<oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd"><dc:coverage>United States, Georgia, Clarke County, Athens, 33.96095, -83.37794</dc:coverage><dc:creator>Cohen, Harlan G.</dc:creator><dc:date>2019-01-01</dc:date><dc:description>&lt;p&gt;Originally posted at Just Security on July 17, 2019 (https://www.justsecurity.org/64946/the-national-security-delegation-conundrum/).&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description><dc:description>&lt;p&gt;In the past two years alone, Trump has claimed national security authority to unilaterally issue steel and aluminum tariffs under Section 232 and threaten the same on auto parts; to implement a travel ban targeting majority-Muslim countries under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA); to threaten Mexico with tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) if it didn’t do more to stop migration to the U.S.; to find funds for a border wall that Congress specifically chose not to support; to continue attacks under the 2001 Authorization of Use of Military Force (AUMF), originally passed to go after the perpetrators of 9/11, on militant groups in Syria and elsewhere; and to float the possibility under the same AUMF of war with Iran (an interpretation the State Department seems to have thankfully mostly dropped) .&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;For many watching these developments, these congressional delegations, justified on national security grounds, seemed like a blank check. To address these concerns, this group would love to see national security delegations rolled-back or disciplined, and a revitalized non-delegation doctrine, which would limit the discretion Congress could delegate, would certainly help. Gundy, thus, set those favoring a regulatory state and those worried about a national security one on a collision course. A win for environmental regulation would be a loss for constraining emergency powers and vice versa.&lt;/p&gt;</dc:description><dc:description>foreign policy -- national security -- Gundy v. United States -- tariffs -- International Trade Law</dc:description><dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format><dc:rights>http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/</dc:rights><dc:subject>University of Georgia. School of Law</dc:subject><dc:subject>Law--Study and teaching</dc:subject><dc:subject>University of Georgia--Faculty</dc:subject><dc:title>The National Security Delegation Conundrum</dc:title><dc:type>Text</dc:type></oai_dc:dc>