-i ssc ARy Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from LYRASIS IVIembers and Sloan Foundation http://www.archive.org/details/facultyresear2321969sava FACULTY RESEARCH EDITION of The Savannah State College Bulletin Volume 23, No. 2 December, 1969 Published by SAVANNAH STATE COLLEGE STATE COLLEGE BRANCH SAVANNAH, GEORGIA Editorial Policies Which Govern The Savannah State College Research Bulletin 1. The Bulletin should contain pure research, as well as creative writing, e.g., essays, poetry, drama, fiction, etc. 2. Manuscripts that have already been published or accepted for publication in other journals will not be included in the Bulletin. 3. While it is recommended that the Chicago Manual of Style be followed, contributors are given freedom to employ other accepted documentation rules. 4. Although the Bulletin is primarily a medium for the faculty of Savannah State College, scholarly papers from other faculties are invited. FACULTY RESEARCH EDITION "^ of g ^ The Savannah State College Bulletin ca c -J * J 2 Published by 8| UI tf K The Savannah State College ^ Volume 23, No. 2 Savannah, Georgia December, 1969 Howard Jordan, Jr., President < Editorial Committee Joan L. Gordon Willie G. Tucker S. M. Julie Maggioni Hanes Walton O u >- ai. iij O z OQ >- < CQ -J -I A. J. McLemore, Chairman Z o H Articles are presented on the authority of their writers, and neither ^ the Editorial Committee nor Savannah State College assumes respon- sibility for the views expressed by contributors. Z I- >- CQ O z o CQ Contributors Dr. James A. Eaton, Director of Graduate Studies, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Dr. Gian S. Ghuman, Associate Professor Natural Sciences, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Dr. Allen P. Hayes, Professor Education, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Dr. Prince A. Jackson, Jr., Acting Chairman Division of Natural Sciences, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Mrs. Dorothy B. Jamerson, Curriculum Materials and Serials Librarian, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Mr. Joseph L. Knuckles, Department of Biological and Physical Sciences, Fayetteville State College, Fayetteville, North Carolina Dr. Shia-ling Liu, Professor of Political Sciences, Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, North Carolina Mr. Joseph M. McCarthy, Assistant to the Director Institute of Human Sciences, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts Dr. Kamalakar B. Raut, Professor Chemistry, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Dr. Hanes Walton, Jr., Associate Professor Social Sciences, Savannah State College, Savannah, Georgia Foreword With this issue, the Facuhy Research Bulletin completes its fifteenth year of publication. Throughout these years, it has served as an organ through which the faculty and staff of Sa- vannah State College and many other colleges have shared with colleagues their academic and literary endeavors. It has also served to encourage and stimulate expression in many in- tellectual and professional fields. Once again, the college is happy to publish this Bulletin. Here at Savannah State College, we feel that good teaching and research must go hand in hand in that good teaching is characterized by the serious search for new truths and in testing and verifying old ones. It is our hope to encourage more mem- bers of the faculty and staff to record and publish the results of their experimentation and creativity. This issue of the Bulletin, as in previous years, includes material that relates to several broad areas of undergraduate and graduate education. Howard Jordan, Jr, President Table of Contents Page A Study of Admissions During the First Year of Graduate Studies at Savannah State College James A. Eaton 7 Chemical Characteristics of Surface and Subsurface Waters Around Savannah Gian S. Ghuman 15 Structured Placements to Attain Favorable Ends for Student Teachers Are Possible Allen P. Hayes 22 Some Philosophical and Educational Thoughts on the Nature of Scientific Inquiry Prince A. Jackson, Jr 27 Student Teachers Suggest Changes Be Made in Their Orientation Program to the C. M. C. Dorothy B. Jamerson 38 In Vitro Persistence of Salmonella typhimurium in a Dually Inoculated Medium. III. With Aerobacter Aerogenes Joseph L. Knuckles 45 Evaluation of Naturalism with Reference to Freedom, Morality, and Inquiry Shia-ling Liu 51 Financing American Colleges in the Ante-Bell um Period: A Survey of Methods Joseph M. McCarthy 59 Studies in the Synthesis of Camptothecin Part I, Preparation of N-methylamino-2-quinanylmethane Kamalakar B. Raut 64 Ghana-Togo Boundary: (Past and Present) Hanes Walton, Jr 66 NATO's Approach to Multilateral Control of Nuclear Weapons Hanes Walton, Jr 75 Machiavelli's Theory of Religion Hanes Walton, Jr 91 5 A Study of Admissions During The First Year of Graduate Studies At Savannah State College 1968-69 Prepared by James A. Eaton Director of Graduate Studies Savannah State College Savannah, Georgia 31404 Introduction This is a study of admissions to the Graduate Studies Program of Savannah State College, beginning with the persons admitted to begin work during the summer quarter, 1968, and continuing with each quarter throughout the 1968-69 regular school year. The purpose is to see where the students came from, how well they measured up to what the college expected of them, and whether they justified or failed to justify the admissions policies set by the Graduate Council. There are three types of admission to graduate study at Savannah State College. First, there are Regular Students students who meet all requirements to begin studies towards a masters degree in elementary education. That includes graduation from an accredited college, an undergraduate cumulative average of at least 2.50, an NTE of at least 450, and T-4 teachers certificate. Conditional Students are (1) those who might be minus one of the requirements listed above but are capable of making up the deficiency within a short time or (2) those students who graduate as secondary majors, and have yet to qualify as elementary majors. Once the lack has been compensated, the student is placed on Regular status. Finally, there are Special Students, who are in-service teachers not seeking degrees but wanting to take courses for purposes of certification or other purposes; they do not have to meet the formal requirements of the degree-seeking students. This study examines each type of admission in relation to the re- quirements set for admission by the Graduate Council. The Pioneers A total of fifty persons were admitted as the initial group of graduate students inaugurating the Graduate Studies Program at Savannah State College in June, 1968. For the most part, great care was taken by the Admissions Committee of the Graduate Council to see that students admitted were capable of doing graduate work. How- ever, the question of what to do about in-service teachers not seeking degrees but wanting to up-grade certification was not adequately answered prior to the opening of the program and this did cause some 7 deviation in admission procedures. To serve some who had not previously applied for admission, a few such students were admitted at the last minute. They are included in the total of fifty. These 50 students consisted of only 7 men, who were almost in- visible among the 43 women. This total of 50 included 20 persons admitted as regular degree-seeking students (no men, 20 women) ; 18 admitted on condition as degree-seeking students (such students had one deficiency such as an NTE score not up to par; 4 men, 14 women) ; and 12 admitted as special (non-degree) students (3 men, 9 women) . Assuming that care was taken in selecting students capable of doing graduate work, the cumulative undergraduate averages should reflect this. Savannah State College requires a minimum of 2.50 as a cumula- tive average for admission as a regular graduate student. The mean c.a. for all 50 students admitted was 2.74. For the students admitted as regular students, the mean c.a. was 2.90. Conditionally admitted students had a mean c.a. of 2.68, while special students had a mean c.a. of 2.54. (See Table 1.) Table 1 : Mean Undergraduate Cumulative Averages Total Group 2.74 Regular Students 2.90 Conditional Students 2.68 Special Students 2,54 Men Students 2.43 Women Students 2.78 Range (including special students) 2.08 to 3.73 Another gauge used for selecting graduate students at Savannah State College is the score on the Common Tests of the National Teacher Examinations. A minimum of 450 is required for regular status. Here again the fifty pioneers showed promise. The mean NTE score for all admitted students was 492, with a range from 330 to 663. (It must be remembered that special [non-degree] students did not have to meet all of the qualifications required of students who planned to seek de- grees.) The regular students had a mean NTE of 523; the conditional, 473; and the special, 451. Another concern all during the summer quarter was the reactions the students would have to the course work presented during this quarter. All of the courses were new, both to the students and the instructors. This led to something less than an all-around group of well-planned classes. While the students were patient, they did not fail to mention this fact when given the opportunity to make individual evaluations of their experiences during this first quarter. From a grade-point point of view, the mean averages for the sum- mer quarter looked rather well. The overall mean average for all stu- dents was 3.21. The regular students had a mean summer quarter average of 3.25; while the conditional students must have felt the need 8 to try harder, since they had a mean average of 3.37. Special students fell slightly below the 3.00 level and made a 2.97 mean cumulative average for the summer quarter. The first quarter was therefore encouraging. It seemed evident from the statistics garnered that adequate care had been taken in selecting regular and conditional students who hoped to earn masters degrees and that these students had proved themselves adequate to meet the challenge of graduate work. The policy of admitting special, non-degree students seemed justified by the mean cumulative average they made in competition with the other students. But this was just the first quarter. The picture could change, by the end of the spring quarter of 1969. Fall Admissions The fall 1968 admissions made the expected drop below the 50 admitted for the summer quarter. A total of 13 students were ad- mitted, 7 women and 6 men. Of this total, 4 were admitted as regular degree candidates (3 women, 1 man) ; 7 were admitted conditionally (4 women, 3 men) and 2 (men) were admitted as special students. It is obvious that the percentage of men admitted in each category was higher in the fall than in the summer. A look at the undergraduate cumulative averages of the fall ad- missions presented a good picture. The over-all mean c.a. was 2.81, compared to 2.84 for the summer. Regular degree-seeking candidates had a mean c.a. of 2.94, compared to 2.90 for the summer, while the conditionals had 2.82, compared to the summer 2.68. Special students for the fall had a mean c.a. of 2.63, compared to the summer 2.54. The mean c.a. for men in the fall went up from the summer's 2.43 to 2.75, while the women had 2.88, ten points higher than in the summer. The range of the c.a.'s was from 2.48 to 3.27. Taking everything into consideration, it appears that the undergraduate grades of the students admitted during the fall quarter were better than the grades of students admitted during the summer. The NTE scores for the fall admissions ranged from 457 to 644, compared to the 330 to 663 range of the summer admissions. The mean NTE score was 530, compared to 492 for the summer, an increase of 38 points. Regular students had a mean of 518 (five points less than the summer admissions), while conditional admissions had a mean of 527 (54 points above the summer conditional admissions). One of the special students was a transient student from Georgia Southern College who was not required to present an NTE score; the other special student had a 600 NTE score. Here again, the NTE scores would tend to indicate that the fall admissions were better prepared on the average than were those admitted for the summer quarter. The Winter Quarter The winter admissions were fewer than for any other quarter, although not drastically so. Only 12 persons were admitted: 2 (both women) as regular students, 8 (6 women, 2 men) as conditional, and 1 male as a special. Three male students were admitted, while 9 women were admitted. Of the three quarters, the mean cumulative average was lowest for the winter quarter 2.68. However, the c.a. for the regular students topped the previous fall high of 2.94 to reach 3.21. The conditional admissions dropped back to a mean of 2.54. The one special student's c.a. was not available. The c.a. for the men was 2.78, .03 points higher than the fall's high, while the mean c.a. for the women was 2.66, the lowest thus far for the year. C.A.'s ranged from 2.12 to 3.55, both the highest and lowest extremes for the year. NTE scores ranged from 393 to 625. The mean NTE score was 504, not as high as the fall but not as low as the summer. Regular students had a mean NTE of 603, substantially higher than both the summer or fall. Conditional admissions had a mean NTE of 486 (3 had no NTE scores), and the one special student had a score of 393. The range was 393 to 625. Spring Admissions Admissions to begin study during the spring quarter reached a total of 17, an increase over both the fall and winter quarters. As usual, there were more women than men (14 to 3 ) . All 6 of the regular students were women. There were 7 conditional students, 2 men and 5 women. Of the 4 special students, 3 were women. The mean cumulative averages compared favorably with those of the previous quarters. The mean c.a. for the total group was 2.89, the highest for the four quarters under study. However, the mean of 2.84 for the regular students was the lowest of either quarter. Con- ditional students had a mean c.a. of 2.58, not as low as the winter quarter but not as high as the other two quarters. Special students had a mean of 2.73, the highest for any group of special students. Men averaged 2.28 and women averaged 2.79. The range of the c.a.'s was from 2.10 to 3.43. NTE scores also compared favorably. Of the total group (3 did not have scores), the mean was 513, less than the fall mean of 530 but better than the 492 of the summer or the 504 of the winter. Regular students had a mean of 541, higher than any quarter other than the 603 for the winter quarter. Conditional students (3 had no scores) had a mean of 520, a mean exceeded only by the fall mean of 527 for conditional students. Special students averaged 465. The range was from 421 to 622. 10 Undergraduate Colleges Students admitted during the first year of operation completed their undergraduate work at 21 different colleges and universities. It should not be surprising to note that the majority of them were graduates of Savannah State College. No other particular college had a large representation. Georgia Southern College was second, but that represented only slightly above 5 per cent of the students. (See Ap- pendix "A" for a complete list of the colleges and the number who graduated from each.) One important factor does assert itself as one looks at the under- graduate colleges: just about all of Savannah State graduate students were graduated from Southern colleges and universities. Nineteen of the 21 undergraduate colleges and universities were Southern. The other two were located in West Virginia and Pennsylvania. Ten, or almost 50 per cent, of these colleges were in Georgia. Other Southern states represented were South Carolina (4), North Carolina (2), Alabama (2), and Tennessee (1). While most of these colleges were predominantly black colleges (61%), predominantly non-black colleges were ably represented by such institutions as the University of Georgia, Peabody College, Clemson University, etc. In spite of the predominance of Southern schools, the variety of background was of such a nature as to provide the possibility of an interesting exchange of ideas among the students. Racial Composition While no special attention was given to ethnic groups when students were being considered for admission to the graduate studies program, nevertheless there was an unexpressed hope that the program would appeal to white as well as black students. Information about the pro- gram was distributed to schools and individuals without regard to racial composition. Located in a metropolitan area like Savannah, there was every reason to hope that the program would not be a com- pletely black program, although its location at Savannah State would probably dictate its being predominantly black, at least at the beginning. For the summer quarter, only 8 per cent of the admissions were white, a definite minority. The fall quarter admissions showed a 30 per cent proportion of white admissions. The percentage rose to 33 per cent for the winter and fell to 29 per cent for the spring. In each instance, then, excepting the summer quarter, white admissions ran to approximately one-third of the students accepted. (See Table 2.) Table 2: White Enrollment No. White Percentage Quarter Total Students Students White Summer 50 4 8 Fall 13 4 30 Winter 12 4 33 Spring 17 5 29 Total 92 17 18.5 11 The number of persons admitted to the graduate studies program for the summer 1968 through spring 1969 period was sufficient to indicate that the program had the support of the community. A total of 92 persons were admitted, 69.5 per cent of whom were women. (See Table 3.) Over 50 per cent were admitted for summer study, indicating that summer study is more popular among in-service teachers than study during the regular term. However, the admissions for each quarter in the regular session were at a respectful level. Total Men Women 50 7 43 13 6 ~^.7 12 3 9 17 2 15 92 18 64 100 19.5 69.5 Table 3 : Number of Admissions Quarter Summer Fall Winter Spring Grand Total Percentages The main three types of criteria used in deciding whether or not a student was to be admitted included the accreditation of the college where the student had done his undergraduate study, the undergraduate cumulative average of the student, and the NTE score of the student. As indicated previously, a variety of undergraduate colleges were represented by the graduate students, including approved small colleges as well as larger universities, thus providing interesting opportunities for exchange of ideas. The mean cumulative averages were usually well above the 2.50 required by Savannah State for regular admission to graduate studies. The overall mean for the year was 2.78. The range was from 2.68 to 2.89. The only mean below 2.50 was for men admitted in the summer and spring quarters. This was due mostly to the admission of special students, not seeking degree credit. The yearly overall mean for men students was 2.56, compared to 2.77 for the women. (See Table 4.) Table 4: Mean Cumulative Averages by Sexes Quarter Overall Men Women Summer 2.74 2.43 2.78 Fall 2.81 2.75 2.88 Winter 2.68 2.78 2.66 Spring 2.89 2.28 2.79 Overall Mean 2.78 2.56 2.77 Cumulative average means for regular, degree-seeking students remained well above the 2.50 minimum. For the year, the overall mean was 2.97, ranging from 2.84 in the spring to 3.21 in the winter. 12 Both conditional and special students remained above the 2.50 level. The yearly overall mean cumulative average for conditional students was 2.65 and 2.63 for special students. As groups, neither of these categories had a mean below 2.50 during the year. (See Table 5.) Table 5: Mean Cumulative Averages by Classification Quarter Summer Fall Winter Spring Overall The required 450 NTE was exceeded in mean scores throughout the year, except for special students admitted during the winter, who were not required to meet the standard. The overall NTE mean for the year was 509. Regular students had a mean of 546; conditional students, 501; and special students 477. It might be noted that some of the students admitted conditionally had not quite reached the 450 level. On the whole, however, the NTE means were good. (See Table 6.) Table 6: Mean NTE Scores by Classification LCgular Conditional Special 2.90 2.68 2.54 2.94 2.82 2.63 3.21 2.54 NA 2.84 2.58 2.73 2.97 2.65 2.63 Quarter Regular Conditional Special Overall Summer 523 473 451 492 Fall 518 527 600 530 Winter 603 486 393 504 Spring 541 520 465 513 Overall 546 501 477 509 As a concluding note, it can safely be said that the first year's admissions were representative of the expectations held by the college for the type of students it hoped to attract to the graduate program. The degree-seeking students, both regular and conditional, had mean scores in all categories above the minimum set by the college. The relaxed policy toward the special admissions, which became apparent during the winter and spring quarters, did not materially decrease either the cumulative average means nor the NTE means. It did serve, however, to increase enrollment. This increase will probably become much more notable as time passes. It seems like a sane policy to continue the present high standards for regular and conditional ad- missions. 13 Appendix "A" Undergraduate Colleges of Students Admitted to Graduate Studies: Alabama A. and M. College 1 Alabama State College 1 Allen University 3 Armstrong State College 2 Benedict College 1 Bloomingburg State College 1 Clemson University 1 Fayetteville State College 1 Fort Valley State College 1 Georgia Southern College 5 Georgia Weslyan University 1 Livingstone College 1 Morris Brown College 1 Oglethorpe University 1 Paine College 1 Peabody College 2 Savannah State College 60 South Carolina State College 1 Spelman College 1 University of Georgia 2 West Liberty State College 1 14 Chemical Characteristics of Surface and Subsurface Waters Around Savannah By G. S. Ghuman The chemical and biological characteristics of water determine its usefulness for home, industry and agriculture. A knowledge of water chemistry gives significant information about the geologic history of the surrounding rocks, the velocity and direction of movement, and the presence of hidden minerals. Although water quality has scientific and economic importance, yet it is poorly understood by many people. This is partly attributed to the fact that the chemistry of ground water is exceedingly complex. Recent advances in geochemistry and analytical methods have stimulated research in hydrogeochemistry so that it is one of the most rapidly advancing fields in the earth sciences. Another factor contributing to this trend is that the demand for quality water will undoubtedly increase with growing population and industrialization. From a consideration of the above-mentioned aspects, the present investigation was undertaken to study the chemical nature of ground (subsurface) water of the Savannah area and the surface water flowing down the Savannah river as well as its branches terminating into the Atlantic Ocean. A general concern of the people and the scientists about the possible impact of the surrounding surface water on the sub- surface water quality has an important bearing on this study. Materials and Methods Water Samples Seven water samples were collected from Savannah and Thunder- bolt cities, and the adjoining Savannah river proceeding down towards the ocean, in the month of January, 1969. Sites of sample collections are shown in the attached map and the exact locations with their latitudes and lono"itudes are described as follows: 15 16 1. Savannah City water supply sample: Subsurface water taken from a house tap near Bacon Park. Location 32 00' 21" N; 81 04' 16" W. 2. Thunderbolt City water supply sample: Subsurface water taken from a tap in the Earth Sciences Laboratory of Savannah State College. Location 32 01' 24" N; 81 03' 20" W. 3. Savannah river water: Surface water collected from the vicinity of the river bridge on highway #17. Location 32 10' N: 81 09' W. 4. Savannah river water: Surface water collected from a point just behind the Kilowatt Room of Savannah Electric Company. Loca- tion 32 04' 48" N; 81 05' 37" W. 5. South channel water: Surface water from a site under the channel bridge for the road leading to Fort Pulaski. Location ^32 01' 26" N; 80 55'48" W. 6. Wilmington river water: Surface water collected from near the boat ramp in Wilmington Island. Location 31 59' N; 80 59' 48" W. 7. Atlantic ocean water : Surface water collected from Savannah Beach. Location 31 59' 30"N; 80 50' 38" W. In the ensuing discussion, these samples will be designated by their serial numbers or by short descriptive names. Analytical Methods pH values were determined by a Beckman glass-electrode pH meter. Carbonates and bicarbonates were estimated by titrating 25 ml. portions of water samples against standard hydrochloric acid and using a few drops of methyl red as the indicator prepared as 0.1% solution in dis- tilled water. Chlorides were determined by titration of the samples with standard silver nitrate solution and potassium chromate was used as the indicator. Total solids were estimated by evaporating to dryness on a waterbath 50 or 100 ml. water samples in tared porcelain dishes. The drying of the samples was completed in the air oven at 110 C for at least one hour and the dried residues were cooled in the desiccator before weighing. Weight lost due to the decomposition of bicarbonates during the process of drying was added to obtain the final estimate of total solids. Qualitative tests were also performed on the water samples for the presence of calcium, sulfate and phosphate. Results and Discussion Data regarding the estimation of different constituents of water samples are given in table 1. 17 > ( M M rs O-I CS o H en t/3 (U 03 "5 CC cS jC !h ;h gH H H H o "O 'TS ^ j:3 o O eu o O o o . ^ i^ ^(-> 5-1 '^^ > 1 *o > t^ nnah ri hway 1 Sh O re re II S re bc 3 reffi reS H c/^^ CD ^ re 3 3 re 3 O > bC ffi X o o o CO 00 3 o bC 3 -3 bC O O CM O 03 o g Z s Z S -r-l s CO i-H ^ ^ < vO 18 pH value of all samples is less than 8.0 which is apparently due to the absence of carbonate ions. Alkalinity is produced almost exclusively by bicarbonate and carbonate ions. It was observed that by distillation of Thunderbolt city water, the pH of the boiling water is raised above 8.5 and it gives a pink color with phenolphthalein indicator. This is due to the conversion of sodium bicarbonate to sodium carbonate on continuous boiling and accumulation of hydrolysable salt. The well- known reaction is represented as follows: 2NaHC03 = NasCOs + H2O + CO2 The lowest pH 6.4 for Savannah river water at highway #17 bridge site, increases abruptly to 7.5 down the river at Kilowatt room site. Likewise, there is a sharp increase in the concentrations of bicarbonate, chloride and total solids from sample #3 to sample #4 and these concentrations rise consistently from sample #5 to sample #7 in order of nearness to the Atlantic ocean. This gives a distinct profile of the extent of mixing of sea water with the river water at various stages proceeding from sea towards inland. Mixing of sea and river waters apparently begins at a point where the Savannah river and the Back river bifurcate (refer map). As in- dicated by the dredging operation conducted by Corps of Engineers to keep the Savannah Port free of silting, during high tide the Atlantic ocean water pushes inland through the Back river and enters the main stream of Savannah river to flow back to the ocean during the low tide-period. Results of table 1 corroborate this observation. Data also indicate the mixing of a greater proportion of sea water with the Wilmington river water as compared to the South channel water. Classification and Quality of Water Natural waters range from less than 10 ppm of dissolved solids for rain and snow to more than 300,000 ppm for some brines. Water for domestic and industrial uses should be less than 1000 ppm and for most agricultural crops should be below 3000 ppm. Davis and DeWiest (1966) based on the total concentration of dissolved solids, gave the following classification of water: 1: Fresh water to 1000 ppm; 2: Brackish water 1000 to 10,000 ppm; 3: Salty water 10,000 to 100,000 ppm; 4: Brine more than 100,000 ppm. According to this classification, the first three samples belong to the 'Fresh water' class, sample #4 is 'Brackish water' and the last three samples are members of the 'Salty water' class. The water supplies of Savannah and Thunderbolt cities are of good quality for all purposes. The entire Chatham County water supply is drawn from a layer of limestone known as Ocala limestone aquifer (1). A very low content of total solids and other constituents in the Savannah river water at Highway #17 bridge site, reveals an almost complete absence of easily weatherable rocks and minerals in its catchment area and all along its course towards the ocean. However, river water at site 3 and up the river, can be used for the city's supply after giving surface water treatment. Such an alternative is necessary only if 19 underground water is threatened with salt water encroachment. To conserve the fresh water supply, the community has expressed much concern about the offshore mining of phosphate in Chatham County. Phosphate Accumulation Savannah river water at site 3, has very low calcium and sulfate ions, but contains fair amount of phosphate which is comparable to the subsurface waters and is better than the salty waters. This gives an indication how, over the ages past, phosphate has been brought from land to the ocean and deposited at depths near the shore. The same process continues still. As a result of this process, a rich phosphate matrix is located in Tybee, Cabbage and Wilmington Islands, at a depth above the acquaclude overlying the impervious limestone (1). Distribution of Bicarbonate and Chloride Bicarbonate and chloride ions were calculated as percentage of the total solids in each sample and the calculated data are reported in table 2. Table 2 Bicarbonate and chloride ions as percentage of total solids in water samples. Total Solids HCO3 CI No Sample description ppm % % 1. Savannah city water 252 41.00 8.0 2. Thunderbolt city water 252 41.00 8.0 3. Savannah river water (Highway 17 site) 75 38.70 37.3 4. Savannah river water (Kilowatt room site) 1944 2.20 45.2 5. South channel water 15710 0.40 50.9 6. Wilmington river water 25244 0.34 51.1 7. Atlantic ocean water 29092 0.35 50.5 The data obtained in table 2 are very much similar to those of Livingstone (1963) who reported 48.6% bicarbonate and 6.5% chloride in a river water with 120 ppm of total solids and 0.41% bicarbonate as well as 55.04% chloride in sea water. For the sea water the same percentages of bicarbonate and chloride were reported by Sverdrup et al (1942). High percentage value of 37.3 for chloride in the Savannah river water at highway 17 site alludes to the fact that a larger fraction of the very mobile ions of chloride from sea water has diffused up the river, although this movement did not appreciably increase the total concentration of solids. Summary and Conclusions Seven water samples from Savannah and adjoining the river down to the Atlantic ocean were analyzed for some of their chemical con- stituents. Subsurface water supply is of very good quality. Savannah 20 river water before reaching the city is particularly low in dissolved salts. Mixing of ocean water is observed up to the highway 17 bridge over the Savannah river. Mixing of waters is complete around Wilming- ton Island. Analytical data give clear clues for the underground strata and phosphate accumulation. Although, the scope of this investigation was fairly limited, however, it has given very useful information, and has opened avenues for further important studies in this field. References Water supply paper 1613-D of the United States Geological Survey. Published by Savannah Morning News-Evening Press in September 29, 1968 issue. Davis, S. N., and DeWiest. 1966. Hydrogeology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. New York. pp. 96-128. Livingstone, D. A. 1963. Chemical composition of rivers and lakes. U. S. Geol. Surv. Prof. Paper 440-G, p. 64. Sverdrup, H. U., M. W. Johnson, and R. H. Fleming. 1942. The Oceans. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. Prentice-Hall, Inc. p. 166. 21 Structured Placements To Attain Favorable Ends For Student Teachers Are Possible By Allen P. Hayes Probably eighty-five percent of beginning elementary teachers have completed a student teaching or internship experience based on the standard model. This model one student teacher, one cooperating teacher, one college supervisor is challenged severely in an essay which is mainly verbal logic (11). Neither is empirical evidence reassuring to advocates of the model. Considering the massive ubiquity of the standard model for student teaching, research evidence regarding it is meager, fragmentary, and discontinuous. And a summary of that relatively small amount of empirical evidence available is discouraging. In general it seems indicated that student teaching results in a decline in favorable attitudes (22), logical consistency (15), "openness" (1), and cohesiveness within "the student-teaching triad"^ (24). The co- operating teacher seems clearly to be more influential upon student teachers than the college supervisor. (1, 12, 13, 19) But the remarkable ubiquity of the standard model in teacher education is probably the major factor in the existence of a professional organization. The Association for Student Teaching, having a full time executive secretary. And the apparent simplicity of student teaching rivals that of marriage. Both student teaching and marriage might appear at first glance to be exquisitely simple institutions; yet in practice and upon analysis both prove to be exceedingly complex. Students of both are seriously concerned with what makes a good "match." Now, matching of dating couples by computer has in recent years become prominent with regard to courtship, the preliminary to marriage. But at this point the analogy between marriage and student teaching breaks down, for there has been as yet little use of the tre- mendous potential of modern data processing and computing capabilities to match or structure student teacher-cooperating teacher-college super- visor trios (the "student-teaching triad"). More full use of data processing and computing capabilities is basic to the thesis^ of this article: It is possible to selectively place particular student teachers with particular college supervisors, and co- operating teachers, so that predictable favorable outcomes result. (Let it be noted here that it is the presently existing population of cooperat- ing teachers and college supervisors to which we refer.) iThe term, "student teaching triad," is explicated in a report of research by Albert H. Yee (24) . This investigator stated, "The triad can be viewed as being comprised of two dyads between the student teacher and each of his leaders, and a dyadic relationship between the two leaders." (p. 98) 2The research underlying the thesis of this article was done at the University of Florida under the direction of Bob Burton Brown. A report of this research (9) was made at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association on February 8, 1969, at Los Angeles, and the research is reported in greater detail in reference (10), the author's doctoral dissertation. 22 Such utilization of the computer is past due in the field of teacher education; other fields, for example business, and space research, have utilized these capabilities far beyond anything attempted in teacher education. So potential values in high speed information processing vastly outstrip present exploitations in the field of teacher education. But much more is needed than efficiency in complex statistical opera- tions, and in data processing; the computer has been aptly termed a high speed idiot. Teacher educators must use the computer as a power- ful tool, as the best in measurement, scholarship, and human relations are marshalled first to develop and then to put to constructive use a theory for student teaching. "There is nothing so practical as a good theory." A good theory, an action theory of student teaching which could guide Directors of Student Teaching in the structuring of student-teaching triads seems possible to the writer as will be explained. But there is an intervening problem, the solution of which probably depends greatly upon the skill of democratic group problem-solving (19). This is the problem of attaining adequate agreement between school systems and preparing institutions as to the proper outcomes of the student teaching experience. Ultimately and logically, this problem resolves into something like, What are the proper objectives of edu- cation? And this is a philosophical-educational question which has troubled both theoreticians and practitioners since Plato, and is still very much alive. Must such a difficult problem be considered impossible of solution? The answer is a qualified "No." That it can be solved, at least for limited periods and for limited populations, is demonstrated by the viable and relatively permanent existence of specific institutions which are accepted as educational. (This last sentence might be con- sidered to offer pragmatic evidence; differing philosophical systems would offer somewhat different answers to the problem on a verbal logic basis.) Thus the problem is one difficult, but not impossible for "educational institutions." But if the question of proper objectives is to be solved, or at least put in a reasonable perspective, in regard to student teaching programs, what is required? Principally it is suggested (a) familiarity with and competence to surmount the barriers to the necessary agreement be- tween college and public school personnel as to acceptable objectives,^ which probably means (b) open and fair discussions within an assump- tion or acceptance that some agreed-upon structure of objectives is better than unexamined or even covert objectives. When public schools' and higher education's objectives for the outcomes of student teaching are unexamined or covert, then inefficiency and even direct contra- diction are probably inevitable. Thus the welfare of student teachers, which should be of foremost mutual concern to both school systems and preparing institutions, is indeed poorly served. Leadership to 3The writings of Bob Burton Brown and his associates suggest some of the diffi- cuhies involved. See (6), (5), and (4). For complete treatment of Brovra's philosophic position, and the instrumentation involved, see (7) and (3) . For material pointedly relevant to the difficulties suggested in this article's text, see (10) pp. 80-83, and pp. 33-37. 23 achieve the essential agreement (or at least a mutual understanding, where total agreement proves impossible) may come from either school systems or higher education. But as Lindley Styles has suggested, "Very little progress toward the intelligent preparation of personnel for edu- cation is likely without close cooperation between school systems and preparing institutions." (21) It may be that agreement as to the proper objectives for education means that, for the purposes of developing a useful theory of student teaching, an explicit philosophic framework must be fat least pro- visionally) accepted. That is, measurement instruments explicitly re- lated to a specific educational theory may have to be employed in order to attain some reliability in prediction of outcomes of student teaching. Such reliability is viewed as an essential characteristic of the "action theory of student teaching" which this article is suggesting can be developed. The "may be" of the above paragraph is inferred from comparing the one piece of research reported by (9) and (10) regarding student-teaching triads which claims see pp. 80 and 73-74 of reference (10) to enable predictable outcomes from deliberately structuring the student-teaching triad, to other related studies (1, 8, 12, 13, 16, 22, 24) . None of the latter make such a claim, except with an added im- plication that certain relatively scarce characteristics among cooperat- ing teachers and college supervisors must be increased. In effect this last means that a population of college supervisors and cooperating teachers different from the present is required. Whatever may be the ideal characteristics of persons filling these roles, if present staffing can be utilized with greater efficiency it must be counted a clear gain. One feature of the study which indicates the possibility of specificity in structuring for predictable outcomes now, is the utilization of measuring instruments explicitly related to particular bodies of edu- cational and personality theory, namely, Experimentalism (see 3 and 7), and the work of Rokeach (see 17 and 18). Two of the measuring instruments used the "D Scale," and the "PBI" (see 18 and 3, respec- tively) may measure basic personality characteristics. If they do, they are likely more "powerful" than certain other instruments* used in comparable pre- and posttest studies of student-teaching triads. But whether comparable or better stochastic prediction of an equal of higher level might be possible with other measuring instruments used with the same ( or other appropriate) powerful statistical technique (the development and analysis of multiple regression models^) has not yet been demonstrated. If other instruments are used, probably the theory to be developed will come out differently. For the most general theory, probably a variety of instruments should be used. In *The most widely used scale is the Minnesota Teacher Attitude Inventory; eleven studies using tliis instrument are abstracted for presentation in (23). Other instruments include the GNC Scale of Logical Consistency of Ideas about Edu- cation (see 15), the Lipscomb Scale of Teacher Attitudes (see 12 and 8), and three Q-sorts measuring "openness" developed by Bills et al (see 1). SFor two treatments of these statistical procedures see Mandenlialls' Linear Models (14), and Bottenbert and Ward's Applied Multiple Linear Regression (2). 24 any case, it does seem possible that if the encouraging resuhs reported in (9) and (10) stand, and are elaborated, that an action theory of student teaching can be developed. To summarize, we may say that the best in measurement, data processing, and computing technology must be orchestrated with sound scholarship and with skill in democratic group problem-solving if the goal of an action theory (or theories) of student teaching and its implication of ability to deliberately structure student-teaching triads to attain specific outcomes is to be attained. Thus, the task is difficult and is complex, but the end result, a more or less elegant theory, would be of great utility to guide Directors of Student Teaching in placing student teachers with some assurance that certain desired ends would result. The thesis of this article has been that the difficulties and com- plexities involved in developing and subsequently using the desired theory (s) can be resolved, with a reasonable expenditure of resources so as to fully exploit available technological capabilities. The writer submits that such resources should be allocated and a full scale effort made. It is posited that the standard model for student teaching is still relevant, and can be made increasingly valuable in modern teacher education programs. Student teaching may be likened to a massive gold mine with elusive and seemingly erratic concentrations of lode. The mine has been productive for years, but by fits and starts, and with great imprecission. Now with the possibilities eminent in theo- retical and technological advance, the gold mine or student teaching can become more predictably and more steadily productive, its con- tributions to the human enterprise much more perfectly realized. Considering the massive inertia of the status quo, surely it is wise to explore thoroughly the possibilities of the standard model, prior to preemptive commitment of research funds to newer programs which must bear the same onus as to effectiveness, but have the disadvantages inherent in newly-hatched ideas. References 1. Bills, Robert E., Macagnoni, Virginia M., and Elliot, Richard J. Student Teacher Personality Change as a Function of the Personalities of Supervising and Cooperating Teachers. Final Report on Project S-020, U. S. Office of Education Cooperative Research Program, August 31, 1964. 2. Bottenbert, Robert A., and Ward, Joe H., Jr. Applied Multiple Linear Regres- sion. Technical Documentary Report PRL-Tr)R-63-6. Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. 1963. 3. Brown, Bob Burton. The Experimental Mind in Education. New York: Har- per and Row, 1968. 4. . , and McClave, James T. "Observation and Evaluation of the Classroom Behavior of Student Teachers." Gainesville: Teacher Competence Research Project, University of Florida, 1967. (Mimeographed) 5. ^ , and Vickery, Tom Rusk. "The Belief Gap in Teacher Educa- tion." The Journal of Teacher Education 18 :417-21 ; Winter 1967. -,"Bringing Philosophy into the Study of Teaching Effectiveness." The Journal of Teacher Education 17:35-40; Spring 1966. . , "The Relationship of Experimentalism to Classroom Practices. Doctors thesis. Madison: University of Wisconsin. 1962. (Unpublished) 25 8. Goodall, Robert C. "The Effects of Selected Teacher Characteristics on the Attitudes of Elementary Student Teachers." Doctor's thesis. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1967. {Dissertation Abstracts, 26:2024-A) 9. Hayes, Allen P. "Effects of College and Public School Supervisors on Student Teachers Beliefs, Dogmatism, and Satisfaction with Student Teaching." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Asso- ciation; February 8, 1969, Los Angeles. 10. , . , "Effects of Cooperating Teachers and College Supervisors on Student Teachers' Beliefs." Doctor's thesis. Gainesville: University of Florida, 1968. (In process with University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan.) 11. Kaltsounis, Theodore, and Nelson, Jack L. "The Mythology of Student Teach- ing." The Journal of Teacher Education 19:277-281; Fall 1968. 12. Lipscomb, Evan E. "A Study of the Attitudes of Student Teachers in Ele- mentary Education." Doctor's thesis. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1962. (Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts) 13. McAulay, J. D. "How Much Influence Has a Cooperating Teacher?" The Journal of Teacher Education 11 :79-81 ; March, 196(). 14. Mendenhall, William. An Introduction to Linear Models and the Design and Analysis of Experiments. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Com- pany, 1968. 15. Newsome, G. L., Gentry, H. W., and Stephens, L. D. "Changes in Consistency of Educational Ideas Attributable to Student Teaching Experiences," The Journal of Teacher Education 16:319-22; September 1965. 16. Price, Robert D. "Relations Between Cooperating Teachers' and Student Teachers' Attitudes and Performances." Doctor's thesis. Austin: University of Texas, 1960. {Dissertation Abstracts, 22:2615) 17. Rokeach, Milton. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1968. 18. . The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960. 19. Smith, William S. Group Problem-Solving Through Discussion, a Process Essential to Democracy. New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1965. 20. StoUer, Nathan, editor. "Television for Teacher Education." Changes in Teacher Education: a Reappraisal. Report of NCTEPS Columbus Conference, 1963, Washington, D. C. : National Education Association, 1964. 21. Styles, Lindley. "Significant Differences." The Educational Researcher 20:4; Number 1, 1969. 22. Vittetoe, J. 0. "The Influence of Cooperating Teachers on Attitudes of Stu- dent Teachers." Doctor's thesis. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University, 1963. {Dissertation Abstracts, 24:3223) 23. White, Jo Ann. "Changes During Student Teaching as Measured by Pre-Tests and Post-Tests." Research on Student Teaching; Cedar Falls, Iowa: Associa- tion for Student Teaching, Research Bulletin No. 5, 1965. 24. Yee, Albert H. "Interpersonal Relationships in the Student-Teaching Triad." The Journal of Teacher Education 19:95-112; Spring 1968. 26 Some Philosophical and Educational Thoughts On The Nature of Scientific Inquiry By Prince A. Jackson, Jr. PROLOGUE The Great American Dilemma At this moment the King, who had been for some time busily writing in his note-book, called out "Silence!" and read out from his book, "Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the court." Everybody looked at Alice. "I'm not a mile high," said Alice. "You are," said the King. "Nearly two miles high," added the Queen. "Well, I sha'n't go, at any rate," said Alice: "be- sides, that's not a regular rule: You invented it just now." "It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King. "Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice. The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. "Consider your verdict," he said to the jury, in a low trembling voice. Lewis Carroll, ALICE IN WONDERLAND The greatest American dilemma today, is the critical scientific man- power shortage. The literature pertaining to science is replete with references to the dire lack of scientists, engineers, technicians, and good science teachers. Yet prior to the mid-1950's, the warning cries of those who were keenly aware of our predicament, were generally ignored. Today, twelve years since the advent of Sputnick I, we are deluged with proposals for better science curricula. Since the enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958, we, the taxpayers, have been spending hundreds of millions of dollars each year in science and mathematics training programs, based on the hypothesis that our educational institutions can turn out more scientists, engineers, technicians, and dedicated science teachers if we put enough money into these programs. The programs being pursued at present include science faculty fellowships and scholarships for science and mathematics teachers, scholarships for "bright" students, the construc- tion of modern curricula in science and mathematics, the writing of textbooks in modern scientific and mathematical terms, plus proposals for the subsidization of science and mathematics teachers' salaries. Why are we so illogical? Why do we continue to believe so strongly that money alone will solve our problems? Many of our leading scientists are of the opinion that our schools, colleges, and universities cannot solve, alone, our present dilemma of 27 the critical scientific manpower shortage. While it is true that they may make a contribution to the solution, the entire dilemma will not be resolved until we have a citizenry which has an understanding of science, what science can do, and what science cannot do. Dr. James B. Conant, a very prominent scientist and former president of Harvard University, has described the situation in the following words: I have seen repeated examples of such bewilderment (lack of scientific knowledge) of laymen. If I am right in this diag- nosis (and it is the fundamental premise of this book), the remedy does not lie in a greater dissemination of information among nonscientists. Being well informed about science is not the same thing as understanding science, though the two propo- sitions are not antithetical. What is needed are methods for imparting some knowledge of the tactics and strategy of science to those who are not scientists.^ Dr. Conant's book poses the following questions in the writer's mind: 1. What are these methods of which Dr. Conant writes? 2. Will these methods increase our understanding of science? 3. Will these methods alleviate our critical scientific manpower shortage? 4. What are the educational implications of these methods? 5. Will the enlightened laymen be able to apply these methods in the solutions of human problems? 6. Why is scientific education of the masses really important? The remainder of this paper will be devoted to the discussion and the answers to these questions. Part I of the paper discusses the nature of science and the necessity of a scientific education for the masses. Part II of the paper discusses the nature of the method that we call "scientific inquiry," how it will increase our understanding of science, and alleviate our scientific manpower shortage. The Epilogue will discuss how the enlightened laymen will be able to use "scientific inquiry" in the area of human problems. A complete bibliography may be found at the end of the paper. 1 James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 4. 28 Part I THE NATURE OF SCIENCE "Every new theory believes that at last it is the fortunate theory to achieve the 'right' answer. When will we learn that logic, mathematics, physical theory, are all only our inventions for formulating in compact and manageable form what we already know, and like all inventions do not achieve complete success in what they were designed to do, much less complete success beyond the scope of the original design, and that our only justification for hoping to penetrate at all into the unknown with these inventions is our past experience that sometimes we have been fortunate enough to be able to push on a short dis- tance by acquired momentum?" P. W. Bridgman, 1936 The dropping of the atom bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima during World War II in 1945 was the greatest single event, perhaps, in making the masses of the world conscious of science and its awesome destructive power. Although man had been inventing weapons of destruction with the aid of science for hundreds of years before, the use of the power of science for evil had escaped, virtually, the masses of the world. But at Hiroshima, more than 40,000 were killed in probably less than five seconds. It is said that the skeletons of some of the factory buildings were pushed backwards and sidewards as if by a giant hand. In an issue of a national magazine of a few years ago, a man who was several miles away from Hiroshima told of how his clothes were blown, literally, off of him. The effects of radiation on those who survived, are still being written up in many medical journals today. On the other hand, technology, the main product of science, has made life far more comfortable, livable, and abundant, even beyond our wildest dreams. Examples of this are far too numerous to include in this paper. Although many laymen think of science and technology synonymously, they are quite different due to the vastly dissimilar motivations of the tAvo. Technolog)^- must not be equated with science. Henry D. Smith made the distinction in the following words: The object of scientific and engineering research is to aug- ment and clarify our knowledge of the natural world. Our eagerness to pursue such knowledge arises from two sources, either an intellectual interest in understanding the law of nature or a desire to use natural forces for the material improvement of man's living conditions. These two motives can be crudely characterized as a desire for enlightenment and desire for utility. In the scientist the first is dominant, in the engineer the second. This distinction of motivation remains important even though the methods and specific problems of science and engineering have become increasingly similar. ^Technology is interested in the practical. This is not prime interest of science. 29 What is science? The writer concludes that the definition of science by Jacob Bronowski is a typical one. Professor Bronowski defines science in the following words: Science is the creation of concepts and their exploration in the facts. It has no other test of the concept than its empirical truth to fact. Truth is the drive at the center of science; it must have the habit of truth, not as a dogma but as a process.^ The nature of science is such that one phenomenon is enough to disprove a hypothesis, but a million million do not suffice to prove it.* Professor Joseph J. Schwab of the University of Chicago estimates that at the present tempo of research in the Western world, the duration of revisionary cycle in some of the branches of science to be on the order of fifteen years. Thus a body of knowledge acquired in the con- ventional way by a graduate of 1956 is likely to be inadequate in 1971 and, by 1978, as obsolete as notions of the ether, or the impenetrable atom. No better example of this non-dogmatic characteristic of science can be cited than the theory of Classical Mechanics and the theory of Relativity.^ The general aim of science is to progress towards and construct empirical theories that can explain an enormous range of natural phenomena. Scientists can never say that any theory is final or corresponds to absolute truth, because at any moment new facts may be discovered and compel them to modify or construct a new theory. All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses and the scientist looks for order in the appearances of nature by exploring such likenesses. It is a history of magnanimous victories as well as a myriad of tragic defeats for the human intellect in its endless war against nature, ignorance, childish superstitions, and baseless fears. If to be a humanist is to respond perceptively to all dimensions of man's life, an informed study of the findings and of the development of science must surely be an integral part of humanistic education.^ Albert Einstein once said, "World War III will be fought with rocks." Of course the implication is that the great powers of the world have nuclear and biological weapons so powerful, that if World War III ever started, civilization will be destroyed. This one fact, more than any, makes it imperative and paramount, that the masses must have a scientific education. All of our people must understand what science 3Jacob Bronowsld, Science And Human Values, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 77. The interested lay reader who is interested in the nature of truth should read Bertrand Russell's The Problems Of Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), and St. Thomas Aquinas' Sum,ma Theologica (1265- 1273) and Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitale (1258-59). *Sir James Jeans, "The New Background of Science, (New York: MacmiUan, 1933), p. 46. 5The implication here is not that Classical Mechanics is obsolete. In fact Albert Einstein said in 1948, "No one must think that Newton's great creation can be overthrown by (Relativity) or any other theory. His clear and wide ideas will forever retain their significance as the foundation on which our modern concep- tions of physics have been built." sEmest Nagel, "Science And The Humanities" in Education In the Age of Science, edited by Brand Blanshard, (Basic Books, New York 1959), p. 189. 30 can do and what science cannot do. Our masses must become scien- tifically literate, and acquire such attitudes, understandings, and hope- fully aptitudes, so that they will be able to participate in the decision making process efficiently with scientists to construct the kind of life in this world which is now available to us. Without this basic structure of science they are scientific illiterates who cannot make intelligent decisions in the most important area of their life.' It is generally agreed now that the future of civilization depends on how the vast storehouse of scientific knowledge is used.^ The use of this knowledge must be a joint decision of all men. Part II THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY "What hopes and fears does the scientific method imply for mankind? I do not think that this is the right way to put the question. Whatever this tool in the hand of man will produce depends entirely on the nature of the goals alive in this mankind. Once these goals exist, the scientific method furnishes means to realize them. Yet it cannot furnish the very goals. The scientific method itself would not have led anywhere, it would not even have been born without a passionate striving for clear under- standing." A. Einstein, Out of My Later Years According to most of our prominent science educators the tradi- tional courses in science have failed to give our students a firm under- standing of science. As a result of this indictment, other methods of science teaching have been discussed and one of the most important ideas to come out of these discussions is the idea of inquiry. In a (February, 1963) paper delivered as a portion of a Symposium of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Thirty-sixth Meeting, Washington, D. C, the method of scientific inquiry was described as a worthwhile objective, and something that our various educational efforts should deliberately try to achieve.^ The great prog- ress of modern science has been made possible only because the scien- tific mind is an inquiring mind. The inquiring mind of Newton cor- related the force pulling an apple from an apple tree with the force holding the moon in its orbit as it revolves about the earth. As a result of this inquiry and further inquiries, the Law of Universal Gravitation was born. The analytical mind of Michael Faraday dis- covered the relationship between electricity and magnetism. Clerk Maxwell's inquiring research revealed a relationship among electricity, ^Edward K. Weaver, "Science and Curriculum," School Science and Mathematics, February, 1959, pp. 138-50. ^The Power of science is not to be underestimated. Rene Descartes recognized this in 1640 when he said, "Give me matter and motion, and I will construct the universe." ^Robert M. Gagne, "The Learning Requirements for Enquiry," (American Insti- tute For Research) . 31 magnetism, and light. The Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science^^ gives a detailed account of how inquiry led to some of our most important scientific discoveries. From the incipiency of modern science during the century of genius^^ scientific inquiry has been used by scientists to bring about astonishing results in the physical and biological sciences. To the scientist, it is a process. Summing it up in the words of Paul F. Brandwein,^- "it embodies an aim. In it is posture, individual liberty, and humilit}^ It develops a mistrust of one's brain to reach grand conclusions. Inherent in it is a self-correct- ing attempt to defeat one's own conclusions, and the knowledge that the only certainty is uncertainty." In listing the advantages of using scientific inquiry through the case history approach, James B. Conant wrote: The advantages of this method of approach are twofold: first, relatively little factual knowledge is required either as regards the science in question or other sciences, and relatively little mathematics; second, in the early days one sees in clearest light the necessary fumblings of even intellectual giants when they are also pioneers; one comes to understand what science is by seeing how difficult it is in fact to carry out glib scientific precepts..^^ The use of scientific inquiry as a teaching method will infuse into the student, the vicissitudes of research and a better understanding of the conditional nature of truth in science. As a result, the student will begin to analyze more severely and critically, the soundness of his conclusions. In addition he will develop for himself, the structure of science and the habits necessary for remaining scientifically literate long after the termination of his formal education.^* The use of scien- tific inquiry will demonstrate the veracity of Roger Bacon's principle^^ of "Sine experintia nihil sufficienter sciri potest." Sir Percy Nunn wrote: Encourage the love of observing and investigating natural phenomena, which is the mainspring of scientific life. Given that love, the mastery of scientific method becomes a natural incident of . . . progress; without it, scientific method, however scrupu- lously "cultivated," is sterile . . . The student must learn . . . what it is to face problems in the position of a real investigator, left largely to his own wits to wrest from nature the answers to the questions he puts to her.^'' loj. B. Conant and L. K. Nash, Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1961). iiThe seventeenth century. i2Paul F. Brandwein, The Teaching of Science, Harvard University Press, Cam- bridge, 1962, pp. 112-113. i3James B. Conant, On Understanding Science, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1947, p. 18. i*Joseph J. Schwab, "Science Education" in School Revieiv, 1960. pp. 176-194. l^Without experience, nothing can be certainly known. i^Sir Percy Nunn in The New Teaching, 1918. 32 Thomas Aylesworth said that "the most successful teachers are often those who let the students behave as practitioners of a given discipline." With the use of this method, science teaching discards its old identity of "memorizing facts from the text book" and becomes a new and delightful experience. The "science inclined" student becomes apparent years earlier and can be given proper guidance in time to begin his development. As a result of this early start, many of these students will become the future "Newtons, Einsteins, and Galileos." In our scientific age, an understanding of the methods of scientific inquiry must be a part of each student's education. This "grounding" in inquiry must be infused throughout the student's entire education if he is to receive the full benefits of it. Inquiry will develop wisdom as well as knowledge. It is this wisdom that will provide us with a scientific literate citizenry. Without this wisdom, we will continue to flounder as in past years. It would do well for all of us to keep in mind, the maxim expressed by Horace: Brute force, unsupported by wisdom, falls of its own weight.^^ EPILOGUE A Philosophy of Scientific Inquiry "This is indeed a mystery," (remarked Watson). "What do you imagine that it means?" "I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit fact." A. Conan Doyle, "Sherlock Holmes" The methods of scientific inquiry have produced astonishing results in the physical and biological sciences. The twentieth century has brought the airplane, which has changed the definition of "neighbor" from terms of distance to terms of time. The twentieth century has miracle drugs and the polio vaccine. The twentieth century has brought the hydrogen bomb, which can and will wipe out civilization in less than one day if another world war comes. The twentieth century has brought technological advances in both weaponry and modern comforts that amaze even the scientific man. The twentieth century has brought the landing of terrestrial man on an extraterrestrial body. This achieve- ment is bound to have theological and philosophical impacts on the future thinking of man. One of the most amazing stories of the astonishing feats of modern technology is the story that appeared in the January 25, 1963 issue of LIFE magazine about color film and the Polaroid Camera Company in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The manufacturing of self-developing color film for many years had been termed an impossible feat. Polaroid's scientists not only destroyed this myth, but invented the molecule that was necessary to do the job. i7Horace, Odes, 111, 4. 33 When the late President John F. Kennedy committed this nation to landing a man on the moon by 1970, the commitment was not taken seriously at the time because of its seemingly insuperability. Yet this feat was accomplished on July 20, 1969, with the aid of technological methods unknown when the commitment was made in 1962. Our research in agriculture has produced methods, so efficient, that we are now growing twice as much food on one-half of the land as we used only fifteen years ago. Three great problems of mankind are racism, poverty, and increas- ing growth in human population. These problems must be solved if humanity is to survive. There are many social scientists who claim that these three problems are but variations of the same problem. There are much empirical data to support this hypothesis. The high correlation between poverty and dark peoples cannot be attributed to chance alone. It has been said that the problem of population is not too many births rather the inability of man to share the available bread at the table. The problem of feeding the masses of the world is not one of abundance of food but the inability of man to share. It is only natural then after reviewing some of the amazing results of scientific inquiry, to ask the question, "Can the method of scientific inquiry be utilized in the solution of human problems?" The answer to this question is not unanimous by any means. There is even disagree- ment among many prominent scientists. Perhaps the reason for the disagreement is because of the almost unanimous agreement that there is no one set of rules of inquiry that will provide the answers to any given science problem. The most widely quoted statement of support is the now famous statement of P. W. Bridgeman: "The scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one's damnedest with one's mind, no holds barred. "^^ The great difficulty to be encountered in applying the scientific method to human affairs is the very preciseness of science. Lord Kel- vin, the great English scientist, said: ". . . when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science.^^ isp. W. Bridgman, "Prospect for Intelligence," Yale Review, New Haven, 1945, p. 44. Francis Bacon (1600) advocated a scientific method as follows: Make and record many observations of a given problem, perform many experiments pertaining to the problem and record the results, and then construct theories on the basis of induction. Today, Bacon's procedure has been formulated into five steps: (1) Define the problem to be solved; (2) collect data relevant to the problem; (3) formulate hypotheses; (4) perform experiments to test the hypotheses; and (5) formulate conclusions on the basis of the experiment. i^Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures and Addresses, Macmillan S. Company Ltd. 34 However, there is a fair degree of agreement among scientists that the procedure of inquiry is the only one they are certain will yield the results of reliable knowledge, valid explanation and predictions, if such results can be achieved.^" Are there any implications from the preceding statement for the utilization of scientific inquiry by the layman in human affairs? This question can be answered by taking another brief look at scientific inquiry with Ernest Nagel: The procedure of scientific inquiry promotes a habitual sense of the difference between competent and doubtful evidence, and between well-grounded conclusions and those that have a precarious foundation. Scientific inquiry is a procedure of applying logical canons for testing claims to knowledge. These logical canons have been adopted neither as arbitrary conventions, nor because they can be established by appeals to self-evidence. They are themselves the distilled residue of a long series of attempts to win reliable knowledge, and they may be modified and improved in the course of further inquiry .^^ With the above statements as support, the writer concludes that the utilization of scientific inquiry in the solution of human problems is the most logical method to use. After all, this technique of thought and attitude of mind, has had unparalleled success in certain areas of human endeavor. In closing, the writer wishes to emphasize that good science teach- ing develops in each child of our classes, functional knowledge, under- standing, and power of critical thinking, that will serve to increase his stature, in public and private life as long as he lives. In light of the great advances in science and its effects on humanity, we can no longer justifiably speak of science and the humanities as two widely separate entities. In setting the goals of science education the National Science Teachers Association has selected as its position the following statement: The primary goals of science education should be intellec- tual. What is required is student involvement in an exploration of important ideas of science. The mental stimulation and satis- faction of exploring one's environment, learning about its past and probable future, examining man's role in the scheme of things, discovering one's own talents and interests these are reasons enough for the study of science, just as they are for the study of most disciplines. Science is one of man's major intel- lectual accomplishments, a product of the mind which can be enjoyed not for its material fruits alone but for the sense which it provides of the order in our universe.^^ 20Herbert Feigal, "Naturalism and Humanism" in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, edited by Herbert Feigal and May Broadbeck, Appleton-Century-Crafts, New York, 1953, pp. 8-18. 2iNagel, op. cit., p. 189. 22The National Science Teachers Association Position on Curriculum Development in Science. 35 Bibliography "For it is not knowing, but the love of learning, that characterizes the scientific man; while the 'philosopher' is a man with a system which he thinks embodies all that is best worth knowing. If a man burns to learn and sets himself to comparing his ideas with experimental results in order that he may correct those ideas, every scientific man will recognize him as a brother, no matter how small his knowledge may be." Barber, Bernard and Hirsch, Walter. The Sociology of Science. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1962. Blanshard, Brand. Education in the Age of Science. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. Bloom, Benjamin et al. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. New York: Random House, Inc., 1957. Brandwein, Paul F., Watson, Fletcher G. and Blackwood, Paul E. A Book of Methods. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1958. Bridgman, Percy W. "Prospect for Intelligence," Yale Review. New Haven, Conn. 1945. Bronowski, Jacob. Science and Human Values. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. Butterfield, Herbert. The Origins of Modern Science. New York: Collier Books, 1957. Cohen, I. Bernard and Watson, Fletcher G. General Education in Science. Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Conant, James B. Science and Common Sense. New Haven : Yale University Press, 1962. Conant, James B., and Nash, Leonard K. Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961. Conant, James B. On Understanding Science. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. Danto, Arthur and Morgenbesser, Sidney. Philosophy of Science. New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1960. Eddington, Sir Arthur. The Philosophy of Physical Science. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. Feigal, Herbert and Brodbeck, May. Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts Co., Inc., 1953. Frank, Phillip. Modern Science and Its Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1949. Gagne, Robert M. "The Learning Requirement For Enquiry," American Institute for Research. Hall, A. R. The Scientific Revolution. Boston: The Beacon Press, Inc., 1954. Huxley, Sir Julian. "Evaluation in the High School Curriculum," School Review. Summer, 1960. Jeans, Sir James. The New Background of Science. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933. Nagel, Ernest. "On the Science and the Humanities" in Education in the Age of Science. Edited by Brand Blandshard, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. Newman, James R. What Is Science? New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1955. Northrop, F. S. C. The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Rogers, Eric. Physics for the Inquiring Mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Scheffler, I. Philosophy and Education. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1958. 36 Schwab, Joseph J. and Brandwein, Paul F. The Teaching of Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962. 68:176-195. Taylor, F. Sherwood. Science Past and Present. London : William Heinemann, Ltd., 1945. Watson, Fletcher G. "Science Teaching" in Education in the Age of Science. Edited by Brand Blanshard, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. Weaver, Edward K. "Science and Curriculum," School Science and Mathematics. February 1959. Whitehead, Alfred N. The Aims oj Education. New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1961. Whitehead, Alfred N. Science and the Modern World. New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1956. ". . . all science as it grows towards perfection becomes mathematical in its ideas." A. N. Whitehead 87 Student Teachers Suggest Changes Be Made In Their Orientation Program To The C. M. C. By Dorothy B. Jamerson The Curriculum Materials Center contains a representative sampling of the textbooks currently in use in grades one through twelve in the Savannah-Chatham County Public School System. It also houses encyclopedias, bibliographies, sample tests, curriculum publications from school systems throughout the United States, programmed text- books and a small collection of integrated (representing various races in the illustrations) school books. Other enrichment materials in the forms of a Cyclo-Teacher, wall maps, globes, charts, brochures, leaflets, pictures and pamphlets are located here. Activities in the Curriculum Materials Center have been guided by its original objective which is to provide samples of various types of printed teaching materials for the use of students enrolled in the teacher education curriculum, local in-service teachers and others engaged in curriculum development. The annual report 1964-65 of the Curriculum Materials Librarian states, "Experiences over the past year reveal that there is a need, not only to provide teaching materials .... but to introduce these materials to individuals and groups. "The one orientation session held with student teachers at the be- ginning of each quarter provides too little too late. It is our belief that orientation to the C.M.C. should begin earlier in the student's career at the time when he begins his courses in the teacher education curriculum. Orientation could profitably be continued throughout the student's period of specialization and include the final session at the beginning of the quarter in which he starts his student teaching. Such a program would provide time to aid him in the acquisition of knowl- edge in depth of all materials available in the C.M.C." Through the cooperation of Mrs. Dorothy Hamilton and Mrs. Ida Gadsden in September 1965 the orientation sessions each quarter with students beginning practice teaching were increased to two before the practice experience and one just prior to its end. As a means through which future sessions might be improved, each group was asked to contribute suggestions for making the program more responsive to their needs. From September 1965 through May 1968 nine groups of student teachers totaling three hundred twenty-eight members participated in orientation to the C.M.C. One hundred sixty-three of this number con- tributed one hundred ninety-nine suggestions for changes in the pro- gram. Seventeen items submitted were not applicable. 38 Chart A is a tabulation of the different suggestions received and the number of students making the suggestions in a specific year. Items #1 through #14 were made during the three quarters 1965-66; items #15 through #19 were the new suggestions submitted 1966-67; and items #20 through #24 were new suggestions entered during 1967-68. Chart B lists the items of greatest frequency and longest duration. Examination of these items reveals that they can be grouped : a. items showing weaknesses in the instructional area of orienta- tion to C.M.C. #1, 2, 3, 16. b. items showing weaknesses in the background of students #8, 9. c. items relating to external forces affecting this program #5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18. This project of involving students in the effort to improve orienta- tion to the C.M.C. has produced changes based on their observations. Item 12, "Require all graduating seniors to attend all sessions," brought about the rescheduling of the final session to a time before graduating seniors take their examinations. This effectively stopped the absence of those students from the final session. Item 20, "Provide display of free and inexpensive materials," has become a part of the program. Those items which are within the power of the C.M.C. Librarian to act upon will be drafted into the program. It is recommended that through interdepartmental consultation in- cluding student participation, other suggestions made by student teachers and reported in this study be given consideration to the end that those suggestions possessing merit be incorporated into a new program for orientation of student teachers to the Curriculum Materials Center. 39 ;? S H^ g C8 lb M u CO qj Ph H B ti M t>- CO S C^ c^ 11 r 1 c; M u O , KO I-- CJ vo vo C^ Os o I U O (A o CD M) (A u 10 vo Ov On O o G O ^ VO 3 03 cfl CO CO lU *i ri S 2 S (TO (N (M O J3 T3 C CS a, 4) cfi i-Q C13 O JS !-( ^-a -73 (D G G _> a -0^ (B iD 3 ^ (U (U 3 ") tn (H S-1 '3 in B vo Si -5 S a> 0) vo PL| G fti u CJ CO G 3 G CS O ^ 03 o la G a;) J3 S -2 jj i; CO S s acS (U 3 G t ST .S O i2 >-> s^ ^3 "^ G lU +-> ^ t o . 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Table 2 Changes In pH Values of Modified Selenite-F Broth Inoculated With S. typhimurium and A. aerogenes Pathogen/ Flask nonpathogen Incubation pH of number ratio period (days) medium *28 1:0 2 5.8 29 1:0 4 6.0 30 1:0 6 6.0 31 1:0 8 6.0 32 1:0 10 6.1 33 1:0 16 6.4 34 1:0 31 6.4 35 1:400 2 4.8 36 1:400 4 4.8 37 1:400 - 6 4.8 38 1 :400 8 5.4 39 1:400 10 5.4 40 1:400 16 5.5 41 1:400 38 6.2 42 1:800 2 4.8 43 1:800 4 5.1 44 1:800 6 5.1 45 1:800 8 5.3 46 1:800 10 5.5 47 1:800 16 5.9 48 1:800 38 6.1 *Tlie initial pH of MSFB in each flask was 5.8. Summary Salmonella typhimurium underwent a 35 fold multiplication during the first day in MSFB inoculated with this species and A. aerogenes irrespective of varied ratios in their inoculum-numbers. Neither of the species appeared to have had a significant inhibitory effect on the growth of the other. The persistence and multiplication of S. typhi- murium in mixed cultures with A. aerogenes appear to be reduced pri- marily by the availability of appropriate nutrients for the total bacterial population. Salmonella typhimurium persisted at high-levels in MSFB (initial pH of 6.9) for 44 days and 38 days in MSFB (initial pH of 5.8) irrespective of the typhimurium-aero genes inoculum-ratio employed. Salmonella typhimurium is able to tolerate a pH of 4.8 but demon- strated an ability to alter this pH toward a more alkaline one. 49 Literature Cited 1. Bowling, R. E. and Wynne, E. S., 1957. Studies on the mechanism of an- tagonism by Aerobacter strains. J. Infect. Diseases, 88-84:277-281. 2. Jung, R. E. and Shaffer, M. F., 1952. Survival of ingested Salmonella in the cockroach Periplaneta americana. Am. J. Trop. Med. and Hyg., 1 :990-998. 3. Knuckles, J. L., 1959. Studies on the role of Phormia regina (Meigen) as a vector of certain enteric bacteria. Doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut. 4. Knuckles, J. L., 1967. In vitro persistence of Salmonella typhimurium in a dually inoculated medium. I. with Proteus morganii. Savannah State College Faculty Res. Bulletin, 21:177-184. 5. Knuckles, J. L., 1967. In vitro persistence of Salmonella typhimurium in a dually inoculated medium. XL with Aerobacter cloacae. Savannah State College Faculty Res. Bulletin, 21:185-191. 50 Evaluation of Naturalism With Reference To Freedom, Morality, and Inquiry By Liu Shia-ling Professor of Political Science Fayetteville State University After a careful study of the definitions of naturalism by Butler, Vergilius Ferm, William K. Frankena, Ralph Winn and others, some definite conclusions may be drawn as to the real meaning of naturalism : (1), "Nature is all in all of reality"; "It is the sum and substance of all that is." Beyond the World of Nature there is no supernatural being or beings, or kind of entity (such as Plato's Ideas). (2), "To know nature is to come to terms with it ... by social and tested experience, by scientific method, by reflections based on such experiences and methods." In other words, "every state of the world or event in it can be explained causally or mechanically by reference to previous states or events, or else is the result of chance." The method of exploration is more inductive than deductive. Consequently, it rejects faith, revelation, authority, tradition, a priori reasoning, and intuition as source of truth or guidance. For it all meaning originates in experience, and all beliefs must be tested by experience in accordance with general canons of scientific method and all speculations and reflections must be based on such spirit. (3), Since the pattern of the world is to be found within the World, man is wholly a part of It as to origin and destiny. "No element of his being is immortal, and he is only an incidental product of the world process, whether considered as an in- dividual or as a species." (4), Since the world is not static, everything is changing, relative and nothing is absolute. In summary, it is evident that naturalism implies two important elements: one relates to method; another to conclusions. The naturalist therefore adopts and generalizes the scientific approach and following this scientific method he feels forced to accept the conclusions indicated. I. Freedom Under Naturalism A study of the Western history in Middle Ages will suffice to indict the Christian belief as one of the formidable forces in restricting the development of political and ideological freedom. All the academic effort was utilized to justify or rationalize that particular faith in this period. The political theories of Cicero and Roman lawyers, Seneca and the fathers of the Church, St. Thomas, Marsilio of Padua and William of Occam, along with others, will testify to the authoritative monopoly on the part of Church at this time. Even after the Protestant attack upon absolutism, people might have had a little bit more political freedom idealogically. However, they were indoctrinated to the dogmatic teach- ings of the church. On the other hand, the idealism of Plato has hindered the thinking of the West for centuries; the dialectic idealism of Hegel has developed into the absolute rule of the statism or Nazism; the so-called scientific materialism of Marx patterned after Hegelism 51 has created in this world one of the most totalitarian political systems. Historically, at least, both supernaturalism and idealism which the naturalists are opposed to present much limitation rather than culti- vation upon freedom of man everywhere. Since naturalism is opposed in general to the characteristic doctrines of supernaturalism and idealism, the theory of the naturalists would set the man free free to work out his own political system, free to think his own problems out. Through social and tested experience man can and should decide for himself a certain form of government without any reference to any supernatural or absolute imposition. He is also free to change the form of government through whatever means, evolutionary or if neces- sary, revolutionary. A few citations from the writings of such famous naturalists as Rousseau, Locke (also a realist), Hume, and Spencer will support this point. Although Rousseau concedes in the Social Contract that the sovereign power as "absolute, sacred, and inviolable," he nevertheless asserts that it "does not and cannot exceed the limits of general con- ventions, and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and liberty as these conventions leave him."^ According to him, "the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and good of each associate, and which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before."- The rights of individuals, such as liberty, equality, and property, which natural law attributed to men as such, to him, are really the rights of citizens. Historians do agree that it was the political theory of Rousseau and Locke which contributed to the cause of American and French Revolution and laid down the cornerstone of modern political democracy. Hume's contribution to freedom lies in his criticism and gradual elimination of the system of natural law. According to G. H. Sabine, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature "occupies a crucial position in modern philosophy and its importance is not even mainly in the field of political philosophy. . . . The general philosophical position that Hume developed had a profound bearing upon all branches of social theory. What Hume supplied was a penetrating logical analysis which, if accepted, destroyed all the pretensions of natural law to scientific validity."^ Although Carlyle sneered at Hume's philosophy as "a flat continuous thrashing-floor for logic, whereon all questions, from the doctrine of rent to the natural history of religion, are thrashed and sifted with the same mechanical impartiality," yet it was this very "same mechanical impartiality" which destroyed the eternal verities of reason and natural law and, consequently, enhanced the freedom of man to investigate, to think, to speculate and to reason. In justifying the duty of civic obedience, Hume typically used the empirical ap- proach, it is because a stable society in which order is preserved, property protected, and goods exchanged is not possible without them. ^Social Contract, 11. iv. 2Ibid., I. vi. 3G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, Holt, 1947, p. 598. 52 "The members of a society do feel a sense of common interest," he says, "and they admit the obligations that this is seen to impose. . . . This common interest is more like language than it is like a promise or a rational truth. It is a body of conventions or rough general rules that have been shown by experience to serve human needs in a general way. . . . For the sake of stability men have to know what they can rely on, and hence rules of some sort are necessary. If they become too inconvenient, men will change them, even by violence if there is no other way."* Obviously these rules, in Hume's opinion, are not eternal verities rooted in nature, but merely standard ways of behaving justified by experience of their consequences and fixed by habit. After all, according to Hume, the hypothetical liberty "is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains."^ Among the naturalists, Herbert Spencer probably would be one of the most outstanding.^ The universal process of evolution, according to him, is a movement from uniformity and incoordination to diversity and coordination; in all phenomena, inanimate and animate, there is a development from "an infinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, co- herent heterogeniety."' It is so too in social evolution. Consequently, political policy must be accommodated to this universal progress from the like to the different.^ In civilized society, government must accept the inevitable individuation and automatic equilibration of parts ; any extension of state activity beyond what is necessary to protect in- dividual freedom of action tends to impede the increasing specialization and the spontaneous interaction of interdependent individuals that are essential factors of social evolution. According to Francis W. Coker's analysis, Spencer is of the opinion that "the state has two, and only two, sorts of duties. Its primary function the function which formed the original motive of political organization is defense against external attack; its secondary function is to prevent encroachments reciprocally among the individuals within the political community. . . . The state's sole domestic duty, in other words, is to preserve justice." And Spencer's formula for justice is this: "every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not upon the equal freedom of any other man."^ In his first book. Social Statics, published in 1884, he advocated the so-called doctrine of "equal freedom" in asserting that every human has "equal rights to the use of this world."^ Spencer's strong opposition to the governmental operation or regulation of in- dustry, aU state aid to education or industry led Sabine to conclude that "he went even beyond the early liberals," meaning John Stuart Mill, Bentham, Adam Smith, David Richardo, etc.^^ ^Sabine, Ibid., p. 603. ^Charles W. Hendel, Jr., Hume Selections, Scribner's Sons, 1927, p. 174. 6Ferm, Ibid., p. 438. "Herbert Spencer, First Principles, Pt. 11. ^Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Chap. 18-19. ^Francis W. Coker, Recent Political Thought, Appleton-Century, 1934, p. 394. mbid., p. 89. uSabine, cited, p. 672. 53 So far as ideological freedom is concerned, Ralph Winn is of the opinion that the naturalists might agree to a sort of social selection which is different from the biologists' natural selection in this respect: that whereas in natural selection the struggle is mainly of brawn against brawn, with individuals and whole species perishing or surviving in the end; in social selection, the struggle is among competing concepts. ^^ Since naturalism would recognize that supernaturalism, idealism, mythology and absolutism are also a part of human experience, a true naturalist would accept and tolerate them as a part of nature and hence they are also in the struggle for social selection, although they would not agree to their particular points of view. In this sense, as far as naturalism goes, no other school of ideology would indeed be more liberal. However, the fore-mentioned conclusion would not blind us into believing that all naturalists would naturally or automatically be for the extension of freedom as such. The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, whom Butler described as one of the naturalists,^^ is a case in point. According to Sabine, Hobbes' political writings "were de- signed to support absolute government and in Hobbes' intention this meant absolute monarchy . . . and he sincerely believed that monarchy Avas the most stable and orderly kind of government."^* Probably it was Hobbes' belief that human nature is selfish and the state of nature is "a war all against all," and consequently all social authority must be concentrated in the sovereign for each other's protection and security. ^^ Hobbes also stressed the fact "that resistance to authority can never be justified, since justification would require the approval of authority itself. It followed equally that resistance will in fact occur wherever government fails to produce that security which is the only reason for subject's submission."^'' Superficially, Hobbes' theory would be used to support absolutism and therefore suppress freedom, but the last part of the statement cited above would however indicate that Hobbes would also justify the resistance to any authority if it ever occurs. As a matter of fact, Hobbes' only argument for government is that it does in fact govern and consequently, any government is better than anarchy. Monarchical government he thought more likely to be effective than any other kind, but his theory is equally good for any government that can preserve peace and order. Later thinkers had indeed no difficulty in adapting it to a republican or parliamentary form of government. In his analysis of the origin of the sovereign power, Hobbes himself stated "that as if every man should say to every man, T authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up the right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner'." And he further stated that the essence of the commonwealth is "a multitude. 12D. D. Runes: Twentieth Century Philosophy, Philosophical Library, p. 532. isButler, Four Philosophies, Harper, 1957, pp. 64-72. i*Sabine, cited, p. 456. i^See my article, Dr. Sun Yat-sens Theory of the State, China Culture, March, 1960, p. 34. i^Sabine, cited, p. 470. 54 by mutual consents one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end that he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for the peace and common defense."^" In this sense, Hobbes' theory of absolutism in politics is based on an extreme position of individualism and eventually his extreme in- dividualism had been explored by later thinkers for the extension of freedom. II. Morality Under Naturalism It is generally assumed that the naturalists are not religious since they do not believe in any supernatural being or beings, or absolute ideals. In the Western world, morality had been made synonymous with religion, consequently whoever does not believe in religion are considered or regarded as of low morality. Nothing however is farther from the truth. The naturalists may be atheistic, yet they may not be anti-religious, nor is it necessary for them to be non-religious, immoral or even non-moral. In fact most of the naturalists are very religious men with high, if not higher, moral standard. In the first place, it is not necessary for a man to believe in any supernatural being in order to be religious. According to Julian Huxley, "belief in supernatural beings is not an essential or integral part of the religious way of life, nor, conversely, are the objects of religious feeling necessarily super- natural beings."^^ Secondly, like other aspects of a culture, religion is only a part of human experience. According to the naturalists, "while religion may be a valuable phase of life and the source of genuine inspiration, it is defined as purely natural, an affair of men adjusting themselves to the forces and process of Nature; thereby achieving a harmonious life."^^ In this sense, it is therefore very clear that religious truth is the product of human mind. It is not necessary to attend church services or believe in supernatural beings to be religious. On the other hand, one's attendance at the services is not necessarily a good in- dication of his being religious either. Under the influence of Christianity, Western civilization tried to relate morality with religion, or more specifically with Christian beliefs. It is inconceivable to think otherwise. But this is certainly not true. The teachings of Confucius, for example, are mainly a code of morality or ethics. When he was asked about the worship of ghosts and spirits, Confucius said: "We don't know yet how to serve men, how can we know about serving the spirits?" When he was asked about death, he said: "We don't know yet about life, how can we know about death? "2 In reality, the naturalists in the West, like Confucius in China, advocated a rather high standard of sound conduct without reference to the traditional religious beliefs. Spencer talked about a sort of "perfect type of life" in which "the development of the individual will only be limited by the equal right of other men to develop; but in this state, the individual, moved by his inner impulse, will spontane- I'Leviathan, Pt. II, chap. xvii. isjulian Huxley, Religion Without Revelation, p. 21. i9Butler, cited, p. 116. ^^Sources of Chinese Tradition, Columbia Uni. Press, p. 31. 55 ously avoid all encroachments on the normal development of others; indeed, he will exert all his effort to promote this development, until at last the work undertaken for the furtherance of distant ends will in itself no longer be distasteful ! . . . The continuation of the conditions of perfect type of life must be based on the principle of benevolence."^^ According to him, evolution will modify human nature until the in- dividual will find "his highest blessedness in sacrifice . . . for what is possible to the best human nature lies within the reach of the whole of human nature, and development is incomplete as long as there is still a possibility of life being richer and of more value by the un- folding of capacities which bring immediate satisfaction to the in- dividual himself and at the same time are the cause of benefits to other men. "22 Julian Huxley's "idea of fulfillment" and "science of human possibilities" as the essence of his "evolutionary humanism" could also be cited as the most desirable standard of human endeavour.^^ In his treatise, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume discussed the general principles of morals, benevolence, and justice in great detail. "The epithets sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent, or their equivalent," he says, "are known in all languages, and universally ex- press the highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank of human nature, and make them approach in some measure to the divine. "2* Furthermore, a careful review of the "Axiology of Naturalism" by Butler in the Four Philosophies will convince the readers that the naturalists are very much concerned with life's value and do give much attention to the study of this problem. The naturalist concept of God may be different from that of the conventional, or even it is not God or gods, yet the naturalists are not necessarily "God-less" people. To the ordinary religious people, morality is to obey the dogmatic teach- ings of their respective denomination or faith, to the naturalists, "the only moral to be drawn is that each generation must do its best, content that its conclusions should be scrapped later, provided only they have helped humanity's advance. "^^ 2iHarold Hofing: A History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 4S4. ^2Ibid., p. 485. 23 Julian Huxley, cited, pp. 194, 201. 2tHendel, Jr., cited, pp. 200-201. 25Julian Huxley, cited, p. 35. 56 III. Inquiry Under Naturalism In general, the method of inquiry of the naturalists could be described as "empiricistic." An empiricist believes that our knowledge arises from experience and can be known to be correct only when it can be checked against future experience. According to Hume, pure reason which the rationalists like Spinoza trusted is valid in logic and mathematics, because we are there concerned only with the relations of our ideas to each other. To answer questions about what is really existent in the world, the empiricist teaches that reason must start with the data of the senses, work with them to derive conclusions, and check the conclusions by further observation. Because of the emphasis they put on the human experience, they would not be bound by previous tradition or belief and would be amenable to any conclusion they encountered in their pursuit of knowledge. For instance, if the con- clusion of a naturalist philosopher does diverge from the beliefs of religion, he will not say, "Mea culpa! I must have made a mistake." He will say, rather, "So much the worse for those who have not thought this through, and who have accepted on faith something that my philosophical examination shows to be false. '"6 Of course, the natural- ists will rely mainly on science in their pursuance of knowledge. "The contribution which science can make is two-fold," Julian Huxley asserted, "It can contribute an enormous body of hard-won, tested, organized knowledge; and also a spirit of disinterested devotion to truth, and a willingness to apply this spirit to any problem, irrespective of prejudices or possible consequences."^' However, according to Ferm, "experience is not something apart from reason. Reason itself is empirical when it observes and respects experience and weaves it into some coherent meaning. Of course, no empirical method can today ignore the methods of responsible scientific inquiry; but such inquiry does not mean an enslavement to laboratory techniques nor to purely inductive procedures. Scientific methods con- tinually employ hypotheses and critical deductions. "^^ As Dr. DeChemin has very well pointed out in the class, "the naturalist investigates, reflects, and speculates. To the naturalists, facts and speculations are both important." From this observation, we can very well conclude that the naturalist is willing to accept any change or any new discovery which is based on "social, tested human experience." He doubts the existence of a personalized God, he accepts the agnosticism of T. H. Huxley. He is against supernaturalism. yet he is ready to admit it as a part of nature. He believes that "all dependable knowledge comes through natural channels and the world is amenable to such inquiry."-^ Indeed such ideas as democracy, freedom and tolerance "have been shaped, not in accordance with the eternal laws of the universe, but in accordance with the rational will of man aspiring to become master 26Lewis White Beck: Six Secular Philosophers, Harper, 1960, p. 15. 27Julian Huxley, cited, p. 190. 28Ferm, p. 439. ^-"Ibid., p. 439. 57 of his earthly home and of his historical destiny. And it is possible, no doubt, increasingly to realize this long-range ambition."^'' Ferm in fact has summarized this situation very well by saying that "prac- tically all disciplines of contemporary inquiry be they educational, programs of social reforms, scientific, technological, ethical, economic are committed to the empirical method and unity of understanding and with phenomenal success !"^^ soRunes, cited, p. 536. 3iFerm, cited, p. 440. 58 Financing American Colleges In The Ante-Bellum Period: A Survey of Methods By Joseph M. McCarthy Assistant to the Director Institute of Human Sciences Boston College Chestnut Hill. Massachusetts 02167 From the earliest days, American higher education had serious financial problems. In our own day, we are accustomed to prophecies of the demise of private colleges and the constant efforts of development offices to secure new sources of revenue. But whatever methods are chosen to cope with current financial problems and no matter how dark the forecast for the financial future of colleges, these methods and forecasts have their root or counterpart in past experience. When one speaks of the methods used by American colleges and universities to finance themselves, virtually the first means that springs to mind is the solicitation of individual benefactions. Most generally, I suppose, we think of these because we have all at one time or another been approached by our alma mater for such donations. Yet in the earliest period of American colleges there were virtually no alumni, and, until the turn of the twentieth century, precious few. Thus it was that such benefactions were most often sought from individual wealthy patrons. So many of our colleges are named for their earliest or most indulgent benefactor that it is clear that such naming must have been a condition of the gift. Qliite early in our history, Cotton Mather pointed out to Elihu Yale that a Yale College might be "much better than an Egyptian pyramid" as a memorial.^ After some persuasion, Yale donated dry goods which yielded about 500 pounds sterling on the American market. ^ For such a relatively modest donation, Yale achieved immortality of a sort. The names of other colleges were for sale, as witness the educational immortality of James Bowdoin, William Denison, Henry Rutgers, and William Carleton. The transactions were not always easy or smooth. Rhode Island College at Providence, for example, first wooed a wealthy Llewelin, then was reduced to offering its name to whomever would donate six thousand dollars. There were, sad to say, no takers. When the price came down to five thousand dollars, Nicholas Brown took the bait and was in for $160,000 ere his benefactions ended.^ Pity such poor schools as Amherst, which, despite repeated attempts, never managed to sell its name! iQted in Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History (N. Y.: 1962), 9. 2The figure of 400 pounds is given in Charles F. Thwing, A History of Higher Education in America (N. Y. : 1906), 325; Rudolph, American College, 9, puts the figure at 550 pounds. ^Rudolph, American College, 181; Thwing, History of Higher Education, 327-328. 59 We are most apt to think of individual benefactions in terms of the post bellum period when Vassar, Smith, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Chicago and Wellesley were endowed. Yet the struggHng colonial colleges relied heavily on this sort of munificence, even though . . . from 1721 to 1746 the largest personal benefaction received in cash by Yale was about 28. Even in the case of Harvard, in 1746 more than a century after its foundation endowment in securities amounted to only 11,150 in debased Massachusetts currency.* Add to this the fact the bequests to the "newer" schools (Brown, Columbia, Dartmouth, Delaware, Penn, Princeton and Rutgers) amounted to only 7,402 in the three decades before the Revolution,^ and it is obvious that the earliest colleges in our country did not exactly thrive on individual donations. It is, of course, virtually impossible to deal effectively with such figures, as they do not include donations of materiel, such as Elihu Yale's bequest. The colleges also interested themselves in soliciting community subscriptions, whether these were to be paid in currency, produce, or labor. In 1769, for example, Princeton's agents rounded up about a thousand pounds worth of produce in Georgia, and the school sent a ship to take it to market.^ In the years preceding the Revolution, such subscriptions brought to the newer schools the following amounts: Brown, 3,775; Columbia, 2,900: Dartmouth, 750; Penn, 4,500; Princeton, 6,600; Rutgers, 2,300.'' The combined total for newer schools up to the Revolution would thus be 20,805. Of course, many pledges were never delivered on, since they were often made in produce and were thus canceled by a poor crop. It is all but impossible, there- fore, to assess the effect of such pledges on the finances of early colleges. That such community subscriptions did not fall from favor after the Revolution is apparent from the work of the Congregational ministers of Iowa and their wives, who gave the state university $452.65 in 1849, $153 in 1852, and $711 in 1853. Until the third decade of the nineteenth century, lotteries were looked upon as a sort of voluntary tax, and were a major money-raiser for colleges. Their popularity was tempered only by the fact that six to fourteen percent of the gross of a successful lottery went toward expenses, and the person or institution running an unsuccessful one was responsible for the assumption of unsold tickets.^ Lotteries were thus a somewhat chancy method of raising money. ^Beverly McAnear, "The Raising of Funds by the Colonial Colleges," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVIII (1952), 593-594; Thwing, History of Higher Education, 325, presents an interesting list of benefactions to Yale in the early period. sMcAnear, "Raising of Funds," 598. ^Rudolph, American College, 182. ''McAnear, "Raising of Funds," 595-596. ^Thwing, History of Higher Education, 324. ^McAnear, "Raising of Funds." 597. 60 In the pre-Revolutionary period, eighteen lotteries were held to benefit colleges (nearly all of them prior to 1764).^" Yet there is some uncertainty about interpreting their results, as is illustrated by the lottery which Harvard held to buy Joseph Pope's orrery. Three thousand tickets were sold at two dollars each on a total of 696 cash prizes amounting to $4,169. Our source straightfacedly tells us that ". . . after paying premiums of about $2,700 and $2,250 to Mr. Pope for his orrery, a balance of some $400 above expenses was paid into Harvard College treasury. "^^ Even a casual accounting will reveal that this lottery, if the account be true, was on a par with the old shell game. If such transactions were typical of lotteries, it is small wonder that they gradually fell into desuetude as immoral. Yet they may well have done enormous good for colleges. Thwing speaks of a New York lottery which brought in a total of $270,000 for Union, Hamilton College, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons. ^^ Nonetheless, by the 1830's lotteries were no longer a feature of American life and education. In addition to the above sources, American colleges in the pre- Revolutionary period sent funcl-raisers to the British Isles. Holland, the British West Indies, and the American South. These agents were generally clergymen, and were able to enlist the services of diocese in their work. Their appeal would be made from pulpits, and the collec- tions taken up during church services. Customarily such agents por- trayed the American colleges as missionary organizations dedicated to Christianizing the Indians. The colleges grossed over 69.000 in Eng- land and America by the employment of such agents. ^^ In addition to such prosaic methods as these, colleges were also wont to seek funds from a bewildering variety of other sources. In an effort to match a sum promised by a benefactor, Boston College held a fair at Boston Music Hall in 1864 which netted over $27,000.1^^ Only two years later, a similar fair brought in $30,728.'^ Kenyon College of Ohio had in the 1820's numerous New England sewing circles to provide funds for it.^'' Some schools became so desperate as to offer perpetual scholarships, especially in the era 1835-1860, but these worked to the detriment of the schools utilizing them, and soon went by the board.^' Various other schemes, such as attempts by zealous presidents to endow colleges with the proceeds of inventions, proved ineffective on the whole, and were soon out of vogue.^^ iiA. R. Spofford, "Lotteries in American History," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1892, 179. i^Thwing, History of Higher Education, 329. i^McAnear, "Raising of Funds," 598-611; these amounts have been reckoned to be the equivalent of five million dollars. ^'^Centennial History of Boston College (Chestnut Hill, 1963), 20-21. isDavid R. Dunigan, A History of Boston College (Milwaukee, 1947), 91-95; Centennial History, 21. ii^George F. Smythe, Kenyon College: Its First Century (New Haven, 1924), 65. i7Rudolph, American College, 190-192. 18/fezU, 184. 61 Tuition ought to be mentioned as a means of college finance. At the same time, i*^ must be admitted that this should not loom too large in any account of fund raising. After all. Dartmouth's tuition was only thirteen dollars in 1779, Harvard's only twenty dollars in 1807, and only six of Dartmouth's 1806 graduating class of thirty-nine had squared their accounts with the college by the time of their departure. The rest owed a total of $1,222.18, to "say nothing of $2,317.47 owed by the other three classes. ^^ Actually, the practice of bidding for students and seeking poor students so as not to seem snobbish soon vitiated tuition's value as a source of income.^" All of the sources of funds mentioned above are private. Yet America's colleges in the early period were not loath to accept monev from the government. The principal ways in which the several States have aided higher education may be enumerated as follows: (1) by granting charters with privileges; (2) by freeing officers and students of colleges and universities from military duty; (3) by exempt- ing the persons and property of the officers and students from taxation; (4) by granting land endowments; (5) by granting permanent money endowments of statute law; (6) by making special appropriations from funds raised by taxation; (7) by granting the benefits of lotteries, and (8) by special gifts of buildings and sites.-^ Some of this enumeration seems to err on the side of subtlety, as in the case of "granting the benefits of lotteries." In the three decades from 1745 to 1775, Columbia, Penn, and Dart- mouth received a total of 2,776 of public funds.^^ The Great and General Court of Massachusetts appropriated funds for Harvard on over one hundred occasions before 1789, and Williams College received $150,000 between 1793 and 1868.23 ^or were all of these funds directly appropriated. In addition to the sources listed above, legislatures assigned colleges income from ferry and bridge tolls, duties on furs and tobacco, and proceeds from prize ships.-^ Federal aid to higher education is, of course, a subject in itself. The Ordinance of 1787 and the Morril Act of 1862 deserve detailed examination, both in their provisions and their application. Suffice it to say that Federal support has always been of extreme importance to American higher education, despite the denials which were fashion- able between the end of the Civil War and 1958.-^ i^Brubacher, John S. and Willis Rudy, Higher Education in Transition (N. Y. : 1958), 38. 20Rudolph, American College, 199. 2iFrank W. Blackmar, The History of Federal and State Aid to Higher Education in the United States (Washington, 1890), 24. 22McAnear, "Raising of Funds," 593. 23Rudolph, American College, 185-187. 2'1'Brubacher and Rudy, Higher Education, 37; Rudolph, American College, 14. 25Cf. Rudolph, American College, 189; the most exliaustive discussion of Federal (and State) Aid to higher education is to be found in Blackmar, History of Federal and State Aid. 62 It is difficult in the extreme to evaluate the effect of the utilization of all of these income sources by ante-bellum colleges. Certainly, all of these sources combined brought no more than 43,000 to the seven "newer" colleges prior to the Revolution.^^ But Ave have already noted that sending fund-raisers abroad and to the South brought in 69.000 in that period, which would indicate that the "elder three," Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary, must have gotten the lion's share of moneys to be had, whatever the source. It is more useful to note that the productive funds of all the colleges did not exceed $500,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century .^^ Perhaps it is enough, all things considered, to state simply that the funds raised from the various sources were sufficient to sustain higher education until the coming of the post-bellum period brought hordes of patrons. Yet if higher education survived, individual colleges |>erished, e.g., Transylvania University.^^ What American higher edu- cation would be like if all of the colleges founded prior to the Civil War had survived is a subject for fascinating speculation. The best that can be said is that enough funds were available to sustain continued life and growth in a sufficiency of American colleges. The difficulties experienced by American colleges in this period are all the more apparent when their financial vicissitudes are measured against the affluence of later days, i.e., when it is considered that the productive funds of colleges amounted to four hundred million dollars at the turn of the century, and that at Columbia the annual gifts between 1890 and 1901 surpassed all of those to that time (and this in a decade of economic recession! ) .^^ That the percentage increase in funding outstrips the percentage increase in institutions is more than probable, although it has not been demonstrated. It is all but impossible to relate the statistics given above to the value of money in a given era (whether generally or in relation to a par- ticular struggling school) , and to the total financial profile of higher education in the same era. The figures are, however, instructive in one respect: they present a fragmented but convincing picture of the determination of school officials and common citizens to sustain the existence and growth of American higher education by any means available. 26McAnear, "Raising of Funds," 598. 27Thwing, History of Higher Education, 325. 28Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: Urban Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincin- nati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis (Chicago, 1964), .293. 29Thwing, History of Higher Education, 333, Rudolph, American College, 426. 63 Studies In The Synthesis of Camptothecin Part I, Preparation of N-niethylainino-2-quinanylniethane By Kamalakar B. Raut In 1966, Wall and co-workers isolated Camptothecin,^ an alkaloid with a novel ring system exhibiting potent antilukemic and antitumor activities in animals from the tree Camptotheca Acuminata, Nyssaceae. In order to study the possibility of its synthesis it was necessary to prepare N-methylamino-2-quininylmethane. The present paper describes this preparation. The reactions are given below briefly. ;^CBr3 CH.Br ^ CH,..\HCIl3 The starting material was 2-methylquinoline (quinaldine) which was converted by bromine and acetic acid to w-tribromoquinaldine according to method of Hammick.^ A number of methods is available for converting w-tribromoquinaldine to w-monobromoquinaldine. The most useful method was to heat w-tribromoquinaldine and tetralin.^ The w-monobromoquinaldine was treated with methylamine and the hydrobromide of N-methylamino-2-quinonylmethane melting at 230 C was isolated. iM. E. Wall, M. C. Wani, C. E. Cook, K. H. Palmer, A. T. McPhail. G. A. Sim, J.A.C.S. 8S, 3888 (1966). 2D. L. Hammick, J.C.S. 1923, 2883. 3D. L. Hammick, C. N. Lammiman, E. D. Morgan and A. M. Roe. J.C.S. 1955, 2436-41. 64 Experimental W -Trihromoquinaldin. To a mixture of 50 grams of dry powdered sodium acetate, 100 grams of glacial acetic acid and 14 grams of pure quinaldine (1 Mol) at 70, 48 grams of bromine (3 Mol) in 100 grams of acetic acid were added in the course of ten minutes the mix- ture being thoroughly shaken. The solution was boiled for a few minutes (until the separation of sodium bromide caused violent bump- ing) left for half an hour on the water bath, cooled and poured into water, and the faintly yellow crystalline precipitate washed and dried (weight 36 grams). After recrystallization from alcohol it gave m.p. 128. When ordinary quinaldine is used in the above preparation, the product obtained on pouring into water contains tarry matter difficult to remove. A good product is obtained, however, by allowing the acetic acid solution to cool and omitting the treatment with water. A mixture of sodium bromide and W-tribromoquinaldin separates, which is filtered, washed with cold glacial acetic acid and finally with water. W-monobromoquinaldin. W-tribromoquinaldine (30 grams) was stirred in purified tetralin at 100 for 6 hours then 150 for 2 hours. The cooled solution was extracted with dil. H2SO4 (25% by volume) and the aqueous portion washed with a little chloroform to remove tetralin. The acid solution was then neutralized with aqueous ammonia, in an ice-bath. Crystallization of the precipitate from light petroleum gave 12.4 grams of W-monobromoquinaldine, m.p. 57. ^methylammo-2-quinonylmethane: W-monobromoquinaldine, 0.2 grams was dissolved in ten ml. of benzene and methylamine was bubbled through the solution for 3 minutes. At the end of the reaction the solution was warmed on water bath and part of benzene removed. On cooling crystals of the hydrobromide of N-methylamino-2-quinonyl- methane melting at 230 were separated. The compound has not been prepared before. 65 Ghana-Togo Boundary: (past and present) By Dr. Hanes Walton, Jr. Background to the Togoland Problem One of the striking differences between Leagues of Nations Mandates systems and the U.N. Trusteeship system is that while the former was mainly interested in "just treatment" of the dependent people involved, the latter has been concerned with "their progressive development towards government or independence." This shift of emphasis has been mostly evidenced in the case of the two Togolands under United King- dom and French Trusteeships.^ The Togolands have not commanded the international spotlight because of their size or international im- portance. They were among the smaller of the eleven areas under the trusteeship, and they are geographically rather far removed from any direct involvement in the "cold war." Basically then, the Togoland Problem is the result of the accelerated effort to apply the abstract ideal of self-determination to a complex milieu in which the criteria for identifying "self" are indeterminate, unstable, or subject to easy manipulation. In 1884, the Germans concluding a treaty which represented the first formal move to create a German African empire, established a German protectorate over a small coastal enclave (Togo, meaning "behind the sea") no more than fifteen miles wide and three miles deep. This embodied its hinterland. Final boundary delimitations with the British, in regard to Gehomeyast and with the French, in regard to Dahomey, were not made until 1897 and 1899 respectively. As German administration was terminated in 1914, this means that Togoland existed for only fifteen years as a separate political unit.^ Historically, this is the measure of unity possessed by the peoples of modern Togo. Despite the brevity of the German presence, however, it was not insignificant. Their presence provoked that tenuous sense of unity imposed by all imperial powers upon colonial people under their con- trol. After World War I, with the defeat of Germany, the country was partitioned into British and French spheres by an arbitrary north-south line, with Lome and most of the rail lines in the British sphere. On July 10, 1919, a final Anglo-French agreement was signed in Paris in accordance with which the British withdrew westward, leaving Lome, the rail lines, one third of the Ewe and nearly two-thirds of Togoland under French control.^ Three years later, the British and the French mandates were confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations. During the ensuing seventeen years, the two mandates were administered iG. M. Carter (ed.) Politics in Africa (New York: Harcourt. Brace, & World, Inc., 1966), p. 35-88. 2Ibid., p. 5. 3F. M. Bourett, The Gold Coast (California: Hoover Library Publications, Stan- ford University Press, 1949), p. 100. 66 under the supervision of the League of Nations Mandate Commission British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast Colony and Dependencies, and French Togoland as a separate dependency under the direct control of the French Minister of Colonies. When the League became defunct, the future of the Togoland Mandates became dubious. This uncertainty was removed by the declaration of intent by the British and the French delegates at a meet- ing of the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946. According to this declaration, the two governments undertook to draw trusteeship agreements for the two territories and to place them under the United Nations Trusteeship system.* The following December these agreements were approved by the General Assembly. During the follow- ing nine years the "Togoland Problem" has emerged as one of the most intractable and persistent questions the United Nations has been called to resolve. The tenth General Assembly, however, took a major step towards a solution by its decision to supervise a plebiscite in British Togoland. This plebiscite was held in May, 1956, and the results and implications follow. During the period 1885-1900, when boundaries of Togoland were laid down, no conscious effort was made to have them coincide with those of ethnic groups. The Dagomba State in Northern Togoland was split down the middle the capital Yendi and half the state falling within (German) Togoland, the other half in the northern territories of the (British) Gold Coast. The Ewes were also split approximately in half.^ Other groups such as Kusasi, Adja-Onatchi. Ana and Fon were also bifurcated by the creation of the German Togoland. In the final delimitation of the then boundary between British and French Togolands, somewhat greater respect was shown for the ethnic boundaries. In 1919, the Boundary Commissioners were directed to avoid separating villages from their agricultural lands. The Franco- British Declaration of that year further stipulated that inhabitants living on either side of the frontier would be permitted, if they declared their intention within six months of the boundary delimitations, to move with their property to the sphere (French or British) of their choice. The peoples of the Dagomba state were reunited under one administra- tion, as were the Gourma, Kusasi and others. The case of the Ewe is quite different. During the war years, 1914-1919, most of Eweland was under British administration. The British westward withdrawal in 1919 from what was roughly the eastern boundary of Eweland to the present boundary of British Togoland meant not merely that the Ewe in French Togoland were obliged to learn their third European language, but also that Ewe groups not previously divided, found themselves straddling a new international boundary. The drive for Ewe unification reflected, at least partially, a desire to return to the brief five years of unity under the British. 'Coleman, op. cit. ^Ibid., p. 46. 67 Another factor is that the emergence of political systems tended to be co-terminous with the arbitrary boundaries carved out by the colonial powers on an arbitrary north-south axis. The ethnic com- positions of the two Togolands reflected this division, which explains in part the sharp and persistent cleavage between north and south in the two territories.^ Peoples of the Togolands The northern and southern sections of the Togolands can be characterized by three criteria, namely: a. Traditional forms of socio-political organizations; b. Degree of Western acculturation; c. Level of economic development. ~~~ The northern sections of both Togolands have larger political organizations, much centralized and hierachial than the southern sections. On the British side, for example, the majority of people belong to Mamponsi, Dagomba or Gonja States, which existed long before the arrival of the British. Similarly, on the French side, one finds the Cotochi, Bassari, Kon-Komba, Losso and others, ruled by Superior Chiefs, who had traditionally exercised considerable authority. Moreover, both Administering Authorities (British more than the French) have endeavored to preserve the integrity of such pre-existing systems by minimizing disruptive influence and by supporting and ruling through the traditional authorities. By contrast, in the Southern section the groups have been much more loosely organized in political systems marked by considerable decentralization and dispersion of authority. Among the Ewe for example, the Sub-tribe (numbering a few hundred to 20,000) was the widest independent political unit, and there were about 120 such groups at the turn of the century. Moreover, the political structure was conciliar and somewhat democratic. These differing traditional patterns, coupled with the different policies, the Administering Au- thorities were able or inclined to pursue, have significantly influenced the degree to which the peoples of the respective sections have been predisposed towards and have become involved in modern types of political activities." Involvement in such activity has been more pronounced in the Southern section than in the Northern, because there is an absence of traditional chiefs, moreover, the elites are fearful of any challenge to their power and to the status quo of political modernists. There is the fact that Western acculturation carried first by the trader and mis- sionary, then by the government agent was most effective at the coast; only recently has there been any penetration into the north. The third criterion is economic development. In the north, economy has been 6Ibid. "Togoland Report. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Offices. 68 overwhelmingly based upon subsistent agriculture, whereas in the cocoa and palm-oil areas in the south there has been a comparatively high degree of commercialization. This has resulted in the creation of a middle class composed of farmers and traders economically active and deeply concerned over political processes and the resultant impact on economic arrangements. These sectional differences in the degree of Westernization and economic development have operated to sharpen the traditional culture cleavage between the Northern and Southern people. The central fact, though, is the basic distrust and fear of the less developed northern leaders and the peoples regarding the pre- tentions and ambitions of the politically more articulate and ambitious Southerners. British Administration Historically, the British ruled Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast since 1919. In 1956, when the Gold Coast was preparing for independence, the British iterated their stand to incorporate Togo in Gold Coast for independence.^ The reasons for that gesture are obvious. First, Togo could benefit from an association with the self- governing Gold Coast; and also the idea of larger scale units of human organization in the modern world was subscribed to by the British. Certainly any such association could help the Gold Coast as well; particularly with regard to VRP. While integration was not absolutely essential to the Volta River Project, it would enhance effective man- agement. Perhaps the most convincing argument was the lack of a persuasive case for any of the alternatives to integration. Secondly, Togo could not be an able independent unit. Coupled with this were doubts about popular support to any of the alternatives to integration. The British were not altogether unselfish for they Avere also concerned about maintaining effective support with the African leadership of the Convention People's Party; besides, Togoland was never administered as an entity. Thirdly, there was a complete integration of the peoples of the Gold Coast and British Togoland at the local level (in local governments), but unfortunately, less integration at the central government level. French Administration In contrast, the French Government maintained administrative and territorial integrity of the French Sphere of Togoland. Because of its larger size of population, possession of Port of Lome, internal rail lines, and greater potentialities as a viable economic unit, it was easier to administer as a separate entity.^ The French assimilationist policy i.e., French Union, made this a different political destiny from the British. There was disruption of traditional authorities, hence French direct rule, and ultimate legislative and executive authorities rested in the French government in Paris. sColeman, op. cit., p. 100. 9[bid., p. 101. 69 The French policy since 1945 was directed towards guiding develop- ments and creating situations in Togoland which would result in con- tinued close association of Togoland with the French Union. There- fore, for obvious reasons of state a policy was designed to ward off such alternatives as Ewe or Togoland unification, or integration with the Gold Coast or complete independence. Political Associations in the Togolands For purposes of analysis, these can be classified under three broad headings according to their various positions on the issue of the poHtical future of Ihe two Togolands; namely UNIFICATIONISTS unification of the Togolands, either as a step toward unification with the Gold Coast or step toward independence of a united Togoland State. UNIONISTS Association of French Togoland with French Union. These included chiefs and factions who had otherwise benefited from the French rule, and INTEGRATIONIST, associations which ad- vocated the complete and permanent integration of British Togoland with an independent Gold Coast. All of the unificationists and FTP were of the Ewe leadership. For example, the following personalities were all Ewes: A. M. Simpson A.E.C. S. G. Antor T.C. Sylvanus Olympic CUT E. K. Essien JUVENTO Pedro Olympic MPT K. A. Gbedemah C.P.P. Dan Chapman Founder of A.E.C. Date Area of ^Category and Title Abbreviations Formed Activity UNIFICATIONISTS All-Ewe Conference A.E.C. 1945 So. G.C. Togol and Congress T.C. 1943 So. Br. Togo Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise JUVENTO 1951 So. Fr. Togo Comite de I'Unite Togolaise C.U.T. 1939 So. Fr. Togo Mouvement Populaire Togolaise M.P.T. 1954 So. Fr. Togo UNIONIST Parti Togolaise du Progres P.T.P. 1946 So. Fr. Togo Union des Chefs et des U.C.PN 1951 No. Fr. Togo INTEGRATIONIST Convention People's Party C.P.P. 1949 G.C. Br. Togo Northern People's Party N.P.P. 1954 No. Br. Togo *James S. Coleman, Togoland, September, 1956, Carnegie Endowment for Inter- national Peace. 70 The Ewe constituted 210^ of the population of the two Togolands, Thirty-three per cent of the British Togoland and 16% of the French Togoland.^ The differing aspirations and activities of the various Ewe groups give some substance to the popular notion that the Ewe and Togoland problems are synonymous. Most Ewes have tended to assume such to be the case. The Togolands and the U.N. The Ewe question in particular and unification sentiments in general prompted the investigation of the Visiting Missions. The first Mission reported among other things that "a memorandum was also presented by the Anfoega branch of the 'Dyanamic CPP' and it was obvious from the flags and posters displayed in the area that supporters of the CPP were in a large majority there." The Second Mission con- cluded "a formal consultation with the people will be necessary to decide the question" and "a plebiscite would be the most democratic, direct and specific method of ascertaining the true wishes of the people.^' On the issue of unification vs. integration, the Trusteeship Council displayed a certain ambivalent attitude. For instance, between 1947 and 1954, the United Nations and the Administering Authorities were in general committed to a policy of furthering the development of pan-Togoland institutions. The anti- unificationist groups (CPP in British Togoland, PTP and VCPN in French Togo) became very strong. In short, developments in the two Togolands during and after 1952 made it possible for the administering Authorities to resist, on grounds of substantial Togolese opposition, any further development of common Togoland institutions.^^ The Plebiscite and After In the plebiscite held in British Togoland on May 9, 1956, a majority of the registered voters (58%) voted in favor of union with an independent Gold Coast. Accordingly, in a memorandum submitted to the Trusteeship Council on July 13. 1956, the government of the United Kingdom proposed that Trusteeship Council and General As- sembly request the Administering Authorities to prepare and terminate the trusteeship agreement and for the union of the Territory with the Gold Coast as soon as the latter became independent. So in agreement with this on March 6, 1957. British Togoland became part and parcel of the new State of Ghana. French Togoland has since July 1960 be- come a sovereign state of the new Togo, and a member of the French Union. ^^International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Sep- tember, 1956). iiCarnegie Endowment for International Peace (September, 1956). i^Ibid., p. 126. 71 Critique and Speculation About the Future of Togo Republic and Ghana The new questions are: (1) is the urge for Ewe unification over? and more importantly (2) will Ghana ever make an attempt to include the Togolands? One of the Togo's most serious problems concerns the Ewes, an important tribe numbering less than two million. Some 200,000 of them live in Togo.^^ And the nature of the problem can be seen in the exchange of notes between Ghana and Togo years after Togo's independence. This note emphasized the persistent desire of Ghana for unification with Togo. There was a formal complaint by Ghana, alleging attempts on the life of the President of Ghana, in Kulungugu by the people using Togolese Soil "for the purpose of planning and carrying out outrage."^* Even here, an occasion was sought by the African Affairs Secretariat, to reiterate Ghana's stand on the unification of Togo with it in these words: The artificial division of the peoples of Ghana and Jogu. brought about as part of a settlement between the Great Powers after the First World War, in total disregard of the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. . . . The Government of Ghana does not contest the right of either Ghanaians who are in Togo or of Togo citizens who are in Ghana, to join in such discussions and to make proposals as to the means by which the artificial division between the two countries can be ended. On the contrary, the Government of Ghana believed that a solution of this problem can only be secured through the active and open participation of leaders of opinion and political figures of both countries. ^^ There is no doubt that the artificial boundary referred to here has special reference to the Ewe people, who populate both Togolands. More recently, after an abortive coup in November last. President Grunitzky accused the Comite de I'Unite Togolaise (C.U.T.) party of the late President Olympio of having organized the affair, and described them as "enemies of reconciliation and national unity." On a broader front C.U.T. charged the Grunitzky government with neglecting the interest of the Ewe people in the South, and in particular with failure to pursue cultural, economic, and other links with Ghana, where the majority of the Ewes now live. They accused the government of a lack of dynamism in its internal economic policies, and of extrava- gance, of over-dependence on French aid and of seeking to close links with OGAM group of states led by the Ivory Coast.^^ i^Lewis N. Alexander, World Political Patterns, Chicago: Rand McNally & Com- pany, pp. 409-410. i^Exchange of notes between Governments of Ghana and Togo December 7, 1962. i6West Africa, No. 2582, November 26, 1966, p. 1347. 72 There is some truth in all these charges, but they over-simplified the problems. Grunitzky appears to have genuinely tried to get a representative cabinet, but he lacked a popular base. On the economic side, there is little anyone can do, for Togo is a poor country that exports cocoa, coffee, ground nuts, cotton and palm products, all in small quantities. The budget leaves no room for locally financed devel- opment, and so recourse to aid is absolutely essential. There has been in fact little development in the past three years despite a five-year development plan. Even the current military regime of Ghana seems to be figuring prestigiously in Togo. At a demonstration after the attempted coup, various bizarre rumors were circulated among them that General Ko- toka and Colonel Afrifa, the architects of the Ghana coup, who happened to be in Togo on a visit over the crisis week-end, had been brought to supervise the army's coming to power in Lome.^' In fact, it was perfectly clear that expert advice in coup-making was what was lacking and Kotoka and Afrifa may well have felt a sense of superiority, seeing what bad planning could do. It says much for the public disturbance that, although a Government reception had to be cancelled, the two Ghanaians did not leave for home until the appointed time. On January 13 of this year, barely two weeks after Grunitzky reshuffled his cabinet, which axed a number of people, including Antoine Meachi, a new and successful coup was conducted by the army, led by Lt. Colonel Eyadema.^^ Some suggest that the reason for the downfall of Grunitzky was that he lacked credibility. He was brought in by the army as a compromise candidate to paper the cracks of national unity, and when it seemed that he no longer could do this, he was discarded. Thus, when the peoples of Lome took to the street on November 21 to show their dislike to their government and their Unite Togolaise (U.T. ) sympathies, they dealt it a mortal blow. About mid-day of the day of the coup, many people carried placards saying "Long Live African Unity," "North or South," "We Are All Brothers" and only one said "DoAvn with Grunitzky. "^^ In the light of the present developments, it would not be unreason- able to assume the following, that: 1. The people, more so, and to a lesser degree the politicians, are realizing the practicality of unification overtures the advan- tages of mutual benefits; 2. That this realization would become even more clear as the years go by, and political maturity becomes established; 3. And then any future gestures of this kind would not be totally acknowledged as the politicians wish, but the people's wishes. Such integration feelers might come from either Ghana or Togo. Ghana has used the Ewe question, more than once in the past, as a basis for Togo to merge with it, and it would be a surprise if she didn't use it again. ^West Africa, No. 2583, January 21, 1967, p. 71. ^West Africa, No. 2590, January 21. p. 71. ^^Ibid., p. 94. 73 Bibliography Alexander, Lewis M. World Political Patterns. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company. Bourret, F. M. The Gold Coast. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, Hoover Library Publications, 1949. Coleman, James S. Togoland (International Conciliation) . Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 1956. Exchange of Notes Between the Governments of Ghana and Togo. December 7, 1962. Great Britain Colonial Office, British Togoland-Politics and Government. Togoland Report. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954. U. N. General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Session. Special Report of the Trusteeship Council on Administrative Unions Affecting Trust Territories. New York: 1952. U. N. Trusteeship Council. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Togoland under French Administration, 1946. U. N. Trusteeship Council. Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Togoland under British Administration, 1946. West Africa, No. 2582. November 26, 1966. West Africa, No. 2583. December 3, 1966. West Africa, No. 2590. January 21, 1967. 74 NATO's Approach To Multilateral Control of Nuclear Weapons By H. Walton, Jr. Theoretically speaking, statesmen must not tie their own hands; they must not cut off their alternatives; they must retain the capacity to adapt their policy to the unique contingencies of the moment. How- ever, in practice, statesmen tend to combine these approaches, generally giving priority to the free hand rather than the clear line. The men who bear the responsibility for conducting the foreign relations of states tend to regard their business as a pragmatic endeavor, requiring careful attention to cases rather than doctrinaire application of a for- mula.^ In some instances, they appear to believe that it is possible simultaneously to state firm commitments and remain uncommitted; American adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty, for example, was presented as an act which clearly told of the Soviet attack upon Western Europe.^ Therefore, many of the alliance commitments which the United States has undertaken since 1945 may be regarded as line-drawing operations in the sense that their primary function is to put the Com- munist powers on notice that aggression against specific states will be resisted by the United States.^ As Helmut Von Moltke argues, an alli- ance never really achieves what is militarily desirable; individual allies extend themselves only if and when they think they can gain a political advantage. Then commitments to systematic involvement in world affairs require that the United States accept an active role either in the alliance patterns of the balance of power system, collective security system, or in a system of world government, if only to gain a political advantage over her foe. Since Claude states in his book. Power and International Relations, that no system of world government prevails, nor a system of collective securit}^ but a system more or less of balance of power still prevails. Hence, if we adopt Mr. Von Moltke's argument, that allies extend themselves only to achieve a political advantage, we can see that NATO has been struggling since its formation in 1949 to become an exception to this proposition. Therefore, the United States has attempted to solve her main problem in international relations (i.e., how to cope with the dynamics of Soviet expansionism since the war) by resorting to a general system of collective defenses,* in which no system of central control is present above the military command. America's alliance policy in the Cold War has been one of collective defenses instead of collective security ilnis Claude, Power & International Relations (New York: Random House, 1964) p. 201. 2A. Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 478-479. 3Qaude, op. cit., p. 201. 'i Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959) , p. 49-74. 75 or world government because it does not limit the freedom of the state to maneuver in the pursuit of its objectives as the collective securit)' principle does. As a result, there remains only the balance of power system, which can accord such autonomous maneuvers. The balance of power system involves alliances which are essentially externally-oriented groupings, designed to organize cooperative action among their mem- bers for the purpose of dealing with conflict situations posed by states or groups of states on the outside.^ Balance of power postulates two or more worlds in jealous confrontation, while collective security postulates one world, organized for the cooperative maintenance of order within its bounds.^ However, a major factor in any alliance, especially one that operates in the framework or has a framework of a balance of power system, is the political, military, and economic situation of each of the alliance members. The greater the stability, politically and economically, and the stronger it is militarily, the better are its chances for leadership and for dictating policy to other members of the alliance that are weaker and less stable. In a case where all the members except one are inferior, the greater are the chances that they will have to go along with a policy which is dictated by the one superior power. But as time moves along and some of the members gain some sort of equality with the leading one, conflict arises around the most dictated policy, the one which had been, before equality, left to the choice of the superior member. These assertions are the secondary thesis of the paper. The primary thesis is that NATO's approach to multilateral control of nuclear weapons did not exist prior to evening the gap between the superior member and the more or less inferior members of NATO. Up until the present time the nuclear policy has been con- trolled solely by the United States. Now, since more and more European countries have gained equality within the alliance, the greater their demand has been for a voice in the policy of control. NATO is an alliance against an aggressor or any combination of aggressors. It is an alliance not for war but for peace." NATO is the prime example of "an alliance forced by twentieth century conditions to become an international organization,"^ an instrument of the balance of power system which has been modernized by the adoption of the form and techniques of international institutions.^ The NATO alliance owes its creation to a series of Communist aggressive actions after World War II in Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, Greece, Turkey, Czecho- slovakia and Berlin. ^ These events forced Western Europe and the United States to recognize, first, that Communist tactics for gaining world-wide hegemony extend beyond political and economic measures sQaude, op. cit., p. 145. (>Ibid. 7Ben Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 115. SRuth Lawson, "Concerning Policies in the North Atlantic Community," Interna- tional Organization XII (Spring, 1958), p. 164. ^Claude, op. cit., p. 281. lOA. Buchan. NATO in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1960). 76 and, second, that Western interests could not be assured without mili- tary forces capable of deterring Communist takeover attempts. These two factors led to a common realization of the NATO concept of a collective military defense for its members and their territories. NATO, like any other alliance, involves a complex of historical, political, psychological, economic, and military factors. Thus, it suffers when these factors are not in harmony. Yet, during the period when the heart of NATO's defenses rested on the commit- ment of United States military power, Alliance strategy, forces and resource commitments had the simplicity of a relatively single focus. Today, this focus has become more diffused. The remarkable growth in Western Europe's economic, political, and military strength has shifted relationships among its members and, in recent years, the Atlantic Alliance has seemed to become considerably more vulnerable to the infirmities noted by Von Moltke. Since the end of World War II an important change has taken place in the nature of alliances. In the past, alliances have been created for three basic reasons: ( 1 ) to provide an accretion of power, (2) to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. (3 1 to provide an incentive for mutual assistance beyond that already supplied by an estimate of the national interest. There was some inconsistency among these requirements, to be sure, even before the advent of nuclear weapons. The desire to leave no doubt about the collective motivation of the states occasionally conflicted with the attempt to combine the maximum number of states for joint action. ^^ The wider the system of collective action or defense, the more varied were the motives animating it and the more difficult the task of obtaining common action proved to be. Then, the inevitable conclusion is that not everybody joined the alliance for the same things. Therefore, the greater the number entering the alliance, the more intense and direct has to be the threat which would produce joint action. This traditional difficulty has been compounded in the nuclear age. The requirements for tight command and control of nuclear weapons are to some degree inconsistent with a coalition of sovereign states. ^- The enormous risks of nuclear warfare affect the credibility of tradi- tional pledges of mutual assistance. In short, the destructiveness and range of modern weapons have a tendency to produce both extreme nationalism and neutralism.^'' As a result, Europeans feel that sharing in nuclear control is the mark of first-class status. With regard to this emphasis, the nuclear issue has become a sort of touchstone in the relations between the United States and the European members of NATO. The European governments have sought to raise their partici- pation in the control of a nuclear deterrent force. To make the discus- iiHenry Kissinger, "Coalition Diplomacv In A Nuclear Age: The Atlantic Com- munity II (Fall, 1964) . p. 431. i2Theo Summer, "For An Atlantic Future." Foreign Affairs, XLIII (October, 1964), p. 113. i^Livingston Hartley, "Atlantic Partnership How?", Orbis, VIII (Spring. 1964). p. 141. 77 sion of this topic more beneficial, let us first start with the nature and composition of the Alliance itself. The next general premise is the most fundamental. Political policy must always be the master of military strategy. This is the first principle to be applied in a consideration of defense policy. Defense and foreign policies are inextricably interwoven: the two can be con- sidered separately but it is impossible to divorce the one from the other. It is a truism to say that the best defense policy a country can have is a good foreign policy, but the logical consequences of the truism are rarely appreciated. A unilateral foreign policy is a contra- diction in terms and is no more tenable than a unilateral defense policy.^'* Since today no country can, alone, provide for its defense, the doctrine of interdependence has come into being. A communique issued after talks between the British Prime Minister in October, 1957, and President Eisenhower states this doctrine of interdependence: The arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defense and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is out- dated. The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will hence- forth act in accordance with this principle.^^ Obviously the implications of interdependence extend more widely than defense arrangements and must include political co-ordination, which, even with the militar)^ subordinated to the political, is highly necessary. The advent of nuclear weapons has pointed up the grim truth of Clemenceau's dictum that war is too serious a matter for generals alone. Obviously, expert military advice must provide the basis for an intelligent defense policy. But unless the essential point that the purely military view is only one aspect of defense in its widest sense is grasped, then problems cannot be seen in their right perspective. The vastly accelerated pace of modern war means that decisions of vital consequence may have to be taken in a matter of minutes and it is imperative that the responsibility for these decisions rest squarely on political shoulders. Captain B. H. Linddell Hart has this to say: Statesmanship, in the H-bomb age, must control not only the aims but the operations. It should direct military defense planning and the formulation of military doctrine. Hence states- men and their diplomatic advisers must have a greater knowl- edge of military technique than they needed in the past. That is as important as for soldiers to submit to political direction.^'' ^W. 0. Miksche, "The Nuclear Deterrent and Western Strategy," Orbis, VIII (Summer. 1964), p. 231. 15NAT0: Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris, Text of Statements, December 1957, Dept. of State Publication No. 6606. 16B. H. L. Hart, Deterrent or Defense (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1%0), p. 3. . 78 President Kennedy, also, commented that: Political planning must be aware of military realities, and military plans in turn must be responsive to political considera- tions . . . Our force goals, our military policy, our deployments and our war plans themselves must all reflect the purposes and spirit of our great community. Military and political problems are not separable, and military and political men must work ever more closely together.^' Hence, with the idea of interdependence and political co-ordination in mind, one can therefore begin to see part of the nature of the alliance itself. Already before the NATO Treaty, there had been a renewal of some old alliances. In March, 1947, Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance. On March 17, 1948, this Treaty of Alliance included the Benelux countries and the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collabora- tion and Collective Self-Defense. In many ways this treaty provided a pattern for the North Atlantic Treaty. In June, 1947, General Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced the famous Marshall Plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe.^^ Finally, on April 4, 1949, due to Soviet expansion and aggressive diplomacy, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.'^ Greece and Turkey acceded to it in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955.^''^ The Treaty itself was a model of clarity and brevity. Its purpose is well expressed in the Preamble: The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the prin- ciples of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security .^^ This unique task of establishing an alliance between sovereign states for collective defense in time of peace, without any direct sur- render of national independence, and thus, without supranational insti- tutions, posed many problems. Gradually the political and military organization, described below, was evolved, all agencies created by i^Speech to NATO Military Committee, Washington, April 10, 1961. i^Buchan, op. cit., p. 43. i^Hubertus Lowenstein, NATO and the Defense of the West (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) , p. 3-5. '-oibid., p. 5. 2iNorth Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 1). C, April 4, 1949. 79 the alliance being subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries.'^ Parallel to the work of the organization, the Council was concerned with establishing a common defense policy in the fields of armaments production and military strategy.^-' Therefore, the principal instrument of decision-making in NATO is the North Atlantic Council. It is composed of representatives of all fifteen member governments. It can meet at three levels : ( a ) Heads of Government (as it did once, in December, 1957. or as they did January, 1965); (b) Foreign Ministers (as it usually does, twice yearly) ; occasionally, the council at the ministerial level brings together Defense and Finance Ministers; (c) Permanent Ambassadors (once a week, or more frequently). When the Council makes unanimous deci- sions, these are deemed to be binding upon all the member governments. Lord Ismay, former Secretary General of NATO, wrote: "T^Tien governments hold divergent views, negotiation con- tinues until unanimous agreement has been obtained. It is true that unanimity is not always achieved without considerable patience and a good deal of give and take; but it has always been reached in the end. That is because the interests and objectives of all NATO countries are fundamentally the same, and because the habit of thinking alike for the common good is growing daily. "^'' NATO, therefore, was established not as a supernational or federal organization, but as a defensive league of states lacking any organs of central government. ^^ Each member guarded its sovereign preroga- tives. In theory, precise distinctions can be drawn between federations, supranational organizations, confederations and mere alliances. In real life, which is always imprecise, the controversy over the differences between these types of associations is apt soon to reach a point of diminishing returns. But, in the present context, at least a rough distinction between a confederation and an alliance helps to fix the actual scope and limits of NATO. A confederation, although it does possess a central government (possibly including legislative, executive and judicial organs) or expressly delegated powers,-' does not impinge on the sovereignty of its members. Members of a confederation, unlike those of most federations, reserve the right to withdraw from the compact if they wish to do so. But while they remain in it they are obligated to carry out the decisions of the central organs, so long as these act within the scope of their defined powers. Moreover, although the members of a confederation usually vote as equal states, they can 22Buchan, op. cit., p. 114. 23Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Communitv (New York. Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 21. 25/6iW., p. 60. 26Henry Kissinger, "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," Foreign Affairs (July, 1962) . 27Francis Coker, "Sovereignty," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 11th printing. XIV, p. 260-268. 80 be considered legally bound to follow specified decisions which are taken by simple maj orities.^^ NATO was set up as an alliance, not as a confederation. It is an intergovernmental group whose members undertake to consult, to coor- dinate and to cooperate. Whatever controls NATO exercises over its members, it exercises them with the approval of its members.^^ The NATO bodies, such as the Secretariat and the Council, can facilitate communications among governments, approve reports, render opinions, make recommendations, and address requests. But NATO, as a strictly intergovernmental body, cannot lay down binding policy guidelines, nor can it issue authoritative directives, not even in the crucial area of military defense, which is the raison d'etre of the Alliance.^" A veto is retained by each member government. All of the member govern- ments give lip-service to the fact that an attack upon one shall be deemed an attack upon all. But final decisions are retained by each state as to what action, including military force, it shall undertake to support its treaty obligations. The architects of NATO hoped that intensive joint planning among the members (e.g., standardization of equipment, joint training exercises, combined deployment, joint war exercises, mutual exchanges of intelligence, close cooperation in the planning of national defense policies and intensive political consulta- tion) would generate centripetal forces sufficient to offset the cen- trifugal tendencies which invariably plague alliances in times of crises. ^^ But in the final analysis, significant policies within NATO can be developed only through the process of diplomatic negotiation. Article IX of the Treaty, which sets up the North Atlantic Council defines neither powers nor procedures. The Council can take decisions only by unanimous consent. However, the main thing here is the fact that the stronger and more stable country has the pleasant position of more or less dictating a policy or policies, which it feels is more or less in its own interest, and the weaker and less stable members of the alliance accept it even when it is, at times, contrary to their national interests. Sir Geoffrey Crowther, former editor of The Economist, states : The alliance will be expected to work in matters that the United States deems important, but not in matters that Britain and France deem important, and even perhaps vital to their existence. If this is the American attitude, and it is, then it is hard to see how there can be an effective alliance ... I am not trying to say that the State Department must always dance to a Franco-British tune. It is obvious that the strongest member of the alliance must have the biggest say in determining its policies . . . But it is also in the logic of alliance that the permanent and vital national interests of the weaker partners 28Merrill Jensen, The New Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950), p. 27. 29Alastair Buchan, Arms and Stability in Europe (New York: Frederick A. Prae- ger, 1953) , p. 142. soCarol E. Bauman, Political Cooperation in NATO (Wisconsin: Univ. of Wis- consin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, June, 1960) . ^nbid., p. 10. 81 become permanent and vital interests of the United States, or the alliance will suffer.^^ During the 1950's, the ever closer team work and growing military strength of the alliance was a great political achievement. This growing intimacy of the Council's members smoothed the path of diplomatic cooperation. America, because of her powerful position in the alliance as well as in the world, invoked her unilateral policies. Yet serious problems of coalition diplomacy remained. For example, the inability of the leading European nations of the Atlantic Alliance to devise common policies to protect their relatively remote interests in the Far East and Southeast Asia during the period 1949-54, and the U. S.' unwillingness to do so or to help them do so. Also, the crisis of confidence which confronted NATO at the time of Suez and Hungary compelled the statesmen of the Alliance to take another look at the question of political coordination. The British and French felt that they had been let down shamefully by their American ally.^^ Another example is the situation of September, 1958, when De Gaulle, in letters to both Eisenhower and Macmillan called for a creation of a closer working relationship among the three leading members of NATO.^^ De Gaulle appeared to be more interested in developing common strategic responsibilities outside the European territory of NATO than in acquiring a privileged voice in the determi- nation of intra-European NATO policy. ^^ Rene Pleven stated: France, the only continental member of NATO which today has defense responsibilities of comparable magnitude to the British, would also like to have the means of making her voice heard.^^ On the same point, Furniss made the following remarks: What France was trying to do was simply to get the United States to realize how important it is that the nations of the West stand together against the Soviet challenge and that they be so whenever and wherever that challenge is presented. The French thesis is that the surprises which the Soviet Union is adept at producing in all parts of the world may at any moment directly affect the territories of the French Community; and that in view of this, it would be both logical and useful to allow France to participate in the formulation of global defense plans ... It wants permanent cooperation with the United States and Great Britain along tliese lines, whether through NATO or otherwise.^" 32Geoffrey Crowther, "Reconstruction of an Alliance" Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXXV, January, 1957, pp. 180-181. 33Susan Strange, "Strains on NATO," The Yearbook of World Affairs 1956 (Lon- don, England: Institute of World Affairs, 1956), p. 22. 3*Robert Strausz-Hupe et al, Building the Atlantic World (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1963), p. 49. 35/feiW. 36Rene Pleven, France in the Atlantic Community, Foreign Affairs, XXXVTII (October, 1959), p. 22. 37Edgar S. Furnise, Jr., "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," International Organization XV (Summer, 1961), p. 349-365. 82 However, this so-called "tripartite" proposal was received unfavorably by the United States' State Department. Washington had refused to share with France, or its major allies, nuclear secrets which were in the possession of the Soviet Union and which had been given to Britain,^^ under the McMahon Act. France resented this as well as being left out of the disarmament talks before she got a national nuclear force. Now, we can see that France, at first a weak member, with other interests abroad, sought only equality in the decision-making structure of NATO to help her protect her other communities as well as herself. Each time she was denied or rejected. France, then, found herself having to formulate a go-along policy to protect her national interests more adequately. Thus, as I stated before, the U. S. being a strong member of this alliance, dictated policy that tended to be solely in her interest most of the time and reduced the other allies to second-rate members. Also being a member of several global defense systems the U. S. needed only to adopt a policy which suited her interest in that particular defense system and cover the other portions of her interest in her other defense systems. On the contrary, the second-rate members being unable economically, politically and militarily to join other global defense systems to cover their national interest adequately tried to do this in one alliance, in which they didn't even have equality. Therefore, a situational condition arose, as soon as those members of the Alliance were able to gain equality (i.e., by strengthening them- selves politically, economically, and militarily) they endeavored to pursue policies that were in the favor of their national interests. They were no longer willing, nor in a position to have policies dictated to them. France is a leading example, while Portugal and Spain are, too, but to a lesser degree, because they have not yet gained equality, Portuguese policies began to shift after the Goa and the Santa Maria incident.^^ However, no other example will show this better than our forth- coming discussion of NATO's approach to multilateral control of nuclear weapons. The previous discussion of the nature of the alliance itself was to provide some background so as to make the coming discussion more meaningful. While the major military problem confronting the West in the nuclear field is ensuring the capacity to retaliate immediately and effectively in the event of a surprise attack, the greatest political problem for the alliance is undoubtedly the political control of nuclear weapons.'*'' The development of nuclear policy within NATO has evolved out of the interaction of the status quo tendency of United States preferences and the revisionist pressures emanating from Europe specifically from London, Paris, and Bonn. Until the end of 1960, 38Lowenstein, op. cit., p. 191. 39Sydney Gruson, "Our Policies Bother Allies," New York Times, February 25, 1962. toFrederick Muliey, "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control or Consultation," Orbis, VIII (Spring, 1964), p. 21-36. 83 the question of the role of nuclear weapons and control over their use within the alliance had been deliberately evaded. However, no deci- sions were taken except to study the problem for the next meeting of the Council in May, 1961. Prior to 1961, the United States retained exclusive control of the nuclear weapons in NATO. American policy concerning nuclear weapons has clearly dominated the development of NATO strategy since 1949. That policy has had a quality of ambivalence, growing out of competing operational priorities and interests, all of which have been firmly based in the domestic political environment.''^^ These policies reflect continuing tension between the U. S. to retain exclusive control of these weapons and the desire of European governments to participate in this control or to deploy their own nuclear forces.*^ This process of interaction has carried NATO policy away from the Ameri- can unilateral control system, through a stage of "nuclear sharing," "NATO nuclear force by co-ordination of national forces already in existence," and finally to the creation of a "multilateral force."*^ Attention is now directed toward the implementation of this multilateral force, but this raises immensely more difficult questions. This con- tinuing controversy over nuclear control is a reflection of the vast changes in the international environment since 1949, most notably the resurgence of the nations of Western Europe, and the alliance itself. United States nuclear policy has been necessarily modified, reflecting the growth of Europe's strength and the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In this frame of reference, three definable policies can be identified among the issue of nuclear weapons control. The first policy: Ameri- can unilateral control ranged from 1949 into a period extending through the Korean war. NATO then operated in the framework of an American nuclear dominance that could hardly be challenged. The American nuclear monopoly, shortly after this period, was ended by the Soviets, and Britain became the third nuclear power in 1952.** In any event, the Europe of that era was in no position to demand a share in United States' nuclear strength as a price for alliance. Enfeebled by the war and virtually stripped of its military strength, Western Europe was too dependent on the United States for its economic recovery and defense, to contest seriously the United States' monopoly of control. Britain was striving in these years to effect a change of policy in the direction of the early wartime arrangements for atomic energy.*^ The second policy: Nuclear sharing and bilateral controls began in 1953, after the Eisenhower Administration came into power. The United States looked out upon a vastly changed situation in nuclear weapons and international security. Britain had the bomb; the Soviet Union, no longer ruled by Stalin, was amassing formidable military "i^Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 72. 43Birrenbach, op. cit., p. 11. 44Ronald Clark, The Birth of the Bomb (London: Phoenix Hours, 1961), 45/6i(/. 84 power, and the United States had successfully tested the Hydrogen Bomb. Washington then advanced a new look in defense policy which relied on "quality" atomic weapons rather than on "quantity" conventional forces as the mainstay of Western security. This idea was welcomed by European governments because they could not fulfill the ninety -division objective set forth at the 1952 NATO conference in Lisbon. For NATO, the new look meant direct dependence on nuclear weapons, at least of the tactical variety, not only for deterrence of aggression but also in planning for actual defense against attack. Nuclear sharing meant to the U. S. sharing of certain kinds of information, not control of weapons, and this with reference to tactical systems, not the strategic deterrent forces. This certainly did not suffice to terminate the pressures on Washington by its European allies to share in control of these weapons. This pressure finally prompted Secretary of State Dulles to announce in the summer of 1957 plans for establishing nuclear-arms stockpiles in Europe for use by NATO armies and for the sale of intermediate range missiles to Britain.'^^ The President personally pointed out that such a stockpile arrangement ought to make it unnecessary for others to manufacture nuclear weap- ons,*'' but Paris and London saw it differently. The dawn of the missile age, symbolized by the sputnik in the fall of 1957, caused another round of debate over control within NATO. The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called into question the credibility of the United States' deterrent for the protection of Euro- peans who voiced acute concern that their dependency on the United States' nuclear monopoly might constitute what was termed "annihila- tion without representation." Another fear was the fact that the American nuclear weapons might not be used at all since the cities of North America would be the targets of Soviet retaliation.'*^ President Eisenhower personally attended the NATO meeting in Paris at the end of 1957 to reassure the allies in the postsputnik crisis that America would come to their defense. He declared that "national self-sufficiency" was out of date, and he pushed for a broader type of nuclear sharing and for a system of bilateral controls within NATO as a new form of interdependency responsive to the new dangers of the missile era. In addition, the stockpile idea was followed through, with the nuclear warheads under United States' custody but the weapons were deployed also in accordance with NATO joint planning."*^ Britain agreed to the IRBM offer, and their missiles were placed there under a "two-key" system under which the United States and British authorization were both required to join the warhead to the missile and fire it. Jupiter IRBM's were accepted by Italy and Turkey, but France refused to accept such weapons unless they were under French 46Jack Raymond, The Neiv York Times, July 17, 1957, p. 1. i-'Ibid., July 18, 1957, p. 4. *8Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1962), p. 220-221. i9The New York Times, December 17, 1957, p. 12. 85 control.'''' Also the 1958 atomic-energy legislation of the U. S. did permit broadened sharing of information and also some sharing of materials, but all subject to stipulation of such a nature that Britain, already an established nuclear power, was the only nation that could derive important benefits. Washington's theory behind this was that "an artillery man does not need to know the formula for gunpowder or how to make it in order to use an artillery shell effectively,"^^ but this concept did not satisfy Paris. The De Gaulle government pressed for- ward with its own nuclear plans and in February of 1960 exploded its first nuclear device.^^ The third policy: A NATO force by assigiunent and coordination or a multilateral deterrent (an amalgamated nuclear force) to which two or more nations contribute components and in which the weapons systems are placed under joint planning and operational control. The French bomb, and related actions and pronouncements of the French government, crystallized growing fears that nuclear proliferation^^ threatened the unity of the alliance and the realization that "sharing" could not deal with the problem. Finally, numerous proposals for NATO began to appear. General Lauris Norstad, NATO's military chief, called for the establishment of NATO as a fourth nuclear power. ^* At the NATO Council meeting in December of 1960, the United States advanced another proposition. Secretary of State Herter told the NATO Council that the United States would supply a force of five submarines to NATO by the end of 1963 if the European govern- ments would work out an accord on the political control of the force and themselves arrange a contribution of one-hundred medium-range missiles to the force as a second component.^^ Herter spoke of the idea as a "concept," the British called it an "offer," and the Germans said it was a "proposal."'''^ However, the French continued to improve their nuclear capability as they became progressively stronger eco- nomically and politically. With the advent of the Berlin Crisis, the Kennedy administration had to deal very early with the problems of European defense. At Ottawa, in May of 1962, President Kennedy gave some concrete form to the idea advanced by Robert Bowie of Harvard and Christian Herter. Kennedy announced that the U. S. would assign to NATO's command a force of five nuclear submarines. The President also announced that the United States would give careful consideration to a "NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and soOsgood, op. cit., p. 221-223. 5lU. S., Congress, Joint Commission on Atomic Energy', 86th Cong., 1st Session. 1959, p. 91. 52Bertrand Goldschmidt, "The French Atomic Energy Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XVIII (Sept. -Oct. 1962), p. 39-42, 46-48. 53 Albert Wohlstetter, "Nuclear Sharing: NATO and the N+1 Country," Foreign Affairs, April, 1961. 54Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, Dec. 20, 1960. 55Jack Raymond, The New York Times, Oct. 13, 1969, p. 1. 56Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, December 20, 1960, p. 2. 86 control."^' As a result of the Kennedy-Macmillan agreements at Nassau late in 1962 and the policies voted by the NATO Council at Ottawa in May of 1963, the concept of the NATO force had begun to take definite form. The Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLFj, a concept calling for a joint NATO fleet of 25 missile-carrying cargo ships, attempts to give a greater share of nuclear sharing to her allies. The MLF mixed- manning principle and collective ownership have placed great strain on relationships with the allies as well as on the relationship with the Soviet Union. ^^ The continental pressure by the United States upon her allies to accept this MLF idea has presented a critical challenge for NATO. The real origins of the MLF plans were the fears of many Euro- peans that they could not rely on U. S. nuclear weapons to protect them. They believed the U. S. might sacrifice the Continent rather than risk nuclear retaliation against its own soil. Thus, they wanted their own nuclear deterrent, or at least a finger on the trigger of a joint deterrent. The U. S. response was MLM, a device that would offer greater sharing possibilities only. The dispute then between France, on one hand, and the U. S., West Gei-many and Britain on the other hand, over the mixed-manned nuclear force, proposed by Wash- ington is not about ownership but about control and the major weak- ness of the MLF approach stems from confusing the question of physical possession of nuclear weapons ^vith the question of control over their use. This distinction is clearly recognized in the existing national nuclear forces by procedures to ensure that it is the political head of government and not the military commanders who exercises control. Surely it cannot be intended to breach this vital principal of political control in the MLF. Thus part ownership of the "hardware" will not confer any participation in control, and conversely, it is possible to have a share in control without any ownership of the actual missiles. So far, both the nuclear weapons and the nuclear strategy of NATO have been almost exclusively provided by the United States with minor participation of the United Kingdom.^^ Now the other members of NATO, especially France, want to participate in formulating defense policy, because in World War II, France found herself defending the continent alone while the British Bomber command stayed at home. This is not the sole reason, but it is a major one: fear of abandonment in a crisis situation. Someone may refuse to act. The prime purpose of the MLF is to head off the possibility the Federal Republic of Germany might seek to acquire her own nuclear weapons or might be tempted to take part in a joint France-German "Hanson W. Baldwin, The New York Times, May 12, 1962, p. 8. ssZbigniew Brzezinaki, "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence," Foreign Affairs, XLIII (Oct. 1964), p. 126. 59Wallace Magathan, Jr., "Western German Defense Policy, Orbis VlII (Summer, 1964) , p. 292-301. 87 force.'' It is further aimed at isolating President De Gaulle within Europe. It is only secondarily concerned with avoiding the dangers of nuclear proliferation and does not address itself to the general issue of control of all nuclear weapons within the Alliance. The major defect of the MLF is its failure to resolve the problem of control of nuclear weapons, which is the core of all the nuclear difficulties within NATO. There is still no indication of how the command system of the MLF itself will be organized and there is a strong probability that, if the force is ever created, disputation about its control will intensify instead of reduce the friction within the Alliance. Even if an agreed and satisfactory control system can be evolved for the MLF, this will not greatly assist in the development of a control system for the other nationally commanded nuclear forces which comprise the vast majority of NATO nuclear weapons. The crucial issue is whether the U. S. could block the use of the MLF in any crisis, and still remain free to use its own nuclear arsenal.^^ Therefore, a nation which has its entire nuclear force in the MLF would be severely hurt in a crisis situation. No wonder De Gaulle had described the entire device as an ingenious plan for assuring American nuclear control. ^^ Therefore, the multilateral concept seems either to entail a built-in series of vetoes by participating governments, which would make it of dubious military value, or to require the renunciation of the power to choose between war and peace on the part of some or all of the participants.^^ At the moment of this writing the principle of political control exercised by the alliance as a whole over the nuclear retaliatory forces has not been agreed upon, let alone the practical problems of "who, how, and when" involved in drawing up the machinery of such control. Hence, my conclusion is that the crisis within the alliance is a situational thing and not one of personality. My conclusion is based on the fact that the countries of Europe have now regained their stability and want some voice in the policies that affect their national interests. Bibliography PUBLIC DOCUMENTS North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D. C, April 4, 1949. NATO: Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris Text of Statements, December. 1957 Department of State Publication No. 6606. U. S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing . . . To Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 86th Cong., 1st Session. 1959. fiORonald Steel, "In Place of NATO," New Republic Vol. 151 (November 14, 1964) , p. 20. (>Ubid. 62Steel, op. cit., p. 20. GSKlaus Knorr, A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem of Management, Policy Memorandum 26 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, 1963). 88 BOOKS Bauman, Carol E. Political Cooperation in NATO. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1960. Birrenbach, Kurt. The Future of the Atlantic Community. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Buchan, Alastair. NATO in the 1960's. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. . Arms and StabiUtv in Europe. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Claude, Jr., Inis L. Power & International Relations. New York: Random House, 1964. Clark, Robert. The Birth of the Bomb. London: Phoenix House, 1961. Coker, Francis W. "Sovereignty," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 11th Printing, New York : Macmillan, 1954. Hart, B. H. L. Deterrent or Defense. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960. Jensen, Merrill. The Neiu Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1950. Knor, Klaus. A NATO Nuclear Force: The Problem of Management. Princeton: Center of International Studies. 1963. Lowenstein, Hubertus. NATO and the Defense of the West. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Moore, Ben T. NATO and the Future of Europe. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Osgood, Robert. NATO The Entangling Alliance. Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1962. Strange, Susan. "Strains on NATO," The Yearbook of World Affairs 1956. London: Institute of World Affairs. 1956. Strausz-Hupe, Robert, et al. Building the Atlantic World. New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1963. Vandenberg, Arthur. The PRIVATE Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. Wolfers, Arnold (ed). Alliance Policy in the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hop- kins University Press, 1959. ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS Baldwin, Hanson W. The New York Times, December 20, 1960. _^ The New York Times, May 12, 1962. Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence," Foreign Affairs XLIII (October, 1964), p. 126. Growth er, Geoffrey. "Reconstruction of an Alliance," Foreign Affairs (January, 1957). pp. 180-181. Fumiss, Jr., Edgar S. "De Gaulle's France and NATO: An Interpretation," International Organization XVI (Summer, 1961), pp. 349-365. Goldschmidt, Bertrand. "The French Atomic Energy Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists XVIII (Sept. & Oet., 1962), pp. 39-42, 46-48. Gruson, Sidney. "Our Policies Bother Allies," The New York Times, February 25. 1962. Hartley, Livingston. "Atlantic Partnership How?" Orbis VIII (Spring, 1964), p. 141. Kissinger, Henry. "Coalition Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age," The Atlantic Com- munity II (Fall. 1964), p. 431. 'The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," Foreign Affairs XLI (July. 1962) . 89 Lawson, Ruth. "Concerning Policies in the North Atlantic Community," Inter- national Organization XII (Spring, 1958), p. 164. Magathan, Jr., Wallace. "Western German Defense Policy," Or bis VIII (Summer, 1964) , pp. 292-301. Miksche, F. 0. "The Nuclear Deterrent and Western Strategy," Orbis VIII (Summer, 1964) , p. 231. MuUey, Frederick. "NATO's Nuclear Problems: Control or Consultation" VIII (Spring, 1964) , pp. 21-36. New York Times, July 17, 1957. ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS Pleven, Rene. "France in the Atlantic Community," Foreign Affairs XXXVIII (October, 1959), p. 22. Raymond, Jack. The New York Times, July 17, 1957. _ . The New York Times, October 13, 1960. Sommer, Theo. "For an Atlantic Future," Foreign Affairs XLIII (October, 1964), p. 113. Steel, Ronald. "In Place of NATO," New Republic, vol. 151 (November 14, 1964), p. 20. Wohlstetter, Albert. "Nuclear Sharing: NATO & the N+1 Clountry," Foreign Affairs (April, 1961). REPORTS NATO, The First Five Years: 1949-1954, Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion, 1955. 90 Machiavelli's Theory of Religion By Dr. Hanes Walton, Jr. The name Machiavelli over the centuries has been associated with evih "Machiavellism" generally implies deceit and self-interested wrongdoing, but the man Machiavelli was an exti-emely patriotic citizen whose intentions were honorable. In large measure his theories re- flected the times in which he lived. At the time, Italy was experiencing a period of decadence. To this end, Machiavelli's advice to rulers on how to obtain power and to retain it fitted the character of the times. Machiavelli felt any means ought to be employed to preserve the State because these means were forced on the ruler by necessity. It seems worthwhile, therefore, to ascertain what Machiavelli's thoughts were as to religion. This research was facilitated by the many indications as to his attitude toward religion which are scattered throughout his writings, particularly The Prince and The Discourses. Statement of the theories. Machiavelli's theories with respect to religion were intimately linked to his idea of raison d'etre de Fetas: He advocated the use of a national religion for State purposes and the choice of religion not for its supernatural validity, but for its power as a myth in unifying the masses and cementing their morale.^ The history of the idea of raison d'etre de I'etas in the modern world begins with Machiavelli, a heathen, a man to whom the fear of hell was unknovvn, and who could set about his work of analysing the essence of raison d'etas with all the naivete of the ancient Avorld.- Religion as a means of social control. Firstly, Machiavelli subordi- nated religion, as such, to the State. Religion became one more means of social control. Its importance lay in its ability to reinforce the political authority of the State. . . . for there are many good laws, the importance of which is known to the sagacious lawgiver, but the reasons for which are not sufficiently evident to enable him to persuade others to submit to them; and therefore do wise men for the purpose of removing this difficulty, resort to divine authority.^ Machiavelli's thesis was that neglect of divine worship would lead to the ruination of the State. There is no surer prognostic of impending ruin in any State than to see divine worship neglected or despised . . . The reli- gion of all nations is founded upon some principles . . . All rulers and commonwealths ought to have a special regard to 1 Machiavelli: The Prince and The Discourses (New York: Random House, 1940), p. 37. 2Friedricli Meinecke, Machiavellism, trans. Douglas Scott (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) , p. 29. ^Machiavelli, op. cit.. Discourses XI, p. 147. 91 the fundamental principles of the religion of their country, for whilst they are kept inviolate it will be an easy matter to main- tain devotion and consequently good order and union amongst the people.* Machiavelli valued religion to the extent that it assisted in obtaining these ends. Unification and preservation of Italy was his obsession. His whole political w^ay of thought was nothing else but a continual process of thinking about raison d'etat. His system of thought was brought into being by the coinciding (in Italy) of a political collapse with a spiritual and intellectual renaissance.^ Statecraft which existed during Machiavelli's day taught that everything must be considered in terms of its usefulness, all religious and moral limitations notwith- standing. Machiavelli said, "the ruler should use religion to reinforce his authority even if he himself did not believe in it." And therefore everything that tends to favor religion (even though it were believed to be false) should be received and availed of to strengthen it; and this should be done the more, the wiser the rulers are, and the better they understand the natural course of things . . . and their authority afterwards [will give] them credence with the people.*^ Religion as a supernatural force. Machiavelli did not believe in religion as a supernatural force. To Savonarola's claim to revelation from God, Machiavelli said, "Whether this were so I do not take it upon me to pronounce . . . but very many believed him without having any real grounds for their belief."^ Machiavelli did not believe that God directly ordered the affairs of men. He wrote, in "The Golden Ass," as follows: The belief that by kneeling idly upon thy knees thou canst leave all to God has brought many kingdoms and states to ruin . . . Let no man be so senseless as to think that if his house fall he can leave it to God to save him.^ Machiavelli believed in a non-personal, non-interfering Deity. He believed that fortune and not God controlled the fate of mankind. He said mankind w orked out its own salvation under the limits set by the laws of chance, fate, and opportunity, which sometimes undo the efforts of man. We see everyday things happen contrary to all human expecta- tions and that our freewill be not wholly set aside, I think it may be the case that Fortune is the ordained of one-half of our actions.^ ^Ibid., pp. 149-50. sMeinecke, op. cit., p. 29. ^Machiavelli, op. cit., p. 50. 7E. Erskine Muir, Machiavelli and His Times (New York: E. P. Button & Co., Inc., 1936), p. 164. 8"The Golden Ass" cited by D. Erskine Muir, Machiavelli and His Times (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1936), pp. 165-66. Muir, op. cit., p. 166. 92 "Men suffered," Machiavelli said, "because they could not adapt themselves to changes in time and human affairs." Therefore, they had no fortune at one time and bad fortune at another. Religion in the Roman Empire. Machiavelli believed the mainte- nance of religion was one of the reasons for the great successes of the Roman Empire. He thought religion was a binding force that kept alive the loyalties of the people in the community. Machiavelli believed that when religion began to decay in Rome so did the civilization of the empire. Machiavelli' s Critics Machiavelli found two main faults with religion and the Church. Firstly, he blamed the Church for advancing a policy detrimental to Italy. Machiavelli was greatly distressed over the temporal power the Church wielded, and felt that this Avas an obstacle to the unification of Italy. The Popes, at first by virtue of their power to excommunicate and later both by this and force of arms, together with indul- gences, inspired fear and veneration . . . Through the evil example of that Court the country has lost all piety and faith . . . We Italians owe this debt to the Church and the priests, that we have become irreligious and wicked; yet we owe them a greater, which is the cause of our ruin, that is, that the Church has ever kept, and keeps, our country divided.^" The Church was never strong enough to conquer the other four Italian States herself and indeed when her own temporal power was threatened called in "some foreign potentate to defend her."^^ The second indictment Machiavelli leveled against the Church was that it had brought religion to disrepute and religion, he felt, was useful to the State. He was appalled at the low moral level to which the Church had sunk. All his life he had never seen the Papacy occu- pied by one man of even ordinary goodness and decency. ^- At heart Machiavelli was a heathen, although the Christian view did have influence on him. He charged Christianity with having made men humble, unmanly, and feeble. He objected to the principles taught by Christianity because they did not promote his political objectives. Reflecting now as to whence it came that in ancient times the people w ere more devoted to liberty than in the present, I believe that it resulted from this, that men were stronger in those days, which I believe to be attributable to the difference of education, founded upon the difference of their religion and ours. For, as our religion teaches us the truth and the true way of life, it causes us to attach less value to the honors and possessions of this world; whilst the Pagans, esteeming those things as the highest good, were more energetic and ferocious in their actions . . . y^Ibid., p. 160. i^Machiavelli. op. cit., pp. 284-85. 93 Our religion, moreover, places the supreme good in grandeur of soul, strength of body, and all such other qualities as render men formidable; and if our religion claims of us fortitude of soul, it is more to enable us to suffer than to achieve great deeds. ^-^ Machiavelli, therefore, broke with the dualistic and onesidedly spiritual- izing ethic of Christianity, which depreciated the natural impulses of the senses. He strove principally for a new naturalistic ethic which would follow the dictates of nature impartially and resolutely.^* Machiavelli conceived of a "virtu" which included all his real and supreme values. Though ethical qualities were embraced in it, it funda- mentally intended to portray something dynamic, which nature had implanted in man heroism and the strength for great political and warlike achievements and first and foremost, perhaps, strength for the founding and preservation of flourishing states.^'' Machiavelli sepa- rated virtu into two categories one original; the other derivative. He believed that virlu that the founder and ruler of a State had to possess was of a higher order and that the derivative virtu would endure only if rooted in a naturally spirited and unspoiled people. Machiavelli retained the basic Christian distinction between good and evil. However, his virtu existed in a higher moral world of its own. It was the vital source of the State. Machiavelli defined the good in terms of whether the individual acted in the interest of the com- munity as a whole. He believed the State could produce moral good- ness and justice by its own constraining power that men were driven to action by necessity. In the Christian tradition the individual can apply to a higher law than the interest of the community. In his (Machiavelli's) identification of morality with action in the interests of the community especially the community defined in terms of a particular State lies his greatest departure from the Christian tradition.'^' Machiavelli saw a struggle between virtu and fortuna. Virtu fore- stalled bad fortune. Machiavelli said fortuna was malicious and, there- fore virtu also had to be when there was no other way open. According to Meinecke, this expressed quite plainly the real spiritual origin of Machiavellism the infamous doctrine that, in national behavior, even unclean methods are justified when it is a question of Avinning or helping the power which is necessary for the State.^' Virtu, fortuna, and necessita appear repeatedly in Machiavelli's writings. He believed virtu and necessita were related. Virtu was the vital power of men which created and maintained States, giving them meaning and authority. Machiavelli traced morality to necessity. For him, necessity was the force that brought men into the form required by virtu. I'l'Meinecke, op. cit., p. 31. i^Staff of Columbia College (ed.), Chapters in Western Civilization (New York: Columbia University Press. 1954) , pp. 1, 145. i^Meinecke, op. cit., p. 36. 94 Machiavelli believed good and bad times occurred in cycles and that virtu did not exist in the ^\ orld in unlimited supply that is passed around the world continually. Machiavelli believed that only in ancient times did a single nation Rome possess a preponderant supply of virtu. Further, he believed that it was necessary to act in accordance with the morality prevailing in the existing cycle. Machiavelli lived in a bad time. For this reason he believed public order could be achieved only in an atmosphere where the Prince was feared. It was no good longing for the existence of religious and patriotic feelings that could not in the nature of things be attained overnight.^^ Critique Machiavelli was intensely secular. He was not moved by the things that religious dreams are made of. He was a pragmatist, distinguishing between the ideal form of institutions and the pragmatic conditions under which they operate. Machiavelli created a new immorality, but he expressed the ethical consciousness of his time. Attention had shifted from God to man and greater emphasis was placed on temporal security and not eternal salvation. Machiavelli had no belief in a spiritual life and, therefore, he stripped religion of its intrinsic value. Religion became one more technique for consolidating power in the State. He felt the State was capable of generating such morality as was necessary to promote its political ends. Machiavelli did not believe that man was destined for a supernatural end and his actions, therefore, could not be judged in terms of the divine or natural law. Mankind had to be driven into action even to eat when hungry according to Machiavelli. Deeds of courage and bravery as taught by paganism were preferred by Machiavelli, and particularly as existed during the Roman Empire. He denounced Christian virtues love, gentleness, and suffering as sources of weakness in the State. Moreover, Christianity placed its importance on and advocated that its followers live their lives in preparation for life after death. Machiavelli was interested in this world, and particularly in restoring order to Italy. Machiavelli was extremely nationalistic and extreme nationalism does not, or cannot, strive on such virtues. The only values that matter are greatness, power, and fame. This was especially so during the time in which Machiavelli lived and wrote. He himself said that his advice to rulers fitted the character of the times. From a practical standpoint, when there is interaction between religious morality on the one hand and political necessity on the other, it is more likely that a happy medium will be struck and excess in either direction avoided. However, in formulating his theories, Machiavelli let himself become too influenced by his own life and his own misfortunes. Morality created by the State's constraining power, in the long run, might tend to diminish democratic freedoms. Law in itself does not make men good. Over the long run, public conscience is more effective than any number of laws. 95 Machiavelli erred in failing to see religion as personal and indi- vidualistic and, as such, ineffective as a tool of social control. It is an intangible force motivated from within. Religion cannot be success- fully legislated. Each man is as religious as suits his own needs. Christianity recognizes a higher law than the State and, to the writer, it offers mankind a sustaining force when all else fails. For those believers who are chosen, there is always the good life awaiting them in heaven. This was certainly not true of paganism. Machiavelli divorced politics from metaphysics and ethics, laying the basis for Realpolitik. He had no sympathy for humanity. His theories would leave mankind entirely without spiritual solace, alone in a godless world of nature with only the power that nature provided. This is barbaric, for then man would be in a constant struggle with the same nature from whence his powers were derived. Modern culture has operated under a dualism since Machiavelli. On the one hand are absolute values and on the other relative values. This dualism created by Machiavelli contained its own conflict. Morality was necessary for the existence of the State as Machiavelli conceived it and at the same time morality could be dispensed with whenever national self-preservation required it. It should be noted that ideals and ethics are important in politics as norms, not techniques. A successful statesman must keep abreast of public opinion, he must compromise, and he must make concessions. Religious reformers come into play in bringing public morale closer to an ethical norm. Bibliography Butterfield, Herbert. The Statecraft of Machiavelli. London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1955. Catlin, George. The Story of Political Philosophers. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939. Cliabod, Ferderico. Machiavelli and the Renaissance. Cambridge: Harvard Uni- versity Press, 1958. Gilbert, Allan (trans.) : Niccolo Machiavelli. Durham: Duke Uni- versity Press, 1965. Hale, John Rigby. Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy. New York: Macmillan Co., 1960. Jensen, DeLamar. Machiavelli: Cynic, Patriot or Political Scientist. Boston: Heath Co., 1960. Meinecke, Friedrich. Machiavellism. Trans. Douglas Scott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. Lerner, Max (intro.). Machiavelli: The Prince and the Discourses. New York: Random House, 1940. Muir, D. Erskine. Machiavelli and His Times. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1936. Staff of Columbia College (ed.). Chapters in JFestern Civilization. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press. 1954. 96 p jik-. '^mlt ^