<oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:coverage>United States, Georgia, Clarke County, Athens, 33.96095, -83.37794</dc:coverage><dc:creator>Lowe, Henning Bernd C</dc:creator><dc:date>1996-01-01</dc:date><dc:description>Business Organizations Law</dc:description><dc:description>&lt;p&gt;When discussing mergers and acquisitions, most of the focus is given to whether the board of directors of the target company has a right of “self-defense” to stay independent. However, this thesis focuses on the other side of the transaction and seeks to determine whether the bidder in making a tender offer is acting unlawfully. Since a director has unlimited personal liability for a breach of his or her fiduciary duties, the question of whether a takeover-bid can be a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty is of great importance, yet little literature and no case law are devoted to the subject. The author addresses this issue by differentiating the duties of target-directors and bidder-directors during a takeover and by seeking to formulate a set of rules for bidder-directors to follow when making a tender offer. In developing these rules for bidder-directors, the business judgment rule and &lt;em&gt;Smith v. Van Gorkom&lt;/em&gt; are considered.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description><dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format><dc:rights>http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights><dc:subject>University of Georgia. School of Law</dc:subject><dc:subject>Law--Study and teaching</dc:subject><dc:subject>International law</dc:subject><dc:title>Fiduciary Duties of Bidder Directors in the Context of Tender Offers - Fair Play in a War</dc:title><dc:type>Text</dc:type></oai_dc:dc>