidavit as a condition precedent to preparation and transmittal of the transcript and record to the appellate courts. He may not, however, require payment of other costs as a condition precedent. See In the Matter of Contempt by Four Clerks, 111 Ga. 89 (1900); Bryant v. Motors Insurance Corp., 109 Ga. App. 47 (1964); Ops. Att'y Gen. 1951, p. 256. He has other remedies for collection of costs in general. As to instances wherein advance costs are required, see Ga. Code Ann. 24-2727, as amended by Ga. Laws 1971, p. 774; Ga. Code Ann. 24-3403, 24-3407. Normally, costs (other than those for preparing transcript and other than those required to be advanced) are to be collected after final judgment under Ga. Code Ann. 24-3409, and execution for the same can be issued under Ga. Code Ann. 24-3410. Note, also, that under Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 18, 22 (Ga. Code Ann. 6-1002) one wishing a notice of appeal to serve as a supersedeas must pay the trial court costs. For history of recent legislation involving costs and fees, see Op. Att'y Gen. U71-
90.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-17 (3/3/72)
Chiropractors not considered physicians for insurance purposes: Ga. Laws 1960, p. 289, the Georgia Insurance Code, codified in material part at Ga. Code Ann. 56-1708,56-1802 (7), and 56-1811, includes certain provisions respecting nonprofit hospital service corporations and nonprofit medical service corporations in their relationships with licensed doctors ofmedicine. The term "licensed doctor of medicine" and similar terms as used in these sections do not include chiropractors. This for the reason that the definition of "chiropractic," as set forth in Ga. Laws 1921, p. 166 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-501), is not broad enough to bring chiropractic within the definition of "practice of medicine" contained in Ga. Code Ann. 84-901, as amended by Ga. Laws 1970, p. 301. A contrary finding relating to podiatrists (see Op. Att'y Gen. 71-133) is distinguishable, since the definition of "podiatry" contained in Ga. Laws 1958, p. 174 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-601) is sufficient to bring podiatrists within the definition of medical practitioners for insurance purposes.

315

U72-20

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-18 (3/3/72)

School busses: The safety and equipment standards set up by Ga. Code Ann. 68-1667, based upon Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 556, would probably apply to the busses of a city transit system wherein school children ride, since that section relates to "every bus used for the transportation ofschool children." Not every Code provision relating to school busses, however, would apply to transit company busses. Note that Ga. Code Ann. 68-1502, based upon the same 1953 statute, defines "school bus" and "bus" in different ways. See subsections 1 (f) and (3) (b) of that section.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-19 (3/6/72)
County commissioners; filling vacancies: Where a county has not adopted the county manager form ofgovernment, a vacancy on the board of commissioners may be filled according to a local Act (in the instant case, Wilkes County by Ga. Laws 1958, p. 2091, Section 12). This is true since Ga. Code Ann. 23-801, as amended by Ga. Laws 1947, p. 173, the general statute on the subject, specifically authorizes the terms of that section to be varied by a special Act. On the other hand, in a county wherein the county manager type of government has been adopted according to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 23-9, as based upon Ga. Laws 1922, p. 82, vacancies on the board must be filled according to 23-922. This section makes no provision for variance by local or special Act, and consequently, such a local or special Act would be invalid. See Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-20 (3/17/72)
Elections; registration of students: Domicile means actual physical presence without any present intention ofleaving. See Op. Att'y Gen. 71-151. Under the Georgia Election Code, Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, officially codified in material part as Ga. Code Ann. 34-609, 34-612, 34-614, 34-627, 34-632, registrars may require applicants for voter registration to give information concerning residence. Questions asked may include: Whether applicant has voted elsewhere, residence of spouse, if any, where taxes are paid, future intentions as to location, etc. If

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questionnaires are used, however, they should be required of all voters and not merely from students. See Fair u. Osser, CA. No. 71-2212 (E.D. Pa., 1971); Jolicoeur u. Mihaly, 488 P. 2d 1 (Calif. 1971); Wilkins u. Bentley, 189 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1971).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-21 (3/20/72)
County ordinances; zoning; traffic; criminal provisions: Under the "County Home Rule Amendment," Ga. Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. II-A (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8402 to 2-8406), county commissioners may adopt reasonable ordinances, including zoning ordinances. They may not provide criminal punishment for violations of ordinances as a general rule, however. See Ga. Code Ann. 2-8402 (c) (3). Legislation creating criminal offenses is reserved to the General Assembly. See Ga. Constitution, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1301). On the other hand, under the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 556 (Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 68-15, 68-16, 68-17), counties may regulate traffic on highways to the extent permitted by that Act. See Ga. Code Ann. 68-1607. For instance, they may alter speed limits (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1628), but are not authorized to place traffic control devices upon roads other than those under purely local jurisdiction. (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1610, 68-1611; Mayor, etc., of Woodbury u. State Highway Dept., 225 Ga. 723 (1969)).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-22 (3/21/72)
Taxation; distribution of penalties for failure to make return: Penalties for failure to make timely tax returns arising under Ga. Code Ann. 92-6913, as amended by Ga. Laws 1937, p. 517, are the property ofthe county, and no division should be made for the state or the school system. Since under the above Code section, penalties must be paid into the county treasury, Ga. Code Ann. 92-8439, based upon Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 77, does not affect the matter, even though the latter Code section states that penalties "are part of the tax." ( Ops. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 577 (April 19, 1954), adopted and incorporated.)

317

U72-25

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-23 (3/22/72)

Marriage: While a pregnant female may contract marriage when under the age of 16, this can be done only with parental consent, regardless of the pregnancy. Ga. Laws 1965, p. 335 (Ga. Code Ann. 53-102). This section requires that the pregnancy be evidenced by the certificate ofa licensed physician ofthis state, but does not require that the physician live in the county of the applicant for license. Ga. Code Ann. 53-201, as amended by Ga. Laws 1965, p. 335, requires that if any female applicant for marriage license be a resident of this state, the license shall be issued in the county of her residence.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-24 (3/29172)
Clerks of courts; filling vacancies: The Act creating the City Court of Warner Robins, Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2650, is silent as to the method of filling a vacancy in the office of clerk. Section 13 of the Act, however, indicates that all applicable provisions as to superior court clerks should be applied to this officer. Vacancies, therefore, should be filled according to the procedure governing vacancies in the office of superior court clerk. See Ga. Code Ann. 24-2704 to 24-2711. Note, that under 24-2709 no special election need be held if, at the time the election would be scheduled, less than six months ofthe term ofoffice would remain. See also Ga. Code Ann. 23-701, as amended by Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., pp. 26, 198, relating to the appointive power of ordinaries.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-25 (3/31/72)
Superior court clerks; docket entries: According to Ga. Code Ann. 24-2714, superior court clerks shall keep three dockets for the trial and hearing ofcases according to the indicated subparagraphs of subsection (5) of that section: Subparagraph (1), an issue docket on which shall be placed all civil cases.. .in which there is an issue to be tried by jury or likely to be tried; subparagraph (2), a motion docket on which shall be placed motions to be decided by the judge; * * * subparagraph (6), a trial docket of criminal cases, showing parties, attorneys and character of case. The above entries are to be made by the clerk without any order of the judge. Further docket entries, however, such as final decrees, default judgments, jury verdicts with judgments, and guilty pleas, will be made only

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upon order of the judge. On construction of statutes by determination of legislative intent, see Plantation Pipeline Co. v. City ofBremen, 227 Ga. 1 (1970); Boyles v. Steine, 224 Ga. 392 (1969); Stone Mountain Memorial Ass'n v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746 (1969).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-26 (4/4172)
Public officers and employees; simultaneous employment: An employee ofthe executive branch ofstate government may not run for justice of the peace. This would be a violation of Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1309, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. 26-2309, which makes it a crime for an executive officer or employee to accept employment in the judicial branch. A justice ofthe peace is a state officer in the judicial branch. See Long v. State, 127 Ga. 285, 286 (1907). Further, running for an elective office by a State Merit System employee is prohibited by Rule 3, Par. 3.105, Rules and Regulations of the State Merit System.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-27 (4/6/72)
Intoxicating liquor: County commissioners cannot call a referendum upon the sale ofliquor. Such a referendum can only be called on petition according to the procedure set out in Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1002 to 58-1010). No county has a right to participate in the liquor business or to operate package stores. This would result in a conflict of interest, since the county is obligated to regulate the business within its boundaries. See Op. Att'y Gen. 68-119.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-28 (4/17/72)
Superior court judges; disqualification; appointment of judge emeritus to preside: Judges are disqualified from presiding over cases in which they have served as counsel ofrecord. Ga. Code Ann. 24-102. This rule applies to judges who have acted as district attorneys in cases later brought before them. Allen v. State, 102 Ga. 619, 622 (1897). Where a judge is under such a disability, there are several methods of securing the services of another judge. The Governor may make the designation under Ga. Code Ann.

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U72-29

24-2610, based upon Ga. Laws 1905, p. 87; the disqualified judge, himself, may acquire the services of a judge of another circuit under Ga. Code Ann. 24-2623. These methods are cumulative. See Bloodworth v. State, 160 Ga. 197 (1925); Dupriest v. Reese, 104 Ga. App. 805 (1961); Pendergrass v. Duke, 144 Ga. 839, 840 (1916). A further method is by requesting the services of a judge emeritus under Ga. Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-4802), and Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 24-26A). See especially Ga. Code Ann. 24-2605a, 24-2621a to 24-2623a. The disqualified judge should make this request in writing, preferably in the form of an order. Adams v. Payne, 219 Ga. 638
(1964). Statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized. Ryan v. Commissioners of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730 (1948).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-29 (4/19/72)
Mental illness; procedure for hospitalization in medical admissions county: Ga. Laws 1969, p. 505 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-5) governs hospitalization of the mentally ill. A medical admissions county is a county in which the procedure is governed by Ga. Code Ann. 88-504.1 to 88-504.6, 88-505.1 to 88-505.7, and 88-506.1 to 88-506.4. See Ga. Code Ann. 88-508.9. Questions concern construction of Ga. Code Ann. 88-504.2, based upon Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 505, 520; 1971, p. 796. This section authorizes the ordinary to order taking into custody a person described as apparently mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others. This description must be contained in a certificate of an examining physician or in affidavits of two persons. The certificate or affidavits are the minimum basis for such an order ofthe ordinary, and are of an evidentiary nature. They do not make it mandatory that the ordinary issue the order, for this would deprive him of the jurisdiction and discretion granted him by Ga. Code Ann. 24-1901 (9), as amended by Ga. Laws 1969, pp. 505, 541. See also Comer v. Ross, 100 Ga. 652 (1897). If the affidavits are filed, they do make it mandatory that the ordinary exercise discretion, but do not require that he exercise it in a particular way. His order should be based upon sufficient evidence. See Harrington v. Frye, 116 Ga. App. 755 (1967); Ga. Code Ann. 24-104 (6). The affidavits must not only contain statements as to the subject's condition and dangerous propensities, but also the observations upon which this conclusion is based. The weight of evidence necessary for a detention order is

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not that there is "probably cause" for it, but, rather, that there is "sufficient evidence."
As to determining legislative intent by construing statutes in pari materia, see Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9); Botts v. Southeastern Pipe-Line Co., 190 Ga. 689 (1940); Hawes v. Dinkler, 224 Ga. 785 (1968).
The common.law emphasized the element of actual insanity before a person could be taken into custody. Porter v. Ritch, 39 A. 169 (Conn. 1898); Crawford v. Brown, 151 N.E. 911 (Ill. 1926). Georgia now permits taking to custody where there is apparent insanity based on reasonable grounds. Such statutes have been held valid. See Plancich v. Williamson, 357 P. 2d 693 (Wash. 1961); annotations beginning 92 A.L.R. 2d 570 (1963).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-30 (4/25/72)
Jury commissioners; age of eligibility to serve: A jury commissioner is a public officer. Edge v. Holcomb, 135 Ga. 765 (1910). No person may hold public office until he is 21 years of age. Ga. Code Ann. 89-101 (1). Section 10 ofGa. Laws 1972, p. 193, which reduces the general age of majority from 21 to 18, expressly states that the Act does not affect age requirements for public officers; therefore, a jury commissioner must be at least 21 years old.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-31 (4/28/72)
Civil Court of Richmond County; salary of chiefjudge: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 3365, which refers to the "Judge of the Civil Court," and which fixes compensation, is construed to mean only the chief judge ofthe Civil Court ofRichmond County, rather than to include the associate judge. When this Act is construed with Ga. Laws 1971, p. 2745, and Ga. Laws 1971, p. 3103 (a population bill relating to salaries in the Civil Court of Richmond County), it will be noted that the associate judge has been receiving a salary smaller than that of the chiefjudge, and is allowed to practice law, whereas the chief judge is not. It would appear that the legislative intent was to apply the 1972 statute exclusively to the chief judge.

321

U72-34

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-32 (4/28/72)

Municipal elections; referendums: A city referendum must be held according to the Municipal Election Code, Ga. Laws 1968, p. 885, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 34A. This, being a general law, may not be varied by a local Act. See Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401). Registration of electors is governed by Ga. Code Ann. 34A-507. Qualification of voters is governed by Ga. Code Ann. 34A-501, except that because offederal rulings, durational residence requirements are no longer valid. See Dunn u. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Abbot u. Carter, (three judge ct., N. D. Ga., No. 15689).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-33 (4/28/72)
Elections; county boards of education: Candidates for board of education in DeKalb County must qualify according to the Georgia Election Code, Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, as amended by Ga. Laws 1970, p. 347, codified in material part as Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 34-10. The Election Code, being a law of general application, must be complied with. See Ga. Constitution, Art. XII, Sec. I (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 2-80). This means that a candidate, unless he is an incumbent who has previously complied with the Election Code, must file notice with the ordinary. The notice must be accompanied by a nominating petition, or the candidate must have been nominated in a party primary.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-34 (5/5/72)
Motor vehicles; accident reports: The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 556 (Ga. Code Ann. Chs. 68-15 to 68-17; Ga. Code Ann. 68-9906, 68-9927) applies generally to traffic on highways. Ga. Code Ann. 68-1601, however, declares Ga. Code Ann. 68-1618 to 68-1625 and Ga. Code Ann. 68-9927 applicable to highways "and elsewhere throughout the state." The case of Cook u. State, 220 Ga. 463 (1964), construes this provision to make drunken driving contrary to Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625 an offense, even though not committed on a highway. Since Ga. Code Ann. 68-1623, requiring accident reports, is also among those sections referred to in Ga. Code Ann. 68-1601, it would follow the rule in the Cook case. It is, therefore, concluded that all

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accidents must be reported, even though they may occur on private property.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-35 (5/5/72)
Public property; restricted use: There are at least two types of public property: first, property such as public parks, open to the general public for its use and pleasure; second, publicly-owned property restricted to use by a governmental agency, such as prison busses, highway department trucks and the like. Areas reserved for parking by public employees fall into the second category.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-36 (5/8172)
Retirement of employees; state patrol and G.B.I. agents: The Employees Retirement System Act, Ga. Laws 1949, p. 138, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-25), provides special benefits for persons involuntarily separated without prejudice. See especially Ga. Code Ann. 40-2505 (3). By Ga. Laws 1970, p. 26, effective July 1, 1970, Ga. Code Ann. 40-2518 was amended to establish lower mandatory retirement ages for officers and agents of the Uniform Division, Department of Public Safety and for G.B.I. agents. All affected personnel employed prior to July 1, 1970, and forced to retire by reason of the 1970 Act, are entitled to involuntary separation benefits. The retirement rights under a job accepted prior to the effective date of the 1970 Act have become vested. See Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719 (1936); Bender v. Anglin, 207 Ga. 108 (1950); Burks v. Board of Trustees, 214 Ga. 251 (1958); Webb v. Whitley, 114 Ga. App. 153 (1966).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-37 (5/9/72)
Age of majority; guardianships: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193, which reduced the age of majority from 21 to 18, specifically provides that it is not applicable to "legal instruments or court decisions in existence prior to its effective date" [July 1, 1972]. Guardianships exist under court decrees or legal instruments. Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 49-1. Therefore, the age of majority as to guardianships created prior to July 1, 1972 remains 21. Statutes usually have a

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U72-40

prospective, rather than a retrospective operation. Ga. Code Ann. 102-104; F. H Ross and Co. v. White, 224 Ga. 324 (1968). An existing guardianship, however, could be amended upon application to the ordinary so as to change the age of majority of the ward. See Hardin v. McCord, 72 Ga. 239 (1884). [See Op. Att'y Gen. U71-40, infra.]

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-38 (5/11/72)
Consolidation of municipal and county governments: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 2211, provides that the governments of Bibb County and of the City of Macon may be consolidated upon a referendum wherein the consolidation is approved by both the voters of the county and ofthe city, tabulated separately. This is in line with the procedure for ratification of local constitutional amendments. See Ga. Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8101). In such a referendum the votes of citizens of Macon should be tabulated twice: first as citizens ofthe city, then, again, as residents of the county. See Op. Att'y Gen. 66-263. This is in accord with the Georgia Constitution. The Constitution of the United States does not require a strict majority rule on every issue. See Gordon v. Lance, 403 U. S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1889, 29 L. Ed. 2d 273 (1971).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-39 (5/11172)
County boards of education; sale of schoolhouse sites: A county board of education cannot sell a schoolhouse site until it first finds by resolution thatthe site is"unnecessary or inconvenient for school purposes." Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 641 (1952). The contemplated sale of such a site to a city, with lease back to the county for school purposes, is obviously inconsistent with these required findings.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-40 (5/17172)
Age of majority; collection of child support payments by Probation Department: The Probation Department is correct in continuing to collect child support payments for individuals between 18 and 21 when such payments arise out of court orders

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in existence prior to July 1, 1972, the effective date of Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193, which changed the age of majority from 21 to 18. The 1972 Act specifically exempts from change the status of persons whose age of majority is material in legal instruments or court decrees in existence prior to the effective date. See Op. Att'y Gen. U72-37, supra.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-41 (5/19/72)
Superior courts; compensation and employee rights ofsecretaries to judges and district attorneys: Secretaries to judges of the superior court and to district attorneys, when such secretaries are employed under Ga. Laws 1972, p. 617, may be compensated from funds derived from the existing superior court appropriation, Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 111, 114. The Act of1972 did not specify an effective date, and, therefore, is effective as of July 1, 1972, according to Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1364 (Ga. Code Ann. 102-111). These secretaries would not be eligible for participation in any state retirement plan in the absence of further legislation placing them under such a plan. They would, however, be eligible for state health insurance under Ga. Laws 1963, p. 277 (Ga. Code Ann. 89-1201), since that law covers all full-time state employees paid directly from the state treasury. See Op. Att'y Gen. 70-106.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-42 (5/22/72)
Intoxicating liquor; time of referendum as to legalization: According to Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1003), an election as to legalization ofliquor will be held within 30 days after the filing of a petition with the ordinary. The word "filing" here means the date the petition is handed to the ordinary, not the date upon which the petition is determined to be valid. The situation is comparable to the filing of nomination petitions. See Ga. Laws 1970, pp. 347, 362 (Ga. Code 34-1010, 34-1011). Attention is called to changes in liquor referendum laws made by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 207.

325

U72-45

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-43 (5/23/72)

Statutes; clerical error in municipal annexation Act: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 3685, provides for the annexation of certain territory by the city of Milledgeville, but contains a clerical error as to the number of feet on one side of the property. This annexation proposal is subject to referendum, and the Act must be submitted to the electorate as written without omissions. The Act has been drawn and approved by the Governor in accord with Ga. Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. VII (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 2-19) and is a valid Act in spite of imperfections. The election will not be abortive, since the courts do not allow a clerical error to defeat legislative intent. Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50 (1950); Cairo Banking Co. v. Ponder, 131 Ga. 708 (1908). See, specifically, as to errors in annexation Acts, City of Jesup v. Bennet, 226 Ga. 606 (1970); Town of Roswell v. Ezzard, 128 Ga. 43 (1907).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-44 (5/30/72)
County court of Baldwin County; compensation of solicitor: There is no conflict between provisions as to effective dates in Ga. Laws 1972, p. 3314, relating to the county court of Baldwin County. Section 2 ofthis Act provides that automatic increases in the salary ofthe solicitor ofthis court shall begin after July 1, 1973. Section 5 provides that the Act in general (which governs a number of other matters) shall become effective January 1, 1973. These provisions can be reconciled by construing the Act as effective January 1, merely postponing the salary increase for the solicitor until July 1.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-45 (6/5/72)
Probation; conditions in drug cases: Under Ga. Laws 1956, p. 27; 1958, p. 15; 1965, p. 413 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2711), a judge placing a defendant on probation may impose conditions. According to Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1960), he may also impose conditions in addition to those enumerated in the Code section. In a drug abuse case, such conditions may require that the probationer submit his person, residence and vehicle to search and seizure at any time without a search warrant whenever requested to do so by his probation officer or law enforcement officer. See People v. Mason, 488 P. 2d 630 (1971); cert. den., 405 U. S. 1016 (1972).

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326

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-46 (6/7/72)
Intoxicating liquor; municipal referendum as to sale: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 207, provides for the legalization ofliquor sales by petition and referendum in municipalities. This is in addition to the method of legalization in counties authorized by Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1002 et seq.). The municipal election is quite separate from any previous county election, and the failure of legalization at a county election would not prohibit a municipal election during the following two years under Ga. Code Ann. 58-1010. A municipal election can be held as soon as the petition procedures are complied with.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-47 (6/7/72)
Intoxicating liquor; sale near church property: Ga. Laws 1935, p. 73 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-724), prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages within 100 yards of a church. This restriction applies in all directions for 100 yards from the property line of the grounds surrounding the church. See Ops. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 461. It does not apply, however, to church property, such as a parsonage, entirely separated from the church grounds.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-48 (6/9/72)
Municipal corporations; business and professional taxes: Under Ga. Laws 1969, p. 426 (Ga. Code Ann. 92-307) municipalities may levy professional taxes upon attorneys within the limitations of said law. See Brown v. City of Atlanta, 221 Ga. 121 (1965); Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Hines, 53 Ga. 616 (1875). Such a professional tax is not to be confused with a license to practice, however. A provision requiring an attorney to pay a municipal license fee as a condition precedent to practice has been held invalid. Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41 (1971), quoting Mayor of Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga. 460, 462 (1867). Such a license requirement would be an attempt to regulate the practice oflaw, which is the prerogative of the state. See Ga. Laws 1963, p. 70 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 9-7). Any ordinance or local law

327

U72-50

enacted in a case for which provision has been made by general law
is invalid. Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401).
As to whether municipal corporations may levy business taxes upon national banks: they may not as of the date of this opinion, but may levy such taxes upon the effective date of the permanent amendment to 12 U.S.C. 548, January 1, 1973. See history of this amendment, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1969, Vol. 2, pp.1598-99. Taxes upon state and federal banks must be upon the same basis. See Ga. Laws 1952, p. 46 (Ga. Code Ann. 92-2406.1). On determination oflegislative intent in interpretation ofstatutes, see United States v. Congress ofIndustrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); Washington v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 136 Ga. 638 (1911). Unequivocal language in a statute obviates judicial construction. Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U. S. 98 (1937); Latimer v. Sears Roebuck Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960); Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U.S. 550 (1892); Gazan v. Henry, 183 Ga. 30, 106 A.L.R. 498 (1936); 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, 226. A municipal charter or other enactment of the General Assembly delegating the power to tax constitutes "state legislation." City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368 (1960).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-49 (6/9/72)
Intoxicating liquor; municipal operation of liquor store not authorized: No municipal corporation may operate a store for the sale of alcoholic beverages, for such an operation would create a conflict of interest between the duty to regulate and the need for profit. See Op. Att'y Gen. 69-119. There is nothing in Ga. Laws 1972, p. 207, authorizing municipal liquor referendums, which changes this principle.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-50 (6/21/72)
Housing authorities; municipal housing authority cannot manage church owned property: The powers ofhousing authorities are stated in Ga. Laws 1937, p. 210, Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-11. Question is whether the Athens Housing Authority can contractually engage itself to manage an apartment complex built and owned by a Catholic Church pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1715 Z-1. It cannot legally do so. Under Ga. Code Ann. 99-1115 (b),

U72-51

328

authorities may prepare, carry out, lease, and operate projects; and under subsection (f) of that section, they can cooperate with "the city, the county, the state, or any political subdivision." None of these powers include management contracts with private organizations, and powers are strictly construed. See Beazley v. DeKalb County, 210 Ga. 41 (1953). A further reason for holding the proposed contract inoperable is that under 12 U.S.C. 1715Z-1, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development could require that the project be operated at a profit, whereas Ga. Code Ann. 99-1116 requires that projects be operated on a nonprofit basis.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-51 (6/23/72)
Elections; voting by former citizens: A citizen of Georgia who moves to another state, beginning residence therein after the 30th day next preceding the election for President and Vice-President, should be permitted to register to vote for such officers up to 14 days prior to the election, and to vote, either in person, or by absentee ballot, assuming he satisfied the requirements for absentee voting. See Ga. Code Ann. 34-602 (8), as based upon Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., pp. 26, 45; 1968, p. 847; 1970, p. 383; 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 61, 64. This interpretation is intended to comply with the legislative intent in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9). This interpretation is further strengthened in that it comports with federal holdings and enactments. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972); 42 U.S. C. 1973 aa-1
(e).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-52 (717/72)
Intoxicating liquor: There is no general provision of law which would prohibit a nonprofit corporation from engaging in the sale of alcoholic beverages.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-53 (7/12/72)
Moving expenses of Employment Security Agency personnel: U. S. Department of Labor, Employment Security Manual, 2050, authorizes the use offederal funds to pay moving expenses ofstate

329

U72-56

agency personnel whenever this is in accord with state law. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 806 (Ga. Code Ann. 54-645), authorizes the Georgia Commissioner ofLabor to determine what are proper expenditures of federal funds for employment security purposes. He may, therefore, authorize payment of the moving expenses from said funds. Op. Att'yGen. 72-63, holding that state funds cannot be used for moving expenses, has no application to this situation.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-54 (7/14/72)
Superior court judges emeritus; eligibility: A judge, otherwise eligible for emeritus appointment, must, according to Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a), be in at least his 19th year of service. According to the same Ga. Code Ann. section, World War II military service is counted; each full year as a year, and each fraction of a year as a full year. Therefore, military service of three years, two months and 24 days counts as four years, leaving only 14 years and one day to be served as a judge necessary for appointment.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-55 (7/17/72)
Witness fees: Ga. Laws 1966, p. 502 (Ga. Code Ann. 38-801 (d)), provides a $4 per diem for witnesses. This applies to both civil and criminal cases. See Op. Att'y Gen. 70-11. The fee is payable whether the witness is a resident of the forum county or not. If he is a resident ofthat county, he cannot demand payment in advance. If he is a nonresident of the forum county, a subpoena in a civil case, in order to be valid, must be accompanied by the tender ofone day's fee plus mileage at eight cents per mile. The nonresident cannot, however, demand advance payment in a criminal case. See Op. Att'y Gen. 67-311.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-56 (7/19/72)
Game and fish; property seized by wildlife rangers: A wildlife ranger is a peace officer for the purpose ofseizing property used in certain violations. Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-118, 45-529). Property seized for forfeiture shall, under Ga. Code Ann.

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45-529, as modified by the Reorganization Act (Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1015, Sections 1501, 1527), be delivered to the Commissioner of Natural Resources. Property seized as evidence, on the other hand, is under the order and control of the appropriate court. See State v. Jacobs, 30 N.E. 2d 432 (Ohio 1940). Ga. Laws 1967, p. 749 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-3101, 27-3102), providing for seizing certain
weapons as contraband, relates only to weapons used against persons. As to inventory and further disposition by the court of things seized, see Ga. Laws 1966, p. 567 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-302, 27-310, 27-313).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-57 (7/24172)
Employment security; powers of State Department of Labor Board of Review: All statutory references herein are to the Employment Security Act, Ga. Laws 1937, p. 806, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 54-6). Ga. Code Ann. 54-612, 54-613, 54-618 all relate to notification ofclaimants ofdeterminations as to payment. These sections refer only to "mailing" the notice. Question: Can the review board require this to be by registered mail? No. While the board has broad powers under Ga. Code Ann. 54-615, 54-616, administrative boards are limited to powers expressly granted, or that arise by necessary implication. Bentley v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 152 Ga. 836 (1922). There is nothing in the statute giving the board power to enlarge the requirements for notice.
Ga. Code Ann. 54-612 provides that one wishing to do so must file an appeal within seven days after the "mailing" of a determination. Ga. Code Ann. 54-613 requires that one wishing to appeal further must do so within 10 days after the "mailing" of a decision on review. The board of review has issued a rule changing these requirements to seven days and 10 days, respectively, after the "receipt" of such notices. Is this rule valid? No. The board cannot enlarge a limitation period specifically set by statute. See Jordan v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 343 (1972); Horton v. Huiet, 113 Ga. App. 166 (1966); Tuttle v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa. Supr. Ct. 46; New Jersey Board of Review Decision, BR-33511, March 28, 1955. On interpretation of statutes, see State Revenue Commission v. Alexander, 54 Ga. App. 295 (1936); Drake v. Drewry, 109 Ga. 399 (1899).

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U72-59

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-58 (7/24/72)
Intoxicating liquor; sale by municipality: By Ga. Laws 1898, p. 216, the City of Leesburg was authorized to operate a liquor dispensary. This Act was never formally repealed, but was repealed by the general terms of the 18th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1919, which prohibited all liquor sales. See Ga. Code Ann. 1-824 to 1-826). The 21st Amendment (Ga. Code Ann. 1-835 to 1-837) repealed the 18th in 1933, but neither this fact nor the enactment of the Georgia legalizing statute, Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-10), had the effect of reenacting the 1898 statute or of authorizing the city to operate a liquor store under Ga. Code Ann. 58-1001 to 58-1010. In fact, a general revision of an entire subject-matter, such as that of the 1937-38 Act, has the effect of repealing prior inconsistent laws. Leonard u. State, 204 Ga. 465 (2) (1948); Mosley u. Lanier, 213 Ga. 373 (1) (1957); International Minerals, etc., Co. u. Bledsoe, 126 Ga. App. 243, 247 (1972); Buttrill u. Thomas, 126 Ga. App. 498 (1972); Thompson u. Ga. Power Co., 73 Ga. App. 587 (1946). Therefore, since the 1898 statute is repealed, the city falls under the general rule that a county or municipality cannot engage in the liquor business, since this would create a conflict of interest between the need to regulate and the need for profit. See Crummey u. State, 83 Ga. App. 459, 463 (1951); City ofAtlanta u. Henry Grady Hotel Corp., 220 Ga. 249, 257 (1964).
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-59 (7/24/72)
Superior court judges emeritus; calculation of military service: Military service during periods of armed conflict are counted as one year of military service for one year of eligibility and any fraction of a year of military service as a whole year for eligibility. Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a, 24-2609a). Therefore, military service from July 1943 through February 1946 counts as three-not four-years. That the service was performed in four different calendar years is immaterial. See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-14. Where there has been a miscalculation of years ofmilitary service and a resultant overpayment into the fund made, the administrative error should be corrected and the overpayment refunded. Board ofCommissioners u. Clay, 214 Ga. 70 (1958).

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332

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-60 (7/24/72)
Age ofpersons; elections: Ga. Code Ann. 89-101 (1) provides that no one shall hold public office until he has reached the age of 21 years. The Age of Majority Act, Ga. Laws 1972, pp. 193, 199, expressly retains this provision. The restriction to persons 21 or over, however, relates to holding public office, not to running for office, and all statutes limiting the right to hold office are strictly construed. See McLendon v. Everett, 205 Ga. 713 (1949). The restriction, therefore, would not prevent a person under 21 years of age from having his name on the ballot if he will become 21 on or before the date for assuming office.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-61 (7/26/72)
Insurance and survivor's benefits of murdered state employee: Where the widow of a state employee has been convicted of his murder, and the widow was beneficiary in his state life insurance policy, the proceeds should be paid to his estate, rather than to the widow. Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 687, officially codified as Ga. Code 56-2506. Survivor's benefits under the retirement system, however, are not governed by the cited Act, and must be paid to the widow.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-62 (7/26172)
Negligence in treating victims of accident or emergency; Good Samaritan Law limited: At common law there is ordinarily no duty upon a person to render first aid to an accident victim, and one who does so is liable for reasonable or ordinary care. 57 Am. Jur. 2d, Negligence, 45; Restatement, Torts 2d, 324. The Georgia Good Samaritan Law, Ga. Laws 1962, p. 534 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-930), exempts volunteers aiding victims from liability for their negligence as long as the assistance is rendered in good faitli. Where, however, the victim is employed by an industry, which must comply with 29 C.F.R. 1910, requiring the employer to maintain certain first-aid facilities, the employer and persons

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U72-65

employed by him in a first-aid capacity are not volunteers, but are under a legal duty to assist. They are not protected by the Good
Samaritan Law, and the employer and his first-aid employees are responsible to exercise reasonable care. See 56 C.J.S., Master and Servant, 162; 53 Am. Jur. 2d, Master and Servant, 194; Restatement, Agency 2d, 354, 512 (2).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-63 (7/27/72)
Bail: Readmission to bail, following forfeiture ofthe initial bond is discretionary with the court, and the court's order is necessary for each new bail in the same case. Ga. Code Ann. 27-903, as amended by Ga. Laws 1971, p. 408. Note that prior to the 1971 amendment, this Code section restricted acceptances ofbail for the same offense to twice.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-64 (7/27/72)
Employees Retirement System; effect of improper termination: An employee governed by the Employees Retirement System Act, Ga. Laws 1949, p. 138, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-25), was notified that his position had been abolished. He was then terminated and his contributions refunded to him according to Ga. Code Ann. 40-2503. It was later determined that the termination was in error, and he resumed his position. Under these circumstances, he could return his contributions immediately and reestablish his creditable service notwithstanding the five-year waiting period provided for in Ga. Code Ann. 40-2504 (12).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-65 (7/27/72)
District attorneys emeritus: A district attorney must pay the contributions for service as a city court solicitor if time so served is to be counted for district attorney emeritus retirement benefits. Service as city court solicitor is creditable under Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2902a), but the district attorney must make payments into the fund to cover the entire period for which retirement is to be paid. See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-25. While Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909a sets a time limit upon when

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payments for military service are to be made, it is silent as to the time when service as a city court solicitor must be paid for. Consequently, the district attorney may make these payments at the conclusion of his first term of office.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-66 (7/30172)
Juvenile courts; appointment and compensation of counsel: The Juvenile Court Code, Ga. Laws 1971, p. 709, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 24A, provides that a juvenile offender is entitled to counsel at all stages of the proceeding. Ga. Code Ann. 24A-2001 (a). If the juvenile is indigent, the juvenile court judge may appoint counsel to be compensated from county funds. Ga. Code Ann. 24A-3401 (3). See also Argersin~er u. Hamlin, 35 L. Ed. 2d 530 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). While Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5702) restricts the purposes for which county money can be used, subsection (3) ofthat section lists operation ofthe courts as a proper purpose. Further, while a county cannot legally pay out money without a clear authorization under the law, Ga. Code Ann. 24A3401 constitutes such an authorization. See also Bibb County u. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429 (1955).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-67 (7/30172)
Ordinaries; maintenance ofrecords: Ga. Code Ann. 24-1804 (8) requires each ordinary to keep a book for each of nine enumerated purposes. This means a separate book for each purpose. An Act which clearly declares the legislative intent is not open to construction. Floyd County u. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313 (1921).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-68 (8/1/72)
MARTA tax: The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority tax of one percent is both a sales and use tax. For discussion of locale ofMARTA tax, see Op. Att'y Gen. 72-32. As to use taxes, see Independent Publishing Co. u. Hawes, 119 Ga. App. 858, 861 (1969). See also, Ga. Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360, especially Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a (1). While the Sales Tax Act (Ga. Code Ann. 92-3412a) makes provision for credit for payments

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U72-71

made to another state against use tax, there is no such credit under MARTA except for taxes paid elsewhere for rapid transit purposes. Resolution, Fulton County, Art. IV, 3, December 29, 1971. See Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2243; 1971, p. 2082. Consequently, a Fulton County resident, who had purchased an automobile in Florida and paid four percent sales tax in that state could not thereby claim credit against the MARTA tax.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-69 (8/7/72)
Lotteries: So-called sweepstakes and other promotional contest schemes of a lottery-like nature are illegal. See Op. Att'y Gen. 68-442; Boyd v. Piggly Wiggly, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 628 (1967). The present Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 26-27, based upon Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1317 et seq., contains substantially the same prohibitions against lotteries as were included in the former law. See Tierce v. State, 122 Ga. App. 845 (1970).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-70 (8/7/72)
Tax assessments: County boards of tax assessors have a discretion as to fixing property valuations. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 517 (Ga. Code Ann. 92-6911). This valuation is subject to arbitration. Ga. Code Ann. 92-6912, as amended by Ga. Laws 1958, p. 386. Assessment at a certain value after arbitration does not preclude the taxing authorities from fixing a different value for a succeeding year, even though no improvements are made on the property after the arbitration.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-71 (8/7/72)
Conflicts of interest; school construction: A contract between a municipality or its independent school system and a construction corporation for the building of a public school probably is wholly void and unenforceable when the president of the construction corporation also is the mayor ofthe municipality, a member ofthe municipal board of education, and one of the officials by and through whom the municipality and its school system conduct municipal and school business. Furthermore, no assurance can be

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given that criminal violations might not arise from such a financial transaction. See Ga. Code Ann. 26-2306, officially codified from Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1307; Montgomery v. City ofAtlanta, 162 Ga. 534 (2) (1926); Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759 (1937); Ops. Att'y Gen. 69-343, 71-124, U70-175, and U71-l.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-72 (8/11172)
Wine; storage in dry county; questions as to legalization of sale: The manufacture, storage, and sale of wine is governed by Ga. Laws 1935, p. 492 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-8), and by Ga. Laws 1937, p. 851 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-9). Wine is not governed by the Intoxicating Liquor Law. See Gay v. Clements, 214 Ga. 136 (1958). Neither of the cited laws prohibits the storage ofwine in a county wherein the sale is illegal, but requirements of the State Revenue Department should be complied with. When the sale of wine has been prohibited by referendum under Ga. Code Ann. 58-807, no positive answer can be given as to how such referendum result can be reversed. This is because of conflict in appellate court decisions. See Wharton v. State, 67 Ga. App. 545 (1942), holding that a second referendum might be held upon the sale of liquor under Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-10), even in the absence of clear statutory authority. On the other hand, see City ofAlbany v. Bond, 224 Ga. 712 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court apparently reached a contrary result respecting a mixed drink referendum proposed to be held under Ga. Laws 1964, p. 771 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1083). (Both above decisions based upon statutes prior to certain amendments.)

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-73 (8/11/72)
Intoxicating liquor; matters oflegalization, licensing and control under Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-10): When a county becomes wet, liquor businesses within corporate limits are licensed by the city; those outside of corporate limits by the county. Ga. Code Ann. 58-1031. Under this section, the licensing authority has the power to pass upon the qualifications of an applicant. The maximum license fee to be charged a manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer is $5,000. Ga. Code Ann. 58-1032. Neither a city nor a county can legally operate a

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U72-76

liquor store. See Op. Att'y Gen. U72-58. The maximum excise tax allowed upon spirituous liquor is 80 cents per wine gallon. Ga. Code Ann. 58-1038. The proceeds of licensing must be handled in accordance with Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701) and Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5702). As to determination ofnumber and locations of licenses, the licensing authority has power to adopt all reasonable regulations. See Ga. Code Ann. 58-1028, 58-1029, 58-1031. Sale ofliquor is a privilege, not a right. Ga. Code Ann. 58-1068. If a county legalization referendum fails, a city may immediately provide for its own referendum under Ga. Laws 1972, p. 207. Op. Att'y Gen. U72-46.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-74 (8/11/72)
Open Records Law; school files ofminor children: Ga. Laws 1959, p. 88 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2701), the Open Records Law, is generally interpreted to intend that records kept on behalfofthe public shall be open and that those kept for the benefit of an individual shall not. See Op. Att'y Gen. 68-507. Common sense and good judgment should prevail, but there is no absolute legal right on the part of a parent to inspect his minor child's school records.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-75 (8/11/72)
Public funds; expenditures by state agency handling both state and federal funds: The Georgia State Crime Commission can establish policies for the expenditure of federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grants which comply with federal law. Expenditures of state matching funds must comply with state regulations. See Financial Guide for Administration and Action Grants (LEAA), Section III F., p. 20. This is analogous to a situation wherein a state agency can spend federal funds for moving expenses of employees, but not state funds. See Op. Att'y Gen. U72-53, supra.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-76 (8/11/72) Administration of LEAA grants: It is not a conflict of interest

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for the individual holding positions of President of the National Association of Citizens Crime Commissions, State Crime Commission Chairman, and Executive Director of the Metropolitan Atlanta Crime Commission to apply for a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant on behalfof the national group when the funds will be administered through the state and the work done by the metropolitan commission. This is in accord with 42 U.S.C.A. 3701, and assumes that the individual will make no personal profit from the transaction.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-77 (8/11/72)
Elections; notation of incumbency on municipal ballots: Under the Municipal Elections Code, Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 885, 920, as officially codified in Ga. Code Ann. 34A-1002, 34A-1003, the incumbency of a candidate must be noted on an official primary ballot. There is no such requirement as to election ballots (Ga. Code Ann. 34A-1004), and incumbency should not be noted thereon.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-78 (8/17172)
Motor vehicles, golf carts as: A golf cart is a vehicle other than a tractor, not operated upon a track, and propelled by other than muscular power. It thus falls within the definition of "motor vehicle" set out in Ga. Laws 1927, p. 226 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-101). If it is to be operated upon a public road, the operator must comply with the registration requirements of Ga. Laws 1927, p. 226 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-201) and with the inspection requirements of Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 616, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1726). He must also comply with all equipment requirements of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 68-17.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-79 (8/21/72)
Cancellation of security deeds and writs of execution from record: To cancel a mortgage or security deed from record, the mortgagor or grantor should present the instrument to the clerk with a written order from the mortgagee or grantee stating that the debt has been paid in full. The clerk should then copy the order

339

U72-80

upon the face of the record and write on the record "satisfied," dating and signing the entry. Ga. Code Ann. 67-117, 67-1306; Burgess u.Simmons, 207 Ga. 291, 297 (1950). The written order need not be physically on the security deed. See Blumenfield u. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 168 Ga. 327 (1929). A fraudulent cancellation does not affect the validity of a security deed held by a grantee or his assigns. Luther u. Clay, 100 Ga. 236 (1896). An assignment need not be attached to the instrument. However, ifthe clerk has reason to be suspicious, he should require that the assignment be presented. Luther u. Banks, 111 Ga. 374 (1900). The clerk may assume that the presentation of an instrument for cancellation by a corporate officer is bona fide in the absence ofreasonable grounds for suspicions to the contrary. Massell u. Fourth National Bank of Macon, 38 Ga. App. 601 (1928). The clerk is generally not liable for the cancellation ofan instrument on a forged order unless grounds of suspicion exist. See Luther u. Banks, supra. The need for a corporate seal with reference to cancellation of security instruments has been largely eliminated. Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 565, 571, 818; 1969, pp. 152, 159 (Ga. Code Ann. 22-104, 22-5106). There is no statutory requirement for attestation of the signature to the cancellation. Other jurisdictions have held that no attestation is necessary. See Charleston u. Ryan, 22 S.C. 339 (1884); Blalock u. Windham, 229 Ala. 413, 157 So. 486 (1934).
As to satisfaction of executions, see Ga. Laws 1966, p. 408 (Ga. Code Ann. 39-609, 39-610). Note that the amount of a partial payment should be entered on the execution; if total payment is made, the execution should be cancelled and the judgment marked "Satisfied." Where judgment has been rendered it will become dormant seven years after execution has been issued unless it is kept alive by a bona fide public effort to enforce it according to the method prescribed in Ga. Code Ann. 110-1001. See First National Bank of Bainbridge u. McCaskill, 27 Ga. App. 391 (1921). If a judgment is allowed to become dormant, it can be revived within the ensuing three years by scire facias or by suit. See Ga. Code Ann. 110-1002, 110-1003. If no effort is made to revive a dormant judgment, it will become unenforceable at the end of the three years. Watkins u. Conway, 221 Ga. 374 (1965). Therefore, the clerk should remove executions from the general execution docket 10 years after issuance when there has been no effort to enforce.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-80 (8/21172) Tax executions: Tax executions in rem are issuable only if the

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property is unreturned and the owner is unknown. Ga. Code Ann. 92-8103. Note that under Ga. Laws 1969, p. 960 (Ga. Code Ann. 92-6202.1), where property has been returned or taxes paid for a preceding year, it is deemed returned for the current year. Taxing authorities must make reasonable effort to ascertain the property owner. See Suttles v. The B-X Corp., 212 Ga. 221 (1956). A tax execution against the estate of a named person is not an execution in rem, is against no person as defendant, and is, therefore, void. Execution should issue in personam against the personal representative, against an heir, an agent ofthe deceased, or against the occupant of the property. See Miller v. Brooks, 120 Ga. 232 (1904); Wilson v. Wester, 181 Ga. 130 (1935); Norris v. Coley, 100 Ga. 544 (1897).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-81 (8/21/72)
Intoxicating liquors; mixed drink referendums: The "mixed drink" or "sale by the drink" law, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 771; 1969, p. 1140 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1083), is amendatory of Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 103 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-10). Therefore, it is governed by the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 58-10. See Hawes v. Dinkler, 224 Ga. 785 (1968). Ga. Code Ann. 58-1002 provides for liquor elections "as hereinafter provided for" and Ga. Code Ann. 58-1005 provides that such elections shall not be held at the time of any other election (primary or general). Therefore, the election as to mixed drinks provided for in Ga. Code Ann. 58-1083 may not be held in conjunction with any other election.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-82 (8/21/72)
Motor vehicles; authority of municipalities as to width of mobile homes: The state regulates the width of mobile homes transported along public roads. Ga. Laws 1941, p. 449 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-405). In the absence of an additional statute, a municipality cannot further regulate the width, but can, by ordinance, confine the mobile homes to certain streets if the requirements indicated by Allison v. Medlock, 224 Ga. 37 (1968), are met. The city may also furnish escorts for the mobile homes. If an ordinance attempted to require the mover to furnish escorts, there might result an undue

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U72-85

burden on interstate commerce. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Atlanta v. York Mfg. Co., 155 Ga. 33 (1922).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-83 (8/22/72)
Mobile homes; regulation by counties: Ga. Laws 1971, p. 631, as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 403 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 23-27), governs mobile homes within counties. Section 4 of the 1972 amendment prevents counties from requiring annual renewals of permits. Section 2 of the 1972 amendment makes it mandatory on the county to require a permit for each mobile home used as a residence or for any purpose other than resale. For each such home, the green decal mentioned in Section 3 of the 1972 amendment must be issued. The same is true for mobile homes used as offices by mobile sales lots and construction companies.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-84 (8/23/72)
State Merit System; salary increases for state employees: State Personnel Board Regulation A. 700, to the effect that a person is not eligible for a longevity increase until the person has been at the maximum of the salary range and has not received a salary adjustment (other than an overall adjustment) for at least two years, is in accord with the statute. See Ga. Laws 1971, p. 204 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-2207).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-85 (8/25/72)
Alligator products: It is illegal to import alligator skins from a foreign state to Georgia, and no permit may issue for such purpose. The only method of legally possessing alligators or alligator skins is to hold a license to operate an alligator farm. Violations could result in a fine up to $1,000 and imprisonment up to 12 months. Ga. Laws 1971, p. 236 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-226); Game and Fish Rules and Regulations, 260-2-.6.

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342

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-86 (8/29/72)

Intoxicating liquor; municipal regulations as to sale by the drink: Under Ga. Laws 1964, p. 771; 1969, p. 1140 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1083), municipalities in which sale ofliquor by the drink is legal may regulate the business. This includes authority to set the hours of sale, but there is no statutory requirement that sales cease at a certain hour. Compare Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, 560-2-11-.07, 560-2-5-.10.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-87 (8/30172)
Taxation; collection of delinquent taxes: Where tax is collected by levy and sale, a county may recover, in addition to the taxes due and interest thereon, its costs and all expenses ofthe sale. Ga. Code Ann. 92-8106. No penalty can be assessed without specific statutory authority. State Revenue Commission u. National Biscuit Co., 179 Ga. 90 (1934). It follows that where the property has been returned, the county cannot collect further penalties beyond interest and costs above mentioned. If under Ga. Laws 1972, p. 822, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. 92-4901.1, a tax collector or tax commissioner secures the written consent of the sheriff to act as ex-officio sheriffin the collection of taxes, he cannot, under this statute, "turn over any tax executions to any other levying officials...." He must, therefore, once having assumed this duty, proceed to collect the taxes by levy and sale.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-88 (8/31/72)
Jury commissioners: According to Ga. Laws 1935, p. 151, amending Ga. Code Ann. 59-101, a person may not succeed himself as a jury commissioner. This also applies to persons appointed to fill an unexpired term as jury commissioner, since such a person has held full title to the office. See Tappy u. State, 82 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1955); Mechem, Public Officers and Offices, 133. The power to appoint includes the right to fill vacancies. 67 C.J.S., Officers, 51. Therefore, a person appointed by the superior court judge to fill a vacancy on the board ofjury commissioners is, in law, a jury commissioner.

343

U72-91

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-89 (9/5/72)

nnB. State Merit System; proposed regulations concerning maternity
leave: The merit system proposes changes in its Regulations, 801 and B. 804. Present regulations comply substantially with Office of Contract Compliance Regulations, 41 C.F.R. 60-20.3 (1971), which authorizes a pregnant employee otherwise qualified for leave to take maternity leave. Regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972)), however, go further in that they appear to require disability benefits for prospective mothers. Since the EEOC Regulations are not perfectly clear, and have no judicial interpretation at this time, any new merit system regulations must be promulgated in light of the fact that they may need to be amended when EEOC regulations are more clearly defined or interpreted.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-90 (9/5/72)
Secondary security deeds; rebates: Under Ga. Code Ann. 57-201, based upon Ga. Laws 1966, p. 574; 1967, p. 637; 1968, p. 1086, if a renewal or additional loan upon a secondary security deed is made within 36 months after the first loan, the borrower "shall" receive a rebate according to a described formula. Since this statute is in the public interest and may affect the rights of third persons, the use of the word "shall" renders it mandatory. See Garrison v. Perkins, 137 Ga. 744,755 (1911); Spivey v. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775 (1971). Indeed, under these circumstances, the word "may" is sometimes construed to be mandatory. Spivey u. Mayson, 124 Ga. App. 775 (1971). The language of the Code section, "[t]he borrower shall further have the right to anticipate payment ..." is also mandatory. See Hollman u. Hollman, 88 Cal. App. 748, 264 P. 289 (1928). For comparative statutes in other states, see N. C. Laws 1971,C.1229,S.2;Va.Laws1966,C.285;1968,C.324;1970,C.576.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-91 (9/8/72)
Superior court judges emeritus; calculation of time for retirement: It is true that in calculating time of service for retirement, one year of credit shall be given for each year or fraction of a year spent in the armed forces during a creditable period. Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362, as amended by Ga. Laws 1968, p. 275 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a). This "fraction of a year" means

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fraction of a 12 month period, not fraction of a calendar year. See Ops. Att'y Gen. 72-14, U72-54, U72-59. Moreover, there is no statutory basis for granting a full year's credit for a fraction of a year's service in a civilian state office. Therefore, a judge with three years and four months military service (credited as four years) and four years actual service as a state court solicitor would have eight years creditable service before taking office as judge. He would need to complete 10 full years as judge, and would not be in his "19th year of service" as required by Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a until the lOth anniversary of his assuming office.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-92 (9/8/72)
County board ofeducation employees; workmen's compensation: An employee of a county board of education is a county employee for purposes of the workmen's compensation laws. Workmen's compensation benefits for such employee, if due, are payable from county education funds. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239 (1971).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-93 (9/11/72)
Age of majority; jury duty: The Age of Majority Act, Ga. Laws 1972, p. 193, in lowering the age of majority from 21 to 18, made 18-year-olds subject to jury duty. They should be placed on jury lists, and are subject to grand and petit jury duty. The preexisting law contemplated that jurors would be 21 years of age or older. See Ga. Code Ann. 59-106, 59-201, 59-203, as amended by Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 284; 1968, p. 533; Op. Att'y Gen. 67-187. Persons over 18 now enjoy full citizenship, however, and therefore are entitled to perform jury service. Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Peters v. Kif{, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). The provision of the Age of Majority Act making the 18-year status inapplicable to public officers required to be of a stipulated age is not material to this discussion. A juror or grand juror is not a county officer as is evidenced by Ga. Code Ann. 59-201, making certain county officers incompetent to serve as grand jurors, a provision which would be unnecessary if grand jurors were officers, since Ga. Code Ann. 89-103 prohibits persons from holding more than one county office.

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U72-96

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-94 (9/14/72)
District attorneys emeritus; time served as member of General Assembly as creditable: The amendment by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220 to Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780 (see Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909a) authorizes credit toward retirement of a district attorney emeritus of all time served as a member of the General Assembly up to a maximum of three years, provided payment is made in accordance with the statute. Consequently, a district attorney who served 2 1/2 years in the General Assembly would be entitled to 2 1/2 years credit for that service.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-95 (9/15/72)
District attorneys emeritus; interest upon payments into fund: While Ga. Laws 1949, p. 780 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909a), as amended by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 220, requires that a district attorney seeking credit toward appointment as district attorney emeritus for service in the military, as judge of a city court, or as salaried attorney for the state or any authority thereof, make payments into the fund with interest, the statute is silent as to interest payments for service as city court solicitor, assistant district attorney, or assistant to a district attorney (see Ga. Code Ann. 24-2902a). Consequently, interest need not be paid when paying for service in the three positions last mentioned.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-96 (9/19/72)
Sales and use taxes; no exemption for sale of materials used in church construction: The Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-34A) contains no exemption for sales to churches or for materials used in the construction of churches. Such sales are, therefore, subject to the tax. See Ops. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 866.

U72-97

346

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-97 (9/19/72)

Taxation; procedure by dissatisfied taxpayers: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1125, repealed the arbitration provisions of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-60 and substituted appeal to a "State Board of Equalization." This procedure relates only to taxation of property of public utilities. Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1094, providing for review of county tax assessments, relates to property of taxpayers in general. This Act repeals and superseded Ga. Code Ann. 92-6912, eliminating the arbitration procedure formerly set out therein and substituting an appeal to a county board of equalization. Arbitration has been eliminated as a method of reviewing ad valorem tax matters that may arise in the future.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-98 (9/20/72)
Streets and highways; municipal ordinances upon same subject as statutes: The state has control over all streets and highways and may prescribe their uses and establish the method of control over them. Mayor, etc. ofSavannah u. Ellington Co., 177 Ga. 149 (1933). The General Assembly has authorized municipalities to control streets within their limits. Ga. Laws 1962, p. 140 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-313). A municipality may adopt an ordinance prohibiting conduct also prohibited by statute if the ordinance requires, as proofofits violation, an element which is not necessary to the proof ofthe statutory offense. Loach u. City ofLaFayette, 19 Ga. App. 639 (1917). If this requirement as to element of proof is lacking, an ordinance operating upon the identical subject-matter as a statute invades a preempted field, and is void. Shirley u. City of College Park, 102 Ga. App. 10 (1960). The control of roads which are part ofthe State Highway System is vested in the State Highway Board. Ga. Laws 1950, p. 62, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1602 (a)); Ga. Code Ann. 95-1721, as amended by Ga. Laws 1935, p. 160. The provision authorizing municipalities to control their streets does not give the power to control state highways. Mayor, etc., of Woodbury u. State Highway Dept., 225 Ga. 723, 729 (1969). Further, the use of state's property cannot be regulated by municipal ordinance. See City of Atlanta u. State of Georgia, 181 Ga. 346 (1935).
Therefore, certain ordinances (18-29, 18-32, and 18-33) ofthe City of Columbus are void insofar as they attempt to govern the following matters regulated by state law:

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Obstruction of, or littering public roads. See Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1316, 1317 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-2611, 26-2612). Obstruction of, or throwing foreign matter upon, highways. See Ga. Laws 1956, p. 615 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-609, 95-9922). Selling merchandise while parked upon highway right-of-way (Ga. Code Ann. 95-9922). Littering public or private property. See Ga. Laws 1970, p. 494 (Ga. Code Ann. 85-1603c, 85-1604c).
An ordinance regulating the erection of certain signs upon property is not invalid as operating in a preempted field, since the state law contemplates the enactment of more restrictive ordinances. See Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess., pp. 5, 21.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U7299 (9/22/72)
Mountain Judicial Circuit; court reporter's compensation: The compensation basis for the court reporter of the Mountain Judicial Circuit has been changed several times by local Acts (Ga. Laws 1960, p. 258; 1970, p. 332; 1971, p. 316). Under the current law, reports of criminal proceedings in the superior courts or hearings in the superior courts are covered by the reporter's salary, but the county remains liable under the fee system for such records as may be necessary in proceedings such as coroners' inquests or habeas corpus proceedings, which are civil in nature. (For procedure in coroners' inquests, see Ga. Laws 1953, p. 602 (Ga. Code Ann. 21-210 to 21-213); record in habeas corpus cases, see Ga. Code Ann. 50-124). Since the compensation is on differing bases, the county fiscal authorities should require the court reporter to itemize his services in rendering statements so that authorization of payment can be ascertained.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-100 (9/27/72)
~xemptions from taxation: City ordinance exempting parcels of property exceeding five acres in area from ad valorem taxes until the parcel is subdivided violates Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-2504), and the ordinance is void.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-101 (10/2/72)
Prisons and prisoners; detainers where inmate to be released has appeal pending: The Detainer Act, Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1110 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-330 to 77-336), relates to retention of prisoners scheduled to stand trial on pending indictments, accusations or informations. The Act does not specifically mention prisoners with appeals pending upon prior convictions. There is nothing in the Act, however, which would prohibit either a district attorney or a sheriff from writing the Board ofCorrections that such a situation exists with reference to a prisoner, and from sending an arresting officer with a warrant to pick up the prisoneruponrelease.SeeOps. Att'y Gen. 68-358, 68-502. On detainer, generally, see Ops.Att'y Gen. 68-295, 69-268, 69-410.
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-102 (10/6/72)
Drug offenses; jurisdiction of, and punishment for first offense of possession of one ounce or less of marijuana: This offense, under Ga. Laws 1971, p. 271 (Ga. Code Ann. 79A-9917), carries a penalty of imprisonment not to exceed one year or a fine not to exceed $1,000 or both. The purpose of this law is obviously to provide a milder penalty than was the case under Ga. Laws 1967, p. 296 (see Ga. Code Ann. 79A-9915). Misdemeanors are offenses other than felonies, and felonies are punishable by death, imprisonment for life, or for more than 12 months. See Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1263; 1970, pp. 236, 237 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-401 (e) (g)). See also, Ga. Laws 1865-6, p. 233 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506). By definition in Ga. Code Ann. 102-102, a "year" is construed to mean "12 calendar months." Therefore, the offense above described is construed to be a misdemeanor, and to be within the jurisdiction of state courts. See Ga. Laws 1970, p. 679 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2106a).
UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-103 (10/9/72)
County boards of education; qualifications: County boards of education are created, and the general qualifications for membership are set out in Ga. Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. V, Pars. I and II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6801, 2-6802). True, the first sentence

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U72-105

of 2-6802 permits the residence requirements to be changed by local legislation upon referendum, and the second sentence ofthat section provides for "further qualifications as may be provided by law." However, this provision as to general qualifications to be provided by law is construed to mean by general law, such as that contained in Ga. Laws 1919, p. 288 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-907 to 32-910). If an attempt were made to enlarge the qualification requirements (other than residence requirements) by local law, there would be a violation of Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401), which prohibits special legislation in cases where provision has been made by existing general law.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-104 (10/18172)
County tax digests; approval by State Revenue Commissioner: A local board oftax assessors is requesting a tax commissioner, whose first digest for the year was rejected by the State Revenue Commissioner, to make out a new digest and mail tax notices without sending the revised digest to the State Revenue Commissioner for approval. This he cannot do. Ga. Code Ann. 92-6917 provides for a penalty upon any tax collector who collects any taxes before the tax receiver has transmitted the digest to the State Revenue Commissioner. Tax commissioners, whose duties combine those of tax receivers and tax collectors, are bound to conform to rules of the Revenue Commissioner according to Ga. Code Ann. 92-4611 (8). Duty to complete digest and forward to Revenue Commissioner, see Ga. Code Ann. 92-6917. Penalty for failing to perform duties respecting digest, see Ga. Code Ann. 92-5402; effect of making out digest badly, see Ga. Code Ann. 92-5403. Duties of State Revenue Commissioner with respect to digests, see Ga. Code Ann. 92-7001 et seq. It is apparent that the digest must be approved in its final form before any taxes are collected.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-105 (10/23/72)
Municipal corporations; annexation ofterritory: Ga. Laws 1962, p. 119 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-902), providing for the annexation of certain lands "upon the written and signed applications ofall ofthe owners ofall ofthe land," includes within "owners" the transferors

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of deeds to secure debt, rather than the grantees in such deeds. See Op. Att'y Gen. 67-16, resolving a similar question relating to Ga. Laws 1966, p. 409 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-904). Despite the strong language of Ga. Code Ann. 67-1301, the grantor in a security deed retains certain equitable rights in the land. See Bell v. Allied Finance Co., 215 Ga. 631 (1960); Citizens Bank ofMoultrie v. Taylor, 155 Ga. 416 (1923). It is the apparent legislative scheme to place the decision as to annexation upon persons residing in the area, rather than upon persons holding mere security interests in the property. See Ga. Code Ann. 69-904.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-106 (10/23/72)
Tuberculosis; action to be taken by Battey State Hospital with reference to intoxicated patients: If a person with infectious tuberculosis becomes intoxicated it is possible that his behavior might subject him to involuntary commitment to Battey State Hospital, but only ifhe is conducting himself so as to expose other persons. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499,548 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-704); Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, 270-5-8-.02, 270-5-8-.03, 270-5-8-.03 (6). If a voluntary patient becomes intoxicated and unruly on the hospital grounds, he may be taken into custody by hospital personnel, isolated, and held for trial under Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 548 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-702), which makes it a misdemeanor to be intoxicated on hospital grounds. If this course is pursued, however, it constitutes an arrest under Ga. Code Ann. 27-207 (arrest without warrant) or Ga. Code Ann. 27-211 (arrest by person in whose presence crime is committed). Ifthis is done, the offender must be brought before an officer authorized to receive an affidavit and issue a warrant within 48 hours after the arrest. Ga. Laws 1956, p. 796 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-212).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-107 (10/25/72)
MARTA tax; application to transportation charges: The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) tax imposed by Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2243, and effecutated in Fulton and DeKalb Counties by resolutions of December 29, 1971, imposes a sales and use tax on the same items as those covered by the Georgia Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch.

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U72-110

92-34A). Transportation of persons is taxable under Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a (C) (1) (a). Transportation of property is exempt. See Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a (C) (2) (j). MARTA tax is, therefore, imposed on the full cost of round-trip air flights originating in the MARTA area, whereas the tax is not collected on any part of a flight originating outside the area. See Op. Att'y Gen. 72-32.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-108 (10/25/72)
Elections; display of voting machines: Under Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., pp. 26, 116, officially codified as Ga. Code 34-1213 (a), the public display of a voting machine containing the ballot labels takes place at such times and in such public places as the ordinary deems most suitable for the information and instruction of the voters. This display is to take place during the 30 days preceding a general or primary election, but there is no requirement that the machine be on display for the entire 30 days.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-109 (10/26/72)
Sales and use taxes: The Georgia Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360 (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-34A), does not exempt sales by nonprofit corporations. There appears to be nothing in the law which would exempt sales by the Columbus Area Vocational-Technical School, and, consequently, they are subject to the tax. See Op. Att'y Gen. 66-32.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-110 (10/27/72)
Regional libraries; disposal of surplus property: The only laws providing for the disposal of public property relate to state and county property. See Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1148 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-1941 to 40-1944), and Ga. Laws 1882-3, p.126 (Ga. Code 91-804). These statutes do not specifically govern regional libraries, but give some guidance as to how their surplus property should be disposed of. The trustees of such libraries are public officials, and are charged with a public trust, i.e., a fiduciary relationship. Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. I, Par I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-101). As to duties of such persons see Dorsett v. Garrard, 85 Ga. 734 (1890); Malcolm v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449 (1955). Such trustees are bound by

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the same rules as administrators of estates. DeKalb County v. Wilson, 217 Ga. 566, 568 (1962). Sales by such persons are made at public outcry. See Ga. Code Ann. 108-409, 113-1702. Therefore, surplus property of these libraries should be disposed of at public sale.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-lll (10/28172)
Motor vehicle equipment; flashing red lights: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1092, reserves the use of flashing red lights atop vehicles to certain emergency vehicles. Such a light could not be used upon a stationwagon news vehicle, even when parked. If a flashing light is needed for such a vehicle, it should be amber in color, and a permit for the same must be obtained from the Department of Public Safety according to Section 3 of the Act cited above.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-112 (10/31/72)
Pistol licenses; effect of pardon: A person convicted of a felony is ineligible for a pistol license for 10 years after conviction. Ga. Laws 1968, pp. 1249, 1324 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-2904). A full pardon relieves him from this disability. Ga. Laws 1943, pp. 185, 195 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-528); Op. Att'y Gen. U71-10. Even though the automatic disability has been removed, however, it does not follow that it is obligatory on the ordinary to issue the license. Ga. Code Ann. 26-2904 states that the ordinary may issue the license. This would indicate that the language is permissive and not mandatory. See Roe v. Pitts, 82 Ga. App. 770, 772 (1950). The carrying of arms concerns the public interest. Melton v. State, 41 Ga. App. 501, 503 (1930). It is apparent that the ordinary has a discretion as to who shall receive a license. While a pardon restores citizenship rights (Hulgan v. Thornton, 205 Ga. 753 (2) (1949)), it does not necessarily restore the recipient to his pre-conviction status in all matters. See Morris v. Hartsfield, 186 Ga. 171 (1938); Commissioner v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E.2d 95 (Mass. 1964).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-113 (10/31/72)
Georgia Crime Laboratory; Clinical Laboratory Licensure Law not applicable: The Clinical Laboratory Licensure Law, Ga. Laws

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U72-116

1970, p. 531, provides at Section 1 (b) (Ga. Code Ann. 84-5501) that the law does not apply to laboratories: "operated and maintained exclusively for research and teaching purposes, involving no patient or public health services." This effectively excludes the Georgia Crime Laboratory from coverage.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-114 (10/31/72)
Traffic violations; jurisdiction ofrecorders' courts: The recorder's court of Columbus does not have jurisdiction of state offenses. For discussion ofrecorders' jurisdiction over offenses against state laws adopted as ordinances in certain cities, see Op. Att'y Gen. 72-79, supra. The Department of Public Safety may revoke drivers' licenses as a result of convictions under such ordinances. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 598, 604 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-9908); Ga. Laws 1955, pp. 736, 737 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1681). Nothing in the opinion in Gordon u. Green, 228 Ga. 505 (1972) is at variance either with this opinion or with Op. Att'y Gen. 71-103, which is still valid.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-115 (11/2/72)
Tax exemptions; places ofreligious worship: It is the duty oflocal tax assessors to ascertain what property is subject to taxation. Ga. Code Ann. 92-6913, as amended by Ga. Laws 1937, p. 517. Therefore, a religious organization believing that it has a claim to exemption should present its evidence to the local taxing authorities.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-116 (11/6/72)
Elections; votes for one candidate not counted for substitute: Where a candidate whose name is on the ballot withdraws before the election, but after absentee ballots are mailed out, votes on such ballots for the original candidate cannot be counted for another candidate substituted by his party. All statutory references which follow are to Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26, officially codified as Ga. Code Ann. Title 34. The law requires that a voter cast his ballot either for a listed candidate or for a write-in candidate. See Ga. Code Ann. 34-1322 (a), (c), 34-1332, 34-1338. If a name is on the ballot, the person named is considered a

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candidate. Ga. Code Ann. 34-103 (p), 34-1504. While Ga. Code Ann. 34-1003, 34-1106, 34-1109, and 34-1110 constitute a method for substituting candidates, there is no provision for counting a vote unless the candidate is written in or listed on the ballot. The voting of a straight party ticket does not alter this rule, since, not even here, is the naming of the candidate on the ballot dispensed with. See Ga. Code Ann. 34-1323 (b), 34-1103 (b), 34-1206(b), 34-1220(b), 34-1314.2.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-117 (11/6/72)
Elections; list of constitutional amendments: There is no provision of law which prohibits the distribution of a list of proposed constitutional amendments to persons in line at the polls, provided neither the literature nor persons making the distribution attempt to influence the vote. The literature in question is for information only, and contains no argument or language which does not appear on the ballot. On conduct of elections, see Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., p. 26 (Ga. Code Ann. 34-1307, 34-1311, 34-1313(d), 34-1913).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-118 (11/6/72)
Cooperative markets; marine fishery products: A group ofBryan County fishermen cannot, under the Cooperative Marketing Act, Ga. Laws 1921, p. 139, codified in material part as Ga. Code Ann. 65-201, 65-202, establish a cooperative market for handling marine fishery resources. The Ga. Code Ann. sections cited relate to certain agricultural products actually produced on farms, and could not be extended to cover marine fishery products because of the rule of ejusdem generis. For examples of the application of this rule, see Standard Oil Co. v. Swanson, 121 Ga. 412 (1904); Grier v. State, 103 Ga. 428 (1898); Sanders v. State, 86 Ga. 717 (1890).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-119 (11/8/72)
Superior court judges emeritus; time spent as judge of qualifying juvenile court as creditable: Time spent as judge ofa court ofrecord from which appeals may be taken directly to the Supreme Court

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U72-120

or Court of Appeals is creditable toward appointment as judge of the superior courts emeritus, assuming the other time factors bring the judge within the Emeritus Act. See Ga. Laws 1945, p. 362, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602a). Appeals from the court in question, which is a juvenile court, may be taken directly to the appellate courts named. Whitman v. State, 96 Ga. App. 730 (1957). Further, the court, at the time ofthe service claimed for credit, was operating under Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 291, 309, Section 33, which required record keeping in a manner sufficient to bring the court within the appellate court requirements for "courts ofrecord." See DeKalb County v. Deason, 221 Ga. 237 (1965); Crosby v. Dixie Metal Co., 227 Ga. 541 (1971). Laws relating to pensions are to be liberally construed. City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576 (1944). Therefore, service as indicated is creditable toward appointment as a judge emeritus.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-120 (11/20172)
Taxation; city-county contract for collection: Question is whether, by contract, a county tax commissioner could add a city's tax notices to his computerized tax cards and collect taxes for the city, and, further, could such a contract be drawn without special legislation. Cities and counties may contract with each other. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5901); Ga. Laws 1962, p. 140 (Ga. Code Ann. 69-310, 69-312). A council may bind future councils by contracts covering proprietary functions, but not by contracts as to governmental functions. Horkan v. Moultrie, 136 Ga. 561 (1911). Courts will not interfere with business affairs of municipalities except in a clear case of mismanagement or fraud. Lawson v. Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942); Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 206 Ga. 753 (1950). On the other hand, there are problems which may arise under the proposed contract. Collection may be a governmental function not delegable under the city charter. Further, this system may place a great risk upon the municipal tax collector when he does not have control ofthe funds. He is absolutely liable for losses except through Acts of God. Ops. Att'y Gen. 1945-47, p. 535. While the proposed plan is not facially illegal under the general law, special clarifying legislation is recommended.

U72-121

356

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-121 (11/22/72)

Blood tests for drunken driving: Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 575 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-2501), contains some apparently contradictory language in that it requires a blood test to show the amount of alcohol in a person's blood "at the time of the offense," and, at the same time, requires that such tests be given by qualified persons who ordinarily would not be available at that time. It is suggested that blood tests be made as soon as possible after the offense, leaving it to the accused to raise the time factor in rebuttal. This will, as nearly as possible, preserve the legislative intent. See Wellmaker u. Terrell, 3 Ga. App. 791 (1907). Further, the language of subsection (b) (g) ofthe section, "[t]he result of any such test shall not be admissible in evidence against the defendant ..." may be interpreted to mean that a result of the test favorable to the defendant may be introduced by him.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-122 (11/27/72)
Interstate compacts; legality of contract between Georgia and Alabama for operation of the Tri-Rivers Waterway Development Authority: The question is as to the legality of Georgia (with federal consent) entering into a compact with Alabama for the improvement of the navigability of the Apalachicola, Chattahoochee, and Flint Rivers. The agency for performing these functions would be, according to legislation passed by Alabama, "The Tri-Rivers Waterway Development Authority." Although the term "Authority" is used in this legislation, the resulting agency would not be a typical bond floating and fund raising "authority" as generally used in our law, but, rather, an arm of state government. For discussion of types of authorities, see 3 E.G.L. Authority Financing, especially 4 through 6. Since the instrumentality would be an arm of government, the General Assembly could appropriate funds for its support. Ga. Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5501), and, while under Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. III (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6203), the legislature can make supplementary appropriations, such appropriations give a low priority to the project considered. It is recommended, therefore, that if the legislature create an arm of government for the purposes intended, that the agency be similar to a board, bureau, or commission, and that its appropriations be treated in the General Appropriations Act.

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U72-125

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-123 (11/27/72)

Income tax exemptions for retired teachers: Certain teachers are not members of the Teachers Retirement System, but of local retirement systems. In such cases the Teachers Retirement System pays only a portion of the teacher benefits, the remainder being paid by the county. Ga. Laws 1943, p. 640 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2922). As to Fulton County, specifically, see Ga. Laws 1945, p. 528. Retirees under such systems may claim exemption from state income tax only in the amount which has been paid on their behalf to the local system from the Teachers Retirement System. Ga. Laws 1943, p. 640, as amended by Ga. Laws 1960, p. 1153; 1968, p. 543 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2923).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-124 (11/30/72)
Coastal Marshlands Protection Act; enforcement: The Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, Ga. Laws 1970, p. 939 (Ga. Code Ann. 45-136 to 45-147), may be enforced in the following ways: (1) by temporary restraining order and injunction under Ga. Code Ann. 45-142; (2) by prosecution for misdemeanor under Ga. Code Ann. 45-145; (3) by civil penalties imposed by the Department of Natural Resources under amendment by Ga. Laws 1972, p. 991.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-125 (12/1/72)
Traffic violations; jurisdiction of court of ordinary: While Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess., pp. 558,562 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-511), may appear to place exclusive jurisdiction of traffic offenses in certain counties in the court ofordinary, the superior court cannot be divested of its constitutional jurisdiction over such matters by statute. Williams v. State, 138 Ga. 168 (1912); Smith v. State, 62 Ga. App. 733 (1940); Nobles v. State, 81 Ga. App. 229 (1950); Allen v. State, 85 Ga. App. 887 (1952). The jurisdiction under this statute, therefore, is concurrent. The superior court, on the other hand, cannot require that all of such cases be bound over to it. Once a court of competent jurisdiction has entertained a case it will be retained to the exclusion of other courts. Mordecai v. Stewart, 37

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Ga. 364 (1867). See also, Carstarphen u. Dayton, 222 Ga. 138 (1966); Pitts u. Pitts, 224 Ga. 11 (1968). The authority of the superior court to exercise supervision over inferior tribunals does not give it power to preempt the jurisdiction of such tribunals. See Op. Att'y Gen. 67-370. Sheriffs, under Ga. Code Ann. 24-2813 (2), are required to attend sessions of the court of ordinary whenever required to do so by the ordinary.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-126 (12/1/72)
Retirement of court reporters: There is no statute which would prohibit a court reporter who has retired under the Fulton County pension plan (see Ga. Laws 1939, p. 571) from obtaining employment in another judicial circuit and continuing to draw his Fulton County retirement benefits.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-127 (12/1/72)
Arrests; powers of peace officers and private security officers to make arrests for state and federal offenses: A peace officer may make an arrest with a warrant, or without a warrant, where certain conditions exist, i.e., the crime is committed in his presence, the offender is endeavoring to escape, or where there is likely to be a failure of justice for want of an officer to issue a warrant. Ga. Code Ann. 27-207; Ramsey u. State,92 Ga. 53 (1893). This section applies to both state and local officers. Jenkins u. State, 3 Ga. App. 146 (1908). A private security officer (not deputized) has the same arrest powers of any private citizen as set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 27-211. If a legal arrest is made for a state offense which is also a violation of federal law, the suspect may be delivered to federal officers. Lovelace u. U S., 357 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1966). For state offenses relating to the federal crime of aircraft hijacking, see Ga. Laws 1968, p. 1249 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-1307, 26-2901); Ga. Laws 1969, p. 741 (Ga. Code Ann. 26-3301).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-128 (12/6172)
Municipal corporations; wine and malt beverage tax: A city cannot require that, with limited amounts excepted, all beer and

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U72-131

wine possessed therein have said city's tax paid thereon. The taxing power of a city must be plainly conferred by the state. See Lewis & Holmes Freight Corp. v. City ofAtlanta, 195 Ga. 810 (1943); Irwin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111 (1948). The proposed tax would require all substantial quantities of the beverages to be purchased within the city, and would thus be invalid as unreasonable. See Chandler v. City of Tifton, 206 Ga. 43 (1949). An ordinance or local legislation imposing such a tax would appear to violate Ga. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401), in that it would enact a special law upon a subject for which provision has been made by general law. See Local574, etc., Ass'n. v. Floyd, 225 Ga. 625, 627 (1969). General laws regulating possession ofbeer, see Ga. Laws 1937, p. 148 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-726); of wine, see Ga. Laws 1937, p. 851 (Ga. Code Ann. 58-915, 58-930).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-129 (12/14172)
Superior court judges emeritus; secretaries not authorized: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 617, authorizing superior court judges to employ secretaries to be compensated from state funds, applies only to full-time judges, not to judges emeritus called upon to preside in a particular case under Ga. Laws 1962, p. 547 (Ga. Code Ann. 24-2622a).

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-130 (12/21/72)
Motor vehicles; flashing lights: Ga. Laws 1972, p. 1092, which regulates flashing lights on vehicles, does not require a use permit for law enforcement vehicles with flashing blue lights, nor for properly designed fire-fighting vehicles and ambulances with red lights. The only use permit provision is for vehicles whose operators can show a need for flashing lights, and where the color is something other than blue or red.

UNOFFICIAL OPINION U72-131 (12/28/72)
Public officers and employees; simultaneous employment: A state employee under the merit system cannot hold public office. Op. Att'y Gen. 67-145; Rules and Regulations of the State Merit

U72-131

360

System, 3.600. Membership on a county board of education is prohibited to merit system employees, since such membership is a public office. See Coleman v. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458, 459 (1898); Stanford v. Lynch, 147 Ga. 518, 519 (1918).

TABLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
GEORGIA LAWS AND CODE SECTIONS
Table 1 United States Constitutional Provisions Cited Table 2 Georgia Constitutional Provisions Cited Table 3 Georgia Laws Cited Table 4 Georgia Code Annotated Sections Cited

363 TABLE 1 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
CITED
Op. No. Art. I, Sec. 3 .................................. 72-48 Art. I, Sec. 9, Par. 3 ............................. 72-34 Amend. 1 .................................... 72-154 Amend. 12 ................................... 72-149 Amend. 18 .................................. U72-58 Amend.21 .................................. U7~58
TABLE 2 GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
Op. No. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I ........................... U72-110 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III ............................ 72-32 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV .......................... 72-154 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXV .......................... 72-68 Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I ............................ 72-64 Art. I, Sec. III, Par. II ........................... 72-34 Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I ........ 72-159, U72-19, U72-32, U72-48,
U72-103, U72-128 Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. II .......................... 72-154 Art. II, Sec. VII, Par. I .................... 72-149, 72-151 Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I .......................... U72-21 Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. XI ........................ 72-112 Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII ....................... 72-82 Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XVII ...................... 72-169 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. VI .................... 72-118, 72-136 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. XI .......................... 72-156 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. XIII .......................... 72-18 Art. V, Sec. II, Par. I ............................ 72-18 Art. V, Sec. II, Par. IV .................... 72-118, 72-136 Art. V, Sec. IV, Par. I .......................... 72-100 Art. V, Sec. XI, Par. I ........................... 72-39 Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I ..................... 72-3, 72-179 Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. II .......................... 72-79 Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I .......................... 72-57 Art. VI, Sec. XI ............................... 72-114

364
GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS-Continued
OP. No.
Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Par. II ....................... U72-28 Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. II ....................... U72-12 Art. VI, Sec. XVI, Par. I ................... U72-5, U72-7 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II ......... 72-68, 72-110, 72-111, 72-117,
72-154, 72-174 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV ................... 72-28, U72-100 Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I .................. 72-111, U72-122 Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-71 Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I .................... 72-59, 72-132 Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. II .................. U72-66, U72-73 Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I ...... 72-132, 72-140, U72-73, U72-120 Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I ........................ 72-174 Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. III ...................... U72-122 Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. IV .................. 72-107, 72-112 Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. I ........................ U72-103 Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. II ....................... U72-103 Art. VIII, Sec. XIII, Par. I ........................ 72-52 Art. XII, Sec. I ............................... U72-33 Art. XII, Sec. I, Par. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-153 Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I ......................... U72-38 Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. IV ......................... 72-31 Art. XV, Sec. I, Par. I ........................... 72-79 Art. XV, Sec. II-A ............................. U72-21

365
TABLE 3 GEORGIA LAWS CITED

AcT PAGE

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1865-6

.... 72-47

Ga. 231 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
233 ..

..

..L~.w.. s.

. . . . 1870

.

.

. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .

.

U72-102

i875 273 ... a~: i.~~s

72-164

0



G~ L~ws 27 ..

0



1876

72-164

0. 0.

0



72-18

128 133

. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

G.~:. L. ..a..w..s..

.. .. .. .. 1877

..

.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

..

...... 72-92
72-164

G~. 24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .0 . . . . . . 72-43

83 . Laws 1882---3

U72-110

G.-. 126 .....

r:.;.;,~ .1888. 0

0. 0. 0

72-64

a~: L"aws 39 .....



0

1889

0

0





0.

0

0



G.-. 29 .....

r:.;.;,~ 1590..:...91

...... 0. 72-159 .. 72-159

G~: L.~~ 152 ....

0



0

i894 .

. ... 72-4

a"a: 1898 99 ........ i~~~



0

0



.1.9o5 . . 216 ...... a~. i~~~

... 0. 0. .. U72-58

1913. . . .. 87 ...... G~.i.~~

U72-28





0





~

0

12-so

i9i9 135 ......... a~: L"a~~



0



0

125

135 . . . . . . . . . . . .

0

0

0



0



0



0

. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .... 77227-2-11-461642

:::: ........... G.-. L~~ 249 ...... 0 : . ................ u72-103

288



0

0.







0



.192i. .

U72-118

139 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ................ . U72-17

166 .. Ga. Laws 1922

U72-19

82

0. 0. 0.

0

0

0.

0.

0









0





0.

0

0



366 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

AcT PAGE

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1924

195 ........................................ 72-126

Ga. Laws 1925

152 ......................................... U72-4

325 ................................... 72-129, U72-1

Ga. Laws 1927

226 ........................................ U72-78

321 ......................................... 72-64

Ga. Laws 1931

7, 24 .................................. 72-36, 72-120

35 ......................................... 72-112

191 ......................................... 72-54

199 .............................. 72-71, 72-99, 72-133

Ga. Laws 1931, Extra. Sess.

99 ............................... 72-34, 72-71, 72-133

Ga. Laws 1933

106 ........................................ U72-10

Ga. Laws 1935

73 ......................................... U72-47

135 ........................................ 72-108

151 ........................................ U72-88

160 ........................................ U72-98

168 ......................................... 72-73

492 ........................................ U72-72

Ga. Laws 1937

148 ....................................... U72-128

210 ........................................ U72-50

230 ........................................ 72-133

264 ............................. 72-132, 72-167, 72-172

322 .............. 72-69, 72-71, 72-79, 72-108, 72-136, 72-170

355, 357 ...................................... 72-12

355, 361 ...................................... 72-12

355, 367 ...................................... 72-12

503 .................................... 72-5, 72-161

517 .................................. U72-22, U72-70

708 ......................................... 72-20

753 ......................................... 72-54

758 .......................................... 72-3

806 .................................. U72-53, U72-57

851 ................................. U72-72, U72-128

Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess.

77 ......................................... U72-22

103 .................... U72-27, U72-42, U72-46, U72-58,

U72-72, U72-73, U72-81

AcT PAGE GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

367 OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1937-38, Extra. Sess.-Continued 214 ........................................ 72-169 307 ......................................... 72-77 558 .................................. 72-79, U72-125
Ga. Laws 1939 135 ......................................... 72-79 160 .......................................... 72-5 571 ....................................... U72-126
Ga. Laws 1941 277 ........................................ 72-157 449 ............................. 72-29, 72-165, U72-82 510 ......................................... 72-47 514 ......................................... 72-47
Ga. Laws 1943 185 ........................... 72-6, 72-21, 72-35, 72-49 185, 195 ................................... U72-112 196 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7~79,7~10~7~136 203 ......................................... 72-12 566 .......................................... 72-3 640 ............................ 72-82, 72-145, U72-123
Ga. Laws 1945 362 ........................ 72-8, 72-42, U72-28, U72-54,
U72-59, U72-91, U72-119 528 ....................................... U72-123 1199 ........................................ 72-87
Ga. Laws 1946 73 ......................................... U72-10 90 ......................................... 72-147
Ga. Laws 1947 173 ........................................ U72-19 1108 ....................................... 72-177
Ga. Laws 1949 138 .................................. U72-36, U72-64 138, 162 ..................................... 72-155 249 ........................................ 72-117 778 ......................................... 72-53 780 ............ 72-14, 72-17, 72-25, U72-65, U72-94, U72-95 1009 ....................................... 72-140 1140 ........................................ 72-98 1179 ........................................ 72-47
Ga. Laws 1950 50 ..................................... 72-29, 72-55 62 .................................... 72-39, U72-98

368 AcT PAGE

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1950-Continued 62, 66 ....................................... 72-64 73 ......................................... 72-142 152 ................................... 72-70, 72-172 238 ........................................ 72-112 390 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 72-95
Ga. Laws 1951 291, 309 ................................... U72-119 360 .............. 72-32, U72-68, U72-96, U72-107, U72-109 565 ......................................... 72-91 598 ............................ 72-79, 72-136, U72-114 726 ......................................... 72-24 861 ......................................... 72-68 874 ........................................ 72-159 3087 ....................................... 72-159
Ga. Laws 1952 46 ......................................... U72-48 76 ......................................... 72-133 79 .......................................... 72-92 238 ......................................... 72-29
Ga. Laws, Jan.-Feb. Sess. 1953 331 .................................... 72-29, U72-2 602 ........................................ U72-99 2809 ....................................... 72-159
Ga. Laws 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess. 210, 211 ..................................... 72-148 284 ........................................ U72-93 556 ...................... 72-79, U72-18, U72-21, U72-34 556, 557 ...................................... 72-33 556, 575 ................................... U72-121 556, 616 .......................... 72-33, 72-60, U72-78 2733 ....................................... 72-159
Ga. Laws 1955 10 .......................................... 72-10 339 ........................................ 72-103 483 ............................. 72-55, 72-166, U72-56 483, 490 ..................................... 72-174 736 .................................. 72-79, U72-114 2088 ....................................... 72-159
Ga. Laws 1956 27 ................................... 72-128, U72-45 161 ......................... 72-3, 72-93, 72-138, 72-150 161, 170 ...................................... 72-21

AcT PAGE

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

369 OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1956-Continued

161, 173 ..................................... 72-126 161, 177 ...................................... 72-96 161, 178 ...................................... 72-61 615 ........................................ U72-98 796 ....................................... U72-106
Ga. Laws 1957 103 ........................................ 72-136 134 ......................................... 72-15 608 ......................................... 72-70
Ga.' Laws 1958 15 .................................... 72-21, U72-45 34 ......................................... 72-147 174 ........................................ U72-17 268 ........................................ 72-136 714 ......................................... 72-53 2091 ....................................... U72-19
Ga. Laws 1959 88 ................................... 72-148, U72-74 318 ........................................ 72-136 354 .................................... 72-29, 72-55
Ga. Laws 1960 67 ......................................... 72-131 85 .......................................... 72-12 153 ......................................... 72-32 235 ........................................ 72-168 258 ........................................ U72-99 289 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7~41,7~62,7~65,7~76,
72-152, U72-17 289, 293 ..................................... 72-125 289, 303 ...................................... 72-80 289, 405 ...................................... 72-66 289, 505 ......... ............................. 72-83 289, 687 .................................... U72-61 289, 694 ...................................... 72-66 780 ........................................ 72-178 1148 ........................................ 72-21 1153 ...................................... U72-123 1172 ....................................... 62-119
Ga. Laws 1961 127 ........................................ 72-138 133 ......................................... 72-18 147 .................................... 72-44, 72-92 354 ......................................... 72-92

370

AcT PAGE

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1961-Continued
517 ......................................... 72-39 Ga. Laws 1962
17 .......................... 72-71, 72-72, 72-73, 72-107, 72-112, 72-141, 72-150
119 ........................................ U72-105 140 ............................ 72-64, U72-98, U72-120 156 ........................................ 72-178 156, 173 ...................................... 72-96 527 ......................................... 72-86 530 ......................................... U72-2 534 ........................................ U72-62 547 ....................................... U72-129 694 ......................................... 72-45 736 ........................................ 72-100 752 ........................................ 72-107
Ga. Laws 1963 34 .......................................... U72-6 70 ......................................... U72-48 81 .................................... 72-124, U72-3 81, 117 ...................................... 72-12 277 ........................................ U72-41 333 ........................................ 72-165 333, 334 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-33 368 ........................................ U72-16 415 ......................................... 72-87 593 ........................................ 72-107 624 ......................................... 72-64 630 ................................... 72-29, 72-172
Ga. Laws 1964 3 .................................... .' . 72-16, 72-37 171 ........................................ 72-170 310 ......................................... 72-43 338 ......................................... U72-1 416 .................................. 72-132, U72-13 485 .......................................... 72-3 493 ................................... 72-61, 72-138 495 ........................................ 72-138 499 ........................................ 72-175 499, 548 ................................... U72-106 731 ........................................ 72-100 771 ........................... U72-72, U72-81, U72-86
Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess. 26 ....................... 72-123, 72-149, 72-151, U72-20,
U72-33, U72-116, U72-117

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued AcT PAGE

371
OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess.-Continued

26, 45 ...................................... U72-51 26, 97 ....................................... 72-74 26, 116 .................................... U72-108 26, 198 ..................................... U72-24
Ga. Laws 1965 18, 22 ...................................... U72-16 81 .......................................... 72-23 105 ........................................ 72-117 210 ........................................ 72-111 217 ........................................ 72-111 335 ........................................ U72-23 413 ........................................ U72-45 629 ......................................... 72-22 765 ................... ..................... 72-151 2243 ........................... 72-32, U72-68, U72-107 2650 ....................................... U72-24
Ga. Laws 1966 121 ........................................ 72-121 291 ........................................ 72-118 408 ........................................ U72-79 409 ....................................... U72-105 502 .................................. 72-157, U72-55 546 ........................................ 72-170 567 ........................................ U72-56 574 ........................................ U72-90
Ga. Laws 1967 153 ......................................... 72-54 296 ....................................... U72-102 382 ........................................ 72-117 595 ........................................ 72-109 637 ........................................ U72-90 650 .................................... 72-34, 72-84 722 ......................................... 72-72 738 ........................................ 72-113 749 ........................................ U72-56 2377 ........................................ 72-57
Ga. Laws 1968 275 ........................................ U72-91 277 ......................................... 72-22 297 ......................................... 72-27 434 ........................................ 72-157 436 ........................................ 72-135

372

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

AcT PAGE

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1968-Continued

448 ......................................... 72-46

475 ........................................ 72-144

516 ........................................ 72-152

533 ........................................ U72-93

543 ....................................... U72-123

565 .................................. 72-169, U72-79

847 ........................................ U72-51 885 ........................................ U72-32

885, 920 .................................... U72-77

992 ......................................... 72-43 1086 ....................................... U72-90 1110 ................................. 72-61, U72-101

1148 ................................. 72-73, U72-110

1203 ................................... 72-29, 72-55

1217 ....................................... 72-163 1249 ...................................... U72-127

1249, 1263 .................................. U72-102

1249, 1277 ................................... 72-118

1249, 1282 .................................... 72-24

1249, 1307 .................................. U72-71

1249, 1309 .................................. U72-26

1249, 1316 .................................. U72-98 1249, 1317 .................................. U72-69

1249, 1324 .................................. U72-112

1249, 1328 ................................... 72-163

1364 ................................. 72-171, U72-41

1399 ......................... 72-3, 72-96, 72-111, 72-138

1399, 1400 .................................... 72-21

1399, 1403 ................................... 72-148

1432 ....................................... 72-118 1690 ........................................ 72-28

Ga. Laws 1969 152 .................................. 72-169, U72-79

234 ........................................ 72-125

266 ......................................... U72-9

397 ........................................ 72-100

426 ........................................ U72-48 492 .......................................... 72-4 505 ........................................ U72-29

505, 520 .................................... U72-29

505, 541 .................................... U72-29

546 .................................. 72-141, 72-162

572 ........................................ U72-12

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

373

AcT PAGE

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1969-Continued

598 ......................................... 72-21 600 ........................................ 72-102 602 .......................................... 72-3 603 ........................................ 72-146 640 ........................................ 72-118 741 ....................................... U72-127 763 ......................................... 72-78 960 ........................................ U72-80 996 .............................. 72-3, 72-101, 72-124 1015 ........................................ 72-56 1140 ................................. U72-81, U72-86
Ga. Laws 1970 26 ......................................... U72-36 32, 54 ...................................... 72-141 177 ......................................... 72-29 187 ........................................ 72-105 208 .................................... 72-27, 72-51 236 .................................... 72-3, 72-138 236, 237 ................................... U72-102 301 ................................... 72-26, U72-17 332 ........................................ U72-99 347 .............................. 72-48, 72-74, U72-33 347, 362 .................................... U72-42 383 ........................................ U72-51 451 ......................................... 72-12 494 ........................................ U72-98 497 ......................................... 72-43 531 ....................................... U72-113 541 ........................................ 72-125 679 .................................. 72-57, U72-102 683 ........................................ 72-118 692 ................................... 72-61, 72-134 700 ........................................ 72-158 939 ....................................... U72-124 954 ........................................ 72-131
Ga. Laws 1971 4 .......................................... 72-162 45 .............. 72-81, 72-98, 72-110, 72-153, 72-173, U72-6 84 .......................................... 72-10 93 ......................................... 72-122 103 ........................................ 72-121 111 .................................... 72-52, 72-72 111, 114 .................................... U72-41

374

AcT PAGE

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1971-Continued

204 ........................................ U72-84 236 ................................... 72-85, U72-85 242 ........................................ 72-141 252 .......................................... 72-2 271 ....................................... U72-102 315 ......................................... 72-27 316 ........................................ U72-99 338 ......................................... 72-56 342 ........................................ 72-111 373 ......................................... 72-50 400 ........................................ 72-161 408 ........................................ U72-63 430 ......................................... 72-86 515 ......................................... 72-60 572, 573 ...................................... 72-43 591 ......................................... U72-2 602 ......................................... 72-48 631 .................................. U72-15, U72-83 709 ................................... 72-94, U72-66 774 ........................................ U72-16 796 ........................................ U72-29 856 .... ' .................................... 72-90 906 .................................. 72-111, 72-154 2082 .................................. 72-32, U72-68 2745 ....................................... U72-31 3103 ....................................... U72-31
Ga. Laws 1971, Extra. Sess. 5 ...... ' .................................... 72-19 22, 60 ....................................... 72-74 61 ......................................... U72-51 69, 88 ....................................... 72-74
Ga. Laws 1972 26 ..... ' .................................... 72-52 137 .................................... 72-34, 72-99 176 ......................................... 72-82 193 ................... 72-36, 72-51, 72-88, 72-118, 72-136,
U72-30, U72-37, U72-40, U72-93 193, 199 .................................... U72-60 207 ..................... U72-42, U72-46, U72-49, U72-73 214 ........................................ 72-176 220 ................................... 72-25, U72-94 237 ......................................... 72-74 250 ......................................... 72-74

AcT PAGE

GEORGIA LAWS-Continued

375 OP. No.

Ga. Laws 1972-Continued

348 ........................................ 72-113 350 ........................................ 72-125 387 ........................................ 72-153 403 ........................................ U72-83 480 ........................................ 72-161 489 ......................................... 72-65 577 ......................................... 72-96 579 ........................................ 72-111 592 ........................................ 72-124 600 ........................................ 72-101 602 .................................. 72-102, 72-160 604 ........................................ 72-128 617 ........................... 72-104, U72-41, U72-129 638 ......................................... 72-90 722 ................................... 72-38, 72-116 726 ........................................ 72-113

742 ........................................ 72-134 822 ........................................ U72-87 910 ........................................ 72-132 938 ........................................ 72-137 991 ....................................... U72-124 1015 ............... 72-30, 72-39, 72-45, 72-49, 72-58, 72-71,
72-100, 72-117, 72-121, 72-162, U72-56 1015, 1045 ............................... 72-77, 72-80 1015, 1052 ........................ 72-70, 72-132, 72-167 1015, 1059 ................................... 72-106 1015, 1069 .................................... 72-81 1069 ....................... 72-49, 72-121, 72-128, 72-150 1076 .................................. 72-170, 72-171 1078 .................................. 72-108, 72-135 1092 .......................... 72-40, U72-111, U72-130 1094 ....................................... U72-97 1125 ....................................... U72-97 1251 ............................. 72-95, 72-101, 72-124 1545 ........................................ 72-31 1267 ............................. 72-89, 72-175, 72-178 2211 ....................................... U72-38 3314 ....................................... U72-44 3365 ....................................... U72-31

377
TABLE 4 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS CITED

CoDE SECTIONS

OP. No.

1-107 to 1-113 .................................. 72-48

1-128 ........................................ 72-34

1-801 ....................................... 72-154

1-812 ....................................... 72-149

1-824 to 1-826 ................................ U72-58

1-835 to 1-837 ................................ U72-58

2-101 ...................................... U72-110

2-103 ........................................ 72-32

2-114 ....................................... 72-154

2-125 ........................................ 72-68

2-301 ........................................ 72-64

2-302 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-34

2-401 ...... 72-159, U72-19, U72-32, U72-48, U72-103, U72-128

2-402 ....................................... 72-154

2-1201a ............................... 72-149, 72-151

2-1301 ...................................... U72-21

2-1908 ....................................... 72-82

2-1911 ...................................... 72-112

2-1917 ...................................... 72-169

2-3006 ................................ 72-118, 72-136

2-3011 ...................................... 72-156

2-3013 ....................................... 72-18

2-3101 ....................................... 72-18

2-3104 ................................ 72-118, 72-136

2-3301 ...................................... 72-100

2-3506 ....................................... 72-39

2-3901 ................................... 72-3, 72-179

2-4102 ....................................... 72-79

2-4401 ....................................... 72-57

Ch. 2-46 ..................................... 72-114

2-4802 ...................................... U72-28

2-4902 ...................................... U72-12

2-5101 ................................. U72-5, U72-7

2-5402 .......... 72-68, 72-110, 72-111, 72-117, 72-154, 72-174

2-5404 ................................ 72-28, U72-100

2-5501 ............................... 72-111, U72-122

2-5503 ....................................... 72-71

2-5601 ................................. 72-59, 72-132

2-5701 ...................................... U72-73

378 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

2-5702 ............................... U72-66, U72-73 2-5901 ......................... 72-132, 72-140, U72-120 2-6001 ...................................... 72-174 Ch. 2-62 ..................................... 72-107 2-6203 ..................................... U72-122 2-6204 ................................ 72-107, 72-112 2-6301 ...................................... 72-159 2-6701 ...................................... 72-120 2-6801 ..................................... U72-103 2-6802 ..................................... U72-103 2-7502 ....................................... 72-52 Ch. 2-80 .................................... U72-33 2-8001 ...................................... 72-153 2-8101 ...................................... U72-38 2-8104 ....................................... 72-31 2-8301 ....................................... 72-79 2-8402 to 2-8406 .............................. U72-21 3-203 ...................................... U72-12 3-705 ....................................... 72-178 3-1004 ....................................... 72-75 Ch. 3A-1 ..................................... U72-1 Ch. 5-15 ...................................... 72-95 5-1502 ....................................... 72-95 Ch. 5-29 ...................................... 72-78 5-2909 ....................................... 72-78 6-1002 ...................................... U72-16 8-201 ......................................... 72-1 9-401 ........................................ 72-54 9-401.1 ....................................... 72-54 9-402 ........................................ 72-54 Ch. 9-7 ..................................... U72-48 11-304 ...................................... 72-117 11-305 ...................................... 72-117 13-201 ...................................... 72-131 13-203 ...................................... 72-131 13-207 ...................................... 72-131 13-303 ....................................... 72-80 Ch.13-14 .................................... 72-169 13-2013 ..................................... 72-146 13-2025 ..................................... 72-146 13-2202 ...................................... 72-23 13-2203 ...................................... 72-23 16-412 ....................................... 72-77

379 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

CoDE SEcTIONs

OP. No.

Ch. 17-5 .................................... U72-13 17-503 ...................................... U72-13 17-505 ...................................... U72-13 17-510 ...................................... U72-13 17-602 ...................................... 72-168 17-603 ...................................... 72-168 17-608 ...................................... 72-168 18-106 ...................................... 72-133 18-605 ...................................... 72-133 20-201 ...................................... 72-118 20-1007 ...................................... 72-83 21-210 to 21-213 .............................. U72-99 Title 22 ..................................... 72-152 22-104 ...................................... U72-79 22-1006 ..................................... 72-169 22-1008 ..................................... 72-152 22-4402 ..................................... 72-169 22-4403 ..................................... 72-152 22-4801 ..................................... 72-169 22-5106 ..................................... U72-79 23-601 ...................................... U72-4 23-602 ...................................... U72-4 23-701 ...................................... U72-24 23-801 ...................................... U72-19 Ch. 23-9 .................................... U72-19 23-913 ....................................... 72-64 23-922 ...................................... U72-19 23-1502 ...................................... 72-64 Ch. 23-27 ................................... U72-83 23-2708 ..................................... U72-15 23-2710 ..................................... U72-15 24-102 ...................................... U72-28 24-104 ...................................... U72-29 24-401 ....................................... U72-14 24-501 ...................................... U72-14 24-801 ...................................... U72-14 24-807 ...................................... U72-14 24-1601 ...................................... 72-43 24-1716 ...................................... U72-2 24-1716a ................................ 72-29, 72-55 24-1804 ..................................... U72-67 24-1901 ..................................... U72-29 Ch. 24-21A ................................... 72-57

380

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SEcTIONs

OP. No.

24-2106a ................................... U72-102 24-2111a ..................................... 72-57 24-2112a ..................................... 72-57 24-2606.1 ..................................... 72-87 24-2610 ..................................... U72-28 24-2623 ..................................... U72-28 Ch. 24-26A ............................ U72-11, U72-28 24-2602a . 72-8, 72-42, U72-11, U72-54, U72-59, U72-91, U72-119 24-2605a .................................... U72-28 24-2609a ................................ 72-8, U72-59 24-2610a ................................ 72-8, U72-11 24-2610a.1 .................................... 72-42 24-2612a .................................... U72-11 24-2620a ................................. 72-8, 72-42 24-2621a to 24-2623a ........................... U72-28 24-2622a ................................... U72-129 24-2704 to 24-2711 ............................ U72-24 24-2709 ..................................... U72-24

24-2714 ..................................... U72-25 24-2727 ................................ 72-43, U72-16 24-2729 ..................................... U72-16 24-2738 ...................................... 72-29 24-2739 ...................................... 72-29 24-2813 .................................... U72-125 ' 24-2823 ...................................... 72-43 24-2826 ...................................... 72-43 24-2810a ................................ 72-29, 72-55 24-2904 ...................................... 72-43 24-2908 ..................................... 72-114 24-2924 ...................................... 72-43 24-2902a .......................... 72-17, 72-25, U72-95 24-2909a ............. 72-14, 72-25, U72-65, U72-94, U72-95 24-2910a ..................................... 72-25 24-3103 ...................................... 72-92 24-3104 ...................................... 72-92 24-3107 ...................................... 72-92 24-3105a ..................................... 72-92 24-3403 ..................................... U72-16 24-3407 ..................................... U72-16 24-3409 ..................................... U72-16 24-3410 ..................................... U72-16 Title 24A ................................... U72-66 24A-101 ...................................... 72-94

381 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

24A-401 ...................................... 72-94

24A-2001 ................................... U72-66

24A-2302 ..................................... 72-94

24A-3101 ..................................... 72-94

24A-3401 ................................... U72-66

25-104 ...................................... 72-109

25-127 ...................................... 72-109

26-401 ..................................... U72-102

26-1201 ..................................... 72-118

26-1202 ..................................... 72-118

26-1307 .................................... U72-127

26-1308 ...................................... 72-24

26-2306 ..................................... U72-71

26-2309 ..................................... U72-26

26-2611 ..................................... U72-98

26-2612 ..................................... U72-98

Ch. 26-27 ................................... U72-69

26-2901 .................................... U72-127

26-2904 .................................... U72-112

26-3003 ..................................... 72-163

26-3301 .................................... U72-127

26-9925a .................................... 72-118

27-207 ......................... 72-24, U72-106, U72-127

27-211 .............................. U72-106, U72-127

27-212 ..................................... U72-106

27-302 ...................................... U72-56

27-310 ...................................... U72-56

27-313 ...................................... U72-56

27-511 .................................. 72-29, U72-2

27-903 ...................................... U72-63

27-2506 ................................ 72-3, U72-102

27-2506.1 .................................... 72-138

27-2512 ..................................... 72-126

27-2514 ..................................... 72-115

27-2518 ..................................... 72-115

27-2530 to 27-2533 ........................ 72-61, 72-134

27-2535 ..................................... 72-134

27-2701 ..................................... 72-156

27-2702 ..................................... 72-128

27-2709 ...................................... 72-21

27-2711 ..................................... U72-45

27-2801 ...................................... 72-29

27-3101 ..................................... U72-56

382

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

27-3102 ..................................... U72-56

29-106 ...................................... 72-118

30-116 ...................................... 72-147

32-121 ................................. 72-36, 72-120

32-141 to 32-143 ................................ 72-73

32-103a ..................................... 72-140

Ch. 32-6 ................................. 72-16, 72-37

32-603 .................................. 72-16, 72-37

32-611 ....................................... 72-16

32-612 ....................................... 72-16

32-907 to 32-910 ............................. U72-103

32-1006 ..................................... U72-10

32-2901 ..................................... 72-145

32-2903 ...................................... 72-82

32-2904 ..................................... 72-145

32-2922 ............................... 72-82, U72-123

32-2923 .................................... U72-123

Ch. 32-30 ..................................... 72-68

32-3005 ...................................... 72-68

Ch. 32-31 .................................... 72-111

Ch. 32-33 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-111

Ch. 32-39 .............................. 72-111, 72-154

34-103 ..................................... U72-116

34-602 ...................................... U72-51

34-609 ...................................... U72-20

34-612 ...................................... U72-20

34-614 ...................................... U72-20

34-627 ...................................... U72-20

34-632 ...................................... U72-20

34-803 ...................................... 72-123

Ch. 34-10 ................................... U72-33

34-1001 ..................................... 72-123

34-1002 .......................... 72-74, 72-123, U72-77

34-1003 .................................... U72-116

34-1010 ................................ 72-48, U72-42

34-1011 ..................................... U72-42

34-1102 ...................................... 72-74

34-1103 .................................... U72-116

34-1106 .................................... U72-116

34-1109 .................................... U72-116

34-1110 .................................... U72-116

34-1206 .................................... U72-116

34-1213 .................................... U72-108

383

GIEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

34-1220 .................................... U72-116

34-1307 .................................... U72-117

34-1311 .................................... U72-117

34-1313 .................................... U72-117

34-1314 ..................................... 72-123

34-1314.2 ................................... U72-116

34-1319 ..................................... 72-149

34-1322 .............................. 72-151, U72-116

34-1323 .................................... U72-116

34-1330 ..................................... 72-149

34-1332 .............................. 72-151, U72-116

34-1336 ..................................... 72-151

34-1338 .............................. 72-151, U72-116

34-1504 .................................... U72-116

34-1506 ..................................... 72-151

34-1508 ..................................... 72-149

34-1510 ..................................... 72-149

34-1511 ..................................... 72-149

34-1601 ..................................... 72-149

34-1602 ..................................... 72-149

Ch. 34-17 .................................... 72-151

34-1913 .................................... U72-117

Title 34A ................................... U72-32

34A-501 .................................... U72-32

34A-507 .................................... U72-32

34A-1003 ................................... U72-77

34A-1004 ................................... U72-77

36-101 ........................................ 72-4

36-102 ........................................ 72-4

36-103 ........................................ 72-4

36-202 ........................................ 72-4

36-1303 ...................................... 72-39

38-710 ...................................... 72-142

38-801 ................................ 72-157, U72-55

39-609 ...................................... U72-79

39-610 ...................................... U72-79

Ch. 40-4 ...................................... 72-73

40-402 ...................................... 72-141

40-404 ....................................... 72-73

40-408 ................................. 72-72, 72-150

40-413 ...................................... 72-112

40-420 ....................................... 72-73

40-423 ................................. 72-71, 72-107

384

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

Ch. 40-8B .................................... 72-178 40-805b ..................................... 72-175 40-901 ....................................... 72-18 40-1303 ...................................... 72-18 Ch. 40-19 .................................... 72-161 40-1902 ....................................... 72-5 40-1910 ....................................... 72-5 40-1921 ..................................... 72-161 40-1941 to 40-1944 ....................... 72-73, U72-110 40-1943 ...................................... 72-73

40-2001 ..................................... U72-10 40-2107 ................................ 72-45, 72-117 40-2110 ...................................... 72-45 Ch. 40-22 ............................... 72-81, 72-153 40-2201 ................................. 72-98, U72-6 40-2203 .......................... 72-98, 72-110, 72-173 40-2207 ..................................... U72-84 Ch. 40-25 ............................. U72-36, U72-64 40-2503 ............................... 72-122, U72-64 40-2504 ..................................... U72-64 40-2505 ................................ 72-56, U72-36 40-2505.1 .................................... 72-122 40-2518 ............................... 72-155, U72-36 40-2701 ............................... 72-148, U72-74 40-2803 ...................................... U72-6 40-3505 ..................................... 72-162 40-35131 .................................... 72-132 40-35162.4 to 40-35162.6 ......................... 72-128 40-35162.7 ................................... 72-150 43-123 ...................................... 72-172 43-124 ................................ 72-132, 72-167 43-126 ...................................... 72-172

43-134 ...................................... 72-172 43-602a ..................................... 72-172 43-604a ...................................... 72-70 43-608a ..................................... 72-172 44-401 ....................................... 72-24 44-9901 ...................................... 72-24 45-101.1 ..................................... 72-166 45-102 ...................................... 72-166

45-110 ...................................... 72-166 45-114 ................................ 72-166, 72-174 45-117 ....................................... 72-55

385

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

45-118 ...................................... U72-56

45-136 to 45-147 ............................. U72-124

45-142 ..................................... U72-124

45-145 ..................................... U72-124

45-226 ................................. 72-85, U72-85 45-529 ...................................... U72-56 47-101 ....................................... 72-74 47-102 ....................................... 72-74 47-110 ....................................... 72-20 47-504 to 47-509 ................................ 72-64

47-516 ....................................... 72-72

Ch. 49-1 .................................... U72-37

49-102 ...................................... 72-147

50-124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-99

53-201 ...................................... U72-23

Ch. 54-1 ..................................... 72-133

Ch. 54-6 .................................... U72-57

54-612 ...................................... U72-57

54-613 ...................................... U72-57

54-615 ...................................... U72-57

54-616 ...................................... U72-57

54-618 ...................................... U72-57

54-645 ...................................... U72-53

Title 56 ................................ 72-41, 72-152

56-102 ........................... 72-62, 72-125, U72-23

56-213 ....................................... 72-80

56-310 ....................................... 72-41

56-713 ....................................... 72-66

Ch. 56-8 ...................................... 72-65 56-1303 ...................................... 72-83

56-1401 ...................................... 72-41

56-1403 ...................................... 72-41

56-1505 ................................ 72-76, 72-152

56-1506 ...................................... 72-76

Ch. 56-17 ..................................... 72-65

56-1708 ..................................... U72-17 Ch. 56-18 ..................................... 72-65

56-1802 ..................................... U72-17

56-1811 ..................................... U72-17

Ch. 56-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-65

56-1929 ...................................... 72-65 56-2506 ..................................... U72-61 56-2701 ...................................... 72-66

386

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

Ch. 56-34A ................................... 72-158 56-3403a .................................... 72-158 56-3406a .................................... 72-158 56-3410a .................................... 72-158 57-201 ...................................... U72-90 58-724 ...................................... U72-47 58-726 ..................................... U72-128 Ch. 58-8 .................................... U72-72 58-807 ...................................... U72-72 Ch. 58-9 .................................... U72-72 58-915 ..................................... U72-128 58-930 ..................................... U72-128 Ch. 58-10 ................. U72-58, U72-72, U72-73, U72-81 58-1002 ............................... U72-46, U72-81 58-1002 to 58-1010 ............................ U72-27 58-1003 ..................................... U72-42 58-1005 ..................................... U72-81 58-1010 ..................................... U72-46 58-1028 ..................................... U72-73 58-1029 ..................................... U72-73 58-1031 ..................................... U72-73 58-1032 ..................................... U72-73 58-1038 ..................................... U72-73 58-1068 ..................................... U72-73 58-1083 ........................ U72-72, U72-81, U72-86 59-101 ...................................... U72-88 59-106 ...................................... U72-93 59-201 ...................................... U72-93 59-203 ...................................... U72-93 65-201 ..................................... U72-118 65-202 ..................................... U72-118 Ch. 66-4 ..................................... 72-133 67-117 ...................................... U72-79 67-1301 .................................... U72-105 67-1306 ..................................... U72-79 68-101 ...................................... U72-78 68-201 ...................................... U72-78 68-214 ...................................... U72-9 68-405 ................................ 72-165, U72-82 Ch. 68-5 ...................................... 72-34 68-521 ...................................... 72-133 68-522 ...................................... 72-133 68-525 ....................................... 72-71

387 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

CoDE SECTIONS

OP. No.

Ch. 68-6 ...................................... 72-34

68-603

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Chs. 68-15 to 68-17 ................. 72-79, U72-21, U72-34

68-1502 ................................ 72-33, U78-18

68-1601 ..................................... U72-34

68-1607 ..................................... U72-21

68-1610 ..................................... U72-21

68-1611 ..................................... U72-21

68-1618 to 68-1625 ............................ U72-34

68-1623 ..................................... U72-34

68-1625 ........................... 72-46, 72-79, U72-34

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68-1628 ..................................... U72-21

68-1667 ..................................... U72-18

68-1680

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68-1681 ............................... 72-79, U72-114

Ch. 68-17 ................................... U72-78

68-1726 ........................... 72-33, 72-60, U72-78

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68-1824

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68-2501 .................................... U72-121

68-9906 ..................................... U72-34

68-9921

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68-9927 . , ................................... U72-34

69-310 ..................................... U72-120

69-312 ................................ 72-64, U72-120

69-313 ...................................... U72-98

Ch. 69-4 ...................................... 72-64

69-902 ..................................... U72-105

69-904 ..................................... U72-105

71-108

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74-105 to 74-108 ............................... 72-118

Ch. 74-4 ..................................... 72-175

389 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

84-930 ...................................... U72-62

84-931 ...................................... 72-118

84-932 ...................................... 72-118 Ch. 84-14 .................................... U72-1 84-1404 ................................ 72-129, U72-1 84-1409 ...................................... 72-22 84-1417 ................................ 72-129, U72-1 84-1420 ...................................... U72-1 84-5002 ...................................... 72-163

84-5005 ...................................... 72-163

84-5501 .................................... U72-113

Ch. 84-58 ..................................... 72-90

Ch. 84-60 .................................... 72-141

84-6002 ..................................... 72-141 84-6004 ..................................... 72-162

85-1603c .................................... U72-98

85-1604c .................................... U72-98

86-205 ....................................... 72-10 86-206 ....................................... 72-10

Ch. 88-5 .................................... U72-29

88-504.1 to 88-504.6 ............................ U72-29 88-504.2 .................................... U72-29 88-505.1 to 88-505.7 ............................ U72-29 88-506.1 to 88-506.4 ............................ U72-29

88-508.9 .................................... U72-29 88-702 ..................................... U72-106

88-704 ..................................... U72-106

Ch. 88-12A .................................... 72-2

Ch. 88-17 .................................... 72-175 89-101 .......................... 72-69, U72-30, U72-60

89-103 ....................................... U72-93 89-716 ...................................... 72-121 89-720 ...................................... 72-121

89-913 ....................................... 72-86

89-926 ...................................... 72-125

89-934 ...................................... 72-153

89-1201 ................................ 72-92, U72-41

89-1203 ...................................... 72-44 89-1206 ...................................... 72-44

89-1501 ..................................... 72-113 91-804 ..................................... U72-110

Ch. 91-8A ................................... 72-161

92-2406.1 ................................... U72-48

390 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

ConE SECTIONS

OP. No.

Ch. 92-27 .................................... 72-159

92-2701 ..................................... 72-159

92-2704 ..................................... 72-159

Ch. 92-28 .................................... 72-159

92-2804 ..................................... 72-159

Ch. 92-34A .................... U72-96, U72-107, U72-109

92-3402a ..................................... 72-32

92-3403a ........................ 72-32, U72-68, U72-107 92-3412a .................................... U72-68

92-3502 ..................................... 72-125

92-4611 .................................... U72-104

92-4901.1 ................................... U72-87 92-5402 .................................... U72-104

92-5403 .................................... U72-104

92-5902 ..................................... 72-159

Ch. 92-60 ................................... U72-97

92-6202.1 ................................... U72-80

92-6911 ..................................... U72-70 92-6912 .............................. U72-70, U72-97

92-6913 .............................. U72-22, U72-115

92-6917 .................................... U72-104

92-7001 .................................... U72-104

92-8103 ..................................... U72-80

92-8106 ..................................... U72-87 92-8439 ..................................... U72-22 92A-101 ..................................... 72-106

92A-102 ..................................... 72-106

92A-242 ...................................... 72-71 92A-246 ...................................... 72-69

92A-302 ..................................... 72-157

92A-302a .................................... 72-144

92A-401 .................... 72-71, 72-108, 72-135, 72-170

92A-405 ..................................... 72-136

92A-408 ............................... 72-108, 72-170

92A-410.1 .............................. 72-170, 72-171

92A-415 ..................................... 72-108

92A-421 ..................................... 72-170

92A-434 ...................................... 72-79

92A-436 ..................................... 72-170

92A-438 ..................................... 72-170

92A-501 to 92A-505 ............................. 72-79

92A-511 ................................... U72-125

92A-605 ...................................... 72-91

391

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

CODE SECTIONS

Qp. No.

92A-615.2 ................................... 72-107

Ch. 92A-11 ................................... 72-135

92A-1101 .................................... 72-135

92A-1102 .................................... 72-135

Ch. 92A-21 ................................... 72-27

92A-2102 ..................................... 72-27

92A-2108 ..................................... 72-51

92A-9908 ................................... U72-114

93-304 ....................................... 72-84

93-307 ...................... 72-34, 72-84, 72-133, U72-48

93-307.1 ...................................... 72-34

93-308 ...................................... 72-133

93-309 ....................................... 72-34

93-316 ...................................... 72-133

93-504.3 ..................................... 72-133

95-207 ....................................... 72-64

95-609 ...................................... U72-98 95-801 ....................................... 72-64

95-906 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-64

95-1001 ...................................... 72-64

95-1504 ..................................... 72-172

95-1602 ................................ 72-39, U72-98

95-1609 ...................................... 72-64

95-1620 ................................ 72-39, 72-117

95-1621 ...................................... 72-39

95-1705 ..................................... 72-172

95-1710 ...................................... 72-64

95-1711 ..................................... 72-172

95-1714 ...................................... 72-64

95-1721 ..................................... U72-98

95-1723 ...................................... 72-64

Ch. 95-20A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72~19

95-2002a ..................................... 72-19

95-2901 to 95-2907 ............................... 72-4

95-9922 ..................................... U72-98

97-102 ....................................... 72-15

97-106 ....................................... 72-15

98-220 ....................................... 72-53

98-223 ....................................... 72-53

99-103 ....................................... 72-12

99-123 ....................................... 72-12

99-132 ....................................... 72-12

392

GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS-Continued

CODE SECTIONS

OP. No.

Ch. 99-2 ..................................... U72-3

99-209 ....................... 72-3, 72-12, 72-101, 72-124

99-217 ....................................... 72-12

99-908 ...................................... 72-147

99-912a ..................................... 72-147

Ch. 99-11 ................................... U72-50

99-1115 ............................. '........ U72-50

99-1116 ..................................... U72-50

99-2916 ...................................... 72-12

99-3201 ...................................... 72-27

99-3203.1 ..................................... 72-27

102-102 ............. 72-38, 72-57, 72-60, 72-73, 72-74, 72-96,

72-102, 72-103, 72-125, 72-135, 72-137,

72-141, 72-168, U72-29, U72-51

102-103 ................................. 72-64, 72-82

102-104 .......................... 72-34, 72-119, U72-37

102-111 ............................... 72-171, U72-41

108-212 ...................................... 72-86

108-409 .................................... U72-110

108-1109 ..................................... 72-86

Title 109A ................................... 72-178

109A-2-105 .................................. 72-96

109A-2-106 .................................. 72-96

110-901 ..................................... 72-147

110-1001 .................................... U72-79

110-1002 .................................... U72-79

110-1003 .................................... U72-79

112-109 ...................................... 72-47

Ch. 112-2 ..................................... 72-47

112-201 ...................................... 72-47

112-203 ...................................... 72-47

112-204 ...................................... 72-47

112-205 ...................................... 72-47

112-207 ...................................... 72-47

112-9901 ..................................... 72-47

112-9904 ..................................... 72-47

113-1702 ................................... U72-110

393
INDEX
OP. No.
ABORTION. Age of Majority Act, effect upon consent ............ 72-118 AD VALOREM TAXES. Arbitration, equalization substituted for ............ U72-97 Railroads, of, when payable to City of Atlanta ........ 72-159 ADJUTANT GENERAL. Air, assistant for, incentive pay not
authorized ................................ 72-10 Flight pay not authorized ........................ 72-10 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Investigations and hearings conducted by
same body ................................ U72-1 Rule making power strictly construed .............. U72-57 ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, STATE
DEPARTMENT OF. Depository Board, State, membership upon by Director of
Fiscal Division ............................. 72-30 Fiscal Division, director as member of State
Depository Board . . . ........................ 72-30 ADOPTION. Records of, how kept ........................... 72-175 ADVERTISING. Outdoor, issuance of permits ...................... 72-19 Prison publications, in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-96 AGE OF PERSONS. Elections, persons not reaching 21 until after
election ................................. U72-60 Jury duty ................................... U72-93 Juvenile offenders, commitment to Division of Children
and Youth ................................ 72-94 Majority, age of-
Abortion, consent to .......................... 72-118 Background and history of 1972 statute ............ 72-51 Child support payments, effect of 1972 statute
upon collection .......................... U72-40 Decrees, preexisting, effect of statute
upon ........................... U72-37, U72-40 Drivers licenses, effect of act upon applicant for
learners permit accompanied by adult ......... 72-136 General discussion of 1972 statute ................ 72-51 Guardianship proceedings, effect of 1972
statute upon ............................ U72-37

394

INDEX

AGE OF PERSONS-Cont'd

OP. No.

Majority, age of-Cont'd Jury duty, effect of Act, upon .................. U72-93

Legal instruments, effect of 1972

statute upon ............................ U72-40

Officers, public, eligibility not affected by

1972 statute ............................ U72-30

Peace Officers Standards and Training Act,

effect of 1972 statute upon .................. 72-51

Public officers, eligibility to be ................. U72-60

Regents of university, effect upon, by change in

age of majority statute ..................... 72-36

Security salesman ............................ 72-88

Sterilization, consent to ....................... 72-118

Marriage, for ................................ U72-23

Office, public, eligibility for ..................... U72-30

Peace Officers Standards and Training Act,

eligibility under ............................ 72-51

AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES COMMISSIONS.

Health insurance for employees .................... 72-78

Pension coverage for employees .................... 72-78

AGRICULTURE.

Economic poisons, see Economic Poisons.

Markets, see Cooperative Markets.

AIR DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS.

Transportation, State Department of, sponsorship ..... 72-117

AIRPORT SYSTEM PLANNING PROJECT, STATE.

Transportation, State Department of, to

sponsor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-45

ALLIGATORS.

Caiman, not regulated by alligator protective

law ...................................... 72-85

Importation of alligator products prohibited ......... U72-85

Possession of alligator products, when

authorized ............................... U72-85

APPEALS.

Costs, which must be paid as condition

precedent ............................... U72-16

APPROPRIATIONS.

Merit System, State, not made for ................. 72-173

Statute contingent upon, interpretation ............. 72-141

Supplementary, effect of ....................... U72-122

ARCHIVES AND HISTORY, DEPARTMENT OF.

Records management center, see Records

Management Center.

INDEX

395

OP. No.

ARREST. Bondsmen, foreign, authority to make ............... 72-24 Federal offenses, for, by state officers ............. U72-127 Intoxicated persons upon hospital grounds ......... U72-106 Peace officers, powers of ....................... U72-127 Private persons, by ........................... U72-127 ATLANTA, CITY OF. Railroad company taxes, when payable ............. 72-159 ATTACHMENT. Escrow accounts not subject ....................... 72-1 ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. Juvenile court, appointment of counsel, in .......... U72-66
Municipal tax upon attorneys distinguished from license .................................. U72-48
Public Safety Department, representation of persons,
before, in license revocation cases ............... 72-54 AUDITOR, STATE. Superior court judges, expense funds of,
audited ................................... 72-87 AUTHORITIES. Inventory of property not kept by Purchasing and
Supplies Division .......................... 72-161 Types of ................................... U72-122 BABY SITTING. Regulated by law, as not ........................ U72-3 BAIL. Foreign bondsmen, authority to make arrest in
Georgia .................................. 72-24
Readmission to, after forfeiture .................. U72-63 BALDWIN COUNTY, COUNTY COURT OF. Solicitor, compensation of ....................... U72-44 BANKING AND FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF. Before 1972, see Banks, Superintendent of. Delegation of authority, limitations upon ............. 72-80 Reorganization Act, creation by .................... 72-80 BANKING AND FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF. Building and loan association functions, transfer to,
by Reorganization Act ....................... 72-77 Reorganization Act, creation by .................... 72-80 BANKS AND BANKING. Borrowed money, correspondent funds considered
as ...................................... 72-146
Branch, effect of holding company establishing
nonbanking subsidiary ....................... 72-131

396

INDEX

OP. No.
BANKS AND BANKING-Cont'd Correspondent funds, what constitute .............. 72-146 Holding companies-
Compliance with Sale-of-Checks Act ............... 72-23 Establishment of nonbanking subsidiaries .......... 72-131 Merger with nonbanking corporation, not permitted ... 72-169 Municipal taxation of banks ..................... U72-48 Reorganization ActEffect ...................................... 72-77 Transfer of functions to Department of Banking
and Finance ............................. 72-80 Sale-of-Checks Act, holding companies to comply
with ..................................... 72-23 State banks-
Borrowed money, what constitutes ............... 72-146 Correspondent funds, status of .................. 72-146 BANKS, SUPERINTENDENT OF. After 1972, see Banking and Finance, Commissioner of. Credit unions, bylaws of, disapproved, when ......... 72-109 Reorganization Act, transfer of functions to
Commissioner of Banking and Finance ........... 72-80 BATTEY STATE HOSPITAL. Intoxicated patients, procedure respecting .......... U72-106 BIBB COUNTY. Consolidation with Macon, tabulation of votes
in referendum ............................ U72-38 BLOOD TESTS. Drunken driving, for, interpretation of statute ...... U72-121 BONDS. Bail, see Bail. State of Georgia, void, when ..................... 72-164 BRIDGES. Closing, of .................................... 72-64 General discussion as to construction and
maintenance ............................... 72-64 BUILDING ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD. Human Resources, Department of, not transferred
to, under reorganization without further legislation ............................... 72-162 Size of, interpretation of statute .................. 72-141 BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS. See Savings and Loan Associations. BUILDING PERMITS. State construction, local permits not needed ........... 72-7

INDEX

397

OP. No.
BYLAWS. Credit unions, disapproved, when .................. 72-109 CAIMAN. Alligator protective law, not regulated by ............ 72-85 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. Supreme Court of the United States decision as to,
effect ............................... 72-97, 72-115 Transfer of prisoner under death sentence ........... 72-126 CARRIERS. Motor vehicle-
Interstate commerce, in, registration and fees .................................... 72-71
Rates, effect of 1972 Act upon ................... 72-34 CERTIFIED PUBLIC WEIGHERS. Highway materials sold to state, weighing ............ 72-47 CHECKS. Limitations of actions upon ...................... 72-178 Revenue Commissioner, State, in hands of, how disposed
of ...................................... 72-178 Sale of, see Sale of Checks. CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT. General discussion .............................. 72-38 CHILDREN. Early Childhood Development Act, financing matters .. 72-116 CHILDREN AND YOUTH, STATE DIVISION FOR. Juvenile offenders, custody of .......... 72-94, 72-101, 72-124 CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS, STATE BOARD OF. Educational qualifications of applicants, determination
of ...................................... 72-139 CHIROPRACTORS. Educational qualifications of applicants for license,
determination of ........................... 72-139 Physicians, not considered as, for insurance purposes .. U72-17 CHURCHES. Intoxicating liquor sales near .................... U72-47 Sales and use tax upon materials for construction .... U72-96 CITIZENSHIP. Medical scholarship, necessity that applicant be an
American citizen ........................... 72-68 CLERKS OF COURT. Vacancies, filling ............................. U72-24 COASTAL MARSHLANDS PROTECTION ACT.
Enforcement ................................ U72-124

398

INDEX

OP. No.
COLUMBUS AREA VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOL.
Sales and use taxes, not exempt from ............. U72-109 COMPENSATION, STATE COMMISSION ON. Reorganization, effect of, upon .................... 72-121 COMPTROLLER GENERAL. Treasurer, State, final report of .................... 72-18 CONDEMNATION. See Eminent Domain. Game and fish violations, property seized for ........ U72-56 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. Employment, in, see Officers and Employees, Public. Intoxicating liquor, sales by political
subdivisions ................. U72-27, U72-49, U72-58 Law enforcement agencies, no conflict where same individual
officer of different, when no personal profit made .. U72-76
Medical college faculty not compensated by medical research foundation ................... 72-86
Public Safety Department officers, compensation by Federal Government permitted . . . ........... 72-69
SalesSchool construction, where contractor is public official ................................ U72-71
School construction where contractor is public official .................................. U72-71
CONSOLIDATIONS. Political subdivisions, referendum, how
tabulated ................................ U72-38 CONSTABLES. Appointment by notary public, ex-officio justice of
the peace ................................ U72-14 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Amendments-
Enabling Act, necessity for ..................... 72-179 Treasurer, State, effect of adopting proposed ........ 72-31 ContractsState-
Excess of one year, in .................. 72-59, 72-132 Federal Government, with ................... 72-132 Funds, state, earmarking prohibited .......... 72-107, 72-112 Gratuities, scholarships for state prisoners, effect of provision ................................ 72-111

INDEX

399

OP. No.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Cont'd
Jury, requirements as to ......................... U72-7 Religious freedom, effect of scholarships to students
attending nonpublic colleges .................. 72-154 Tax exemptions, see Taxation. Terms of office, effect of amendment upon ............ 72-31 CONTRACTORS. Building permits fees, local, not payable for state
construction ................................ 72-7 CONTRACTS. Cities contracting with counties ................. U72-120 Counties contracting with cities ................. U72-120 Photocopies, use of ............................. 72-142 State-
Cooperatives, purchase from ..................... 72-5 Counties, with .............................. 72-174 Employment terminated by statute, effect ........ U72-36 Excess of one year, for ................... 72-59, 72-132 Federal Government, with ..................... 72-132 Health insurance, group, for employees, State Personnel
Board .................................. 72-44 Improvements, temporary, to make on nonstate-owned
property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-174 Interdepartmental contracts .................... 72-167 Interstate compacts, legality of ................ U72-122 Regents of University System, by ................ 72-140 Skidaway Island, agreements between Department
of Natural Resources and other agencies as to sewage ................................ 72-167 Trotters Shoals Lake Project, with respect to ....... 72-132 COOPERATIVE MARKETS. Fishery products not handled by ................. U72-118 COOPERATIVES. State purchasing from ............................ 72-5 CORPORATIONS. Banking, not permitted to merge with nonbanking .............................. 72-169 Merger, bank not permitted to merge with nonbanking corporation ............................... 72-169 NonprofitIntoxicating liquor, sale by .................... U72-52 Sales and use taxes to be paid by ............... U72-109 Stock, warrants issued for, as covered by Securities Law ..................................... 72-15

400

INDEX

OP. No.
CORRECTIONS, STATE BOARD OF. After 1972, see Offender Rehabilitation,
State Department of. Capital punishment, Supreme Court decision relating to,
effect ................................... 72-115 Juvenile offenders, custody .................. 72-3, 72-101 Names of prisoners, released to communities
in need ofrecreational assistance .............. 72-148 CORRECTIONS, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Juvenile offenders, custody of .................... 72-124 COSTS. Appeal, what payments clerk may demand upon ..... U72-16 Escaped prisoner, reimbursement of costs for trial
of ....................................... 72-43 Over-size motor vehicles, not deducted from
penalties ................................. 72-29 Taxes, delinquent, where collected by levy and
sale .................................... U72-87 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS. Taxation, status as to ........................... 72-20 COUNTIES. Bridges, maintenance of ......................... 72-64 Contracts-
Cities, with ............................... U72-120 State, with ................................. 72-174 Employees Retirement System, rights of retirees
under, employed by county .................... 72-56 Expenditures, juvenile court, compensation of counsel
appointed in ............................. U72-66 Funds, Family and Children Services Department,
State, donations to, for day care and other services .. 72-12
Intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicating Liquors. Jail, Governor's emergency fund not used in building .. 72-150
Mobile homesRegulation of .............................. U72-83 Transported through, no permit required for ................................... U72-15
Ordinances which may be adopted by .............. U72-21 Package stores not operated by ................... U72-27 Roads, authority of compared to that of municipal
corporations .............................. U72-4 Sovereign immunity as to bridges .................. 72-64 Tax returns, ownership of penalties for failure
to make ................................. U72-22

INDEX

401

OP. No. COUNTIES-Cont'd
Taxation, contract with the city for collection ....... U72-120 Workmen's compensation for educational employee ... U72-92 COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. Vacancies, how filled .......................... U72-19 COURT REPORTERS. Bills for services, how submitted .................. U72-99 Compensation ................................ U72-99 Insurance, state, not eligible for ................... 72-92
Retirement of, employment by different county after .. U72-126 CREDIT CARDS. Insurance, purchase of card as improper inducement to
obtain ................................... 72-66 CREDIT UNIONS. Bylaws, power of Superintendent of Banks to
disapprove ............................... 72-109 CRIME COMMISSION, STATE. Conflict of interest does not exist where same
individual official of several law
enforcement agencies ....................... U72-76 Funds-
Federal, expenditure of ....................... U72-75 State, expenditures of ........................ U72-75 CRIME LABORATORY, STATE. Clinical Laboratory Licensure Law, not applicable
to ..................................... U72-113 CRIMINAL LAW. Capital offenses, see Capital Punishment. Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, violation of ..... U72-124
Counties, criminal provisions not created by ordinances ............................... U72-21
Strict construction of criminal statutes .............. 72-85 Traffic violations, see Traffic Control. DEATH PENALTY. See Capital Punishment. DEEDS TO SECURE DEBT. See Security Deeds. DEKALB COUNTY. Education, county board of, qualification of candidates
for ..................................... U72-33 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. Banking and Finance Commissioner, of, by ........... 72-80 Pardons and Paroles Board, State, delegations to
subordinates .............................. 72-105
Public Service Commission, by, to subordinates ........ 72-99

402

INDEX

OP.No. DEPOSITORIES, STATE. Board, State Depository, State Treasurer, effect
of Reorganization Act upon membership . . . . . . . . . . 72-30 DETAINERS. Appeal pending, procedure where prisoner to be
released has ............................. U72-101 Interstate agreement on detainers act, effect of clerical
error ................................... 72-137 DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. Emeritus-
Assistant district attorney, credit for service, as ..................................... 72-25
City court solicitor, counting time served as ....... U72-65 Contributions for time not served as district
attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-65 Contributions to fund for time served in other
capacities .............................. U72-95 Correction of clerical error by State
Treasurer ............................... 72-13 Eligibility for appointment ...................... 72-17 General Assembly, time of service in as
creditable ......................... 72-25, U72-94 Interest, when payable into fund ................ U72-95 Military service, credit for ...................... 72-14 Social security, employer contributions where not
employed by state ......................... 72-11 Radio transmissions by, restricted ................. 72-114 Secretaries-
Compensation, method of ................ 72-104, U72-41 Employee rights, of .......................... U72-41 DOCKETS. Superior court clerks, entries made by ............. U72-25 DRIVERS LICENSES. Attorney, representation by, at license revocation
proceedings ............................... 72-54 Classification system discussed .................... 72-108 Eye examinations-
Effective date of provision for .................. 72-171 Required, when ............................. 72-108 Veterans, for ............................... 72-170 Learners permit, effect of Age of Majority Act as
to applicant being accompanied by adult ......... 72-136

INDEX

403

OP.No.
DRIVERS LICENSES-Cont'd
Photographs, when required ..................... 72-108 Reinstating, funds from fees for, to be paid into
state treasury ............................. 72-107 Requirements for issuance ....................... 72-108 Suspension or revocation-
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, under, where insurance judgment not paid ................. 72-91
Municipal court, upon conviction in ............... 72-79 Veterans, visual acuity examinations, for ........... 72-170 Visual acuity, see Eye examinations, supra. DRIVERS TRAINING SCHOOLS. Licenses, when necessary ........................ 72-135 DRUGS. Jurisdiction of offenses ........................ U72-102 Public Safety Department officers, compensation by
Federal Government for aid in drug control ....... 72-69 Violations, misdemeanors, when ................. U72-102 DRUNKEN DRIVING. Alcolyzer test ................................. 72-46 Balloon tests for intoxication ...................... 72-46 Blood tests, for, interpretation of statute ........... U72-121 Implied consent law, screening test ................. 72-46 EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT. Analysis and discussion .......................... 72-38 Financing matters ............................. 72-116 ECONOMIC POISONS. Mildew resistant paint, as ........................ 72-95 EDUCATION. Handicapped persons, questions as to legality of
distribution of funds for ....................._. 72-52 Scholarships to students attending nonpublic
colleges .................................. 72-154 EDUCATION, COUNTY BOARDS OF. Elections, qualification of candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-33 Funds, see Schools, Public.
Private schools, distribution of public funds, to ..................................... 72-52
Merit system employee as member of ............. U72-131 Qualifications of members, how fixed ............. U72-103 Sale of schoolhouse sites ........................ U72-39 Workmen's compensation for employees ............ U72-92

404

INDEX

OP.No.
EDUCATION, STATE BOARD OF. Attendance at schools, determination of, under
MinimumFoundation Program ............ 72-16, 72-37 Daily attendance requirements, authority to
make ............................... 72-16, 72-37 Early Childhood Development Act, duties under ....... 72-38 ELECTIONS. Absentee ballots, notary public seal not
necessary ................................ 72-177 Ballots-
Incumbency, indicated upon ..................... 72-74 Name of candidate not appearing upon,
effect ................................ U72-116 Candidates-
Age of .................................... U72-60 Ballot, necessity for name to appear
upon ................................. U72-116 Substitute candidate, vote for original candidate not
counted for ............................ U72-116 What constitutes ........................... U72-116 Constitutional amendments, list of, distributed to
persons in line at polls .................... U72-117 Education, county boards of ..................... U72-33 Incumbents designated on primary ballots ............ 72-74 Intoxicating liquor, see Intoxicating Liquors. Mixed drink referendum not held in connection with
other ................................... U72-81 Moving away, effect of voter ..................... U72-51 Municipal, see Municipal Corporations. Nomination petitions-
Education, county boards of, members ............ U72-33 Signatures, number needed ..................... 72-48 United States Senator, for nomination of ........... 72-48 Nonresidents, when permitted to vote .............. U72-51 Polls, list of constitutional amendments distributed,
at ..................................... U72-117 Presidential electors-
Former citizens voting for ..................... U72-51 Write-in votes for ............................ 72-149 Primaries, incumbency indicated on ballot ............ 72-74 Referendums, tabulation of votes where two subdivisions
participating ............................. U72-38 Registration of voters, questionnaires to
students ................................ U72-20

INDEX

405

ELECTIONS-Cont'd

OP. No.

Special, Senate, United States, for unexpired term .................................... 72-123
Votes, tabulation in referendums where two subdivisions voting ........................ U72-38
Voting machines, display of .................... U72-108 Write-in candidates-
Notice of candidacy .......................... 72-151 Presidential electors, for ....................... 72-149 Publication of notice ......................... 72-151 ELECTRICITY. Limited number of customers, sales not
regulated ................................. 72-84 EMERGENCY VEHICLES. Lights, flashing, color regulated .................... 72-40 EMERITUS POSITIONS. District attorneys, see District Attorneys. Military service-
Students Army Training Corps, service in, as constituting ............................. 72-42
Social security employer contributions where officer not employed by state ........................... 72-11
Superior court judges, see Superior Courts. EMINENT DOMAIN. Groveland Lake Development Authority, venue of
actions .................................. U72-12 Priorities in acquiring state property disposed of
as surplus ................................. 72-4 Venue of actions .............................. U72-12 EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM. Counties, rights of retirees employed by ............. 72-56 Disability retirees, effect of employment ............. 72-56 Murder of employee, where beneficiary commits ...... U72-61 Reinstatement after improper termination .......... U72-64 Survivor's benefits, where beneficiary commits
murder of employee ........................ U72-61 Termination, improper, procedure upon ............ U72-64 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCY, GEORGIA. Moving expenses of employees paid from federal funds.. U72-53 EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LAW. Limitation of actions .......................... U72-57 Notice to claimants of actions .................... U72-57 Rule making powers of Department of Labor Board
of Review, limitations upon .................. U72-57

406

INDEX

OP. No.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.
Maternity leave for employees, adoption of rules ..... U72-89 ESCAPE. Costs, reimbursement to clerk and officials by
Department of Offender Rehabilitation ........... 72-43 ESCROW. Attachment, accounts not subject to ................. 72-1 EVIDENCE. Seized property, use of ......................... U72-56 EXAMINING BOARDS, STATE. Funds to be paid into state treasury ............... 72-112 Veterans preferences not retroactively applied ....... 72-119 EXECUTIONS. Cancelling from record ......................... U72-79 Dormancy ................................... U72-79 Satisfaction .................................. U72-79 Tax executions-
In rem, issued, when ......................... U72-80 Personam, in, when issued .................... U72-80 EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1972. See Reorganization. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. Principle applied .............................. U72-5 EXTRADITION. Bondsmen, foreign, authority as to arrest ............ 72-24 EYEGLASSES. Insurance, when contracts executed by dealers constitute..72-62 FAIR HOUSING LAWS. Real Estate Commission, authority to promulgate
rules and regulations ........................ 72-129 FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, DIVISION OF. Assignment of court-ordered support ............... 72-147 Before 1972, see Family and Children
Services, State Department of.
FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES.
STATE DEPARTMENT OF.
After 1972, see Family and Children Services, Division of. County donations, acceptance for day-care and other
services .................................. 72-12 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. Arrest of offenders against, by state officers ........ U72-127 Contracts of state, with ......................... 72-132 Funds, expenditures by state agencies ....... U72-53, U72-75 Public Safety Department officers, compensation
for aid in drug control ........................ 72-69

INDEX

407

OP. No.
FEES. Witnesses ................................... U72-55 FELONIES. Defined .................................... U72-102 Fl. FAS. See Executions. FINES. Over-size motor vehicles, distribution of penalties for
driving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72~9 FIRE DEPARTMENTS. Lights on vehicles, colors regulated ................. 72-40 FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND, GEORGIA. Trustees, majority needed to take action ............ 72-103 FIRST AID. Employer, duty to render to injured employee ....... U72-62 FISCAL AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEES. General Assembly, of, transfer of funds .............. 72-72 FISCAL DIVISION. See Administrative Services, State Department of. FISH AND FISHING. Cooperative markets not permitted to handle products..U72-118 FRATERNAL BENEFIT SOCIETIES. Agents, written examination not required ............ 72-65 FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE. Bondsmen, foreign, authority as to arrest ............ 72-24 FURMAN V. GEORGIA. Effect of decision ......................... 72-97. 72-115 GAME AND FISH. Alligators-
Caiman not protected by laws .................... 72-85 Possession of products ........................ U72-85 Cooperative markets for fishery products not
permitted ............................... U72-118 Property seized by rangers, use ................... U72-56 GAME AND FISH COMMISSION, STATE. Reorganization, effect of, upon .................... 72-100 Salt and fresh waters, delineation, by .............. 72-166 GENERAL ASSEMBLY. District attorneys emeritus, time served as
creditable .......................... 72-25, U72-94 Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees, transfer of funds ........ 72-72

408

INDEX

OP. No. GEORGIA BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Involuntary separation benefits where retirement
caused by statute .......................... U72-36 GIFTS. State agencies, to, requisites for acceptance .......... 72-143 GOLF CARTS. Motor vehicles, as ............................. U72-78 State Parks Department, lease of, as invalid .......... 72-59 GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS. Legal duty to render assistance, effect of ........... U72-62 GOVERNOR. Body guard, compensation where employed beyond state..72-144 Emergency fund, county jail, not used in
building ................................. 72-150 Reorganization, limitations upon authority of,
under ................................... 72-162 Superior court judge, designation where regular judge
disqualified .............................. U72-28 Treasurer, State, appointment of, to fill vacancy ....... 72-18 GRAND JURY. Age of jurors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-93 Officers, public, members as not .................. U72-93 GROVELAND LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Eminent domain, venue of actions ................ U72-12 GUARDIAN AND WARD. Age of Majority Act, effect upon existing guardianship .. U72-37 GUILTY, PLEAS OF. Docket entries, how made ....................... U72-25 GWINNETT COUNTY, STATE COURT OF. Solicitor, qualifications of ........................ 72-57 HANDICAPPED PERSONS. Education, of ............................. 72-38, 72-52 HATCH ACT. State law, correlation with ....................... 72-153 HEALTH INSURANCE. See Insurance. HEALTH, LOCAL BOARDS OF. Physical examination for school students, duties with
respect to ................................ 72-176 HIGHWAY BOARD, STATE. Control of highway system vested in ............... U72-98 Transportation, State Department of, naming director ... 72-39

INDEX

409

OP. No.
HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, STATE.
Advertising permits, outdoor, issuance of ............. 72-19 After 1972, see Transportation, State Department of. Director, name changed to "Director, State
Department of Transportation," effect of ........ 72-39
Eminent domain, disposal of surplus property acquired by ................................ 72-4
Name changed to Department of Transportation ....... 72-39 Over-size motor vehicles, allocation of penalties
for driving ................................ 72-29 Reorganization Act of 1972, effect .................. 72-39 Surplus right-of-way, disposal of .................... 72-4 HIGHWAYS. Administration of, see Highway Board, State;
Transportation, State Department of. Bridges, maintenance of ......................... 72-64 Counties, authority of compared to that of municipal
corporations .............................. U72-4 Jekyll Island roads incorporated into State Highway
System .................................. 72-172 Municipal corporations, authority of ............... U72-98 Parks, State, roads as part of State Highway System ... 72-172 HISTORICAL COMMISSION, GEORGIA. Gifts, requisites for acceptance .................... 72-143 HOLDING COMPANIES. Banking, establishment of nonbanking subsidiaries .... 72-131 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS. Age 65, veterans pension as affecting income
when over ................................ 72-28 Veterans, pensions as affecting income when over 65
years of age ............................... 72-28 HONESTY IN GOVERNMENT. Medical college faculty not compensated by medical
research foundation . . ....................... 72-86 HOSPITAL SERVICE NONPROFIT CORPORATION. Agents, written examination not necessary ........... 72-65 HOUSING AUTHORITIES. Church owned property, management not permitted ... U72-50 Private organizations, contracts with .............. U72-50 HOUSING LAW, FEDERAL. Real Estate Commission, Georgia, authority to
promulgate rules and regulations .............. 72-129

410

INDEX

OP. No. HUMAN RESOURCES, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Adoption records, how kept ...................... 72-175 Building Administrative Board not transferred to under
reorganization without further legislation ........ 72-162 Family and Children Services, see Family
and Children Services, Division of. Physical examinations for school students,
administration of .......................... 72-176 IMPLIED CONSENT LAW. See Drunken Driving. IMPROVEMENTS. State, by, requisites for ......................... 72-167 INCOME TAX. Exemptions for retired teachers ................. U72-123 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. Injuries to employee, duties of employer as to
rendering aid ............................. U72-62 INDUSTRY AND TRADE, DEPARTMENT OF. Airport System Planning Project, transfer to Department
of Transportation ........................... 72-45 Reorganization Act of 1972, effect .................. 72-45 INJUNCTIONS. Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, to enforce ...... U72-124 INSOLVENCY. Insurance companies-
Deposits of securities, effect upon ................. 72-41 Pool, insurance insolvency, no liability when company
defunct before pool created ................. 72-158 INSURANCE. Agents, written examination, when necessary ......... 72-65 Chiropractors not considered as physicians for
purposes of .............................. U72-17 Court reporters not eligible for state insurance ........ 72-92 Credit cards, purchase not authorized as inducement .... 72-66 Eyeglass dealers, when contracts of, constitute ........ 72-62 Group-
Credit card ownership as not proper basis for ................................ 72-66
Health for public officers and employees, contracts for ............................. 72-44
Health insuranceAgricultural commodities commissions, employees of ............................. 72-78 Public officers and employees, contracts for ......... 72-44

INDEX

411

INSURANCE-Cont'd

OP. No.

Health insurance-Cont'd

Secretaries to superior court officials, right

to .................................... U72-41

State employees, contributions to be made according to

established plan ......................... 72-113 Life insurance, murder of insured by beneficiary,

effect ................................... U72-61

Murder of insured by beneficiary, effect ............ U72-61

Purchase of property as improper inducement to accept

policy .................................... 72-66 State employees, superior court reporters not
eligible ................................... 72-92 INSURANCE COMMISSIONER.

Control of companies, extent of ................... 72-152

Merger of companies, authority with respect to ....... 72-152 INSURANCE COMPANIES.

Agents, when written examination necessary ......... 72-65

Certificate of incorporation not dependent upon

approval date of charter application ............. 72-76 Charter, approval of application for, date not material
as to certificate of incorporation ................ 72-76 Control of companies, how acquired ................ 72-152 Credit card purchased as improper inducement to
accept policy ............................... 72-66 Deposits, effect upon of receivership ................ 72-41 Insolvency-

Deposits of securities, effect upon ................. 72-41 Pool, not liabile where company ceased doing business
before organization of pool ................. 72-158 Merger, approval of insurance

commissioner ............................. 72-152

Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act invoked where

judgment not paid .......................... 72-91 Successor company, relationship to deposits of original
company .................................. 72-41 Taxes upon premiums, overpayments not refunded ..... 72-83 INSURERS OTHER THAN INSURANCE

COMPANIES.

Eyeglass dealers, when contracts constitute insurance ... 72-62 INTEREST. District attorneys emeritus, when payable into

fund ................................... U72-95

Secondary Security Deed Act, under ............... U72-90 INTERNS.

Graduation from medical school, practice before ....... 72-26

Practice as. before takinQ" medical examination ........ 72-26

412

INDEX

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

OP. No.

Inspection of vehicles engaged in ................... 72-33

Motor vehicle carriers in, registration and fees ........ 72-71

INTERSTATE COMPACTS.

Legality of ................................. U72-122

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Church property, sales near ..................... U72-47

Counties not to participate in sale of .............. U72-27

Elections as to sale-

Municipal corporation, by, time of holding ........ U72-46

Petition for election, necessity for ............... U72-27

Time of ................................... U72-42

Licenses-

Fees from, disposition of ...................... U72-73

Qualifications of applicants, passing upon ......... U72-73

Who may issue ............................. U72-73

Mixed drink sales-

Municipal regulations as to .................... U72-86

Referendum not to be held in connection with other

election ............................... U72-81

Municipal corporations-

Legalization authorized by, when ............... U72-46

Partially within "wet" and partially within

"dry" counties, issuance of licenses ........... U72-8

Municipal operation of stores not authorized .. U72-49, U72-58

Nonprofit corporations, sale by ................... U72-52

Privilege rather than right, sale as ................ U72-73

INTOXICATION.

Alcolyzer tests ................................. 72-46

Hospital grounds, public, disposition of drunken

persons upon ............................ U72-106

INVESTIGATION, DIVISION OF.

Witness fees for employees ...................... 72-157

JAILS.

Governor's emergency fund not used in building

for county ................................ 72-150

Misbehavior of prisoners, in, effect upon good time

allowances ................................ 72-61

JEKYLL ISLAND.

Roads incorporated into State Highway System ........ 72-172

JOINT-SECRETARY, STATE EXAMINING

BOARDS.

Records, when transferred to Records Management

Center ................................... 72-89

INDEX

413

OP. No.
JUDGES. Richmond County, civil court of, salary ............ U72-31 JUDGMENTS. Assignment of ................................ 72-147 Docket entries of, how made ..................... U72-25 Dormancy ................................... U72-79 Failure to pay in motor vehicle accident cases, see
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility. JURISDICTION. Juvenile offenders, over ......................... 72-179 Retention of case by court entertaining ............ U72-125 JURY. Age of jurors ................................ U72-93 Commissioners-
Age of eligibility to serve ..................... U72-30 Appointed, not eligible to succeed
selves ................................. U72-88 Constitutional requirements for .............. U72-5, U72-7 Number of jurors in superior court ........... U72-5, U72-7 Unanimous verdict, requirement for ................ U72-7 JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Constables, appointment of ...................... U72-14 State Executive Branch officer not permitted to
run for ................................. U72-26 JUVENILE COURTS. Counsel, appointment of ........................ U72-66 Judges, service as, creditable for judge emeritus,
superior court ........................... U72-119 JUVENILE OFFENDERS. Custody of .................... 72-3, 72-94, 72-101, 72-124 Division of Children and Youth, commitment
to ................................. 72-94, 72-101 Jurisdiction over .............................. 72-179 LABOR, COMMISSIONER OF. Federal funds for moving expenses of employees, when
authorized ............................... U72-53 LABOR, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Employment security, rules and regulations
respecting ............................... U72-57 .LABORATORIES. License laws not applicable to State Crime
Laboratory .............................. U72-113

414

INDEX

OP. No.
LAKE LANIER ISLANDS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY. Reorganization, effect of ........................ 72-100 LAND SALES ACT. Out-of-state lands not applicable to ................. 72-90 LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION. Conflicts of interest not present where same individual
officer of several law enforcement agencies . . . .. U72-76 LEESBURG, CITY OF. Liquor sales, by .............................. U72-58 LIBRARIES. Regional, disposal of surplus property ............. U72-110 Teachers Retirement System, coverage of employees .... 72-82 LICENSES. Drivers training schools, when needed for ........... 72-135 Insurance agents ............................... 72-65 Intoxicating liquor, when issuance mandatory ........ U72-8 Medical practice, see Physicians. Real estate brokers, experience necessary before taking
examination ............................... 72-22 Taxation and licenses distinguished ............... U72-48 LIE DETECTORS. Psychological stress evaluators distinguished from
polygraphs ............................... 72-163 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Administrative rule, statute not changed by ......... U72-57 Checks, suit upon ............................. 72-178 LOTTERIES. Promotional contests as violations of law ........... U72-69 Sweepstakes as violations of law .................. U72-69 MACON, CITY OF. Consolidation with Bibb County, tabulation of votes
in referendum ............................ U72-38 MAJORITY. Age of, see Age of Persons. MALT BEVERAGES. Municipal corporations, limitation upon right to tax .. U72-128
MARKETS. Cooperative, fishery products not handled by ....... U72-118 MARRIAGE. Pregnant female, necessity for parental consent
where underage ........................... U72-23

INDEX

415

OP. No.
MARTA. Sales and use tax-
Credit for taxes paid in other states ............. U72-68 Round-trip air flights from territory ............ U72-107 Where effective .............................. 72-32 MASS GATHERINGS. National Campers and Hikers Association, meeting
subject to law ............................... 72-2 MASTER AND SERVANT. Injuries to employee, degree of care owed by master in
rendering aid ............................. U72-62 MEDICAL COLLEGE OF GEORGIA. Medical research foundation, faculty not to be employed
directly by ................................ 72-86 MEDICAL EDUCATION BOARD. Scholarships under ............................. 70-68 MEDICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION. Medical college faculty not to be employed directly
by ...................................... 72-86 MENTAL ILLNESS. Emergency facilities, commitment to .............. U72-29 Hospitalization of persons, emergency facility,
commitment to ........................... U72-29 Medical admissions county, what constitutes ......... U72-29 Ordinary, commitment by, to emergency facility ...... U72-29 MERGER. Bank not permitted to merge with nonbanking
corporation ............................... 72-169 MERIT SYSTEM, STATE. Accumulated leave for nonmerit-system employees ..... 72-67 Appropriations not made for ..................... 72-173 Classified employees, what constitutes . . . ........... U72-6 Deputy department heads, status after
reorganization ............................. 72-81 Education, County Board of, employee as member ... U72-131 Funds, how obtained ........................... 72-173 Maternity leave for employees, regulations
concerning ............................... U72-89 Real Estate Investment Board, State, coverage of
employees ................................ U72-6 Reorganization-
Deputy department heads, effect upon ............. 72-81 Division directors, effect upon ................... 72-58 Retroactive pay increases to covered employees not
authorized . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 72-110

416

INDEX

OP. No. MERIT SYSTEM, STATE-Cont'd
Salary increase for employees, when authorized ............................... U72-84
METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY.
See MARTA. MILDEW RESISTANT PRODUCTS. Economic poisons, as ........................... 72-95. MILITARY SERVICE. District attorneys emeritus, credit for ............... 72-14 Students Army Training Corps, service in as
constituting ............................... 72-42 Superior court judges emeritus, credit
for .......................... 72-42, U72-54, U72-91 MINIMUM FOUNDATION PROGRAM. Attendance of students, determination by State
Board of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-16, 72-37 Daily attendance, authority of State Board of
Education to make requirements for ........ 72-16, 72-37 Vocational-technical schools, when students
included for determining attendance ............ 72-37 MINORITY. Age of, see Age of Persons. MINORS. Age of, see Age of Persons. Early Childhood Development Act, general discussion ... 72-38 MISDEMEANORS. Defined .................................... U72-102 Drug violations, when treated as ................. U72-102 High and aggravated nature, good time allowance
where convicted of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-138 MOBILE HOMES. Counties, regulation by ......................... U72-83 Municipal regulations as to width ................. U72-82 Transported through counties, no permit required .... U72-15 Width, municipal regulations as to ................ U72-82 MOTOR BOATS. Accident reports, by whom filed ................... 72-168 MOTOR VEHICLE CARRIERS. See Carriers. MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY. Insurance judgment not paid, action to be taken ....... 72-91 MOTOR VEHICLES. Accidents, private property on, reports ............. U72-34

INDEX

417

MOTOR VEHICLES-Cont'd

OP. No.

Bumper standards, when applicable ................. 72-50

Carriers, see Carriers.

Drivers licenses, see Drivers Licenses.

Emergency vehicles, flashing light colors regulated ..... 72-40

Equipment, bumper standards, when applicable ....... 72-50

Flashing lights-

Restriction of use .......................... U72-111

Use permit required, when ................... U72-130

Golf carts, as ................................ U72-78

Inspection-

Interstate commerce, inspection of vehicles in ....... 72-33

Out-of-state-

Certificates, effect .......................... 72-60

Inspection stations, revocation of

authorization ........................... 72-33

Roving stations for as not practical .............. 72-165

Stations, for, necessary equipment ............... 72-165

Used cars with unexpired cartificates .............. 72-60

License tags, when transferable ................... U72-9

Lights, flashing, restriction upon use .............. U72-111

Mobile homes, see Mobile Homes.

Over-size, allocation of penalties ................... 72-29

Responsibility for damages, see Motor Vehicle

Safety Responsibility.

Size and weight, municipal regulation as to width

of mobile homes .......................... U72-82

Trailers, see Mobile Homes.

License tags not transferable ................... U72-9

MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL CIRCUIT.

Court reporter, compensation .................... U72-99

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

Annexation-

Clerical error in Act, effect of .................. U72-43

Property owners, who are .................... U72-105

Security deed grantors as property owners ....... U72-105

Beer, see Malt beverages, infra.

Bridges, maintenance and closing .................. 72-64

Contracts, corporations ........................ U72-120

Elections-

Ballots, incumbency of candidate indicated,

when ................................. U72-77

Incumbency of candidates, when indicated on

ballot ................................. U72-77

418

INDEX

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Cont'd

OP. No.

Elections-Cant'd

Referendums to be conducted according to

Election Code ........................... U72-32

Highways, state, authority with respect to .......... U72-98

Intoxicating liquors, see Intoxicating Liquors.

Issuance of license, when mandatory .............. U72-8

Legalization of sales, by ...................... U72-46

Sales by municipality not authorized ...... U72-49, U72-58

Malt beverages, limitations upon right to tax ....... U72-128

Mobile homes, regulations as to width ............. U72-82

Ordinances, state law, on matters covered by ........ U72-98

Roads, authority of, compared to that of

county ................................... U72-4

Taxation-

Attorneys at law, professional tax upon .......... U72-48

Business or professional taxes .................. U72-48

County, contract with, for collection ............ U72-120

Exemptions invalid, when .................... U72-100

Licenses and taxes distinguished ................ U72-48

National banks, upon ........................ U72-48

Wine, limitations upon rights to tax .............. U72-128

MUNICIPAL COURTS.

Drivers licenses suspension upon conviction .......... 72-79 MURDER.

Insured, of, by beneficiary, effect ................. U72-61

Retirement, survivor's benefits to person committing .. U72-61

NATIONAL CAMPERS AND HIKERS

ASSOCIATION.

Mass Gathering Statute, meetings subject to ........... 72-2

NATURAL RESOURCES, COMMISSIONER OF.

Reorganization Act, effect of ................ 72-70, 72-100

NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE DEPARTMENT OF.

Boat launching ramps, contracts for construction ...... 72-174

Boating accident reports, by whom filed ............. 72-168

Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, enforcement of ... U72-124

Reorganization, effect of, upon .................... 72-100

NAVIGATION.

See Motor Boats.

Interstate compacts respecting .................. U72-122 NEGLIGENCE.

Emergency, degree of care owed by one aiding in .... U72-62

NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS. See Corporations.

NONPROFIT MEDICAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS.

Agents, written examination not required ............ 72-65

INDEX

419

OP. No. NORTH GEORGIA MOUNTAINS AUTHORITY. Peace Officer Standards and Training Act, security
personnel not governed by . . . ................. 72-27 NORTHWEST BRANCH EXPERIMENT STATION. Regents of University System, contract for operation ... 72-140 NOTARIES PUBLIC. Seals, absentee ballot not necessary on ............. 72-177 NOTARIES PUBLIC EX-OFFICIO JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE. Constables, appointment of ...................... U72-14 NURSERY SCHOOLS. Operation of .................................. U72-3 OFFENDER REHABILITATION, STATE
DEPARTMENT OF. Before 1972, see Corrections, State Board of. Escaped prisoner, reimbursement to court officials of costs
for trials .................................. 72-43
Funds, transfer of .............................. 72-72 Pardons and Paroles Board, relation to .............. 72-49 Probation functions transferred to ................. 72-128 Records, retention of ............................ 72-75 Transfer of prisoner under death sentence ........... 72-126 OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE. Maternity leave for employees, adoption of rules ..... U72-89 OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC. Age-
Eligibility for office .......................... U72-30 Majority, reaching after election but before
inauguration ........................... U72-60 Appointed to fill vacancy, status of ................ U72-88
CompensationEducational leave with pay prohibited ............. 72-98 Increases in salary, when authorized ............. U72-84 Longevity increases, when authorized ............ U72-84 Retroactive pay increases not authorized .......... 72-110
State Commission on, effect of Reorganization Act ................................... 72-121
Deputy department heads, status after reorganization ... 72-81 Educational leaves with pay prohibited .............. 72-98 Expenses of moving and relocation ........... 72-63, U72-53 Grand jurors, as not ........................... U72-93 Group health insurance, contracts for ............... 72-44 Hatch Act, effect of ............................ 72-153

420

INDEX

OP. No. OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC-Cont'd
Health insuranceContracts for ................................ 72-44 Paid for according to established plan ............ 72-113
Insurance, for, court reporters not eligible ............ 72-92 Involuntary separation benefits where retirement caused
by statute ............................... U72-36 Leave-
Annual, for nonmerit-system employees ............ 72-67 Maternity, regulations concerning ............... U72-89 Longevity increases, when authorized .............. U72-84 Moving expensesFederal funds, paid from, when authorized ........ U72-53 State funds, for, not authorized .................. 72-63 Personnel Board, State, regulations of .............. 72-153 Political activities regulated ..................... 72-153 Relocation expenses not authorized ................. 72-63 Reorganization Act, effect of, see Reorganization. Retirement, see Retirement. Retroactive pay increases not authorized ............ 72-110 Right to hold office, construction of statute .......... U72-60 School construction where contractor is public official .. U72-71 Secretaries to superior court officialsCompensation, method ........................ 72-104 Employee rights of .......................... U72-41 Judges emeritus not entitled to ................ U72-129 Simultaneous employmentEducation, county board member-
Merit system employee, as .................. U72-131 Executive branch employee running for justice
of the peace ............................ U72-26 Justice of the peace, state executive employee
running for ............................ U72-26 Medical college faculty not compensated by medical
research foundation ....................... 72-86 Merit system employees as members of county
board of education ...................... U72-131 Public Safety Department officers, compensation
by Federal Government for aid in drug control ... 72-69 Terms of office, effect of constitutional amendment
changing position ........................... 72-31 Treasurer, State, see Treasurer, State. United States Senator, special election for ........... 72-123 Vacancies, status of person appointed to fill ......... U72-88

INDEX

421

'OP. No. OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC-Cont'd
Vested retirement rights not divested by subsequent statute .................................. 72-122
OPEN RECORDS LAW. See Records. OPTICIANS. Insurance, when contracts by, constitute ............. 72-62 OPTOMETRISTS. Insurance, when contracts by, constitute ............. 72-62 ORDINANCES. Counties, types which may be adopted ............. U72-21 Reasonableness, necessity for ................... U72-128 State law, on matters covered by ... U72-98, U72-114, U72-128 Traffic, upon same subject-matter as statutes ....... U72-114 ORDINARIES. Books to be maintained in office .................. U72-67 Fees in traffic violation cases ..................... U72-2 Game and Fish violations, payment of fines and forfeitures
into retirement funds ........................ 72-55 Mentally ill persons, commitment to emergency
facilities ................................ U72-29 Records, maintaining .......................... U72-67 Retirement, see Ordinaries Retirement Fund. Retirement funds, payment of fines and forfeitures into. . 72-55 Traffic violation cases-
Fees ...................................... U72-2 Jurisdiction over ........................... U72-125 ORDINARIES RETIREMENT FUND. Fines or forfeitures, payment into, from ............. 72-55 OUT-OF-STATE LAND SALES ACT. Land Sales Act of 1972 compared to ................ 72-90 PAINT. Mildew resistant, as economic poison ................ 72-95 PARDONS. Effect of, generally ........................... U72-112 Pistol permits, effect upon right of convicted person
to obtain ............................... U72-112 PARDONS AND PAROLES. Financial benefits to prisoners upon release .......... 72-102 PARDONS AND PAROLES, STATE BOARD OF. Capital punishment decision, effect upon ............. 72-97 Delegation of authority to subordinates ............. 72-105 Employment of personnel, effect of Reorganization Act .. 72-49 Federal authorities, no jurisdiction to act in case
of prisoner held by .......................... 72-35

422

INDEX

OP. No.
PARDONS AND PAROLES, STATE BOARD OF-Cont'd Majority necessary to grant reprieve ................. 72-6 Offender Rehabilitation Department, relation to ....... 72-49 Reorganization Act, effect as to employment of personnel. . 72-49 PARKS.
Roads in state parks as part of State Highway System .. 72-172 PARKS DEPARTMENT, STATE. Director, effect of reorganization upon ......... 72-70, 72-100 Golf cart lease agreement void as violative of one-year
contract restriction .......................... 72-59 Lease of golf carts for period longer than one year
as void ................................... 72-59 Reorganization, effect upon ...................... 72-100 PAROLE.
Federal prisoner, no jurisdiction in Georgia board ...... 72-35 PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS AND TRAINING
ACT.
Age of participating persons ...................... 72-51 North Georgia Mountains Authority, security personnel
not governed by ............................ 72-27 PEACE OFFICERS. Arrest, powers of ............................ U72-127 PEACE OFFICERS ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND. Fines and forfeitures, payments into, from, by
ordinary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-55 PENALTIES, CIVIL. Coastal Marshlands Protection Act, enforcement, by .. U72-124 PENSIONS. Agricultural commodity commissions, for employees
of ....................................... 72-78 PERSONNEL BOARD, STATE. Health insurance, group, for officers and employees,
contracts ................................. 72-44 Regulations as to political activities of officers ........ 72-153 PHOTOCOPIES. Litigation, use in .............................. 72-142 PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS. Drivers licenses, eye examinations for .............. 72-171 Students at public schools, for .................... 72-176 PHYSICIANS. Chiropractors not considered as, for insurance purposes .. U72-17 Interns, employment before taking medical examination.. 72-26

INDEX

423

PISTOLS.

OP. No.

License to carry-

Discretion of ordinary ....................... U72-112

Pardon, effect upon right ..................... U72-112 POISONS.

Mildew resistant paint as economic poison ............ 72-95

POLICE OFFICERS.

Motor vehicles, of, color of lights regulated ........... 72-40 POLYGRAPHS.

Psychological stress evaluators distinguished ......... 72-163 PORTS AUTHORITY, STATE.

Additional funds, borrowing, procedure ............. 72-127

Container-handling facility, financing of ............ 72-127

Sale of property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-53

PRISONS AND PRISONERS.

Advertising in inmate publications ................. 72-96

Appeal pending, procedure where prisoner to be

released has ............................. U72-101

Bus, chartered, transportation of prisoners by ......... 72-93

Detainers, see Detainers.

Escape, costs, reimbursement to court officials,

for ...................................... 72-43

Federal, parole jurisdiction not in state authorities ..... 72-35

Financial benefits upon release ................... 72-102

Good time allowances-

Misbehavior in jails, effect upon . . . . . . . .......... 72-61 ~isdemeanors of high and aggravated nature,

in case of .............................. 72-138

Jail, misbehavior in, effect upon good time

allowances ................................ 72-61

Privacy, right of .............................. 72-148

Probation, State Board of, authority to investigate

cases .................................... 72-21

Records, retention of ............................ 72-75

Recreational assistance, release of names to

communities needing ....................... 72-148

Release, work clothes in lieu of business

suit, when issued .......................... 72-160

Reprieve, majority of State Board of Pardons and Paroles

needed for ................................. 72-6

Scholarships for inmates, state funds for ............ 72-111

Sentences, see Sentence and Punishment.

Transfer of inmate under death sentence ............ 72-126

Transportation by chartered bus ................... 72-93

Work clothes in lieu of business suit, issued upon

release .................................. 72-160

424

INDEX

OP. No. PROBATION. Conditions, of, waiver of search warrant, as ......... U72-45 Reorganization, effect upon collections by circuit
probation supervisors ....................... 72-128 PROBATION, STATE BOARD OF. Age of Majority Act, effect upon collection of child
support payments ......................... U72-40 Investigation of cases, when permitted .............. 72-21 PROMOTIONAL CONTESTS. Lottery laws, as violations of .................... U72-69 PROPERTY. Ports Authority, State, sale by ..................... 72-53 Public-
Parking areas reserved for state employees ........ U72-35 Restrictive use of ........................... U72-35 Schoolhouse sites, sale of ...................... U72-39 StateDisposal, where acquired by eminent domain, priorities
as to purchase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-4 Improvements-
Necessity of fee simple title in state before making ......................... 72-167
Temporary, when made on nonstate-owned property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-174
Inventory of authority property not kept by Purchasing and Supplies Divisions ........... 72-161
Ports Authority, State, sale by ................... 72-53 Surplus-
Disposal of .............................. U72-110 University system, of, sale .................... 72-73 PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATORS. Polygraphs, distinguished from ................... 72-163 PUBLIC SAFETY. See Safety, State Department of Public. PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See Schools, Public. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION. Delegation of authority to subordinates .............. 72-99 Employees of railroads, jurisdiction with reference to safety ................................. 72-133 Interstate motor carriers, registration and fees ..................................... 72-71

INDEX

425

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION-Cont'd

OP.No.

Jurisdiction, limited number of customers, service not

regulated ................................. 72-84

Limited number of corporations, services to, not

regulated ................................. 72-84

Railroad employees, jurisdiction with respect to safety

of ...................................... 72-133

Reorganization, effect of ......................... 72-71

Utility rate changes, procedure for ................. 72-34

PURCHASES, SUPERVISOR OF.

After 1972, see Purchasing and Supplies Division.

Cooperatives, purchasing from ...................... 72-5

PURCHASING AND SUPPLIES DIVISION.

Before 1972, see Purchases, Supervisor of.

Inventory of state authority properties, not required

to keep .................................. 72-161

QUORUM.

Majority of agency, action by ..................... 72-103

RADIO.

District attorneys, transmissions by, restricted ........ 72-114

RAILROADS.

Collision involving personal injuries, crews not required

to remain at scene ........................... 72-9

Employees, jurisdiction of Public Service Commission

with respect to safety ....................... 72-133

Personal injuries, train crews not required to remain at

scene of ................................... 72-9

Taxes due Atlanta, when payable ................. 72-159

REAL ESTATE.

Sales, regulation of ............................. 72-90

REAL ESTATE BROKERS.

Escrow accounts, not subject to attachment ............ 72-1

Experience necessary before examination ............ 72-22

REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, GEORGIA.

Fair housing laws, authority to promulgate rules and

regulations as to ........................... 72-129

Hearings, conduct of ............................ U72-1

Investigations, conduct of ........................ U72-1

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT BOARD, STATE.

Merit system for employees ...................... U72-6

REAL ESTATE SALESMEN.

Experience necessary before taking broker's examination. . 72-22

RECORDS.

Adoption, of, how kept .......................... 72-175

426

INDEX

RECORDS-Cont'd

OP.No.

Cancelling instruments from U72-79 0



0



0



0



0



0



0



0



Checks in possession of Revenue Commissioner, as

. 0



0

72-178

Destruction .... 72-175, 72-178 0

0



0

0



0



0

0

0



0



0

0

0

0

Inspection of public school records of

minor children ... U72-74 0

0

0

0



0



0



0

0

0



0

0



0



0



0

0

0



0

Management standards, necessity for establishing

. 0



0

72-175

Open Records Law, see Inspection of public, supra.

Ordinaries, to be maintained by

U72-67 0

0

0



0



0

0

0

0



0

0



Photocopies, use of. 72-142 0



0



0

0



0

0

0

0

0



0



0



0



Prisoners, of, retention by Department of Offender

Rehabilitation . 72-75 0

0



0

0



0



0



0

0

0

0



0



0



Records management center, see Records

Management Center.

Retention in department where needed .. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72-89

Revenue Commissioner, State, how disposed of .. 0 0 0 72-178

RECORDS ACT, GEORGIA.

See Records.

RECORDS COMMITTEE, STATE.

Management standards, necessity for establishing . 0 0 0 72-175

RECORDS MANAGEMENT CENTER.

Transfer of records to, when proper . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72-89

REFERENDUMS.

Mixed drinks, as to, not held in connection with another

election U72-81 0

0

0



0



0

0



0

0



0

0

0



0

0



0

0



0



Wine, as to sale of, reversal of result

U72-72 0

0

0



0

0



REGULATIONS.

See Rules and Regulations.

RELIGION.

Freedom of, effect of scholarships to students attending

nonpublic colleges as affecting . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 72-154

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.

Tax exemptions, for . U72-115 0



0



0



0



0



REORGANIZATION.

Airport System Planning Project, State, to be sponsored

by Department of Transportation ............ 0 72-45

Banking and Finance, Department of, transfer of

functions to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 72-77, 72-80

Compensation, State Commission on, effect upon .. 0 72-121

Deputy department heads, effect upon merit system

status .. 72-81 0



Game and Fish Commission, director, effect upon ... 0 72-100

Highway Department, State, Director's name

changed to "Director, State Department

of Transportation,"

.......... 72-39 0

0



0



INDEX

427

OP. No.
REORGANIZATION-Cont'd
Jekyll Island State Park Authority, effect upon ........ 72-70 Lake Lanier Islands Development Authority, effect
upon membership .......................... 72-100 Legislation, further, necessity for in certain instances .. 72-162 Limitations upon authority of Governor to institute
without legislation ......................... 72-162 Merit system-
Deputy department heads, status ................. 72-81 Division directors, status of ..................... 72-58 Natural Resources Commissioner, membership on
Jekyll Island-State Park Authority ............. 72-70 Natural Resources, State Department of, Park
Department functions transferred to ........... 72-132 Pardons and Parole Board, effect upon, as to the
employment of personnel ..................... 72-49 Parks Department, State, effect upon .......... 72-70, 72-100 Probation supervisors, circuit, collections by unaffected... 72-128 Public Service Commission, effect upon .............. 72-71 Safety, State Department of Public, effect upon .. 72-71, 72-106 State Park Department functions transferred to
Department of Natural Resources ............. 72-132 Transportation, State Department of-
Airport System Planning Project, State, to sponsor ................................. 72-45
Director of, name changed from "Director, State Highway Department," ..................... 72-39
Treasurer, StateConstitutional amendment, proposed, abolishing as constitutional officer, effect .................. 72-31 State Depository Board, effect upon membership ..... 72-30
REPORTERS. See Court Reporters. RETIREMENT. Counties, rights of persons employed by who have retired
under Employees Retirement System . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-56 Court reporters, employment by different county after..U72-126 District attorneys not regarded as within local
retirement systems .......................... 72-25 Involuntary separation benefits where retirement caused
by statute ............................... U72-36 Safety, State Department of Public, employees,
mandatory ............................... 72-155

428

INDEX

OP. No. RETIREMENT-Cont'd
Secretaries, to superior court officials, rights of ...... U72-41 Survivor's benefits, murder of principal where
beneficiary commits ........................ U72-61 Vested rights not divested by subsequent statute ...... 72-122 REVENUE COMMISSIONER, STATE. Checks in hands of, how disposed of ................ 72-178 Records, how destroyed ......................... 72-178 Tax digests, duties with respect to ................ U72-104 RICHMOND COUNTY, CIVIL COURT OF. Chief judge, salary ............................ U72-31 ROADS, PUBLIC. County authority compared to that of municipalities ... U72-4 Municipal authority compared to that of county ....... U72-4 RULES AND REGULATIONS. Statutes, conflicting with, effect ................... 72-153 Strict construction of power ..................... U72-57 SAFETY, STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC. See Safety, State Department of Public. Creation .................................... 72-106 Expenses of members ........................... 72-106 Reorganization, creation by ...................... 72-106 SAFETY, STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC. See Safety, State Board of Public. Drivers license suspension ........................ 72-79 Employees, mandatory retirement ................. 72-155 Federal compensation to officers for aid in
drug control ............................... 72-69 Funds collected for reinstating drivers licenses to be paid
into state treasury ......................... 72-107 Governor, duty to guard ........................ 72-144 Inspection of vehicles, maintenance of stations ........ 72-33 License revocation hearings, representation of licensee by
counsel ................................... 72-54 Police radio service frequencies, use of .............. 72-114 Reorganization, effect upon ................. 72-71, 72-106 Retirement of employees, mandatory ............... 72-155 SALE OF CHECKS. Bank holding companies, compliance with Act ......... 72-23 SALES AND USE TAXES. Church construction, materials for, subject
to tax .................................. U72-96 Columbus Area Vocational-technical School, not
exempt ................................ U72-109

INDEX

429

SALES AND USE TAXES-Cont'd

OP. No.

MARTA tax, see MARTA.

Nonprofit corporations not exempt ............... U72-109

SALTWATER.

Game and Fish Commission, delineation, by ......... 72-166

SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.

Charter approval by Secretary of State not affected by

Reorganization Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-77

Reorganization, effect upon ....................... 72-77

SCHOLARSHIPS.

Medical Education Board, citizenship of applicant ...... 72-68

Nonpublic colleges and universities, to students

attending ............................... 72-154

Prison inmates, state funds for ................... 72-111

SCHOOL BUSSES.

Safety standards governing ...................... U72-18

Transit company busses, when considered as ........ U72-18

SCHOOLS.

Drivers training, see Drivers Training Schools.

SCHOOLS, PRIVATE.

Handicapped persons, for, legality of distribution of

public funds to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-52

SCHOOLS, PUBLIC.

Busses, see School Busses.

Construction of school where contractor is public

official .................................. U72-71

Daily attendance requirements, authority of State Board

of Education to make ........................ 72-16

Funds, automobile for county superintendent, not

authorized expenditure ..................... U72-10

Physical examination for students, administration and

financing ................................ 72-176

Records, inspection of those of minor children

by parents ............................... U72-74

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.

Drug violations, for ............................ U72-45

Probation, waiver of warrant as condition for ........ U72-45

Warrants, waiver of, as condition for probation ...... U72-45

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Building and loan associations, charter approval not

affected by Reorganization Act ................. 72-77

SECURITIES.

Salesmen, age of as affected by Age of Majority

Act ...................................... 72-88

430

INDEX

SECURITIES-Cont'd

OP. No.

Uniform Securities Act, not adopted in Georgia ........ 72-15

Warrants for purchase of common stock ............. 72-15 SECURITY DEEDS.

Cancelling from record ......................... U72-79

Municipal annexation of territory, grantors as

electors ................................ U72-105 Secondary Security Deed Act, rebates of charges . . . . . U72-90

SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT.

Computation of sentences, erroneous discharge of

inmate, effect of ........................... 72-130

Credit on sentence-

Disability, time spent in institution for treatment

or examination ........................... 72-134

Erroneous discharge, effect ..................... 72-130

Federal prison, time spent in ................... 72-130

Disability, credit for time spent in treatment ......... 72-134 Discharge of inmate, erroneous, effect .............. 72-130

Good time allowances, forfeited, how ................ 72-61

Jail, misbehavior, in, effect ....................... 72-61 Juvenile offenders, see Juvenile Offenders.

Law, determined by, rather than by court ............. 72-3

Marijuana, possession of small quantities .......... U72-102

Misdemeanors of high and aggravated nature,

construction of ............................ 72-138

Probation, State Board of, authority to investigate ...... 72-21

Suspended sentence, partial, imposition by trial court

as invalid ................................ 72-156

SEWAGE.

Water Quality Control Act, treatment as subject to ... U72-13 SHERIFFS.

Bond jumper from foreign state, authority as to ....... 72-24 SHERIFFS RETIREMENT FUND. Ordinaries, payment into, by, from fines or

forfeitures ................................ 72-55 SKIDAWAY ISLAND.

Contracts between Department of Natural Resources

and otheragencies as to sewage facilities ......... 72-167 SOCIAL SECURITY.

Emeritus officers not employed by state, employer

contributions for ............................ 72-11 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

Bridges, application of doctrine as to ................ 72-64

INDEX

431

OP. No. SPECTACLES. See Eyeglasses. STATE COURTS. Solicitors, qualifications of ........................ 72-57 STATE OF GEORGIA. Alabama, contract with, for navigation facilities
on rivers ............................... U72-122 Boat launching ramps, contracts for construction ...... 72-174 Bonds, void, when ............................. 72-164 Building permits, local, not necessary for construction
by ....................................... 72-7 Contracts, see Contracts. Cooperatives, contracts with ....................... 72-5 Debt, when bonds of, repudiated ................... 72-164 Funds-
Drivers licenses, fees for reinstating, to be paid into state treasury ........................... 72-107
Early Childhood Development Act, use in administering ........................... 72-116
Earmarking not permitted ............... 72-107, 72-112 Federal and state funds, expenditures by agencies
handling both .................... U72-53, U72-75 Fiscal Affairs Subcommittees, transfer, by .......... 72-72 Handicapped persons, distribution of public funds for
education ............................... 72-52 Scholarships for prisoners ..................... 72-111 Treasury, state, to be paid into .................. 72-112 Workmen's compensation trust fund, authorization to
retain interest ........................... 72-125 Gifts to, requisites for acceptance ................. 72-143 Improvements-
Fee simple title in state, when necessary .......... 72-167 Temporary, when made on nonstate-owned
property ............................... 72-174 Sovereign immunity as to bridges .................. 72-64 STATE PATROL. Body guards for Governor, compensation where used as,
beyond state .............................. 72-144 Involuntary separation benefits where retirement caused
by statute ............................... U72-36 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See Limitation of Actions.

432

INDEX

STATUTES.

OP. No.

Appropriations, where contingent upon, interpretation .. 72-141

Conflicts, see Construction; Repeal, infra.

Construction-

Clear and unequivocal, effect .................. U72-67

Errors, clerical, effect ............. 72-125, 72-137, U72-43

Latest expression by the legislature .............. 72-124

Legislative intent ............................ 72-141

Pari materia, where statutes in ............... U72-29

Practices, long-continued, effect of ............... 72-133

Reasonableness of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72-90

Effective date-

Operative, becoming, distinguished ............... 72-171

Repeals by implication as affected by ............. 72-101

Enabling Acts, when needed ..................... 72-179

Errors, clerical, effect .............. 72-125, 72-137, U72-43

General, as affected by local ..................... U72-19

Local laws-

Effect upon general .......................... U72-19

Subjects already covered by general laws .. U72-103, U72-128

Mandatory, when .............................. U72-90

Municipal ordinance dealing with subject covered by .. U72-128

Operative, when ............................. U72-171

Ordinances, municipal, effect where on same

subject-matter ..................... U72-98, U72-114

Repeal-

Effective date with reference to ................. 72-101

Implication, by ....................... 72-101, U72-58

Local, by general Act .......................... 72-57

Retirement rights, vested, not divested by ........... 72-122

Retroactive in nature, when ................ 72-119, 72-134

Rules and regulations, conflicting with, effect ........ 72-153

Subject-matter, general revision of, effect ........... U72-58

STERILIZATION.

Age of Majority Act, effect upon consent to .......... 72-118

STUDENTS.

Voters, as, questionnaires, to .................... U72-20

STUDENT'S ARMY TRAINING CORPS.

Emeritus positions, service in, as related to

eligibility ................................. 72-42

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS, COUNTY.

Automobile, for, school funds not expended for ....... U72-10

INDEX

433

OP. No.
SUPERIOR COURT CLERKS. Costs on appeal, which may be demanded ........... U72-16 Docket entries, made by ........................ U72-25 Escaped prisoners, reimbursement of costs for trying .... 72-43 Records, cancelling instruments upon .............. U72-79 Vacancies in office, filling ....................... U72-24 SUPERIOR COURTS. Judges-
Audit of expense funds ......................... 72-87 Disqualification, procedure upon ................ U72-28 Secretaries-
Compensation ............................. 72-104 Employee rights .......................... U72-41 Judges emeritusCalculation of creditable service ................ U72-91 Contributions for years not served as judge ........ U72-59 Disqualified judge, appointment in lieu of ......... U72-28 Eligibility ........................ 72-8, 72-42, U72-11 Juvenile court service as creditable ............. U72-119 Military service time with reference to
eligibility ............. 72-42, U72-54, U72-59, U72-91 Overpayments into fund, return of .............. U72-59 Payments into fund ............................ 72-8 Secretaries not paid from state funds ............ U72-129 Social security, employer contributions for, where not
employed by state ......................... 72-11 Jurisdiction-
Juvenile offenders, over ....................... 72-179 Lower tribunals, of, not preempted ............. U72-125 Traffic violations, of ........................ U72-125 Jury, number of jurors .......................... U72-5 Juvenile offenders, jurisdiction over ................ 72-179 SUPPORT. Age of Majority Act, effect upon orders ............ U72-40 SUPPORT OF DEPENDENT'S LAW. Assignment of court-ordered support to Division of Family
and Children Services ....................... 72-147 SURPLUS PROPERTY. University system, of, sales ....................... 72-73 SWEEPSTAKES. Lottery laws, as violations of .................... U72-69 TAX ASSESSORS. Discretion as to fixing valuations ................. U72-70 New assessment after arbitration ................. U72-70 Property accessible, duty to ascertain ............. U72-115

434

INDEX

OP. No. TAX DIGESTS. Approval, necessity for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72~104 Disapproval, effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72~104 TAX EXECUTIONS. See Executions. TAX EXEMPTIONS. See Taxation. TAX RETURNS. Penalties for failure to make, distribution of ......... U72-22 TAX SALES. Costs, where taxes collected by ................... U72~87 TAXATION. Arbitration, equalization substituted for ............ U72~97 Banks, national . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72~48 City~county contract for collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72~120 Council of State Governments, status of .............. 72~20 County, contract with city for collection ........... U72-120 Delinquent taxes, costs where collected by levy
and sale ................................. U72-87 Equalization-
Boards of, created . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-97 Substituted for arbitration .................... U72-97 ExemptionsHomestead, see Homestead Exemptions. Parcels in excess of certain area ............... U72~100 Religious worship, places for .................. U72-115 Teachers, retired, for ........................ U72-123 Unconstitutional, when ...................... U72-100 Insurance companies, overpayments upon premiums
not refunded ............................... 72-83 Licenses and taxes distinguished .................. U72-48 Municipal, see Municipal Corporations. Overpayments not refunded ....................... 72-83 Penalties authorized, where delinquent ............. U72-87 Refunds, insurance companies overpaying premium taxes,
not authorized ............................. 72-83 Returns, see Tax Returns. TEACHERS. Income tax exemption, where retired ............. U72~123 TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM. Clerical personnel of county and regional libraries,
coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72~82

INDEX

435

TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM-Cont'd

OP. No.

Federal Government, status of teacher loaned to ...... 72-145

Income tax exemptions for retired teachers ......... U72-123

Libraries, clerical personnel covered ................ 72-82

Loaned to Federal Government, status where teacher

is ...................................... 72-145

TRAFFIC CONTROL.

Private property, reports of accidents upon .......... U72-34

Violations-

Jurisdiction-

Ordinary, of ............................. U72-125

Recorders' courts, of .................. 72-79, U72-114

Superior court, of .......................... U72-125

Ordinances based upon statutes, effect of ......... U72-114

Ordinaries, fees of ............................ U72-2

Recorders courts, jurisdiction of ................ U72-114

TRAILERS.

See Mobile Homes; Motor Vehicles.

TRANSPORTATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF.

Air demonstration projects, sponsorship of ........... 72-117

Airport System Planning Project, State, to sponsor ..... 72-45

Before 1972, see Highway Department, State.

Bridge maintenance, compliance with federal requirements

as to ..................................... 72-64

Control of highway system vested in ............... U72-98

DJrector, name changed from "Director, State Highway

Department," .............................. 72-39

Federal requirements as to bridges, compliance with .... 72-64

Funds, state, use in sponsorship of air demonstration

projects .................................. 72-117

Industry and Trade, State Department of, transfers

from ..................................... 72-45

Jekyll Island roads incorporated into State Highway

System .................................. 72-172

Name changed from State Highway Department ....... 72-39

Reorganization Act of 1972, effect .................. 72-39

Weighing of materials used for highway purposes ...... 72-47

TREASURER, STATE.

Comptroller General, final report to ................ 72-18

Constitutional amendment, proposed, effect upon term .. 72-31

Depository Board, State, effect of reorganization Act upon

membership ............................... 72-30

District Attorneys Emeritus Retirement Program,

correction of administrative error ............... 72-13

436

INDEX

OP. No. TREASURER, STATE-Cont'd Resignation, procedure upon ...................... 72-18 Vacancy in office, appointment to fill ............... 72-18 TREASURY, STATE. Funds to be paid into ..................... 72-107, 72-112 TRI-RIVERS WATERWAY DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY.
Legality of ................................. U72-122 TROTTERS SHOALS LAKE PROJECT. Contracts of state relating to, legality of ............ 72-132 Financing plans ............................... 72-132 TUBERCULOSIS. Intoxicated patients on hospital grounds, procedure
respected ............................... U72-106 Involuntary commitment of patients .............. U72-106 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. See Employment Security Law. UNITED STATES SENATORS. Nomination petitions for ......................... 72-48 Special election for ............................ 72-123 UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA. Age of students, effect of statute changing age of
majority .................................. 72-36 Dependents of students, extension of health service
programs to .............................. 72-120 Health service programs, extension to spouses and
dependents of students ...................... 72-120 Property, sales of surplus ........................ 72-73 Regents-
Age of students, effect of statute changing age of majority ........................... 72-36
Contracts of .......................... 72-140, 72-167 Northwest Branch Experiment Station, contract
for operation ............................ 72-140 Surplus property, sales of ....................... 72-73 Spouses of students, health service programs extended to ..72-120 USED CAR DEALERS. Inspection of vehicles ............................ 72-60 UTILITIES, PUBLIC. Rate changes, procedure for ....................... 72-34 Small number of customers, effect of sales, to ......... 72-84 VENUE. Eminent domain actions, of ..................... U72-12 VERDICTS. Docket entries, how made ....................... U72-25 Unanimous, requirement for ..................... U72-7

INDEX

437

VETERANS.

OP. No.

Drivers licenses-

Requirements ............................... 72-108

Visual acuity examinations for .................. 72-170

Examinations, professional, preferences not

retroactively applied ........................ 72-119

Pensions, homestead exemption as affecting .......... 72-28

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION.

Medical college faculty not compensated directly by

medical research foundation ................... 72-86

VOCATIONAL-TECHNICAL SCHOOLS.

Minimum foundation program, when attendance

considered for purposes of ..................... 72-37

WAGE-PRICE FREEZE.

Utility rates, effect upon ......................... 72-34

WARNER ROBINS, CITY COURT OF.

Clerk, filling vacancy in position of ................ U72-24

WARRANTS.

Search, see Searches and Seizures.

Stock, for purchase of, as regulated by Securities Act ... 72-15

WATER.

Salt and fresh, delineation by Game and Fish

Commission .............................. 72-166

Sewage, treatment of as subject to Water Quality

Control Act .............................. U72-13

}VATER QUALITY CONTROL ACT.

Sewage treatment as subject to ................... U72-13

WEAPONS.

Pistols, see Pistols.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

Highway materials sold to state, weighing ............ 72-47

Weighers, see Certified Public Weighers.

WILDLIFE RANGERS.

Property seized as evidence, use of ................ U72-56

WILKES COUNTY.

Commissioners, filling vacancy on board ............ U72-19

WINE.

Municipal corporations, limitation upon right to tax .. U72-128

Referendum as to sale, reversal of result ........... U72-72

Storage in dry county .......................... U72-72

438

INDEX

OP. No. WITNESSES. Fees ....................................... U72-55
Fingerprint experts employed by Division of Investigation, for ......................... 72-157
WORDS AND PHRASES. Alligators .................................... 72-85 Authorities ................................. U72-122 Busses ..................................... U72-18 Caiman ...................................... 72-85 Classified employee ............................ U72-6 Death row ................................... 72-115 Domicile .................................... U72-20 Felonies ................................... U72-102 Golf carts ................................... U72-78 Land owners ................................ U72-105 License ..................................... U72-48 May ....................................... U72-90 Medical admissions county ...................... U72-29 Misdemeanors ............................... U72-102 Misdemeanors of high and aggravated nature ........ 72-138 Motor vehicles ............................... U72-78 Net fine ..................................... 72-29 Only ....................................... 72-138 Polygraph ................................... 72-163 Principally .................................. 72-154 Psychological stress evaluators ................... 72-163 School busses ................................ U72-18 Sectarian .................................... 72-154 Service to the public ............................ 72-84 Shall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U72-90 Tax ....................................... U72-48 Year ...................................... U72-102 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Educational employees of county, how paid .......... U72-92 Trust fund, authorization to retain interest earned .... 72-125 ZONING. County ordinances, by ......................... U72-21 Criminal provisions, not adopted by counties ........ U72-21 Outdoor advertising permits as influenced by ......... 72-19