OPINIONS of THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JUNE 15, 1965-DECEMBER 31, 1966 ARTHUR K. BOLTON ATTORNEY GENERAL ATLANTA THE HARRISON COMPANY PUBLISHERS TABLE OF CONTENTS OPINIONS, JUNE 15, 1965-DECEMBER 31, 1965 . . . . 1 OPINIONS, JANUARY 1, 1966-DECEMBER 31, 1966 . . 185 TABLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .541 TABLE OF GEORGIA LAWS CITED . . . . . . ~ . . . . . 543 TABLE OF GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS CITED .. 553 INDEX . . . 571 ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF GEORGIA HENRY P. FARRER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1868-1872 N.J. HAMMOND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1872-1877 ROBERT N. ELY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1877-1880 CLIFFORD L. ANDERSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1880-1890 GEORGE N. LESTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1890-1891 W. A. LITTLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1891-1892 J. M. TERRELL . . . . . . . .1892-1902 BOYKIN WRIGHT . . . . . .1902-1902 JOHN C. HART . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1902-1910 HEWLETT A. HALL t .... . 1910-1911 THOMAS S. FELDER .... . 1911-1914 WARREN GRICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1914-1915 CLIFFORD WALKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1915-1920 R. A. DENNY . . . . . . 1920-1921 GEORGE M. NAP! ER . 1921-1932 LAWRENCE S. CAMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1932-1932 M. J. YEOMANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1933-1939 ELLIS G. ARNALL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1939-1943 GRADY HEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1943-1945 EUGENE COOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1945-1965 ARTHUR K. BOLTON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1965- Ill ARTHUR K. BOLTON The Attorney General OPINIONS of THE ATTORNEY GENERAL June 15, 1965-December 31, 1966 OPINION 65-1 (Unofficial) July 1, 1965 You ask who, other than a justice of the peace and an ex officio justice of the peace, has the authority to issue a criminal warrant for the State of Georgia. Any judge of a superior court, city or county court, or any justice of the peace, or any municipal officer clothed by law with power of a justice of the peace, may issue a warrant for the arrest of any offender against the penal laws. The clerk of any such official has no authority to issue a warrant in the absence of express statutory authority to do so; but a clerk, or even a deputy clerk, may issue a warrant when the power for him to do so is specifically granted by statute. It therefore appears that in order to ascertain the officials who possess this authority in your area, one must resort to special legislation passed by the General Assembly relevant to your particular locale. OPINION 65-2 July 6, 1965 Recently you have requested an official opinion as to whether or not Greene County andjor the Greene County Board of Education may be entitled to receive funds in lieu of taxes from income derived from the sale of timber <1nd pulpwood on certain property in Greene County. I have determined that Greene County is not entitled to receive such funds. The tract of land in question was conveyed on December 21, 1933, by J. D. Watson to the Regents of the University System of Georgia. The Constitution of the State of Georgia provides, in Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV, that the General Assembly of Georgia may by law exempt all public property from taxation. In Ga. Laws 1946, p. 12, as amended, the General Assembly did in fact exempt all public property from taxation. As the property held by the Regents of the University System of Georgia is public property, it is clear that Greene County and/ or the Greene County Board of Education is not entitled to receive taxes on the property in question. Therefore, that county could not be entitled to a percentage of the income 2 derived from the sale of timber and pulpwood from such lands in lieu of taxes. It is true that certain other counties receive a portion of the proceeds from the sale of timber on land owned by the Regents of the University System of Georgia. Some years ago, the United States Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to acquire certain submarginal lands on behalf of the Federal Government. These lands were purchased under the Bankhead-Janes Farm Tenant Act, 7 U. S. Code, 1000. Under the Bankhead-Janes Farm Tenant Act, the Secretary of Agriculture paid 25% of net revenues from such acquired lands to the counties in which the lands were located. 7 U.S. Code, 1012. In 1954, land which had been acquired under the Bankhead-Janes Farm Tenant Act in Putnam and Morgan Counties was conveyed by the United States of America to the Regents of the University System of Georgia by deed. In 1960, in accordance with this then existing policy, the Regents of the University System of Georgia entered into contracts with counties wherein lands originally acquired by the United States under the Bankhead-lones Farm Tenant Act were located. These contracts provided that the Regents of the University System of Georgia would pay 25% of the gross income from the sale of timber and timber products on these lands to the counties involved, and the counties in turn would agree to furnish fire and police protection and such other public improvements as might be deemed in the best interest of the county. To my knowledge, the Regents has never entered into such a contract except in connection with lands acquired under the Bankhead-lones Farm Tenant Act. Therefore, it is my opinion that Greene County and/or the Greene County l3oard of Education is not entitled to receive funds from the sale of timber products on lands owned by the Regents of the University System of Georgia located in Greene County. OPINION 65-3 July 6, 1965 You ask whether a county board of education may lawfully pay a rebate from funds collected for the operation of the county schools to the county tax commissioner to help defray his tax collection expenses. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: 3 OPINION In my opinion it would be illegal for a county school board to expend school funds to help defray the tax collection expenses of the county tax commissioner. DISCUSSION It is axiomatic that the powers of public officers and boards are limited to those defined by law, Ga. Code Ann. 89-903, with this limitation being particularly applicable to the disbursement of public funds. See e.g. Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 418 (1950); Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142 (1) (1933). While Ga. Code Ann. 32-1118 does provide that the county board of education shall annually recommend to the fiscal authority of the county the rate of levy for school purposes, I am unaware of any authorization for a rebate by the board of education to the Tax Commissioner to cover any portion of the expenses of tax collection. To the contrary, Ga. Code Ann. 32-942 expressly provides in part: "When said common school fund shall be received and receipted for, it shall be the duty of the officers authorized by law to receive such fund and keep the same separate and distinct from other funds, and said funds shall be used for educational purposes and none other ...." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the illegality of an expenditure of school funds for tax collection rather than school purposes would appear to be clear even in the absence of the foregoing statutory provision, the reason being that the prohibition of the use of school funds for non-school purposes reaches not only statutory but also constitutional heights as well. Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945, Ga. Code Ann. 2-570 I, enumerates the purposes for which the General Assembly may authorize county taxation, with "educational purposes" being one of such specifically authorized purposes and "the expenses of administration of the county government" another. It is well settled that funds derived from a county tax which is levied for one specific purpose (e.g. educational or school purposes) may not be used for any of the other enumerated purposes. See e.g. Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae, 174 Ga. 591, 594 (3) (1932); Burke v. Wheeler County, 54 Ga. App. 81, 85 (1936); Op. Att'y Gen. 196061, pp. 168, 170. I, therefore, conclude that a county school board 4 cannot lawfully pay a rebate to the county tax commissioner to help him defray b.is tax collection expenses. Accord, Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59, p. 128. It goes without saying, of course, that this constitutional requirement respecting the expenditure of public school funds would prevail over any local statute (but not a subsequent local constitutional amendment) to the contrary. OPINION 65-4 July 7, 1965 The instant opinion deals solely with the question of whether or not the State Board of Education can lawfully administer a "state plan" submitted to the U. S. Commissioner of Education pursuant to Title II of the "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965," in view of the fact that Title II of this new Act contemplates programs which would provide school library resources, textbooks and other printed instructional materials for the use of students and teachers in private as well as public schools. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION It is my opinion that so long as Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 is wholly financed by the Federal Government and no State matching funds are involved, the State Board of Education may lawfully administer a State plan adopted under this title of the Act even though it contemplates the providing of school library resources, textbooks and other printed instructional materials for the use of students and teachers in private as well as public schools. DISCUSSION The "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965," Pub. L. No. 89-10, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. (April 11, 1965) (79 Stat. 27) provides for Federal grants to the States: "for the acquisition of school library resources, textbooks, and other printed and published instructional materials for the use of children and teachers in public and private elementary and secondary schools." See Sec. 201. (Emphasis added.) 1t is important to note at the outset that although Title II does contemplate the use of the specified printed material by teachers and students in private schools, it also expressly provides that title 5 to such material shall vest only in a public agency (e.g. a state board of education), see Sec. 205. It is also significant that the title permits federal financing of a state plan in its entirety (covering administrative as well as operational expenses), see Sec. 203 (a) (2). Thus, it appears that the administration of a Title II state plan by the State Board of Education would require neither an expenditure of state funds nor a grant of title to any property which the State Board may acquire with the use of federal funds. Looking then to the question of whether or not the fact that the state plan will permit children and teachers in private schools to "use" the printed and published materials specified in Title I I might run afoul some provision of state law, I am aware of but three constitutional provisions which might conceivably be considered to be relevant. The first of these constitutional provisions (and I am unaware of any statutory prohibitions which would appear to be involved) is Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-114), which provides: "No money shall ever be taken from the public Treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religionists, or of any sectarian institution." While I am of the opinion that this provision might well present a serious problem if any State matching funds w~re involved in the Title II assistance to students and teachers of parochial schools, 1 it would seem that the absence of any disbursement of state funds causes the provision to be clearly inapplicable. The next constitutional provision worthy of mention would seem to be Art. VI I, Sec. I, Par. I I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402), the relevant portion of which declares: "The General Assembly shall not by vote, resolution, or order grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation or association. . . ." I. Compare this provision with the 1958 amendment of Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. I I (7) which gives the State Government, Departments and agencies authority to disburse State funds to match Federal funds for certain specified scholarships "and for use in other Federal education programs." 6 In my opinion, this provision is inapplicable because of the fact that to the extent a "donation" or "gratuity"is involved, it is by a vote of the United States Congress and not a vote, resolution or order of the General Assembly. The last constitutional provision which might be mentioned in the matter is Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5604), which states: "The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned to any individual, company, corporation or association and the State shall not become a joint owner or stockholder in or with any individual, company, association or corporation." Even more clearly than the two previously mentioned constitutional provisions, this language does not apply to the instant situation. There is, of course, no involvement of any pledge of credit by the State, \}nd, inasmuch as Title II expressly requires that "title" to the materials purchased with federal funds shall vest in a public agency [which in this State would presumably be the State Board of Education] no question of the prohibited "joint ownership" would be presented. In view of the fact that the foregoing constitutional provisions are the only legal provisions of the State of Georgia that I am aware of which might even remotely be argued to be prohibitive of that part of Title II which relates to the use of the specified educational materials by students and teachers in private schools, and, in view of the fact that for the reasons already stated I believe that none of these three provisions would be held to prohibit such use, it follows that I am of the opinion that the State Board of Education of the State of Georgia may lawfully administer a state plan under Title II even though such plan contemplates the use of the educational materials provided thereunder by students and teachers in private elementary and secondary schools. OPINION 65-5 (Unofficial) July 8, 1965 In your letter you state that under the authority of an Act of the 1965 Legislature creating fire districts in Thomas County and providing for the levy of a tax for the purpose of providing fire protection for these districts, certain of the fire districts voted 7 overwhelmingly in favor of fire protection. Then you raise the question: " . . . can Thomas County now levy a tax for this fire protection in 1965, our tax levying date being the second Tuesday in September, or must we wait until 1966 to levy any tax?" Upon the approval of the voters of the respective fire districts for fire protection, as provided by said Act, Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2680, the Commissioners of Roads and Revenue of Thomas County are thereby empowered by the same Act to furnish fire protection for each fire district approving same and to levy a tax on the taxable property in each such district not to exceed twelve (12) mills for the purpose of providing such protection. I have no knowledge of any provision in the Georgia law that would require that each such district wait until 1966 to obtain the protection that it is entitled to now, or that would require the Commissioners of Roads and Revenue to wait until 1966 to levy a tax to provide such protection. OPINION 65-6 (Unofficial) July 12, 1965 You ask my opmwn on whether or not bond money may be expended by Cobb County for sidewalks, building maintenance, etc., under the provisions of following local constitutional amendment ratified in 1964: "The governing authority of Cobb County is authorized to expend any funds of the county available to them for the purpose of constructing, extending, repairing and maintaining sidewalks outside the limits of any incorporated municipality within the county." (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 416). It is the general law of this State that bond money may be expended only for the purposes for which the bonds were issued. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85 (1954); Wheeler v. Trustees of Fargo School District, 200 Ga. 323 (1946); Marks v. Richmond County, 165 Ga. 316 (1927). In Touchton v. Echols County, supra, at page 88, the court stated: "This court has long required strict adherence in the application of bond funds to the purposes for which they were voted." 8 In Wheeler v. Trustees of Fargo School District, supra, at page 336, the court stated: "The approval of these bonds by the electors and validation according to statute created a status analogous to a contractual relation between such electors and the State, which could not be destroyed or impaired by a subsequent statute or constitutional provision." The foregoing would appear to indicate that the aforesaid recent local amendment does not authorize the expenditure by Cobb county for the purposes stated in said amendment of monies obtained from the sale of bonds authorized for other purposes. Although the local amendment quoted above, in amending Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701) authorizes the governing authority of the county only to expend any funds of the county available to them for the purposes quoted therein, the natural assumption is that since the amendment was made to the provisions of the Georgia Constitution specifying the purposes for which the General Assembly is empowered to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax, that said local amendment would authorize the governing authority of Cobb County to levy a tax for the purposes for which said amendment authorizes said governing authority to expend county money. On the basis of this assumption, it would appear that the only bond money that the governing authority of Cobb County could expend under the provisions of said local amendment would be money obtained from the sale of bonds for the purpose of constructing, extending, repairing and maintaining sidewalks as stated in said amendment, provision for the retirement of said bonds by a tax levy having been made as provided by law. OPINION 65-7 (Unofficial) July 14, 1965 This will acknowledge receipt of your letter requesting an opinion as to whether, in view of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43 (1965), the Act of 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 42) providing a supplement for the court reporter of the South Georgia Judicial Circuit, is unconstitutional. 9 The 1965 Act referred to, passed as a General Act without having been advertised, amends the Act of 1964 (Ga. Laws 1964, Ex. Sess., p. 220), renaming the Albany Judicial Circuit as the "South Georgia Judicial Circuit," so as to add a Section 2A., which declares that the court reporter of that circuit shall receive, in addition to any fees or other compensation or emoluments now received by him, a supplement in the amount of $255.00 per month, to be allocated between the five counties in the circuit according to a prescribed schedule. In the Fleming case, an Act of 1964 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 361), creating the office of assistant soliCitor general of the Coweta Judicial Circuit, and fixing his compensation at a prescribed amount to be allocated between the several counties in the circuit as therein provided, was declared unconstitutional on the reasoning that it was a "local" or "special" Act, and had not been advertised as required by the Constitution, Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XV, (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1915). In its decision, the Supreme Court declared: " . . . Neither the Constitution nor a general law affecting the office of solicitor general in all judicial circuits in the state makes any provision for the appointment or election of an assistant solicitor general. " . . . In our opinion these two Acts are local or special laws, and being passed not in conformity with the above stated constitutional provisions, they are null and void. One of the main purposes of this constitutional provision was to prevent local and special laws which affected only a particular locality, such as a county or municipality, from becoming laws unless notice of intention to introduce such bills be given during a specified time preceding their introduction in the General Assembly by newspaper advertisement published in the locality affected, the object being to prevent duties and obligations being opposed on local governments without giving those in charge of such governments an opportunity to oppose their passage. The Act of 1964, as amended, provides that the Assistant Solicitor General of the Coweta Judicial Circuit shall receive as compensation for his services a salary of .$400.00 per month to be paid at the rate of $87.50 per month for four of the counties and $50.00 per month for the 10 remaining county in the circuit. The acts in question affect only these counties. They are local and special acts." The Fleming case comes as somewhat of a surprise in view of prior Supreme Court decisions which indicated that Acts dealing with the superior courts were general in nature. See Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307 (1910); Geer v. Bush, 146 Ga. 701 (1917); Geer v. Colquitt Hardware & Furniture Co., 146 Ga. 811 (1917); Long v. State, 160 Ga. 292 (1925); and Norris v. McDaniel, 207 Ga. 232 (1950). However, this office has always entertained some doubts on the subject, and on December 4, 1953, a memorandum was distributed which concluded that as a precautionary measure, any such ~aw-particularly those fixing compensation for officers from county funds-should be advertised as local legislation. Whichever may have been assumed as to the law in the past, however, the Fleming case has now made it clear that as regards salary matters, such laws are special in nature. I, therefore, am of the opinion that the Act of 1965 referred to in your request is unconstitutional. Just as the laws struck down in the Fleming case, the law in question affects only an enumerated list of counties, and each of these is affected differently from the others in the group. General law provides that the court reporters shall receive a per diem paid by the county, Ga. Code Ann. 24-3104, and a contingent expense and travel allowance paid by the State. Ga. Code Ann. 24-3107. The Act in question makes a different and additional provision for the South Georgia Judicial Circuit, which tends only to emphasize the "special" or "local" nature of this Act. Moreover, the effect is to add additional "duties and obligations" on these counties, as referred to in the Fleming case. OPINION 65-8 July 14, 1965 You ask whether the rules and regulations which have been promulgated by the State Department of Family and Children Services in connection with its public assistance programs must be filed with the Secretary of State under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338-56). You refer both to the Act's definition of the term "rule" and to its exclusion from general filing requirements of those rules which relate to "loans, grants and benefits" by the State or one of its agencies. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: ll OPINION , It is my opinion that rules and regulations promulgated by the State Department of Family and Children Services in connection with its operation and administration of public assistance programs are expressly excluded from the general filing requirements of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. DISCUSSION In connection with its general requirement that state boards, bureaus, commissions, departments and officers1 authorized by law to make rules and regulations, must file the same with the Secretary of State2, the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338-56 (Ga. Code Ann. 3A-l01 to 3A-123) broadly defines' the term "rule" as: " . . . each agency regulation, standard or statement of general or particular applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency. The term includes the rules of practice and procedure for the approval or prescription for the future rates and prices and the amendment or repeal of a prior rule . . . " [Sec. 2 (f) of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 3A-l02 (f))] The Act then proceeds, however, to expressly exclude certain rules, such as those which relate solely to internal management of an agency and do not affect private rights or procedures available to the public, from its general filing requirements. One such exclusion, and the one you have specifically mentioned in connection with your rules and regulations dealing with public assistance, is Section 2 (f) (9) of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 3A-l02 (f) (9)) which embraces: "rules relating to loans, grants and benefits by the State or of an agency." I. All of these entities are included within the Act's definition of the term "Agency," see Section 2 (a) (Ga. Code Ann. 3A-l02 (a)). 2. See Sections 5 and 6 of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 3A-l05 and 3A-l06.) 12 It is my opm10n that the four categorical public assistance programs administered by your Department, to wit: Old Age Assistance (see Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-6), Aid to the Blind (see Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-7), Aid to Dependent Children (see Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-9) and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-20), each of which provides for the grantof financial assistance to eligible individuals, are unquestionably programs providing for "grants and benefits" by the State Department of Family and Children Services (an "agency"), and that the rules and regulations which the Department promulgates3 in connection with its operation and administration of such programs [e.g., eligibility requirements] are therefore within the scope of the above quoted exclusion to the Act's filing requirements. OPINION 65-9 July 15, 1965 You ask whether a school bond election called by a county board of education may be held at the same time as the general election. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION It is my opinion that a school bond election called by a county board of education may be held concurrently with the general election. DISCUSSION Georgia Code Ann. 32-1403 provides in part: " . . . when any county board of education shall deem it to be to the best interests of education in the county to incur any bonded debt for building, equipping or purchasing sites for the building and equipping of schoolhouses, pursuant to Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I and II of the Constitution of 1877, as amended in 1945, the election required shall be called and held in the manner prescribed by Ch. 87-2, and the bonds shall be validated in the manner prescribed by Ch. 87-2. . . . " 3. Said rules and regulations are authorized and indeed required of the Department by statute. See Ga. Code Ann. 99-605, 99706, 99-905 and 99-2004. 13 The initial paragraph of the Constitution referred to in this code section, 1 in speaking of the election requisite to an issuance of bonds by a political subdivision of the State, refers to voter approval "in an election for that purpose." Such language would clearly seem to contemplate a "special election" and in view of the same this office has previously ruled with respect to school bonds that a "special election" is necessary if a school district is to incur a bonded debt. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, p. 218.2 It follows that the instant inquiry is essentially one of determining the propriety of holding the "special election" required for the issuance of school bonds concurrently with a general election. Approaching the problem in this light and looking first to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 87-2 [which under the above quoted school bond statute controls the manner in which the bond election may be called and held], it is noted that none of the statutory provisions of this Chapter in any way specify the time at which a bond election may or must be held. The most relevant provision in this respect, Ga. Code Ann. 87-202, merely states that such bond elections shall be held at all the voting precincts in the political subdivision involved, by the same persons, in the same manner, and under the same rules and regulations that elections for officers of such political subdivision are held. This being so, I conclude that special elections may be held concurrently with a general election by virtue of Ga. Code Ann. 34-806 (1964 Supp.) which states: "Every special election shall be held and conducted in all respects in accordance with the provisions of this Code relating to general elections, and the provisions of this Code relating to general elections shall apply thereto insofar as practicable, and not inconsistent with other provisions of this Code. All special elections held at the time of a general election shall be conducted by the poll officers by the use of the same equipment and facilities, so far as practicable, as are l. To wit: Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I of the 1945 Constitution (Ga: Code Ann. 2-6001). 2. See also Ga. Code Ann. 34-103 (ab) which defines a special election as an election "that arises from some exigency or special need outside the usual routine." 14 used for such general election. At least 30 days shall intervene between the call of a special election and the holding of same." (Emphasis added.) Provided that sufficient time exists between the call for and holding of the bond election so as to meet the statutory requirement respecting advertising, see Ga. Code Ann. 87-201, and the thirtyday interval contained in Ga. Code Ann. 34-806, it would seem that this last-mentioned statute clearly contemplates that a special election may be held concurrently with a general election. OPINION 65-10 July 16, 1965 You ask certain questions relating to the possible involvement of local boards of education in the "Headstart" programs which are being financed by the Federal Government. In specificity, you request answer to the following: "1. Under Georgia Statute, how is a school defined?" "2. Is there an age limit for school enrollees? If so, what are the maximum and minimum?" "3. Do local boards of education have permission to establish kindergarten and nursery school programs under Georgia law?" Your letter also asks generally whether the "Headstart" programs may be treated as part of the regular school program and whether the State Department of Education may participate through the School Lunch Division and other services which may be considered eligible for participation. My answer and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION 1. While I am unaware of any statutory definition of the word "school," the term, as used in the laws relating to the common or public schools of Georgia, has been .construed by the courts as having reference to the twelve grades of instruction offered by a public educational institution. 2. There is no statutory limitation respecting the minimum and maximum age at which an individual may be enrolled in the public schools and this matter is one which is left to the discretion of the local school board. 15 3. The school laws of Georgia authorize (but do not require) local boards of education to operate kindergarten and nursery school programs. 4. Although a categorical answer to the broad question of the authority of the State Department of Education to participate in "Headstart" programs is not possible [a precise answer would require detailed examination of the contents of each and every headstart program], it may be said generally that the State Board of Education could authorize the Department's participation in those aspects of a headstart program which are of an educational and instructional nature. DISCUSSION l. I am unaware of any statutory definition of the word "school" in this State. On the other hand, the term has been judicially construed both in Georgia and elsewhere. It would seem to be well settled everywhere, for example, that the term "school" is not to be confused with or considered as synonomous to the term "schoolhouse." It is instead a generic term denoting an "institution" for instruction or education, which is not measured by the walls of one particular building. See e.g. Words and Phrases "School" p. 306; Black's Law Dictionary, "School" p. 1511 (4th Ed. 1951 ). In Georgia, the Supreme Court has said that at least insofar as it is used in the laws of this State referring to the common or public schools, the term "school" has reference to a complete twelve grade institution. See Irwin v. Crawford, 210 Ga. 222, 225 (1953); Accord, Brinson v. Jackson, 168 Ga. 353 (1929). It therefore appears that the term "school," as used in the school laws of Georgia, refers to the twelve grades of instruction which might otherwise be described as an elementary and secondary education, whether offered by a school system in one or in a plurality of buildings. 2. While Ga. Code Ann. 32-937 provides that admission to the common schools: " . . . shall be gratuitous to all children between the ages of six and nineteen years residing in the district in which the schools are located ... ," this provision has been held by the Supreme Court of Georgia not 16 to be a limitation on the ages of children who may be taught in the public schools, but merely a statement that children within the specified age group shall be taught free. Worth v. Board of Education, 177 Ga. 166, 176 (1933). Inasmuch as I am unaware of any other statute which might be considered as limiting the ages during which children may be taught in the public schools, and in view of the fact that Art. VII I, Sec. V, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6901) vests management and control of county school systems in the county boards of education1 I conclude that the minimum and maximum ages of children who may be taught in the public schools is a matter which addresses itself to the local boards of education. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 274. 3. Ga. Code Ann. 32-620 provides in pertinent part: "The State Board of Education shall have authority to provide for implementation of State-wide programs in the public schools of this State for the education of adults, preschool children, and exceptional school children as may be defined by the State Board, and for the implementation of other educational programs not ordinarily coming within the prescribed curricula of the public schools, ..., such as remedial reading programs for those public school children found to be deficient in reading skills, . . ., and other similar education programs ... Local units may, prior to implementation of such programs by the State Board, implement such programs locally in accordance with criteria and standards prescribed by the State Board." (Emphasis added.) It is my understanding that the State Board of Education has not at this time implemented any state-wide program for the education of preschool children [e.g. kindergarten or nursery school programs]. Consequently it would appear that under the above code section local boards of education are authorized to establish kindergarten I. See also Ga. Code Ann. 32-901, 32-909, and 32-912 concerning the broad powers of county boards of education to manage, control, make arrangements for and pass rules and regulations concerning local school systems. 17 and nursery school programs. Such locally implemented programs for preschool children would, of course, be subject to any criteria or standards relating to their operation which might be promulgated by the State Board of Education. 4. Concerning the participation of the State Board of Education in "Headstart" programs generally, a precise answer is not possible in that it would require examination of the details and content of each and every "Headstart" program which might be involved. It is my understanding that such programs are not uniform and consequently it is entirely possible that an individual "Headstart" program might contain some activities in which neither the State nor local boards of education could lawfully participate and other activities in which such participation might be perfectly proper. In attempting to shed some light on this question I can only say that under the broad authority given to the State and local boards of education by the above quoted Ga. Code Ann. 32-620, such portions of a "Headstart" program as are of an educational and institutional nature would most likely be matters in which the State and local boards of education could participate. OPINION 65-11 July 19, 1965 You refer to the resolution of the General Assembly which authorizes the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to develop and maintain a register of blind persons residing within the State of Georgia. You ask specifically (I) whether the State Department of Public Health is authorized to make medical information on blind persons available to the Vocational Rehabilitation Division from its own records and the records of county departments of public health; (2) whether there would be any civil or criminal liability involved in the event employees of state or county employees make such information available for registry purposes; and (3) whether any civil or criminal liability might attach to ophthalmologists or other specialists who make eye examinations and send reports thereof to the county departments of public health. My reply to your letter must be accepted as unofficial and solely as an expression of my personal views on the matter. Subject to this understanding my personal opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: 18 OPINION The State Department of Public Health may lawfully authorize the rendering of medical information concerning blind persons to the Vocational Rehabilitation Division from both its own records and the records of the county departments of public health. I am unaware of any theory whereunder civil or criminal liability could attach to employees of state or county health departments because of their transmission of such information to the Vocational Rehabilitation Division, provided, of course, that their action in the matter was taken in accordance with existing rules, regulations and policies of the State Department of Public Health. I am similarly unaware of any theory whereby civil or criminal liability would attach to ophthalmologists or other specialists who make eye examinations and send reports concerning the same to county departments of public health. DISCUSSION A resolution of the General Assembly of Georgia set forth as Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 386-87, authorizes the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation: "to develop, compile and maintain, as up-to-date as possible, a register of all blind persons known to be residing within the State of Georgia, such register to describe with respect to each person so registered, to the extent that such information may be ascertained, the cause and extent of blindness, profession or occupation of such blind person, current employment status, and such other information as may to the State Board of Vocational Education and the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation seem to be desirable." Section 2 of the same resolution authorizes the State Board of Vocational Education and Director of Vocational Rehabilitation to use their best efforts to secure, on a voluntary basis: "the cooperation of all other agencies of Federal, State and local government, of physicians, optometrists, blind persons and other interested individuals and organizations in the development, compilation and maintenance of the aforesaid register of blind persons." It would seem apparent that this legislative authorization for the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to secure the assistance of other State and local governmental agencies respecting its registry 19 of blind persons quite necessarily confers a reciprocal authority in such other agencies to assist the Division. Thus the resolution (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 386-87) could probably be taken as sufficient in itself to constitute authorization for the State Department of Public Health to forward or permit the forwarding of medical information contained in its records and in the records of county health departments to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Moreover, such an interpretation would not appear to result in a conflict with any other statute of this State which is relevant to the confidentiality of Health Department records. To the contrary, the other statutes also distinctly imply that the State and county health departments may authorize such a transmission. Ga. Code Ann. 88-306 (b), for example, leaves the question of whether Health Department records should be classified as confidential to the State and county boards. By implication this would seem to allow health departments to promulgate regulations which do permit the transmission of medical information from such departments to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation as well as to promulgate regulations prohibiting the same. Furthermore, it should probably be pointed out that even with respect to such information as is classified as confidential by health departments, the statute [ 88306 (b)] provides only that said "confidential" information shall not be subject to public inspection. It is highly questionable whether a court would hold that records which have merely been transferred from one governmental agency to another could be said to have been subjected to "public inspection." Similarly, Ga. Code Ann. 88-1723, in stating that it shall be unlawful for any person to permit inspection of, or disclose information contained in vital records "except as authorized by regulation," clearly implies that where such authorizing regulation does exist, it would not be unlawful to disclose what otherwise would be confidential information. Also, section (b) of this same statute expressly states that the department may authorize the disclosure of data contained in vital records "for research purposes." Inasmuch as I am of the view, for the reasons above stated, that the State and county health departments may legally transmit medical information concerning the blind to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, it would, in my opinion, seem to follow automatically that neither civil nor criminal liability could attach to any employee of said departments for a disclosure which is made pursuant to departmental regulations or policies. Similarly I know of no theory whereby civil or criminal liability 20 might attach to ophthalmologists or other specialists who make eye examinations and send reports thereof to the county department of public health. The county departments have express statutory authority under Ga. Code Ann. 88-203: "(a) To determine the health needs and resources thereof by research, and the collection, analysis, and evaluation of all data pertaining to the health of the community; (b) To develop, in cooperation with the Department of Public Health, programs, activities and facilities responsive to the needs of its area; (c) To secure compliance with the rules and regulations of the Department of Public Health that have local application; " This statute, coupled with the necessarily implied authorization contained in Section 2 of Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 386-87 (cited at the outset of the "discussion" portion of this memorandum) for physicians to cooperate with the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation in the matter of the registry of blind persons, would clearly seem to negative any possible civil or criminal liability of doctors for relaying such information to the Division through county departments of public health. See also 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons 36 p. 942; Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A .2d 345 ( 1962) [where public interest in disclosure was said to outweigh a private interest in non-disclosure of medical information]. OPINION 65-12 July 21, 1965 You request my opmwn on whether an "automobile auction house" may "sell," after July 1, 1965, motor vehicles required to be inspected under the Motor Vehicle Inspection laws without first obtaining inspection certificates for these vehicles. Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 188, 195, provides as follows: "After July I, 1965, no dealer engaged in the business of selling new or used motor vehicles shall sell at retail any vehicle required to be inspected by this Article unless the dealer shall have said vehicle inspected in accordance with the provisions of this Article and a current official inspection certificate is obtained for said motor vehicle and placed thereon." 21 It is my understanding that auction houses acquire no title to vehicles sold by them but act as agents for the owner. It is also my understanding that both automobile dealers and members of the general public may buy and sell at these auctions. Under the above stated law, it is my opinion that a motor vehicle sold by a new or used car dealer to a member of the general public through an auction house is a sale at retail covered by the above Act. Other sales consummated by auction such as those between two dealers; a private individual and a dealer; and between two private individuals would not appear to come within the requirements of the Act. OPINION 65-13 July21, 1965 You make reference to Ga. Code Ann. 13-204 as amended by the General Assembly in 1960 which now requires private banks lawfully engaged in the banking business prior to June 30, 1960, to register with the Superintendent of Banks and pay a $10.00 registration fee. You have requested that 1 use the investigative powers of this office to determine whether some particular banks come within the purview of this action and are required to register as of June 30, 1960, and whether they are actually engaged in the banking business at the present time. The investigative powers of the Attorney General as set out in Ga. Code Ann. 40-1615 consist of the power to: " ... institute and conduct investigations into the affairs of any department, agency, board, bureau, commission, institution or authority of the state; to require the services and assistance of any state official in the conduct of such inquiry and investigation; to compel evidence and subpoena witnesses; to inspect records, documents, correspondence, and books of any department, agency, board, bureau, commission, institution or authority of the state; to require the production of records, documents, correspondence and books of any person, firm or corporation which relate, directly or indirectly, to dealings with the state, any of its departments or adjuncts." 22 Careful consideration reveals that only in the latter part of this section is mention made of any agency or entity other than a state department, agency, or entity. Even then, those other than public entities are mentioned only insofar as they relate to dealings with the state. Under Georgia law, private banks are not subject to regulation by the State Banking Department or any State Agency. However, private banks are required to submit an annual report to the Banking Department. This would appear to be a situation which must be remedied by the General Assembly. I regret that the office of the Attorney General does not have the authority to conduct investigations into the affairs of private banks. OPINION 65-14 (Unofficial) July 21, 1965 In your letter you state the following facts: "A certain tract of land in Lee County, Georgia, was returned for taxes but the taxes were not paid. An execution was issued for taxes due upon this certain tract of land. John Doe paid the Sheriff of Lee County the amount due under the execution and the execution was then transferred to John Doe under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 92-7602. The amount due under this execution and paid to the sheriff was $50.00. John Doe immediately proceeds to enforce the execution. The property is properly advertised and then offered for sale by the sheriff before the courthouse door, where John Doe was the highest bidder for $100.00." and then ask my opinion on the following questions: a. "Who holds the $50.00 excess for the benefit of the true owner?" b. "For what period of time is this excess held?" c. "What disposition is ultimately made of this excess if the true owner does not appear to claim same?" 23 Ga. Code Ann. 39-1311 (set out below) which delineates the responsibilities of a purchaser at a judicial sale as to the proceeds of the sale, neither places an interest in nor a responsibility on a purchaser as to any surplus after satisfaction of the execution. The provisions of this Code section appear to me to be completely in accord with the statement of the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Slaton, 148 Ga. 294, 298 (1918), that "his [the Sheriffs] relation to the surplus after satisfaction of the tax fi. fas. was fiduciary " 39-1311. "Purchaser need not trace funds.- The purchaser at judicial sale shall not be bound to look to the appropriation of the proceeds of the sale, nor to the returns made by the officer, nor shall he be required to see that the officer has complied fully with all regulations prescribed in such cases. All such irregularities shall create questions and liabilities between the officer and parties interested in the sale. The innocent purchaser shall be bound only to see that the officer has competent authority to sell, and that he is apparently proceeding to sell under the prescribed forms." Ga. Code Ann. 92-7602 provides that the "transferee [of a tax execution] shall have the same rights as to enforcing said execution and priority of payment as might have been exercised or claimed before said transfer." John Doe, in your example, as transferee of the tax fi. fa., gained no greater rights than those held by the County before transfer-and as to the proceeds of the sale, that was to receive the amount due under the tax fi. fa. In view of the foregoing, my opinion as to your specific questions is as follows: a. The Sheriff would hold the $50.00 excess for the benefit of the true owner. b. Assuming the Sheriff does not pay over the $50.00 to the true owner and the true owner otherwise fails to act, the Sheriff would hold the $50.00 for the duration of the redemption period plus the running of the statutory period on the right of the true owner to claim the $50.00. c. Inasmuch as the Sheriffs relation to the sale, and the 24 proceeds thereof, is that of an officer of the County, the $50.00 should be turned over to the County to become a part of its general fund if the true owner does not appear to claim same. In your example the property was returned for taxes. It is interesting to note that Ga. Code Ann. 92-8103 provides that in the case of property not returned, but assessed and sold for taxes, the surplus "shall be paid over to the ordinary as a part of the educational fund . . . subject to the claim of the true owner within four years." Ga. Code Ann. 92-8305 provides that surplus funds from a tax sale of wild lands, if such land is not redeemed within two years from the date of sale, shall be paid over by the Sheriff to the State Treasurer. OPINION 65-15 (Unofficial) July 22, 1965 You ask whether the County Commissioners can specify the depository for school funds. You have attached a letter you received from the Chairman of the Commissioners contending that the Commissioners have the right to specify the depository. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION It is my opinion that the County Commissioners do have the legal right to specify the bank to be used as a depository for school funds. DISCUSSION While I do not believe the code sections cited by the County Commissioners give them authority to specify the depository for school funds, they would appear to have this right under Ga. Code Ann. 89-811, which provides: "The county authorities shall designate one or more solvent banks as depositories of all county moneys and moneys belonging to the school funds of the county, and of school districts therein, and of other districts therein organized for any purpose; and if the county authorities shall not have provided for such a depository, the county board of education or the trustees of any school district or the proper authorities having supervision over any other public fund may designate such a depository as to their funds; and if there be no 25 applicable depository selected, the officer collecting or holding any public funds may select a depository." On the other hand it is obvious that control over disbursement of school funds is a matter within the jurisdiction and control of the county board of education. It would, therefore, appear to me that where a depository has been selected by the school board due to failure of the county authorities to act, and the county authorities at some later date then do decide to specify a depository for the school fund, the county school board should, if and provided that an immediate transfer would for some reason interfere with school operations, be given a reasonable time to transfer such funds, so as not to interfere with education in the county. OPINION 65-16 (Unofficial) July 23, 1965 You inquire as to whether you are entitled to the increased homestead exemption of $4,000 for persons sixty-five years of age or over (as provided by the 1964 amendment to the Constitution of Georgia) under the following set of circumstances: You are seventy-nine years of age; your total gross income is less than $1, 700; you are being allowed the $2,000 homestead exemption; the Board of Tax Assessors has valued your home at $5,380 and other low rental property, which you own, at $7,780. I am enclosing a photostatic copy of an opinion of the Attorney General to Mr. Hiram K. Undercofler, State Revenue Commissioner, dated April 28, 1965, which in answer to question number 4 therein contains the Attorney General's opinion as to the meaning of "income from all sources" as contained in the constitutional amendment. If your income from all sources is $1,700, and you are seventynine years of age, you are entitled to the $4,000 homestead exemption on the assessed value of your homestead only (not on rental property), provided you claim the exemption by filing with the Tax Receiver or Tax Commissioner the affidavit as to age and income as required by the 1964 amendment to the Constitution of Georgia. 26 OPINION 65-17 (Unofficial). July 23, 1965 This is in response to your letter concerning the sale of intoxicating beverages on election day. I understand that your question is specifically directed to bond referendums such as hospital bonds or school bonds. The Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. II, Sec. V, Par. I provides: "The General Assembly shall by law forbid the sale of intoxicating drinks in this State or any political subdivision thereof on all days for the holding of any election in the area in which such election is held and prescribe punishment for any violation of the same." (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1101) The Georgia Election Code, which was passed by the General Assembly in 1964 (Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Session, p. 26, 196) provides that any person who shall sell or buy or offer for sale any alcoholic beverages on primary or election days shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The Election Code applies to general elections as well as special elections and to any "state or county election or primary for any other purpose whatsoever. . . ." (Ga. Code Ann. 34-102) It is apparent that bond referendums are covered by the Georgia Election Code, and the provision which makes it a misdemeanor to sell intoxicating beverages on election days would apply to such bond elections. OPINION 65-18 (Unofficial) July 26, 1965 You request an opinion on whether the Court of Ordinary or Superior Court has jurisdiction of offenses involving improper tag registration, improper tags, no tags, etc. I am pleased to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 68-2 which contains provisions for licensing motor vehicles and chauffeurs. I am also pleased to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 689902, 68-9904, 68-9905, and 68-9906, and particularly 68-9901 and portions of 68-9902 which provide as follows: 27 68-990 I. "Any person, firm, or corporation owning or operating any motor vehicle described in 68-20 I on any public highway or street after March 1st of each year, without complying with the provisions of that Section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Acts 1931, pp. 213, 216.)" 68-9902. " . . . Any person who shall violate any other provision of Ch. 68-2 of the Code of 1933 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. (Acts 1925, pp. 315, 317; 1931, pp. 7, 34; 1953, pp. 366, 369.)" I am also pleased to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 24102 and 92A-502 which provide as follows: 2-4102. " ... The Court of Ordinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants, try cases, and impose sentences thereon in all misdemeanor cases arising under the Act known as the Georgia State Highway Patrol Act of 1937, and other traffic laws, and in all cases arising under the Compulsory School Attendance law in all counties of this State in which there is no city or county court, provided the defendant waives a jury trial. . . ."(Emphasis supplied.) 92A-502. "The Court ofOrdinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants, try cases, and impose sentence thereon in all misdemeanor cases arising under Cbs. 92A-l through 92A-5, and other traffic laws of the State, in all counties of this State in which there is no city or county court, provided the defendant waives a jury trial. . . ."(Emphasis supplied.) As you can see from the above quoted Code sections, the violations of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 68-2 are misdemeanors. It is my unofficial opinion that the provisions of Ch. 68-2 are not within the purview of Ga. Code Ann. 2-4102 and 92A-501 and that the provisions of Ch. 68-2 are not "traffic laws" contemplated by Ga. Code Ann. 2-4102 and 92A-50 1. Therefore, it is further my unofficial opinion that the courts of ordinary have no authority or jurisdiction in violations arising under Chapter 68-2. Reference to the Georgia law as respects the local co.urt structure in Henry County would determine the court of ordinary's jurisdiction for consideration of misdemeanors. 28 OPINION 65-19 (Unofficial) July 27, 1965 I have recently received, on your behalf, a request for my opinion concerning the newly established residence requirement imposed upon individuals who wish to learn barbering in this State. The Georgia Code provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any person to follow the occupation of a barber ... unless he or she shall have first obtained a certificate of registration as provided in this Chapter." (Ga. Code Ann. 84-402.) The law pertaining to barber students provides that: "Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit any person over the age of sixteen (16) years and who has been a resident of the State of Georgia for at least six (6) months from learning said occupation under a barber . . . ." (Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 603, 612.) While it is understood that the new residence requirement works a hardship in some cases, it appears that the law is clear, and that no person may study barbering in this state without first meeting the residence requirement. OPINION 65-20 (Unofficial) July 27, 1965 This is to acknowledge receipt of your recent letter requesting an opinion as to the proper procedure for filling vacancies for unexpired or full terms of local Hospital Authorities. I am pleased to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 499, 599) which provides as follows: "88-1803. Creation of hospital authorities.- There is hereby created in and for each county and municipal corporation of the State a public body corporate and politic to be known as the 'Hospital Authority' of such county or city, which shall consist of a board of not less than five nor more than nine members to be appointed by the governing body of the county or municipal corporation of the area of operation ... '; : :;<\.:.~ ~ ' . : 29 for staggered terms as specified by resolution of the governing body. No authority created hereunder shall transact any business or exercise any powers hereunder until the governing body of the area of operation shall, by proper resolution, declare that there is need for an authority to function in such county or municipal corporation. A copy of said resolution adopted by the governing body shall be filed with the Department; likewise, copies of any resolution adopted by the governing body providing for filling vacancies in the membership of the authority or making any changes in membership. The members of the hospital authorities now in existence shall serve out the remainder of their terms as provided for by resolutions of the governing body, or until a vacancy occurs for any other reason, in which event the appointment of new members and the filling of vacancies shall be in accordance with the provisions hereof. Appointments to fill vacancies on the board of any hospital authority activated on or after March 15, 1964, either for an unexpired or full term as fixed in the original resolution or ordinance creating the same, shall be made as follows: "( l) The governing body of the area of operation shall submit a list of three (3) eligible persons to the board of the hospital authority. "(2) The board at its next regular meeting shall select one of the three (3) persons named in said list. "Appointments to fill vacancies either for an unexpired or full term on the board of all hospital authorities in existence prior to March 15, 1964, shall be made as follows: "( 1) Prior to May 1, 1964, the board of such hospital authority shall by resolution elect to have vacancies filled on such board pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter or in the same manner as such appointments were filled prior to the approval of this Act or its otherwise becoming law. "(2) After said resolution has been: formally adopted by the board, it shall be filed with the governing authority of all participating unit or units of such authority and all appointments to fill vacancies thereafter shall be governed by the terms of such resolution unless changed by local legislation or constitutional amendment. 'll 52~:1 30 "Any two (2) or more counties or any two (2) or more municipalities or any county or municipality, or combination thereof, by a like resolution or ordinance of their respective governing body may authorize the exercise of the powers herein provided for by an authority. The membership of such authority affected by like resolutions of the respective governing bodies of any two or more of the governing bodies of the participating units shall be not less than five nor more than fifteen members, the terms and distribution of members between the participating units to be provided for by the resolutions adopted by the gqverning bodies of the participating units. The resolutions of the governing bodies of participating units acting together for the creation of an authority may be amended by the governing bodies of the participating units from time to time. Nothing herein is intended to invalidate any of the acts of existing boards of authorities. Hospital authorities shall be granted the same exemptions and exclusions from taxes as are now granted to cities and counties for the operation of facilities similar to facilities to be operated by hospital authorities as provided for under the provisions of this Title." Your letter shows that on June 2, 195 1, the City of Bainbridge and Decatur County, pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 99-15 of the Ga. Code Ann. (Ga. Laws 1941, p. 243, as amended) passed a resolution creating a Hospital Authority for the City of Bainbridge and Decatur County, Georgia. Such original resolution provided, inter alia, that vacancies for an unexpired or full term of said trustees of the local Hospital Authority would be by such Authority naming one ( 1) person to such vacancy. Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803 cited above, your Hospital Authority, as an Authority in existence prior to March 15, 1964, was required prior to May 1, 1964, by resolution to elect whether to have vacancies filled on said Hospital Authority pursuant to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803, or to continue the filling of such vacancies pursuant to the terms of the original Authority resolution, i.e., the resolution of June 2, 1951. Your letter further shows that the local Hospital Authority of the City of Bainbridge and Decatur County, Georgia, failed to pass such a resolution prior to May 1, 1964. Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803 is silent on what happens if no resolution is filed concerning which 31 method should be utilized in filling vacancies or expired terms. It therefore is my unofficial opinion that your Hospital Authority will be required to fill any vacancies according to the procedure outlined in Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803 applicable to Hospital Authorities activated on or after March 15, 1964, i.e., the governing body ofthe area of operation submitting a list ofthree (3) eligible persons to the board of the Hospital Authority for the selection of one (l) at the board's next regular meeting. As a result of your board's failure to elect by resolution the method of filling vacancies prior to May 1, 1964, it is felt by the undersigned that a substantial legal question would exist as to the legality of appointment of a member to such board to fill any vacancy contrary to that procedure prescribed by Ga. Code Ann. 88-1803 on Hospital Authorities activated on or after March 15, 1964. OPINION 65-21 (Unofficial) July27, 1965 I am pleased to acknowledge receipt of your recent letter concerning Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-15 relative to the control of rabies. In your letter you specifically ask the following questions, to wit: "1. Is a local health department or municipality required by law to conduct a Rabies Control Program in which stray and unwanted dogs are caught, impounded and humanly dispatched?" "2. When a local health department receives notice that a citizen of the county has been bitten by an unclaimed stray dog is it required by law for the local health department to impound and observe the animal in question at county expense?" "3. Does the new Health Code invalidate Ga. Code Ann. 88-207a?" In answering your question number I, I am pleased to call your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-1501 where it is provided, inter alia, that the primary responsibility for the control of rabies within each county rests upon each County Board of 32 Health. Such boards have specific statutory authority to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the prevention of such disease. It therefore appears that the local County Board of Health should adopt rules and regulations relative to the catching and impounding of strays and unwanted dogs. In answering the second question you pose, this again appears to be a situation whereby the local County Board of Health should prescribe rules for the prevention and control of rabies by providing for the vaccination, the tagging and certification of dogs and for the confinement of any animal which exhibits any signs of rabies. It further appears that the cost of such confinement would be an expense of the county board of health to be included in its budget which is submitted to the local taxing authorities under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-214. For your information, I am enclosing herewith a suggested guide prepared by the Georgia Department of Public Health to be utilized by each county board of health adopting rules and regulations for the control of rabies within said county. The answer to your last question is affirmative. Under the provisions of Ga. Laws 1964, page 654, Ga. Code Ann. 88-207a (Ga. Laws 1945, p. 448) relating to the control of rabies was repealed in its entirety and Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-15 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 499, 577) was substituted in lieu thereof. OPINION 65-22 July 27, 1965 In response to your recent oral request for a determination of the resident status of two individuals who have applied for scholarship aid, I have prepared this informal opinion for your guidance. The rules of the Board of Regents pertaining to the classification of students as residents provides: "If a student is over 21 years of age, he may register as a resident student only upon a showing that he has been domiciled in Georgia for at least twelve months prior to the registration date." The Board's rule concerning scholarship aid provides: "Scholarship aid shall be granted only to legal residents. To a be considered legal resident . . . an applicant must present 33 evidence as follows: If over 21 years of age, that bona fide residence in the State of Georgia has been established for at least one year next preceding registration for school, and that he is eligible to become a registered voter." While the scholarship rule uses the terms "legal residents" and "bona fide residence," it is believed that what is meant by those terms is actually "domicile." The term "bona fide resident," as used in a jurisdictional statute pertaining to divorce actions, has been construed to mean "domicile." Williams v. Williams, 191 Ga. 437, at 438 (1940). This memorandum assumes that the Board of Regents intends "legal residents" and "bona fide residence" to mean ''domiciliaries" and "domicile." The first case is that of a woman over 21 years who is married to a service man stationed in Texas. The woman was born and raised in Georgia, and lived here until the time of her marriage, at which time she removed to the military base in Texas. It appears that the husband is not a resident of Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. 79-403 provides: "The Domicile of a married woman shall be that of her husband, except in the case of voluntary separation and living apart, or in pending application for divorce." Assuming that the husband is not domiciled in Georgia, conclude that the applicant is not entitled to scholarship aid from the State of Georgia. The assumption of the husband's domicile is not based upon his military status, for while a person in military service may change his domicile (Engram v. Faircloth, 205 Ga. 577 (1949)), the mere enlistment in the Armed Forces and transfer by military order does not necessarily change the domicile. Squire v. Vazguez, 52 Ga. App. 713 (1935); also General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Monday, 79 Ga. App. 609 (1949). The second case is that of a man who has taught school in Louisiana for the past three years. This individual teaches in the foreign State for nine months and returns to Georgia for three months. He owns property here and votes in Georgia. A domicile once established continues until a new domicile is acquired. Williams v. Williams, supra. Residence means living in a particular locality; domicile means living in that locality with the intent to make it a fixed and permanent home. Residence requires 34 only physical presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires presence in that place as well as an intention to make it a domicile. Worsham v. Ligon, 144 Ga. 707 (1916). A new domicile cannot be acquired simply by change of residence without an intention to abandon the old domicile. A person may continue to be domiciled in this state even though actually residing in another state. Williams v. Williams, supra. While the question of the Louisiana teacher's domicile appears to be a proper question for a jury, and while more facts about the case would be helpful, I conclude that said teacher could be domiciled in this State. Certainly residence outside of the State does not, in itself, determine the issue. OPINION 65-23 (Unofficial) July 27, 1965 You ask for an opinion of this office as to whether the carrying of a pen-type tear gas gun would violate any existing Georgia law relating to the carrying of concealed weapons without a license. From your letter, it appears that such an instrument is an aerosoltype device which squirts a liquid or a mist of an eye-irritating chemical to temporarily disable any attacker. It also appears that the weapon does not have a separate chambered barrel capable of firing a projectile, but is designed instead to discharge a blast of tear gas from a gas cartridge which is screwed into the weapon, becoming affixed thereto. Upon a cursory look of several periodicals dealing with this particular subject matter, I find that this weapon has been held by the United States Treasury Department not to be subject to the National or Federal Firearms Act. I am not aware of any existing law of this State which would be violated by the carrying of a pen-type tear gas gun of the nature you describe in a concealed manner. There are only two Georgia statutes of which I am aware that might conceivably be said to prohibit the carrying of the particular pen-type gas gun to which you refer. They are Ga. Code Ann. 26-5101, which provides: "26-5101. Carrying concealed weapons.-Any person having or carrying about his person, unless in an open manner 35 and fully exposed to view, any kind of metal knucks, pistol, dirk, sword in a cane, spear, bowie knife, or any other kind of knives manufactured and sold for the purpose of offense and defense, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."; and Ga. Code Ann. 26-5103, which states: "26-5103. Carrying pistols without license.-lt shall be unlawful for any person to have or carry about his person or to have in his manual possession outside of his own home or place of business any pistol or revolver without first taking out a license from the ordinary of the county in which the party resides: Provided, that nothing in this law shall be construed to alter, affect, or amend any laws now in force relative to carrying of concealed weapons on or about one's person: and Provided further, that this law shall not apply to sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, marshals, or other arresting officers of this State or the United States, who are now allowed, by law, to carry revolvers; nor to any students of military colleges or schools when they are in the discharge of their duty at such colleges." Under the above statutes, it would seem obvious that the crux of the matter is whether this particular tear gas weapon may be deemed to be a "pistol" or "revolver." Inasmuch as this particular weapon does not appear to have a separate chambered barrel which is capable of firing a projectile, but is instead designed solely for the discharge of a blast of sodium pentachlorophenate or oleoresin capsicum or other tear gas from a gas cartridge which is affixed to the weapon, I believe that this key question is answered in the negative by the case of Muse v. Interstate Life & Accident Co., 45 Ga. App. 839, 840 (1932), where the court stated: " . . . a 'gun' is a metal tube for }iring projectiles by the force of gunpowder or other explosives, together with its stock, carriage, or other attachments. When it is mounted on a carriage it is called a cannon, and when it is mounted on a stock requiring the use of both hands it is commonly called a rifle, musket, carbine, or fowling piece. It is also called a pistol or revolver. A pistol is a small firearm, usually mounted on a handgrip, which can be }ired with one hand. As used in common parlance, the word 'gun' is used interchangeably with the word pistol . . . ."(Emphasis added.) 36 This view that the term "gun" or "firearm" (which includes "pistol" and "revolver") necessarily connotes a weapon used to discharge a shot or projectile by the action ofgunpowder or some other chemical explosive, the action being in the nature of rapid combustion, also seems to prevail in the other jurisdictions of the United States where the question has arisen. See, e.g., 94 C.J.S. Weapons, Section l. For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the particular type of aerosol device which squirts a liquid or a mist of an eye-irritating chemical to temporarily disable the attacker could not reasonably be considered to be a "pistol" or "revolver" within the purview of Ga. Code Ann. 26-5101 and 26-5103, and hence may, without license, be carried in a concealed manner. OPINION 65-24 (Unofficial) July 28, 1965 You have requested my opinion on whether "ad valorem taxes due by railroads and other public service corporations to Fulton, Cobb and DeKalb counties are payable and become delinquent on December 20 under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 92-2704, or whether such taxes are payable and become delinquent under the provision of the special laws [affecting Fulton, DeKalb and Cobb counties and contained in Act 721, Ga. Laws 1953; Act 794, Ga. Laws 1964; and H. B. 429, Ga. Laws 1965, respectively]." Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-27 provides for the reporting, assessing and collecting of the ad valorem tax on railroads. Ga. Code Ann. 92-5902 provides that "the laws now in force providing for the taxation of railroads in this State shall be applicable to the assessment of taxes" on public utilities named in the section. The following sections (as set out below) of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-27 are controlling as to whom railroads and public utilities are to make returns for purposes of the ad valorem tax and the date on which said taxes become delinquent. "92-270 I ... On or before the first day of March each railroad company in this State shall make an annual return as of January first preceding to the State Revenue Commissioner for the purposes of county taxation in each of the counties through which said road runs ...." (Emphasis supplied.) 37 "92-2704 ... Whenever the State Revenue Commissioner shall ascertain and levy in the manner specified the amount of tax due by such company to each of such counties, it shall be his duty at once to notify the president and treasurer of such railroad company of the amount due in each of said counties for county taxes of said railroads, and each and every road is required, on or before December 20th in each year, to pay to the tax collector of each county through which the railroad runs the amount stated by the State Revenue Commissioner as the tax due to such county." (Emphasis supplied.) The special Acts, referred to in your letter, affecting only DeKalb and Cobb Counties (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 328, and Ga. Laws 1965, p. 435, respectively) both amend Ga. Code Ann. 92-6402. The provisions of this Code section apply only to "All persons, companies, and corporations, who are by law required or directed to return any property for taxation to the ojjicers of the several counties ..." (Emphasis supplied), and, thus, would not apply to railroads and public utilities since they are required by law to make returns to the State Revenue Commissioner. (See above excerpt from Ga. Code Ann. 92-270 1.) The 1953 local act affecting only Fulton County and the City of Atlanta (Ga. Laws 1953, p. 2733) amended a similar 1951 local act (Ga. Laws 1951, p. 3087) but did not change the provisions of Section 13 of the 1951 Act, which section specifically provides as follows: "Section 13. The taxes referred to herein to be collected by the Tax Collector or Tax Commissioner of Fulton County shall mean the ad valorem . . . taxes shown to be due on returns filed by the taxpayer . ..."(Emphasis supplied.) Neither of the foregoing local acts purport to require railroads and public utilities to return their property for ad valorem tax purposes directly to local authorities or to set up procedures for apportionment of personal property were such direct reporting contemplated (in conflict with the provisions of the general Ia w above cited), but, rather, as provided in Section 13 of the 1951 Act (supra) limit the applicability of the local acts to taxes shown to be due on returns filed by the taxpayer with the Tax Receiver or Tax Commissioner of Fulton County. 38 For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion that the annual ad valorem taxes assessed on returns of railroads and public utilities made to the State Revenue Commissioner and stated by him to be due to the respective counties of this State do not become delinquent until after December 20 in the year for which such return and assessment is required by law. OPINION 65-25 (Unofficial) July 28, 1965 This is in reply to your letter asking for an opinion as to whether or not Jenkins County funds can be used to pay one-half of the premiums for group life and hospitalization insurance for county employees. Art. VII, Sec. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia restricts the purposes for which counties in this State may levy taxes. Art. VII, Sec. V of the Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from authorizing any county through taxation or otherwise from appropriating money to any individual except for purely charitable purposes. Consequently it has been held by the courts in this State that counties have no authority to levy taxes for the insurance of its employees. Floyd County v. Scoggins, 164 Ga. 485 (1927); Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Co., 172 Ga. 378 (1930); City ofAtlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833 (1933); Kelley v. County of Newton, 198 Ga. 483 (1944). It follows that the use by a county of public funds for the payment of group life and hospitalization insurance premiums of its employees would violate the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution. OPINION 65-26 (Unofficial) July 29, 1965 You request my opinion as to whether owners and occupants of permanent type residences, as well as owners and occupants of trailer or mobile home type improvements on lots leased from the Georgia Power Company under twenty year leases, with rights in the Power Company to terminate the leases and in the lessees to remove the improvements, are entitled to the homestead exemption under Georgia law. 39 Ga. Code Ann. 92-233 states in subparagraph (b) thereof, as set out below, the interest that must be held by the applicant in real property before he is entitled to the homestead exemption: "(b) Where the person who is the applicant holds the bona fide fee title, (although subject to mortgage or debt deed) or an estate for life, or holds under any bona fide contract of purchase providing for the conveyance of title to the applicant upon performance of the said contract, or holds under an occupancy agreement as a stockholder of a nonprofit cooperative ownership housing corporation, which holds property, either as owner or under a 99 year lease, subject to a mortgage insured by the Federal Housing Administration under Section 213 (a) (l) of the National Housing Act, 64 Stat. 54, 12 U.S.C. 1715 (c) (1950)." The facts as stated in your letter indicate that the lessees have no greater interest in the land than a usufruct and that the improvements placed thereon are personal property of the lessees. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the lessees as described above are not entitled to the homestead exemption as provided by the Georgia law. OPINION 65-27 (Unofficial) August 2, 1965 You request my opinion on three specific questions, two of them pertaining to taxation and the other to voter registrars. "I. When the county tax assessors, acting under Ga. Code Ann. 92-6912, make a change in a tax return and mail out the 10 days' notice to a resident taxpayer, but sets three dates for hearing complaints, which dates are more than ten days from the mailing date, is said taxpayer precluded by law from demanding arbitration if he is dissatisfied with the decision of said tax assessors rendered on such hearing dates? "2. Where county tax assessors use a percentage of the fair market value of real property in arriving at the taxable value of such property, is the taxpayer then entitled to the full $2,000.00 homestead exemption, or to only the same percentage thereof as used in evaluating his property for tax purposes? 40 "3. Are county voter registrars required to be in their office during a primary election held for the benefit of a certain political party? If so, who pays said registrars for that day's service?" (1) The Supreme Court of the United States, in Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. 64 (1920), reversing the Supreme Court of Georgia in the same case, 147 Ga. 666 (1918 ), held that both notice and an opportunity to be heard is required by the due process clause of the Constitution to be given the taxpayer before an increase in the assessed value of his property as returned by him can become final. In that case the ten days' notice was given, arbitration was timely undertaken, but the arbitrators could not agree on a valuation prior to the expiration of the ten day period provided by the Georgia statute for the arbitrators to set a valuation. The Court held that the Georgia provision for arbitration, under the facts as stated, did not itself afford due process of law. Under the facts as stated in your question, the opportunity to be heard as set by the board of tax assessors was not afforded the taxpayer until the expiration of the ten day period within which he is entitled to request arbitration as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 926912. The Georgia law makes no provision for any such hearing in lieu of arbitration. Therefore, it must be concluded that the notice as mailed the taxpayer in your example was not a notice of final assessed value placed on the property by the board of tax assessors and that the final assessed value did not become fixed until the board of tax assessors acted upon the results of the hearing set by them. It is my opinion that the taxpayer's right to arbitration would begin to run (under the facts as stated in your question) upon notice of final assessed value fixed by the board of tax assessors as a result of the hearing set by them. (2) The answer to your second question is found in Youmans v. Hamilton, 218 Ga. 402 (1962), wherein the court stated that the homestead exemption is deducted from the value assessed for tax purposes, not from the fair market value of the property. (3) In response to your third question, please note Ga. Code Ann. 34-1305 which provides in part that "The registrars shall meet at their main office during each primary or election for the purpose of considering the qualification of electors whose names may have been omitted by inadvertence or mistake from the list of electors." 41 Furthermore, please note that Ga. Code Ann. 34-603 (c) provides for the compensation of the county registrars. This compensation is paid from county funds. The Code does not require that a political party pay any part of the compensation fixed for the county registrars. OPINION 65-28 (Unofficial) August 2, 1965 You have requested an opinion whether it is permissable to sell in the State of Georgia canned vegetables that have been packed by prison labor. I am pleased to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 77318(b) and 77-9910 which provide as follows: 77-318 (b). "No goods, wares or merchandise, manufactured, produced, or mined wholly or in part, by the inmates of any prison or public works camp operated under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections, shall be sold in this State to any private person, firm, association or corporation, except that nothing herein shall be construed to forbid the sale of such goods or merchandise to other political subdivisions, public authorities, municipalities or agencies of the State or local Governments, to be consumed by them, or to agencies of the State to be in turn sold by such agency to the public in the performance of such agency's duties as required by law. This does not prohibit the sale of unprocessed agricultural products produced on State property." 77-9910. "Any warden, guard, official or other person who violates any of the provisions of section 77-318 or any regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, relating to the sale of prison made goods, or the hiring out of prisoners, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as provided by law." Construing the above provisions, it is my unofficial opinion that canned vegetables are "goods, wares, or merchandise," and packed vegetables would be considered "manufactured" or "produced." It is further my unofficial opinion that these provisions as quoted would not relate to goods which have been packed outside of this State by prison labor of another state. 42 OPINION 65-29 (Unofficial) August 3, 1965 You ask for a clarification of an opinion of this office to the State Superintendent of Schools dated July 6, 1965, which stated that it would be illegal for a County School B9ard to expend school funds to help defray tax collection expenses. You refer to Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106, which provides that the county tax collector is entitled to a two and one-half percent commission for his services in collecting the school tax, and raise the question as to whether the opinion of this office dated July 6, 1965, would have the effect of declaring Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 to be unconstitutional. OPINION It is my opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 does not, and under the Constitution of this State could not, require that the commissions payable to the county tax collector for his collection of the school tax be paid out of the public school fund. It is my opinion that if tested in the courts this code section would, in order to uphold its constitutionality, be interpreted as doing no more than to fix the compensation due the tax collector for his services in collecting the school taxes as a sum equal to two and one-half percent of the collections under such tax levy. As so determined such commissions would then be payable to the tax collector from the general county tax fund and not from the school fund. DISCUSSION That no disbursement from the public school fund can lawfully be made for any non-educational purpose is no longer open to question. Ga. Code Ann. 32-942; Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Company, 172 Ga. 378 (1931); Burke v. Wheeler County, 54 Ga. App. 81, 85 (1936) (cert. denied). See also, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 189; 1960-61, p. 168; 1958-59, p. 125; 195 7, p. 116; 1954-56, p. 245. In ruling that a county board of education could not legally expend public school funds to pay any part of the charges made by the county attorney to the county commissioners for the collection of delinquent taxes, this office has previously stated the seemingly obvious fact that the "collection" of taxes is not a proper function of a county board of education. Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59, p. 128. The above cited decisions and opinions also clearly show that the prohibition of any expenditure of school 43 funds for non-educational purposes is constitutional as well as statutory. The constitutional prohibition stems from Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 325701) which provides that the General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose, except: "1. To pay the expenses of administration of the county government. **** "3. For educational purposes upon property located outside of the independent school systems, as provided in Art. VI I I of this Constitution. **** "15. To provide for workmen's compensation ... for officers and employees." It is well settled that taxes raised for one specific purpose under this constitutional provision cannot lawfully be used for any o:,t;r enumerated purpose. E.g., Atlanta Chamber of Commerce v. McRae, 174 Ga. 581, 594 (3) (1932); Burke v. Wheeler County, 54 Ga. App. 81, 85 (1936). Hence in Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, pp. 168, 170 this office ruled that in view of the fact that workmen's compensation was not an "educational purpose," the payment of premiums for such insurance for school employees was a legal obligation of the governing authority of the counties and could not be paid from school funds.' If the providing of workmen's compensation for school personnel is not an "educational purpose" for which school funds may constitutionally be expended, it would seem to me to be most unlikely that the courts would hold that in payment of a commission to the county tax collector as compensation for his tax collection services would be an expenditure for "educational purposes." This being so, I am forced to conclude that if the situation were one whereby the only possible construction of Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 was that of requiring that l. A constitutional amendment was recently adopted in order to authorize (but not require) county school boards to use school funds to provide workmen's compensation for school personnel. See Ga. Laws 1956 p. 10 II. 44 the "two and one-half percent commission" referred to therein be paid from the school fund, the statute would clearly be unconstitutional. Fortunately, however, this is not the situation. Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 provides: "The county tax collector shall continue to collect unpaid county school taxes formerly levied and payable under the provisions of this section, and shall be entitled to commission of two and one-half percent for collecting the same. He shall pay over to the board of education all moneys collected for the schools once a month. He shall also collect all county school taxes levied under the authority of Art. VI I I, Sec. XII, Par. I [Ga. Code Ann. 2-7501] of the Constitution of this State, upon which collections he shall receive a commission of two and one-half percent. He shall likewise pay over to the county board ofeducation once a month, all moneys collected under such levies. In those counties where the tax collector or tax commissioner is on a salary basis the fees herein provided for shall be collected by him and paid over to the proper fiscal authorities. (Acts 1946, pp. 206, 211.)" Not only does the language of the statute expressly state that the tax collector shall pay over "all moneys collected under such levies" to the county board of education, but the clause which directly relates to his commission reads "upon which collections he shall receive a commission of two and one-half percent." It significantly does not read "from which collections he shall receive a commission of two and one-half percent." In view of the foregoing, it therefore seems to me to be the more logical construction of Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 to say that it is designed merely to determine the amount of compensation payable to the county tax collector for his services in collection of school taxes, and that the statute is not intended to shift the source of payment from the general tax fund of the county to the public school fund. 2 It is also right 2. The general philosophy of the General Assembly of not allowing monies raised by school taxes to be used for any purpose which is not strictly educational in nature may be seen elsewhere. Art. VIII, Sec. XII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-7501) of the State 45 basic, of course, that where a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions, one of which would render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the courts will give it that construction which will harmonize it with the Constitution, e.g., Glustrom v. The State, 206 Ga. 734, 739 (1950); Forrester v. Culpepper, 194 Ga. 744, 749 (1942). Consequently, I am of the opinion that the courts would reject any contention that Ga. Code Ann. 32-1106 authorize a county school board to use the public school fund to pay the county tax collector the commission he is entitled to under this section, and would hold instead that the obligation to pay the commission refused to in this section is one which rests on the governing authorities of the county. OPINION 65-30 (Unofficial) August 5, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask: ( l) Whether an individual who signs the name of a parent to an application to transfer a child from a colored school to a white school without the knowledge and consent of such parent could be prosecuted for forgery; and (2) Whether a notary public who witnessed the signature could also be prosecuted. While your letter does not so state, I assume that the transfer application to which you refer is one which is required of parents seeking to transfer their children from one public school to another under the provisions of a "freedom of choice" plan of school desegregation adopted by a local school board. It also appears from your letter that some of the relevant factual considerations (e.g., whether the notary was aware that the individual signing the application was not the person he held himself out to be) may not yet be known. And finally, I have no knowledge as to whether Constitution, for example, provides that the expense of an election called by a county school board to raise the twenty mill limitation on the school tax shall be borne by the county. Similarly, see Ga. Code Ann. 32-1107 and 34-402. 46 the transfer application in question constituted a sworn statement or affidavit of the individual in question, or merely a signed but unsworn letter where the notary merely witnessed the signature. In view of my limited familiarity with the precise facts involved, it follows that I am not able to reply to your question with a clearcut yes-or-no answer. Consequently, the instant letter does no more than attempt to point out the legal considerations involved. These considerations are: l. Possible criminal violations if the transfer application constitutes a sworn statement or affidavit. In your letter you refer to the signature having been witnessed by a notary public but do not state whether or not the document signed was a sworn statement or affidavit. If the transfer application does constitute a sworn statement or affidavit, the situation obviously becomes something quite different from that of an unsworn statement with the notary merely signing as a witness to the signature. If the statement was sworn, the individual would appear to be subject to prosecution for "false swearing" under Ga. Code Ann. 26-4003 which provides: "False swearing shall consist in wilfully, knowingly, absolutely, and falsely swearing, either with or without laying the hand on the Holy Evangelist of Almighty God, or affirming in any matter or thing, other than a judicial proceeding, by a person to whom a lawful oath or affirmation has been administered." The penalty is three to ten years in the penitentiary (see Ga. Code Ann. 26-4004), and if it can be shown that the notary was aware of the false swearing it would seem that the notary would be subject to the same penalty, as a principal in the second degree (an accomplice). See Ga. Code Ann. 26-501. If the facts were to show actual inducement of the individual's false swearing by the notary he would also be subject to prosecution for "subornation of false swearing" under Ga. Code Ann. 26-4005. 2. Possible criminal violations if the transfer application does not constitute a sworn statement or affidavit. If the transfer application does not constitute a sworn statement or affidavit it would appear to me that the only forgery statute which might be held applicable would be Ga. Code Ann. 26-3914 "Forging any other writing." This section provides: 47 "Any person who shall fraudulently make, sign, forge, counterfeit, or alter, or he concerned in the fraudulent making, signing, forging, counterfeiting, or altering of any other writing not herein provided for, or shall fraudulently utter, publish, pass, or tender the same, knowing the said writing to be forged, or counterfeited, or falsely and fraudulently altered, with intent to defraud any person, firm, or corporation, or shall fraudulently cause or procure the same to be done, shall be punished by imprsionment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than five years." The crux of the problem of applying this provision, of course, is that of whether an "intent to defraud" is present, such "intent to defraud" being an essential element of the offense of forgery. See Goldstein v. The State, 94 Ga. App. 437, 438 (1956) (cert. denied); Moore v. Bank ofDahlonega, 82 Ga. App. 142, 148 (1950); Grier v. The State, 64 Ga. App. 718,721 (1941). Unfortunately (but under the peculiar circumstances not surprisingly) I have been unable to locate any Georgia decision in point and any answer to your question is therefore somewhat speculative, with the matter really being subject to determination only in the courts. On the other hand it can be said the required "intent to defraud" is ordinarily not limited to situations where money or property is obtained by the forged document. See 37 C.J.S. Forgery 4. It is generally sufficient to show that the forged instrument was designed to prejudice the rights of some person. Ibid. 1 In Georgia it would seem that any intention to trick, deceive or mislead a person into taking an action which he otherwise might not have taken might well be sufficient. In Isaacs v. The State, 7 Ga. App. 799, 801 (1910), for example, the Court of Appeals said: " To defraud' includes to deceive. While the accusation in the present case does not in terms charge that the representations were made by the defendant with intent to deceive, it states it even more strongly by alleging that the 1. In the present situation there would clearly seem to be prejudice both to the right of the parents to select their child's school and to the right of the school board to rely on such choice in making pupil and teacher assignments. 48 representations made by the defendant were fraudulent . 'fraudulent' is defined as something that will deceive, cheat, and mislead; inducing belief in what is not true and causing one to act upon such belief." See also Wood v. The State of Georgia, 48 Ga. 193, 298 (1873). While it is true that the factual situations in the foregoing cases were completely different from the instant one (forgery not being involved in the former case) I am of the opinion that the concept expressed therein regarding "fraudulent" and "defraud" would more likly than not be held by the courts to be applicable to the "intent to defraud" referred to in Ga. Code Ann. 26-3914. I therefore conclude that a conviction for forging under this code section is quite possible in the situation of false transfer applications. OPINION 65-31 August 5, 1965 You requested an opinion from this office concerning whether the Board of Examiners of Nurses for Georgia may distribute to each licensee a questionaire provided by the American Nurses Association, a private professional organization. The contemplated distribution would be accomplished by the questionaires being mailed from your office at the same time and in the same envelope in which an application for annual license renewal is mailed to each registered nurse in this State. You also asked whether your office might legally perform a somewhat similar service at the request of the American Association of Dental Examiners, another private professional association. Putting the questions another way, may the State legally include in the envelope with its official mailing questionnaires or information of a private association which, while of interest to the profession with which a State Board is concerned, is not material required by the State Board in the performance of its statutory duties? While the Association would at its expense furnish the questionnaire or information, and while it might agree to reimburse the State for any additional expense incurred, State employees would be used in State offices to perform the mailing function. Also, the State would pay for the postage cost which, even though 49 it would have been incurred in any event, and probably in the same amount, would be attributable in part to the mailing of the questionnaire or informati9n of the private Association. Even though the costs incurred on behalf of the Association of services and pro-rata postage would be difficult to ascertain, they would nevertheless be costs incurred for private as opposed to official public purposes. Moreover, the request of the Nurses Association or the Dental Association cannot be placed in a vacuum and dealt with without regard to the over-all operation of your office. There are twenty-seven examining boards which utilize the Joint Secretary and his offices. Each of those boards represents a separate and distinct profession or business calling. Virtually every one of those professions or businesses has a national and/ or State association, which is private and not in any way officially connected with the professional examining board or any other arm of the State Government. Each such association from time to time conducts, or potentially may conduct, surveys in which it seeks or will seek information from members of the profession it represents. Moreover, each such association disseminates information to its members and would in many cases like to distribute the information to licensed nonmembers as well. It would be most convenient to the association if it were able, through your office, to solicit from or distribute to all members of the profession it represents information in which it is interested. The potential volume of work which you could be called upon to perform on behalf of private associations is therefore appreciable, since it must be assumed that if it is legal as well as administratively practicable and desirable to perform the function for one professional association, it must be done for all. It is our opinion that your office cannot legally perform the requested services on behalf of a private association, since no matter how careful you were to attempt to assign to the project the added costs involved and pass such costs on to the association, it would be virtually impossible to prevent incurring some cost to the State on behalf of a private association. 50 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Constitution of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402) provides in part: "I. The General Assembly shall not by vote, resolution or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation or association ...." If the General Assembly cannot authorize the performance of gratuitous services (which would be granting a donation or gratuity), a fortiori, an administrative board created by the General Assembly is under a similar prohibition. No matter how worthy is the proposed project, or how laudable the purpose of the Nurses Association or the Dental Association, our conclusion must be the same. "Incidental advantage to the public or to the State, which results from the promotion of private interests . . . does not justify their aid by the use of public money." 42 Am. Jur. 758. You are of course free to allow the various associations access to the mailing lists of licensees governed by the several State boards, since such lists are public information in any event and since you undoubtedly wish to cooperate to the extent legally possible and administratively feasible with bringing about improved conditions in all of the professions under your jurisdiction. However, there must be a crystal clear separation between the official work performed by your office and the work which should appropriately be performed by a private professional association. OPINION 65-32 August 9, 1965 I have your letter together with enclosed copies ofletters from the Douglas-Coffee County Chamber of Commerce, relative to a tract of land located in Coffee County, Georgia, which is presently owned by the State of Georgia and is under the jurisdiction of the Georgia Department of Defense. The correspondence attached to your letter discloses that the Cable Raincoat Co. of Boston, Massachusetts, has tentatively selected Coffee County, Georgia, as the site for the development of a substantial new industry, provided it is able to immediately purchase a certain tract of land located therein which is owned by the State of Georgia. 51 You state in your letter that a primary investigation reveals that the property is surplus to the needs of the State, and request my official opinion as to whether you, as Governor, would be authorized to issue an Executive Order effectuating the sale of this property through the State Purchasing Department, after proper advertisement, to the highest and best bidder. Under the Constitution and the laws of Georgia, it seems clear that the power to dispose of State owned property rests in the legislature, and such property may not be sold or otherwise disposed of without specific legislative approval. This general principle is stated in 81 C. J. S., 107, p. 1079, and reads as follows: "State property cannot be sold or disposed of except by authority of law, but in the absence of constitutional limitations, the State, like any individual owner of property, may convey its property in any way it sees fit, and its grant may be express or by necessary implication. The power to dispose of State property is vested in the Legislature, which may make provision therefor by statute and may regulate or change anytime the method of disposition, and the statutory provisions must be complied with or the sale or disposition thereof will be void." (Emphasis added.) I also call to your attention the following concise language as an excerpt from a decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia relating to this problem: "The problem arises from the fact that only the Legislature can dispose of State property or any interest therein, unless, of course, the Legislature has given some official this authority." Western Union Telegraph Company v. W. & A. Railroad Company, 142 Ga. 532, 534 (1915). This office has furnished several rulings to the effect that State property cannot be leased, sold or otherwise disposed of without legislative authority. The only exception to this rule is stated in Ga. Code Ann. 91-804, which reads as follows: "91-804. Unserviceable property so/d.-When any public property shall become unserviceable, it may be sold or otherwise disposed of, by order of the proper authority, and an entry of the same shall be made in said book, and the money received therefrom shall be paid into the treasury." 52 Under the provisiOns of Ga. Code Ann. 91-805, "proper authority" is defined as follows: "91-805. 'Proper authority' defined.-The 'proper authority' referred to in this Chapter is the Governor, for all officers of the State; and the county commissioners or other officers having charge of county matters, for all officers of the county." In the case of Dyer, eta!. v. Martin, eta!., 132 Ga. 445 (1909), and in the case of Trapnell v. Candler County, 146 Ga. 617 (1917), the Supreme Court of Georgia, in construing the above quoted Code sections, held: "When any public property shall become unserviceable, it may be sold or otherwise disposed of by order of the proper authority. Public property becomes unserviceable in the purview of this law, so as to empower the proper authority to sell the same, when such property cannot be beneficially or advantageously used under all the circumstances." The usual procedure followed in the sale and disposition of State property is for the proper State Department head to submit to the Governor for determination a statement that the property has become unserviceable, and cannot be beneficially or advantageously used under all the circumstances, and the Governor is the proper authority to make determination if the property is actually unserviceable and should be sold or otherwise disposed of. You further state in your letter that Major General George J. Hearn, Adjutant General of the State of Georgia, has advised you that the property here in question is surplus to the needs of and cannot be beneficially or advantageously used by the State Department of Defense. Therefore, it is my opinion that should you, as Chief Executive of the State of Georgia, determine that the property involved is surplus to the needs of the State, you may, by appropriate Executive Order, authorize the sale of said property through the office of the State Supervisor of Purchases; and provide for the proper advertisement for receipt of sealed bids and the award to the highest bidder, reserving the right to reject any and all bids and provide that the proceeds from the sale of the land be paid into the State Treasury. 53 This writer was of the opinion, prior to the receipt of your letter, that transactions of this nature were covered under the Act of 1964 creating the State Properties Control Commission. However, in reading this Act, it is my opinion that such is not the case, and this conclusion is further supported by the fact that the General Assembly did not repeal the Code sections herein cited pertaining to the power of the Governor to dispose of unserviceable property. As a precautionary measure, it is suggested by this office that you secure at least three appraisals of this property prior to the execution of any Executive Order, and in this manner it can be determined that the bids, when submitted, are made on a fair and equitable basis, and the public is receiving just and adequate compensation for the property. OPINION 65-33 (Unofficial) August II, 1965 You tefer to the inability of the Hall County Board of Education to "purchase" needed school busses due to the fact that its borrowing capacity under Art. VII, Sec. VI I, Par. IV of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6004) is not sufficient to permit financing through a "temporary loan." In specificity you desire to know whether it would be possible for the Board to enter into a lease agreement whereunder it would lease such busses for a single year and have three one-year renewal options plus a purchase option exercisable at the end of the final renewal period. It appears from your letter that a local bank would be willing to purchase the school busses and then lease them to the school board under such an agreement. OPINION It is my opinion that a lease agreement whereunder a county school board leases school busses for a single year is not on its face illegal merely because such agreement also gives the school board three one-year renewal options coupled with a purchase option exercisable at the end of the final renewal period. Such an agreement might be subject to attack, however, if the yearly "rental payments" are so grossly in excess of what reasonably could be considered to be the "fair rental value" of the busses as to lead to a conclusion that the transaction, while disguised as a lease plus purchase option, is essentially a "conditional sale." 54 DISCUSSION That a county school board is authorized to lease as well as purchase school busses would hardly seem to require extended comment. Suffice it to say that such authority is clearly set forth by statute. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 32-425, 32-427, 32-909, 32928, and 32-618. Hence there is no problem relating to legality of the subject matter of the lease agreement contemplated. The problem which is presented arises instead from certain limitations and restrictions which the laws of Georgia place upon the power of a county school board to incur by contract, a pecuniary obligation which extends beyond the year during which such obligation came into being. You refer in your letter, for example, to Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-6004) which, in addition to all other obligations, allows county boards of education to make temporary loans between January 1st and December 31st of each year to pay expenses for such year. This constitutional provision also restricts such "temporary loans" to an amount not exceeding 75% of the boards' gross income during the last preceding year (in addition to containing certain other limitations), and you have indicated that because of such restrictions the Hall County Board of Education is unable to finance the purchase of busses through a temporary loan. You also mention Ga. Code Ann. 32-928 which provides: "It shall be unlawful for any board of education to make any contract involving the expenditure of funds in excess of the total appropriation for the current fiscal year, provided county boards of education shall have authority to contract for the transportation of pupils for a period not to exceed four years. Any indebtedness created, contract made, or order or draft issued in violation therefore shall be void." But although this statute would on its face seem to empower a school board to enter into contracts "for the transportation of pupils for a period not to exceed four years," I am of the opinion that it would be right adventurous to rely on this seeming legislative exception to the general prohibition therein of contracts involving the expenditure of funds in excess of the total appropriation for the current fiscal year. The reason that I question the wisdom of any great reliance on this pupil transportation "exception" is that even assuming that the authority to contract for the transportation of pupils for a period up to four years is inclusive of a power to 55 contract for the lease ofschool busses for such period, I would have great reservations as to the constitutionality of the authorization. Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-600 1) places a general prohibition upon the incurring of any new "debt" by a political division or subdivision 1 of this State (other than temporary loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue) unless the majority of voters in the subdivision give their assent thereto. In City of Dawson v. Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 712-13 (1899), the Supreme Court of Georgia defined the word "debt" as used in a similar restriction contained in the 1877 Constitution as follows: "Debt, therefore, as used in the constitution, is to be understood as a liability which is undertaken and which must be discharged at some time in the future, but which is not to be discharged by a tax levied within the year in which the liability is undertaken." It therefore seems to me that any contract which obligates a county board of education to make payments for a period of more than one year is prohibited by the Constitution of this State, any statute to the contrary notwithstanding. See also, e.g., Barwick v. Roberts, 188 Ga. 655 (2) (1939) and 192 Ga. 783 (1941); Byars v. City of Griffin, 168 Ga. 41, 56-59 (1929); Renfroe v. Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81 (1913). On the other hand a lease agreement for a term of a single year involving nothing more than expenditure of income anticipated during the year (from taxes and appropriations) would not under the foregoing language of the Supreme Court of Georgia, create a "debt." This being so such a lease agreement would not be in danger of running afoul the constitutional debt limitations and for that matter would also be consistent with the general restrictions set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 32-928. l can see no reason why one or more bona fide options in the lease agreement the school board to renew the lease for additional one-year terms would vitiate the agreement. Nor would it necessarily make a difference that such I. It is settled that school districts are political subdivisions within the meaning of this constitutional provision. See, e.g., Campbell v. Red Bud Consolidated School District, 185 Ga. 541, 548 (1938). 56 renewal options were coupled with purchase option exercisable at the end of the final renewal option. The only possible problem that I can think of in connection with a renewable one-year lease coupled with a purchase option (as is here contemplated) would be a situation where the yearly "rental" payments are so greatly in excess of anything which could reasonably be considered to be the "fair rental value" of the busses as would lead a court to conclude that the transaction, while disguised as a lease-purchase option agreement, is in actuality a "conditional sale" with the "rental" payments constituting installments on the purchase price. To avoid attack on this theory it would seem to be advisable to keep the yearly payments under the agreement within the range of "fair rental value" even though this would presumably cause the sale price under the purchase option to be something more than "nominal." OPINION 65-34 (Unofficial) August 12, 1965 Your letter to the Secretary of State, State of Georgia, in which you asked whether it is legal for a Justice of the Peace to change the court day of his court without legal authority, has been referred to me. May I direct your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 24-90 I and 24902 which provide: "24-90 I. Justices of the Peace shall hold their respective court monthly at fixed times and places; and when from any reason the business of such court cannot be disposed of in one day, such courts may hold from to day or adjourn to such time as may be agreed upon by the parties, with the consent of the court, until the business is disposed of." (Emphasis added.) "24-902. All justice courts for militia districts embraced in whole or in part within the corporate limits of any of the cities having by the last authorized census of said city a population of over 5,000 inhabitants, shall have jurisdiction as fixed by the Constitution in and over said district and in and over said city, and shall hold their courts monthly at }i'xed times and places at some convenient place within said district or city, said time and place to be fixed as now provided by law. 57 Said justices of the peace may hold their courts at the same or at different times or at the same or dif]erent places, as they may desire." (Emphasis added.) May I also direct your attention to the case of McDonald v. Marshall et al., commissioners; et vice versa, 185 Ga. 438 (1938), wherein Justice Hutcheson said referring to 24-902: "This law does not, by the italicized expression, permit the individual justices of the peace who are within the purview of the section to change the time and place of holding their court 'as they may desire'. It merely provides that the several justices of the peace need not hold their courts at the same time and place, but each individual justice of the peace may hold his court at a time and place different from the others, 'said time and place to be fixed as now provided by law.'" Your letter does not state whether the justice court you inquired about is within the corporate limits of any city nor does it state the time and place fixed by law for holding the court. However, it is my unofficial opinion that by virtue of the above quoted, a justice of the peace has no authority to change the time for holding court so fixed by law without legislative sanction and that any judgments rendered at times or places other than those fixed by law are void. See Freeman v. Gaither, 76 Ga. 741 (18g6); Baker v. Thompson & Scott, 89 Ga. 486 (1892); Cox v. Hillyer, 65 Ga. 57 (1880); and Morris & Company v. Hinson, 144 Ga. 705 ( 1915). OPINION 65-35 (Unofficial) August 12, 1965 Your letter to the Attorney General of the State of Georgia, in which you asked an opinion on several questions relative to funds received by the City of Fort Valley from the State of Georgia under the 1965 Act authorizing municipal grants, has been referred to me for reply. Your first question is: "(I) May the city lawfully invest all or any portion of such funds in short-term obligations?" May I direct your attention to the provisions of Section I of the 58 Act authorizing these grants (Ga. L. 1965, p. 458), which provides as follows: "Section l. It is hereby declared to be the purpose and intent of the General Assembly that State funds be made available to the governing bodies of certain incorporated municipalities of this State to aid them in fulfilling their responsibility to construct and maintain a system of public roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges and appurtenances, and to provide traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic therein, and funds made available under this Act shall be used for such purposes and not otherwise." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Code Ann. 89-816.1 provides: "89-816.1. Investment of surplus, or of funds not immediately needed, in United States war bonds or other obligations.- It shall be lawful for the treasurer of any municipality or county or board of trustees of any independent school district to invest any surplus funds in his hands, or any special funds held or being accumulated for any special purpose, or any funds on hand not required for the operation of the municipality, county, or school district for the current fiscal year, to invest such funds in war bonds andjor other valid obligations of the United States Government repayable at face value or better when such investment is authorized by the mayor and general council, county commission, ordinary, board of trustees, or other authority in charge ~f the affairs of said municipality, county, or independent school district: Provided, funds accumulated for any special purpose shall be invested only in securities whose maturity date is prior to the date when such funds shall be needed for said special purposes or which are redeemable prior thereto without penalty or loss of principal. "Any bonds or other securities purchased or held pursuant to the preceding paragraph shall be held subject to the same conditions as those attached to the funds from which same were purchased." Under the provisions of the above quoted Code section, it would appear that the City of Fort Valley has the authority to invest any of its funds, general or special, in government obligations according 59 to the context of the Code section. The only restnctwn which would be placed on the funds which are the subject of your inquiry would be those restrictions of Section 1 of the Act above quoted which provides that " ... funds made available under this Act shall be used for such purposes and not otherwise." In this connection, may I direct your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 102-102(9) which provides: "In all interpretations, the court shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view, at all times, the old law, the evil, and the remedy." May I also direct your attention to the definition provided in Black's Law Dictionary for the word "shall." After stating that the word "shall" is obligatory or mandatory, the dt;finition further provides that it may be construed as merely permissive or directory (as equivalent to "may") to carry out the legislative intention and in cases where no right or benefit to anyone depends on its being taken in the imperative sense, and where no public or private right is impaired by its interpretation in the other sense. It is my unofficial opinion that the limitation imposed by Section 1 of the Act authorizing these grants was intended by the Legislature to be a limitation on the final use of these funds and that the word "shall" as used in that section should be interpreted as permissive or directory when the question of temporary investment of these funds is considered. Certainly no right or benefit is lost by taking this interpretation; but to the contrary, the benefit of capital earnings is lost if this interpretation is not taken. Therefore, construing Section 1 of Georgia Laws 1965, p. 458, in pari materia with Ga. Code Ann. 89-816.1, it is my unofficial opinion that the General Assembly intended the funds granted to the municipalities to be special funds and did not intend to restrict them so as to prohibit their temporary investment so long as the investment does not interfere in any way with the expedient use of the funds for the purposes provided in the Act, and the maturity date of the government obligations does not extend beyond the date when such funds shall be needed for these purposes. Your second and third questions are as follows: "(2) If such investment is permitted, may the term for 60 which such funds are so invested extend beyond the end of the city's current fiscal year?" "(3) If such investment is permitted, may the term for which such funds are so invested extend beyond the end of the State of Georgia's current fiscal year?" The answers to your second and third questions have been provided in the discussion of your first question, above, since the term for the investment of the funds is governed by the date the funds will be needed rather than by the fiscal accounting year of either the State of Georgia or the City of Fort Valley. Your fourth question is: "(4) If such investment is permitted, is the interest derived therefrom subject to the same restrictions regarding the purpose for which it may be spent by the municipalities as the principal?" In answer to your last question, may I direct your attention to the last paragraph of Ga. Code Ann. 89-816.1 which has been quoted above. According to that paragraph, any bonds or securities which have been purchased would be held subject to the same conditions as those attached to the funds from which the same were purchased. It is my unofficial opinion that the use of the word "bonds" as used in these provisions should be construed to include the obligation to repay the principal as well as the obligation to pay any interest or premium. Therefore, it is further my unofficial opinion that any interest earned by the investment of the funds granted to the municipalities by the State of Georgia would be subject to the same conditions as those attached to the funds from which the bonds were purchased. OPINION 65-36 (Unofficial) August 13, 1965 You inquire as to the extent and procedure in Georgia for the legal issuance of beer, wine and liquor licenses. I am sure that you realize that the law with respect to issuing licenses for each of these products is different. The law concerning the issuance of licenses to sell liquor is contained in Ga. Code Ann. Chapter 58-10 and we are enclosing 61 for your convenience a printed pamphlet contammg this Code chapter. You will note that prior to the issuance of any licenses to sell liquor, the residents of the county must vote in a referendum to authorize the sale of such products within the county. Our Supreme Court has held that where the county has voted to adopt rules and regulations for the sale of alcoholic liquors in the county, that each and every city must respond to the referendum and cannot arbitrarily refuse to issue licenses where the majority of those in the county have voted in the affirmative. Stephens, Mayor, et a/. v. Moran, 221 Ga. 4 (1965). According to the records in this office, Paulding County has not yet voted in such a referendum and neither have the surrounding counties. With respect to the sale of malt beverages or beer, the General Assembly of Georgia provided that the County Commissioners could issue licenses or refuse to issue licenses in their discretion. Ga. Code Ann. 58-718. The General Assembly in passing this law made no provision for any referendum on this subject, and therefore, the referendum would not be authorized. Ga. Code Ann. 58-807 provides for an election to determine whether or not the sale of wines shall be prohibited and in essence, therefore, provides that the sale shall be legal unless an election is held and it is voted to prohibit the sale. OPINION 65-37 August 16, 1965 You requested my opinion concerning whether, under a so-called "population act," a county whose population under the then applicable census would bring it within the purview of the Act would, when a later census reflected a change in population which removed it from the population limits set forth in the act, automatically be removed from within the purview of the Act. Conversely, where a county's population did not at the time of an Act's passage and approval come within the limits set forth in the act, would a subsequent change in that county's population as reflected by a later official census automatically bring that county within the purview of the act? The answer to both questions is "Yes." The Supreme Court of Georgia has held on various occasions that the legislature is authorized to make a classification of cities or 62 counties based on population, provided certain requirements are met, including the requirement that "The act is so framed as to let in all cities (counties) coming within the population classification, and let out all cities falling below the classification." City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368 (1960). See also Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31 (1914); Murphy v. West, 205 Ga. 116(1949). The Warm Air Heating Contractors Act (Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1622, as amended) with which you are specifically concerned contains language which meets the above requirement. The original act applies to "counties having a population of 85,000 inhabitants or more by the U. S. Census of 1940 or any future U. S. Census ... " Subsequent amendatory legislation broadened the purview of the Act to include various other counties with population within specified minimum and maximum limits "according to the U. S. Census of 1950 or any future U.S. Census." Accordingly, as a new census becomes the then current census, only counties meeting the population requirements set forth in the Act according to the then current census are covered by the Act. OPINION 65-38 August 17, 1965 You ask whether a superior court judge in a multiple county judicial circuit who also sits as a juvenile court judge pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 24-2403, may, when sitting as a juvenile court judge, hold a hearing in a county which although within his "judicial circuit," is not the county of the child's legal residence. You point out that the feeling of many superior court judges that the hearing must be held in the county of the child's residence has the harmful effect of delaying juvenile hearings and causing children to remain in jail for unnecessarily long periods. My opinion respecting the question you have posed, along with the reasons therefor, is as follows: OPINION It is my opinion that a juvenile court hearing must be held in the county in which the juvenile resides. DISCUSSION The laws of Georgia provide for the existence of juvenile courts in every county of the State (see Ga. Code Ann. 24-240 I, 24-2403) 63 and limit the jurisdiction of such courts to certain enumerated matters involving juveniles who are "living or found within the county" wherein thejuveni_le court sits. Inasmuch as proceedings in juvenile courts are civil rather than criminal in nature (Hampton v. Stevenson, 210 Ga. 87 (l) (1953)), and inasmuch as Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. VI of the Constitution of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 24906) provides that civil cases shall be tried in the county wherein the defendant resides, the Court of Appeals has held that a child who has committed a crime in a county other than that of his residence cannot be proceeded against in a juvenile court outside the county of his residence (even though he clearly would be subject to criminal prosecution in the superior court of the county in which the crime was committed). Whitman v. The State, 96 Ga. App. 730 (2) (1957). Inasmuch as the territorial jurisdiction of a juvenile court is fixed as the county within which such court sits, and in view of the above cited constitutional provision, I can see no basis for any contention that a juvenile court hearing may be held in some other county merely because of the fact that the individual who sits as the juvenile court judge in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. 242403, is also the judge of a multiple county judicial circuit. That the judicial functions of an individual who sits both as a superior court judge and as a juvenile court judge are separate and distinct respecting each court would also seem to be implicit in the language of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2403 which provides inter alia: "The above provisions shall be construed to mean that the [superior court] judge is presiding over a juvenile court of such county, which he shall thereupon establish and conduct as separate and distinct to any other court to which he may have been elected or appointed." (Emphasis added.) OPINION 65-39 August 18, 1965 You ask whether county commissioners can lawfully aid their county school board in its operation of a vocational-technical school by financial assistance from the general tax fund of the county. My opinion along with the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION In my opinion county commissioners cannot lawfully aid their county school board in its operation of a vocational-technical 64 school by financial assistance from the general tax fund of the county. DISCUSSION Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgi11 of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701) declares that the General Assembly shall not have power to delegate to any county the right to levy a tax for any purpose except those specifically set forth therein. It is also well-settled that taxes raised for one specific purpose cannot lawfully be used for any other enumerated purpose. E. g. Atlanta ChamberofCommercev. McRay, 174 Ga. 581,594 (3) (1932); Burke v. Wheeler County, 54 Ga. App. 81, 85 (1936). It has frequently been stated, for example, that no expenditure from the public school fund can lawfully be made for anything which is not an "educational purpose." Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Company, 172 Ga. 378 (1931); accord, Ga. Code Ann. 32-942. The authority of the General Assembly to delegate taxation power to the counties for "educational purposes" is set forth in subparagraph 3 of the aforesaid Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the State Constitution, and provides that such delegation is legal: "For educational purposes upon property located outside of the independent school systems, as provided in Article VIJJ of this Constitution." (Emphasis added.) It would seem quite clear from the emphasized proviso of the above constitutional provision, however, that with respect to education the taxing power of the county is strictly limited, both in a procedural and in a substantive sense, to such taxation as is provided for in Art. VI I I of the Constitution. Looking then to Art. VII I, it is noted that the sole provision therein dealing with taxation by counties for educational purposes is Art. VIII, Sec. XII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-7501). The relevant portion of this constitutional provision states: "The fiscal authority of the several counties shall levy a tax for the support and maintenance of education not less than five mills (as recommended by the county board of education) upon the dollar of all taxable property in the county . . . ." To permit county commissioners to use general tax funds of the county to supplement the school tax raised under this constitutional provision would obviously render it meaningless. Hence, where a 65 county board of commissioners attempted to use another constitutionally included purpose, to wit: "To build and repair the public buildings and bridges," as a vehicle to permit the levy of a county tax for the building and repairing of public school buildings, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that such tax levy was (where the maximum school tax under the above quoted constitutional provision had already been imposed) violative of Art. VIII, Sec. XII, Par. I. See Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Twiggs County v. Bond, 203 Ga. 558 (1948). While the factual situations may be somewhat different there is little doubt in my mind but that the principles enunciated in the Twiggs County case would be controlling in the instant situation. For this reason I conclude that the county commissioners cannot lawfully aid their county school board in its operation of a vocational-technical school by financial assistance from the general tax fund of the county. OPI~ION 65-40 (Unofficial) August 19, 1965 You ask whether the City of Hull may expend funds provided under the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 458) for street light rental, stop or caution lights, Bush Hog mower for rights-of-way, signs for school bus stop and street names and litter barrels. A review of the above subject necessitates a discussion of the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. L. 1965, p. 458 ), which authorized grants to municipalities of the State of Georgia, and related law. Section I of that Act provides as follows: "'Section I. It is hereby declared to be the purpose and intent of the General Assembly that State funds be made available to the governing bodies of certain incorporated municipalities of this State to aid them in fulfilling their responsibility to construct and maintain a system of public roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges and appurtenances, and to provide traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic therein, and funds made available under this Act shall be used for such purposes and not otherwise." 66 To implement the provisions of this Act, the General Assembly appropriated for 1965-66 the sum of six million dollars. This amount was appropriated as part of the Highway Department budget, which budget was subject to the limitations as provided in Section 25 of the General Appropriations Act (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 44), which is quoted here: "Section 25. Highway Department. Appropriation of all funds in this Section is to be in conformity with and pursuant to Article VI I, Section IX, Paragraph IV, of the State Constitution, and shall be in an amount equal to all money derived from motor fuel taxes received by the State Treasurer in each of the immediately preceding years, less the amount of refunds, rebate and collection costs authorized by Jaw . . . " Subsection (b) to Art. VII, Sec. I X, Par. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6204) was an amendment proposed by Georgia Laws 1960, page !297, and ratified November 8, 1960. I quote the pertinent portion of this reference: "(b) An amount equal to all money derived from motor fuel taxes received by the State Treasurer in each of the immediately preceding fiscal years, less the amount of refunds, rebates and collection costs authorized by law, is hereby appropriated for the fiscal year beginning July l, of each year following, for all activities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges in this State, as authorized by laws enacted by the General Assembly of Georgia; and for grants to counties for aid in county road construction and maintenance, as provided by law authorizing the State Treasurer to make such grants . . . " May I direct your attention to portions of an opinion rendered by the Attorney General to the Director of the State Highway Department dated June !!, I963, which directed itself to problems under the Act approved October 8, 1962 (Ga. Laws 1962, Sept.Oct. Ex. Sess., p. 33), as amended by the Act approved April 9, 1963 (Ga. Laws 1963, p. 441), which were both repealed by the 1965 Act. I quote the pertinent portion of that reference: 67 "While the General Assembly would not, in view of this Constitutional provision, be authorized to divert state road funds to other purposes, the provision in my opinion leaves considerable latitude to the Legislature in defining what shall be and constitute activities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges; however, it has not attempted to confer the same latitude upon the municipalities in expending such funds granted to them ... "(Emphasis added.) Under the discussion of the constitutional limitations imposed on State road funds contained in that opinion and keeping in mind the prior Act and amendments relating to grants by the State of Georgia to municipalities, I conclude that "to construct and maintain a system of public roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges and appurtenances, and to provide traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic therein" would be "activities incident to providing and maintaining an adequate system of public roads and bridges in this State" under the provisions of Art. VII, Sec. I X, Par. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 as amended and the Georgia General Assembly by the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 458) declared the same within its latitude. It is further my opinion that the General Assembly by the language of the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 458) intended to confer upon the municipalities qualifying under the Act some latitude in determining what would 'be "traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic." However, I cannot conclude that such latitude is completely discretionary without limitations. May I further direct your attention to the provtsJOns of Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p. 228, 6501, relative to grants of powers to municipalities: " 6501. Grants of Powers to Municipalities. "Municipal powers are wholly derived from legislation, constitutions or both, and the rule has been very commonly announced that municipal powers are strictly limited to those expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily incidental to the objectives of the corporation. But in some respects the 68 municipality is a favorite of the law, since it is a segment of sovereign power, and so under the rule of 'sovereignty' a number of statutes imposing new or additional liabilities, duties or disabilities have been interpreted strictly, but in favor of the municipality.... Similarly, statutes granting powers which tend to be highly discriminatory, as for example, the power to grant exclusive franchises, or permitting the gratuitous distribution of taxpayer's money are interpreted strictly against the municipality." (Emphasis added.) The Act approved March 31, 1965, in my opinion authorizes grants to the qualifying municipalities. Since these grants are gratuitous aids and since the Act authorizing these grants confers some latitude upon the qualifying municipalities in determining what would be "traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic" in derogation of the will of the General Assembly, it is my opinion that Act should be strictly construed, but construed in pari materia with prior Acts and amendments authorizing grants to municipalities. Construing the Act approved March 31, 1965, in whole and keeping in mind the prior Acts and amendments authorizing grants to municipalities, it is my opinion that the General Assembly by the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 458), intended to aid qualifying municipalities to fulfill their responsibility to provide a system of roads and streets and to aid the municipalities m providing traffic control. Thereby, a reasonable construction of the Act would be one which best effectuates the end that funds so made available would be used directly and not indirectly for these purposes. Therefore, I am constrained to the position that funds received by municipalities under this Act must be used for "devices and equipment" which have as their primary function the direct control of traffic, or else provide a direct accommodation to the general flow of traffic. Under this construction then, Bush Hog mower for rights-of-way and litter barrels would not be legitimate expenditures. Since these items do not have as their primary function the direct control or accommodation of the tlow of traffic, although they may indirectly or as an auxiliary purpose facilitate the 11ow of traffic, they \\ ould not be qualified expenditures within the strict construction of the Act. 69 Street name signs present some difficulty. However, the usual and general purpose for street name signs is to facilitate individuals in gaining directions and is not strictly speaking a measure directed at controlling or accommodating the general t1ow of traffic. Therefore, it is my conclusion on this point that if street name signs are needed generally to mark streets they would not be a legitimate expenditure. Street light installation and street light rental also present some difficulty. Street lights may properly be used to accommodate the t1ow of traffic directly and such is the case, in my opinion, where street lights are installed at some point to illuminate traffic hazards or to illuminate particularly congested areas. At the same time, street lights may be used primarily to illuminate residential areas as a measure to control crime. On this point, I conclude then that where street lights are installed or rented primarily to directly control or accommodate the general t1ow of traffic. the expenses for such installation or rental would be legitimate expenses under the Act approved March 31, 1965. However, where stn:d lights are installed or rented as general city improvement or as a measure to control crime, then it is my opinion that the expenses of installation or renting would not be qualified expenditures. Under the foregoing discussion it is my opinion that stop or caution lights and signs for school bus stop would be legitimate expenditures by the municipalities. OPINION 65-41 (Unofficial) August 26, 1965 You state that you have a client who travels the rural areas selling cookies, candies and novelties from his automobile. You ask whether your client is subject to a State tax on rolling stores. Ga. Code Ann. 92-2952 defines the term "rolling store" as follows: "The term 'rolling store' as used in this law [ 92-2950 to 92-2960] shall be held to mean and include a motor vehicle of any kind or description traveling from place to place over the public roads and highways of this State transporting goods, wares, merchandise, or other commodities, and from or at which such goods, wares, merchandise, or other 70 commodities so transported are sold or offered for sale at retail or exchange for goods, wares, or products of any kind or character whatsoever. . . . " It is clear that your client operates a rolling store, as defined in the above Code section, and since the goods which he sells are not goods excluded from the operation of the law as defined in Ga. Code Ann. 92-2954, 92-2961, I must conclude that he would be subject to a State tax imposed on rolling stores. OPINION 65-42 (Unofficial) August 27, 1965 You request an opmwn from this Department concerning whether or not the Mayor and Council can enter into a contract or lease which extends beyond the term of office of said officials, and whether the Mayor and Council can borrow money where the Mayor signs a note which extends beyond the terms of office of the Mayor and Council. Your first question asks whether or not the Mayor and Council can enter into a contract or lease which extends beyond their terms of office. The Mayor and Council of the City of Greenville have the power to "contract and be contracted with so far as may be necessary to the proper management of the affairs of said city." Ga. Laws 1886-87, pp. 498, 500. While a municipal corporation may bind itself by, and cannot abrogate any contract which it has the right to make under its charter, one Council cannot, by ordinance, bind itself and its successors to a given line of policy, or prevent free legislation by them in matters of municipal government. Williams v. The City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816. See also Ga. Code Ann. 69-202. Acts which a city cannot do by an ordinance cannot be done by a contract. Screws v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga. 839. While it appears that a contract could be entered into which extends beyond the terms of office of a Mayor and Councilmen, this writer emphasizes the fact that "a municipal corporation has no power to make contracts restricting or limiting its legislative or governmental powers," and that a contract which restricts the legislative and governmental powers of future councils is ultra vires and void. Barr v. City Council ofAugusta, 206 Ga. 751. 71 Your second question is concerned with whether or not the Mayor and Council can borrow money where the Mayor signs a note, payment of which extends beyond the terms of office of the Mayor and Council. Municipalities which are authorized to levy taxes are authorized to make temporary loans between January 1st and December 31st in each year to pay expenses for such year. The loan must be payable on or before December 31st of the calendar year in which the loan is made. Ga. Code Ann. 2-6004, Art. VII, Par. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945. The City of Greenville is, of course, authorized to levy taxes. Ga. Laws 1886-87, p. 498, as amended. Since the Mayor and Councilmen of Greenville are elected on the first Wednesday in April of each year and hold office for a period of one year (Ga. Laws 1886-87, pp. 498, 499), a temporary loan payable beyond the term of office of the Mayor and Council could not be made as of this date because any such loan would have to be paid by December 31st in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution. OPINION 65-43 August 30, 1965 You requested an official opinion concerning any possibility of waiving the residence requirements of six months for students entering barber schools or barber colleges. The law pertaining to barber students, as set forth in Georgia Laws pp. 603, 612 (Ga. Code Ann. 84-410), provides in part as follows: "Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit any person over the age of sixteen (16) years and who has been a resident of the State of Georgia for at least six (6) months from learning said occupation under a barber. . . ." While it is understood that the new residence requirement works a hardship in some cases, it appears that the law is clear, and that no person may study barbering in this State without first meeting the residence requirement. OPINION 65-44 August 31, 1965 You discuss the erosion taking place at the "Etowah Indian Mounds" property and your past negotiations with the United 72 States Army Corps of Engineers respecting this problem. You have attached a letter from the U. S. Army Engineer District of Mobile, Alabama, in which the suggestion is made that the necessary erosion control work be undertaken by the Historical Commission under a cost reimbursable contract with the Corps of Engineers (with all subsequent maintenance to be the responsibility of the Historical Commission). The letter further suggests that if the Historical Commission lacks the authority or staff to physically carry out such a contract, thought should be given to obtaining assistance from some other State agency which could contract for the work on behalf of the Georgia Historical Commission. Your letter indicates that you are uncertain as to your authority (1) to request such work by another State agency and (2) to "assume future liability" (by which I assume you refer to any contractual obligation on your part respecting future maintenance of the erosion control structures). My opinions respecting these matters, along with the reasons therefor, are as follows: OPINION ( 1) I am of the opinion that the Georgia Historical Commission is legally authorized to cooperate and enter into agreements with certain other agencies of the State of Georgia respecting such matters as erosion control at historic sites. This being so, I believe that it would be perfectly proper for the Commission to request of and agree with the Department of State Parks, Historic Sites and Monuments, that the latter enter into a contract with the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers whereunder it (i.e., the Department of State Parks) would erect erosion control structures on the "Etowah Indian Mounds" property with monies made available by the Federal Government. (2) It would not be legal, however, for the Georgia Historical Commision or the Department of State Parks to incur a contractual obligation with respect to future maintenance of such erosion control structures. DISCUSSION ( 1) The Board of Commissioners of the Georgia Historical Commission is empowered to adopt and execute general plans, methods and policies for permanently preserving sites and areas of historic interest, Ga. Code Ann. 40-811a (a), and is further authorized: 73 "To coordinate any of its objectives, efforts or functions with those of any agency or agencies of . . . this State . . . having duties, powers or objectives similar or related to those of the commission and to cooperate, counsel and advise with them." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Code Ann. 40-8lla (c). It would seem to me that this statutory language clearly vests the Board of Commissioners of the Georgia Historical Commission with a general authority to enter into agreements with other State agencies respecting such matters as erosion control at a historic site, provided, that such other State agency has related or similar duties, powers or objectives pertaining to the erosion problem. One State agency which immediately comes to mind in this connection is the Department of State Parks, Historic Sites and Monuments. Ga. Code Ann. 43-124 (f) empowers and directs this Department: "To contract and make cooperative agreements with the United States Government, political subdivisions of the State, corporations, associations, or individuals . . . to protect, restore, preserve . . . any historic, archeologic or scientific site, ground . . . or other property for public use: Provided, that no contract or cooperative agreement shall be made or entered into unless or until the General Assembly has appropriated money therefor or fimds have otherwise become available for said purposes." (Emphasis added.) Thus there would seem to be no question as to the Department's authority to undertake the contemplated erosion control project for the Georgia Historical Commission's benefit if and when Federal funds are made available by the Corps of Engineers. This being so I am unaware of any reason why the Georgia Historical Commission could not properly request the Department of State Parks to enter into such a contract. (2) It would not be legal, however, for either the Georgia Historical Commission or the Department of State Parks, Historic Sites and Monuments to incur any contractual obligation respecting future maintenance of the erosion control structures. Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I of the State Constitution of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5601) prohibits the contracting of any State debt except for the few particular purposes enumerated in this constitutional provision (which purposes are not broad enough to 74 encompass maintenance of the instant erosion control project), and it is well settled that any contract in violation of this constitutional provision is invalid. Barwick v. Roberts, 192 Ga. 783 (5) (7) (1941); Barwick v. Roberts, 188 Ga. 655, 657-58 (1939); Renfroe v. City of Atlanta, 140 Ga. 81 (1913); Dawson v. Dawson Waterworks Co., 106 Ga. 696, 710-12 (1899) (wherein the term "debt" is defined for constitutional purposes as a liability not to be discharged by a tax levied during the year in which the liability was incurred). OPINION 65-45 August 31, 1965 You wrote concerning the compensation of an individual employed as a consultant to the State Board of Corrections. After referring to a proviso in the 1965 General Appropriations Act which generally limits any salary payable out of the Board's appropriation to the $15,600.00 which you receive as Director, you ask my opinion as to whether or not the employee in question may legally be paid a "subsistence allowance" of $2,000.00 in addition to his base salary of $15,600.00. In the General Appropriations Act of 1965, the following proviso was added at the end of Section 17 relating to the appropriation for the Department of Corrections: "Provided, that no funds appropriated in this Section or otherwise available, shall be used to pay a salary in excess of the Director's salary, except salaries for physicians." If this provision could be circumvented by so simple a means as calling part of the employee's compensation "subsistence allowance," it would quite obviously be rendered meaningless. I hardly think that a court of law would permit the will of the General Assembly to be so easily frustrated, especially in a matter involving the disbursement of public funds, and where no other statute exists (that I am aware of) which may be pointed to as expressly authorizing a "subsistence allowance" for such employee. In view of the above, it is my official opinion that the State Board of Corrections may not legally supplement the maximum salary which the law permits it to pay to one of its employees by means of a "subsistence allowance." 75 The opinion herein expressed applies only to the employees and circumstances involved. OPINION 65-46 (Unofficial) September 1, 1965 You inquire as to whether or not the Middle Georgia Coliseum Authority is liable for sales and use taxes on purchases of tangible personal property made by it. Section 3 (a) of the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act (Ga. Laws 1951, p. 360, et seq.), as amended, defines the word "person" for purposes of the Act as follows: "Person includes any ... corporation . . . body politic or political subdivision, whether public or private, or quasi public. . . ." Thus, it appears that the Coliseum Authority is subject to the Act and must pay the taxes imposed by it unless exempted by some provision of law. Insofar as I have been able to ascertain, the only tax exemption conferred on the Authority is that conferred by Section 4 of the Act approved March 15, 1963 (Ga. Laws 1963, p. 2250, et seq.), creating the Authority. According to its terms, "all the property, income, obligations and interest on the obligations of the Authority and the transfer thereof shall be and hereby are declared to be nontaxable for any and all purposes." This statutory language is not as broad as that dealt with in Oxford v. Housing Authority of the City of Barnesville, 104 Ga. App. 797 (1961), which provided that not only the Authority's property but the Authority itself was exempt from all taxes. Consequently, I feel that the Coliseum Authority's exemption is limited to taxes imposed on the particular subjects of taxation specifically mentioned and does not apply to taxes, like those imposed by the Sales and Use Tax Act, on the sale and use of tangible personal property. In the hope that it may be helpful, I am enclosing a copy of an official opinion, dated October 24, 1963, relating to the applicability of the Sales and Use Tax Act to the Jekyll IslandState Park Authority. 76 OPINION 65-47 (Unofficial) September 3, 1965 Replying to your letter, I have secured from the State Law Department the previous exchange of correspondence between the clerk of the superior court, Ware County, and myself, relative to the question as to whether or not court costs in reciprocal support cases should be paid by the solicitor general out of the $50 fee which he receives, in view of the fact that the clerk is now on a salary rather than a fee basis. As previously pointed out, Ga. Code Ann. 99-911 a pro- vides: "99-911a. Officials to represent plaintzff-The solicitor general of each superior court shall represent the plaintiff in any proceeding under this Chapter, and for such services he shall be paid the sum of $50 for each petition handled whether this State. is the initiating or responding State, which sum shall be in addition to any other fees, salaries or emoluments now received by the solicitor general from any source whatsoever. In all counties in which the clerk of the superior court and the sheriff of said county are on a fee basis, the solicitor general shall pay from said sum so received by him to the said clerk and to the said sheriff such fees as are allowed by law for filing of process and service of petitions filed under this Chapter. "Provided, however, the above stated sum shall not be paid to the solicitor general if he is provided, by the county in which the petition is handled, with an assistant who is an attorney-atlaw and whose sole and specific duty is to handle such petitions; in which event the sums received shall be paid into the treasury of said county. "Provided, further, however, that before the said sum shall be paid an order granting or denying support shall have been entered." If the above section is the only law touching on the subject, it is clear that the solicitor is not required to pay court costs out of the fees received in reciprocal support cases, as the two requirements for exemption prescribed by the statute appear to be present; i.e., the clerk is on a salary basis in Ware County, and your solicitor general does not have an assistant supplied by the county. 77 The Act referred to in your letter is a local Act placing the sheriff, clerk of superior court, ordinary, tax collector and tax receiver of Ware County upon a salary basis. (Ga. Laws 1961, Vol. 2, pp. 2465- 2472). It does not relate directly to the solicitor at all. The provision to which you make specific reference is Section 8, which in pertinent part provides: "Section 8. All fees, fines, forfeitures, commissions, costs, insolvent costs, allowances, penalties, funds, monies and all other emoluments and perquisites of whatever kind which shall be allowed said officers after the effective date of this Act, excepting said salaries accruing to each of said offices, but expressly including all emoluments and perquisites for services performed as officers of ex-officio officers of the City Court of Waycross or of any other court in said county, shall be and become the property of Ware County, Georgia, and said County is hereby subrogated to all rights, claims, and liens of said officers respectively therefor . . . ." I suppose that the argument is made that since the clerk was entitled to receive costs from the solicitor prior to the time that the clerk was placed on a salary basis, he is still entitled to do so under the 1961 local Act, the only difference being that he should pay these funds into the county treasury. I do not believe that this construction can be maintained, however. The 1961 Act refers only to fees, costs, etc., "which shall be allowed said officers after the effective date of this Act." After the effective date of the 1961 Act, Ga. Code Ann. 99-911a becomes operative and declares that the clerk shall not receive these costs. For this reason, I do not believe that the passage of the 1961 Act has altered the applicability of Ga. Code Ann. 99-911 a. OPINION 65-48 (Unofficial) September 7, 1965 You request my opinion on the proposition propounded by an offender's attorney in a driver's license suspension hearing that Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 571, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 95 A-607) applies only to nonresident motorists and therefore all sections implementing the above section apply only to nonresident motorists. 78 The particular language of Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 571, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-607) referred to by the attorney is as follows: "Upon notice of such default, the Director shall forthwith suspend the license and registration ofnonresident's operating privilege of such person defaulting which shall not be restored unless . . . " (Emphasis added.) The word "of' is the critical word on which the argument is based and although the attorney .in question admits that tht legislature probably intended to use the word "and" or "or," he submits that the statute is "penal in nature [and] must be limited strictly to the meaning of the language employed and not extended beyond the plain and explicit terms of the statute." Thompson v. Watson, 186 Ga. 396,406, 197 S.E. 774 (1938). While I have no quarrel with the above-stated rule, it is my opinion it is a secondary rule of construction and must be subordinated to the cardinal rule of statute construction that every effort must be made to seek out and give effect to the true intention of the legislature in passing the Act. Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361 (1854); Lamb v. Dunwoody, 94 Ga. 60, 20 S.E. 637 (1894); Roberts v. State, 4 Ga. App. 207{1), 60 S.E. 1082 (1908); Board of Tax-Assessors v. Catledge, 173 Ga. 656, 160 S.E. 909 (1931); Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, 187 S.E. 371 (1936); Curnells v. State, 199 Ga. 486, 34 S.E. 2d 685 (1945); Foster v. Vickery, 202 Ga. 55, 42 S.E.2d 117 (1947); Lamons v. Yarborough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949). It is admitted by all parties that the legislature intended that all motorists traveling the highways of this state be covered by the Georgia Safety Responsibility Act and not merely nonresident motorists. In addition, the offender's attorney admits that it is likely that a typographical error was made in the statute. It is well established in Georgia that "[the courts] should not adopt an arbitrary rule that the legislature intended to make a typographical or clerical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the Act, and destroy it." Lamons v. Yarborough, supra, at 50. In view of the fact that the legislative intent was to cover all motorists and the obvious typographical error existing in the statute, it is my opinion that the courts would hold that Ga. L. 79 1951, pp. 565, 571, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-607) applied to all motorists and not merely to nonresident motorists. OPINION 65-49 September 7, 1965 You requested my opinion on the proper procedure to enforce the statutory provision requiring that official vehicles be distinctly marked. Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 605 (Ga. Code Ann. 681707), provides as follows: "Any motor vehicle which is used on official business by any person authorized to make arrests for traffic violations in this State, or any municipality or county thereof, shall be distinctly marked on each side and the back with the name of the agency responsible therefor, in letters not less than six inches in height. (Acts 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 605)" (Emphasis added.) As you will note, it is mandatory that official traffic control vehicles be distinctly marked, but no provision is made for the enforcement of the statute. The appropriate action to compel performance of a legal duty in this State is a petition for mandamus. Ga. Code Ann. 64-101 provides: "All official duties should be faithfully performed; and whenever, from any cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure or improper performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance, if there shall be no other specific legal remedy for the legal right." The Georgia Supreme Court has sustained the use of the writ to compel obedience to directory statutes such as the one in question here. Board of Commissioners v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361, 153 S.E. 34 (1930). Therefore, it is my opinion that a petition for writ of mandamus brought by a taxpayer or member of the motoring public is the proper method to enforce compliance with the statute requiring the marking of official vehicles. 80 OPINION 65-50 (Unofficial) September 8, 1965 You request information concerning whether institutions of the University System of Georgia may accept a bid from a supplier of milk when said bid is lower than the established price fixed by the Milk Control Commission for the particular milk shed. I have reviewed the powers and functions of the Georgia Milk Commission and have concluded that the price established by the Commission is not a binding price but is merely a recommendation to be followed or disregarded as the licensee chooses. Ga. Laws, 1952, pp. 55, 63 as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 42-554), provides in part that "as a guide to licensees buying or selling milk, the Commission shall determine . . . prices for milk . . . " In addition, subparagraph (i) of the above-mentioned section provides "upon making such determination . . . the Commission shall establish by official order what prices of milk ... are recommended for each milk shed . . . " It is my opinion from the above wording that the prices established by the Milk Commission are merely recommendations. This view has been confirmed by the Chairman of the Georgia Milk Commission. However, it should be noted that the seller must comply with certain filing requirements established by law when not complying with the price recommended by the Commission. In conclusion, I can find no legal impediment to the Regents or one of their institutions accepting a bid to supply milk based on a price lower than the recommended established price, but I offer no opinion on the advisability of this action as it presents a policy matter for the Board's consideration. OPINION 65-51 (Unofficial) September 9, 1965 You raise the following questions pertaining to the power of the Tax Commissioner of Lowndes County to levy and collect tax fi. fas. under certain circumstances, citing Act No. 335, Ga. Laws 1963, p. 3064, which in Section 2 thereof states that in all counties of this State having a population of not less than 47,500 and not more than 49,500 according to the United States Census of 1960 or 81 any such future census, "the tax commissioner shall have full power and authority to levy and collect all tax fi. fas. issued by the tax commissioner as fully and effectively as if done by the sheriff of said county . . . . For the purposes of collecting tax fi. fas., the tax commissioner is hereby vested with all such powers and authority as is by law granted to sht;riffs only insofar as levies, sales and conveyances of property are concerned. The tax commissioners' powers and authority shall be limited to tax fi. fas. only which are issued by the tax commissioners." The specific questions in your letter are as follows: (I) "When a tax fi. fa. is transferred to a third party and placed on the general docket, a sale of the property for the taxes should be handled by whom under our present law in Lowndes County, Sheriff or Commissioner? (2) "When a tax fi. fa. is put on the general execution docket in order to save the liability from running out- seven years limitation - then upon sale for taxes who would advertise and make the levy-the Sheriff or the Tax Commissioner?" You will note that in the part of Section 2 of the 1963 Act quoted above it is stated that the powers granted the Tax Commissioner to levy and collect all tax fi. fas. are "for the purposes of collecting tax fi. fas." It is evident that the 1963 Act did not purport to put the Tax Commissioner in the business of being Sheriff of the county or to have any authority bestowed by law on the Sheriff of the county except insofar as the exercise of that authority is necessary in collecting taxes due the county, which is a responsibility imposed by law on the Tax Commissioner. It is, therefore, my opinion that the 1963 Act, quoted above, bestows on the Tax Commissioner full authority to levy and collect tax fi. fas. issued by him so long as the taxes for which the fi. fas. were issued remain unpaid, and that whether or not the fi. fa. has been entered on the general execution docket has no bearing on this power. With this in mind, I would answer your specific questions set out above respectively as follows: (1) Inasmuch as the taxes due the county are collected upon transfer of the tax fi. fa. to a third party, the authority of the Tax Commissioner over levy and sale under the tax fi. fa. has 82 ended and any sale of property under said transferred tax fi. fa. should be handled by the Sheriff. (2) Inasmuch as the taxes due the county under the tax fi. fa. recorded on the general execution docket remain unpaid, the Tax Commissioner has the authority under the provisions of the above-quoted 1963 Act to collect such taxes, and would, therefore, have the full authority of the Sheriff bestowed by such Act on the Tax Commissioner to levy, advertise and sell property to satisfy the taxes due the county. OPINION 65-52 September 9, 1965 You question whether the State of Georgia can legally use State convict labor in the construction and maintenance of Federal-aid highways. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 177, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 77318) provides in subsection (a) as follows: "The State Board of Corrections shall provide rules and regulations governing the hiring out of prisoners by any penal institution under its authority to municipalities, cities, the State Highway Department, or any other political subdivision, public authority, public corporation, or agency of State or local government, which are hereby authorized to contract for and receive said prisoners, . . . ." (Emphasis added.) It is specifically stated in the above statute that the Board of Corrections is authorized to contract with the State Highway Department for the use of prison labor in the construction and maintenance of public roads, and I can find no prohibition to the use of prisoners on road projects where Federal funds are involved. However, it is quite possible that the Federal Government may have some objection to the use of prison labor on projects where Federal funds are involved, and I ~would suggest that the Board of Corrections and the State Highway Department contact the appropriate federal agency for guidance on this matter. 83 OPINION 65-53 (Unofficial) September 10, 1965 You asked whether or not it is lawful for a person with a pistol license to carry a hand gun in the glove compartment of an automobile and whether or not it is lawful for a woman to place a handgun in her pocketbook, purse or coat pocket as a means of transporting the weapon from one place to another. With respect to your first question, which deals with transporting a weapon in an automobile, it is my opinion that the transporting of a pistol in an automobile, nothing more appearing, is not a violation of the statutes which prohibit carrying pistols without a license. "It shall be unlawful for any person to have or carry about his person or to have in his manual possession outside of his own home or place of business any pistol or revolver without first taking out a license from the ordinary of the county in which the party resides: Provided, that nothing in this law shall be construed to alter, affect, or amend any laws now in force relative to carrying of concealed weapons on or about one's person...." Ga. Code Ann. 26-5103. Although the pistol may be in the automobile, where it is not in contact with the person's hand or any other portion of his body, such person has not violated Ga. Code Ann. 26-5103. Clay v. State, 94 Ga. App. 553, note 4 (1956); Hayes v. State, 28 Ga. App. 67 (1922). With respect to the second question, which concerns placing a pistol in a pocketbook, purse or coat pocket, I call your attention to the following Code section: "Any person having or carrying about his person, unless in an open manner and fully exposed to view, any . . . pistol . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Ga. Code Ann. 265101. In view of this Code section it is my opinion that a weapon carried in a pocketbook, purse or coat pocket would be concealed and thus carrying a weapon in such a manner would violate Ga. CodeAnn. 56-5101. 84 OPINION 65-54 September 13, 1965 You ask my office to furnish you with an opinion indicating the interest the Georgia Department of Public Health has in the Georgia Mental Retardation Center, DeKalb County, Georgia, and whether such interest is legal and valid. Under and by virtue of a warranty deed executed on the 20th day of December, 1963, by Cousins Property, Inc., to the State of Georgia, as corrected by corrective warranty deed issued the 2nd day of March, 1964, by and between the same parties, the State of Georgia received fee simple title to the property on which the Georgia Mental Retardation Center is located. I am attaching hereto a certified copy of the above referred-to warranty deed and corrective deed which are on file in the office of the Secretary of State for your information. It is my understanding that the State Board of Health, acting for the Department of Public Health, will convey fee simple title concerning this site from the State of Georgia to the State Hospital Authority, a body corporate and politic, which is authorized and created under an Act of the General Assembly of Georgia approved February 1, 1939 (Ga. Laws 1939, pp. 144-159), as amended. The Authority and the Department will execute lease agreements whereby the properties and the improvements to be placed thereon will be placed to the exclusive use of the Department for a period of 20 years, or until all bond principal and interest have been paid. However, in no event will such lease agreements exceed a period of 50 years, due to legal restrictions imposed by the provisions of Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5901). Therefore, it is my official opinion that the State of Georgia or State Hospital Authority holds fee simple title to the Georgia Mental Retardation Center property and that a lease agreement will provide the Department with full and exclusive right to usage of the project with reversionary right to title upon compliance with the terms of the lease. 85 OPINION 65-55 September 16, 1965 You asked several questions of this office concerning the procedures to be followed when an employee of a department who has been dismissed is successful in appealing this action to the State Personnel Board with the resulting upholding of the appeal by the Board on the basis of insufficient evidence, inadequacy of charges or other grounds. The questions stem from the return to employment and the practices which are to be followed. I shall attempt to consider these questions in the order which they are normally raised by the various departments. The first question is nearly always "What action does the State Personnel Board desire or require from a department?" Examination of your rules and regulations and memorandums does not show that the State Personnel Board has enumerated any requirements other than to return the employee to service so that he or she will occupy such position as would have been the case had he not been dismissed. In some instances this is easy; in others it is complicated by matters of leave, salary increments, and job status. The question is asked whether the technical procedure is that of a regular appointment or a reinstatement when returning an employee to service. Rule 9 of the State Personnel Board, entitled "Appointments," does not appear to contemplate that a return to service of a dismissed employee should be so classified, nor does the term reinstatement appear to be defined in the regulations. However, if a choice were necessary between the terms of appointment, reappointment, or reinstatement, reinstatement would be the most appropriate word to use to indicate a return to servtce. The date the employee is to be indicated as returned to service is the next question - whether the day actually returned to service after the Board's decision, the day following his last day of actual service, or the date following his last day of accumulated leave for which he was previously paid upon dismissal. Using the dates from a recent case for illustration, the employee was dismissed on June 8, 1965, and paid through June 8, also receiving payment for eighteen and one-half days accumulated annual leave through June 27, 1965. The employee appealed the dismissal and on July 22, the Department was notified that the Board had upheld that appeal on 86 the basis of insufficient evidence to sustain the charges. (Rules and Regulations of the State Personnel Board provide in Rule 14 for appeals. Section 14.600 provides for appeals from dismissals and Section 14.900 specifies the appeal procedure to be followed. Finally, Subparagraph E of Paragraph 14.902 of Section 14.900 reads: "After due consideration, the Board shall render its judgment affirming or disaffirming the action of the appointing authority.") If the Personnel Board affirms the action of the appointing authority in dismissing an employee, nothing further is required. However, where, as in this instance, it has disaffirmed the action, the dismissal is in error. Thus, the employee is wrongfully deprived of employment. According to interpretations placed upon similar situations by this office, by the State Personnel Board, and particularly by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Scott v. Undercojler, 108 Ga. App. 460 (1963) (the rationale of which permeates this entire opinion), the employee is entitled to reinstatement on the job in the same position and at the salary which he held at the time of wrongful dismissal, and with any increments in position or salary which would have automatically been his had he remained in actual service without interruption. He should receive payment or remuneration as though there had been no break in service- subject, of course, to set-off for the benefit of the Department against any amount earned by the employee from other employment during the interval of dismissal. (See Stone Mountain v. Patrick, 19 Ga. App. 269, 9 I S.E. 346 (19 15); Paddock v. Mason, 187 Va. 809, 48 S.E. 2d 199 (1948).) Following Scott v. Undercojler, it would appear that in an instance such as that illustrated above the employee would be returned to service as of the morning of June 9 - all trappings of employment again vesting upon him as of that date. The matter of accrued annual leave for which an employee is paid seems to cause great trouble. In my opinion, it should be treated in the following manner: An employee being returned to service effective the day following his dismissal (in order to avoid a break in service) has already received payment for accrued annual leave (in the example above, for eighteen and one-half days). Under Scott v. Undercojler and other cases, he is entitled to salary from the date set for his return to actual service (less any set-off for other earnings). Obviously the employee should not receive the entire amount of salary in addition to the amount paid for annual leave. Then too, annual leave has a value to the employee (intrinsic, 87 therapeutic, morale) over and above any monetary amount. Also, payment for accrued annual leave is based upon the salary being paid. An employee receiving payment for eighteen days accumulated annual leave at $400.00 per month would receive more than at $350.00 per month. Under Personnel Board rules and salary scales, annual salary increments and position advancements serve to give most employees a steady escalation in salary. The employee would be treated most unfairly by his employers if he were deprived of any accrued annual leave by being forced to accept payment for it against his wishes, and possibly at a reduced rate. Since the purpose of "reinstatement" is to place the employee in such position as though he had had no interruption in service, then he would have deducted from the amount due him any amounts for which he was previously paid as accrued annual leave. Then would follow a bookkeeping entry reinstating to his account all such leave for which previously paid. If, during the period of dismissal, the employee would have received (had he still been in service) an annual increment in salary or a general pay increase, this also should be credited to the employee in computing any amounts due him, retroactive to the date such increase would have become effective. The employoee should also be credited with annual and sick leave earned for the period of dismissal as though he had been actually in service. Generally speaking, when an employee is successful in appealing a dismissal, the department should immediately upon being informed of the Board's decision notify the employee to return to service and follow generally the procedure outlined above, using good judgment and common sense to interpolate where necessary, considering the factors of salary paid at time of dismissal, any increases in salary to which entitled, less annual leave for which paid, less any amounts earned during the interval from other employment, adjustments of annual leave earned, and appropriate corrected payments and reports for Employees Retirement, Social Security, State and Federal income taxes and any insurance or other deductions. OPINION 65-56 (Unofficial) September 20, 1965 You inquire as to whether a person forfeits his voting residence in your county when he moves away but continues to vote there by 88 absentee ballot, and further inquiring as to whether a person must vote in the election district of his residence. The Georgia Election Code (Ga. Code Ann. 34-632) sets forth a number of rules defining voting residence. These rules are merely a codification of case law defining domicile. Under the Election Code, the word "residence" is defined to mean "domicile." Ga. Code Ann. 34-103 (aa). A person who moves away from your county and makes his home elsewhere, forfeits his right to vote in your county. His right to continue to vote may be challenged by the registrars under Ga. Code Ann. 34-627 or by other electors under Ga. Code Ann. 34-628. On the other hand, if a person moves from your county to another place and stays there with the definite intention of returning to your county within the foreseeable future and he intends that his home remain in your county, then his voting residence continues unchanged. As you noted in your letter, Ga. Code Ann. 34-1310(c) clearly requires that in general a person must vote in the election district in which he resides. This provision is mandatory and could easily affect the outcome of an election in which justices of the peace and constables were elected. The board of registrars is authorized to transfer the name of an elector to the election district containing his new residence under Ga. Code Ann. 34-631 (c). Consequently, the board of registrars should see that in future elections each elector is listed upon the electors list of the election district in which he resides. OPINION 65-57 (Unofficial) September 22, 1965 Your question as to when an ordinary can issue warrants for traffic offenses and whether they may be issued by a justice of the peace has been referred to me for reply. In this connection may I direct your attention to the provisions of Chapter 92A-5 of the Ga. Code Ann. and particularly at 92A502, 92A-506, and 92A-5ll. Ga. Code Ann. 92A-502 provides in part: 89 "The court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction to Issue warrants, . . ." Ga. Code Ann. 92A-506 provides in part: "An indictment or accusation shall not be required against a defendant under this Chapter, but a summons specifically setting out the charge shall be issued ..." Ga. Code Ann. 92A-511 provides in part: "The ordinaries shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all cases originating in the county, outside of municipal corporations, " These quoted sections seem to indicate that the ordinary would have jurisdiction in all matters of the criminal process of traffic violations in exclusion to a justice of the peace. However, may I further direct your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 24-1501, which provides in part: "A justice of the peace shall have criminal jurisdiction in the following instances: "2. In issuing warrants for the apprehension of any person charged on oath with a violation of any penal law of this State or for the apprehension of any person who the justice of the peace officially knows has violated any such provision." The case of Cooper et al. v. Lunsford, Ordinary, et al., 203 Ga. 166 (1947) gives some insight into this problem. In speaking of the ordinary's authority to issue warrants in traffic violation cases, Justice Atkinson said therein: "Under section 2 of the act (Ga. Code. Ann. 92A-502), it is stated that 'the court of ordinary shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants;' and where a warrant is, in fact, issued, we do not think that his right and jurisdiction so to do is limited to I any particular instances. " . . . There may be instances where the warrant is issued by a justice of the peace, and the defendant under Code 27-407, is committed to the court of ordinary for trial. And in such a case, there being a warrant, there would be no authority for the ordinary to issue another." It is my unofficial opinion that this case sets forth the theory that 90 the ordinary may issue his warrant for arrest of traffic violations, and although the question of whether a justice of the peace may issue a warrant for traffic violations was not before the court, the theory of the court in relation to this problem is nevertheless sound. Therefore, it is my unofficial opinion that a justice of the peace may issue a warrant for traffic offenses if a warrant has not otherwise been issued by the ordinary. OPINION 65-58 September 22, 1965 r You request an opmwn as to the responsibility of a school principal toward his pupils after they leave the school grounds at the end of the school day. My reply and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION Subject to possible expansion of his responsibility by the county board of education, a school principal has no duty of care and control over his pupils after they leave the school grounds at the end of the school day (or at least after they leave the adjoining areas within sight and sound of the school principal). DISCUSSION The general immunity of school boards and other school officials from liability for loss or injury to students resulting from official actions taken within the scope of their authority or official discretion, e.g., Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 645 (1952); Krasner v. Harper, 90 Ga. App. 128, 135 (1954); Op. Att'y Gen., 1957,p. 100, does not afford a shield to either such officials, or to any other school employee (as a school principal or teacher) whose individual and personal negligence results in loss or injury to pupils or other parties. Generally speaking, school principals and teachers stand in loco parentis to the pupils who are physically under their care, custody and control, e.g., 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 493, and a school principal or teacher may be held liable for injury to a pupil in his charge, where the injury is proximately caused by his individual and personal negligence (i.e., failure to exercise reasonable care) 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 238 (c). It would seem far too obvious to require extended comment that after students leave the school grounds, or at the very least after they leave adjoining areas within sight and sound of the principal 91 or teacher whose negligence is alleged to have caused the injury, they are, factually speaking, no longer under such principal's or teacher's physical care, custody and control. Consequently, the principal's or teacher's legal responsibility toward his students ordinarily would cease at this point where the loco parentis relationship has terminated. On the other hand, this demarcation line of principal and teacher responsibility might conceivably be extended by actions of the county board of education. Said board is empowered "to make all arrangements necessary to the efficient operation of the schools." Ga. Code Ann. 32-909. In view of the board's express statutory authority to operate a system of school bus transportation, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. & 32-611, it may safely be assumed that such power "to make all arrangements necessary" includes authority to see that pupils are safely transported to and from school from reasonably safe points of embarkation and disembarkation. Ordinarily the only personal liability of a school employee which would be involved in a transportation injury, of course, is that of the bus driver whose responsibilities include the depositing of transported children in a safe place. See Greeson v. Davis, 62 Ga. App. 667, 670 (1940). If, however, for some unknown reason, a county school board should decide that a principal or teacher should ride the school bus to preserve order and assist the driver in caring for the children, it would presumably place a duty of exercising due care on such principal or teacher to protect the transported students beyond the limits of school and immediately adjoining property. In this, and possibly in other conceivable circumstances, it would be possible for the school board, in the exercise of its broad managerial powers and authority, to enlarge the area of a school principal's or teacher's responsibility toward students. In the '!bsence of such affirmative board action, however, the responsibility of principal and teacher would not, in my opinion, go beyond sight and sound of school property. OPINION 65-59 (Unofficial) September 22, 1965 You make several inquiries concerning the Georgia Health 92 Code. I will answer your inquiries in the order in which you pose them. Section 88-522. Your first question is whether Ga. Code Ann. ~88-522(d), as amended (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 490), wherein an involuntarily hospitalized person who has been "released" is subject to readmission without the necessity of a new application for involuntary hospitalization any time within 14 calendar months from the date of the order releasing such person, is applicable to a person for whom a guardian has been appointed as well as a person for whom a guardian was not appointed. In this respect may I call your attention to the language of Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(d), which provides in part: "(d) A person who has been involuntarily hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital pursuant to any provisions of this Chapter or any other provisions of law and a guardian was not appointed for such person, . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The language of this provision is in the conjunctive and is clear. Therefore, on this point it is my unofficial opinion that this provision does not extend to a person who has a guardian appointed. The answers to your further questions will give some insight as to procedures of readmitting one to a psychiatric hospital who has a guardian appointed. Section 88-522(d) vs. 88-512(a). Your second question is: "If the word 'released' includes release on convalescent leave (furlough), which rule applies: annually (12 months) (88-512(a)), or 14 months (88-522(d) )?" The provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-512 provide in substance that an improved patient may be placed on convalescent status if the Superintendent of Milledgeville State Hospital believes that such action is in the best interest of the patient. Thereafter, not less than annually, the Superintendent of the hospital shall review the facts relating to the hospitalization of the patient on convalescent status and if he, in view of the condition of the patient at the time of this review, determines that hospitalization is no longer necessary, the patient may be discharged. Any time prior to discharge of a patient placed on convalescent status, the Superintendent may, if he determines such action to be in the best interest of the patient, notify the court of ordinary to issue a "rehospitalization order" on such patient. 93 It is my opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 88-512 contemplates a readmission of a person on convalescent status without the necessity of a new application for involuntary hospitalization. It is further my opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 88-512 contemplates a readmission by an order of the court of ordinary solely on the recommendations of the Superintendent of the hospital or the Georgia Department of Public Health. It is also my unofficial opinion that the readmission procedures established in this section apply only to a patient on convalescent status. The provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-522, and particularly at subsection (d), provide procedures for readmission of a person involuntarily hospitalized and released on conditions other than restored to mental health. It is my opinion that the word "release" as used in this section is a generality and contemplates any type of cessation in the patient's confinement at the hospital to include but not limited to "discharged", "convalescent" leave, or temporary visit. However, it is my opinion that the provisions for readmission at Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(d)(l) apply only when a person has been involuntarily hospitalized, the person had no guardian appointed, and the person was "released" under conditions other than as being restored to mental health, and the person is delivered to the Superintendent or chief officer of the hospital by some other party and the Superintendent or the chief officer determines that rehospitalization is necessary. This readmission procedure may be accomplished without any further order of the court and any time within 14 months of the date of order releasing said person. However, a definition of the word "release" does not clarify all the problems under Ga. Code Ann. 88-511, 88-512, and 88-522. In this connection, it is my unofficial opinion that a discharge as provided for in Ga. Code Ann. 88-511 is a "release" on the condition that the patient is restored to mental health. The word "discharge" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: "To release, liberate, annul, unburden, disencumber, dismiss." An order of discharge by the Superintendent is an order which unburdens or disencumbers the patient of his status as a person mentally ill. Then, it is my unofficial opinion that such an order is one which restores the patient to mental health and the procedures outlined in Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(a) would apply to the patient discharged under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-511. Hence, after 30 days from date of receipt by the ordinary of the Superintendent's 94 discharge order, the person shall be deemed to have been legally restored to mental health. Therefore, it is my further unofficial opinion that the 14 months provision of Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(d) does not apply to a patient discharged under Ga. Code Ann. 88511, to one "released" as being restored to mental health, to one who has a guardian appointed, or to a patient who was voluntarily hos pitalized and later "released." It is further my unofficial opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 88522(d) (2) allows readmission of a person involuntarily hospitalized and "released" under any conditions other than restored to mental health, and if the person had no guardian appointed, any time within 14 months of the date of the order releasing such person on order of the ordinary of the county from which such person was originally involuntarily hospitalized. It is my further conclusion that a patient involuntarily hospitalized or voluntarily hospitalized who had a guardian appointed and who has been subsequently released under any conditions, may be readmitted or rehospitalized without a new application for involuntary hospitalization only if such patient was placed on convalescent status from the hospital and the conditions and provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-512 are met. The answer to your third question, "What does the word 'release' really mean?'' ( 88-522.), has been provided in the above discussion. Section 88-508(b). Your fourth question is "Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(b), how long may a hospital hold a patient on a 'Detention Order' pending a hearing?" The provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(b) provide as follows: "(b) A patient taken into custody under subsection 88506(c) of this Chapter or ordered to be hospitalized pursuant to subsection 88-506(g) of this Chapter may be detained in his home or any other suitable facility under such reasonable conditions, as the ordinary may prescribe, but he shall not, except because of and during an emergency, be detained in a nonmedical facility used for the detention of individuals charged with or convicted of penal offenses. The ordinary may take such reasonable measures, including provisions for medical and hospital care, as may be necessary to assure 95 proper care of a patient temporarily detained pursuant to this subsection." (Emphasis added.) The provisions of Ga. "Code Ann. 88-508(b) italicized above indicate the procedures therein outlined are temporary in nature. The provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(c) provides as follows: "(c) The patient shall be under the jurisdiction of the court of ordinary from the commencement of proceedings pursuant to subsection 88-506(a) hereof until the patient is accepted by a psychiatric hospital or until proceedings are dismissed. The sheriff of the county shall have no duty, responsibility, or liability in the procedure except those duties, responsibilities, and liabilities resulting as a matter of course upon the execution of those functions specifically designated by the court of ordinary to the sheriff and his deputies." That portion of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(c) which relates "until the patient is accepted by a psychiatric hospital," in my opinion, relates to an acceptance under a final order of hospitalization as legalized by Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(g). Therefore, in answer to your fourth question, it is my opinion that when a patient is temporarily detained pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(b), the ordinary is under a duty to either enter an order dismissing the application for involuntary hospitalization or enter an order of final hospitalization within a reasonable time. What would be a reasonable time would necessarily depend upon the individual facts of each case. On this point it is further my opinion that a patient temporarily detained under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(b) is by virtue of Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(c) under the jurisdiction of the court of ordinary until the patient is subjected to a final order of hospitalization as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(g). Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(c) provides that the ordinary may order the sheriff to take the patient in custody. There are no further provisions allowing an order transferring custody of the patient. Ga. Code Ann. 88-508(b) provides that the patient may be detained under such reasonable conditions "as the ordinary may prescribe". Any such conditions prescribed by the ordinary would in my opinion be conditions adjunctive to the sheriffs custody. It is further my opinion that such conditions may prescribe that the sheriffs custody be exercised by an agent. 96 Therefore, it is my opinion that Milledgeville State Hospital or any hospital in holding and caring for patients temporarily detained is a voluntary agent of the sheriff and such relationship between the sheriff and the hospital may voluntarily terminate by the hospital delivering the patient to the sheriff. OPINION 65-60 September 27, 1965 You request an official ruling as to whether or not the State Board of Health has authority to order fluoridation of a city water supply. I have carefully reviewed the May 14, 1965, opinion rendered your Department by Honorable Eugene Cook, former Attorney General, regarding the above subject-matter, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for your information, together with several legal decisions which have arisen since the rendition of that opinion. These decisions, which will be outlined below, further substantiate that the word "treatment," under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-2603(3), would not include adding fluoride to water supply systems. The cases concerning the above subject are outlined as follows, to wit: State of Missouri v. Strahm, 374 S. W.2d 127, in which the court stated: "The addition of fluorides goes beyond the policy established by the addition of such chemicals as chlorine, aluminum sulphate and ferric sulphate. Those chemicals are added to make the water pure and palatable, while the sole purpose of adding fluorides to the water is for the therapeutic effect it will have on those drinking it." New Haven Water Company v. City of New Haven, 210 A.2d 449 (Conn., 1965). In this case the court held that a municipal ordinance requiring a water company to fluoridate was unconstitutional. The court held that: "A municipality can exercise only the powers expressly granted to it or that are necessary to discharge its duties and to carry out the purposes for which it was created." (Emphasis added.) 97 It is my opinion that the decision above cited in the New Haven Water Company case would be equally applicable to the adoption by the State Board of Health of rules and regulations which would require mandatory fluoridation of a city water supply system in that the State Board of Health, under the provisions of the 1964 Health Code, is not granted specific statutory authority to adopt such rules and regulations concerning fluoridation. In the case of Stroup v. Eller, 262 N.C. 573, 138 S.E.2d 240 (1964), the court held that a city council could not order fluoridation of a water supply system and that the question should be decided by a referendum. Again, I feel this decision is applicable to Georgia law. It is my opinion that the decision of whether or not to fluoridate should be decided on a local basis via means of a referendum sans specific legislation authorizing the State Health Department or other agency to require fluoridation. In the case of Hughes v. City of Lincoln, 43 Cal. Rep. 306 (1965), the court held that the State statutes require only that a water supply system be pure and potable. It is my opinion that the same decision would be reached by our Georgia courts. As you know, the question of the feasibility of placing fluorides in a public water supply is highly controversial, many communities having allowed it, many communities having disallowed it, and many communities having taken the same out of their water supply after having installed it. The sole purpose of fluoridation of a city water supply is to reduce the dental caries (dental decay) in teeth of individuals from birth to the age of approximately fifteen (15) years, together with any residual benefit to those persons throughout their lives by consumption of fluoridated water. It is my opinion, therefore, that under the current Georgia law the State Board of Health would be on precarious legal grounds should it attempt to order fluoridation of a city water supply. It is felt that such decision should either be conducted via means of a referendum on the local level or by the introduction of specific remedial legislation in the next session of the General Assembly of Georgia clearly delineating the authority of a proper agency to require fluoridation of water supply systems. 98 OPINION 65-61 (Unofficial) September 29, 1965 You requested an opinion concerning exchange charges made by local banks on checks issued to the tax collector. You also asked for an opinion concerning the payment of court bailiffs, and whether or not a deputy sheriff may be paid as a bailiff by the county where the sheriff is on a salary basis and the deputy is paid a salary by the sheriff. In answer to your question concerning charging of a fee for checks drawn on out-of-town accounts, it has some legal basis and seems to be predicated upon Ga. Code Ann. 13-2027 which authorizes a bank to pay checks drawn on it and charge for the exchange. The practice appears to largely be one engaged in by nonpar banks and by par banks when presented with checks drawn on nonpar banks. Regardless of any legal equities which might be involved, consideration should be given to some practical aspects of the problem. When a bank accepts the account, it can impose certain restrictions. If, in your instance, the tax collector or tax agent did not wish to comply, the bank might very well be justified in refusing to continue handling the account. Therefore, a practical solution might be to charge persons purchasing the tag or paying taxes by a check drawn on an out-of-town bank the extra service charge which it is found will be charged by the banks. If your banks in Bleckley County are all par banks and only make the charge on nonpar banks, the cashier of the bank or any of its officials can explain to you or to the tax officials how to recognize checks drawn on nonpar banks. The nonpar banks are recognizable by an additional prefix number on the check coding fraction. This is normally in the upper right hand corner and consists of a prefix number of two or three digits and a hyphen followed by a suffix number of from one to four digits. In many instances it will also constitute a fraction by having a line underneath and check routing number consisting of three numbers underneath. Nonpar banks will have a prefex number beginning with a nine or nine zero so that they are readily distinguishable. An example of the numbers would be as follows: a par bank would in this area be 64-127 and if a nonpar bank 964127. It could also take the form of a fraction with a denominator of 99 614 which would be the routing symbol for use in handling of checks. I would suggest the collector and tag agent confer with the bank officials about this matter, making it plain they wish the extra charge to be charged back to the drawer of the check and, if the bank was unwilling or unable to comply, then either secure another banking facility or pass the charges on at the time of payment. You might also remind persons paying by check that the acceptance of this check by the tag agent is only conditional payment, subject to clearing and payment of the check at full par value. In answer to your second question, it is my opinion that any person would be entitled to payment for service as a court bailiff. A sheriff has the right to select, with the approval of the court, superior court bailiffs. Ga. Code Ann. 24-3379. The grand jury, however, determines the rate of pay of court bailiffs. Ga. Code Ann. 59-120. Note in this connection also that the law "(2) Recognizes the authority of the sheriff to appoint court bailiffs . . . and provides for the fixing of their compensation . . . . It is certainly contemplated that they shall be paid out of the county treasury. The paying of court bailiffs is in other words a legal charge against the county." Chambers v. State, 22 Ga. App. 748 at 752. OPINION 65-62 (Unofficial) September 30, 1965 You inquire whether the Tax Receiver of Ware County, having elected to be placed on a salary basis as of January l, 1963 (in accordance with the provisions of a special Act approved March 16, 1961 (Ga. Laws 1961, p. 2465) with an effective date of January l, 1965), is governed by all the provisions of the Act under which the election was exercised, and whether there is authority in the law for the County Board of Education to pay the Tax Receiver for preparation of the school digest, and if there is such authority, whether such payment is retained by the Tax Receiver or paid into county funds. When the Tax Receiver elected to be placed on a salary basis as of January 1, 1963, under the provisions of said local Act, he elected to come under all of the provisions of the Act applying to 100 his office including the provision of Section 9 of said Act that "said officers ... shall pay the same (commissions, etc. accruing to their respective offices) into the treasury of said [Ware] County." This leaves the question of whether there is provision in the law for payment by the County Board of Education to the Tax Receiver of the county in c.onnection with the preparation of the digest of taxable property in the county on which the county school tax levy is made. I know of no such provision in the general law and if there is local law so providing, it has escaped my attention. To the effect that an officer in one unit of government, absent specific statutory provision, is not entitled to payment from another unit of government for services rendered to said unit in his official capacity, see Board of Education of Decatur County v. Drake, 157 Ga. 8 (1924); Hurst v. Board of Commissioners of Burke County, 157 Ga. 648 (1924); and 114 A.L.R. 1100 n. Headnote 1 in the Drake case states: "The tax receiver of Decatur County was not entitled to the commission on the county-wide school tax which was computed and levied from digests prepared by him." There is another view that in matters of education the county acts through its Board of Education and the school tax levy is made by the county under the specifically delegated constitutional authority to levy a tax for educational purposes. In this respect see Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701); Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172 (1926); Smith et. a/., Commissioners v. Board of Education of Washington County, 153 Ga. 758 (1922); Sheffield v. State School Authority, 208 Ga. 575 (1952). Pursuant to this view that the school tax is a county tax, the Tax Receiver, being an official ofthe county, would be required to prepare and present to the Tax Collector such a digest as would enable him to collect the taxes levied for educational purposes as well as for other authorized purposes and with no special compensation from the school tax unless specifically provided by statute. Ga. Code Ann. 92-5403 provides a penalty "if the digest is made out so badly as not to answer the purpose of the tax laws." Prior to the 1946 Act (Ga. Laws 1946, p. 206) abolishing local school districts and providing for one county school district outside independent school districts, Ga. Code Ann. 32-1113 directed the secretary to the board of trustees of each local school district to 101 prepare on a special form a digest of all taxable property within the district, with the assistance of the County Superintendent of Schools, and to present such local school district digest to the county tax collector. The 1946 Act, in abolishing the local school districts, provides as follows (Ga. Code Ann. 32-1401): "The county board of education of each county shall succeed to and be vested with all of the rights, powers and duties formerly vested in the local or consolidated school district trustees with respect to . . . preparing tax digests and furnishing same to the tax collector of the county in the manner formerly provided by section 32-1113." So far as I am able to ascertain, this is the only provision in the general law of this State which even makes reference to the authority of the County Board of Education to prepare a school digest. Even this section provides that such authority and duty be exercised "in the manner formerly provided by section 32-1113." I have discussed the practical aspects of this matter unofficially with the State Department of Education and with the Property Tax Unit of the State Revenue Department and have not found knowledge or opinion that the Board of Education of any County in the State is preparing a school digest "in the manner formerly provided by section 32-1113" (Code of 1933), or that, as a practical matter any such digest is necessary since abolition of local school districts. This is another ad valorem tax area in which there is some degree of hiatus in our State law, but from the foregoing legal and practical considerations, it is my opinion that there is adequate support in present Georgia law for the levy and collection of the county school tax without any deduction therefrom as payment for the preparation of a separate school digest. OPINION 65-63 (Unofficial) October 4, 1965 Your recent inquiries ask three specific questions. Your first question was: "Can the sheriff be required to serve a Fi. Fa. and levy issued out of a justice of the peace court?" 102 In this respect may I direct your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2813, which provides: "It is the duty of the sheriff_. . . "l. To execute and return the processes and orders of the courts, and of officers of competent authority, if not void, with due diligence, when delivered to them for that purpose, according to the provisions ofthis Code." (Emphasis added.) One of the provisions of the Code relative to the serving processes is found at Ga. Code Ann. 24-2818, which section provides: "Sheriffs or their deputies may serve or execute all summonses, executions, or other processes issued from justices' courts, as such processes may now be served or executed by constables, and for such services shall receive the same fees as are now allowed constables: Provided, that while it shall be legal for the sheriff to serve justice court processes, he shall not be entitled to charge the defendant, or losing party, any greater fees than those now allowed by law to constables for like service; but if the party wishing any process, mesne or final, served and executed, will pay to the sheriff, in advance, the difference in the fees now allowed to constables for such services and those allowed sheriffs for serving papers issued from the superior courts, the sheriff shall be bound to serve such process." (Emphasis added.) It is my unofficial opinion that if any fi.fa. is delivered to the sheriff for execution and he is paid in advance by the party wishing the fi.fa. executed, the difference between the sheriffs fee and the constable's fee for such execution, then the sheriff is bound and required to execute the fi.fa. Your second question was: "May the sheriff be required to enforce a contempt charge issuing out of a justice of the peace court?" If your question is whether the sheriff may be required to execute and return an order of contempt issuing from a justice of the peace court, then it is my unofficial opinion that such an order would be an order of a court within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2813. I conclude that the sheriff would be under a duty to execute and return the contempt order with due diligence if such order was not void and if said order was delivered to the sheriff for 103 execution. However, if any process is required to be served as part of the contempt proceeding, then it is my unofficial opinion that such process could be required to be served by the sheriff only if the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2818 are met. Your third question was: "By what process or procedure may the justice of the peace prevent a party from interfering with the constable while making a levy in a civil case?" In this connection may I direct your attention to the provisions at Ga. Code Ann. 24-104, which provides in part: "Every court has power_... "3. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the orders of a judge out of court, in an action or proceeding therein." Ga. Code Ann. 24-105 defines the powers of courts to inflict summary punishment for contempt as follows: "The powers of the several courts to issue attachments and inflict summary punishment for contempt of court shall extend only to cases of misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of said courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or resistance by any ojjlcer ofsaid courts, party, juror, witness or other person or persons to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts: Ga. Code Ann. 24-601 (2) limits the power of a justice of the peace in punishing for contempt in the following respect: "Justices of the peace have authority, and it is their duty_ "2. To fine not more than $5 or imprison not more than five hours, any person guilty of a contempt of court, and to pay the fine to the county treasurer or depository, as the case may be, for county purposes." From these quoted code sections, it is my unofficial opinion that a justice of the peace may prevent interference with his constable in making a levy through the contempt processes. 104 OPINION 65-64 October 4, 1965 You have recently requested my official opinion as to whether or not counties and municipalities must enact formal resolutions and ordinances in order to join the Joint Area Planning and Development Commissions. In my opinion, resolutions and ordinances are required in order to create a Joint Planning Commission. Ga. Code Ann. 69-1201 provides for the creation of planning commissions. That law states, in part, that: "The governing authority of each municipality in this State is authorized to create by ordinance a municipal planning commission. The governing authority of each county in this State is authorized to create by resolution a county planning commission. Any two or more municipalities are authorized to create a joint planning commission. Any one or more counties and any one or more municipalities in any one or more of these counties are authorized to create a joint planning commission ...." The law clearly provides that if one municipality or one-county wishes to set up a planning commission, it must do so by ordinance or resolution. Although the word "ordinance" or "resolution" is not used in connection with the creation of a joint planning commission, it would seem that the only reasonable construction of this statute is that ordinances and resolutions are required for such joint planning commissions. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the words of the statute are always to be construed in connection with their context, and the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the statute as a whole in order to give effect to the entire statute. Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 440 (1955). The Court of Appeals of Georgia has stated that: "Where a particular expression in one part of the statute is not so extensive or large in its import as other expressions in the same statute, it must yield to the larger and more extensive expression, where the latter embodies the real intent of the legislature." (Emphasis added.) Oxford v. M{lcon Telegraph Publishing Company, 104 Ga. App. 788,791 (1961). 105 In the statute providing for creation of planning commissions, the expression of larger import is that municipalities or counties are authorized to create by ordinance or resolution municipal or county planning commissions. Therefore, when in the next sentence of the statute it is stated that two or more municipalities or counties are authorized to create a joint planning commission, I think we must assume the General Assembly intended that said joint planning commissions be created by formal ordinances and resolutions. In my opinion this is the only reasonable construction of this statute. Whether or not the county and cities in the 16 area planning and development commissions in Georgia have complied with this law is a question which I cannot answer. You have stated that many of the local governments involved joined area commissions by voting to do so and by recording that action on their minutes. Ordinarily, formality in the wording and passage of municipal ordinances is not required unless the charter of the municipality sets forth procedural requirements. Western and Atlantic Railroad v. Swigert, 57 Ga. App. 274, 275 (1938). It may be that a vote and the recording in the minutes in a particular municipality can be considered an ordinance, depending on the charter provisions of the municipality. Counties, in passing resolutions, must adopt them in accordance with their statutes granting legislative powers, and this method is generally exclusive of all other methods. Toomey v. Norwood Realty Company, Inc., 211 Ga. 814 (1955). Whether or not the cities and counties involved in the area planning commissions have vaiidly enacted the necessary ordinances and resolutions is a matter which addresses itself to the county and city attorneys involved. OPINION 65-65 October 5, 1965 In your letter you ask whether it would be proper under law and under policies of the State Board of Education, for the Superintendent of the newly created Dublin-Laurens County Board of Education (composed of the old Dublin and Laurens County school systems which were abolished by statute as of July 1, 1965) to pay to the teachers in the old Dublin Independent School System an amount equal to their accumulated sick leave credit prior to July 1, 1963. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: 106 OPINION It is my opinion that the sick leave funds of the old Dublin Independent School System became an asset of the newly created Dublin-Laurens County Board of Education on July l, 1965. Consequently, any local authority which might conceivably exist respecting the disbursement of such funds to teachers of the old Dublin Independent School System is now vested in the board of education of the newly created school system rather than in its school superintendent. Whether or not the local school board could disburse the funds in the manner suggested is a matter which the law places within the discretion of the State Board of Education. While it is my understanding that present policies of the State Board of Education would not permit such disbursement, I believe that the reply to this question is one which can more definitely be given by the Department of Education than this office. DISCUSSION Georgia Laws (1965), pp. 2023-2028, implements a local constitutional amendment merging the former independent school system of the City of Dublin and the county system of Laurens County into the Dublin-Laurens County School System. Section 1 provides that upon the effective date of the Act (July 1, 1965): "all property, facilities, assets, debts and obligations of the two school systems so merged shall become the property, facilities, assets, debts and obligations of the Dublin-Laurens School System." Consequently, the sick leave fund of the former independent system, on July 1, 1965, became the property and asset of the Dublin-Laurens School System. Inasmuch as the management and control of this newly created school system is vested in its board of education, it would be this body and not the school superintendent which would exercise such local power as might conceivably exist regarding the disbursement of such funds. Insofar as the question of such local authority is concerned the matter reduces itself to one which is within the discretion of the State Board of Education. Ga. Code Ann. 32-613, which provides for the financing of the sick leave program set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 32-1304, states in part: "The State Board of Education shall define the term 'maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses' and shall 107 have authority to establish m1mmum requirements and standards ... for local distribution, use and expenditure of funds allotted under this Section to local units of administration." (Emphasis added.) In light of this provision it would seem quite obvious that the State Board of Education possesses authority to either allow or disallow the disbursement suggested. It is my understanding that the current policies of the State Board of Education require that the sick leave funds be separately maintained and utilized only for the purpose of providing for "sick leave expenses" (which phrase would hardly seem to include a teacher pay supplement), and thus would not permit the disbursement suggested. The determination of existing policies of the State Board of Education, of course, is a matter which lies more within the knowledge of the State Department of Education than this office. OPINION 65-66 (Unofficial) October 6, 1965 This will acknowledge your letter in which you pose the following questions: (a) Whether persons are sentenced under Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506(a), as amended by Ga. Laws 1964, p. 485, when directed to pay a fine not exceeding $1,000 and "confined at hard labor in a public-work camp in said county and state, or wherever the proper authorities of said state and county may direct ..."for twelve months or less. (b) Whether persons sentenced and confined under Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506(a) are considered to be confined in a State of Georgia correctional institution. In response to question (a), I call your attention to Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 485, 486 (Ga. Code Ann. - 27-2506) in its entirety: "Except where otherwise provided, every crime declared to be a misdemeanor shall be punished either: (a) by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by confinement in the county or other jail, county public works camp or such other places as counties may provide for maintenance of county 108 prisoners for a total term not to exceed 12 months, either a fine or confinement or both; or, (b) by confinement under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections in the State penitentiary, in a public works camp or such other institutions as the Director of Corrections may direct, for a determinate term of months which shall be more than six months but shall not exceed a total term of twelve months. Either the punishment provided in (a) or (b), but not both, may be imposed in the discretion of the sentencing judge; provided, however, that misdemeanor punishment imposed under (a) or (b) may be subject to suspension or probation but the punishment provided in (b) shall not be subject to suspension or probation wholly or partially upon the payment of a fine either directly or indirectly and provided further that the sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend or probate sentences imposed under (a) at any time but in no instance shall any sentence under (a) be modified in a manner to place a county prisoner under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections." The situation presented in your question is a "combination" sentence prescribed in the last phase of the above stated statute. The language in the sentence in question attempting to give the state authorities power to direct where said sentence shall be served is not operative as it is in direct contradiction to the clear intent of the statute which provides that a person may be given a misdemeanor sentence under either paragraph (a) to be served under county jurisdiction or under subsection (b) to be served under state jurisdiction. In short, if a fine is made part of a misdemeanor sentence, regardless of the length of incarceration prescribed by the sentence, the prisoner must serve under county jurisdiction "in the county or other jail, public works camp or such other places as counties may provide for maintenance of county prisoners." Therefore, it is my opinion that the sentence set forth in question (a) of your letter is clearly one under Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506(a). Question (b) is an inquiry whether a "public works camp" is a State or county institution. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 161, 174 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-312) provides in paragraph (a) that "any county may purchase, . . . and maintain a public works camp for the care and 109 detention of all. prisoners. assigned to it by the State Board of Corrections." Paragraph (b) states in part that "all public works camps . . . shall be subject to supervision and control by the State Board of Corrections. . .. " Paragraph (c) provides that "the State Board of Corrections is hereby given the authority to withdraw all prisoners from any camp which does not at any time meet the requirements of the Board or comply with its directions." From the above provisions, it can be seen that public works camps are county-operated correctional institutions, but they must comply with standards established by the State Board of Corrections if they are to retain the quota of State prisoners assigned to their care. The definition of "State Correctional Institution" under your rules is the final determinator in cases of this nature and I can only state that a "County Public Works Camp" is not a State institution unless the facts that (1) State prisoners are assigned to the camp and (2) the State has power to withdraw these prisoners if certain standards are not maintained, outweighs all other indicia of ownership and control vested m the county. In the final analysis, you must make your decision based on your own interpretation of the term "State Correctional Institution." OPINION 65-67 (Unofficial) October 8, 1965 In your letter, you inquire whether a guaranteed arrest bond must be accepted if guaranteed by a surety or insurance company which is not licensed to do business in this State. In your letter your referred to Op. Atty. Gen. 1960-61, p. 102 in which it was stated that Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 338, 339 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-513) required the acceptance of guaranteed arrest bonds in all cases where cash bonds were acceptable, with certain explicit exceptions. This statute was repealed by the Georgia Insurance Code (Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 763) but provision for guaranteed arrest bonds was reenacted in the Georgia Insurance Code (Ga. Code Ann. 56-2438; Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 289, 675). Ga. Code Ann. 56-2438 provides in part as follows: 110 "Any domestic or foreign insurance company, fidelity insurance company, or surety company which has qualified to transact such business within this State may contract to become surety, in an amount not to exceed two hundred ($200.00) dollars each, for any guaranteed arrest bond certificates issued by an automobile club or association, by filing with the Commissioner a certificate thus to become surety." (Emphasis added) As you will note, a company desiring to guarantee arrest bonds should file with the Comptroller General a certificate to be provided by the Commissioner's office. Otherwise, the provisions and restrictions are as were set forth in the repealed provision. Therefore, it is my opinion that the court is not compelled to accept bonds guaranteed by companies which have not complied with the above Code section. OPINION 65-68 October 8, 1965 You have recently requested an official opinion on the procedures to be followed by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia in acquiring certain real property owned by an employee of the University System. You have stated that the Regents have an opportunity to purchase a one-acre tract surrounded by the lands of the Mountain Branch Experiment Station for the sum of two hundred dollars ($200). ' There is no general prohibition in the Constitution or laws of the State of Georgia against the acquisition of real property from an official or employee of the State of Georgia. In 1956, however, the General Assembly of the State of Georgia enacted a statute which does have an effect on such a transaction. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 60, 61 provides that: "It shall be unlawful for any full-time appointive State official or employee to contract to buy from or sell to the State of Georgia any real or personal property, goods or services, or a combination thereof, when such purchase or sale would benefit, or be likely to benefit, such official or employee." This statute has never been construed by the Appellate Courts of 111 Georgia; therefore, we have no judicial interpretation to guide State agencies. It is my opinion that the meaning of this statute turns on the definition of the word "benefit." The General Assembly obviously did not intend to prohibit all sales of real property to the State by an official or employee, or it would not have added the limitation that the purchase or sale involved would have to benefit the official or employee. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (1) sets forth the following rule to govern the construction of the statute: "The ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art, or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter, when.they shall have the signification attached to them by experts in such trade, or with reference to such subject matter." Therefore, the word "benefit" in the 1956 statute should be given its ordinary meaning. Benefit has been defined by Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, as advantage or profit. This definition is supported by similar definitions from various courts in the United States. See McClintock v. Smith, 29 N. W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa); Inre Krause's Estate, 21 P.2d 268 (Wash.). Based upon these definitions, it is my opinion that the State may not purchase real property from an official or employee when said purchase would result in a profit to the official or employee. This means that the State could purchase property from an employee at the employee's cost, plus the value of any capital improvements, less depreciation, or at the market value of the property at the time that such an employee inherited real property, less depreciation. If the State could not reliably ascertain such cost or market value, the State should not purchase the real property involved. Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 60-62 provides that any official or employee who violates the statute prohibiting such a transaction shall be discharged immediately. That same statute also provides that any person violating the provisions involved shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. I suggest that in this situation which you have outlined to me the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia consider condemning the property owned by its employee. The Regents have the power of condemnation by virtue of Ga. Laws 1939, p. 411. Other State Departments and agencies may condemn private property owned by their employees through the use of the State 112 Properties Acquisition Commission, which was set up by the General Assembly at its 1965 session. OPINION 65-69 October 11, 1965 You have recently requested an official opinion as to whether or not the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia can legally authorize the various institutions of the University System to enter into necessary agreements for their employees to participate in a tax-sheltered annuity plan. You have also asked what effect, if any, payments on behalf of individual employees would have on "earnable compensation" as defined in the Act establishing the Teachers Retirement System of Georgia. In Ga. Code Ann. 32-121 (4), the Board of Regents of the University System is given the power to exercise any power usually granted to such a corporation, necessary to its usefulness, which is not in conflict with the Constitution and laws of this State. In that same section, the Board of Regents is given the authority to fix the compensation of the personnel in the schools of the University System. Ga. Code Ann. 32-2926, a provision of the Teachers Retirement System Act, states as follows: "Provided, however, that nothing in this law shall prevent the governing boards of the public school systems of the State and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia from making provision for supplementing retirement and pension allowances of the teachers and other employees of the respective boards who are covered by the terms of the Georgia Teachers Retirement System." It would seem then, by virtue of the statutes above cited, that the Board of Regents would have the authority to authorize the schools in the University System to enter into the necessary agreements for employees to have the benefit of a tax-sheltered annuity. The only possible objection to such action would be on the grounds that by so doing the Regents would be granting a gratuity to these employees, in violation of Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II, oftheConstitution of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402). The so-called tax-sheltered annuity plan, for employees of public institutions, is authorized by Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. Under this plan, the eligible employee 113 merely agrees to a bona fide salary reduction, or to forego a salary increase, as a means of providing the funds for the purchase of the tax-sheltered annuity. The employer must agree to use this salary reduction or salary increase to purchase a tax-sheltered annuity. The employer makes application for the annuity on the life of the employee and names the employee the owner of the annuity. Thereafter, the employer will continue to pay the annuity premiums, and if the premiums are within an exclusion allowance allowed to the employee, such premiums will not be currently taxed to the employee by the Internal Revenue Service. At a later time, generally upon retirement, the employee will elect to receive the annuity proceeds at a time when he is in a lower tax bracket. 1 do not think that by agreeing to a bona fide reduction, the Regents or the State of Georgia are granting a gratuity or donation to the employee. Art. VI I, Sec. I, Par. II (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402) of the Constitution of Georgia of 1945 states that: "The General Assembly shall not by vote, resolution or order grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation or association." The word "donation" has been defined in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary as "a free contribution." The term "gratuity" has been defined in that same work as "something given voluntarily or beyond obligation." A reduction in an employee's salary or the foregoing of a valid salary increase to purchase an annuity would be neither a free contribution nor something given beyond obligation, as the employee is actually entitled to this in return for his services. The purchasing of an annuity whose ownership vests in the employee can be considered merely as another form of compensation. Nowhere in the Constitution of the State of Georgia is the State required to pay its employees in currency. Therefore, it would seem that the purchase of an annuity for the employee should be considered as a form of adjusted compensation. As a contract must be entered into between the employee and the college or university involved, the act of purchasing such an annuity becomes a contractual obligation for services rendered, and not a donation or gratuity. In the case of Trotzier v. McElroy, 182 Ga. 719, 722, 723, (1936), it was contended that a certain pension under a City of Atlanta pension fund was a mere gratuity. The court held that the city's agreement to pay a pension was actually a contract based on consideration 114 flowing from both parties, and gave the pensioner a vested right which could not be impaired. The consideration, of course, would be the services of the employee over a period of time. In a like manner, I think that the agreement to purchase a tax-sheltered annuity for an employee is also a contractual obligation based upon mutual considerations. You have also asked whether or not such a tax-sheltered annuity plan would have any effect on the Teachers Retirement System. In Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 652, 653, the Teachers Retirement Act was amended to add to Subsection 13 of Section 1 the following: "All monies paid by a member into any plan of tax sheltered annuity shall be included as earnable compensation for the purpose of computing any contributions required to be made to the Teachers Retirement System, and also for the purpose of computing any benefits or allowance payable under this Act." I think that the above-cited statute answers your question. It is, then, my official opinion that the Regents of the University System of Georgia may authorize the units of the University System to enter into tax-sheltered annuity plans for its employees, and that such annuities cannot be considered gratuities under the Constitution of the State of Georgia. OPINION 65-70 (Unofficial) October 11, 1965 In response to your recent inquiry whether it is mandatory that a Solicitor General honor a timely demand for trial by an accused serving another sentence in the State Penitentiary and produce him for trial, I have reviewed the controlling statute and case law of this State. The controlling statute is found in Ga. Code Ann. 27-1901: "Any person against whom a true bill of indictment is found for an offense not affecting his life may demand at either the term when the indictment is found, or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter, a trial; or, by special permission 115 of the court, he may at any subsequent term thereafter demand a trial. In either case the demand for trial shall be placed upon the minutes of the court. If such person shall not be tried when the demand is made, or at the next succeeding regular term therafter, provided at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try him, he shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment." There are varying court opinions specifying the statutory prerequisites to the exercise of the privilege of demanding and receiving a speedy trial. There have been a number of opinions stating that the single condition to trial or discharge after demand is that there be a jury impaneled and qualified to try the accused at the designated terms of court. Hunley v. State, 105 Ga. 636, 31 S.E. 543 (1898); Dickerson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 548, 134 S.E. 2d 51 (1963). It has been held that any other condition would be "unwarranted judicial construction." Nix v. State, 5 Ga. App. 835, 63 S.E. 926 (1909). However, in cases where applicable, it has been held consistently that the voluntary absence of the defendant at the time his case was called amounted to a waiver of his demand. Moreland v. State, 51 Ga. 192 (1873); Mager v. State, 21 Ga. App. 139, 94 S.E. 82 (1917);Jackson v. Dorsey, 26 Ga. App. 372, 106 S.E. 210 (1921). As you noted in your request, the Court of Appeals in Hendricks v. State, 108 Ga. App. 259, 132 S.E. 2d 845 (1963) stated that the accused must show that there were qualified jurors on hand to try him and "that he was present and ready for trial." However, the court apparently did not consider the situation of involuntary absence presented in your letter. In short, I am unable to justify any reliance on the latter statement in the Hendricks case, especially since Dickerson v. State, supra, was decided subsequent to Hendricks and stated at 551 that "if the demand is made, then there is but one single condition to trial or discharge," i.e., an impaneled and qualified jury. You will note that there is no chronologically consistent development of the conditions on the demand for trial, and in addition, the statements referred to above are obiter dictum and are not concerned with the involuntary absence of the accused. Therefore, it is my conclusion that the situation is still controlled by the one Georgia case which I have found which dealt specifically with the question. II6 In Flagg v. State, II Ga. App. 37, 74 S.E. 562 (l9I2) the court was faced squarely with the question of a Georgia prison inmate's right to demand trial on an outstanding indictment. The accused made a demand for trial after the indictment was returned, but shortly thereafter, and before trial, he was sent to the chain-gang on another charge. The court discussed the prerequisites to a discharge stating that although the only statutory condition was that a jury be impaneled and qualified to try the defendant at both terms, the courts, upon general principles, have ruled that the defendant's voluntary absence constitutes a waiver of the demand. The state argued that it was not bound to procure the prisoner's presence because the court was without power to com pel his attendance and try him until the expiration of his first sentence. In response, the court stated at 39: "There may be cogent reasons why there should be a statutory suspension of the demand during imprisonment under sentence in a case previously tried, but the courts cannot imply an exception not warranted by the statute. In no fair sense can it be said that the absence of the accused from court while he was in the chain-gang was voluntary." Accordingly, the court held that imprisonment on another State charge at the time of effective demand did not suspend the operation of the demand and discharge statute. In Josey v. State, 102 Ga. App. 707, II7 S.E 2d 64I (I960) the court, although denying relief on other grounds, said in dictum at 709: "The absence of the defendant from the county having jurisdiction to try him does not render the remedy of Section 27-I90 I unavailable since defendant has available the writ of habeas corpus ad deliberandum et recipiendum to compel the production of his person . . . for the purpose of trying him on the pending charge." This holding is in conformity with the general consensus as explicitly stated in Waugaman v. United States, 331 F. 2d 189 (5th Cir., 1964) at I90: "[I]t is generally true that a defendant's right to a speedy trial 117 is not affected by the fact that he is incarcerated in jail on another charge or conviction." (Cases cited.) Of course, it should be borne in mind that in order to receive the right or privilege granted under Ga. Code Ann. 27-1901, the defendant must show a demand made in accordance with the statute. Couch v. State, 28 Ga. 64 ( 1859). In conclusion, it is my opinion that an individual making a proper demand for trial under Ga. Code Ann. 27-1901 must be produced for trial within the statutorily allotted time even though he may be serving another sentence under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections at the time of demand. OPINION 65-71 October 13, 1965 You inquire whether a unit of the University System of Georgia may enter into a contract with a county or city for the paving of a small area on campus, the county or city to perform this service on a fixed cost or reimbursable cost basis. You state further that the institution has advertised for bids on the project and received no response. Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5901 (a)) provides in part as follows: "The State, State institutions, any city, town, municipality or county of this State may contract for any period not exceeding fifty years, with each other . . . provided such contracts shall deal with such activities and transactions as such subdivisions are by law authorized to undertake." However, there is little explanation of the powers of a county outside of restrictions on the use of tax money which is not involved in this case. As stated in United States v. McDaniel, 7 Peters I, 8 L. Ed. 587 (1833) at 13, 592: "The [federal official] is limited in the exercise of his powers by the law; but it does not follow that he must show a statutory provision for everything he does. No government could be administered on such principles. To attempt to regulate by law the minute movements of every part of the complicated machinery of government would evidence a most unpardonable ignorance. . . ." 118 The same principle would relate to agreements made by counties, and it would appear reasonable that if the Regents, as an agency of State government, is empowered to perform this task, then the county, a political subdivision of the State, is authorized to assist them where no county funds will be lost and where private enterprise has expressed no interest in the project. Therefore, it is my opinion that the courts would not look with disfavor on a contract entered into between a unit of the University System and a county or city under the conditions set forth in your letter. OPINION 65-72 October 13, 1965 This is in reply to your letter requesting my official opinion as to whether or not the exchange of shares of stock of a holding company for shares of stock of an insurance company constitutes an offering by the holding company of its stock for "sale to the public" as contemplated by 56-1543 of the Insurance Code. This provision requires that a registration statement be filed with the Insurance Commissioner and for written approval to be obtained from him prior to offering such stock for sale to the public. The attorney for the holding company advises that it already owns 78 percent of the common stock of the insurance eompany and that the transaction involves the exchange of holding company stock for the remaining stock of the insurance company held by approximately 30 stockholders who are either directors, institutional investors, those familiar with the insurance field including agents and former agents of the insurance company, bank officers or close relatives of such stockholders. The purpose is to make the insurance company a wholly owned subsidiary of the holding company. Although, as you point out, the Insurance Code gives no definition to the phrase "sale to the public," there would appear to be no question but what the transfer of stock of one corporation for the stock of another corporation in payment therefor is a "sale." Edward v. /oar, 172 N.W. 620, 622, 15 ALR 256. "A sale," as defined by Blackstone, is a transmutation of property from one man to another in consideration of some price or recompense in value. Iowa v. McDonald, 4 S. Ct. 210, 219, 110 U.S. 471, 28 119 L.Ed. 198 (1884); Cain v. Ligon, 71 Ga. 692, 694, 51 Am. Rep. 281 (1883). Since Ga. Code Ann. 56-1543 contains no provision for exempting from its terms sales to any particular members of the public, it is my opinion that it clearly applies to the subject transaction. A registration statement should, therefore, be filed and your written approval obtained prior to the making of the offer in question. OPINION 65-73 (Unofficial) October 14, 1965 You inquire whether under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act an administrative agency has the authority to revoke the license of a licensee if he is able to show that he is momentarily complying with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license whenever license revocation proceedings are instituted. Section 1 of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act provides as follows: " . . . It is intended that this Act not create or diminish any substantive rights or delegated authority but is to provide a procedure for administrative determination and regulation where expressly authorized by law or otherwise required by the Constitution or a statute." Section 14 of the Act provides: "In addition to any other requirements imposed by common law, constitution, statutes or regulations: "(1) In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice served personally or by mail." Section 2(b) provides as follows: " 'Contested case' means a proceeding, including but not restricted to rate making, price fixing, and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." 120 From these quoted sections of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that the purpose and intent of the Act is not to create additional substantive requirements in what is cause for revocations of a license by an adminstrative agency. Rather, the purpose and intent of the Act, in my opinion, is to provide uniform, minimum procedural requirements to be followed by an adminstrative agency in determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party, in matters in which the particular agency regulates and to which the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act applies. There is an apparent conflict with this interpretation of the Act which is found at Section 19(c), which provides as follows: "No revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings the agency has sent notice by certified mail to the licensee of individual facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and the licensee has been given an opportunity to show compliance with all/awful requirements for the retention of the license, . .. " (Emphasis added.) This language implies that a revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of a license by an administrative agency would not be "lawful" unless the licensee has been given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license. It is my opinion that the opportunity to show compliance referred to by Section 19(c) is the opportunity to show a license. It is my opinion that the opportunity to show compliance referred to by Section 19(c) is the opportunity to show a compliance with lawful requirements at the time the licensee is alleged to have been in noncompliance, and does not refer to a compliance at the time of a licensee receiving notice, or at the time of the institution of agency proceedings to revoke the license. A contrary construction would place an additional substantive requirement upon administrative agencies in the revocation of licenses. Therefore, it is my opinion that an administrative agency may proceed to revoke a license of a licensee in conformity with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act; and the fact that the licensee shows at the agency's proceedings that he is momentarily complying with all lawful requirements for the retention of his 121 license, would be immaterial. The real question to be resolved by the agency's proceedings would be whether the licensee had been in noncompliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of his license at the time that the licensee is alleged to have been in noncompliance with such requirements. OPINION 65-74 October 21, 1965 You ask this office to review a proposed "General Statement of Policy" by the State Board of Health for the operation of the Georgia Mental Health Institute as to legal form, sufficiency and possible conflict with any other laws of the State of Georgia. I have carefully reviewed the General Statement of Policy and find that the same has four primary goals, namely: "(a) To provide for Institute patients accurate diagnosis and treatment best suited to the individual case. This will include a full range of modern treatment of mental illness. "(b) To train workers for all the mental health professions, to carry out specific research studies in the field of mental health and mental disease and to give to its patients the best known treatment. "(c) To help provide professional staff to man future state programs now being planned. "(d) To help provide specialized research personnel." Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-115 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 507), the Department of Public Health is designated as the agency of State government which has supervision and administrative control of State facilities for the treatment of mental illness and mental retardation. Under 88-115, subparagraph (a) authorizes the Department of Public Health to: "prescribe all rules and regulations for the management of such facilities or institutions not conflicting with the law; It is provided under subparagraph (f) of Ga. Code Ann. 88-115 that the Department of Public Health has: 122 "full authority to receive patients ordered hospitalized in such facilities or institutions pursuant to the provisions of any law, to receive any voluntary patients, to discharge such patients pursuant to the provisions of law, ... and, in general, to exercise any power or function with respect to patients provided by law . . . ." It was the express intent of the General Assembly, as outlined under subparagraph (f) of Ga. Code Ann. 88-115, to always provide the highest degree of medical, scientific and other diagnosis, treatment, custody and care as is consistent with medical practice. I also call your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-601 and 88-602 (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 499, 546-547), which provide as follows: "88-601. Powers and duties of Department of Health in mental health. "_The Department of Health shall have administrative responsibility for and supervision of the State program for mental health. The Department of Health shall: "(a) Exercise general supervision and control of the State's program for mental health; "(b) Direct, supervise, and control the medical and physical care, treatment, and mental rehabilitation of patients in the institutions under the control, management, or supervision of the Department of Health; "(c) Exercise all other powers and duties commensurate with the purposes of this Chapter, including but not limited to the prevention of mental illness, the treatment, care, custody, diagnosis, and the rehabilitation of mentally ill persons either hospitalized in institutions under the control, management, or supervision ofthe Department of Health or voluntarily subject to such institutions or other programs administered by the Department of Health, together with the duties and powers hereinafter set forth and such other duties and powers as may be deemed necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Chapter; and "(d) Adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this Chapter. 123 "88-602. Establishment and operation of facilities for treatment over the State of Georgia.- The Department of Health, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall have the power to establish facilities provided funds are available therefor for the treatment of the mentally ill over the State of Georgia. Such facilities shall be operated, supervised, and staffed as directed by the Department of Health. The Department of Health, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall have authority to negotiate with and contract for services in the field of mental health with public or private hospitals, medical schools, training institutions, appropriate departments or agencies of the State, county, or municipal governments, or any person, partnership, corporation, public or private, for services in the field of mental health, personnel training in the field of mental health, and other purposes set forth under this Chapter provided that the other contracting party be and remain a nonprofit institution. The Department of Health shall prescribe the procedure for admission to, treatment in, and discharge from treatment centers established pursuant to this section." (Emphasis added.) It is therefore my opinion under the above-quoted Code sections that the State Board of Health may adopt General Policy Statements concerning the procedure for admission to, treatment in and discharge from treatment centers established pursuant to law. I am pleased to call your further attention to the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 338), as amended. This Act is concerned only with State agencies and with such administrative functions as rule-making and adjudications. It appears, therefore, that the sole purpose of the Administrative Procedure Act is to achieve uniformity in reference to basic areas, and in so doing, to equip each agency with the means of obtaining statutory purposes, as well as to provide ample safeguards in protecting the public interest. I invite your particular attention to the verbiage contained in subparagraph (a) of Section 2 of this Act, which defines the word "agency" to mean any: "state board, bureau, commission, department, activity or officer authorized by law expressly to make rules and regulations or to determine contested cases . . . ." Additionally, subparagraph (f) of Section 2 defines the word "rule" as: 124 "each agency regulation, standard or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency." This subparagraph then proceeds, however, to expressly exclude from its general filing requirements certain rules, such as those which relate solely to the internal management of an agency and which do not affect private rights or procedures available to the public. After a careful review of the proposed General Statement of Policy relating to the operation of the Georgia Mental Health Institute, it is my official opinion that such policy falls within the exception of being a statement concerning only the internal management of your Department and therefore would be expressly excluded from the general filing requirements of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act. As a matter of policy, however, I would suggest that you file such General Statement of Policy with the, office of the Secretary of State in the same manner that you have filed Admission Policies to other State Institutions under control of the Georgia Department of Public Health. It is therefore now in order for the State Board of Health to adopt the General Statement of Policy relating to the operation of the Georgia Mental Health Institute. OPINION 65-75 (Unofficial) October 28, 1965 This letter is in reply to your request for my opinion concerning the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors by persons holding licenses to sell mixed drinks in those areas where such licenses are authorized. The Revenue Tax Act to legalize and control alcoholic beverages and liquors provides: "Sales to minors, intoxicated persons, and habitual drunkards prohibited. - Any person who by himself or another shall furnish or cause to be furnished or permit any person in his employ to furnish alcoholic, spirituous liquors, or beverages to any minor, to any person who is noticeably 125 intoxicated, or to any habitual drunkard whose intemperate habits are known to such person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall be punished as for a misdemeanor." (Ga. Code Ann. 58-1061.) Ga. Code Ann. 58-612 also provides that any person who furnishes alcoholic beverages to a minor is guilty of a crime. This section would apply to either liquor or beer. The rules and regulations of the cities and counties which have authorized mixed drink sales have generally prohibited sales to minors and have provided that the license can be suspended or revoked if sales to minors are made. I am not familiar with the laws from other states on this subject, but in Georgia the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors is prohibited. OPINION 65-76 November 3, 1965 You ask my official opmwn as to whether or not you could legally transfer the Athens Farmers' Market property to the Athens Chapter of the Georgia Jaycees under current State law or by a new Act of the Legislature. In answer to your inquiry as to whether or not you could legally transfer such property under current State law, I am pleased to call your attention to 65-340 of the Code of Georgia Annotated (Ga. Laws 1956, p. 503), which provides as follows: "65-340. Closing ofmarkets by Commissioner ofAgriculture; disposition ofproperty; proceeds ofsale._ The Commissioner of Agriculture is hereby directed to evaluate each of the present farmers' markets that are being operated by the State and to determine whether any one or more of them should be closed. In making the determination the Commissioner shall consider the need for the particular market from the standpoint of the marketing of farm products and the convenience of the farmer, keeping in mind that when a market is too close to another the number of buyers may be reduced in both markets. He shall also consider the cost to the State government. If he determines that any market should be closed he is hereby authorized to close iL When any market is closed by the Commissioner, the State Properties Commis- 126 sion may lease or sell the property according to their discretion for industrial sites to attract new industries to the community. The proceeds of the sale or lease shall be paid into the State treasury to the credit of the general fund." It is my opinion that the above-quoted Code section authorizes you to close any of the currently operated Farmers' Markets upon your determination that such closure would be in the best interest of the State. However, I would call your attention to the fact that upon closure of the Market property in question, the same would have to be turned over to the State Properties Commission for any final disposition thereof, such as the sale or leasing of such property. It is my further opinion that the above quoted Code section would not authorize the transfer of the closed Market to any party other than the State Properties Commission. In response to your second inquiry as to whether or not a new Act of the legislature could authorize the conveyance of the Athens Farmers' Market property to the Athens Jaycees, I am pleased to call your attention to Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, codifie~ as Ga. Code Ann. 2-401, which provides as follows, to wit: "2-40 l. Paragraph I. Genera/laws; uniform operation; how varied.- Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law. No general law affecting private rights, shall be varied in any particular case, by special legislation, except with the free consent, in writing, of all persons to be affected thereby; and no person under legal disability to contract, is capable of such consent." It is my opinion under the above-quoted constitutional provision that should legislation be introduced in the General Assembly which specifically pertained to a transferral of the Athens Farmers' Market property to the Athens Jaycees, such would constitute a special law for which provision had already been made by an existing general law and would therefore be unconstitutional. The only method whereby such transfer might be effectuated would be the specific repeal of Ga. Code Ann. 65-340 cited above, and the subsequent enactment of a resolution authorizing the transfer of the subject property. 127 OPINION 65-77 November 4, 1965 This is in reply to your letter enclosing a copy of the petition of Veterans Life Insurance Company seeking an amendment to its corporate charter and requesting my official opinion as to whether or not the petition complies with the law. You point out that the stockholders' resolution authorizing the amendment, increasing the company's authorized capital, was adopted at a meeting held more than two years ago and that the company has sold a very substantial volume of stock during the intervening two years. You have requested specific instruction as to the validity of the resolution. The provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 56-1509 authorize a domestic insurer to amend its charter and set forth the procedure to be followed to accomplish this. A majority vote of the stockholders voting at a lawful meeting of stockholders of which the notice given to them included prior notice of not less than 10 days of the proposal to amend is required. Paragraph (2) of this section provides in part: "Upon authorization of such an amendment, the insurer shall file in the office of the Secretary of State an application asking that its charter be so amended . . ." (Emphasis added.) This section further provides for a certificate to be annexed to the application for amendment, signed by the president or a vice president and attested to by the secretary or assistant secretary under the seal of the corporation, setting forth that the amendment has been authorized in writing by the holders of a majority of the voting power of the outstanding capital stock, "or by affirmative vote of such a majority voting at a lawful meeting of stockholders or members of which notice given to stockholders or members included prior notice of not less than ten days of the proposal to amend." The petition filed in this instance contains such a certificate although the meeting of stockholders was held some two years prior to the filing of the petition. The question presented is whether Ga. Code Ann. 56-1509, in requiring a certificate certifying that a proposed amendment has received an affirmative vote of a majority of the voting power, relates to a majority of the voting power at the time of the filing of the petition. If so, and if the vote taken in 1963 was not an 128 affirmative vote of a majority of the voting power at the time the petition was filed in September of 1965, the petition would not be in compliance with the law and would be unauthorized. It is well settled that legislative authorization is essential to enable a corporation to increase its capital stock and that the increase can only be accomplished legally in the mode and subject to the limitations prescribed by the legislature in authorizing the increase. See 11 Fletcher, Corporations, Chapter 58, Section 5133. Although there is no provision requiring the petition to be filed within any specified time limit from the date of approval by the stockholders, the language used in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1502 (2) "Upon authorization . . . the insurer shall file . . ." seems to contemplate that the petition be filed promptly. The word "upon" is used to designate or denote the time at which anything happens; it may mean before, after, or simultaneously with the fact to which it relates, and is often employed in the sense of after, contemporaneously with, or shortly after, as soon as, at, or at the time of, or after, or when. See Ross v. Jones, 151 Ga. 425, 428 (1920). It is my opinion that the word "upon" as used here when construed with all of the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 56-1509 must be given the meaning of "as soon as" or at least, "within a reasonable time after." The rights of third persons are involved and a duty is imposed upon the officers of the corporation to implement the will of the stockholders. A duty is also owed to the public and to prospective stockholders by the officers of the corporation to proceed promptly with an amendment which has been approved by the stockholders so that it will become a matter of public record with the Secretary of State. Otherwise, a few promoters holding a majority of the outstanding stock of a new corporation could conceivably authorize fundamental amendments to a corporate charter and withhold making a formal filing with the Secretary of State until after a substantial number of shares of stock has been sold. This, of course, would defeat the purpose and intent of the statute requiring the majority of the voting power to approve amendments. A cardinal rule governing the construction of statutes is to carry into effect the legislative intent and purpose. Ford Motor Co. v. Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950); Lewis v. City of Smyrna, et a!., 214 Ga. 323, 326, 140 S.E.2d 571 (1958). In interpreting legislative provisions applying to amendments of 129 corporate charters, the purpose of the provisions and evils sought to be remedied should be kept in mind. It has been held that these statutes will be liberally construed so as to give effect to the evident spirit and purpose thereof. Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 194 N.Y. 212, 87 N.E. 443; 7 Fletcher, Corporations, Chapter 43, Section 3673. In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 561509 requires that a petition for amendment to an insurer's corporate charter be filed within a reasonable time after approval by the stockholders and that consequently the certificate certifying that it has been approved by a majority vote of the voting power means a majority vote of the voting power at the time the petition for amendment is filed. Whether or not the petition in this case is in compliance with this provision, of course, depends upon whether or not the number of affirmative votes which the amendment received constituted a majority of the voting power in September of 1965. The petition meets all other legal requirements. OPINION 65-78 November 5, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask whether a deputy sheriff appointed by the county sheriff may legally serve as a member of a county board of education. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION In my opinion a deputy sheriff cannot serve as a member of a county board of education. DISCUSSION Ga. Code Ann., 89-103 provides: "No person shall hold, in any manner whatever, or be commissioned to hold at one time, more than one county office, except by special enactment of the legislature; nor shall any commissioned officer be deputy for any other commissioned officer, except by such special enactment." (Emphasis added.) It would seem settled that a member of a county board of education is a "county officer," e.g., Stanford v. Lynch, 147 Ga. 518, 519 (1918); Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, p.58, and that county sheriff is also 130 a "county officer," e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 34-2601, 24-2803; Carter v. Veal, 42 Ga. App. 88 (2) (1930), Op. Att'y Gen. 195859, pp. 38-39. Hence, the emphasized clause of Ga. Code Ann. 89-103 which relates to deputies of commissioned officers of the county would, in my opinion, preclude a deputy sheriff from serving as a member of the county school board. OPINION 65-79 November 5, 1965 You ask whether the State Board of Education is legally authorized to make grants to local school systems for the purpose of enabling such local boards to provide in-service training for teachers in their employment. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION In my opinion the State Board of Education is fully authorized by law to make grants to local school systems for the purpose of enabling the local systems to provide in-service training for teachers in their employment. DISCUSSION Section 52 of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act, i.e., Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3, 45-46 (Ga. Code Ann. 1964 Supp. 32-652) provides inter alia: "The State Board of Education is hereby authorized . . . to conduct . . . education demonstrations, experimentations, field tests, and such other projects as may, in the opinion of the Board, tend to support, improve or strengthen the public schools of this State, the quality of education provided Georgia's children and youth in the public schools of this State and the qualifications and technical skills of professional personnel employed in the public schools of this State, and is hereby authorized . . . to cooperate with public school systems . . ..for such purposes . . . ." This provision would seem to me to be more than adequate legislative authorization for the State Board of Education to make the grants in question, and, as you point out in your letter, the General Assembly has in fact appropriated money for this particular purpose, with 1said appropriation being listed as a line item in the budget. 131 In reply to your question as to whether any constitutional provision might be violated by such a grant, I would say that I am unaware of any way in which these grants would conflict with the State Constitution. Quite to the contrary, said grants would appear to be an authorized expenditure of State tax moneys under Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I of the 1945 Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 25501). In enumerating the purposes for which the powers of taxation over the whole State may be exercised subparagraph 2 of this provision lists "educational purposes," and this term has been construed broadly, Worth v. Board of Education, 177 Ga. 166, 175 (1933). Hence, the improvement of the qualifications and technical skills of teachers through in-service training would clearly seem to me to lie within the scope of and constitute an "educational purpose" under the State Constitution. OPINION 65-80 November 8, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you refer to previous opinions of this office ruling that it is not legal for a member of a county board of education to sell insurance to his school board, e.g., Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 192, and inquire as to the application of this ruling where an individual who has sold insurance to a county board of education is subsequently elected or appointed to the board. Specifically, you ask whether existing insurance contracts may be renewed where the person who sold the insurance to the board prior to his membership thereon continues to be a member at the expiration date of the original contract. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION Where an individual who has sold insurance to a county board of education is subsequently elected or appointed to the boan} it would be illegal, upon expiration of the existing insurance contract, to renew the same where sa:id individual's interest in the insurance company continues to coexist with his membership on the county board of education. DISCUSSION There is no question, of course, as to the illegality of a school board member doing business with the board of education on which he serves. Not only does Georgia follow the common law rule that 132 no public agent may make a profit out of public business entrusted to his care, e.g., Hulgan v. Gledhill, 207 Ga. 349 (5) (1950); Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759 (1) (2) (1937), but Ga. Code Ann. 26-2904 causes the receiving of any profit from the use of public funds in his hands to be a felony. This statute, which implements Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. VI of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5606) provides in pertinent part: "The receiving, directly or indirectly, by any officer of the State or county ... of any interest, profits, or perquisites arising from the use or loan of public funds in his hands, or money to be raised through his agency for State or county purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two years nor more than seven years, and such offender shall be disqualified from holding office."1 The applicability of this rule to the situation where an individual who after having sold insurance to the county board of education is elected or appointed to serve on the board does not appear to have been considered either in a reported decision of this State or in any prior decision of this office. Nor have I been able to locate any reported decisions of other jurisdictions dealing with this precise question. Consideration of the matter and the public policy upon which it rests, however, leads me to conclude that upon termination of an existing contract of insurance any renewal thereof would be prohibited for the same reasons which would bar the school board member from making an initial sale of insurance to the board on which he serves. In my opinion, the renewal of an expired or aboutto-expire insurance contract is legally indistinguishable from entering into an entirely new contract. Both clearly constitute a "business transaction" between the school board and the insurance company, and, if the initial purchase is such as would be tainted by the existence of an interest of a board member in the insurance l. Ga. Code Ann. 32-949, which prohibits a school board member from selling "supplies or equipment" to his school board is not overlooked! It would seem, however, that the term "supplies or equipment" is not sufficiently broad to encompass the sale of "insurance." See Op. Att'y Gen. l954-56,p. 192. 133 company, the same public policy and legislative intent would bar any renewal of an existing contract. OPINION 65-81 November 8, 1965 You request my official opinion as to whether or not the State Board of Health has authority under the provisions of the 1964 Health Code of Georgia (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 499), as amended, to adopt rules and regulations requiring the testing of infants for inborn errors of metabolism including phenylketonuria. You state in your letter that phenylketonuria is an inborn error of metabolism wherein one of the amino acids (the building blocks of proteins) is improperly metabolized with resultant metabolic products which lead to serious mental retardation. It appears that phenylketonuria results from the abnormal metabolism of the essential amino acid, phenylalanine. If undetected and untreated before the age of six months, normal development of the brain may be permanently impaired resulting in phenylpyruvic oligophrenia, a disorder characterized by various degrees of mental deficiency, usually severe. The context of your letter indicates that several tests have been developed which, if administered to a new-born infant, would identify the presence of phenylketonuria. There apparently are two tests utilized in detecting this disease, those being the urine test and the blood test. The urine test in its simplest and cheapest form seems to be the direct diaper test which is carried out by placing a few drops of 10% ferric chloride solution on the wet diaper as the infant is being undressed for physical examination. It is my understanding that a blue-green reaction is obtained immediately if phenylpyruvic acid is present in the urine, and this test is of great importance in conducting mass screening programs because of its simplicity and low cost. It is further my understanding that the blood tests, on the other hand, are advantageous as they eliminate the hazardous time lag necessary for positive urine tests, and that the test is conducted by puncturing the baby's heel, touching the same to filter paper, securing a specimen thereon and then forwarding same to a lab for 134 processing, and it seems that the medical profession prefers the blood test method over the urine test, since the blood test has detected phenylketonuria in some adults who tested negatively with the urine method. The above procedure and conclusions as outlined is the basis of the following opinion. In connection with your specific question, I call your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-2501 (Ga Laws 1964, p. 499), as amended, which provides as follows: "88-250 I. Mental retardation recognized as health problem.~ Mental retardation is hereby recognized as a public health problem affecting the general welfare and economy of the State, and further the mentally retarded individual is recognized as one who may be improved or rehabilitated physically and mentally through care, training, schooling, and treatment. Adequate facilities and programs, including specialized services to meet his needs, are declared to be in the best interest of the mentally retarded individual and essential to the public health and welfare." Your attention is further directed to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-108, which provides, inter alia, as follows: "88-108. The department; its duty, functions, and powers.~ The department is created and established to safeguard and promote the health of the people of this State, and is hereby empowered to employ all legal means appropriate to that end. "Illustrating without limiting the foregoing grant of authority, the department is hereby empowered to: "(a) Provide epidemiological investigations and laboratory facilities and services in the detection and control of disease, disorders, and disabilities and provide research, investigations, and the dissemination of information concerning reduction in the incidence and proper control of disease, disorders, and disabilities; "(b) Forestall and correct physical, chemical and biological conditions that, if left to run their course, could be injurious to health; * * * "(f) Detect and relieve physical defects and deformities 135 and provide treatment for mental and emotional disorders and infirmities; . . ." Section 88-110 of the 1964 Health Code states that: "88-110. The department, rules and regulations.Manifestly, no legislative body can foresee or cope with all situations and conditions, which, if not promptly checked, would militate against the health of its constituents. Therefore, said department is authorized and directed by and through its board to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to effect prevention, correction, and abatement of such situations and conditions. Such rules and regulations must be adapted to the purposes intended and be within the purview of the powers and duties imposed upon said department by this Title." It is a basic principle of law that an administrative agency such as the State Board of Health derives its power by delegation from the legislature and that in transacting its business, must abide strictly by its charter of powers which was granted it by such legislature. The field of public health is an ever expanding one and the General Assembly of Georgia has specifically recognized this fact under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-110, hereinabove cited. It is my opinion, therefore, that phenylketonuria and other inborn errors of metabolism in infants are conditions which the legislature intended to cover under this section. It is my further opinion that the State Board of Health has authority to adopt and promulgate reasonable rules and regulations which will affect prevention, correction and abatement of such situations and conditions so long as such rules do not violate constitutional or legal guarantees of any person and are within the purview of the powers and duties imposed upon the State Health Department by the 1964 Health Code. I feel, however, that I should call your attention to the fact that the courts tend to regard compulsory examinations as potential invasions of individual liberty and privacy and generally will be alert to possible violations of due process. The courts generally try to make sure that the statutory or regulatory authorization of compulsory examinations bears a reasonable relationship to the 136 public health purpose to be advanced (Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 558, 561 ), and that the particular rule or order is expressly authorized by law (Ex parte arata, 198 Pac. 814; Wragg v. Griffin, 170 N.W. 400). While health regulations in a general way are not affected by constitutional provisions, such power must be exercised reasonably (Patrick v. Riley, 287 Pac. 455; People v. Robertson, 134 N.E. 815). It cannot be exercised so as to deprive citizens of the exercise or enjoyment of their lawful rights in a manner not injurious or dangerous to others (People v. Winer, 110 N.E. 870). The health of the people is of supreme importance to the State and measures reasonably calculated to promote the public health, with uniformity, have been sustained. It is a well-recognized principle that the protection of public health is one of the first and necessary duties of government (State, ex ref. Mowrer v. Underwood, 27 N.E.2d 773; Knowles v. Housing Authority of the City of Columbus, 94 Ga. App. 182 (1956). In Allison v. Cash, 143 Ky. 679, it was said by the court that: "A board of health is an instrumentality of government created for convenience and invested with such powers as will enable it to protect the general health of the people of the State, county or community over which it is given jurisdiction. . . ." It is believed that the decisions of Georgia courts would follow this reasoning. Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 102-102, ,-r9 it is provided that in all interpretations the court shall look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil and the remedy. It has been a general rule that the courts interpret broadly and liberally the right to legislate in the interest of public health, public safety and public morals. The Supreme Court held in the case of Abel v. The State, 64 Ga. App. 448 (1941 ), that the Board of Health was created, not by a subordinate division of the government, but by statute, and derived its power to establish rules and regulations directly and solely from the legislature. The court further held: "When we are considering the right to legislate in the interest of public health, public safety, and public morals, the courts should interpret broadly and liberally. But, generally speaking, when we include in this the right to impose 137 reasonable regulations in matters otherwise in the interest of the public welfare, the words of the regulation should be determined with some strictness, so as not to include everything that might be enacted or adopted as a regulation by a subordinate division of government on the ground of mere expediency." It is my opinion, therefore, that the adoption of rules and regulations concerning phenylketonuria would be for the purpose of the detection and prevention of a condition which adversely affects the health of the citizens of the State of Georgia and that the State Board of Health would be authorized, under the provisions of the 1964 Health Code, as amended, to adopt such rules and regulations. I am enclosing herewith for your information Xerox copies of specific statutes relative to the subject matter which have been adopted by several other States. In case the State Board of Health desires to seek amendatory legislation specifically granting the Board authorization to adopt rules and regulations pertaining to phenylketonuria, this office will be pleased to assist you in the preparation thereof upon request. OPINION 65-82 November 8, 1965 This is in reply to your letter in which you enclose copies of H.R. No. 238-657 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 505) and a resolution passed by the interim committee, established in accordance with the provisions of H.R. No. 238-657, establishing a sub-committee, to consist of three members of said interim committee to: "study and analyze the tax structure, the basis of taxation and the powers of taxation of the State Revenue Department as such relate to or affect the revenues of local governments, and that such sub-committee, in the conduct of this study, be authorized to examine into the records of the State Revenue Department and into the procedures followed by said Department in administering the revenue laws affecting local governments." and providing that: "the names of the three members of this sub-committee be furnished the State Revenue Commissioner as his authority 138 for opening the records of the State Revenue Department to the membership of this sub-committee." and then you ask my opinion as to whether such sub-committee "would be authorized under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 92.8414 to have access to the records and procedures of the Property Tax Unit of the State Revenue Department in the furtherance of their duties and responsibilities as set out in the enclosed resolution." H.R. No. 238-657 created an interim committee: "to study all matters concerning the relationship between the costs incurred by local governments in operating the public school systems of Georgia. To carry out the provisions of this Resolution, said committee shall be authorized to study and analyze all matters that have a bearing on the subject, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to: determining a fair and realistic method of measuring the financial ability of local governments; an analysis of the tax structure of local governments, including the basis of taxation used by such governments and the powers of taxation of such governments and other matters relating thereto." This resolution did not amend, and did not purport to amend, the provisions contained in Ga. Code Ann. 92-8414 concerning the confidential and privileged nature of all information secured by the State Revenue Commissioner incident to the administration of the tax laws. However, it is my opinion that the two aforestated resolutions created in the aforestated sub-committee such an office of State Government with such duties and authority as to entitle it in its official capacity to have access to such confidential and privileged information and that, therefore, the State Revenue Commissioner is authorized by Ga. Code Ann. 92-8414 to disclose his files and such information as called for to members of said sub-committee. It is further my opinion that any such disclosure by the State Revenue Commissioner places on the members of the interim committee receiving same the responsibility of maintaining the confidential and privileged character of such information. Ga. Code Ann. 92-8414 provides, inter alia, the following: that the Commissioner may divulge such confidential information "to 139 an officer of the State or local government entitled in his official capacity to have access thereto" and that "furnishing such information . . . shall not be deemed to change the confidential character of such information." OPINION 65-83 November 9, 1965 You ask whether property located in a county school system at a time such system incurs a bonded indebtedness remains subject to the bond tax levy after such property is annexed to an independent school system. My answer is in the affirmative based upon Chappell v. Small, 194 Ga. 143 (4) (1942), and Bond v. Pattillo, 174 Ga. 571 (2) (3) (1932). As stated in headnote four of the Chappell decision: "When an election was held in a school district to determine whether or not bonds for such school district should be issued, and the election resulted in favor of such bonds, which were duly validated property embraced within the territory which at the time of such election was contained within such school district is liable for its proportionate part of the taxes necessary to be raised for the purpose of discharging such bonded indebtedness." To the same effect, see Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, pp. 214, 217, 240; 1960-61, p. 144. OPINION 65-84 (Unofficial) November 9, 1965 In your letter you requested answers to the following questions: (1) May a school board be liable for injuries incurred by a pupil riding one of its school busses; (2) Could the school board insure itself for actions arising from such injuries? OPINION (1) Neither the Rockdale County Board of Education nor its members, by virtue of their membership, would be liable for injuries incurred by a pupil riding on one of its school busses. 140 (2) While the second question is to some extent answered by the reply to the first, Ga. Code Ann. 32-429 expressly authorizes, and indeed requires, local school boards to purchase insurance policies insuring the pupils riding the same against death or bodily injury. DISCUSSION 1. The law of Georgia, as most other American jurisdictions, is that a local school board is not liable in tort for injuries incurred by pupils on school property or in the course of their transportation to and from the public schools, and that the members of the board cannot be held personally liable for any loss or injury resulting from an act taken by the board where such act lies within the scope of its authority or official discretion. Ga. Code Ann. 23-1502; Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 645 (1952); Krasner v. Harper, 90 Ga. App. 128, 135 (1954); McLeod v. Pulaski County, 50 Ga. App. 356 (1935); 47 Am. Jur. Schools 57; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts 129, p. 923; Op. Att'y Gen. 1937, p. 100; 195456, p. 192. It must be carefully noted, of course, that this shield from liability, which is generally referred to as the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" (see also Ga. Code Ann. 23-1502), is applicable only where the act or conduct causing the loss is one which was taken by the board within the scope of its authority or official discretion. It does not protect a board member where it is such member's own personal and individual negligence which causes the injury rather than an action of the school board. Another exception is the fact that while the doctrine protects the school board and the members of the board from liability where the injury results from ordinary negligence of the board, it would not apply where the action of the board amounts to malicious, wilful or wanton misconduct. See, e.g., Beckanstin v. Drake, 89 Ga. App. 636, 637 (1954); Krasner v. Harper, supra at 135. 2. While the second question is to some extent answered by my reply to the first inquiry (i.e., that neither the school board nor its members would ordinarily be liable for negligent actions or inactions of the board), I might point out that Ga. Code Ann. 32429 both authorizes and requires school boards to purchase insurance policies for the protection of school children transported 141 on school busses in an amount to be determined by the local board. Said Code section provides: "The various school boards of the counties, cities and independent school systems employing school busses are hereby authorized and required to cause policies of insurance to be issued insuring the school children riding therein to and from school against bodily injury or death at any time therefrom resulting from an accident or collision in which said busses are involved. The amount of such insurance shall be within the discretion of the respective boards.'' OPINION 65-85 (Unofficial) November 10, 1965 The subject-matter of your concern, to wit: the alleged payment of local teacher supplements by some counties on a racial basis, is one which I have discussed informally with an official of the Georgia Teachers and Education Association. I think there is no doubt in anyone's mind that such a practice, if it does exist, is completely illegal under the laws of the State of Georgia (see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 32-609, and particularly the last two sentences thereof) as well as contrary to existing policies of the State Board of Education. It would seem that the principal question is not that of legality but that of how the wrong, if it does exist, may be corrected. Ordinarily the procedure would be that of one or more of the aggrieved teachers asking for a hearing on the matter before the local school board involved and then, in the event of an adverse decision before the local board, appealing to the State Board of Education. This would be the procedure set forth at pages 160-62 of "Georgia School Laws," a 1961 publication of the State Department of Education. In addition, it is my personal view (not to be construed as an official view of the office of the Attorney General) that pursuant to its right under Ga. Code Ann. 32-643, 32-656 to withhold State school funds from any local school system failing to comply with State school laws or State Board policies, rules or regulations, the State Board of Education could, if it so desired, itself hold the initial hearing. I could not, of course, speculate as to whether or not the State Board would be agreeable to holding the initial hearing itself rather than first affording the 142 local system an opportunity to remedy the situation, but it conceivably might agree to do so upon a proper showing that this is the better procedure under the particular circumstances involved. Under either method of procedure, however, it would seem to me to be necessary for a request for a hearing to be filed by or on behalf of a complaining teacher and I believe it would also be quite necessary for the complainant to produce evidence at the hearing to show that teacher supplements are in fact being paid on a racial basis. The trouble with reliance upon the A-3 Form (Teachers Salary Payroll) you mention in your letter is, according to the information I have been given by officials of the State Department of Education, that the State Department of Education has always construed and accepted the absence of any figures in the contract salary column of such form as indicating that these figures are the same as the amounts shown in the column reflecting the State funds paid to the teachers. The position of the officials of the State Department of Education with whom I spoke is that the word of the local systems is, and in view of the absence of manpower for comprehensive investigative enforcement procedures must, in the absence of specific and detailed information or complaints to the contrary, be accepted. OPINION 65-86 (Unofficial) November 10, 1965 This is in reply to your letter concerning adoption procedures of the Department of Family and Children Services. In specificity you refer to the affidavit of a person respecting that Department's custody over the child and express doubts as to the value of such affidavit in adoption proceedings on the ground that it is hearsay. The practical reason for this procedure, of course, is to keep the name of the natural mother confidential. It seems to be the general opinion of social workers and others involved in child adoptions that it is not desirable either for the natural mother to know the identities of the adoptive parents or for the adoptive parents to know the name of the natural mother. Although I am not familiar with the opinion of the Attorney General's office referred to, I am informed that this procedure has been in use at least fifteen years 143 without having been questioned. Under Ga. Code Ann. 74-407 it is not necessary that the names of the natural parents be included in the adoption petition where unknown to the petitioners for adoption, and, under Ga. Code Ann. 74-403, consent of the natural parents is not required for adoption where their rights have been surrendered to the State Department of Family and Children Services. While I indeed see your point as to the hearsay problem which might be presented if some party objected to the use of the affidavit to show the surrender of rights to the State Department, I think the best answer is the fact that adoption proceedings are not ordinarily adversary proceedings with this probably accounting for the fact that no objection has yet been taken to the long standing procedure described. As to future habeas corpus proceedings, it would seem to me that in the event this unlikely event should occur (unlikely in that the natural mother would have no way of knowing where and with whom the child was placed), it would then be sufficient in time to prove the actual written consent of the mother by means other than the affidavit. OPINION 65-87 November 10, 1965 You inquire as to the authority of local school systems to destroy old records maintained under State law or State Board regulations in order to alleviate storage space problems which often develop after a period of years. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION Being unaware of any State law which would authorize a local school system to destroy old records, I am of the opinion that it would be illegal for local school officials to destroy any records being maintained pursuant to the requirements of State law. As to records which are kept pursuant to regulations of the State Board of Education alone, and nowise required or provided for by State law, it would be proper to destroy such records only in those cases where the State Board has provided for their destruction. DISCUSSION It is the general rule that an officer having public records in his charge is merely a custodian of the same, with all property rights 144 therein being vested in the office and the public. 45 Am. Jur. Records & Recording Laws 7. As custodian of the public records placed in his charge and control, the public officer cannot destroy, deface or give up the same without authority from the source which requires the public record in question to be made and maintained. 45 Am. Jur. Records & Recording Laws 12. Concerning those records which local school systems are required to keep by law, I am aware of no legislative authorization for their destruction by the local school officials having custody over the same.' Hence, I am forced to the conclusion that the destruction of records of this sort would be illegal. On the other hand, where the records involved are kept solely for compliance with regulations or policies of the State Board of Education [and not pursuant to any State law] it would seem that the State Board of Education could itself authorize the discontinuance or destruction of such records. In this case the propriety of destruction by a local school official would depend upon whether or not such destruction has been authorized by the State Board of Education. OPINION 65-88 (Unofficial) November 12, 1965 Your question is whether or not public school buildings in Whitfield County may be used as polling places in elections. Ga. Code Ann. 34-705 provides that the ordinary of the county shall select and fix the polling place within each election district. Ga. Code Ann. 34-706(a) states that: "In selecting polling places, the ordinary shall, wherever practicable, select school houses, municipal buildings or rooms, or other public buildings for that purpose. School, county, municipal or other governmental 1. The authority of the Governor to order the destruction of records of any department of the State in certain specified situations (see Ga. Code Ann. 40-809, 40-810) would not appear to be applicable to any records of counties, county school systems or other political subdivisions of the State. 145 authorities shall, upon request of the ordinary, make arrangements for the use of their property for polling places: Provided, however, that such use shall not substantially interfere with the use of such property for the purposes for which it is primarily intended." It can clearly be seen from the above-quoted section of the Election Code that the General Assembly intended that, wherever possible, school buildings be used as polling places. An affirmative duty is placed on school officials to make their property available for polling places. Although the Code section states that the use shall not substantially interfere with primary use of such public property, it would appear from the Code that this is a decision which lies within the discretion of the ordinary. OPINION 65-89 (Unofficial) November 17, 1965 In your letter you asked the opinion of the Attorney General as to whether a member of the County Welfare Board may become a candidate for political office in view of the provisions of the Hatch Act, and whether there is any time limit prescribed by the Act should the member resign from the Board to become such a political candidate. May I direct your attention to part of the provisions of the popularly named "Hatch Political Activity Act," 5 U.S.C. Sec. ll8k (a) (1964), which provides as follows: "(a) Influencing elections; officer or employee defined. No officer or employee of any State of local agency whose principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans' or grants made by the United States or by any Federal agency shall (l) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or a nomination for office, or affecting the result thereof, or (2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, command, or advise any other such officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute any part of his salary or compensation or anything else of value to any party, committee, organization, agency, or person for political purposes. No such officer or employee shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns. . ." 146 The term, "principal employment," as it appears in the above quoted provisions, was defined in the case of Alexander J. Maturri vs. United States Civil Service Commission, 229 F.2d 435 (1956) as referring to both an individual's public employment, and his private employment, when the question of where the individual is principally employed is considered. In answering your first question, may I also direct your attention to part of the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 99-503, which provides for the organization and compensation of the County Board of Family and Children Services, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: "99-503. County Boards. The county board of family and children services shall consist of five members who shall be appointed by the Director of the State Department of Family and Children Services on the recommendation and nomination of the county commissioner or board of commissioners, or other constituted fiscal or financial agent of the county. Such commissioner or commissioners, or fiscal or financial agent, shall recommend and nominate to the Director of the State Department of Family and Children Services three influential and respected citizens, recognized for their demonstrated interest in family and children services provided by the county department, for each position on the county board to be filled by the Director: Provided, however, that no elected officer of the State or any subdivision thereof shall be eligible for appointment to the board. The term of office of members of the county board shall be for five years, except that upon the expiration of the terms of the present members of said board one member shall be appointed for a one-year term; one member for a two-year term; one member for a three-year term; one member for a four-year term; and one member for a five-year term. The Director of the State Department may provide rules and regulations governing selection of persons to serve as chairman and vice chairman of said boards. Appointments to fill vacancies caused by death, resignation or removal before the expiration of a term shall be made for the remainder of such term in the same manner as herein provided for original appointments. Members of the county board shall serve without compensation, except that they shall be reimbursed for traveling and other expenses 147 actually incurred in the performance of their official duties. . ." Since the language quoted above clearly provides that members of the county boards are to serve without compensation, other than expenses, it would appear that it was not contemplated that a member of the Board should depend upon his membership as his sole employment. Therefore, it is further my unofficial opinion that an individual that is a member of the county board should consider such membership along with any other private employment in determining by which he is "principally employed" and whether he is within the prohibitions of the Hatch Political Activity Act. In answer lo your second question, should an individual resign from an office within the prohibitions of the Hatch Act, I find no time limit stated which must be complied with before he can become a candidate for political office. In connection with your questions, may I also call your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 89-103, wherein it states "89-103. (259) Holding plurality ofcounty offices; deputies ofcommissioned officers. No person shall hold, in any manner whatever, or be commissioned to hold at one time, more than one county office, except by special enactment of the legislature; nor shall any commissioned officer be deputy for any other commissioned officer, except by such special enactment. (Acts 1890-1, p. 102)" (Emphasis added.) This provision of the Georgia law in my unofficial opinion is a direct prohibition against an individual holding tw() county offices at the same time. OPINION 65-90 November 18, 1965 You have recently requested my opinion as to whether or not a "private bank" is eligible to make a loan which may be guaranteed by the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation under the provisions of Ga. Laws, 1965, p. 217. It is my official opinion that such "banks" are not eligible to make such guaranteed loans. Section 6 of the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation Act (Ga. Laws, 1965, p. 217) states that: 148 "The loans provided herein may be made by commercial (sic) banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, life insurance companies, credit unions, and retirement and pension systems." You have asked whether or not a "private bank" is a "commercial bank" within the meaning of this section of the Act. The term "commercial bank" is not defined in the Act creating the corporation, and, therefore, other sources must be resorted to in order to determine its meaning. The only definition of the term "bank" that I have been able to unearth in the statutes of Georgia is that found in Ga. Code Ann. 13-201. The courts of Georgia have long held that statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of existing law, and should be construed in harmony with the existing system of jurisprudence. Botts v. Southeastern Pipeline Co., 190 Ga. 689, 700,701 (1940). Ga. Code Ann. 13-201 defines "bank" as corporations authorized by law to perform enumerated banking functions, and specifically excludes private bankers from the general definition of "bank," although certain provisions of the Banking Law are made expressly applicable to private bankers. The Supreme Court in Lawson v. Citizens Bank of Hahira, 185 Ga. 527 (1938), held that the term "bank" in the Banking Law did not include private bankers doing a banking business. In light of the above-cited authorities, it is my official opinion that the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation may not guarantee loans made by private bankers. OPINION 65-91 (Unofficial) November 18, 1965 You ask whether the absence of a savings clause in a proposed "home rule" amendment to the State Constitution (see Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 752-58) might cause a repeal by implication of the existing constitutional amendments of local application under which governmental authorities of certain counties now operate. OPINION While I believe that it is unlikely that the adoption of a "home 149 rule" constitutional amendment sans savings clause would effect an ipso facto repeal of all existing local constitutional amendments pertaining to county government, I am of the opinion that such a savings clause will be required if the possibility of a repeal by implication of certain portions or provisions of the prior amendments (on the grounds of their being inconsistent with or in conflict with the "home rule" amendment) is to be avoided. DISCUSSION Generally speaking, the usual principles governing the construction of statutes also apply to the construction of constitutions. E.g., DeJarnette v. Hospital Authority of Alba1,1y, 195 Ga. 189, 204 (1942); Jones v. Darby, 174 Ga. 71, 72 (1932); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 15. The rule respecting repeal of special laws by the enactment of a general statute1 is that there is no such general repeal unless it is "plainly manifest" from the terms of the general law that such was the intention of the law-making body. E.g., Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 372, 384 (1939); Walker v. The State, 74 Ga. App. 48, 53 (1946). Thus, while I have not been able to locate a case in point dealing with constitutional amendments, I am of the opinion unless a court were to construe the language of the "home rule" amendment as clearly manifesting an intention of repealing all existing local constitutional amendments relating to county government (and while not impossible I believe this construction is unlikely2), there would be no ipso facto repeal of all existing amendments relating to county government. 1. This situation must be noted as being contra-distinct from that of the attempted enactment of a special or local law in a case for which provision has already been made by an existing general law. Where the general law comes into existence first, local or special legislation is prohibited by Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-40 I). 2. The fact that the proposed "home rule" amendment is one which merely authorizes (and does not direct) the governing authority of each county to adopt reasonable ordinances pursuant to its provisions would seem to indicate that the intention is not one of requiring all counties to operate solely under the home rule amendment, with all existing local constitutional amendments being repealed by implication. See Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 752-58. 150 On the other hand, it is recognized that the possibility of conflicts and inconsistencies between the various extant local constitutional amendments and the proposed "home rule" amendment is present. Consequently it would seem to me that even considering the fact that repeals by implication are not favored, the absence of a savings clause respecting local constitutional amendments might very likely result in some parts or provisions of the various local constitutional amendments dealing with county government being held to be repealed by implication. A comprehensive statement of the law in this regard appears in DeJarnette v. Hospital Authority ofAlbany, supra, where at page 204 of the reported decision the court states: "With respect to statutes, it has been repeatedly held that repeals by implication are not favored, and that a statute will not be so construed as to repeal a previous one, unless the two are so repugnant and irreconcilable that they cannot stand together, or the latter was intended to cover the subjectmatter of the other and operate as a substitute for it. . . . The same rule applies with respect to amendments to the Constitution, so that an earlier provision remains in force in so far as it is not repugnant to an amendment, in the absence of an express repeal; in order to effect a repeal, the repugnance must be so clear and positive that they cannot consistently stand together. . . . The different provisions of the Constitution should be harmonized, if practicable. If an amendment duly adopted necessarily conflicts with some previous provision, the amendment, being the last expression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an implied modification pro tanto of the former provision." While the determination of possible conflicts and inconsistencies between the proposed "home rule" amendment and the extant local constitutional amendments would require a detailed study of each of the latter and is outside the scope of this memorandum, it would seem apparent that the insertion of a savings clause would be the only certain way of averting the danger of repeal by implication. OPINION 65-92 (Unofficial) November 19, 1965 In your recent letter you request information as to what effect "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965" has upon a munici- 151 pality's right to tax, and whether a municipality has the right to levy a sales tax. It should be noted that section 4, subsection 3 of "The Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965" (Ga. L. 1965, p. 298) provides that the power granted municipalities shall not be construed to extend to "action adopting any form of taxation beyond that authorized by law or by the Constitution." Therefore, the taxing authority of a municipality is still limited by general law and the Constitution. Your question as to the authority of a municipality to adopt a sales tax is answered by Ga. Code Ann. 92-3446a, which provides that: "No county, municipality, school district or political subdivision of the State, shall impose, levy, or collect a gross receipts, sales or use tax, or tax on amusement admission or services included in this Chapter: Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to apply to a fixed license, occupational or franchise tax based on gross receipts or on a gross receipts basis and provided further that no county or municipality shall be prohibited from levying or collecting an excise tax on malt beverages and/ or wine." OPINION 65-93 (Unofficial) November 19, 1965 You ask whether or not the language in Section 1106(a) of the Social Security Act or the terms of Section F of the proposed contract allow the Georgia Department of Public Health to classify and hold information as confidential and if so, would such Section be in conflict with the Georgia "Open Records Law." I direct your attention to the provisions of Section 1106 of the Social Security Act which provides, inter alia, as follows, to wit: "Sec. 1106. (a) no disclosure of any return or portion of a return (including information returns and other written statements) filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under title VI I I of the Social Security Act or under subchapter E of chapter I or subchapter A of chapter 9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, or under chapter 2 or 21 or, pursuant thereto, under subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, or under regulations made under authority 152 thereof, which has been transmitted to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, or of any file, record, report, or other paper, or any information, obtained at any time by the Secretary or by any officer or employee of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the course of discharging the duties of the Secretary under this Act, and no disclosure of any such file, record, report, or other paper, or information, obtained at any time by any person from the Secretary or from any officer or employee of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, shall be made except as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both." (Emphasis added.) Section F of the proposed contract, pertaining to confidential nature and limitation on use of information and records obtained in carrying out the contract provides as follows, to wit: "F Confidential Nature and Limitation on Use of Information and Records "In accordance with regulations promulgated by the Secretary, the State agency will adopt policies and procedures to insure that information contained in its records and obtained from the Secretary or from any provider of services, in carrying out its functions under this agreement, will be used solely for the purposes of this agreement. Such information shall be disclosed only as provided in Section 1106 of the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Secretary." Your attention is further directed to Ga. Code Ann. 40-270 l of the (Ga. Laws 1959, p. 88), which provides as follows: "40-2701. Rights of public to inspect records.-All State county and municipal records, except those, which by order of a court of this State or by law, are prohibited from being open to inspection by the general public, shall be open for a personal inspection of any citizen of Georgia at a reasonable time and place, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse this privilege to any citizen." 153 It is my opinion that the provisions of Section l l06(a), cited above, pertains only to information obtained at any time by any person from the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and not to any other records obtained by the Georgia State Department of Public Health in the conduct or administration of an entirely different program, such as the licensure of nursing homes under applicable State statutes. This latter program is, of course, subject to the Georgia "Open Records Law." It is further my opinion that the Georgia State Board of Health under the authority of the 1964 Health Code can adopt rules or regulations declaring that information obtained solely for carrying out the purposes of Section 1864 of the Social Security Act be confidential. It would not be necessary, however, for the State Board of Health to adopt rules and regulations requiring that information obtained from the Secretary or from any officer or employee of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare be deemed "confidential," as such information has already been declared confidential by Section ll06(a) of the Social Security Act. OPINION 65-94 (Unofficial) You have asked the following questions: November 22, 1965 I. How can the office of Clayton County Treasurer be abolished? 2. Can the County Treasurer delegate his duties to someone else and can someone else legally take over his duties'? 3. What would be the effect if he were to resign from this office'? With respect to question number one, I call your attention to Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. IV of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which provides in part as follows: "Whatever tribunal, or officers, may be created by the General Assembly for the transaction of county matters, shall be uniform throughout the State, and of the same name, 154 jurisdiction, in remedies, except that the General Assembly may . .. abolish the office of County Treasurer in any county ...." (Emphasis added.) am informed, however, that the present county treasurer of , Clayton County has just been reelected to a four-year term, pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 23-1001 and the provisions of Art. XI, Sec. II, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia which provide as follows: "The county officers shall be elected by the qualified voters of their respective counties or districts, and shall hold their ojjice for four years. They shall be removed upon conviction for malpractice in office; and no person shall be eligible for any of the offices referred to in this paragraph unless he shall have been a resident of the county for two years and is a qualified voter." (Emphasis added.) The question arises as to whether or not the office of county treasurer can be abolished so that it can be effective immediately upon such abolishment so as to preclude the present county treasurer from serving out his term of office. This point apparently has been passed upon by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of McCall v. Wilkins, 145 Ga. 342 (1916), in which the court held that passage of an Act abolishing the office of county treasurer of Wayne County was authorized by the express provisions of the Constitution, and being so, is by force of the Constitution unaffected by the provision of the Constitution providing for the election of county officers of the qualified voters of the counties or districts, their terms of office, how they shall be removed, and certain qualifications necessary to their eligibility. Although this 1916 case was passed upon prior to the adoption of the present Constitution of 1945, the 1945 Constitution did carry forward the two provisions which have been referred to herein. The court held that since the legislature, acting pursuant to the authority provided by the Constitution, abolished the office of county treasurer of Wayne County and made provision for deposit and disposition of the public funds of the county through the agency of a banking institution, it was not erroneous for the judge, on presentation of the petition of the plaintiff alleging himself to be county treasurer and seeking to enjoin the board of commissioners of roads and revenue from dealing with the public funds in the manner specified in the Act, to refuse to sanction the petition and issue a rule nisi as 155 prayed. It has been held that where the legislature is given constitutional power to legislate on any specific subject-matter, a statute passed in the exercise of this power, which conforms strictly to the constitutional grant, is not rendered unconstitutional by the fact that it has the incidental effect of legislating out of office certajn officers holding office under the general provisions of the Constitution. See 43 Am. Jur. 191; Hines v. Etheridge, eta/., Commissioners, eta/., 173 Ga. 870 (1931). My answer, therefore, to your first question is that the office of county treasurer can only be abolished by an Act of the General Assembly, and it is my opinion that such an Act would have the effect of abolishing this office as of the date so specified in the Act. With reference to your second question, I point out that Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 23-10 spells out certain duties of the county treasurer and requires him to take an oath that he will faithfully collect, disburse, and account for all monies or other effects of the county, and otherwise faithfully discharge all the duties required of him as county treasurer. He is also required to post a bond to protect the county from any loss. At your request, I am sending you a copy of the laws setting forth the duties in general of the county treasurer. I, therefore, will not enumerate those duties here, but I do call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 23-1016 which provides that all county funds are to be paid to and disbursed by the county treasurer except such as may be specially excepted by law and then to be collected and disbursed as specially directed. In view of the foregoing, I do not feel that it would be proper for any one to assume the duties of the treasurer nor would it be proper for the treasurer to attempt to delegate his responsibilities and duties to some other officer or other person. There is no provision of law providing for such an assumption or delegation of these duties and responsibilities. Ga. Code Ann. 23-1016, however, does expressly provide that county funds may be paid and disbursed other than through the county treasurer when such is authorized by law. If there be any laws affecting payment and disbursement of any county funds of Clayton County other than to and by the county treasurer, of course, the handling of such county funds in the special manner as authorized would be proper. In answer to your third question, I can only advise that if the county treasurer were to abandon his office or to resign prior to the expiration of his term of office and prior to the abolishment of this 156 office by the General Assembly that it would be incumbent under the law for the Ordinary to fill this vacancy in office as vacancies in other county offices are filled. This would be by appointment by the Ordinary and the calling of an election to fill the vacancy. OPINION 65-95 (Unofficial) November 29, 1965 In your letter you state that the Augusta Museum is a non-profit incorporated institution which is controlled by a board of elected trustees and receives its support by financial allotments from Richmond County, the City of Augusta, and the Board of Education. It is open to the general public, and its collections range from Indian archaeology to history, natural science and art. In addition, the museum conducts various archaeological excavations. You state that the museum is housed in the historic building of Academy of Richmond, which property is restricted to use only for educational purposes. You ask if a tax exemption can be granted to the Augusta Museum and ask that the museum be declared eligible to receive government surplus. The only exemptions from ad valorem property taxation are those enumerated in the Constitution of 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5404). The Constitution of 1945, Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV provides, in part, as follows: 'The General Assembly may, by law, exempt from taxation all of the property; . . . all institutions of purely public charity; all intangible personal property owned by or irrevocably held in trust for the exclusive benefit of . . . educational and charitable institutions, no part of the net profit from the operation of which can inure to the benefit of any private person; all buildings erected for and used as a college, incorporated academy or other seminary of learning, and also all funds or properties held or used as endowment by such colleges, incorporated academies or seminaries of learning, provided the same is not invested in real estate; . . . - the real and personal estate of any public library, and that of any other literary association, used by or connected with such library; all books and philosophical apparatus and all paintings and statuary of any company or association, kept in a public hall and not held as merchandise or for purposes of 157 sale or gain; provided the property so accepted be not used for the purpose of private or corporate profit and income, distributable to shareholders in corporations owning such property or to other owners of such property, and any income from such property is used exclusively for religious, educational and charitable purposes, or for either one or more of such purposes and for the purpose of maintaining and operating such institution; . . . ." In 1946 the General Assembly passed an Act exempting from taxation all of the property enumerated in the above-stated clause of the Constitution, using the identical language there employed. (Ga. Laws 1946, p. 12.) The tax exemption status of museums has not been decided by the Georgia courts. However, courts in other jurisdictions have held that public museums are charitable institutions. "While libraries and museums devoted to public use are not strictly places of instruction such as schools, they nevertheless, serve important educational purposes and may be deemed to be 'charities' within tax exemption status." Tappan Washington Memorial Corporation v. Margetts, 75 A.2d 823,9 N.J., supra, 212. In view of the operation and activities of the Augusta Museum, in my opinion it would qualify as a charitable institution and would be exempt from taxation. Of course, the personal property owned and exhibited by the Museum would be exempt under the provision that exempts "all books and philosophical apparatus and all paintings and statuary of any company or association, kept in a public hall and not held as merchandise or for purposes of sale or gain." OPINION 65-96 (Unofficial) November 29, 1965 You ask whether or not "Naturopathic Physicians" are permitted to do obstetrical work in this State and by what authority naturopaths are permitted to practice in Georgia. Naturopathy is defined by Ga. Code Ann. 84-2901 as "that philosophy and system of the healing art embracing prevention, 158 diagnosis, and treatment of human ills and functions by the use of several properties of air, light, heat, cold, water, manipulation, with the use of such substances, nutritional as are naturally found in and required by the body, excluding drugs, surgery, X-ray, and radium therapy, and the use of X-ray equipment." It is my opinion that the practice of obstetrics involves procedures which are not embraced within the definition of naturopathy. It is my opinion, therefore, that a naturopathic physician may not conduct an obstetrical practice in this State. In answer to your second question, naturopaths currently practicing in the State of Georgia were originally licensed in accordance with the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 84-2905 by the Georgia Board of Naturopathic Examiners. The licenses issued pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 84-2905 did not specify an expiration date and were, in effect, permanent licenses. Naturopathic practitioners, currently practicing in Georgia, are practicing under the licenses granted by the Georgia Board of Naturopathic Examiners prior to the abolition of that Board in 1956. OPINION 65-97 (Unofficial) November 30, 1965 This will acknowledge receipt of your letter concerning voir dire examination of prospective jurors in this State. In addition to certain questions on voir dire allowed in the trial of felony cases by Ga. Code Ann. 59-806, Ga. Code Ann. 59-705 (Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1032, as amende_d Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 214, 215) was enacted by the Georgia General Assembly in 1949 and amended in 1951. This Act greatly amplified the right to an individual examination of the panel of jurors from which a jury is to be selected, without interposing any challenge. In civil cases, all parties have this right; and in criminal cases, both the State and the defendant have the right to an individual examination of each juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing challenge. The examination may touch upon any matter or thing which will illustrate any interest of the juror in the cause, including any opinion as to which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning or bias, 159 which the juror might have respecting the subject-matter of the suit, or counsel or parties thereto, and religious, social and fraternal connections of the juror. In the case of Atlanta Joint Terminals v. Knight, 98 Ga. App. 482 (1958), the court held: "While hypothetical questions em bodying a substantial outline of the case proposed to be made are not proper, because such questions tend to cause a juror to pledge himself to a future action if the evidence turns out to be that propounded by the hypothetical question, and thus to prejudge the case, nevertheless questions which only seek to ascertain that the juror's mind is free of preconvictions which might cause him to do just this are entirely proper." The examination is conducted under the supervision and direction of the court, and what questions may or may not be asked must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise of which will not be interfered with unless clearly abused. Whaley v. Sim Grady Machinery Company, Inc., 218 Ga. 839 (1963). I am personally unaware of any objections to the Georgia laws as they exist on the subject of voir dire. I am enclosing a copy of the statutes referred to herein and hope that this information will be of some assistance to you. OPINION 65-98 December 1, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask: (1) Whether the Higher Education Assistance Corporation is an agency of the State? (2) Whe' ',er the General Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to appropriate funds directly to the Higher Education Assistance Corporation? (3) What must be done, in the event both of the foregoing questions are answered in the negative, to make the Higher Education Assistance Corporation a State agency to which funds may be appropriated directly by the General Assembly? 160 My opinion and the reasons therefor respecting the questions you have presented are as follows: OPINION (1) The Higher Education Assistance Corporation is a public corporation but is not "an agency of the State" in the sense that its obligations are debts of the State. (2) The General Assembly is empowered by the Constitution to appropriate funds directly to the Corporation. (3) Reply to question three is obviated by the .answer to question number two (i.e., no additional action is necessary). DISCUSSION 1.. Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 was amended in 1964 by the addition of a paragraph providing that: "The General Assembly is hereby authorized to provide by law for a program of guaranteed student loans and for the payment of interest on such loans, which loans shall be used for the purpose of acquiring an education beyond the 12th grade. The General Assembly is authorized to create an Authority, a corporation or other entity for the purpose of administering any such law. Such law shall provide the agencies which may participate in any such loan program which may include commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan associations, life insurance companies, credit unions, and retirement and pension systems. Such law shall provide a maximum rate of interest which may be charged for such loans and shall provide a portion of such interest which will be paid by the State. State funds may be expended for such purposes and the General Assembly is hereby authorized to appropriate money therefor. The General Assembly is also authorized to provide that contributions for the purposes provided herein shall be deductible for State income tax purposes. The General Assembly is also authorized to provide for such tax exemptions as shall be deemed advisable in connection with such program. The General Assembly is hereby authorized to provide for all other matters relative to the purposes provided for herein." Ga. Laws 1964, p. 1000 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701 (11)). 161 While the original legislation to implement this constitutional amendment, see Ga. Laws. 1964, pp. 735, et seq., (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-33), was actually passed prior to adoption of the amendment by the peop'le in November, 1964 (with a provision causing its effective date of July 1, 1965, to be conditioned upon such adoption), the General Assembly subsequently, in March, 1965, repealed the original Act in toto and substituted a revised version. See Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 217-224. Like the original Act, the current legislation establishes a non-profit corporation known as the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation in order to provide for a program of guaranteed student loans. There is no question, of course, as to the fact that the Corporation is a public corporation. It was created by the General Assembly pursuant to constitutional authority rather than by private individuals under general corporation laws; its purpose is one of a public nature; its management is by a board of directors comprised of three State officials ex-officio plus twelve members appointed by the Governor for fixed terms of six years; its existence continues until termination by the General Assembly; and upon dissolution all corporate properties and monies become properties and monies of the State. See Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 217, 219, 221, 224. On the other hand the corporation is a legal entity distinct from the State, with the right, for example, to contract, adopt rules and regulations, and to sue and be sued in its own name. Inasmuch as Section 5 (2) of the Act provides in part: "No obligation of the Corporation shall be a debt of the State and the Corporation shall have no power to make its debts payable out of any monies except those of the Corporation." the Corporation cannot be deemed an "agency" of the State in the sense of having an agency power to bind the State (as its principal) by its actions, including its undertaking of any fiscal obligation. 2. In actuality, the above answer to your first question is probably rendered largely academic by the answer to the second. Whether or not the Corporation is "an agency of the State," it is a proper subject for direct appropriations by the General Assembly. The constitutional amendment which authorized the General Assembly to create the Corporation for the purpose ofadministering the law expressly provides that: 162 "State funds may be expended for such purposes and the General Assembly is hereby authorized to appropriate money therefor." In view of the fact that the Higher Education Assistance Corporation is the entity created to operate the program of guaranteed student loans, I can scarcely imagine any contemplated recipient of State appropriations under this constitutional provision other than the Corporation itself. It is, therefore, my opinion that the General Assembly unquestionably has the right to appropriate funds directly to the Higher Education Assistance Corporation. 3. Inasmuch as it is my view that the General Assembly already is empowered to appropriate funds directly to the Higher Education Assistance Corporation, it follows that no reply is required to your third question. OPINION 65-99 December 2, 1965 This is in reply to your letter regarding a proposed agreement between the State Board of Education and the National Center for School and College Television (NCSCT). In essence, the agreement (a copy of which is attached to your letter) would provide for NCSCT to bear a portion of the production costs incurred by the State Department of Education in said Department's production of an educational television course, in return for the exclusive right to duplicate and distribute such course in states other than Georgia. Under the proposed terms, and in consideration of the payment specified in the agreement, the State Department, at the time it produces the "Telecourse" for its own use, agrees to produce for and furnish to NCSCT a master video-tape recording of original quality for each of the four lessons contained in the "Telecourse." The State Department further agrees that at the time it produces related course materials, such as printed teacher guides, for its own local use, it will, in consideration of the payment specified, produce for and furnish to NCSCT fifty copies of said related course materials. There is no limitation or restriction on the State Department's production and use of master video-tape recordings or duplicate tape recordings within the State. 163 You request opinions as to the following questions: (1) Is the State Board of Education legally authorized to enter into the proposed agreement? (2) May the funds received from NCSCT under the agreement be returned by the State Board of Education to the budget of the ETV Unit of the State Department of Education? My opinion and the reasons therefor with respect to your questions is as follows: OPINION (1) The State Board of Education is legally authorized to enter into the proposed agreement. (2) The funds received from N CSCT under the agreement may be returned by the State Board of Education to the budget of the ETV Unit of the State Department of Education. DISCUSSION 1. The broad powers of the State Board of Education in connection with the carrying out of the public school laws and assuring a more economical and efficient operation of the public schools and "any phase of public education in the public schools of this State,'' see, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. 32-603, is fully applicable to the new field of educational television. Ga. Code Ann. 32-408.1, in empowering the State Board of Education to make educational programs available through the medium of educational television, and to own and operate television stations and related facilities, expressly authorizes the Board: "to enter into agreements with other agencies, persons, firms or corporations for the production and/or transmission of educational television programs." In my opinion, the agreement in question, which is essentially a joint venture between the State Board of Education and NCSCT respecting the production of educational television courses, and which would lower the production costs which otherwise would presumably have to be borne entirely by the State Department of Education, is within the purview of the above statutory authorization. 164 In reaching this conclusion the rule that only the legislature can dispose of State property, see, e.g., Western Union v. W. & A. RR. Co., 142 Ga. 532, 534 (1914); Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 404; 1960-61, p. 380, is not overlooked. Were the contract seeking to sell or even lease an educational video-tape which was property of the State, I might be impelled to an opposite conclusion. However, here there is no transfer of tangible property, real or personal, which is owned by the State. At best, NCSCT is given a right to copy the "Telecourse" produced by the State Department of Education upon the shared cost arrangement. While it is true that in view of the newness of the subject-matter (i.e.,educational television) and the absence of any reported judicial decisions interpreting the recent Georgia statutes relating to educational television I cannot guarantee what action a court might take in the matter, it is my opinion that the rule of Western Union v. W. & A. R.R. Co., supra, relating to the disposal of physical property owned by the State would not be expanded so far as to cover the incorporeal property rights here involved, especially in light of the statutory provisions first above-mentioned herein. Nor do I think that this result would be altered by the fact that instead of making the video-tape copy of the "Telecourse" itself, NCSCT employs the State Department of Education to make the copy in return for the payment specified in the agreement. 2. The affirmative answer to your second question is based upon Ga. Code Ann. 32-413.1 which provides: "The State Board of Education is authorized and empowered and is hereby designated the proper State agency to receive . . . any other funds that may be . . . granted or otherwise made available to the State for educational television purposes at all levels of education and shall, after receipt of same, use, allot or distribute the same in accordance with the intent, terms, and conditions of such appropriations and grants," and also upon the broad policy and regulatory power conferred on the Board respecting the more economical and efficient operation of any phase of public education in the public schools of the State. See Ga. Code Ann. 32-603. 165 OPINION 65-100 December 6, 1965 The Georgia Board of Chiropractic Examiners requests an opinion concerning whether or not the Board may accept a certificate from the National Board of Chiropractic Examiners in lieu of giving the written examination to prospective licensees. The National Board of Chiropractic Examiners is composed of members from several states. The National Board of Chiropractic Examiners has devised a battery of tests which the Board will administer to prospective licensees at various testing centers throughout the United States. The results of these tests may be made available to the Secretary of any State Examining Board. Ga. Code Ann. 84-507 provides, inter alia, that "Any person wishing the right to practice chiropractic shall make written application to said Board of Chiropractic Examiners through the Joint Secretary, State Examining Boards, in such form as may be adopted and directed by the Board." Ga. Code Ann. 84-508 provides: "All examinations shall be in writing, the subjects of which shall be as follows: anatomy, physiology, symptomatology, pathology, physical diagnosis, neurology, chemistry, hygiene and sanitation, chiropractic orthopedy, nerve tracing and adjusting as taught by standard chiropractic schools or colleges, bacteriology, and spinography. A license shall be granted to all applicants who shall correctly answer 75 per centum of all questions asked, and if any applicant shall fail to answer correctly 75 per centum of the questions on any branch of said examination, he or she shall not be entitled to a license." Ga. Code Ann. 84-102 provides, inter alia, that "All of the meetings of the said respective Boards shall be held in the Capitol: Provided, that the examinations of applicants for licenses may be conducted at some other designated place in this State...." Ga. Code Ann. 84-510 provides that "Persons licensed to practice chiropractic under the laws of any other state having requirements equal to those of this Chapter, may in the discretion of the Board be issued a license to practice in this State without examination upon the payment of a fee of $50." The purpose of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 84-5 is, among other things, 166 to provide for the examination of prospective licensees by the Georgia Board of Chiropractic Examiners. The only instance in which a person may be issued a license to practice chiropractic in this State without examination by the Georgia Board of Chiropractic Examiners is when said person holds a license issued by another state. It is my opinion that the Georgia Board of Chiropractic Examiners must administer the tests to candidates for licenses to practice chiropractic in this State, and that said Board may not issue a license based upon the result achieved by a candidate upon an examination administered under the exclusive auspices, control, and supervision of the National Board of Chiropractic Examiners. OPINION 65-101 December 8, 1965 I received your letter enclosing a letter from the director of the Georgia Prison Industries Administration of Reidsville, Georgia, covering proposed purchase of a Ford station wagon, country sedan. As noted to you in my memorandum of some weeks ago, there seems to be some question of the propriety of purchasing country sedans or station wagons in lieu of a vehicle more aptly fitting the classification of truck. However, in this particular case, there is an additional reason for feeling this should not be purchased. In the letter of justification or statement of end use by A. L. Dutton, Director, to M. H. Doyle, Assistant Director of Finances and Purchasing of the Department of Corrections, Dutton states: "This vehicle will be used to transport personnel." This is obviously contra to the law and is simply going to cause considerable trouble if the vehicle is purchased. I am aware the law could be interpreted as allowing such a purchase, for he states it is to be purchased out of profits from the Prison Industries Administration. However, Ga. Code Ann. 40- 200 1, in setting up the prohibitions against purchase of passengercarrying automobiles, prohibits expenditure of "funds appropriated to any department" and also "any State funds otherwise coming into the possession of any such department." This has probably been construed to mean that only funds which originated from the office of Treasurer, even though latterly 167 transferred, were to be the prohibited funds. Yet, there would seem a most compelling argument that "any State funds otherwise coming into the possession" could definitely include any profits which might be made from sale of State-produced articles. The State is the owner, the manufacturer and the seller, and any funds which then come into the possession of the State or any profits which arise from its operations are State funds. This being the situation, any purchase, such as this, would be prohibited. I would suggest you return this request and advise the department that if it feels it has adequate justification for making such a purchase, it should seek remedial legislation in the General Assembly in order to remove any questions about the purchase. OPINION 65-102 (Unofficial) December 9, 1965 This will reply to your letter requesting copy of any law enacted by the legislature of Georgia waiving sovereign immunity. There is herewith enclosed copy of Ga. Code Ann. 95-1505; also copy of Ga. Code Ann. 95-1710. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is well established in this State, the leading cases upholding this principle being Tweatt v. the State, 66 Ga. 673 (1881);Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga. 691 (1931); and State Highway Department v. McClain, 216 Ga. 1 (1960). The State Highway Department is the State. See State Highway Department v. Elberton Sou. Ry. Co., 211 Ga. 838 (1955); also State Highway Department v. Sou. Ry. Co., 219 Ga. 435 (1963). In Tounsel v. State Highway Department, 180 Ga. 112 (1935), our Supreme Court refused to construe the statute granting to the State Highway Department the right "to sue and be sued" as a general consent to be sued, or a waiver of sovereign immunity. Georgia does not have a Court of Claims. We do have a Claims Commission which reviews claims which, except for sovereign immunity, could be recovered in a tort action. This Claims Commission acts in an advisory capacity to the legislature, which may provide for payment by a joint resolution of both houses of the General Assembly. 168 OPINION 65-103 (Unofficial) December 10, 1965 This will acknowledge your letter asking advice on the following questions relative to the conversion of a private bank into an incorporated bank: l. What right does a private bank have to convert into an incorporated bank? 2. Whenever a private bank applies for a charter, what discretion must (or may) the Superintendent of Banks exercise with reference to: (1) capital stock; (2) ability, experience, character, reputation, and financial standing of private banker; and (3) the need for a bank in the community? 3. What are your recommendations as to the changing of the banking laws to protect the interests of the private bank owner and at the same time protect the interest of the public? With reference to your first question, I refer you to Ga. Code Ann. 13-1201 (Ga. Laws 1919, p. 174), which provides: "Any person, firm, or voluntary association doing a banking business may convert such private bank into a bank as herein defined by complying with the laws in regard to the incorporation of banks as herein prescribed, and in the event of such incorporation the capital stock may be paid by a transfer of the assets of such private bank, provided the live assets of such bank shall exceed its liabilities by an amount equal to the amount of the capital stock, such assets to be taken at the true value thereof, and the Superintendent of Banks shall cause an examination of said private bank to be made and its assets and liabilities ascertained before authorizing payment of the capital by a transfer of such assets and before permitting such private bank to begin business as an incorporated bank." Thus, a private bank has the right to convert into a State bank only if it can comply with the laws in regard to the incorporation of the bank as set forth in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 13-9 entitled "Incorporation of Banks." Regarding your second question, I refer you to Ga. Code Ann. 169 13-905 which req_uires the Superintendent of Banks to make an investigation upon the filing of an application for a bank charter relative to the things which you have enumerated in your question. Specifically, I call to your attention the portion of this section which provides as follows: "The Superintendent of Banks shall exercise his discretion in his consideration of the application, but the Superintendent of Banks shall not approve the application until he has ascertained to his satisfaction: (a) That the public need and advantage will be promoted by the establishment of the proposed bank or trust company; (b) That conditions in the locality in which the proposed bank or trust company will transact business affords reasonable promise of successful operations; (c) That the applicants are acting in good faith; (d) That the proposed capital and surplus are not less than the required minimum and are adequate in the light of current and prospective banking conditions; (e) That proposed officers and directors have sufficient banking or trust experience, ability and standing to afford reasonable promise of successful operation; (f) That the name of the proposed bank or trust company does not resemble, so closely as to be likely to cause confusion, the name of any other bank or trust company transacting business in this State or which had previously transacted business in this State; and (g) That the application has complied with all the applicable provisions of this Code." In the case of Persons v. Mashburn, 211 Ga. 477 (1955), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a synopsis of this statute demonstrates clearly a legislative intent tha.t all reasonable precautions be taken to avoid an unsuccessful banking venture, which experience has taught is extremely hurtful and demoralizing to any community. The Court further held that it demonstrates the intention of the Legislature to vest the Superintendent of Banks with broad powers and heavy responsibilities in the ultimate duty to exercise his judgment and discretion in each case of an application 170 for a bank charter, and to issue or withhold his approval of the application for charter in accord with his sound judgment and discretion. The remedy of mandamus against him provided by Ga. Code Ann. 13-1701 the court held, is not to control the free exercise of the discretion vested in the Superintendent by law, but to require him to exercise it. I do not feel that it would be appropriate to attempt to answer your third question at this time. OPINION 65-104 (Unofficial) December 14, 1965 You ask where your property tax liability was for the year 1965, in view of the fact that you lived in DeKalb County on January 1 of that year but moved to Rabun County in February, 1965. Ga. Code Ann. 92-6202 provides: "What property returnable. -The individual returns made by taxpayers to the tax receiver shall be for property held and subject to taxation on the first day of January, next preceding." Personal property is generally subject to taxation in the county where the owner resides on January 1 of that year, unless the property is connected with some trade or business which is situated more or less permanently in another county (Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 483). Based upon the information contained in your letter, your property would be subject to taxation in DeKalb County for the year 1965, and not in Rabun County for that year. Should you continue to live in Rabun County, you would then be required to pay taxes there for subsequent years. OPINION 65-105 (Unofficial) December 15, 1965 This is in reply to your request for an opinion concerning whether or not the name of a licensed funeral director must appear in the trade name of the funeral home business which he is conducting. 171 Ga. Code Ann. 84-818 provides: "All funeral establishments and all branch establishments shall be actually operated by persons holding a funeral director's license, who is in full and continuous charge, and who is a resident of this State. There shall be conspicuously displayed in all establishments the name of the person licensed to conduct such establishment." I do not find any requirement that the trade name of a funeral home contain the surname of the person licensed to conduct the business, only that the name of the licensed person be conspicuously displayed in the establishment. OPINION 65-106 (Unofficial) December 17, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask: l. Whether a county board of education by rule or regulation, and as a prerequisite to continued attendance at a public school, can require Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer as part of its daily program; and 2. Whether a county board of education by rule or regulation, and as a prerequisite to continued attendance at a public school, can require children to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag? OPINION Current constitutional interpretations of the United States Supreme Court require a negative answer to both of your questions. DISCUSSION 1. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania statute requiring the Holy Bible to be read without comment in the public schools of the state was violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution notwithstanding the fact that a child could be excused upon the written request of his parents. Inasmuch as the Pennsylvania statute requiring Bible reading was virtually indistinguishable from the Georgia statute, to wit: Ga. Code Ann. 32-705, there would seem to be no question but that a like fate would await our statute should it be attacked in 172 court. Hence the Schempp decision requires that your initial inquiry be answered in the negative. Thinking that it might be of some interest to you, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the most recent opinion of this office concerning the matter of religion in the public schools. 2. The negative reply to your second question is necessitated 1:5y West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where a regulation of a state board of education requiring a compulsory salute to the flag and pledge of allegiance (enforced by possible expulsion from school) was held to be in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Hence, the law as it is (and not, I might observe, as I would have it) precludes a compulsory pledge of allegiance in a public school. OPINION 65-107 (Unofficial) December 17, 1965 In your recent letter you asked whether this State permitted first cousin marriages. Ga. Code Ann. 53-102 provides in part: "To be able to contract marriage, a person must be of sound mind and laboring und((r none of the following disabilities, viz.: . . . 2. Nearness of relationship by blood or marriage, as hereinafter explained ...." Ga. Code Ann. 53-105, provides: "Marriages between persons related by affinity in the following manner are prohibited, viz.: A man shall not marry his stepmother, or mother-in-law, or daughterin-law, or stepdaughter, or granddaughter of his wife. A woman shall not marry her corresponding relatives. Marriages within the Levitical degrees of consanguinity shall be void. Marriages within the degrees prohibited by this Section shall be incestuous." The Levitical degrees of consanguinity, referred to in 53-105 are the ones which are found in Chapter XVII I of the Book of Leviticus in the Old Testament of the Bible. Marriage between first cousins is not prohibited under that Chapter and not being prohibited by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 53-105, such a marriage would be legal and proper in Georgia. 173 This office has rendered a previous opmwn (Op. Att'y Gen. 1952-53, p. 116) holding marriages between first cousins were not prohibited and a similar opinion was rendered on February 16, 1955 (Op. Att'y Gen. 1955-56, p. 157). I trust the above will furnish you with information which is required. OPINION 65-108 (Unofficial) December 20, 1965 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask for: " . . . the final authority in determining information that has probative force, in order to locate the original land lot line when the original corners have been lost or obliterated." You further point out that in the particular situation with which you are concerned some natural monuments are present. Assuming no questions of adverse possession (see Ga. Code Ann. 85-1603) or acquiescence by acts or declarations of adjoining landowners (see Ga. Code Ann. 85-1602) are involved, the rule as to evidence in cases of disputed boundary lines is set forth by Ga. Code Ann. 85-160 I which states: "In all cases of disputed lines the following rules shall be respected and followed: Natural landmarks, being less liable to change, and not capable of counterfeit, shall be the most conclusive evidence; ancient or genuine landmarks, such as corner station or marked trees, shall control the course and distances called for by the survey. If the corners are established, and the lines not marked, a straight line, as required by the plat, shall be run, but an established marked line, though crooked, shall not be overruled; courses and distances shall be resorted to in the absence of higher evidence." Should your concern involve a possible processioning proceeding under Ga. Code Ann. 85-1605, et seq., it would be well to note that in such proceedings the county surveyor and processioners have no authority to make and establish new lines, but their duty is to trace and mark anew old lines or those that can be taken as having been formerly located and established. Dixon v. Dixon, 97 Ga. App. 55, 57 (1958). Hence, it is the duty of the processioners 174 and county surveyor in a processioning proceeding to follow the above-mentioned statutes. Brantley v. Thompson, 102 Ga. App. 355, 360-61 (1960). OPINION 65-109 (Unofficial) December 20, 1965 This is in reply to your request for an opinion concerning whether or not the Board of Examiners of Practical Nurses of Georgia may by administrative rule increase the number of required class hours and reduce the number of hours of practical experience required in the training program for practical nurses. Ga. Code Ann. 84-1031 provides, inter alia: "Rules and regulations regarding the training of practical nurses shall be formulated by the Advisory Committee and the Board of Examiners of Practical Nurses." Ga. Code Ann. 84-1028 provides, inter alia, that: "Hospitals giving this training for practical nurses must include in their course a minimum of 210 hours class work and 1800 hours practical experience during a period of 12 months." It is my opinion that the Advisory Committe and the Board of Examiners of Practical Nurses may make administrative rules prescribing the number of hours of class work and the number of hours of practical experience required in the training program for practical nurses, provided such rules are consistent with the present legislation dealing with this subject. The Legislature has prescribed the minimum number of hours which must be spent in the classroom and involved in practical training experience. It is my opinion that the Advisory Committee and the Board of Examiners of Practical Nurses could increase the number of hours of required classroom work or of practical experience, or both. A rule, however, could not be adopted which would reduce the number of required hours of classroom work or of practical experience below the number of hours prescribed by the Legislature. 175 OPINION 65-110 (Unofficial) December 20, 1965 You request my opmwn on your eligibility for homestead exemption on property located at Floyd County, Rome, Georgia. You state in your letter that you have always claimed Floyd County as your permanent residence and have continuously paid taxes in Floyd County; that you lived there until you entered the military service 13 years ago; that up until July, 1964, you owned two houses in Floyd County - at which time you sold the house on which you had been claiming homestead exemption, leaving you with the house on Lombardy Way on which you now endeavor to claim homestead exemption. You further state that you have a letter from the Floyd County Tax Commissioner expressing her opinion and that of the Floyd County Attorney that you are not eligible for the homestead exemption on the house located on Lombardy Way. You, also, further state that you and your family would be living in the house on Lombardy Way if you were not away from Georgia on active military duty and that upon your retirement from the service, you will be returning to Floyd County. From the facts stated in your letter, it appears that you are a resident and domiciliary of Floyd County, Georgia, and maybe the following definition of homestead would apply to your case. Ga. Code Ann., .92-233 "'Homestead' further defined.- The word 'homestead' whenever used in this law, shall mean and is defined to be the following: . . . (k) The permanent place of residence of a person in the military, naval, marine, or other armed forces of the United States, and said residence shall be construed to be actually occupied as the place of abode of such person, where the family of such person resides thereat, or where the family because of such service is forced to live elsewhere. Absence of a person from his residence because of duty in the armed forces of the United States will not be considered as a waiver upon the part of such person in applying for a homestead exemption. Any member of his immediate family or a friend may notify the tax receiver or the tax commissioner 176 of his absence. This notice will require the tax receiver or tax commissioner to grant the homestead exemption to the person so absent in the armed forces of the United States. . ." I suggest that you discuss this with the county tax officials. You understand that the administration of the ad valorem tax is up to the county officials. OPINION 65-111 (Unofficial) December 21, 1965 This is in reply to your letter concerning the $4,000 homestead exemption which became a part of our Constitution in 1964. I understand that you are over 65 years of age and have income from all sources of less than $3,000 and that you own your own home that you and your family occupy as a homestead. Under these circumstances you would be entitled to the increased homestead exemption. The fact that your wife is not yet 65 or that she had income in excess of $3,000 per year would have no bearing on the question of your eligibility for this exemption. You must, of course, make application for the exemption, and I am sure that the Tax Commissioner will allow your application when presented. Should he refuse to grant the exemption, you could, of course, present your case to the Superior Court for consideration. Your private attorney can advise you of the details should this prove to be necessary. OPINION 65-112 (Unofficial) December 21, 1965 This is in reply to your letter requesting my opinion as to whether an Atlanta department store legally collected the Alabama sales tax on a sale of pajamas made to you recently while in Atlanta. You state that the pajamas were purchased as a gift for your father, who lives in Alabama, and that, in accordance with your instructions, the store wrapped and mailed them to your father's home in Alabama. You also state that you reside, own property, and are employed in Georgia. 177 Based upon these facts, it would appear that you were liable for the Georgia sales tax rather than the Alabama use tax. Since some Georgia dealers, because of their relationship to Alabama, do collect the Alabama use tax, I suspect that the store you dealt with is one of these and that it mistakenly collected the Alabama tax. The facts present a border line case. As long as the Alabama rate remained at 3%, such a mistake was of no practical consequence to the customer. However, since the Alabama rate has been raised to 4%, the customer has, as your situation points up, a real interest in the dealer collecting the right tax. OPINION 65-113 (Unofficial) December 28, 1965 This is in reply to your letter concerning the tax situs of motor vehicles licensed in Long County, Georgia. The situs of personal property for tax purposes is normally the county in which the owner resides. However, where the property is connected with some trade or business and that trade or business is situated more or less permanently in another county, then the tax situs is in the county where the business is situated. Collins v. Mills, 198 Ga. 18 (1944). The fact that the vehicle is not in the county on January 1 would not cause the vehicle to be exempt from taxation. Ga. Code Ann. 92-102 provides: "For the purposes of taxation, 'personal property' shall be construed to include goods, chattels, money, credits and effects, whatsoever they may be; ships, boats, and vessels, whether at home or abroad, . . ." Wright v. Mayor and Council of Brunswick, 140 Ga. 231; St. Simons Transit Company v. Mayor and Council of Brunswick, 141 Ga. 477 (1914). Should you find that the vehicles are connected with the business which is located in Long County, then it would be my opinion that the vehicles would be taxable in Long County even though they might have been temporarily located elsewhere on January 1. 178 OPINION 65-114 (Unofficial) December 29, 1965 This will acknowledge your letter requesting my opinion as to the legality of a contribution of $2400.00 by the City of Folkston to the Charlton County Development Authority. You point out that you contributed a like amount during the calendar year 1965, being under the impression that it was legal under the general welfare clause of your charter. I call to your attention Art. VI I, Sec. V, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5801) which reads as follows: "The General Assembly shall not authorize any county, municipal corporation or political subdivision of this State, through taxation, contribution or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any company, corporation or association, or to appropriate money for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, company, association, institution or individual except for purely charitable purposes. This restriction shall not operate to prevent the support of schools by municipal corporations within their respective limits." 1 Thus, the funds of the City of Folkston could not be used to contribute to the Charlton County Development Authority unless,. this Authority is to operate for purely charitable purposes. A number of development authorities have been created by local constitutional amendments to the above-quoted paragraph of the Georgia Constitution including the Charlton County Industrial Development Authority which was proposed by the 1964 Extra Session of the Georgia Legislature (Acts 1964, Extra Session, p. 363) and ratified November 3, 1964. This is a strong indication that it is generally accepted that industrial development authorities do not fall within the class of corporations operating for purely charitable purposes. In the absence of any Georgia court decision 1. This restriction was also contained in the Georgia Constitution of 1877 as a part of Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5401). 179 to the contrary, it is my opinion that this view is correct. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, p. 336; 1960-61, p. 62; 1960-61, p. 310. Although the constitutional amendment which created the Charlton County Development Authority authorized the County of Charlton to levy an annual tax for the support of the Authority, there is no provision in the amendment authorizing any such levy to be made by any municipalities situated in Charlton County. It follows, therefore, that any contribution by the City of Folkston to this Authority would violate Art. VII, Sec. V, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, referred to herein, and the General Assembly has no authority ro authorize any municipality through its corporate charter to appropriate any of its funds for such purposes. OPINION 65-115 (Unofficial) December 29, 1965 This is in reply to your requesting my opinion as to whether or not a volunteer fireman is entitled to benefits from the Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund as a result of disability from heart diseases or respiratory diseases. The Georgia Firemen's Pension Fund Act was amended by the General Assembly by an Act approved April 5, 1961 (Ga. Laws 1961, pp. 417-421). This amendment sets forth the present definition of firemen and volunteer firemen and is codified as Ga. Code Ann. 78-1001. This amendment also rewrote the fund's provision for benefits payable as a result of heart and respiratory diseases and is presently codified as paragraph (b) of Ga. Code Ann. 78-1017, and reads in part as follows: "Any fireman as defined in this Chapter, who shall become totally and permanently disabled so as to be incapable of serving as a fireman as defined in this Chapter as a result of heart disease or respiratory disease, shall be entitled to receive benefits in the amount of$72 per month: . . ." Since firemen and volunteer firemen are separately defined in the Pension Fund Act, and the above language conferring a benefit as a result of heart or respiratory disease clearly confers it to firemen only, it is my opinion that a volunteer fireman is not entitled to any benefits under this section. 180 OPINION 65-116 December 29, 1965 You ask whether the surplus remaining in a county school bond account after the bonds have been paid off in full may be transferred to the general operating account of the county school system. The situation, as I understand it from your letter and subsequent conversation, is one where the principal and interest on the 1947 county~wide school bond issue of Catoosa County has been fully paid, the bonds retired, and a surplus remains in the debt retirement account for said bond issue. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION Upon retirement of the school bonds in question, the surplus remaining in the debt retirement account became a part of the general school fund of Catoosa County. It would, therefore, be proper for the Catoosa County Board of Education to transfer said surplus to its general fund account. DISCUSSION It is well settled in Georgia as elsewhere that a municipality, school board, or other political subdivision possessing funds or proceeds arising from its sale of bonds or other securities, holds such proceeds in trust for the purposes for which the bonds or securities were issued; and it may not permit such funds to be diverted to or used for any other purpose. Walker v. Wheeler, 210 Ga. 432 (1954); Board of Education of Paulding County v. Gray, 203 Ga. 583 (2) (1948); 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 1934. Similarly, a county board of education is a trustee respecting funds collected from taxation for bond retirement purposes; and it may use such funds solely for the purpose of retiring the principal and interest on such bonds. Ga. Code Ann. 32-1402. See also Art. VII, Sec. VIII, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6101 ). But after the trust purposes have been satisfied and the bonds wholly retired, the trust is at an end. Being no longer held in trust, any surplus in the sinking or debt retirement fund or account becomes a part of the genera] school fund. As stated in Butts County v. Jackson Banking Company, 136 Ga. 719 (4) (1911), and subsequently in Spain v. Hall County, 175 Ga. 600, 603-4 (1932): 181 "When out of a fund raised by taxation for a specific purpose all demands and indebtedness properly chargeable against that particular fund have been paid, or deducted, and there remains a surplus in the hands of the treasurer, the same then becomes a general fund, which may be lawfully applied to the payment of balances due on warrants drawn against other specific funds not sufficient for their payment, or to any other legitimate liability against the county." Inasmuch as the surplus remaining in the 1947 school bond account of the Catoosa County School System has become a part of the general school fund of such county, it follows that the Catoosa County Board of Education may properly transfer said surplus to its general fund account. Accord, Op. Att'y Gen. 1965; 1954-56, pp. 249, 250; 1945-47, p. 163. OPINION 65-117 December 30, 1965 You inquire as to whether or not the Revocation and Suspension Unit has authority to suspend or revoke a driver's license upon receipt of a report of the disposition of certain charges which have been disposed of in a City Recorder's Court. I also understand that most of the cases you have reference to have been disposed of by a forfeiture of bond. From the facts stated in your letter, it appears that the various charges concerned would all be em braced within and included in the charge and crime as defined in Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625, which is popularly referred to as "driving under the influence." In the case of Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 (1953), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a municipal ordinance punishing an act made penal by the State law then existing, covering the same subject matter, must yield to the State law. In the case of City of Atlanta v. Landers, 212 Ga. 111, at 113 (1956), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the only courts with authority or jurisdiction under our Constitution to try "State cases," or persons charged with the violation of State laws, are State courts. Under Ga. Code Ann. 92A-434, the Director of the Department of Public Safety is given the discretionary authority to revoke a driver's license upon receipt of the record of an operator's 182 conviction of, among other things, "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants or drugs." Ga. Code Ann. 92A688 provides for the mandatory revocation by the Department of Public Safety upon receipt of record of "conviction or plea of guilty or forfeiture of bond of any of the following offenses of an operator by or in any court. .. ," and one of the offenses listed is "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors or drugs." It is my opinion that 68-434, 688 both refer and are limited to violations of State law. In the very recent case of Wallace v. The State, 112 Ga. App. 505, the court held that the Director of the Department of Public Safety was without authority to revoke a driver's license based upon the "certification of conviction" from a court without jurisdiction to try cases involving offenses of "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants." In this case, the defendant was charged and is being tried for the violation of Ga. Code Ann. 92A-9913, "operating a vehicle with a revoked driver's license." The defendant's license had been revoked based upon a conviction for "driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants" in a court which had not jurisdiction to try State offenses. Based upon the foregoing citations, and the reasoning contained therein, it is my opinion that neither the Director of the Department of Public Safety nor the Revocation and Suspension Unit is authorized to suspend or revoke a driver's license based upon a conviction or plea of guilty or bond forfeiture in a Recorder's Court in Valdosta, Georgia, or any other court not having jurisdiction to try State offenses. OPINION 65-118 December 30, 1965 This refers to your letter wherein you refer to the desire of some local school superintendents engaged in the supervision of programs or projects for educationally disadvantaged children under Title I of the "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965," to use a portion of the federal grant as an increment to their salaries. Your letter indicates that the superintendents feel that the additional compensation is justified because of the additional work 183 and responsibility which they have incurred in such federally financed programs and projects. Your specific question is whether the federal act would permit any portion of the federal grant to be used for this purpose. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 neither prohibits nor expressly authorizes the use of a portion of the federal grants available thereunder to compensate local school superintendents for their additional work and responsibility in administering programs or projects under said Title. The matter is, therefore, left to the discretion of the State Board of Education and the United States Office of Education. DISCUSSION Title I of the "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965" (20 U.S.C. 241(a)-241(1)) provides for federal grants to local school districts for projects or programs designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families. While Section 205 (a) of the Act (20 U.S. C. 241 (e) ) does set forth certain general lines as to the nature of the program or project contemplated by the new law (i.e., such "size, scope and quality as to give reasonable promise of substantial progress toward meeting those needs") there is no indication whatsoever as to whether or not it would be proper to use a portion of the federal grant to compensate local school superintendents for their additional work and responsibility in administering the program. Under the Act it would appear that matters of this nature are left to the criteria, standards and policies of both the State Board of Education and the U. S. Office of Education. This conclusion is also based upon Section 205 (a) of the Act, the initial sentence of which provides: "A local educational agency may receive a basic grant or a special incentive grant under this Title for any fiscal year only upon application therefor approved by the appropriate State educational agency, upon its determination (consistent with such basic criteria as the Commissioner may establish) ...." (Emphasis added.) 184 Hence, it would appear that the use of any portion of the federal grant to supplement the salary of local school superintendents administering the programs or projects would require (1) that such use be authorized under the policies, regulations and standards adopted by the State Board of Education in connection with the Act, and (2) that the expenditure be authorized by such criteria as the Commissioner of Education has established in connection with the Act. The proper source for information on the Commissioner's criteria, of course, would be appropriate officials in the United States Office of Education. OPINIONS of THE ATTORNEY GENERAL January 1, 1966-December 31, 1966 OPINION 66-1 187 January 3, 1966 We received your letter in which you transmitted the file of a member of the Teachers' Retirement System, together with an affidavit by the member and memorandum of action of the Board of Trustees regarding the member's case. Apparently the member is seeking credit for certain service as an instructor at the Air University, and the Board has asked: 1. Whether the Board may, under the law, give the member military credit for the time in question. 2. Whether the Board has the legal power to make. an interpretation of the phrase "independent system" so that the University of the Air would be covered thereby. In reviewing the file, I note the question has previously arisen and the Board rendered an adverse decision to the member in question rejecting the service for which he had sought to receive credit as service in the Air Force. However, in view of the Military Service Credit Amendment of 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, pp. 438, 442), amending Section 4 and substituting a new Subsection (6) of the Act, it seems only fair to again review his case in light of the amended law. The Board apparently has before it two separate and incompatible propositions for crediting the member with service: i.e., as military service or as service in another system. I do not think any service could be creditable under both sections. It seems significant the member has in the past sought to receive credit for military service. Based on this, we will consider military service first. Subsection (6) of Section 4, as amended in 1965, now provides for military service credit for "any person who was on active duty in the armed forces . . . under the following conditions: . . . (ii) Membership service credit shall be awarded for any period of active military service performed after January 1, 1945 . . ." (Emphasis added.) Further in the subsection the phrase "enter military service" is used repeatedly. In my opinion, based on the phrases quoted, the legislature has expressed an intention that only active military service, as is commonly understood, i.e., the wearing of a uniform, assignment of a service number and performing of military duties, 188 was to be creditable. Based on this, it is my opinion the member in question has not met the requirements of Subsection (6). He has attached as exhibits several documents which were intended to buttress his contentions, but which I feel actually refute any attempts to claim service as a member of the armed forces. He has included an application for Federal employment. His report of efficiency rating was for an educational consultant carrying a professional rating of P-7. His personnel action form was signed by a person whose title was civilian personnel officer. He had no serial number, wore no uniform and would not be entitled to any benefits nor have any status as a veteran or former member of the armed forces under federal acts. In the absence of any of the trappings of armed forces service, I do not think he is eligible for credit on that basis and feel the previous Board action remains correct. Considering the question of the Board having power to interpret "independent system," I presume this was intended to mean "independent school system" as used in Section 4, Subsection (5-a) See Ga. Code Ann. ~ 32-2904 (5-a), which provides in part: "Any teacher coming into the Teachers' Retirement System shall be entitled to receive credit for prior teaching service in other State or independent school systems, up to a maximum of 10 years, where that State or independent school system permits the same credit for teaching service in this State . . ." (Emphasis added.) For several reasons, I do not think the phrase "independent school system" as used was actually intended to include schools on the order of the Air University, United States Air Force, Maxwell Air Base, Montgomery, Alabama. However, though perhaps not intended, it is sufficiently broad and could be interpreted to include such a school. Even if so interpreted (and I feel this would be strained), the member could receive credit only upon it being affirmatively shown (and the burden would appear to be on the member seeking such service as the proponent of such evidence as would be satisfactory) that the system from which service credit was sought permitted the same credit for teaching service in this State. In the absence of such a showing of reciprocity, the Board could not grant any service credits. It is my understanding the Air University is staffed entirely by civilian employees of the Department of Defense, all of which carry 189 GS ratings and are under Federal Civil Service and a Federal Government retirement plan. I am informed the Federal Government retirement would not provide credit for Teachers' Retirement Service, thus this would appear to exclude the Air University on that basis. I concur in the Board's sympathy towards the member and wish that another interpretation might have been made, but feel bound to interpret the law as it has been written and enacted by the legislature. The member's comments concerning "spirit" of the law rather than the strict "letter" of the law are interesting but would not sustain a substantial 4eviation from the standards established by the General Assembly. It is a question of policy for the Board to decide whether or not remedial legislation could or should be presented to the General Assembly. OPINION 66-2 January 4, 1966 Recently, you have requested my official opinion in regard to the following questions. 1. What steps should be taken, under existing circumstances, to allow the Higher Education Assistance Corporation to use funds appropriated to it by the General Assembly at the 1965 Session? 2. Is legislation desirable to ratify an Executive Order of Governor Sanders creating the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Committee as a State agency? In 1965, the General Assembly created the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Corporation to administer a program of guaranteed loans for college students. Ga. Laws, 1965, p. 217. At that same Session, the General Assembly appropriated funds directly to the Corporation. Ga. Laws, 1965, pp. 44, 59.. After the Session ended, a question was raised as to the legality of this appropriation. Because of this, the Governor, on May 24, 1965, created by Executive Order the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Committee. This Committee was created to serve as the State agency to contract with the Georgia Higher Education 190 Assistance Corporation for the conducting of a guaranteed loan program. The appropriation made by the. General Assembly to the Corporation has never been disbursed. In order to make these funds available for the loan program, it will only be necessary to amend Section 22 of the General Appropriations Act of 1965 (Ga. Laws, 1965, pp. 44, 59). Section 22 of that Act appropriates funds for the years 1965-66 and 1966-67 to the "Higher Education Assistance Corporation." That sentence can be amended to appropriate the funds to the "Higher Education Assistance Committee." Then, the Treasurer can disburse these funds to the Committee. The Higher Education Assistance Committee was created by the Governor pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 40-305. This section provides that: "40-305. Power to employ agents. -The Governor shall have power to engage the services of any competent person for the discharge of any duty required by the laws, and essential to the interests of the State, or necessary, in an emergency, to preserve the property or funds of the State." I think it would be desirable for many reasons to introduce legislation ratifying this Executive Order and setting up with some specificity the Georgia Higher Education Assistance Committee. This legislation could provide that the membership of the Committee shall be the same as the membership of the Board of Directors of the Corporation. The Com.mittee would then be given the power to contract with the Corporation for the carrying out of the program of guaranteed loans. The law could also provide that the Committee may receive, on behalf of the State, grants from the Federal Government. OPINION 66-3 (Unofficial) January 7, 1966 You requested that I furnish you a list of cases bearing upon the question of whether or not a superior court, sitting in an equity matter, may acquire jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant. The essential fact to confer jurisdiction is not that a defendant residing in the county has a substantial interest in the litigation, but 191 whether or not substantial relief is prayed against such defendant. First National Bank ofAtlanta v. Holderness, 189 Ga. 819 (1940); Harper v. Gunby, 215 Ga. 466 (11J59). Where substantial relief, meaning substantial equitable relief, Wright v. Trammell, 176 Ga.'. 84 (1932) is prayed against a resident defendant, a nonresident may be properly joined. A ustin v. Raiford, 61 Ga. 125 (1878). If substantial relief is prayed against two defendants, the suit may be brought in the county of the residence of either of the defendants. Hand Trading Co. v. Citizens Bank of Moultrie, 160 Ga. 448 (1925); Spicer v. Macklin, 164 Ga. 135 (2)(1927). Please note, however, that where the only relief prayed that could be granted with respect to a resident defendant was injunctive, it was held that the court did not acquire jurisdiction of non-resident defendants. Meeks v. Roan, 117 Ga. 865 (1903). The Meeks case has been distinguished in Budget Charge Accounts, Inc. v. George, 214 Ga. 312 (1958). In this connection, also note the following language from Railroad Commission of Georgia v. Palmer Hardware Co., 124 Ga. 633 at 640 (1906): "Thus it will be seen that the mere fact of praying an injunction against a defendant does not, in all events, confer the right to file the equitable petition in the county of his residence, and to draw to that county residents of other counties." The Railroad Commission case cites the Meeks case along with many others in a general discussion. OPINION 66-4 January 11, 1966 You request my opinion as to the legality of an arrangement whereby the County Commissioners of Morgan County will assist the Department of State Parks in the construction of a golf course at Hard Labor Creek State Park, Rutledge, Georgia, by cutting all trees, removing all stumps and grading all fairways. In consideration for these services the Department of State Parks proposes to donate to the County the procee~s from all timber to be cut in the course of this project. 192 As you know, title to the real property within the Park is held in the name of the State. Ga. Code Ann. 91-104. Thus title to the standing timber is vested by operation of law in the State of Georgia. I have reviewed the laws relating to the Department of State Parks and do not find any express grant of authority to this agency to sell or dispose of timber, forest products or any other State property. In the absence of such authority, the right of disposal of State property rest exclusively with the legislature. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. W&A Railroad, 142 Ga. 532, 534 (1914). If you so desire, a Resolution could be introduced in the General Assembly appropriating funds to compensate the County Commissioners for their worthwhile undertaking. OPINION 66-5 (Unofficial) January 12, 1966 In your letter you ask: l. Would it be possible to abolish Homestead Exemption as granted under Ga. Code Ann. 2-5404 in a referendum pursuant to the above-mentioned constitutional amendment? 2. Would it be possible to abolish the maximum 20 millage limitation imposed by law in a referendum pursuant to the abovementioned constitutional amendment? 3. Can a local constitutional amendment providing for the abolition of Homestead Exemption be voted on at a date other than the date of a general election? 4. Can a constitutional amendment providing for the abolition of Homestead Exemption and removal of the 20 mill limitation be passed with the provision that it would only be submitted to the people in the event a plan for the merger of Floyd County School systems was accomplished in a referendum held prior to the general election? In view of your desire for an almost immediate answer my conclusions respecting your questions will have to be brief, foregoing any detailed legal analyses. My conclusions are as follows: 193 CONCLUSIONS I. A constitutional amendment of local application authorizes the consolidation of school systems in Floyd County by local law provided that the voters of the school systems involved approve of the same in a referendum. See Ga. Laws 1964; p. 984-86. The amendment further provides that such matters as the manner of election and appointment of school board members and the school superintendent, as well as their tenure in office, may also be provided for by local law upon approval by the voters of the consolidated school system. Inasmuch as this local constitutional amendment is silent as to the homestead exemption provided for generally by Art. VI II, Sec. I, Par. IV of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5404), it would not be possible to vary the general law relating to homestead exemptions by any local or special law authorized under the local constitutional amendment set forth in Ga. Laws 1964, p. 984-86. 2. My reply to your second question is in the negative for the same reason. It is noted, however, that Art. VIII, Sec. XII, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-7501) after first providing for the 20 mill limitation to which you refer, itself provides for removal of the limitation by approval of the voters in a special election called for this purpose. 3. The third question is answered in the negative by Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I oftheStateConstitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8101), which in my opinion, requires constitutional amendments of both general and local application to be submitted to the people at the next general election. 4. In my opinion, it would be possible to draft a constitutional amendment for submission to the people at the general election, which would defer its effective date until the occurrence of two contingent events; i.e., school consolidation and additional voter approval pursuant to local option in the amendment. OPINION 66-6 (Unofficial) January 14, 1966 You requested an opinion as to whether or not the newly-created City Court of Warner Robins has jurisdiction prior to its first term of court in March 1966 to file suits and to process non-jury matters 194 such as filing of accusations and accepting guilty pleas in view of Section 35 of the local act (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 2650, 2663) creating this court which provides: "The first term of this Court shall be held in March, 1966. In order, however, that the Governor may make such appointments as are necessary, that other officers and deputies of the court may be appointed, that quarters may be obtained, and that other administrative details be taken care of, the provisions of this Act shall become effective immediately upon its approval by the referendum herein provided for." 1 Section 36 dealing with the referendum provides in its pertinent part as follows: " . . . If a majority of the vote!> cast on such question are for approval of the Act, it shall become of full force and effect immediately thereafter. . . ." It follows that upon the ratification of the Act by the voters in the referendum, the Court was created and was immediately possessed of all powers conferred upon it by the Act. Since the legislature expressly provided in Section 35, however, that the first term shall be held in March, 1966, but that in order for the making of appointments, obtaining of quarters and other administrative details, the Act would become effective immediately, this provision relating specifically to effective dates must control on this point. I feel, therefore, that there is some question as to the authority of the Court to exercise jurisdiction in any matters other than as enumerated in Section 35 prior to the March, 1966, term. On the other hand it would seem that there would be no objection to the processing of any matters not requiring any order of or immediate disposition by the Court such as the filing of suits and accusations. In view of the relatively short time between now and March, 1966, it may be that you would prefer to wait on these matters so as to avoid the possibility of having your actions attacked as being illegal and unauthorized. OPINION 66-7 (Unofficial) January 17, 1966 This is in reply to your letter requesting to be advised as to whether or not it is legal for a mayor or member of a city council to 195 sell anything to the city by bids or otherwise. I call to your attention Ga. Code Ann. 69-204 which provides: "It is improper and illegal for a member of a city council to vote upon any question, brought before the council, in which he is personally interested." In the case of Trainer v. City of Covington, 183 Ga. 759 (1937), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a contract between the city and the mayor whereby the mayor is to sell a truck to the city is invalid because of public policy, even though such contract was made in good faith and there was no statute or charter provision which prohibited the making of it. It has been the rule at common law that independently of statute such a contract is contrary to public policy and illegal on the theory that one who is entrusted with the business of others will not be allowed to make out of the same a pecuniary profit to himself. And, the cases have held that no public agent shall have the opportunity or be led into the temptation to make profit out of the public business entrusted to his care, by contracting with himself. directly or indirectly, in respect to such business. See also Montgomery v. City of Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 546 (1926); Mayor of Macon v. HufJ; 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Hardy v. Gainesville, 121 Ga. 327 (1904); and Twiggs v. Wingfield, 147 Ga. 790 (1918). I am enclosing a copy of Ga. Code Ann. 26-5002a (Acts 1964, pp. 261, 263) which I believe will be of some interest to you. You will note that this section prohibits any officer of a political subdivision or municipal corporation of the State of Georgia who receives compensation or a per diem for his official duties from making any sales to such political subdivision or municipal corporation in excess of one hundred dollars unless sold as a result of bona fide competitive bidding. This is a criminal statute the violation of which constitutes a felony. It does not alter the proposition that certain contracts may be illegal and void as being against public policy, as pointed out above. OPINION 66-8 (Unofficial) January 17, 1966 This is in response to your letter concerning an alleged claim being made against you by the Sales and Use Tax Unit of the 196 Georgia Revenue Department for a sales tax on your purchase of an automobile in Florida, on October 10,1963, while you were stationed at Orlando Air Force Base. You state that you have since returned to Georgia and are now attending the University of Georgia. The first quoted paragraph of the letter written you by the Unit indicates that you are being called upon for the Georgia use tax, not sales tax. While the use tax is imposed by the same statute, the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act (Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 360-387; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-34a), as amended, that imposes the sales tax, the two are separate and distinct taxes, the subject matter of the use tax being the use in this state of tangible personal property purchased out of state at retail, and that of the sales tax, the sale of tangible personal property in this state at retail. The Act (Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 369, 370; Ga. Code Ann. 92-3412a) does grant a credit against the use tax for either a sales or use tax paid another state if that state grants a like credit against its use tax for a sales or use tax paid Georgia. Since Florida did not grant a reciprocal credit until June 25, 1965, whether or not a credit is due under the circumstances outlined by you depends upon when the automobile was brought into Georgia. If this occurred before June 25, 1965, there would be no credit, and the full amount of the Georgia use tax would be due. OPINION 66-9 (Unofficial) January 18, 1966 You request an official opinion of the Attorney General as to the liability of the State of Georgia for injury and damage to persons and property arising from traffic accidents attributable to nonuniform or improper signs along the highways. Ga. Code Ann. 95-100 1 provides that the counties of Georgia are primarily liable for all injuries caused by reason of defective bridges and the approaches thereto on public highways; and Ga. Code Ann. 95-1710 requires the State Highway Department to defend all suits for such damage and to be responsible for any awards made therein in actions originating on highways over which the Highway Department has jurisdiction. 197 Under Ga. Code Ann. 95-1710 the State Highway Department is liable for damage done to property resulting from the construction of highways and bridges in connection therewith. In this category falls such items as loss of access to property; change of grade or elevation of highway which affects the use of or accessibility to property; damage to property occasioned by erosion or drainage resulting from highway construction; and in general, any damage attributable directly to the construction of State roads; such damage being in violation of the Constitutional guaranty against taking and damaging private property for public purposes without just and adequate compensation (Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I, Constitution of Georgia; Ga. Code Ann. 2-30 1. The State of Georgia, and the Departments thereof, can only be sued when permission is specifically granted by Statute. No such authority has been granted as to damage resulting from posting of improper or non-uniform signs along highways. Ga. Code Ann. 95-1710 does not authorize tort suits in general against the State. State Highway Dept v. Parker, 75 Ga. App. 237 (1947). Under the present law of Georgia, a person suffering damage while using the highways of this State, caused by defects in the highways (defects in bridges and the approaches thereto excepted), whether improper signs or other defects, can recover for his damage against the State only by having the claim presented to and approved by the Claims Advisory Commission, and then having a resolution introduced in and passed by the General Assembly authorizing the Treasurer of Georgia to reimburse him for the damage suffered. OPINION 66-10 January 20, 1966 You requested an official opinion to the following questions: (1) The actuaries of the Teachers' Retirement System have notified the Board of Trustees that the cost of the reduction in the retirement age to 63 will require the increase of contributions by the State from the present percentage rate of 8.29 to a percentage rate of 8.50. Will it be necessary, before the Board of Trustees effectuates this benefit, for the restrictive language which provides that the State's part of this contribution cannot be increased (par. III, last sentence) be repealed by the General Assembly? 198 (2) In the event the General Assembly appropriates the necessary money in the Appropriation Bill to provide for the increase in contribution rate, but does not amend the General Act to allow the Board of Trustees to take formal action to increase the rate to a 8.50%, will the Board of Trustees have the power to make this benefit effective? For your information, I am quoting in its entirety Sec. 1, Par. (c), of an amendment to the Teachers' Retirement System Act, as appears in Ga. Laws 1965, P. 208, quoting from page 210: "(c) In the case of the retirement of any member prior to his attainment of the age of 63 years, the service allowance above described shall be reduced by 1/12 of 3% for each month by which his age at the time of retirement is below 63 years. The aforesaid reduction shall not apply in calculating the service allowance for disability retirement or death. Any retirement benefits or allowances provided or authorized by this Act shall not increase the employer contributions beyond the percentage rate of 8.29% of teachers' salaries." It is my opinion that the answer to your first question must be in the affirmative, as the obvious intent of the Act was that the employer (meaning the State) should not be required to pay beyond the percentage rate of 8.29% of the teachers' salaries. This answer is given on the premise, of course, that the statement in your question concerning the actuaries is correct. The answer to your second question presents some difficulty, but after considering same, it is my opinion that the answer thereto should be in the negative, as I do not believe the Board would have the authority to increase the State's contribution beyond the percentage rate of 8.29%, based solely on the Appropriation Act, and I suggest that the only way to clarify this matter is for remedial legislation to be introduced at the current session of the General Assembly. Therefore, it is my opinion that, in addition to appropriating the necessary funds, the General Assembly must remove the restriction as contained in the above-quoted section of the Teachers' Retirement Fund, based on the assumption that the actuaries report is correct. OPINION 66-11 (Unofficial) 199 January 25, 1966 You ask whether a consolidated school system created by the merger of the Floyd County and Rome school systems could assume the bonded indebtedness of the existing systems. Although your letter does not so state, I assume you refer to a merger pursuant to that proposed constitutional amendment of local application which is set forth as Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 984-986, rather than to a statutory merger under Ga. Code Ann. 32-1201 to 321203 or to a merger under any other proposed constitutional amendment. OPINION It is my opinion that implementing legislation pursuant to the proposed constitutional amendment of local application set forth as Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 984-986, could provide "generally" for the assumption of obligations of existing school systems (including bonded indebtedness) by the resultant consolidated school system. It should be carefully noted, however, that the taxpayers residing in any one of the now separate school systems probably could not be required to pay any part of the bonded indebtedness heretofore incurred by any of the other systems involved in the proposed consolidation. DISCUSSION Ga. Laws 1964, p. 984, sets forth a proposed amendment oflocal application to the State Constitution which would authorize the General Assembly, by special or local law, to provide for the consolidation or merger of existing school systems in Floyd County (subject to voter approval). While the proposed amendment states that the resulting school system shall have title to all school properties and assets of the systems involved in the merger, it is silent as to the assumption of existing obligations, including bonded indebtedness. That the implementing legislation could provide generally for all obligations of the now separate systems to be assumed by the resulting school system notwithstanding any "express" constitutional authorization, however, would seem to be clear. See Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 874-75 (1931) (where the Court held, inter alia, that the legislature could provide for the performance of contracts and payment of debts by the resultant 200 county where two counties merge without being in violation of the "impairment of contracts" provision of the State Constitution). In concluding that the legislature could provide that the resulting school system shall assume all existing obligations, including bonded indebtedness, of course, I refer (with respect to bonded indebtedness) to the responsibility of the resultant school board to see that any unexpended bond funds are used for lawful purposes and carry out in general the other responsibilities and obligations of the former boards of education respecting such indebtedness. It should be carefully noted that it is the general rule that where one school system having a bonded indebtedness is merged with another school system, taxes levied for the purpose of paying off the bonded indebtedness may be levied only on property located within the territorial limits of the school system issuing such bonds, as such territorial limits existed at the time the bonds were originally voted and issued. E.g., Barber v. Cummings & Sons, 167 Ga. 289, 292-94 (1928); Bond v. Pattillo, 174 Ga. 571 (2) (1932); Chappell v. Small, 194 Ga. 143, 150-52 (1942); Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, p. 144; 1954-56, pp. 214, 217, 240. See also Ga. Code Ann. 32-1402, 32-1403. Especially in light of the protective features of Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001), to wit: the general prohibition of any county, municipal corporation or political subdivison from incurring a debt without the assent of the voters "of the county, municipality or division," I am inclined to think that the courts would be very unlikely to hold that the proposed local constitutional amendment here in question gives the General Assembly any "implied" authority to enact local or special legislation which would alter the general law respecting the question of what property may be taxed for existing bonded indebtedness. OPINION 66-12 January 26, 1966 This is in reply to your letter asking whether you are authorized or required to use a formula, taking into consideration earnings, in determining the fair market value of public utilities for tax assessment purposes. "All property shall be returned for taxation at its fair market value. . . ."(Ga. Code Ann. 92-5701) 201 "The intent and purpose of the tax laws of this State are to have all property and subjects of taxation assessed at the value which would be realized therefrom by cash sale, as such property and subjects are usually sold, but not by forced sale thereof, and the words "fair market value," when used in the tax laws, shall be held and deemed to mean what the property and subjects would bring at cash sale when sold in the manner in which such property and subjects are usually sold." (Ga. Code Ann. 92-5702) In Tietjen et al. v. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, 161 Ga. 125 (1925), the court construed the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 92-5702 defining the terms fair market value as employed in the tax value, and held that the Code section states a rule to be applied in arriving at the value at which taxable property should be assessed and does not purport to limit investigations or the manner or agencies by which taxing authorities shall inquire into such values of taxable property. The valuation of public utility property involves special problems since there is no ready market for such property. Earning capacity and the market value of its securities have been held to be the best guides to the value of a public utility. C. J. S., Taxation, 444. ". . . . for taxation purposes, where it is the present value of the property in money that is to be determined, the present, past, and prospective future capacity to earn and the market value of stocks and bonds of the utility for a reasonable period antecedent to making the assessment constitute the most reliable and influential evidence of value." (State ex rei., Public Service Commission, et al. v. Southern Pacific Co., et al., 95 Ut. 84, 79 P.2d 25, 33 (1938) ). It is my opinion that a formula taking into consideration the earnings may be used in arriving at the fair market value of the public service corporation. However, the formula used should not be considered conclusive but be used merely as a guide. "The term 'fair market value' is a variable expression. . . ." (Delta Air Lines v. Coleman, Tax Com"missioner, et al., 219 Ga. 12. 18 (1963) ). "The market value of the property could not be proved with mathematical certainty and must ultimately rest in the realm 202 of opinion, estimate and judgment." (Assessors of Quincy v. Boston Consol. Gas Co. 309 Mass. 60, 34 N.E. 2d 623 (1941) ). Regardless of the formula or formulas used in arriving at a reasoned conclusion as to the fair market value of the particular public service corporation, the rule of fair market value, as stated in the Coleman case, supra, should always be applied. The State Revenue Commissioner should consider all factors that may affect the fair market value of the public service corporation, keeping in mind the following: "The State Revenue Commissioner shall carefully scrutinize the returns made to him, and if in his judgment the property embraced therein is returned below its value, or the return is false in any particular, or in any wise contrary to law, he shall within 60 days thereafter correct the same and assess the value, from any information he can obtain." (Emphasis supplied.) (Ga. Code Ann. 92-6001) In conclusion, the State Revenue Commissioner may use a formula, taking into consideration earnings, merely as a guide in arriving at the fair market value of a public service corporation. OPINION 66-13 January 27, 1966 I understand that you have been requested by the Malt Beverage Industry to modify your malt beverage regulations so as to permit the sale of malt beverages after the hours of the election, and to consider the prohibition on election days only with respect to statewide elections, such as a General election or a statewide Primary. The Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. II, Sec. V, Par. I, (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1101), states: "The General Assembly shall by law forbid the sale of intoxicating drinks in this State or any political subdivision thereof on all days for the holding of any election in the area in which such election is held and prescribe punishment for any violation of the same." Pursuant to this constitutional direction, several laws have been enacted implementing this direction. Ga. Code Ann. 58-609 provides: 203 "Any person who shall give or furnish spirituous, intoxicating, or malt liquors to any person, in any quantity, within two miles of any election precinct, on days of election, either State, county, municipal, or primary elections, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. This section does not prevent prescriptions by physicians, when made as prescribed by la'!Y." The Georgia Election Code, which was passed by the General Assembly in 1964 (Ga. Laws 1964, Extra. Sess., pp. 26, 196), provides that any person who shall sell or buy, or offer for sale, any alcoholic beverage on primary or election days shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The Election Code applies to State and County elections and primary elections for any purpose whatsoever (Ga. Code Ann. 34-102). Ga. Code Ann. 58-609 applies to State, County and Municipal elections. Based upon these authorities, it is my opinion that you do not have the authority to adopt the regulations which the Malt Beverage Industry has requested. The term "election day," as used in the Constitution, has been construed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Rose v. State, 107 Ga. 697 (1899), as encompassing a period of time from midnight preceding the opening of the polls until midnight succeeding the closing of the polls. The proposed changes would be in conflict with the Constitution and laws and you do not, therefore, have any authority to adopt such regulations. OPINION 66-l4 January 31, 1966 In your recent letter you request my official opinion on several points relating to the construction and operation of nursing homes for veterans. Your specific questions are: "(1) Does the Veterans Service Board, under the authority granted it by Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106, have the authority to accept as a gift, from a city, a deed to real property on which to construct and operate the proposed home?" Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106 provides in part as follows: " . . . The Veterans Service Board is . . . authorized to 204 receive from any source gifts, contributions, bequests, and individual reimbursements, ...." (Emphasis added.) The language of the above-quoted section clearly grants authority to the Veterans Service Board to accept gifts of real property from a city. The words "from any source" found therein indicate that potential donors include both private parties and public entities. In similar fashion, Ga. Code Ann. 78-410 creates for general purposes a power in the State Veterans Service Board to accept gifts, grants and contributions from the Federal Government and "other governmental" units. This section provides as follows: "78-4 10. Acceptance of governmental grants and contributions and private gifts, donations, etc. - The State -Department of Veterans Service and the State Board thereof is empowered to accept gifts, grants and other contributions from the Federal Government, or from any other governmental unit, and gifts, grants, donations or contributions of money, facilities and services from individuals and organizations, in addition to any funds appropriated by the State." However, the powers granted by Ga. Code Ann. 78-410 and 78-1106 are limited by the language of Ga. Code Ann. 78-1101, which officially establishes the Georgia War Veterans' Home and narrows the scope of all related statutory provisions to specified facilities at Milledgeville and Rome, Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. 781101 provides in part as follows: "78-1 101. Georgia War Veterans' Home; establishment; location; facilities; purpose; persons admitted.-There is hereby established at Milledgeville, Georgia, on the lands and properties of Milledgeville State Hospital, and at Rome, Georgia, on the lands and properties of Battey State Hospital, herein further described as follows: l. The Cabiness Building located on the land and properties of the Milledgeville State Hospital, Milledgeville, Georgia; 2. Building #17 located on the land and properties of the Battey State Hospital, Rome, Georgia, facilities to be known as the Georgia State War Veterans' Home, . . . . For the purpose of securing treatment or hospitalization, the adjacent facilities of both the 205 Milledgeville State Hospital at Milledgeville, Georgia, and the Battey State Hospital at Rome, Georgia, are hereby established as an integral part of the Georgia War Veterans' Home ...." It should be noted that Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106 specifically refers to the Georgia State War Veterans' Home in the course of discussing the various powers of the Veterans Service Board. The conclusion therefore reached is that under the statute as presently worded, the Veterans Service Board can only accept a gift of real property so located as to be considered a part of the Rome or Milledgeville facilities. "(2) Does the Veterans Service Board, under authority granted it by Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106, have the authority to construct and operate the proposed home?" It follows from the discussion of the first question that the power to construct and operate the proposed home is also limited by the requirement that it be a part of the facilities specifically referred to in Ga. Code Ann. 78-110 l. "(3) Assuming the answer to Question 2 is affirmative, is this authority sufficiently established to overcome the limitations on the Governor's emergency fund, 'No allotment shall be made from this appropriation to a purpose which creates a continuing obligation for the State' (Ga. Code Ann. 40-408)?" The preceding question has been given a contingently affirmative answer. However, the authority of the Veterans Service Board to construct and operate any facilities, regardless of whether or not such power is limited to statutorily established locations, may not contradict the "continuing obligation" restriction on the use of emergency funds. The Georgia courts in one decision defined both "continuing" and "obligation," and interpreting the language found within that opinion, a "continuing obligation" is a contractual instrument which obligates a party to assume future undertakings. Hargraves v. Cooke, 15 Georgia 321 at 326, 330 (1854); Ballantine Law Dictionary With Pronunciations (2nd ed.) at 277, 896. Obviously, the operation of any institution, such as the proposed nursing home, would create a "continuing obligation" as that term is 206 defined. On the other hand, the construction of the facility might be handled in such a way so as to place the state under an obligation fulfillable by a single act and hence noncontinuing in its nature. "(4) Assuming the answer to question 2 is negative, would a 1966 General Assembly Act, specifically establishing a new nursing home, be sufficient legally so as to permit a later allotment for its construction and/or operation from the Governor's emergency fund since it would then not be a creation but would be already established?" Although specific legislation on the subject would clearly establish the power to construct and operate the nursing home in any chosen location, the limitations on the use of the emergency fund discussed in question 3 would still apply in the same manner as therein indicated. "(5) Does the Veterans Service Board have the authority under Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106 to construct and operate the proposed home at a site other than those described in Ga. Code Ann. 78-1101?" This question must be answered in the same manner as was question 1. In reaching this conclusion I have considered whether the amendment eliminating the Veterans' Home Commission (Acts 1960, pp. 1150-1152) and creating the Veterans Service Board in its place established the power to act beyond the specific locations referred to in Ga. Code Ann. 78-1101. In view of the fact that except for the change in names, the language of Ga. Code Ann. 78-1106, dealing with powers, remained unchanged, no increased power to act can be deduced from the change of the name of the administrating body. "(6) In view of the limitations imposed by Ga. Code Ann. 40-408, 40-413, what type legislation would be most desirable for the purpose of obtaining the state matching fund of $1 million necessary to finance the construction of said home?'' In view of the limitations on the use of emergency funds previously discussed, the necessary construction funds may legally be obtained by general appropriation of the General Assembly in odd-numbered years or by its making a supplementary appropriation in other years. (See Art. VIII, Sec. VIII, Par. II & III of the Constitution of the State of Georgia.) 207 "(7) In view of the same limitations, what type legislation would be most desirable, for the purpose of financing the operating cost of said home?'' This question is answered in the same manner as the preceding question 6. "(8) Can you suggest any other method of obtaining state matching funds for the construction and/ or operation of said home?'' It is possible that the State Department of Veterans Service might be legislatively authorized to contract with the State Hospital Authority and thereby finance this project through the self-financing powers of the Hospital Authority as outlined in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 99-14. If the Department of Veterans Service is interested in following this course of action, I will explore the legislation concerning the State Hospital Authority in detail to determine what limitations, if any, are placed on the financing of the construction and operation of the nursing home by this means. OPINION 66-15 February 2, 1966 This is in reply to your letter in which you state the following facts: The Brunswick Port Authority proposes to purchase a tract of land, construct improvements on the land for a manufacturing or industrial plant, and purchase and place in the improvements certain machinery and equipment. The land, improvements, machinery and equipment would then be leased to a business corporation which would use them for manufacturing or industrial purposes. The lease would run for not less than ten years, and at the end of that period the corporation could purchase the leased facilities for the sum of $1.00. After stating these facts, you request answers to the following questions: I. Are purchases by the Authority of machinery and equipment for this project exempt from the taxes imposed by the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act 208 (Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 360-87; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-34a), as amended? 2. If any of the property covered by the lease should be tangible personal property as defined by the Act, would the portion of the rentals derived from that property be exempt from such taxes? To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the effect of a 1960 amendment (Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 153-158) to the Act. As a result of this amendment, Section 2 now requires the purchaser to pay to the seller a tax at the rate of 3 per cent of the purchase price on each retail purchase of tangible personal property and the seller, in turn, to remit the tax to the State Revenue Commissioner. Similarly, Section 2 requires the seller to pay a tax to the Commissioner at the rate of 3 per cent of the sales price on each retail sale of such property. For collecting the tax owed by the purchaser and remitting it to the Commissioner, the seller receives a credit against his liability for the amount collected and remitted. Since the liability of each with respect to a given transaction is the same, one offsets the other. This means the seller has no liability when he properly collects and remits. While the seller is a taxpayer in a technical sense, it can be seen from this that the purchaser is the taxpayer in the real sense. This is further demonstrated by the fact that before the 1960 amendment, the Act, according to the Georgia Supreme Court in Oxford v. J. D. Jewell, Inc., 215 Ga. 616 (1960), only imposed a tax on the seller. It did, however, allow him to reimburse himself by collecting an amount equal to the tax from the purchaser. Because of the Jewell decision, the legislature adopted the 1960 amendment, which had as one of the purposes expressed in its title "to clarify the Act so as to make it clear that the legal imposition of the tax is upon the purchaser and thereby express the original intent of the General Assembly." Based on the view that the purchaser is the real taxpayer and that the seller is only made a taxpayer in a technical sense, in order to strengthen the means of enforcing the Act, the limited tax exemption contained in Section 15 of the act creating the Authority (Ga. Laws 1945, pp. 1023, 1037; Ga. Laws 1958, pp. 82, 86) has no application when the Authority occupies the role of a seller. 209 However, the purchase of property by the Authority for the purpose of reselling it would not be subject to tax, for such a transaction would not be a retail pu.rchase under the Act. (Section 3(c); Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403(C)). Perhaps, in passing, it should be noted that while the proposed arrangement between the Authority and the business corporation is referred to as a lease, this is of no significance, insofar as sales or use taxes are concerned, for, under the Act, sales and leases are both taxed. (Section 3(b); Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a(b) ). What is of significance, although it is not disclosed by your factual statement, is whether the machinery is to be acquired for use directly in manufacturing tangible personal property for sale. If that should prove to be the case, then acquisition, whether by purchase or lease, would be exempt. (Section 3 (c)2(n)2; Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a(C)2(n)2; Rev. Regs. 560-12-2.162). Upon the basis of what has been said, I am of the opinion that purchase of machinery and equipment made by the Authority under the circumstances outlined in your letter would not be taxable but that the sale or lease of such property by the Authority, if such sale or lease does not include machinery for use directly in manufacturing tangible personal property for sale, would be taxable. OPINION 66-16 (Unofficial) February 3, 1966 You state that you wish to change the "Medical Examiner Certificate" from an appointment for an indefinite period to an appointment for a period of five years. Ga. Laws 1953, pp. 602, 604, as amended by Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 1009, 1010 (Ga. Code Ann. 21-203) provides in paragraph 2 that "The Director of the State Crime Laboratory, together with the Director of the Department of Public Health, shall authorize one. or more licensed physicians or pathologists at convenient locations throughout the State to act as Medical Examiners in performing post mortem examinations andjor autopsies as required by this Chapter." As this provision does not specify a tenure for Medical Examiners, it is my opinion that the authorized authorities are free to establish such term as they deem in the best interest of the State. 210 Accordingly, it is suggested that you alter the Certificate to read as follows: "This is to certify that the undersigned authorities have this day appointed as Medical Examiner of this State pursuant to the provisions of the Georgia Post Mortem Examination Act of 1953, said appointee to serve for a period of five years beginning and extending through , unless the appointment is revoked in writing by the appointing authority prior to the expiration date." OPINION 66-17 February 3, 1966 You refer to Section 45 of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-645) and its requirement that State funds be withheld from local school systems which fail to provide the local funds called for by the Act. You state that members of your staff are uncertain as to whether the withholding of State funds is to be based on the per cent by which a local system fails to meet its fiscal obligations under the Act or upon the amount in dollars by which the local system has fallen short. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION The answer to your question depends upon whether the State funds have already been distributed to the local school system when its failure to meet its fiscal obligations under the Act is ascertained (i.e. where the failure to actually provide and use the required local funds pertains to the preceding or a past year and is discovered by an audit of the local unit's operations). In this situation the correct procedure is to reduce the amount of State funds for the ensuing year by the amount in dollars by which the local system has fallen short and increase the amount of local effort by the same amount of money. In all other situations (i.e. where the deficiency relates to the present or a future year and the State funds have not been fully distributed), however, the proper procedure is to reduce the alfotment of State funds by the same percentage as the percentage of deficiency of the local unit (as calculated by the State Board of Education), until such time as the local system provides or uses the required amount of local funds, or makes adequate provision therefor. 211 DISCUSSION It is well settled, of course, the words in a statute are generally to be construed according to their plain and common sense meaning. E.g. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (1 ). Extracting the pertinent provisions of Section 45 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-645) we have the following: "In the event a local unit. .. fails to provide or use the amount of local funds required. . . during any school year. . . the State Board of Education shall calculate the percentage which the deficiency in local funds represents of the total local funds required to be raised and used by the local unit and reduce the amount of State funds allotted to the local unit by the same percentage until such time as the local unit provides or uses, as the case may be, the required amount of local funds, or makes adequate provision for providing or using the same to the satisfaction of the State Board. If State funds allotted to a local unit have been distributed to the local unit when such failure of the local unit is ascertained, or if an audit of operations of the local unit shows that the local unit did not during the preceding or a past fiscal school year actually provide or use the amount of local funds required by provisions of this Chapter and the approved local budget of the local unit for that year, the State Board of Education shall, for the next ensuing fiscal school year, reduce the amount of State contributed. . . funds to be allotted to the local unit by an equivalent amount of money and correspondingly increase the amount of local funds to be supplied by the local unit for that fiscal school year by the same amount of money. . . ." Based upon the foregoing it is my conclusion, as already stated, that the nature of the withholding of State funds (i.e. percentage or equivalent sum in dollars) depends upon whether the deficiency is one relating to a past year for which the State funds have already been distributed (equivalent sum in dollars) or to the current or coming year whether the funds have not been fully distributed (percentage). 212 OPINION 66-18 February 9, 1966 As I understand your letter, you are asking whether or not the Governor would be authorized to provide money from his Emergency Fund to pay the fees charged for county and municipal police officers who attend the Police Academy. The Act creating the Georgia Police Academy (Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 535-537) provides, relative to the training program, Ga. Code Ann. 32-3206, as follows: ". . . The board is hereby authorized to prescribe fees to cover all or part of the cost of furnishing such training under such rules and regulations as the board shall prescribe. The State, municipalities and counties are hereby authorized to expend funds for the purpose of paying the above fees." A reading of the Act will disclose that the Academy was designed to be used by "police officers" employed by the State or any county or municipality. The language, above quoted, indicates to me that it was the intent of the legislature that the State would be authorized to pay for any State employees, and, likewise, the municipalities and counties would be authorized to pay for any employees of a municipality or county. They are "authorized" and not "directed," and it seems to me that the intent of the Act was that each of the employers (State, county, or municipality) would be authorized to pay the fees which their employees were charged. I know of no specific provision of law authorizing the expenditure of State funds on behalf of municipal and county police personnel, and therefore, it is my opinion that funds obtained from the Governor's Emergency fund could not be used for the purpose of paying the fees of county and municipal police officers for attending the Academy. I am sure you are aware of the fact that the Governor's Emergency Fund can be used only for nonrecurring expenses. To my mind, this procedure, once started, would be most difficult to terminate, and I think the General Assembly might take umbrage if they were presented with a request for an appropriation to continue a program started out of the Emergency Fund. 213 OPINION 66-19 (Unofficial) February 11, 1966 In your letter concerning workmen's compensation your first inquiry is whether an employer is subrogated to both medical and compensation expenses incurred by said employer where a third person is liable to the employee for his injury. I would call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. i 14-403 which provides as follows: "Where any person is called upon to pay compensation, medical expenses and/ or funeral expenses on account of injury or death compensable under this Title, and such person contends that a person or persons other than the employer is liable to pay damages, on account of such injury or death, to the injured employee or those entitled to recover for the employee's death, such person called upon to make such payment may give to the persons contended to be so liable and to the injured employee or those entitled to recover on account of his death written notice of such contention and of the fact that the person giving notice is required to make such payment. Upon giving such written notice, the person called upon to make such payment shall be subrogated, to the extent of the compensation medical expenses and/ or funeral expenses payable, to all rights arising out of the injury or death which the injured employee or those entitled to recover on account of his death shall have against such notified persons, and shall have a lien therefor against the net recovery of any judgment or settlement recovered by the injured employee or those entitled to recover on account of the employee's death against any of the persons so notified." Unfortunately, the legislature omitted a comma in the second sentence between compensation and medical expenses which resulted in a slight ambiguity. However, I believe that this statute should be construed so that not only any medical expenses which have been incurred, but also any compensation paid to the employee may be recovered from said third party. Your second inquiry relates to the proper procedure for stipulating a Workmen's Compensation claim when it is evident that the physical disability will be for an indefinite period of time. 214 Please find enclosed a Workmen's Compensation Form # 16, entitled "Standard Form for Agreement as to Compensation." This Form may be executed in triplicate, seven days after the occurrence of the injury. Upon approval an award may be issued adjudicating that the Claimant is temporarily totally disabled and directing compensation to be paid. In order to terminate our liability under such an award prior to the expiration of the statutory limit of 400 weeks, another stipulation or award would have to be entered into establishing that the claimant was no longer temporarily totally disabled and stating the percentage of his disability, if any. Your third and fourth inquiries present the question of whether an employee under the State Merit System is entitled to use his accrued sick and annual leave in lieu of the normal workmen's compensation payments. As you will note from the enclosed Form # 16 that as long as the employee receives his regular weekly wage, the employer is not liable for the $37.00 per week compensation payment. However, the State Merit System regulation Section B.300, Paragraph B.302, provides in part: "In case of accidental injury or occupational disease where compensation is payable under the Georgia Workmen's Compensation Act, the employee may utilize sick leave during his period of disability only to the extent of the difference between said compensation and his regular salary and with the consideration that the sick leave period may be extended but shall not exceed the monetary value of the full sick leave accrued as of the day of the injury." An illustration would perhaps clarify this rule. Assume an employee who is paid $100 a week is injured and receives an award entitling him to receive $37.00 per week compensation for 400 weeks. Assume further that said employee has 80 days or 16 weeks accrued sick leave. His accrued sick leave is worth $1600.00. The employee would be paid $100 a week, $37 of which would be chargeable against his compensation and $64.00 against his sick leave. Since he is being paid $63.00, instead of the usual $100.00 per week for sick leave, he is entitled to extend his sick leave beyond the 16 weeks to approximately 25.4 weeks ($1600-+- $63.00). After 26 weeks have elapsed, said employee would then be entitled to be paid for his annual leave, if he so elects. If he elects to 215 take the annual leave his compensation would be suspended. After the expiration of his annual leave, the employee would then receive $37.00 per week for the duration of the 400 weeks. OPINION 66-20 (Unofficial) February 11, 1966 You requested my opinion concerning the method by which the Sheriff of Randolph County should be reimbursed for his automobile expenses. Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2903, in Section 9 thereof, provides: "In addition to the salaries provided for herein, the Sheriff and the Deputy shall be reimbursed for automobile expenses incurred in carrying out their official duties within Randolph County, but such automobile expenses shall not exceed $4,000 per annum for both the Sheriff and the Deputy." Your first question asks whether or not the term "reimburse," as used in Section 9 of the Act, requires the Sheriff to submit a statement of his expenses in order to be reimbursed for the expense involved in operating his automobiles. Your second question asks whether or not monthly payments to the Sheriff on a mileage basis (such as ten cents per mile), with an accounting at the end of the year and an adjustment to assure the Sheriff that all his expenses for the year were paid, and further providing for a return of funds to the County in !he event he has been overpaid on the mileage basis, would be in legal harmony with Section 9. Your third question asks whether or not monthly payments to the Sheriff at the rate of one-twelfth of $4,000, with accounting and adjustment at the end of the year would be in legal harmony with Section 9. Your first three questions all involve an interpretation of the word "reimburse." The primary meaning of the word "reimburse" is to pay back that which has been expended (Lyons v. Moise's Executor, 298 Ky. 858, 183 S. W. 2d 493), or to make a return or restoration of an equivalent for something paid or expended (Woerz v. Schumacher, 161 N. Y. 530, 56 N. E. 72). The word "reimburse" also means to refund, or to pay back to. (Pasternak v. Thrift Insurance Company, 104 N. E. 2d 712, 715). 216 It is my opinion that the use of the term "reimburse" does in effect require the Sheriff to submit a statement of his expenses in order to be reimbursed for expenses in connection with the operation of his automobiles. The Sheriff of Randolph County is entitled to be paid back, in connection with automobile expenses, only an amount equal to that which he has spent. Unless the Sheriff submitted a statement of his automobile expenses, the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Randolph County would have no effective method of knowing whether or not they were paying back to the Sheriff an amount of money equal to that which he had previously spent in connection with the operation of his automobiles. With respect to your second and third questions, based upon the definition of the term "reimburse," it is my opinion that the Sheriff of Randolph County cannot be paid on a mileage basis, as contemplated by your second question; nor may he be paid onetwelfth of $4,000 per month, as contemplated by your third question. Your fourth question asks whether or not the governing body of Randolph County has the authority to make rules and regulations governing the method of reimbursement of the Sheriff for his automobile expenses. Georgia Laws 1935, p. 778, in Section 11 thereof, provides, inter alia, that the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Randolph County has the power to exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction and control over disbursing public money for county purposes. "Where an act is within the power of the County Commissioners, the manner of doing it must be largely left to their discretion, and that discretion must be a broad one.': Moore v. Mauldin, 199 Ga. 780, 782 (1945). See in this connection: Commissioners of Habersham County v. Porter Manufacturing Company, 103 Ga. 613 (1898); Dyer v. Martin, 132 Ga. 445 (1909); Dunn v. Beck, 144 Ga. 148 (1915); Terry v. Wade, 149 Ga. 580 (1919); Thomas v. Ragsdale, 188 Ga. 238 (1939). Based upon the foregoing authorities, it is my opinion that the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues for Randolph County may make rules and regulations governing the method of reimbursement for the Sheriffs automobile expenses. OPINION 66-21 (Unofficial) 217 February 15, 1966 You asked whether the full pay of an employee can be reached by legal process in Georgia for the purpose of collecting taxes or other obligations. Georgia has no statute which allows for the levy upon an intangible such as wages. Intangibles like wages are reached in Georgia by garnishment. In Georgia there are two types of garnishments, one referred to as "garnishment and attachment" and one referred to simply as "garnishment." Garnishment and attachment is found in Ga. Code Ann. Title 8 and simple garnishment is found in Ga. Code Ann. Title 46. Garnishment and attachment is a very limited remedy and can only be used in certain situations, such as where the debtor is removing or about to remove without the limits of the State or the debtor conceals himself and his property or resists legal arrest. Ga. Code Ann. 46-208 provides an exemption where wages are garnisheed, and the employee is allowed to retain $3 per day plus 50 percent of the balance of the excess, which amount is not subject to garnishment. Therefore, under this process it would not be possible for an employee's entire pay check to be reached. Ga. Code Ann. 92-570 l provides for garnishments for tax obligations. This section specifically provides that a tax collector cannot issue a garnishment to reach a delinquent taxpayer's wages unless he first attempts to collect the tax obligation by levying upon property. Therefore, the clear intent of the Georgia law is that tax collectors are first to attempt to collect delinquent taxes by levying upon property (such as an automobile, furniture, etc.); and if such is not available, then he may issue garnishment but (as shown above) the wages of an employee are exempt to the extent of $3 per day plus 50 percent of the balance of his wages. OPINION 66-22 (Unofficial) February 16, 1966 You request that I review the charter of the City of Folkston and 218 give you my views as to the right of the mayor to introduce motions and vote at council meetings. Section 10 of the Act creating the charter for the City of Folkston (Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 755, 762) does provide, as you point out, that the mayor and board of councilmen shall constitute the legislative department of the city, and shall have full power and authority to pass and enforce all by-laws, resolutions and ordinances. This certainly would seem to give the mayor the same voice and vote as any member of the board of councilmen in this matter. I note that various sections of the charter convey authority to the mayor and board of councilmen to do other acts such as electing a city attorney (Section 25), granting of franchises (Section 26) and levying and collection of taxes (Section 27). Since the mayor is specifically granted the power and authority jointly with the board of councilmen, it could hardly be justified to deny the mayor the right to vote or to introduce motions on these subject-matters. There are other sections of the charter also giving the mayor and board of councilmen joint power and authority to act. I note, however, there are several sections which grant authority only to the board of councilmen such as Section 7, as amended (Ga. Laws 1961, p. 2539), which authorizes the salary of the mayor to be fixed and Section 12 which authorizes the election of a mayor pro tern. It is apparent that these sections grant the right to vote on these particular subject-matters to the board of councilmen only. OPINION 66-23 (Unofficial) February 21, 1966 You requested a ruling as to whether or not the Clerk of the Superior Court of Bacon County must comply with the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2715 (1) and (2) which require the recording of civil proceedings in well-bound books if the Clerk installs micro equipment as authorized by Ga. Code Ann. 24-2747. As you point out, Ga. Code Ann. 24-2747 provides that: " . . . The provisions of this section for the installation and use of such equipment shall be construed to be permissive only, and are cumulative of existing provisions of law: ..." 219 While this language might be construed to mean that the use of micro equipment does not eliminate the necessity of complying with Ga. Code Ann. 24-2715 (I) and (2), I believe it could be argued that this language was employed only to make it clear that no county governing authority was under any duty to purchase such equipment. Ga. Code Ann. 24-2714 (9) of the Code was amended by an Act approved March 6, 1962 (Ga. Laws 1962, p. 639), to permit Clerks of the Superior Courts to keep certain records by microfilm. Although this paragraph, before being amended, dealt only with keeping well-bound books for recording all deeds, mortgages, and other liens and bills of sale, the amendment added the following: "Provided further, that instruments evidencing the title to personal property recorded more than ten (10) years may be re-recorded and any other records, excepting only instruments evidencing the title to real property, may be kept or rerecorded by microfilm or other photographic process of a permanent nature, provided the proper indices and adequate equipment are maintained in addition to the necessary personnel for viewing said records." (Emphasis added.) It seems to me that this amendment when construed with the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2747 might be interpreted to permit the final recording of civil proceedings by microfilm in lieu of in "well-bound" volumes provided proper indices and adequate equipment are maintained in addition to the necessary personnel for viewing these records. OPINION 66-24 (Unofficial) February 25, 1966 In your letter you state that a resident of Georgia is employed by a pulpwood company located in the State of Alabama. The Georgia resident owns a pulpwood truck which is used in delivering pulpwood to his employer. Some of the pulpwood is transported in interstate commerce from Georgia to Alabama, while a part of the pulpwood is transported in intrastate commerce in the State of Alabama. The owner of the pulpwood truck lives in the State of Georgia and drives the truck home each night. Your question is 220 whether or not the above truck is required to have a Georgia motor vehicle license. The State of Georgia has entered into a reciprocal agreement with the State of Alabama which governs the operation of interstate motor vehicles. Motor carriers of property for hire licensed in one state may be operated between the two states without payment of additional motor vehicle license fees when operated strictly in interstate commerce. However, a vehicle so engaged in interstate commerce must be licensed in the state in which such vehicle is based. The controlling reciprocal agreement provides that "the motor vehicle administrators or reciprocating authorities of all states shall agree as to the base of a vehicle but must, in determining the vehicle's base, give consideration, among other things, to the place from which the vehicle leaves and to which it returns in its normal operations." It is, therefore, apparent that the decisive question of the base of a motor vehicle is to be determined by the particular facts concerning its operation. I will be glad to have a local agent of the Motor Vehicle Unit contact you and make an investigation concerning the licensing of subject motor vehicle. I also enclose for your information a copy of the rules and regulations governing the licensing of motor vehicles. You will find a copy of our reciprocal agreement on page 46 of this pamphlet. OPINION 66-25 February 28, 1966 You state the following facts: An insurance company chartered by another State which has been licensed in Georgia for a number of years recently decided to discontinue business. As a part of a procedure for going out of business, it entered into a reinsurance agreement and a loss assumption agreement with another foreign company which has also been admitted to do business in Georgia for some time. By the terms of the reinsurance and loss assumption agreements, this second company obligates itself to assume and pay all losses for which the withdrawing company may be liable. The agreements are silent as to the release of the original insurer under its policies. Based upon these agreements, request has been made for release of securities deposited by this withdrawing company under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 56-310 or the prior provisions oflaw governing deposits of foreign insurers. 221 After stating these facts, you request my official opinion as to whether or not the liability of the insurer has been so extinguished as to authorize an order for the release of the deposited funds within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108 ( 1) which provides: "56-1108. Release ofdeposits. Any deposit made in this State under this title shall be released: (l) To the insurer upon extinguishment by reinsurance or otherwise of all liability of the insurer for the security of which the deposit is held;" Ga. Code Ann. 56-310 which requires the deposit in question provides: "In addition to the deposit required by Section 56-309 each foreign and alien insurer shall deposit with the Treasurer of the State of Georgia securities eligible for the investment of capital funds in an amount not less than $10,000 nor more than $25,000 at the discretion of the Commissioner. This deposit and the deposit required by Section 56-309 (2) (a) shall be administered as provided in Chapter 56-11. Deposits under this section shall be held for the protection of the insurer's policyholders in Georgia and others in Georgia entitled to the proceeds ofits policies." (Emphasis added.) The answer to your question requires an interpretation of the legislative intent in the use of the language "extinguishment by reinsurance or otherwise" in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108 (1). "Extinguishment" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., as "the destruction or cancellation of a right, power, contract or estate." "Extinguishment" connotes the end of a thing, precluding the existence of future life therein. It is sometimes confounded with "merger" in which there is a carrying on of the substance of the thing, except that it is merged into and becomes a part of the separate thing with a new identity. Matt Roberts v. Matt Roberts, 177 Okla. 156, 57 P. 2d 1175, 1177. In an 1854 decision, the Georgia Supreme Court in the case of Moultrie v. Smiley, 16 Ga. 289, 302 (1854), held that the word "extinguishment" has, in the law, no fixed, uniform and universal meaning, but varies with the subject-matter to which it is applied and that the words, merger, suspension and abatement, would, in many instances where extinguishment is used, much more accurately and felicitiously express the idea intended to be conveyed. Here, however, we are 222 dealing with the meaning of an extinguishment of all liability of an insurer for the security of which a special deposit is held. It is wellsettled that in order to "extinguish" an old liability and substitute therefor a new liability, the consent and agreement of the creditor, the old debtor, and the new debtor, is required. Durkey v. Arndt, 46 F. Supp. 256, 263; Restatement, Contracts, 428; Hennessy v. Woodrujj; 210 Ga. 742 (1954). "Reinsurance" is simply a contract which an insurer makes with another to protect the latter from a risk already assumed. Vial v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 256 Ill. 355, 100 N.E. 929, 930, 44 L.R.A., N.S., 317 Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1141. It also means the substitution, with the consent of the insured, of a second insurer for the first, so that the original insurer is released. People v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 179 Mich. 371, 146 N.W. 235, 236; Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 22 Tenn. App. 656, 125 S. W. 2d 493, 496; 46 C.J.S. Reinsurance 1220 (a). See also 13 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 768 1. Although there apparently have been no appellate court decisions in this State interpreting the present provisions of the 1960 Insurance Code ir;tvolving deposits of non-resident insurance companies, the purpose of similar deposits under a prior law, Ga. Code Ann. 56-301, was stated in the case of Collins v. Dacus, 211 Ga. 779, 781 (1955), quoting from Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters v. South Georgia Railway Co., 57 Ga. App. 669 (1938), as follows: "These bonds are for the protection of the citizens of Georgia who have insurance with the non-resident company, and if the foreign company ceases to do business, the bonds remain in the State Treasury until such company 'shall have settled all claims against it' in this State and are subject to the claims of Georgia citizens. under certain prescribed conditions." I The law prior to the adoption of the 1960 Insurance Code provided for the return of the deposits made by foreign insurers " . . . whenever such company shall cease to do business in this State, and shall have settled all claims against it . . . ."A cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the true intention of the legislature, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil and the remedy. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9). The legislature, no doubt, was mindful of the law as it existed at the time the present 223 law was adopted in 1960. The statute as to the depositing of bonds by non-resident insurers and retaining them so long as there is a pending claim in the State, and the statute providing for the prosecution of pending suits after the dissolution of a foreign corporation, are part of the general scheme of our Georgia law to protect Georgia citizens in the collection of just claims against foreign corporations which are dissolved and which have their principal assets in other states. Manufacturing Lumbermen's Underwriters v. South Georgia Railway Co., supra. In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that the language contained in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108 (1) was intended to mean that an insurer, before being allowed to take down its deposits, must extinguish, that is, put an end to all of its liability for the security of which the deposit is held and that in addition to any other means by which this might be accomplished it could also be accomplished by the means of reinsurance. To be accomplished by reinsurance would require, in my opinion, a reinsurance contract whereby a second insurer is substituted for the first or withdrawing insurer, with the consent of the insured, which, of course, would release the first insurer from all liability to the insured. Although the reinsurer in this case has assumed all the losses for which the withdrawing company may be liable, there is no question but what the withdrawing company is still liable to its individual policyholders since they have not consented to release this company from liability. Its liability to its policyholders, therefore, has not been extinguished by the reinsurance and loss assumption agreements. Although the mode for such extinguishment has been provided, it has not and cannot be completely accomplished, without the consent of the policyholders, until the expiration of the policies in force and the payment of all losses and obligations arising out of such policies. It is my opinion, therefore, that the liability of the withdrawing company has not been so extinguished under the facts presented, which would authorize an order releasing its deposited funds. You advised that you received notice from the Insurance Department of the State of Texas in which the withdrawing company is domiciled advising that this company has requested a return of bonds deposited in that State and inquiring as to whether or not you have any objections to this request. I am advised that 224 these deposit funds include a $125,000 deposit which is required by Ga. Code Ann. 56-309 which provides as follows: "56-309. Deposit requirements. (1) The Commissioner shall not issue a certificate of authority to transact insurance to any insurer unless it has deposited in trust with this State securities eligible for the investment of capital funds of domestic insurers under this Title in an amount not less than that required in subsection (2) of this section. This section does not apply to farmers' mutual fire insurance companies. (2) (a) The amount of the deposit required for a certificate to transact any one class of insurance shall be $1 00,000; to transact each additional class of insurance, the amount of deposit shall be $25,000, subject to the limitation that not more than $200,000 total deposit shall be required for any combination of classes. (b) As to foreign insurers, in lieu of such deposit or part thereof in this State, the Commissioner shall accept the current certificate in proper form of the public official having supervision over insurers in any other state to the effect that a like deposit or part thereof by such insurer is being maintained in public custody in such state in trust for the purpose, among other reasonable purposes, of protection of policyholders and/ or creditors, or of the protection of all the insurer's policyholders or of all of its policyholders and obligees." The company in question satisfied the above requirements prior to being licensed in this State by filing the certificate authorized by Ga. Code Ann. 56-309 (2) (b). You have requested to be advised as to whether or not you should object to a return of this deposit by the Texas authorities. The Texas law administering this deposit, of course, governs its release by the Texas Insurance Commissioner. If it had been made in Georgia, the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 56-1102 (1) would have applied. This Section provides in part: "When the deposit is required for authority to transact insurance in Georgia, the deposit shall be held for the protection of all the insurer's policyholders or others entitled to the proceeds ofpolicies within the United States; Provided, this shall not apply to a deposit made under section 56-310; ..." [Emphasis added.] 225 In addition, the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108 relating to release of deposits would have also applied. Since it was made in Texas, however, for the protection of all of the insurer's policyholders, including those in Georgia, the same conditions should be applied to determine your objections to its release, insofar as the protection of those in Georgia is concerned, that apply to your release of the Georgia deposit. Your objections, of course, would be limited to the release of only the amount required to be deposited by Georgia law. OPINION 66-26 February 28, 1966 You inquire as to whether an Area Planning and Development Commission may serve as the administrative body for approving subdivision plats for its member counties, in lieu of each member county establishing a local planning commission for this purpose. By use of the term Area Planning and Development Commission, I assume that you are referring to a joint planning commission organized under the authority vested in municipal and county authorities pursuant to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 69-12. In this connection, may I direct your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 69-1215, which provide as follows: "Same; planning commission as planning authority.From and after the time the municipal planning commission, the county planning commission, or the municipal-county planning commission shall have prepared and adopted a master plan or at least the major street portion of such master plan and shall have recommended to the governing authority of the municipality or the governing authority of the county regulations for the subdivision of land within the municipality or county, respectively, which regulations shall have been adopted by the governing authority of the city or county, as provided in section 69-1212, then no plat ofa subdivision within the municipality or within the unincorporated portion of the county shall be filed or recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county until it shall have been submitted to and approved by the planning commission and such approval entered in writing on the plat by the secretary of the planning commission ...." (Emphasis added.) 226 May I also call your attention to part of the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 69-1201, which provides as follows: "Planning commissions; creation and appointment.-The governing authority of each municipality in this State is authorized to create by ordinance a municipal planning commission. The governing authority of each county in this State is authorized to create by resolution a county planning commission. Any two or more municipalities are authorized to create a joint planning commission. Any two or more counties are authorized to create a joint planning commission. Any one or more counties and any one or more municipalities in any one or more ofthese counties are authorized to create a joint planning commission. The governing authority of any municipality or county that has participated or participates in creating a joint planning commission may continue and may create or retain its own local planning commission whether under the authority of a private Act, general enabling legislation, or other authority. Any county or municipality which has or which may create its own planning commission and which also participates in a joint planning commission may specify in the respective resolutions or ordinances which powers granted shall be exercised by the local planning commission and also the joint planning commission. Wherever the terms, 'municipal planning commission,' 'county planning comm1sswn, or 'municipal-county planning commission,' are used hereinafter, they shall be construed to mean and shall include any planning commission established hereunder. The governing authorities of the political subdivision or subdivisions creating a planning commission shall select the name of the commission, but such name must include the term 'planning commission.' " (Emphasis added.) Ga. Code Ann. 69-1217 provides the procedure for the planning commission to approve or disapprove plats in the following language: "Same; procedure on plats.- The municipal planning commission, the county planning commission, or the municipal-county planning commission is hereby given the authority to give tentative approval or disapproval to preliminary plats and to approve or disapprove final plats but 227 in each case their action shall be taken within 30 days after the submission thereof; otherwise, such plat shall be deemed to have been approved and a certificate to that effect shall be issued by the planning commission on demand: Provided, however, that the applicant for the planning commission's approval may waive this requirement and consent to the extension of such period. The ground of disapproval of any plat shall be stated upon the records of the planning commission. Any plat submitted to the planning commission shall contain the name and address of a person to whom notice of hearing may be sent; and no plat shall be acted upon by the planning commission without affording a hearing thereon, notice of the time and place of which shall be sent by registered or certified mail to said address not less than five days before the date fixed therefor." (Emphasis added.) Construing the provisions of the above quoted Code sections, it is my opinion that a joint planning commission organized pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 69-1201, above quoted, would have the authority to approve or disapprove plats as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 691215 and 69-1217, for its respective member units if there are no local planning commissions created or retained in the member counties or municipalities. However, it must be noted that under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 69-1201, a member county or municipality participating in a joint planning commission may continue to retain its own local planning commission and such a county or municipality may specify which powers shall be exercised by the local commission and those to be exercised by the joint commission. Therefore, where the member counties or municipalities participating in the joint commission have existing local planning commissions, it is my opinion that a joint planning commission would have the authority to approve or disapprove plats according to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 69-1215 and 69-1217, provided the respective member counties or municipalities have specified these powers to be in the joint commission. OPINION 66-27 (Unofficial) March 1, 1966 This is in reply to your letter concerning the revocation of municipal business licenses in cases where the owner or operator of such businesses have in their possession intoxicating beverages. 228 assume that you refer to both distilled spirits and malt beverages. Distilled spirits may not be sold in Walton County as that county is dry. However, malt beverages may be legally sold provided the city issues licenses therefor. The sale of either without a license is prohibited by State law, as is the possession for sale without a license. See Ga. Code Ann. 58-1065, 58-1073, 581077 and 58-726. A municipal ordinance penalizing an act made penal by existing State law covering the same subject matter would not be enforceable. Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758 (1953). It would appear that if the State law is in fact being violated, the local law enforcement personnel, with the aid and advice of the Solicitor and City Attorney, could deal with the problem. I suggest that you discuss this matter with them. OPINION 66-28 (Unofficial) March 1, 1966 This is in reply to your letter of February 18, 1966, requesting a ruling from the Attorney General regarding the answering date of Summons of Garnishments in the Small Claims Court of Mitchell County. The 1964 Act (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 220, 221) amended Ga. Code Ann. 46-105 so as to add the words " ... the clerk of any court of record in which the said garnishment is filed or in which the main case is filed, . . ."to the already existing provisions " . . . to issue a summons of garnishment directed to the garnishee and requiring him to appear at the court where suit is pending or judgment was obtained not sooner than 30 days and not less than 45 days of the service of such summons . . . ." This, of course, includes the Small Claims Court of Mitchell County and appears to require it to allow an appearance of not sooner than 30 days nor more than 45 days from the date of service. I might add that there is some question in my mind also of the constitutionality of the 1963 amendment (Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 2270, 2271) allowing the Small Claims Court Judge to set an answer date to a summons of garnishment allowing less time to answer than is provided by the general law on garnishments (Ga. Code Ann. 46- 229 105). There is a possibility that this provision ~ould be attacked as violating Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-401) of the Georgia Constitution which provides in part: "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law . . . ." OPINION 66-29 March 1, 1966 Your letter was in reference to the amendment to the Game and Fish Laws passed by the 1966 General Assembly. You asked several questions, the first of which is "What is the definition of the term 'immediate family' as used in this amendment and of whom does it consist?" In answering your first inquiry, I am pleased to call to your attention the fact that the Georgia courts generally hold in the construction of statutes that a word will be given its usual and ordinary meaning. State v. Cherokee Brick and Tile Company, 89 Ga. App. 235, 237 (1953). A statute should be read according to its natural and most obvious import of the language without resorting to subtle and forced construction for purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 200 Ga. 216, 221 (1946). The word "family" is a flexible term and it is employed to designate different relationships. In the case of Dodge v. Boston and Providence Railroad Company, 154 Mass. 299 (1891), the court said: "The word 'family' has several meanings. Its primary meaning is the collective body of persons who live in one house, and under one head or management. Its secondary meaning is those who are of the same lineage or descend from one common progenitor. Unless the context manifests a different intention, the word 'family' is usually construed in its primary sense. In King v. Darlington, 4 Term R. 797, under the settlement act of 8 and 9 Wm. III, c. 30, which provided for the granting of a certificate to a poor person who wished to remove from his own parish to another, and that the latter parish should 'be obliged to receive and provide for the 230 person mentioned in the certificate, together with his or her family', it was held that the certificate did not extend to a grandchild of the person receiving it, who lived with his father, and not with his grandfather. Lord Kenyon, C.J., said: 'In common parlance, the family consists of those who live under the same roof with the pater-familias,~those who form (if I may use the expression) his fireside. But when they branch out, and become the heads of new establishments, they cease to be part of the father's family.' " See also Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., et al., 197 A.2d 673, 675 (1964). From the above it is shown that the word "family" has two meanings. Its primary meaning denotes a collective body of persons living in one house or under one head. The relations between such persons therefore are of a permanent or domestic character. Barkley v. International Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., 86 S.E. 2d 602 (1955). The secondary or broader meaning includes all persons who descend from one common progenitor. Kiska v. Skrenski, 138 A.2d 523, 145 Conn. 28 (1958). The general rule therefore is that the word "family" should be given its primary meaning unless the secondary meaning is clearly manifested from the context in which it is used. The secondary meaning is not manifested in any way from the context of the statute. A strong indication for the intended placing of the primary meaning to the term "family" as used in this statute is the use of a modifying and limiting term "immediate" annexed to the noun by the legislature. "Immediate family" according to Ballentine's Law Dictionary, 2d ed. (1948) means "those members of the same household who are bound together by ties of relationship, such as one's parents, wife, children, brothers, and sisters." See 38 Am. Jur. 560. The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the true intention of the legislature in passage of a law. Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (1936); Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 (1949). The basic purpose of requiring a license and a license fee for hunting and fishing is to allow control and regulation of game and fish management in this State by the State Game and Fish Commission. The imposition of a license and a license fee will 231 accomplish such goal by two methods. First, it will provide necessary revenue to run an effective management program. Second, it will indirectly control and limit the number of hunters and fishermen by requiring such a license to be eligible to participate. Therefore, any exceptions as to requiring such license should be strictly construed. This is necessary to promote the legislative intent. To give any other meaning to the word "family" as used in the statute would open the gates to an unlimited number of people who could hunt and fish in this State without securing a license. Such a construction could constitute the license exemptees the rule rather than the exception, and would violate the cardinal rule of statutory construction as above mentioned. It is therefore my opinion that when the legislature used the adjective "immediate" in front of the term "family," they indicated a specific intent to restrict this term to its primary meaning. The Georgia courts have generally given the primary and restricted interpretation to the term "family." In a taxing statute, the court held that: "In the absence of an act of the General Assembly so defining it 'family' as used in the section of the income tax law that excludes as a proper deduction a loss suffered by the sale of tangible or intangible property to a member of the taxpayer's 'family' does not include a brother of the taxpayer who resides in another State and who, like the taxpayer, maintains his own family and household and has done so for years." Oxford v. Chance, 104 Ga. App. 310 (1961). Other jurisdictions have given consistent interpretations of the term "immediate family." Several decisions have held that a son is a member of his father's immediate family so long as he lives with his father, but when he moves and sets up his own abode or household, he is no longer a member of his father's immediate family. See Knights of Columbus v. Rowe, 40 Atl. 451 (1898); Larkin v. Knights of Columbus, 73 N. E. 850 (1905); Davin v. Davin, 99 N.Y.S. 1012 (1906). lt has further been held that an individual living apart from his brother is not a member of the brother's immediate family. Axelard v. Axelard, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 394 (1943); Barkley v. International Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., supra. 232 The Supreme Court of New Jersey gave a like interpretation to the term "immediate family" as used in a taxing statute in that State. Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., et al., supra. Since the primary meaning of "family" is a collective body of persons living together in one house in a permanent and domestic character under one head or management and since the adjective "immediate" indicates a legislative intention to adopt the primary meaning of "family," it is my opinion that the term "immediate family," as used in the statute in question, is restricted to those living in one household, under one head, and bearing a blood or dependent relationship. Such definition would therefore exclude all kin who live outside of the household and who are not dependent on the household head for support. Your second question is "What is the status of land owned by corporations and multiownership of land in regard to this amendment?" It is a general rule of law that a corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from the individuals who compose it. See Nadler, Georgia Law on Corporations, 27 (1950). Under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 22-1827 (Ga. L., Ext. Sess., pp. 214, 222 (1937-38), it is provided as follows: "Every corporation, by virtue of its existence as such, shall have power: . . . (d) To hold, purchase and convey real and personal property of every kind consistent with the purposes of its existence, and to deal with, mortgage, pledge, incumber or lease any such real and personal property with its franchise. . ." From the above-quoted Code section, it is clear that the corporation owns its land, not the stockholders. The statutory amendment only exempts members of the immediate family of the landowner. Therefore, it is my opinion that the shareholders of corporations do not own the land of the corporation and they or members of their immediate family are not exempt from the license requirement in regard to property owned by the corporation. In regard to multiownership of property, there is a different position in this State. Ga. Code Ann. 85-100 l provides as follows: 233 "Wherever two or more persons, from any cause, are entitled to the possession, simultaneously, of any property, a tenancy in common is created. Tenants in common may have unequal shares; they will be held to be equal unless the contrary appears. The facts of inequality shall not give the person holding the greater interest any privileges, as to possession, superior to the person owning a less interest, as long as the tenancy continues." From the above-quoted section, it is clear that multiowners have an individual interest in the land and they hold such land as tenants in common. Therefore, it is my opinion that each interest holder, who owns land as tenants in common, is exempt from the license requirement in question in regard to trapping, hunting, and fishing on such land. This would be true also for members of his immediate family as previously defined. The same result would be true in regard to land owned by partnerships, due to the fact that partners hold such land as tenants in common. See Hartnett v. Stillwell, 121 Ga. 386 (1904). Your third question is "What is the status of leased land and land owned by a hunting club in regard to this amendment?" A lessee of land would not be exempted from the license requirement. The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. It states that only those who hunt, fish, and trap, " . . . on premises owned by him or his immediate family" are exempt from the license fee. Therefore, it is my opinion that the lessee of such land would be required to obtain a license to hunt, fish, or trap on the land he has leased. As for the status of gun clubs, a specific answer would depend on how the club was formed, how the land was purchased, etc. If a gun club was formed as a corporation, the members would not be exempted from the license requirement. If such a club was set up as a partnership, the members and their immediate families would, in my opinion, be exempt from the license requirement. 234 OPINION 66-30 (Unofficial) March 2, 1966 This is to acknowledge your letter regarding the forfeiture of appearance bonds in criminal cases under Forfeiture of Appearance Bonds. Ga. Laws 1965, p. 266 (Ga. Code Ann. ll0-312, ll0313, ll0-314). It is my opinion that the date of forfeiture of the appearance bond would depend entirely upon the wording of each particular bond. In the event the bond indicated an appearance at a term of court, forfeiture would not occur until the end of that particular term of court. However, if the bond is returnable on a specific date, then the 60-day provision would commence to run from that date. OPINION 66-31 March 2, 1966 You requested my view as to whether the office of a county school superintendent is required by law to be located in the county courthouse. My answer, along with the reasons therefor, is as follows: In my opinion, the office of a county school superintendent is not required by law to be located in the county courthouse. This belief is based not only upon the fact that I am unaware of any law which could reasonably be interpreted as requiring a superintendent's office to be maintained in the courthouse, but also upon the fact that existing statutes strongly imply that such offices may be maintained elsewhere. Ga. Code Ann. 32-lO 12, for example, declares: "The county authorities of the different counties shall furnish the county superintendent of schools thereof an office in the courthouse, provided there is sufficient room in said courthouse after furnishing the county officers with offices as now provided by law." This proviso, which clearly indicates that the county officers need not furnish the county school superintendent with space in the courthouse when sufficient space is not available, see Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59 p. 109, would appear to be wholly inconsistent with the existence of any legal requirement that such office be located 235 within the county courthouse. This conclusion would also seem to be supported by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 91-7. In dealing with county buildings (plural) this chapter authorizes the ordinary to erect courthouses, jails, "and all other necessary county buildings" (again implying that the office of a county official need not necessarily be located in the courthouse). OPINION 66-32 (Unofficial) March 3, 1966 This will acknowledge your letter, concerning the applicability of the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act (Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 360-87; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92-34a), as amended, to the purchase or use of tangible personal property by Economic Opportunity Organization, Inc. I infer, from your letter, that Economic Opportunity Organization, Inc., is a private non-profit agency, created to take advantage of Title I I of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P. L. 88-452; 78 Stat. 508), which makes federal funds available to public or private non-profit agencies, or combinations thereof, for the development, conduct and administration of community action programs for combating poverty. Since the Sales and Use Tax Act does not exempt the purchase or use of tangible personal property by anyone engaged in work of this nature, I am of the opinion Economic Opportunity Organization, Inc., is liable for such taxes. OPINION 66-33 (Unofficial) March 3, 1966 This is in reply to your letter wherein you ask whether the constitutional amendment of local application which is set forth as Ga. Laws 1958, pp. 430-31, increased the bonding capacity for school bonds in Clayton County to 10% or to 17%. It appears that some have considered the 10% provided by the amendment to be in addition to the 7% provided for generally by Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001). In my opinion, the bonding capacity for school bond purposes in 236 Clayton County under the aforesaid local constitutional amendment is 10%. The expressed purpose of the amendment is "to provide for the issuance of bonds for school purposes in Clayton County not to exceed ten per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property in Clayton County; . . ." There is nothing contained in the amendment to indicate that this issuance is to be in addition to the 7% provided for generally and viewing the language of the amendment as a whole, considering the ease by which the General Assembly could have provided for the issuance to be in addition to the general 7% if it so desired, and noting the ballot submitted to the voters also stated that the amendment was: " . . . to provide for the issuance of bonds for school purposes in Clayton County not to exceed ten per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property in Clayton County." (Emphasis added.) I am of the opinion that the limit on the bonding capacity of school bonds in Clayton County is 10% and not 17%. OPINION 66-34 (Unofficial) March 4, 1966 This will acknowledge your letter in which you request my unofficial opinion on the application and interrelation of Ga. Laws 1964,p.489,etseq.andGa. Laws 1964,p.493. As you state in your letter, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 489,490 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-309) provides in part that "the State Board of Corrections shall have no authority, jurisdiction, or responsibility with respect to misdemeanor offenders sentenced . . . to confinement in the county or other jail . . . ." In relation to this same category of prisoners Ga. Laws 1964, p. 493 (Ga. Code Ann. 77-201) provides that such prisoners shall earn four (4) days good time per month which is identical to the statutory good time prescribed for State misdemeanor prisoners and, in addition, "shall earn extra good time in the same amount as may be prescribed from time to time by the State Board of Corrections for prisoners under its jurisdiction." The latter Act is not intended to place any jurisdiction in the 237 Board of Corrections with regard to the computation of county sentences; rather, it is a means of providing some uniformity throughout the counties of this State in the computation of county sentences without freezing the amount into a statute, as it has continuously been the policy of the State in regard to all prisoners to allow flexibility in the amount of extra good time to be granted. However, this flexibility was intended to be uniform throughout the State, and it was obviously the belief of the legislature that the Board of Corrections was the only suitable entity on which the desired uniformity could be based. In other words, the Board of Corrections has established a rule regarding only its own prisoners. The legislature has merely directed that all county custodial officers, in computing the extra good time allowance of prisoners under their jurisdiction, shall adopt the Board of Correction's rule as their own. On the basis of the foregoing explanation, it is my unofficial opinion that a county prisoner would receive four (4) days per month good time allowance, plus whatever extra good time allowance may be presently prescribed by the Board of Corrections for its prisoners. In answer to your second question concerning the responsibility for notifying the various county custodial authorities of the Board of Correction's rule relating to extra good time allowances, I presume that technically speaking, the local official would be responsible for requesting a copy of the rules from the Department of Corrections. However, it is my understanding that the Department of Corrections voluntarily sent copies of their rule to all known custodial officers. As they apparently did not send copies to the judges of the various courts authorized to try misdemeanor offenses, I am, by copy of this letter, requesting that they do so at this time. OPINION 66-35 (Unofficial) March 7, 1966 You ask whether the mayor and council have the power and authority to set certain limitations and restrictions upon business licenses when issued. A political subdivision of the State can exercise only that authority constitutionally granted by the State. See Pullman Co. v. 238 Suttles, 187 Ga. 313 (1938). Generally, "business licenses" are authorized as revenue measures and those persons engaged in the business or occupation taxed must pay the prescribed fee if he carries on the activities taxed. Under these circumstances the city would not prohibit the activities in question or condition their exercise. OPINION 66-36 (Unofficial) March 8, 1966 This answers your letter requesting information concerning the methods by which hearings before the Engineering Board may be conducted "in a more organized fashion" so as to avoid "the ridiculous waste of time in needless re-examination, uncalled-for rebuttal and remarks made at the recent hearing." You state that "there must be some method by which to eliminate the time consumed and disorderly procedure recently experienced." The Administrative Procedure Act, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 338, makes the following provisions in relation to the conduct of hearings which would seem pertinent in reply to your letter. Section 14a(3) states: "Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to be represented by legal counsel and to respond and present evidence on all issues involved." (Emphasis mine.) Section 14a(6) gives the Board the right to regulate the course of the hearing. Section 16(a) of the Act provides: "Irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. The rules of evidence as applied in the trial of civil nonjury cases in the superior courts of Georgia shall be followed." Section 16(c) of the Act provides: "A party may conduct such cross-examination as shall be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." Having been present at the previous hearing, I must state, that while the hearing was lengthy, its conduct was organized, and the procedure followed was thoroughly orderly and in conformity with the requirements of the courts of this State. I must re-emphasize that with the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act the bell was tolled on the practice of conducting hearings in an informal manner except by stipulation of the parties, agreed settlement, the entry of consent orders, or defaults. 239 Turning now to the manner in which witnesses are examined, you will recall that a party has an absolute right to present evidence on all issues involved, and the right to cross-examination is such as is required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Witnesses in the previous hearing were examined in accordance with Ga. Code Ann. 24-3388 which provides: "The regular mode of conducting the examination of a witness shall be as follows: First, the witness shall be examined by the party introducing him, and then cross-examined by the other party; after which the original party may further interrogate the witness to explain the direct or rebut the cross-examination; and if any new matter be thus elicited, the opposite party may further examine the witness as to such new matter. In all cases in which more than one attorney is retained on either side, the examination and cross-examination shall be conducted by one of the counsel only; and at the opening of the case both parties shall state to the court towhich attorney the examination and cross-examination of witnesses is confined." You will observe, from Ga. Code Ann. 24-3388, that thereexamination of witnesses is not a waste of time, but is the right of litigants. Indeed, the right of cross-examination is the hallmark of American justice. While the manner and extent of the crossexamination are, to a certain extent, within the control and subject to the discretion of a trial judge, the substantive right of crossexamination cannot be abridged. News Publishing Company v. Butler, 95 Ga. 558 (1894). You will recall that the same questions were occasionally repeated on cross-examination; this is a proper procedure. Ga. Code Ann. 38-1705. The purpose behind this is to see whether the same answer is forthcoming each time the question is asked, and thus to test the credibility of the witness. You are authorized to prevent the repetition of questions or subject-matter on direct examination (Height Accessory Place v. Lam, 26 Ga. App. 163 (1920)), but bear in mind that the redirect examination is designed to give a party the right to explain the direct testimony, or to rebut the cross-examination. It would seem to me, that time can be conserved in any hearing, if witnesses are directed to answer the questions asked rather than embarking upon lengthy soliloquies, the content of which may not be responsive to the questions. The practice of law is frequently taxing to one's patience. 240 However, where valuable rights are in dispute infinite care must be taken to afford all parties a full and free hearing under the rules of law which are designed to protect those rights. While re-examination and rebuttals may seem time-consuming to the Board, they are provided for in the Code. It has been said that "the sparks generated by advocacy create the light by which the truth is seen." OPINION 66-37 (Unofficial) March 9, 1966 This will acknowledge your letter requesting my opinion as to whether or not the Georgia Farm Bureau Association or its salesmen can be required to pay municipal license fees for doing business in the various municipalities of this State. If the Farm Bureau Association is a nonprofit cooperative association formed pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 65-2, and I have no knowledge of whether or not it is such an association, then apparently it would be exempt from franchise and license taxes pursuant to Ga. Code Ann 65-225 in connection with its activities authorized by law. OPINION 66-38 (Unofficial) March 9, 1966 In your letter you state that the City of Canton is in a position to contract for the resurfacing of certain streets which are in a bad state of repair, and ask if payment for such work can be made from funds which the city anticipates it will receive from the State for street improvement. You also ask if the work is done now before the funds are received from the State, would the payment therefor be legal and meet audit regulations? From a legal standpoint I would frown upon contracting for the resurfacing before receiving the funds for several reasons, namely: l. There is no absolute assurance that your city will receive funds from the State for street paving purposes since the Act approved March 31, 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 458), 241 specifies "to the extent funds are made available by the Budget Authorities pursuant to the Appropriation Act of 1965; . . . " 2. The Act further provides that municipalities must file a certificate showing the number of meetings held by the governing authority, that taxes or fees were levied during the preceding twelve months for the operation of the municipal government and the name of the treasurer authorized to receive the funds; and unless the certificate is timely filed, funds for the applicable period is barred from a city. 3. The General Appropriation Act of 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 44, at pp. 63 and 64), requires the governing authorities to execute an affidavit annually that the funds were expended in accordance with the law and the Constitution. 4. A city council cannot bind its successor. The plan which you outline could attempt to bind a future city council to pay for paving which the present council contracted for out of specific anticipated funds. OPINION 66-39 March 9, 1966 You request my opinion on whether the "sending" State of a parolee being supervised in this State under the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision (Ga. Laws 1950, pp. 405, et. seq.; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 27-27a) may retake physical custody of a parolee without the necessity of proceedings under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 726, et. seq.; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 44-4). The Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision provides in part that when retaking a parolee from a receiving State, "no formalities will be required other than establishing the authority of the officer and the identity of the person to be retaken. A II legal requirements to obtain extradition of fugitives from justice are hereby expressly waived on the part of States party hereto, as to such persons." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Code Ann. 27-2701a(3) There are no reported cases in Georgia dealing with the question posed in your letter, but it has been held uniformly in other jurisdictions having both the Uniform Act for Out-of-State 242 Parolee Supervision and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act" that the two Acts do not conflict and that the provisions of the former Act dispensing with extradition proceedings control in cases of out-of-state parolees. Pierce v. Smith, 31 Wash. 2d 52, 195 P. 2d 112 (1948); cert. den'd, 335 U.S. 834 (1948); United States ex rei MacBlain v. Burke, 200 F. 2d 616 (3rd Cir., 1952); People ex rei Rankin v. Ruthazen, 98 N.Y. Supp. 2d 104 (1950); Ex parte Tennen, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P. 2d 338 (1942), cert. den'd, 314 U.S. 585. Although the Georgia courts have not passed on this question, it is my opinion that parolees under supervision in Georgia pursuant to the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision may be picked up and returned to the sending State upon compliance with the requirements of the Act and without the necessity of extradition proceedings. OPINION 66-40 (Unofficial) March 10, 1966 You request my opinion on whether the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (Ga. Laws 1951, p. 565 et seq., as amended; Ga. Code Ann., Ch. 92A-6), particularly the security requirements contained in Section Five (5) are applicable to accidents in which a motor vehicle leaves a public road and strikes a house. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 568, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A605) requires security and proof of financial responsibility of persons involved in "accidents." The term "accident" is defined for purposes of the Safety Responsibility Law by Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565,567, as amended by Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 543, 547 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-601(10)) as the "[c]ollision of any motor vehicle with another vehicle or with any object or fixture or involvement of a motor vehicle in any manner in which . . . damage to the property of any one person to an extent of $100 or more is sustained." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it is my opinion that the owner or operator of a motor vehicle which collides with a house causing damage in excess of $100 must comply with the security provisions of the Safety Responsibility Law. OPINION 66-41 243 March l0, 1966 You ask for my opinion concerning the prospective appointment of a gentleman to the Veterans Service Board who is an officer and director of a bank in which the Veterans Service Board maintains a demand deposit account. You ask whether or not maintaining this account, after the bank's officer-director becomes a member of the Veterans Service Board, would violate any state statute, rule or regulation. The applicable provisions of the so-called "honesty acts" of 1956 and 1959, Ga. Laws 1956, p. 60, and Ga. Laws 1959, p. 35, do not, in my opinion, prohibit the relationship which you described. It is my opinion that membership on the Veterans Service Board of an officer, director or stockholder of a bank engaged in ordinary banking transactions with the Veterans Service Board and which did not sell goods, wares or merchandise, or other chattels or services to the Department of Veterans Service would not be in violation of the above-quoted laws. Therefore, it is my opinion that it would be legal and lawful for the prospective appointee to be a member of the Veterans Service Board under the conditions outlined in your request and contained herein. OPINION 66-42 (Unofficial) March 10, 1966 You pose certain questions concerning the treatment of a married pupil in a public high school. Unfortunately, the questions you pose are not very susceptible of a yes or no answer. In such matters local boards of education are given wide discretionary powers under Ga. Code Ann. 32-937, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The board of education of any county, city or independent school district is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations concerning the right of married students to attend the common schools of this State." It follows that an individual attacking a policy of a county 244 school board in such situations could prevail only by convincing the courts that the particular regulation was so completely unreasonable, arbitrary and without basis as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Needless to say, I am not in a position to predict what the courts would do respecting the matters you mention (assuming the actions are the result of school board policies and not decisions of a local school principal or his faculty). Should the action respecting married students be originated by local school employees (e.g. the principal of a particular school) an appropriate remedy would be the presentation of the matter to the local school board for its decision. OPINION 66-43 (Unofficial) March 11, 1966 You request my opinion on whether the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, et seq., as amended; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 92A-6) . pply to accidents which occur on private property. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 568, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-605) requires security and proof of financial responsibility of persons involved in "accidents." The term "accident" is defined for purposes of the Safety Responsibility Law by Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 567, as amended by Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 543, 547 (Ga. Code Ann. 92A-601 (10)) as the "[c]ollision of any motor vehicle with another vehicle or with any object or fixture or involvement of a motor vehicle in any mc;nner in which . . . damage to the property of any one person . . . is sustained." (Emphasis added.) The above definition, while it does not specify particular locations for accidents intended to be covered by the law, is broad in scope and expresses the legislature's intent that all accidents involving motor vehicles are subject to the law. This intent can be seen in Section 4 of the Safety Responsibility Law (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 565, 568, as amended; Ga. Code Ann. 92A-604) which contains the reporting requirements of the Act and which makes the provision applicable to "[t]he operator of every motor vehicle 245 which ts in any manner involved in an accident within the State. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The legislative intent to make the Law applicable to a class of persons rather than a class of accidents is expressed also in the amended title of the Safety Responsibility Law (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 543, 545) which states that the purpose of the Law is "to eliminate the reckless and irresponsible driver of motor vehicles from the highways of the State of Georgia. . . ." In summary, the purpose of the Safety Responsibility Law is to prohibit certain persons from using the highways, and a person is rendered no less reckless or financially irresponsible because the accident occurs by chance on private property. The protection of the Law runs to the general motoring public and is intended to offer protection from persons who have shown themselves to be financially irresponsible. Therefore, it is my opinion that the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Law would apply with equal force to accidents occuring on the public highways or on private property. OPINION 66-44 (Unofficial) March 16, 1966 You ask for the wording of our State statute concerning the obligation of parents to contribute to the support of an incapacitated son or daughter who has attained the age of twentyone years. Ordinarily, the duty of a father to provide for the maintenance, protection, and education of his child terminates when the child attains majority (i.e., twenty-one years of age). See Ga. Code Ann. 74-105. The father and mother of any pauper, however, are legally obligated to support said pauper, regardless of age. This requirement is set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 23-2302, which provides: "The father, mother or child of any pauper contemplated by the preceding section, if sufficiently able, shall support such pauper. Any county having provided for such pauper upon the failure of such relatives to do so may sue such relatives of full age and recover for the provisions so furnished." 246 The Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the term "pauper" as used in this statute as meaning one who is completely destitute. Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Cook, 182 Ga. 240 (1936). Aside from the foregoing, I am not familiar with any other statute of this State which would require parents to support a son or daughter who has attained twenty-one years of age. OPINION 66-45 March 21, 1966 You requested my official opinion as to whether or not persons who desire to form a new Georgia insurance company may satisfy the requirements of age, residence, good moral character, lack of criminal record and citizenship simply by using purely nominal or dummy incorporators who meet these tests. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1504 (2) which became effective January 1, 1961, provides: "Five or more individuals of the age of 21 years or more of good moral character and who have not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, may incorporate a stock insurer; 10 or more such individuals may incorporate a mutual insurer. Not less than two thirds of the incorporators shall be citizens of the United States and residents of Georgia." It is significant to note that the general corporate statutes providing for the incorporation of private corporations other than for banking, insurance, railroad, trusts, canal, navigation, express and telegraph companies (Acts 1937-38, Extra. Sess., pp. 214, 215) provide that any three or more persons may obtain a charter for such corporations. There is no requirement that these persons must meet any specific qualifications. Thus, it has been stated that in the absence of any express qualifications relating to incorporators proceeding under this statute that it is entirely proper to use dummy incorporators. See Nadler, Georgia Corporation Law 75 and 241; Kardo v. Adams, 231 F. 950. It has been asserted, however, that the use of such dummies is a serious corporate abuse. Ballentine on Corporations 17. It is to be noted that the insurance laws relative to the 247 incorporation of insurance companies dating back to 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 73) provided for the granting of insurance company charters more or less automatically by the Secretary of State upon the filing of a petition by not less than five persons. There were no provisions requiring such persons acting as incorporators to meet any qualifications. With the adoption of the Georgia Insurance Code of 1960, however, provisions were made by Ga. Code Ann. 56-1504 (2) requiring incorporators to meet the qualifications as referred to herein. In addition, provisions were made requiring the approval of insurance company charters by the Insurance Commissioner prior to being granted by the Secretary of State (Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners as early as 1959 recognized that a prime problem associated with the formation of stock promotion life companies has been the absence of competent insurance oriented management. This problem received official recognition by a subcommittee of the Laws and Legislation Committee of the NAIC in 1959 when it recommended a list of minimum requirements which must be met by any new company. Three of these requirements pertain to the personal characteristics of those associated with the new company. See 49 Marquette Law Review, p. 286. One of these requirements was as follows: "The organizers, promoters, backers and incorporators of a new insurance company or a holding company organized with one or more of its purposes being for the sale of stock to finance the organization or establishment of an insurance company shall make a full disclosure of who are such organizers, promoters, backers and incorporators, that a short biographical sketch of these persons should be given to the regulatory authority in the particular state where the said company or companies were being organized. Included in this biographical sketch should be detailed the business experience of these persons and any experience that they may have had in the insurance business." 2 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 511-12 (1959). The rationale underlying this approach is that by exerting some control over the quality of personnel who organize and manage new companies in the formative years, the insurance departments may be able to foreclose many promotional schemes in their incipiency. It is stated that an old regulatory axiom holds that initial 248 prohibition is easier and more effective than attempts at continued control and limitation thereafter. It is interesting to note that present insurance statutes providing for incorporation of insurance companies appear to be patterned after the laws relating to the incorporation of banks as set forth in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 13-9. The Banking Law specifically provides that upon the filing of an application the Superintendent of Banks shall investigate the character, reputation in the community and financial standing of the organizers or incorporators and their motives in seeking to organize the proposed bank or trust company. It has been held that a synopsis of the banking statute demonstrates clearly a legislative intent that all reasonable precautions be taken to avoid an unsuccessful banking venture, which experience has taught is extremely hurtful and demoralizing to any community and that the Superintendent of Banks was vested with broad powers and heavy responsibilities in exercising his judgment and discretion for a bank charter. Persons v. Mashburn, 211 Ga. 477 (1955). It is a reasonable assumption that the legislature had similar intentions in mind in enacting the present laws relating to the incorporation of insurance companies. A cardinal rule to be observed in the interpretation of a statute is to look diligently for the intention of the General Assembly, keeping in view at all times, the old law, the evil, and the remedy. Ga. Code Ann. 102-102 (9). The adoption by the legislature of the aforementioned provisions as a part of the Insurance Code of 1960, when compared to the old law, shows a clear legislative intent of providing for a more thorough screening of applications for new insurance companies. It displays an intent on the part of the legislature to implement, to some degree at least, the recommendations of the Laws and Legislation Committee of the NAIC as referred to herein. A review of the draft of one of the law school professors who assisted the Insurance Laws Revision Committee in drafting the new insurance code reveals that Ga. Code Ann. 56-1504 was originally proposed so as to require only that incorporators be 21 years of age or more. The handwritten notes on draft of this proposed section indicate that the additional requirements as are now contained in the law were added. Thus, the legislature has provided for certain requirements that incorporators must meet in 249 order to be entitled to an insurance charter. It has provided in express terms that such incorporators must possess certain characteristics. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1505 requires the Insurance Commissioner to disapprove a proposed charter if it does not comply with the law. If the incorporators do not meet the requirements specified in Ga. Code Ann. 56-1504 (2), the Commissioner must disapprove the proposed charter application. General laws authorizing the formation of corporations are general offers to any persons who bring themselves within their provisions and if conditions precedent are prescribed in the statutes, they are terms of the offer and must be complied with substantially before legal corporate existence can be acquired. 18 C.J.S. Corporations 45. It is generally held that qualifications prescribed for incorporators are mandatory and must be complied with to form a valid corporation. 18 C.J.S. Corporations 35. A "corporator" has been defined as one who is a member of a corporation, one of the stockholders or constituents of the body corporate. 18 C.J.S. Corporations 35. This definition, however, has been criticized. Cromer v. Burnham, 107 Conn. 216, 140 A. 477. It has been stated that the terms "corporators" and "incorporators" are used interchangeably and should not be used as synonymous for stockholders, shareholders or members. 1 Fletcher, Encyclopedia of Corporate Law 81. Without deciding to what degree an incorporator must be interested in a proposed insurance company under the Georgia Insurance Laws, it is my opinion that something more is required than merely signing the petition for incorporation. Otherwise, the action of the legislature in setting up qualifications for incorporators would have no real meaning. In construing a statute, it should be given a reasonable construction, and one that will make it effective, rather than one which would render it nugatory. Kent v. State, 18 Ga. App. 30, 32 (1916). Every part of a statute must be reviewed together so as to harmonize all parts if practicable, and give sensible and intelligent effect to each, for it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended any part of a statute to be without meaning. State Revenue Commissioner v. Alexander, 54 Ga. App. 295 (1936). To constitute even a de facto corporation, there must be a bona fide and good faith attempt to incorporate under the law. This includes at least a bona fide attempt to comply 250 with the conditions precedent prescribed by the statute. 14 C.J.S. Corporations 10 I & 104. This is true because the corporation is a creature of the law and it cannot be brought into existence except as a result of express legislation. The conference of power upon persons to organize a corporation is legislative in character and must be done by direct legislation, or be founded upon legislative or constitutional provisions. Free Gift Society v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 857, 137 S. E. 382 (1926). In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that a bona fide and good faith attempt or effort to incorporate an insurance company under the present provisions of the Insurance Code cannot be accomplished by the use of "dummy" incorporators, that is, incorporators who are used merely to sign the petition for incorporation and who have no genuine interest in the formation and organization of the company. Your question is, therefore, answered in the negative. OPINION 66-46 (Unofficial) March 22, 1966 This will acknowledge receipt of your letter relating to certain election questions. Your questions are: (1) whether or not it is illegal for a person to live in one election district and continue his registration in another; (2) whether or not a citizen can request the ordinary to purge the registration list; and (3) whether or not under Ga. Code Ann. 34-629(c) an elector may register in the precinct containing the county courthouse when his residence lies in another precinct. In answer to your first question, it is my unofficial opinion that Ga. Code Ann. 34-1310(c) provides that no person shall vote at any polling place outside the election district in which he resides. In answer to your second question, it is the duty of the duty of the county registrars to purge the registration list and not that of the ordinary. Therefore, I would suggest that an interested citizen request the registrars to purge the list rather than the ordinary. In answer to your third question, Ga. Code Ann. 34-629 (c) does provide that an elector who resides in an election district which does not contain the county courthouse may nevertheless be 251 allowed to vote at the polling place of the district containing the county courthouse. As electors do not register in a precinct but in a county, under this provision it is clear that an elector may register with the county and vote either within the district in which he resides or in which the courthouse lies. In answer to all of these questions concerning residence, however, it should be remembered that the general rule of law is that residence is primarily a matter of intention. OPINION 66-47 (Unofficial) March 22, 1966 You ask whether it is legal for a municipal school system to require you to pay tuition as a condition of your children's continued attendance in such school system. You indicate that your children are domiciled outside the city limits but say that you feel that tuition should not be charged due to the fact that you own and are paying taxes on a large home within the city limits. Although I can sympathize with your position, the difficulty with your contention from a legal viewpoint is that the right of a school system to charge tuition hinges not upon the location of taxable property of his parents but upon the domicile of the child. As stated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Edalgo v. Southern Railway Company, 129 Ga. 258, 266 (1907): "The constitution declares that the public schools shall be free to all the children of this State. When a system is provided where any child may be admitted free to a school in the territory where such child is domiciled, the mandate of the constitution is satisfied. If a child desires to enter a school in any other territory, it is permissible to charge such child tuition for the privilege. The right of the school authorities to charge tuition for children who are non-residents of the territory . . . has never been and can not be seriously doubted." (Emphasis added.) Ordinarily, of course, the domicile of a child is deemed to be that of his father. Ga. Code Ann. 79-404. In light of the foregoing, I must conclude that under the facts you have presented it is not illegal for the municipal school system to 252 charge tuition as a condition of your children's attendance in the schools of such system. Accord, Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, p. 142. OPINION 66-48 March 22, 1966 You request my opinion on the following questions: l. Whether the State Crime Laboratory is authorized to make blood alcohol tests? 2. If the laboratory is authorized to make such tests, may certified reports be accepted as evidence and accorded the legal presumptions provided by Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp.556,575? 3. Who is authorized in each county to withdraw the specimen of blood from the accused? The only case dealing directly with the question of blood alcohol tests made by the State Crime Laboratory is Pittman v. State, 110 Ga. App. 625, 139 S.E. 2d 507 (1964) in which the court held that a report of the results of a test performed by the State Crime Laboratory was erroneously admitted in evidence. The basis of this holding was that the chain of handling was not sufficiently established and expert testimony was not offered to establish the probative value of the report. In answer to your first question, it is my opinion based on the Pittman decision that the State Crime Laboratory is authorized to make the tests in question as is any qualified person trained in the particular procedure. Macon Busses, Inc. v. Dashiell, 73 Ga. App. 108, 116, 35 S.E. 2d 666 (1945). However, as will be shown in my answer to your second question, the Crime Laboratory does not occupy a preferred position under the law and its finding must be substantiated by expert testimony of the individual performing the test and the probative value of the results determined by the jury. Pittman v. State, supra at 627, 631. Your second question is whether the State Crime Laboratory may perform tests pursuant to Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 565, 575 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625) and have their reports accepted as State Records and accorded the statutory presumptions established in subsection (d) of the Act. 253 It was held in Pittman v. State, supra, that the procedure established by the above law is in derogation of the general law and must be strictly construed. The court found "no statute . . . that authorizes an official of the State Crime Laboratory to make alcohol blood tests." (Pittman, supra, at 628) thereby rendering the above statute inapplicable to tests made by the Crime Laboratory. The court rejected also the contention that the report was admissible as a record made by a public official, holding that such a document is not admissible "unless there is authority by statute or administrative order to record the facts." Pittman, supra, at 628. The answer to your third question relating to the proper persons to perform the tests is provided by Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 575 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625 (4)) which provides in part that "[t]he Director of Public Safety shall designate one or more physicians or certified hospital technicians for each county to perform such test ...." The Court of Appeals in Pittman confirmed that local physicians or technicians were the only persons authorized to perform tests under the above-stated statute. In summary, it is my opinion that while the State Crime Laboratory may perform blood alcohol tests, it does not do so under authority of the 1953 statute and therefore must be prepared to establish the reliability of their conclusions by expert testimony. The only persons authorized to perform such tests under the favored conditions set forth in the 1953 statute are local physicians or certified technicians designated by the Director of the Department of Public Safety. In either event, the chain of handling must be established to render the evidence admissible. OPINION 66-49 March 22, 1966 Reference is made to your recent letter in which you request my official opinion as to the boundaries of tidewater lands owned by the State. The rights of owners of land adjacent to tidewaters whether navigable or not have been generally delineated by statute and the applicable law reads as follows: " ... the title to the beds ofall tide-waters in this State, where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, and which are not navigable 254 under section 2 of this Act, shall vest in the present owner of the adjacent land for all purposes, including among others, the exclusive right to oysters, clams and other shell fish therein or thereon. If the water is the dividing line, each owner's boundary shall extend to the main thread or channel of the water. * * * " . . . That for all purposes, including among others the exclusive right to the oysters and clams (but not to include other fish) therein or thereon being, the boundaries and rights of owners of land adjacent to or covered in whole or in part by navigable tide-waters, as defined in section 2 of this Act, shall extend to low water mark in the bed of the water; . . . ." These statutory rules were subsequently ratified and confirmed by being incorporated into the State Constitution. (Art. II, Sec. VI, Par. I, Const. of Ga. of 1945). If the State is classed with all of the other owners of tide-water land, the boundaries of its property clearly extends to the low~water mark or stating the rule in somewhat different fashion encompass generally the entire tidewater bed. On the other hand, when the State's unique position as local political sovereign is taken into consideration, its rights of ownership extend far beyond this point for an additional three miles out to sea. See Act 1788, Cobb, 150, as amended. (Ga. Code Ann. 15-101.) It may therefore be definitely concluded in answering your question as specifically worded that the boundaries of tide-water lands owned by the State do extend to the low-water mark in contrast to either the point of high water or mean water. OPINION 66-50 (Unofficial) March 23, 1966 Your inquiry concerned the issuance of motor vehicle license plates where all taxes due the county and State have not been paid. Georgia Laws 1955, pp. 639, 640, provides, in part, as follows: "Section 2. The State Revenue Commissioner or other officer who now or who may hereafter be charged with the 255 responsibility of selling and delivering license tags for motor vehicles, shall require the applicant when applying for any such license tag to present affidavit or affidavits, as a part of said application, showing payment of all ad valorem taxes due the State and any city, county or school district thereof for the previous year, on such vehicles for which an application for license tag is made. Separate affidavits shall be given for each vehicle upon which taxes are paid." (Ga. Code Ann. 68235.) "Section 3. In the event the applicant was not the owner of the vehicle for which an application is made for a license tag but was the owner of another vehicle on January 1 of the previous year, then such applicant shall present affidavit showing payment of all ad valorem taxes due the State and any city, county or school district thereof, on the motor vehicle owned by him, if any, on January 1 of the previous year. If such applicant was not the owner of the vehicle on January 1 of the year preceding the year for which license is sought, he shall by affidavit show from whom and when such vehicle was obtained or purchased." (Ga. Code Ann. 68-236.) "Section 4. The State Revenue Commissioner shall prescribe the form of the affidavits hereinbefore or hereinafter required, and such affidavits shall be a part of the application for license tag. The State Revenue Commissioner shall furnish in sufficient quantity the forms required by this Act to every officer now or hereafter charged with the responsibility of selling and delivering license tags for motor vehicles in this State." (Ga. Code Ann. 68-237.) "Section 8. Any person, firm, or corporation who knowingly makes any false affidavit or affirmation as to any matter or things required by this Act, or who forges or causes to be forged, any such affidavit as required herein, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to fine not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1 ,000.00), or imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five years, or both." (Ga. Code Ann. 68-9928.) Regulation Number 560-10-2.601, promulgated by the State Revenue Commissioner provides as follows: 256 "A Georgia resident, to obtain license plates for the current year, must swear that the ad valorem property taxes on that vehicle or on such vehicles as were owned by him in Georgia on January 1 of the prior year, have been paid to the County and the city of his Georgia residence." The above provisions require that the owner of an automobile must make an affidavit as to the payment of ad valorem taxes on that automobile or such other automobile as was owned by him on January 1 when applying for a license tag. This affidavit is contained on the license plate application form. However, there is no requirement that the applicant swear as to the payment of other property taxes. In conclusion, it is my opinion that the Tag Agent may not issue a tag until the applicant has submitted an affidavit that the property taxes on that vehicle, or on such vehicle owned by him on January 1 of the previous year, have been paid. OPINION 66-51 March 23, 1966 You requested my official opinion upon the following question: "A Georgia stock insurance company chartered after 1950, but before the adoption of the present Insurance Code, has a charter which makes no reference to the issuance of participating policies. Is an amendment to its charter necessary before it may issue such policies?" You have requested that I advise also whether or not the practices of the company before January 1, 1961, make any difference in my conclusion. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1521, which became effective January 1, 1961, states in its pertinent part: "If so provided in its charter, a domestic stock or domestic mutual insurer may issue any or all of its policies with or without participation in profits, savings, or unabsorbed portion of premiums ..." As you point out, Georgia has had a statutory provision relating to participating policies by stock insurance companies for many years, although, prior to the adoption of the Insurance Code of 257 1960, there was no express condition that the issuance of such policies depended upon whether or not the charter made provisions therefor (Acts 1893, p. (7; as amended 1949, p. 959; as amended l950,pp.l21, 122). Ga. Code Ann. 56-110 provides: "Every form of insurance document and every rate or other filing lawfully in use immediately prior to the effective date of this Act may continue to be so used or be effective until the Commissioner otherwise prescribes in accordance with this Title; except that before the expiration of one year from and after such effective date neither this Title nor the Commissioner shall prohibit the use of any such document, rate or filing because of any power, prohibition or requirement contained in this Title which did not exist under laws in force immediately prior to such effective date." Ga. Code Ann. 56-1501 (3) provides: "Existing domestic stock and mutual insurers are governed by the applicable provisions of this Chapter.'' The application of newly-adopted insurance laws to companies previously chartered and doing business within the State cannot be rejected as an unwarranted destruction of such companies' franchise rights since the insurance business affects the public interest. 19 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 10343; 44 C.J.S. Insurance 95 (b); State v. Dilbeck, Tex. Civ. App. 1927, 297 S. W. 1049, cert. den. 48 S. Ct. 339, 276 U. S. 633, 72 L. Ed. 742 (1928); Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Needles, 113 U.S. 574, 5 S. Ct. 681, 28 L. Ed. 1084 (1885); Leonard v. American Life & Annuity Co., 139 Ga. 274, 276 (1913). It follows, therefore, that the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 561521 requiring insurers issuing participating policies to have express power in their charters authorizing them to do so became effective on January 1, 1962, as to all companies lawfully issuing such policies prior to January l, 1961. The provisions, of course, became effective on January 1, 1961, as to all companies not lawfully issuing such policies prior to such date. Your question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. The practices of the company before January 1, 1961, make no difference in my conclusion since the statute applied to all companies as of January 1, 1962. 258 OPINION 66-52 (Unofficial) March 23, 1966 You request my opmwn on whether the Bureau of Safety Responsibility should consider, when determining whether to revoke the owner's license, an allegation that the driver of an automobile involved in an accident was acting outside the scope of the authority given him by the owner. You state that the owner was not in the automobile at the time of the accident. Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 565, 568, as amended (Ga. Code Ann. 92A605(a)) provides in part that "the Director shall suspend the license . . . of the operator and owner of any motor vehicle in any manner involved in the accident . . . ." It is my interpretation of this language that the motor vehicle is the determinative factor rather than the driver and if it is established that an automobile was involved in an accident, the licenses of both "the driver and the owner" shall be suspended unless security is furnished. Any question of legal responsibility for the accident must be determined by the courts. I think it is evident that the Bureau would be embarrassed if, sitting as an administrative agency, it decided that the owner was not responsible for the actions of his agent and in a subsequent legal action for the recovery of damages, it was judicially determined that the owner was legally responsible for the acts of the driver. In short, the Bureau of Safety Responsibility is an Administrative Agency and is not authorized to decide legal questions of ultimate liability for an automobile accident. OPINION 66-53 March 23, 1966 You request my opmwn on whether a court may alter a misdemeanor sentence after the passage of approximately two months so as to change it from a county sentence to a state sentence to be served under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections. In your letter, you state that the particular individual received on December 17, 1965, two consecutive sentences of one hundred ($100) dollars fine or twelve (12) months in the county jail or other county facility. On February 8, 1966, the sentencing court 259 rescinded the original sentence, omitted the fine, directed that the sentences be served concurrently, and directed that the sentences be served under "House Bill761." Unfortunately, the citation "House Bill 761" is not a legal citation, and as I have no other information, I have no way of reviewing the designated authority for the court's action. However, I will assume that the prisoner has been transferred to State custody and examine the legality of that course of action. It is clear from the facts set forth in your letter that the prisoner was originally a county prisoner under Section 1, subparagraph (a) of Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 485, 486 (Ga. Code Ann. 27-2506(a) ). The above-cited law also provides in part that "the sentencing courts shall retain jurisdiction to amend, modify, alter, suspend or probate sentences imposed under (a) at any time but in no instance shall any sentence under (a) be modified in a manner to place a county prisoner under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections." (Emphasis added.) Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 485, 486. Therefore, it is my opinion that the sentencing court was without authority to revise the original county sentence and attempt to convert it into a State sentence to be served under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Corrections. OPINION 66-54 (Unofficial) March 24, 1966 In your letter you state that a corporation is engaged in the production of eggs and the corporation owns a truck which is used in hauling the eggs to market, hauling empty egg cartons back to the farm and in hauling feed for the laying hens. You ask whether, under the Motor Vehicle License Law, this truck should be classified as a farm truck or as a truck hauling agricultural products. Ga. Code Ann. 92-2901 (E) defines a farm truck as follows: "A truck or trailer as previously defined, for which the owner submits a sworn statement as a part of the registration application to the effect that the vehicle is used primarily on and is domiciled upon a farm, primarily for the carriage of unprocessed products of the farm." 260 If the owner submits a sworn statement to the effect that his truck is used primarily on and is domiciled upon the farm and if the truck is primarily used to carry unprocessed products of the farm, then it is a farm truck. Are eggs "unprocessed products of the farm"? It is undisputable that an egg has not been processed, and an opinion of the Attorney General dated February 20, 1964 held that chickens were "farm products" within the meaning of that term found in Ga. Code Ann. 92-201. To hold that only cultivable crops are "farm products" would make it impossible for that great number of farmers engaged in the raising of livestock and in dairying to buy farm truck tags under the Motor Vehicle License Law. It is, therefore, my opinion that a truck used primarily in hauling eggs may be classified as a farm truck if it is used primarily on and is domiciled upon a farm. If this truck cannot be classified as a farm truck, should it be classified as a private truck hauling agricultural products as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 92-2902 (3)? This question has been answered in the negative by the Attorney General in an opinion dated March 28, 1962. "The question involved in determining the proper license fee is whether or not eggs are, within the meaning of this Code Section, agricultural products. This Code Section does provide that straight trucks hauling agricultural products shall not be classified higher than (e). You stated in your letter that the chicken industry is an important part of our farm program in Georgia and that the delivery of eggs by the farmer to his customers is delivery of farm products. The Code Section with which we are concerned however does not use the term 'farm products' but uses the term 'agricultural products.' The Supreme Court, in the case of Davis & Company v. Mayor and Council of Macon, 64 Ga. 128, 134 (1879), held that in ordinary usage the phrase 'agricultural products' is confined to a yielding of the soil as corn, wheat, rye, oats, hay, etc., in its primary form." OPINION 66-55 March 25, 1966 You have requested my official opinion as to whether or not a Georgia corporation may dissolve itself and cease to exist as a legal 261 entity by a unanimous vote of the stockholders. In my official opinion, a corporation may not dissolve itself voluntarily without the judicial proceedings required by Iaw. A corporation, being an artificial legal entity created by the State, cannot be dissolved except by an act of the State. "The existence of a corporation cannot be terminated except by some act of the sovereign power by which it was created." 19 Am. Jur. 2d "Corporations," 587. The corporation laws of Georgia have always provided the methods by which corporations ceased their existence. In Gibson v. Thornton, 107 Ga. 545, 563 (1899), the Supreme Court stated that: "Section 1882 of the Civil Code provides how a corporation is dissolved in this State, viz., by expiration of its charter; by forfeiture of its charter; by a surrender of its franchises; by the death of all its members without provisions for a succession." After 1910, and before the Corporation Act of 1937-38, corporations chartered by superior courts could voluntarily dissolve themselves by the method set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 221302, which provides for a judicial hearing and a court order. This statute was largely superseded by the Corporation Act of 1938 (Ga. L., 1937-38, Extra. Sess., p. 214). Section 9(g) of the Corporation Act of 1938 grants to a corporation the power "To wind up and dissolve itself or be wound up and dissolved in the manner herein provided." A corporation may cease to exist by operation of law, such as by the expiration of thirty-five years, or by voluntary dissolution pursuant to the Act. Section 35 of the 1938 Act, as amended by Georgia Laws, 1945, p. 267 and Georgia Laws, 1949, pp. 950, 953, provides that: "If it should be deemed desirable in the judgment of the board of directors or for the benefit of any corporation incorporated or reincorporated under this Chapter, that it shall be dissolved, the board of directors may adopt a resolution to that effect and call a meeting of the stockholders having voting powers on a proposal to dissolve and take action on the resolution so adopted. Such meeting of the stockholders shall be held upon notice given in the manner hereinbefore provided and if at such meeting or any adjournment thereof the holders of record of stock entitled to 262 exercise two-thirds of all the voting power determine that the dissolution shall take place, a petition with a certified copy of said resolution attached thereto shall be filed in the manner hereinbefore provided for the amendment of the charter and an order obtained thereon from the superior court or the judge thereof dissolving said corporation in the same manner hereinbefore provided for the amendment of a charter to a corporation, and the same shall be advertised in like manner. Two certified copies shall be filed with the Secretary of State with a filing fee of $5. "The provisions of this section shall apply also to any corporation which may have been incorporated under any Act of the General Assembly of Georgia authorizing superior courts of this State to grant charters to corporations. All dissolutions of charters of corporations incorporated prior to the enactment of this Chapter under the terms of its provisions or under the laws in force prior to its adoption, shall in all cases be held to be valid and effective where compliance with the dissolution statute in question was had." And, Section 41 of the Corporation Act states "Before the payment of any part of the capital and before beginning the business for which the corporation was created, the incorporators named in the charter may dissolve the corporation by filing a petition for that purpose, in the manner provided in this Chapter for the amendment of such charter, by the oath or affirmation of a majority of the incorporators named in the charter that no part of the capital has been paid and such business has not been begun. Thereupon, the said corporation shall be dissolved." In my opinion, these statutes preclude any dissolution by a vote of the stockholders without a judicial dissolution. "Some statutes provide for the voluntary dissolution of corporations without judicial proceedings by the filing of a certificate of dissolution or other means, while others provide for voluntary dissolution by judicial proceedings or under judicial supervision." 19 Am. Jur. 2d "Corporations," 1597. The Georgia statute obviously falls in the second category. It may well be that in this era of complex and rapidly changing 263 corporate activity, it would be desirable to have a procedure allowing the Secretary of State to remove from his records inactive corporations which have not seen fit to dissolve themselves in the manner required by law. Until the General Assembly enacts such a statute, however, voluntary dissolution of corporations may only be accomplished by judicial action. OPINION 66-56 (Unofficial) March 28, 1966 This will acknowledge receipt of your letter relating to nomination petitions. Your questions are: (l) Whether or not State Republican Headquarters may purge names on a page of a nomination petition so that said page shall contain only names of persons living within one county? (2) Whether or not the pages of a nomination petition must be consecutively numbered? The first sentence of Subsection (d) of Ga. Code Ann. 34-1010 provides that: "A nomination petition shall be on one or more sheets of uniform size and different sheets must be used by signers resident in different counties." If a given sheet contained the names of eight Bibb County electors and two Jones County electors, I think that it would be permissible for the Party to delete the names of the Jones County electors. Although Ga. Code Ann. 34-1011 (a) provides that a petition must not contain "material alterations" without the consent of the signers, I do not think that a deletion of a name would violate this Section, as it was obviously intended to prevent changes in names or addresses to keep improper signatures on a petition. If the Party deletes improper names, it will merely aid the Secretary of State or ordinary who would have the responsibility of deleting such signatures for tabulating purposes. Of course, the Party could not then itself place the names of such deleted electors on another sheet of the petition. 264 In answer to your second question, it is my unofficial opinion, based upon Ga. Code Ann. 34-10 lO(d), that each sheet of a nomination petition should be numbered consecutively, beginning with number one, at the foot of each page. Regardless of any control numbers which are used in the obtaining of signatures, the pages should be renumbered when submitted to the Secretary of State or ordinary. OPINION 66-56.1 (Unofficial) March 30, 1966 In your letter concerning the applicability of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permits issued to utility owners, you limit your inquiry to utilities other than telegraph and telephone companies. For the sake of clarity, this reply will deal with all utility companies serving the general public. It has been determined that civil rights assurances are not required where, under State laws, the utility has a right rather than a privilege to locate on, over or under the highway right of way. (See Circular Memorandum of February 7, 1966, from J. M. O'Connor, Director of Audits and Investigations). It is, therefore, necessary that a determination be made as to whether the various utilities doing business in this State and having their facilities located within, upon, over, under or across highway rights of way are so located by permission or by statutory right. As pointed out in my letter of March 11, 1966, telephone and telegraph companies have a legal right to construct, maintain and operate their lines upon, under, along and over public highways of this State, provided such lines did not interfere with the ordinary use of the highway. In 1947 the General Assembly, in dealing with utility use of highway rights of way (pipeline for transporting clay) declared: "As a matter of legislative determination it is hereby declared that public highways are maintained for the purpose of enabling persons and property to be transported upon, under and along the same, and said highways are vital necessities to our economic structure. The congestion of traffic on the surface of said highways, the deterioration from constant use and heavy loads, and the frequency of accidents causing damage to persons and property, are all 265 questions of grave public concern and it is necessary in the interest of public safety and economy that means be provided whereby the use of said highways may be enlarged and at the same time the safety of the public increased and the cost of maintenance decreased." (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1634). In line with this thinking, the Legislature in 1953 enacted the State Bridge Building Authority Act, later amended and called the Georgia State Highway Authority Act, and provided that the Authority shall have the following powers: "Section 95-2304(j):-To make reasonable regulations for the installation, construction, maintenance, repairs, renewal, removal, and relocation of pipes, mains, conduits, cables wires, poles, towers, tracks, and other equipment and appliances of any public utility in, on, along, over or under any project." In 1955 the Legislature used the identical language of Ga. Code Ann. 95-2304(j) when it enacted the Georgia Rural Roads Authority Act. (See Ga. Code Ann. 95-2605(j).) Ga. Code Ann. 34A-l04(11) (the Electric Membership Corporation Act) enacted in 1937 provides that each corporation shall have the power: "(11) In connection with the acquisition, construction, improvement, operation or maintenance of its lines, to use any highway, or any right of way, easement or other similar property right, owned or held by the State or any political subdivision thereof subject to reasonable rules and regulations as to safety as may be promulgated by the State Highway Commission or subject to such reasonable terms and conditions as the governing body of such political subdivision shall determine." Ga. Code Ann. 36-1201 authorizes corporations operating pipelines for transportation of petroleum products to traverse with pipelines any property owned by the State or any subdivision thereof, including property owned by municipalities, counties and other political subdivisions. Ga. Code Ann. lJ4-30l (5) authorizes railroad companies to construct its road across, along or upon, or to use any stream of water, watercourse, street, highway or canal which the route of its 266 road shall intersect or touch; provided, that no railroad shall be constructed along and upon any street or highway without the written consent of the municipal or county authorities, and whenever the tracks of any such railroad shall touch, intersect or cross any road, highway or street it may be carried over or under or across at grade level or otherwise, as may be found most expedient for the public good. Recognizing the public concern, interest and welfare in the most advantageous use of highway rights of way, the State Highway Department in 1951 promulgated Rules and Regulations for the Control and Protection of State Highway Rights of Way wherein was spelled out the methods and safety conditions under which utility companies could utilize the highway rights of way under a permit issued by the Highway Department. In Danielsville and Comer Telephone Co. v. Sanders, eta/., 209 Ga. 144, 146 (1952), the Supreme Court of Georgia held that: "the holder of a permit from the State Highway Board of Georgia, allowing it to place its telephone poles and equipment on the strip of land here involved (highway right of way) was entitled, without interference, to enter thereon through its agents and employees, for such purposes." It is pointed out that the language used by the General Assembly of Georgia in 1947, in declaring the public interest in use of highway rights of way (clay pipeline statute), as well as the language in regulations issued by the Highway Department in 1951 makes no distinction in the type of utilities company referred to. It is also pointed out that the Legislature has enacted statutes dealing with all utilities operating in this State with the exception of companies distributing natural gas and electricity at the consumer level, the electric companies referred to being other than electric membership corporations. It is therefore concluded that other utility companies, such as natural gas and electric power distribution facilities, are authorized to install their facilities within the bounds of existing highway rights of way subject to such rules and regulations governing public safety, welfare and other uses of the highway as may be prescribed by the authority having jurisdiction thereof and subject also to the obligation to relocate such facilities at their own expense when such installations conflict with highway 267 construction and improvement, except in those instances where utility facilities are installed on rights of way of streets and roads intersecting multi-lane divided highways constructed on new locations. OPINION 66-57 (Unofficial) April 6, 1966 The Income Tax Law of the State of Georgia does provide for both penalties and interest where there has been a failure to file a return. As to service personnel it also provides as follows: " . . .All other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the time for filing income tax returns and for the payment of said tax by members of the Armed Services of the United States returning from service outside the continental United States is hereby extended, without prior application therefor, to any time within a period of six months next following the return of said serviceman to the continental United States. During such period of extension, no interest shall accrue, nor shall any penalties be imposed therefor. . . ." Ga. Code Ann. 923210. If you have recently returned from duty outside the continental limits, it may be that this Section will apply to your 1964 return. If so, you should simply file the return and attach to it a letter of explanation, referring to this Section of the law. If this is not the case with your 1964 return, you should nevertheless file as quickly as possible. Georgia law provides that the State Revenue Commissioner may, in his discretion, waive penalties and interest where the failure to file the return was due to providential cause. In situations such as yours where Georgia residents are actively serving in the Armed Services, the Commissioner will generally waive penalties where the failure to file was due to pressing military duties. However, it is not the general policy of the Commissioner to waive interest in such situations. If you do not come within the exception cited above, I would recommend that you file the return and include with it payment plus 6 percent interest and send along a cover letter asking that 268 penalties be waived due to your military status. If you take this approach, the State Revenue Department will most likely accept the return as filed. If they do not, feel free to contact me directly. OPINION 66-58 (Unofficial) April 7, 1966 You ask if your town can use the State grants to municipalities to buy an old building and the lot on which it is situated in order to widen a street and an intersection. You also ask if you can go ahead and buy the property now and start on the work and pay for same with funds received at some future time. You indicate that you doubt the legality of using the State grant in this manner. While the purchase of property for right-of-way purposes appears to be within the purview of the law, it is certainly not advisable for you to contract any obligations for the purchase of the property to which you have referred in anticipation of receiving the funds for several reasons, namely: 1. There is no absolute assurance that your town will receive funds from the State for street construction and maintenance since the Act approved March 31, 1965, provides: "to the extent funds are made available by the Budget Authorities pursuant to the Appropriation Act of 1965;" 2. The Act further provides that municipalities must file a certificate showing the number of meetings held by the governing authorities, that taxes or fees were levied during the preceding twelve months for the operation of the municipal government and the name of the treasurer authorized to receive the funds; and unless the certificate is timely filed, funds for the applicable period is barred. 3. The General Appropriation Act of 1965 (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 44, at pages 63 and 64) requires the governing authorities to execute an affidavit annually that the funds were expended in accordance with the law and Constitution of Georgia. 4. Not knowing the amount of funds to which your town is entitled, if funds are made available by the Budget 269 Authorities, and not knowing the purchase price of the building and lot you contemplate buying, the plan outlined in your letter might be an attempt by your present town council to bind future councils by the proposed contract to pay for the property out of future anticipated State grants. OPINION 66-59 Aprilll, 1966 You refer to an amendment by Congress to the Social Security Act in 1965 which permits state vocational rehabilitation agencies to use trust funds from the Social Security Administration to pay vocational rehabilitation and related administrative expenses to Social Security disability beneficiaries. You state that this amendment requires that such rehabilitation services be provided without regard to economic need or citizenship. You further indicate your awareness of certain language in Georgia's Rehabilitation Act relating to economic need and to citizenship or residence, and you ask whether it would be legal under State law for you to obtain the federal funds above referred to and use the same to provide vocational rehabilitation services without regard to economic need or citizenship. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION The use of federal funds, pursuant to an agreement with the Federal Government, to provide vocational rehabilitation services without regard to economic need or citizenship would not be violative of any existing State law. DISCUSSION The only provision of the Georgia Vocational Rehabilitation Act which might conceivably be construed as relating to vocational rehabilitation services to "citizens" (as distinguished from a residence requirement) would appear to be Ga. Code Ann. 322303, which in pertinent part states: "The State Board, through the Division, shall provide the services authorized by this chapter to the physically or mentally impaired, including the blind citizens, determined to be eligible therefor . . ."(Emphasis added.) In my opinion, the phrase "including blind citizens" is one of description rather than limitation, with the provision as a whole 270 indicating the necessity of looking to other portions of the Act to determine what services are authorized and more importantly for the question you pose, who is eligible for such services. The key provision here is Ga. Code Ann. 32-2309 which provides: "Vocational rehabilitation services shall be provided to any impaired individual; (1) who is a bona fide resident of the State at the time of filing his application therefor and whose vocational rehabilitation the Director determines after full investigation can be satisfactorily achieved; or, (2) who is eligible therefor under the terms of an agreement with another State or with the Federal Government: Provided, that, except as otherwise provided by law or as specified in any agreement with the Federal Government with respect to classes of individuals certified to the State Board thereunder, the following rehabilitation services shall be provided at public cost only to impaired individuals found to require assistance with respect thereto: (a) Physical restoration; (b) Transportation provided for other purposes than to determine the eligibility of the individual for vocational rehabilitation services and the nature and extent of the services necessary; (c) Occupational and business licenses; (d) Tools, equipment, initial stock and supplies including live stock and capital advances; (e) Maintenance." As you can see the word or preceding the eligibility of individuals covered under the terms of agreements with another state or with the federal government, causes eligibility of this class to be an alternative to the initial class of bona fide residents of the State. Hence, it may be concluded that neither the mention of citizenship nor residency in the above discussed statutory provisions would prohibit the State from entering into the agreement contemplated with the federal government. The limitation as to vocational rehabilitation services being 271 provided at public cost only to "impaired individuals" found to require financial assistance with respect thereto is also clearly inapplicable in view of the fact that the clause containing this restriction commences with the proviso: "except as otherwise provided by law or as specified in any agreement with the Federal Government . . ." I might further say in closing that I believe that the above conclusions are also supported by the obvious expression of legislative intent in Ga. Code Ann. 32-2305, which among other things authorizes the Vocational Rehabilitation Division to "comply with such conditions as may be necessary to secure the full benefits of such Federal statutes and appropriations." Quite obviously the General Assembly intends that the provisions of the Georgia Vocational Rehabilitation Act shall be liberally construed in favor of obtaining federal financial assistance for vocational rehabilitation services and, it would appear that any agreement with the Federal Government for the providing of such services would be held legal under state law except in those situations where the conflict with an existing state law is quite clear. OPINION 66-60 April 12, 1966 You requested my opmwn as to whether or not the Teachers Retirement System should permit a member who has rendered teaching service in another state which does not reciprocate with Georgia teachers at this time to establish out-of-state service as provided for in Senate Bill No. 66 enacted at the last session of the General Assembly. Senate Bill No. 66 amended Subsection (5-A) of Section 4 of the Teachers Retirement System Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2904 (5-A)) as follows: "Any other provision of this or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, in order for any teacher who becomes a member of the system on or after April 1, 1966, to receive any credit for out-of-state teaching service as provided for herein such teacher must pay, in addition to the amounts provided for herein, the employer amount which would have been paid, plus interest. The Board of Trustees shall determine this amount." (Emphasis added.) 272 The first sentence of Subsection (5-A) of Section 4 provides: "Any teacher coming into the Teachers Retirement System shall be entitled to receive credit for prior teaching service in other or independent school systems, up to a maximum of 10 years, where that State or independent school system permits the same credit for teaching service in this State." (Emphasis added.) This subsection further provides for the amount to be paid into the system in order to receive credit for this out-of-State teaching service. Senate Bill No. 66 did not repeal the reciprocity requirement as set forth above. It merely changed the amount which must be paid into the system by a teacher becoming a member after April 1, 1966, in order to receive credit for out-of-State teaching service "as provided for herein," that is, as provided for in subsection(5-A) of Section 4 including satisfaction of the reciprocity requirement. For the foregoing reasons, it is my opinion that your question should be answered in the negative. OPINION 66-61 VOID OPINION 66-62 April 12, 1966 You requested my official opinion as to whether or not your office should include the salary received by a member of the Teachers Retirement System after attaining the age of 65, with 40 or more years of creditable service, as a part of the five year average salary in computing the member's service retirement allowance, if it is to his advantage to do so. You have also requested to be advised as to whether or not Senate Bill 98, passed at the last session of the General Assembly would have any effect on this conclusion. Section 5 (2) (b) of the Teachers Retirement System Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2905 (2) (b) provides: 273 "(2) Allowance on service retirement. Upon service retirement a member shall receive an allowance which shall consist of: " . . . (b) An annual pension which, together with the annuity provided above, shall provide a total allowance equal to one and three-fourths per cent. of his average compensation over the five consecutive years of creditable service producing the highest such average, multiplied by the number of his years of creditable service, not to exceed 40." (Emphasis added.) Section 8 (1) (a) of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2921 (I) (a)) provides for member contributions to the annuity savings fund to be deducted from the compensation of members by the employers and provides further in part: " . . . [B]ut the employer shall not have any deduction made from the compensation of a member after the close of a school, fiscal or contract year in which the member has attained age 65 and has completed 40 or more years of creditable service. . . ." Senate Bill 98, passed at the last session of the General Assembly amended Section 8 (1) of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-2921 (l) ). This amendment provided and allows a member of the Teachers Retirement System to cease making contributions after 40 or more years of creditable service. The Bill also amended Section 5 (2) (b) so as to require that the five consecutive years of creditable service producing the highest income average, be selected from years of service from which contributions have been made. It is my opinion that the provisions of Senate Bill 98 correctly reflect the intentions of the legislature in that the five consecutive years of creditable service must he selected from years of service from which contributions have been made. Had the legislature intended to allow or permit the creditable service to extend beyond the period for which contributions have been made, the legislature would have, in my opinion, expressly so provided. In the absence of such an expressed and specific provision, it is my opinion that a proper construction of the applicable law requires the conclusion that the five consecutive years of creditable service be computed from that period for which contributions have been made, and that no years could be counted for which no contributions have been made. 274 OPINION 66-63 April20, 1966 You request my official opinion as to the power of the State Department of Education to allot additional funds of an excess nature for the maintenance and operation of local school systems during the 1965-1966 school year. Since the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 as amended, specifically provides that such excess funds can even be applied to a different program or object within the same budget unit, assuming the approval of the Budget Bureau is obtained, it is self-evident that remaining funds can be applied to increase allotments under the same program. See Sec. 7, Ga. Act No. 22 (1966). This provision clearly represents an extension of the general rule allowing the use under proper circumstances of funds remaining after the fulfillment of a program. There is also a rule that all unexpended funds at the end of the fiscal year shall lapse into the general treasury and no longer be available for use by the particular budget unit. See Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 17, 30. This rule inherently carries by implication the converse point that prior to the conclusion of the fiscal year, such moneys can be expended in an allowable fashion upon securing the permission of the Budget Bureau. Finally, it is relevant to note that the legislation providing for the maintenance and operation of local school systems through the program in question placed a limitation only as to the minimum amount expended per teacher and no maximum ceiling was placed on the program. See Ga. Laws 1964, p. 1, pp. 13-14. Hence the statutory authorization for the program itself does not by its language preclude the expenditure by the Department of Education of the funds in question. It is therefore my official opmwn in considering the specific factual situation raised by your question that the Georgia Department of Education may legitimately expend an additional amount of funds for maintenance and operation of local school systems during the 1965-1966 school year, contingent upon the securing of the required approval by the Budget Bureau. OPINION 66-64 (Unofficial) 27S April21, 1966 You wrote concerning the rate at which Georgia sales and use taxes are imposed. Ga. Code Ann. 92-3402a, which imposes the tax, declares in part: "There is hereby levied and imposed, in addition to all other taxes of every kind now imposed by law, a tax on the retail purchase, retail sale, rental, storage, use or consumption of tangible personal property, and the services hereinafter described, to be collected at the rates and in the manner hereinafter set forth: "(a) Every purchaser of tangible personal property at retail in this State shall be liable for a tax thereon at the rate of three per cent. of the sales price thereof. Said tax shall be paid by the purchaser to the retailer making such sale, as hereinafter provided, and said retailer shall remit same to the State Revenue Commissioner, as hereinafter provided, and when received by the State Revenue Commissioner it shall be a credit against the tax imposed hereinafter on said retailer. Every person making a sale or sales of tangible personal property at retail in this State shall be a retailer and a dealer as defined in this Chapter and shall be liable for a tax thereon at the rate of three per cent. of such gross sale or gross sales, or the amount of taxes collected by him from his purchaser or purchasers, as hereinabove provided, whichever is greater: Provided, however, that no retail sale shall be taxable to the retailer or dealer which is not taxable hereunder to the purchaser at retail." Recognizing that it would be impossible, because of the lack of coins representing a fractional part of a cent, to collect precisely three per cent. on each sale, the General Assembly made provision for the establishment of an official bracket system for collection of the tax. Ga. Code Ann. 92-3440a. Acting under the authority conferred on him by Ga. Code Ann. 92-3440a, the State Revenue Commissioner adopted such a system in 1960. Until that time, each merchant established his own system. 276 A copy of Executive Order 60-11, promulgating this official system, is enclosed for your use. Further evidence that the General Assembly contemplated the problem of being unable to collect precisely three per cent. is found in the above quoted portion of Ga. Code Ann. 92-3402a. There it is provided that each retail dealer "shall be liable for a tax . . . at the rate of three per cent. of such gross sale or gross sales, or the amount of taxes collected by him from his purchaser or purchasers, . . . whichever is greater. . . ." OPINION 66-65 (Unofficial) April27, 1966 You requested an official opinion from the Attorney General as to the legal right of the City of Union Point, Georgia, to condemn land outside its city limits to acquire easements needed for use in establishing a watershed to be used for the storage of water for the city water system. The right of eminent domain is the right of the State and the legislature may exercise this right directly through the officers of the State through the medium of corporate bodies, or by means of individual enterprise. See Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-2501); Ga. Code Ann. 36-101,36-103. It has long been recognized that the legislature has power to authorize a municipal corporation to acquire lands beyond the municipal limits and for that purpose to exercise the power of eminent domain, where the proposed taking of private property is strictly for public use. Potts v. City of Atlanta, 137 Ga. 211, 212 (1911). In 1931 the legislature amended the city charter of Union Point, Georgia (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 1019) so as to authorize the city and the mayor and aldermen to establish, operate and maintain systems of waterworks and empowered the city and mayor and board of aldermen "to acquire by purchase, gift or condemnation proceedings, all necessary lands, easements and franchises either within or without the incorporate limits of said city" for that purpose. Section 2 of this amendment provided: 277 "in the event the mayor and aldermen cannot procure by gift or purchase the necessary lands, easements and franchises for the construction and operation of the systems then they shall have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain, and to condemn such lands, easements and franchises either within or without the incorporate limits of the city." Therefore, there would appear to be little question as to the right of your city to procure the necessary easements through condemnation proceedings; however, as you will undoubtedly need an attorney to institute any such proceedings, it is suggested that you take this letter to your city attorney, as he will be more familiar with all the details and be able to give better and more accurate advice than my answer to your letter. OPINION 66-66 (Unofficial) April27, 1966 The attorney for Floyd County is requesting an opinion from the Law Department concerning the legality of payments by the County to Floyd Hospital for conducting blood alcohol tests. You indicate that the tests are being made upon the request of the solicitor general with the Court's approval. The Supreme Court has held that: "Before an officer can be required to pay out public money, or be justified in doing so, those who demand its payment should be able to show a clear provision of the law which entitles them to receive it." Kennedy v. Seamans, 60 Ga. 612 (1878). Several other cases have reached the conclusion that an officer is not required or justified in paying out public funds unless there is a clear provision of law authorizing the payment. Justices Richmond Inferior Court v. State, 24 Ga. 82 (1858), Maxwell v. Cumming, 58 Ga. 384 (1877), Houston County v. Kersh and Wynne, 82 Ga. 252 (1888), Howard v. Early County, 104 Ga. 669 (1898). The Supreme Court has held that a county was not authorized to pay an accountant to aid a solicitor generar in the preparation and presentation of a case. Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Ga. 142 (1933). The Court noted that: "(I)t is for the legislature to determine, and in its power to declare, that the employment of experts for the purpose of assisting the prosecution of a criminal case, in 278 ascertaining and assimilating the evidence, shall be a contingent expense to be paid upon its approval by the judge of the superior court." Freeney v. Geoghegan, supra, 147. My research fails to reveal any statutory provision authorizing Floyd County to pay for blood alcohol tests which are conducted to aid in the proper disposition of cases in the City Court of Floyd County. Ga. Laws 1953, Nov. Sess., p. 556, 575 (Ga. Code Ann. 68-1625, Par. 4) which provides that a person arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor shall have a right to receive a blood alcohol test indicates that the cost of the test shall be borne by the arrested person. OPINION 66-67 (Unofficial) April27, 1966 You requested information concerning the "right to work" laws. Your first question asks whether an attorney may practice law in this State without joining the Georgia Bar Association. The answer to this question is "yes." Your second question asks whether a physician may practice medicine in Georgia without belonging to the American Medical Association. The answer to your second question is "yes." Your third question is: "Is it legal for an agency employing registered nurses to require membership in the American Nurses Association, the professional organization for nurses?" No person in this State may be required to join a labor organization in order to obtain or to retain employment. Ga. Laws, 1947, p. 616, 618. Ga. Laws, 1947, p. 616, 617 provides: "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or an agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." The "right to work" laws are aimed at labor organizations which act as bargaining agents. This writer is unaware of any function of the American Nurses Association which would bring it within the definition of a bargaining agent, as that term is commonly defined in the field of labor law. It appears that the American Nurses Association is not a labor organization. It follows then, that the 279 prohibition against requiring membership in a labor organization is not applicable to the American Nurses Association. OPINION 66-68 May 2, 1966 You have requested my official opinion as to the legal meaning of the term "commercial fishing for shrimp" as this language appears in the 1966 Amendment to Ga. Laws 1955, p. 483. The term "commercial" is generally understood in American law to connote the "purchase and sale or exchange of goods and commodities," "other recognized forms of business enterprise" as well as "every phase of commercial and business activity and intercourse." See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824); Jordan v. Tashiro 278 U.S. 123, 127-128, 49 S. Ct. 47, 73 L. Ed. 214 (1928). When this particular expression is incorporated into a statutory provision, it does not inherently carry within itself any presumed restrictions as to types of commercial activity; that is, the use of the word automatically renders the particular law in question applicable to all commerce unless there is express language to the contrary. The only specific limitation on the prohibition of "commercial fishing for shrimp," here being considered, is that this interdiction is applicable to such fishing only when it is done with power drawn nets. There is no language in this law excluding the fishing for shrimp by bonded bait dealers from the prohibitory restriction. It is therefore my official opinion in answer to your question as specifically worded, that the commercial fishing for shrimp by bonded bait dealers is barred by the language of this recently enacted Ia was long as there is the use of power-drawn nets. OPINION 66-69 (Unofficial) May 3, 1966 You have raised several questions relevant to the capacity of a person declared mentally incompetent to enter into marriage under the laws of Georgia. Your specific questions are as follows. "( l) Can this person (a person who has been declared incompetent and not restored from such incompetency) enter 280 into a valid marriage, either whether it is performed by a minister, or by declaration through a common law cohabitation?" Marriage, whether it is entered into in the usual formal manner or whether it arises by virtue of common law, can only take place through an agreement by parties able to contract. See Ga. Code Ann. 53-102; Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860). The courts have also held that persons adjudicated mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction, the affairs of such person being vested in a guardian, and not subsequently restored to competency, completely lose power to contract and contracts entered into during a period of incompetency are absolutely void until the guardianship is dissolved. See Ga. Code Ann. 20-206; Fields v. Union Central Life Insurance Company, 170 Ga. 239 (1929). Hence, in answer to your first question, a person who has been declared incompetent and not restored from such incompetency cannot enter into a valid marriage, whether it is performed by a minister or arises by declaration through common law cohabitation. It must however be noted that only a court can adjudicate the existence of a marital relationship in a specific case based on a set of particular circumstances and this office can only render its view as to the legal result in an assumed or hypothetical factual situation. "(2) Can a former spouse who was divorced by the incompetent prior to that person's incompetency then establish (after one spouse has been adjudicated incompetent) a marital relationship either by common law or otherwise in the state of Georgia?" A total divorce voids a marriage from the time of the rendition of that decree. (See Ga. Code Ann. 30-119.) Therefore, in considering the second point raised in your letter, a previously dissolved marriage neither bars the subsequent creation of a marital relationship between the same parties nor does it serve in any way as evidence of a latter state of marriage between these parties. "(3) Could you further explain what is meant when a committment paper states that a person was committed and adjudged under the 1964law of Georgia?" The 1964 law of Georgia to which you refer is Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 534. (See also Ga. Code Ann. 88-506). This statute 281 provides the judicial procedure by which a person is hospitalized by means of a court order and also is used as the method for appointing a guardian to manage the estate of mentally incompetent persons. OPINION 66-70 May 3, 1966 You request an official opinion on two questions. Your first question is: "(1) Can the State Parks Department lease private property for state park purposes?" In answering this question, I direct your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 43-124(b) (Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 264, 275; Ga. Laws 1943, p. 180; Ga. Laws 1951, p. 788; Ga. Laws 1958, p. 634) which provides, inter alia, as follows: "43-1 24. Powers and duties. - In addition to the other powers herein granted, the Department is empowered and directed: . . . . "(b) Purchase or acquire lands for parks; eminent domain. - To acquire in the name of the State, by purchase, lease, agreement, or condemnation, such land within the State as it may deem necessary or proper to the extension of the State park system...." From the above, it is my opinion that the department is authorized and empowered to lease such land within the State as it may deem necessary or proper in the extension and best operation of the State parks system. Your second question is: "(2) If the State Parks Department can legally lease private property, can we spend money on leased property to construct permanent facilities?" Heretofore, this office has ruled generally that the State must have title to land before permanent improvements may be made thereon. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, pp. 573-574. Such ruling was based upon Ga. Code Ann. 91-117, (Ga. Laws 1961, p. 47) which provides that: 282 "91-117. Improvement of real estate held by State in fee simple; held with reversion to Federal Government, or under long term Federal license.~ . . . . "Any real estate held by the State of Georgia in fee simple . . . may be improved with funds appropriated for a State department provided the director of the department affected and the Budget Bureau, consisting of the Governor and the State Auditor, consent to the use of such funds if the amount of the funds to be appropriated exceeds $1,000. If the amount of the improvement funds to be appropriated is $1,000 or less, the director of the department shall have the authority to approve the appropriation without the approval of the Budget Bureau." (Emphasis added.) From the above, it is shown that State funds which are to be used for improvements on property are restricted to only such property in which the State of Georgia holds fee simple title. In the past, this office has refused consistently to approve lease agreements or conveyances of land to the State containing reversionary clauses where it was anticipated that permanent improvements would be placed on the land at State expense which the State would stand to lose in the event the property was ever abandoned to the uses prescribed in the respective deed or where the lease agreement was terminated. See Op. Att'y Gen., 1952-53, pp. 109, 170, 357, 359, 502. The underlying reason and purpose of these rulings are patent; any other decision would invite abuse and open the way to needless litigation. One exception to the general rule has been where the improvements, though considered "permanent" in the sense that under general principles of law they would become a part of the realty, were of such a nature as to be easily removable without material damage thereto, and the deed, lease or other instrument of conveyance contained a clause giving the State the right to remove these improvements either before or within a reasonable time after abandonment or termination of the lease by the State. Therefore it is my opinion that only structures which as a practical matter may be removed from the premises as a unit, or dismantled and removed without substantial loss or damage, may be considered as temporary or removable structures within the meaning herein ascribed. 283 Of course each individual case would have to be weighed on its own merits, but in no event could an improvement be deemed to be approvable or moneys spent on a project in which the State holds less than a fee simple title. Consequently, in answer to your second question, it is my opinion that the State of Georgia could not spend money on leased property to construct "permanent facilities." OPINION 66-71 (Unofficial) May 5, 1966 Your letter relates to a charge that may be placed against a person carrying a sign reading "Speed Trap Ahead" who is positioned some distance away from the location of an operating electric speed timer. "Signs within right of way lines prohibited. - There shall be no signs ofany description whatsoever erected or maintained within the right of way lines of the public roads of this State, except route markers, direction or warning signs which may be erected by or at the instance of the public road officials of this State, which officials . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 221,222 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-2002). The word maintained is defined in Ga. Laws 1953, pp. 128, 129 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-2002a). "(h) 'Maintain' means to allow to exist." The punishment for the violation of the above statute is found in Ga. Laws 1931, pp. 221,223 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-9914 and reads as follows: "Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of Chapter 95-20 relating to the erection of advertising structures, devices, etc., within the limits of right of way of public roads, etc., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." (Emphasis supplied.) Your authority for enforcing this statute may be found in Ga. Laws 1939, p. 224 (Ga. Code Ann. 95-1809) and is as follows: "The Georgia State Patrol . . . is hereby especially charged with the duty of enforcing the provisions of this Chapter . . ." The Solicitor General is correct in that there is no charge, under 284 the circumstances of this case, of "interfering with an officer in the performance of his duty." OPINION 66-72 (Unofficial) May 5, 1966 As I understand your telegram, blood tests in Dougherty County are obtained in a local hospital which requires that the "donor" sign a form consenting to the removal of the blood specimen by the hospital, and agreeing that the State Crime Laboratory may perform the test, and that a certified copy of the test shall be admissible in evidence either for or against the defendant. You also refer to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Pittman v. State, 110 Ga. App. 625 (1964). As I understand it, the question posed in your telegram is whether or not the procedure outlined above is sufficient to satisfy the objections specified in the Pittman case, supra, and to entitle the blood tests to be admissible in a criminal prosecution. It is my opinion and my interpretation of Ga. Code Ann. 681625, and the holding of the Pittman case, supra, that the above outlined procedure would not entitle the blood test report from the State Crime Laboratory to be admitted in evidence, either for or against defendant in a criminal prosecution, without some independent proof showing the chain in custody of the blood test sample, the time it was taken and analyzed, and who analyzed same. It is also my opinion that the procedure you have outlined would be insufficient to overcome the objections and holding of the Pittman case. OPINION 66-73 May 6, 1966 You requested an official opinion relating to registration to vote in bond elections. You have asked whether or not Art. VI I, Sec. VII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001) of the Constitution of Georgia requires the use of the list of voters used in the preceding general election in the political subdivision holding a bond election. It is my official opinion that any citizen is entitled to vote in a special election if he has registered to vote by the close of the fifth day (excluding Sundays or holidays) after the call of the special election. 285 The ultimate object of registration laws is the encouraging of citizens to take part in the democratic process. This objective was eloquently treated in the case of Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779(3) (1949), in which the Supreme Court stated that: "Registration laws are the means and machinery by which proofs are submitted showing the existence of the citizen's qualifications as an elector; such statutes having for their purpose regulation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, but not to qualify or restrict the right to vote. Such laws must be impartial, uniform, and reasonable, giving to all a fair, equal, and reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to qualify as an elector." Ga. Code Ann. 34-626 provides for registration insofar as it relates to voting in special elections, and a bond election is such a special election. (Ga. Code Ann. 34-l03(ab) ). Ga. Code Ann. 34-626 provides that: "Section 34-626. Registration ofpersons to vote in special primaries and elections. - Any person who has registered for a general primary or election, if otherwise qualified to vote at any special primary or election occurring before the next November election shall be listed and entitled to vote at such special primary or election. At the close of the registrars' business on the fifth day (if a Sunday or a legal holiday, then on the next following business day) after the call of such special primary or election, the registrars shall cease taking applications from persons desiring to register to vote therein, and {}roceed to examine into the qualifications of the applicants in the same manner as herein provided with reference to applicants desiring to qualify to vote in November elections. The registrars shall then prepare a supplemental list showing the names of additional electors who are entitled to vote at such special primary or election, and any person whose name appears on such list may vote at such special primary or election, subject to the limitations prescribed in the proviso contained in the first sentence of Section 34-624, but the registrars shall purge such list before filing it of all persons who will not be qualified to vote, in the same manner as provided with reference to the list for a November election. A certified list so prepared and arranged alphabetically and divided according to election districts as in the case of 286 November election lists, shall be filed with the clerk of the superior court and the Secretary of State within ten days after the call of such special primary or election. It shall be the duty of the registrars upon the call of a special primary or election to purge the list of electors prepared for the last November election of any names subsequently disqualified for any reason and to furnish the poll officers of such special primary or election two lists, one composed of the names of electors entitled to vote by reason of their registration for the last November election, and the other made up of the names of those entitled to vote by reason of their subsequent registration as hereinbefore provided, subject to the limitations prescribed in the proviso contained in the first sentence of Section 34-624, and no one shall be entitled to vote in such special primary or election unless his name is on one of the lists furnished by the registrars. The registrars may combine such lists. No provision of this Section is intended to conflict with the provisions of the State Constitution prohibiting the special registration of electors to vote in a special election to pass upon the issuance of bonds." It can easily be seen that this Section does not provide for a special registration to vote in special elections, but rather provides for general registration, and provides a cutoff date on the general registration for those entitled to vote in a special election. Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001) of the Constitution of Georgia states, in part, that " . . . all laws, charter provisions and ordinances heretofore passed or enacted providing special registration of the voters of the counties, municipal corporations and other political divisions of this State to pass upon the issuance of bonds by such counties, municipal corporations and other political divisions are hereby declared to be null and void; . . ." This provision of the Constitution also prohibits the General Assembly from passing laws providing for such special registrations. In my opinion, the Georgia Election Code does not provide for a special registration as contemplated by this constitutional provision. Years ago in Georgia, there were numerous ordinances and special statutes providing for a special registration to vote in bond elections. This is illustrated in the case 287 of Stewart v. County ofBacon, 148 Ga. 105 (1918). In 1918, after the Stewart case, the above-quoted constitutional provision was ratified by the people. The case of Brown v. City ofAtlanta, 152 Ga. 283 (1921), illustrates the difference between a general and special registration. "A special registration as distinguished from a general registration is one designed for a particular election and which becomes functus officio when the election under which it was held has been had, that is to say, when the registration cannot be used for any other purpose. A general registration is one made up under general rules." Brown v. City of Atlanta, supra, at 294. The case of Terrell v. Forest Park School District, 175 Ga. 88 (1932) seems to conflict with the Brown case, but a close examination of the opinion of the Court shows that only special registrations are prohibited. In this opinion the Supreme Court stated, at page 90, that "Thus it will be seen that there is no valid law in Georgia providing for special registration of voters for bond elections." This opinion was written in response to a certified question from the Georgia Court of Appeals, and an opinion in the same case in the Georgia Court of Appeals shows that a new list of voters was made up for the purpose of the bond election in question. 45 Ga. App. 717 (1932). It is my opinion that the Supreme Court of Georgia considered this to be a special registration, rather than the compilation of a list from a general registration. Of course,. a reading of the first headnote in the Terrell case might incline one to conclude that a citizen who was not on the general registration list for the last preceding general election could not vote in a special bond election, but it is my opinion that the Court merely considered the statutes involved in those cases to provide for a special registration. If this were not the case, the logical conclusion would be that thousands of voters might register after a general election, which is held every two years, and that if a special bond election were held one year and eleven months after that preceding general election, these thousands of voters would be deprived of the right to vote. It is clear that the provision of the Constitution prohibiting special registrations was intended to encourage the maximum 288 number possible to vote, as this maximum number would be contained on the general registration list. My opinion is further fortified by the last sentence of Ga. Code Ann. 34-626, which provides that "No provision of this Section is intended to conflict with the provisions of the State Constitution prohibiting the special registration of electors to vote in a special election to pass upon the issuance of bonds." This seems to be a clear expression of legislative intent that the Georgia Election Code does not provide for special registration, but rather for general registration from which a list is compiled to vote in special elections. Therefore, it is my opinion that any person who has registered to vote by the close of the fifth day after the call of a bond election is entitled to vote in that election. OPINION 66-74 May 6, 1966 You wrote concerning the administration by the State Department of Education of Title I of the "Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965" (Public Law 89-10; 79 Stat. 27). As you note in your letter, Title I covers projects adopted by local school systems and approved by the State Department of Education (in accordance with applicable federal statutes and regulations) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in what may generically be described as areas of poverty. In your letter and in subsequent conversation with officials of your Department, it has been pointed out that some systems have found it advantageous to assign some of their regularly employed teachers to work full time on Title I projects. These systems receive federal funds to cover the salaries of such teachers as a part of their allotment for said projects. Question has arisen as to whether or not teachers so assigned to Title I projects may also be retained on the list of State allotted teachers for purposes of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act, to wit: Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-6), and in specificity you ask: "May a school system which assigns a teacher to a Title I project providing for the State to transfer funds for the salary from federal funds also list this teacher on the State payroll for the payment of the State certificate salary?" 289 My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION It is my opinion that a teacher assigned to a Title I project may not be retained on the State payroll for payment of the State certificate salary to the local school system. DISCUSSION The Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act, Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 32-6) deals with State support of the programs of education offered by the local school systems of this State. It provides, inter alia, that the State Board of Education shall establish a minimum salary schedule based upon the teacher's class of certification and other uniformly applicable factors as length of service and experience. See Ga. Code Ann. 32-609. The allotment of State funds to a local school system to enable it to provide a minimum foundation program of education includes the amount required to pay such minimum salaries to its State alloted teachers. See Ga. Code Ann. 32-610 and 32-611. Ga. Code Ann. 32-611 contains a restrictive proviso, however, which declares that: " . . . the amount of funds distributed to any local unit for this purpose shall not be in excess of the amount actually required by the local unit for payment of salaries of teachers actually employed by the local unit of administration." While it ordinarily would seem wholly unnecessary to point out the fact that the phrase in this proviso "payment of salaries of teachers actually employed by the local unit" obviously means employed for the purpose of providing a minimum foundation program of education under this State Act, this point is of crucial import in light of the requirements of the federal legislation and regulations which the State is obligated to follow in administering Title I of the federal act. Section 20 I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 [79 Stat. 27] states that it is the purpose of that Act to provide financial assistance to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families in order "to expand and improve their educational programs by various means," 290 and Section 207 (a) (2) requires that no payment be made to any local school system unless the State Department of Education finds that the combined fiscal effort of the local school system and the State was not less for the preceding fiscal year than such combined effort was for the year ending June 30, 1964. This clear statutory intendment that the federal funds be restricted in use to supplementing rather than supplanting State and local effort is expressly recognized by the relevant rules and regulations of the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. See 45 CFR 116.17 (f) (Wednesday, September 15, 1965). Viewing the federal statute and regulations together with the State Code provisions previously cited, it appears that for a school system whose teacher is assigned to a Title I project (which under federal law must be something in addition to and beyond programs provided under the State Act) to receive funds based upon this teacher's certificate salary under the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act, would be violative of Ga. Code Ann. 32-610 and 32-611 which in effect require that payment of State funds for teachers' salaries under the Act be for the State supported programs of education provided for thereunder. Any argument to the effect that a teacher assigned to Title I is engaged in providing such State program of education is met by the fact that this situation would cause a violation of the federal requirement that the federal funds be used solely for special education programs which are to be additional to the State programs under the State Act. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that a teacher assigned to a Title I project may not be retained on the State payroll for the purpose of enabling the local school system to obtain her certificate salary under the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act as well as her salary under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. OPINION 66-75 (Unofficial) May 9, 1966 You requested an unoj]icial opinion as to whether or not a one dollar sheriffs fee is correct for the serving of a summons for each witness to appear before the State Board of Workmen's Compensation which is accompanied by a request on the back for a return of service which shows that the subpoena has been served by the sheriff. 291 Ga. Code Ann. 114-703(b) states in part as follows: "The sheriffs of this State within their respective jurisdictions, and their respective deputies, shall serve all subpoenas of the members or their deputies and shall receive the same fees as are now provided by law for like civil actions . . . ." The fees for civil cases are set out in Ga. Code Ann. 24-2823, as amended. The two fees stated under this section which are in issue are: "Serving copy of process and returning original, per copy . . . . . . . $5 .00" "Summoning each witness . . . . .$1.00" It is my unofficial opinion that summoning each witness is an entirely different matter from serving copy of process and returning original. In serving a copy of process, the sheriff is made a party to the suit. Ga. Code Ann. 81-202 states that: "The clerk shall immediately deliver the original petition, with process annexed, together with a copy of the petition and process for each defendant, to the sheriff or his deputy, who shall serve such copy upon each defendant residing in the county immediately or within five days from the time of receiving it. The officer serving the petition and process shall make an entry of such service upon the original petition and return it to the clerk. The entry of service shall show the date of service. Each copy served on a defendant shall show a date of service signed by the officer serving: Provided, however, that the failure of the copy served on the defendant to show thereon a date of service signed by the officer serving shall not invalidate any service otherwise legally made. Leaving a copy at defendant's residence shall be a sufficient service." From the above, it is seen that the sheriff or his deputy are required in serving process to make an entry of service on the original petition and return it to the clerk. It is also shown that process is served on one who is a party to the case. Before a defendant is required to plea to the merits, the records should contain a legal return of service. Callaway v. Douglasville College, 292 99 Ga. 623 (1886); Keys v. Keys, 86 Ga. 815 (1952). Process is defined as the official notice signed by a sworn officer to inform a defendant of a suit against him and he must appear and answer. Weltner, Process and Service, p. 1 (1961). Summoning each witness is an entirely different matter however. A witness is not a party to the suit and there is no requirement that a return of such service has to be made in order for the service to be binding upon him. However, when the subpoenaing party request a return or an acknowledgement that service has been made to be returned to him, it is still no more than summoning a witness which is an entirely different matter from serving a copy of process. It is therefore my unofficial opinion that when the State Board of Workmen's Compensation requires a sheriff to summon a witness and request on the back of such summons a return of such subpoena to show that said witness has been served, the correct charge for such service by the sheriff is one dollar for each witness. The sheriff has not served a copy of process and therefore a five dollar fee for serving a copy of process and returning an original is not applicable here. OPINION 66-76 May 9, 1966 This is to acknowledge receipt of your recent letter in which you ask for a definition of the term "public office" as the same relates to Section l of the General Planning and Enabling Act of 1957 (Ga. Laws 1957, p. 420). Under Section 1 of this Act it is provided, inter alia, as follows: ". . . A majority of the members of the planning commission shall be citizens who hold no other public office or position in the city or county except that one member may be a member of the board of zoning appeals . . . ."(Emphasis added.) You state that in the past you "have assumed that a public office was synonymous with an elective office," but that only recently you have been confronted with a question as to whether a "public office" might also be an appointive position such as a city manager, etc., and you therefore desire my official opinion on the legal definition of a "public office." 293 There are numerous and varied definitions of the term "public office" as used in our statutes and Constitution. It is a term of vague and variant import, the meaning of which necessarily varies with the connection in which it is used, and, to determine its correct meaning in a particular instance, regard must be given to the intent of the statute and the subject matter in reference to which the term is used. First of all, it becomes necessary to define and explain the terms "office" and "public office." It has been said that the term "office" has no legal nor technical meaning attached to it distinct from its ordinary acceptations. It has a very general signification and may be defined to be "that function by virtue whereof a person has some employment in the affairs of another." It may be public, private or quasi public. See Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273; and Ricker's Petition, 66 N. H. 207. In its broadest sense, a "public office" is a charge, station or employment conferred by appointment by a government. Ordinarily and generally a "public office" is defined to be the "right, authority and duty created and conferred by law, the tenure of which is not transient, occasional or incidental, by which for a given period an individual is invested with power to perform a public function for the benefit of the public." See McDuffie v. Perkerson, 178 Ga. 230 (1934). This definition carries with it ex vi termini the further idea that the power delegated must be exercised by the person in his own and not in another's right. The position is an office whether the incumbent is selected by appointment or by election, and whether he is appointed during the pleasure of the appointing power or is elected for a fixed term. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Bradford v. Justices oflnferior Court, 33 Ga. 332 (1862), held that: "Where an individual has been appointed or elected in a manner prescribed by law, has a designation or title given him by law, and exercises functions concerning the public assigned to him by law, he must be regarded as a public officer." In the case of Morris v. Peters, 203 Ga. 350 (1948), a "public office" was defined as: " . . . . one created by Constitution, statute, or municipal ordinance passed in pursuance of legislative authority." 294 In Goss v. Gordon County, 35 Ga. App. 325 (1926), the court held that the status of a person elected or appointed to office legally provided for is that of a public official. In Lentz v. City Council ofAugusta, 48 Ga. App. 555 (1934), the term was defined as: " . . . . a position specifically created by law for discharge of designated public duties prescribed by law involving exercise of some part of sovereign power. . . ." See also Mayor and Council of City of Butler v. Hartman, 70 Ga. App. 848 (1944). Therefore it is my opinion that any individual who has been appointed or elected to an office in a manner prescribed by law and has been given a designated title by law and who exercises functions concerning the public assigned to him by law is a "public officer" and holds a "public office." It is my further opinion that a city manager would be in this category and necessarily would be one of the persons counted as holding a "public office" in determining the fact of the membership of a Planning Commission in conformity with the General Planning and Enabling Act of 1957. OPINION 66-77 (Unofficial) May 12, 1966 This is in reply to your recent request for my unofficial opinion regarding the scope and applicability of the "Honesty In Government Law." Specifically, you have stated that some cancer patients are treated at the Eugene Talmadge Memorial Hospital, under the Georgia State Cancer Program, on an out-patient basis. Those patients are boarded at boarding houses, the expense of which is initially borne by the Hospital and the Hospital is in turn reimbursed under the Cancer Program. You have requested my unofficial opinion as to whether or not an employee of the Hospital may furnish room and board to such out-patients, without being in violation of the Ia w. In 1956, the General Assembly adopted a law frequently referred to as the "Honesty in Government" law. Included among its 295 provisions are the following (Ga. Laws 1956, pp. 60, 61; Ga. Code Ann. 89-913): "It shall be unlawful for any full-time appointive State official or employee to contract to buy from or sell to the State of Georgia any real or personal property, goods or services, or a combination thereof, when such purchase or sale would benefit, or be likely to benefit, such official or employee." As you can see, the law applies to both "goods and services." Undoubtedly, the furnishing of "room and board" would include the furnishing of goods and services. As it is highly improbable that any person would be willing to take in boarders at a loss, it appears that any such undertaking would be for profit, however small. Thus, the State employee would "benefit or be likely to benefit" from such activity. Moreover, an agreement or undertaking is a "contract" even though not reduced to writing. Since the payment for room and board is made by the Hospital, the fact that the Hospital is reimbursed by the Cancer Program does not remove the transaction from the broad scope of the law. Although the prohibition of the worthwhile activity which you have described might seem to operate against State employees, this is merely a consequence of employment by the State, to be accepted by, and expected of, State employees. Therefore, it is my unofficial opinion that the providing by a State employee of room and board to cancer out-patients at the Eugene Talmadge Memorial Hospital, where such room and board is paid for through the Hospital, should not be undertaken. OPINION 66-78 (Unofficial) May 12, 1966 You ask for information and procedures regarding absentee balloting in primary and general elections of Georgia by citizens of this State who are serving in the armed forces overseas. For your general information, I am enclosing herewith copies of our Code provisions relating to (1) registration to vote by persons 296 temporarily absent from the State, and (2) absentee voting of persons registered to vote in Georgia. The term "board of registrars," as used in the above statutory provisions refers to the county election officials who are charged, among other things, with the duty of preparing voters' lists for the county and determining voting eligibility. The term "superintendent" as used in the absentee voting provisions refers to the ordinary of the county in the case of an election and the county executive committee of the political party holding the primary in the case of a primary. As indicated in Ga. Code Ann. 34-1402, the application for an absentee ballot must be made not more than 90 days prior to the date of the election or primary in which the applicant desires to vote, and under Ga. Code Ann. 34-1405 it must, where the mailing address is located more than 300 miles from the main office of the board of registrars, be received by said board no later than five days prior to the election or primary. As for the ballot itself, it will be counted so long as it is received by the board of registrars prior to the closing of the polls on the date of the primary or election. See Ga. Code Ann. 34-1407. The laws of Georgia provide that the general election shall be held on the Tuesday next following the first Monday in November in each even-numbered year, see Ga. Code Ann. 34-103 (m), and, that where a political party holds a primary to nominate its candidates for public office to be filled in the ensuing general election, such primary shall be held on the second Wednesday in September in each even-numbered year, see Ga. Code Ann. 34801. No list of candidates exists at this time respecting the Georgia primaries to be held in September 1966. OPINION 66-79 May 12, 1966 In your letter you indicated an awareness that the State cannot place capital improvements or developments upon land unless such property is owned in fee simple by the State. Your request raises two specific questions which are: (l) Does the Game and Fish Commission have the power and authority to construct or to 297 contract for the construction of boat launching ramps for the benefit of public use? (2) Whether there are any constitutional prohibitions which would prohibit the State Game and Fish Commission from constructing such boat launching ramps on properties owned by counties or other political subdivisions of the State? In answer to the first question, may I direct your attention to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 45-114, which provides in part as follows: "The commission is hereby directed and authorized to perform the following duties and functions: I. Acquire by purchase, condemnation, lease, agreement, gift or devise, lands or waters suitable for the purposes herein enumerated, and develop, operate and maintain the same for the following purposes: (a) For fish hatcheries, nursery ponds, or game farms, sanctuaries, reservations, and refuges: (b) Lands or waters suitable for wildlife restoration, propagation, protection or management: (c) For public hunting, fishing or trapping areas, to provide places where the public may hunt, trap or }ish in accordance with the provisions of law or the rules and regulations of the commission." (Emphasis added.) Construing the above provisions, it is my official opinion that the Game and Fish Commission has been delegated by the General Assembly of the State of Georgia the authority to develop lands acquired by it for public hunting and fishing. In my opinion to develop lands for these purposes would include the construction of boat launching ramps for access to fishing waters. In answer to the second question, this office has previously ruled that the State must have title to land before permanent improvements may be made thereon. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1962, page 398, Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-1956, pages 573-574. However, these opinions have been based on the proposition that for the State to expend money for permanent improvements on property to which it did not own fee simple title would result in the possibility that State funds could in the future be lost by the owner 298 appropriating his property to uses other than for which the funds were expended. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1952-1953, page 109. Hence, such an expenditure would result in a gift benefit or gratuity accruing to the owner of the property. (See Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which prohibits the General Assembly from granting any donation or gratuity in favor of any person.) It necessarily follows that if the General Assembly is not authorized to grant any donation or gratuity, then the General Assembly cannot vest this authority in any State agency. However, may I direct your attention to the provisions of Art. VII Sec. VII, Par. I of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which provides in part as follows: "(a) The State, state institutions, any city, town, municipality or county of this State may contract for any period not exceeding fifty years, with each other or with any public agency, public corporation or authority now or hereafter created for the use by such subdivisions or the residents thereof of any facilities or services of the State, state institutions, any city, town, municipality, county, public agency, public corporation or authority, provided such contracts shall deal with such activities and transactions as such subdivisions are by law authorized to undertake. "Notwithstanding any other provision of any other section of any other article of this Constitution, the General Assembly shall include in each General Appropriations Act in the appropriation payable to each department, agency, or institution of the State, in addition to such other items as may be included in such appropriation, and whether or not any other items are included, sums sufficient to satisfy the payments required to be made in each year lease contracts now or hereafter entered into pursuant to this Paragraph I (a) by and between such department, agency, or institution of the State and any State authority which has been created and activated at the time of the effective date of this amendment which said lease contracts constitute security for bonds or any other obligations heretofore or hereafter issued by any such authority. In the event for any reason any such appropriation is not made, then the fiscal officers of the State are hereby authorized and directed to set up on their appropriation accounts in each fiscal year as an appropriation the respective 299 amounts required by each such department, agency, or institution of the State to pay the obligations called for under any such lease contract. The amount of the appropriation in each fiscal year to meet such lease contract obligations as authorized hereunder shall be due and payable to each such department, agency, or institution of the State in each fiscal year to be expended for the purpose of paying the lease contract obligation required under the terms and conditions of such lease contracts and said appropriation shall have the same legal status as if the General Assembly had included the amount of the appropriation in a General Appropriations Act." These constititional provisions vest in the State the authority to contract with counties and cities for services and facilities authorized by the Constitution but does not supersede all other provisions of the Constitution. Mulkey v. Quillian, 213 Ga. 507, 509 (1957). Therefore under the views expressed above, it is my official opinion that your request must be governed by the prior opinions of this office which hold that the State must own fee simple title to property before it may make permanent improvements thereon. Under this ruling the results which you desire may be accomplished by the counties or other political subdivisions deeding the property in fee simple to the State of Georgia on which the boat launching ramps are to be constructed. OPINION 66-80 May 12, 1966 Recently you have requested my official opinion as to whether or not the various State Boards created in Ga. Code Ann. Title 84 may have meetings at cities or places other than the Capitol. It is my official opinion that the State Examining Boards must hold all of their meetings in the Capitol, except that examinations of applicants for licenses may be conducted at other designated places. Ga. Code Ann. 84-102 quite clearly states that the Joint Secretary shall maintain an office in the State Capitol, and all of the meetings of the respective Boards shall be held in the Capitol. As these are words of mandate, I think that it is clear that the Boards cannot meet at such places as Jekyll Island. 300 OPINION 66-81 May 12, 1966 I have examined your application for a grant under Title VI I of the Housing Act of 1961, as amended, whereby assistance is requested in the acquisition of fee simple interest to certain land known as Georgia Plaza for open space and park purposes. I have also reviewed all pertinent Federal, State and local laws including particularly Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 91-5A, which establishes the State Office Building Authority as a public body, empower it to receive and expend Federal, State, and local funds, and empower it to contract with the United States of America for the purpose of receiving a grant under Title VI I of the Housing Act of 1961, as amended. I have made appropriate inquiry and I am satisfied that there is no pending or threatened litigation, in either Federal or State courts, challenging your Authority to acquire and develop open space land or to contract with the Federal government for the purpose of receiving a grant under Title VI I of 1961, as amended. Based upon the foregoing, it is my opinion that the State Office Building Authority is a public body empowered to receive and expend Federal, State and local funds, to contract with the United States of America for the purpose of receiving a grant under Title VI I of the Housing Act of 1961, as amended, and to undertake and complete the proposed acquisition and development of fee simple interest in the above described land, and upon such acquisition and development, retain said interest for the designated permanent open space uses; and that upon acquisition of said interest in said land, the State Office Building Authority's interest will be free and clear of any restrictions which would interfere with the purpose of said grant to develop and maintain said land as permanent open space land. OPINION 66-82 (Unofficial) May 13, 1966 Recently, you have requested my opinion as to whether or not a county could supplement the salary of the supenor court judge who sits as juvenile court judge. It is my opinion that an act of the 301 General Assembly would be required to authorize such a supplement. Ga. Code Ann. 24-2403, a provision of the Juvenile Court Act provides that in counties having a population ofless than 50,000, where in a juvenile court has not been established, the judge of the superior court shall sit as the juvenile court judge. The Section also provides in part that "This shall involve no additional expense (except as may be authorized by the board of county commissioners or other authority controlling the fiscal affairs of such county), shall create no new court or judge but shall merely clothe the judge with additional powers." (Emphasis added.) It is my opinion that a superior .court judge presiding over a juvenile court is nonetheless a superior court judge. In the case of Houlihan v. Ryan, 205 Ga. 734 (1949) the Supreme Court held that under Art. VI, Sec. XII, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia the assent of the General Assembly is necessary for a salary supplement for superior court judge to be paid from county funds. I think that the reference to additional expenses in Ga. Code Ann. 24-2403, is concerned with such expenses as the salaries of referees, probation officers and clerical help. In the Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, at p. 99, there is an unofficial opinion which states that a superior court judge in a county under 50,000 may be given additional compensation by the county for his service as a juvenile court judge. It is my opinion that such additional compensation cannot be given without specific authorization by the General Assembly. OPINION 66-83 May 13, 1966 I have carefully reviewed the contents of your letter, including the provisions of the law to which you referred. Those provisions, as well as the legislative history of the Teachers Retirement System Act, were considered by me prior to rendering my previous opinion. My review shows that the General Assembly has been continually concerned, since the inception of the Teachers Retirement System, with the actuarial soundness of the System; e.g., Ga. Laws 1961, p. 392, 9. The provision in sub-paragraph (5) of Ga. Code Ann. 32-2904 302 that: "No such member shall receive credit for teaching service where contributions were not made during the teaching service. . .", and the provision in Senate Bill 98, passed at the last session of the General Assembly, that a teacher's highest five-year average compensation shall be determined from that period "during which such member was making contributions to the system," confirm my opinion that in determining a teacher's "average compensation over the five consecutive years of creditable service producing the highest such average" (Ga. Code Ann. 322905 (2) (b) ) the five consecutive years of creditable service must be selected from years of service from which contributions have been made. If, as you say, there are inequities in the Teachers Retirement System Act, that is a matter which addresses itself to the General Assembly. OPINION 66-84 May 13, 1966 You request my official opinion as to whether the Warden of Georgia State Prison may deliver bodies of deceased inmates to the Medical College of Georgia under any of the following circumstances: 1. Where the inmate, by his Last Will, left his body to the Medical College, and his next of kin consents to such disposition; 2. Where the body is not claimed; or 3. Where the next of kin is in financial straits and agrees, for a consideration, that the Medical College may have the body. For the sake of clarity, let me first respond to your request as it relates to bodies of inmates which are not claimed by anyone. In 1964, the General Assembly created a Board for the Distribution and Delivery of Certain Dead Bodies, that Board to consist of professors and demonstrators of anatomy and the deans of medical and dental colleges incorporated under the laws of this State (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 645; Ga. Code Ann. 88-2701). By that same Act, the General Assembly provided as follows (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 645; Ga. Code Ann. 88-2702): 303 "All public officers of this State and their assistants and all officers and their deputies of every county, city, town or other municipality and of every prison, chain gang, morgue, public hospital, sanatorium or sanitarium (except the Milledgeville State Hospital, which institution shall have authority to perform autopsies on the dead bodies of persons dying as patients in said institution, all in the discretion of the superintendent and medical staff of said institution), having control over any dead human body, not dead from contagious or infectious disease, and required to be buried at public expense, are required to notify the board of distribution, or such person as may from time to time be designated in writing by said board, or its duly authorized officer, whenever any such body comes into their possession or control, and shall, without fee or reward, deliver such body and suffer the board and its duly authorized agents who may comply with the provisions of this Chapter to remove such body, to be used only within this State, solely for the advancement of medical science: Provided, that no such notice shall be given, nor shall any such body be delivered, if any person, claiming to be and satisfying the authorities in charge ofsaid body that he or she is ofany degree of kin, or is related by marriage to, or socially or otherwise connected with and interested in the deceased, shall claim the said body for burial, but it shall be at once surrendered to such person for interment, or shall be buried at public expense at the request of such claimant if a relative by blood or a connection by marriage and financially unable to supply such body with burial." (Emphasis added.) As seen above, the Warden of the Georgia State Prison, among other persons in charge of prisons, chain gangs, etc., upon the death of an inmate (not dead from contagious or infectious disease) required to be buried at public expense, should notify the Board for the Distribution and Delivery of Dead Bodies (or its designated agent, or authorized officer). No notice is required to be given to the Board if any person claims to be, and satisfies the Warden that he or she is, any degree of kin, or is related by marriage to, or is socially or otherwise connected with and interested in the deceased. If such claim is made, the body of a deceased inmate should be surrendered at once to such person for burial, or be buried at public expense at the 304 request of such claimant if such claimant is related by blood or marriage and is financially unable to bury the deceased. (One who is only "socially or otherwise connected with and interested in the deceased" has no right to require burial at public expense.) The law provides further that unclaimed bodies shall be kept by the person or persons having charge or control of them for at least 24 hours after death, before delivery to the Board for the Distribution and Delivery of Dead Bodies, and that during this 24hour period, notice of the death shall be posted at the Courthouse door of the County in which said body is held (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 646; Ga. Code Ann. 88-2704). For your information, it should be noted that the medical schools to which such bodies are distributed by the Board are required to embalm them and preserve and keep them for a period of 60 days, and to deliver them to any claimant, described above, who shall claim such bodies for burial before the expiration of said 60 days. (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 646; Ga. Code Ann. 88-2704.) The Board has the power to distribute unclaimed bodies among the medical schools and colleges incorporated in this State. Thus, the Board, not the Medical College of Georgia, should be notified when the Warden has an unclaimed body. As indicated above, this law applies only to unclaimed bodies required to be buried at public expense. Responding to your inquiry regarding bodies claimed by persons related by blood or connected by marriage and in financial straits, such bodies are to be buried at public expense, upon request. If, as you have indicated may occur, such a claimant does not request burial at public expense, the Warden should obtain from such claimant a signed statement to the effect that: "I do not claim the privilege of burial of the body of at public expense, and I agree to the delivery of said body to the Board for the Distribution and Delivery of Dead Bodies, with the understanding that I may make claim within 60 days for the delivery of said body to me." The Warden should point out to such a claimant in financial straits that the Board undoubtedly would inform the claimant, upon request, of the name of the school or college to which such body was delivered, and that the claimant could make claim, within 60 days, to such school or college for delivery of the body. The Warden, of course, has no authority to make any 305 payment to a claimant in financial straits for the use of such body. The procedure outlined above is in accordance with the law and at the same time would put the claimant in touch with a school or college where the practice of paying for such bodies exists. Responding to your inquiry regarding the disposition of the bodies Of persons who have by Will donated their bodies to a medical school or college, please be advised that "Conviction of crime shall not deprive a person of the power of making a will." (Ga. Code Ann. 113-206.) However, a person can only dispose of "property" by Will (Ga. Code Ann. 113-101, 113-208). The body of a deceased person is normally not considered to be "property." Therefore, if an inmate undertakes, by Will, to bequeath his body to a medical school or college, it is my opinion that the procedures outlined above should nevertheless be followed. That is to say, even if an inmate leaves a Will donating his body to a medical school or college, and his body is unclaimed, notice of his death should be posted on the Courthouse door and the Board for Distribution and Delivery of Dead Bodies should be notified. Such notice should indicate that the deceased left a Will leaving his body to a specified school or college. If a person, such as described above, claims the body, the body should be delivered to such claimant, or buried at public expense if the claimant is a relative by blood or is connected by marriage and is financially unable to afford the burial. Without going through all the qualifying details, let me summarize my opinion as follows: (a) Where the body of an inmate is not claimed, notice should be posted on the Courthouse door for 24 hours, and notice should be given to the Board and the body delivered as directed by the Board. (b) Where the body of an inmate is claimed by a relative, or a person connected by marriage, in financial straits, such person should be advised that, upon request, the body will be buried at public expense, or that sudh person may execute a "consent" (described above). If such "consent" is executed, the Board should be notified and the claimant may then negotiate with the school or college which receives the body. (c) Where an inmate donates his body by Will, and the body is not claimed, the procedure outlined in subparagraph 306 (a) above should be followed and the Board should be notified of the name of the school or college specified by the inmate in his Will. (d) Where an inmate donates his body by Will, and the body is claimed by a proper claimant, the procedure outlined in subparagraph (b) above should be followed. If a "consent" is executed, the Board should be notified of the name of the school or college specified by the inmate in his Will. If a "consent" is not executed, the body should be buried, either at the expense of the claimant or at public expense, as the case may be, notwithstanding the Will. OPINION 66-85 (Unofficial) May 16, 1966 You requested an unofficial opinion as to the legality of a city recreation department sponsoring teenage dances with an admission fee. The right of a municipality to engage in various types of recreational activity has been clearly established by statutory enactment. Ga. Laws 1946, pp. 152, 153 as amended (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 69-6). Ga. Code Ann. 69-603, quoted below, leaves no doubt that teenage dances are a type of recreational activity which may be lawfully engaged in by a city. "The governing body of any such county or municipality may establish a system of supervised recreation and it may, by resolution or ordinance, vest the power to provide, maintain and conduct parks, playgrounds, recreation centers and other recreational activities and facilities in the school board, park board, or other existing body or in a recreation board as the governing body may determine. Any board so designated shall have the power to maintain and equip parks, playgrounds, recreation centers and the buildings thereon, and to develop, maintain, and operate all types of recreation facilities, or to operate and conduct facilities on properties controlled by other authorities, and it may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this law, employ play leaders, playground or community center directors, supervisors, recreation superintendents or such other officers or employees 307 as it deems proper or needed and the recreation authority is authorized to develop a program ofrecreational activities and services designated to meet the various leisure time interests of all people." (Emphasis added~) It is also a recognized principle of the law of Georgia that a city may derive revenue from the operation of recreational programs and may even show a profit from a particular recreational activity. Davis v. City of Atlanta, eta/., 84 Ga. App. 572, 576 (1951); City of Brunswick v. Taylor, 87 Ga. App. 751, 753 (1953). Although the previously-cited statute does not specifically refer to a municipality's power to charge admission, the fact that subsequent case decisions have held the right to exist legally establishes that the 1946 Act allows the operation of recreational programs in this manner. The conclusion therefore reached is that a city recreation department may sponsor teenage dances and charge those wishing to attend an admission fee. OPINION 66-86 (Unofficial) May 18, 1966 We find ourselves in much the same dilemma as you regarding the construction of Ga. Code Ann. 26-2603 as to tractors propelled by diesel fuel rather than gasoline. It appears to me that "motor vehicle" is separate and distinct from "other like vehicle propelled by electricity or gasoline." It is my opinion that a tractor is a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Act, and that the question of its fuel does not effect this construction. However, as you have noted, a completely opposite construction can be tendered upon authority of this section. As to your question arising under Ga. Code Ann. 58-207(b), We can be more precise. Ga. Code Ann. 58-207, as amended, provides that all vehicles and conveyances which are used to convey any liquors or beverages the transportation of which is in violation of the laws of the State shall be seized and condemned by any sheriff or other arresting officer, who shaH report the same within ten days after said seizure to the Solicitor of the county, city, or superior court having jurisdiction in the county where the seizure was made. In the event that the vehicle is ordered sold by the court, 308 the proceeds ansmg from said sale shall be applied first to the payment of the expenses in said case, including the expenses incurred in the seizure and "one-third of the remainder to the officer making the seizure and furnishing the proof," provided such seizing officer reported the seizure to the proper prosecuting official within ten days from the seizure. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in the case of Cloud v. DeKalb County, 70 Ga. App. 777 (1943), held that the mere fact that a county policeman receives a salary does not preclude him from receiving his part of the fees provided by law for the confiscation of vehicles engaged in the illegal transportation of liquor. The Court stated on page 780: "There is no provision of law which has come to our knowledge prohibiting an officer who receives a salary from also receiving fees, and there is no such law applicable to those involved here. This being true there is no reason why the legislature could not provide for fees, or commissions, or other sums, in addition to the officer's salary. It is quite clear that 58-207 does not preclude the officers here from receiving the sums therein provided for, for the reason that the section contemplated that certain officers were then on a salary and that others would be put on a salary, and with those facts in mind, it did not provide that if an officer was on a salary, or was put on one, his part of the one-third of the proceeds of the sale would become the property of the county." It is my opinion that, based upon the above stated authorities, officers authorized to seize according to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 57-207 would be entitled to the special fees provided therein. However, it should be noted that restriction on this may be placed on such persons when the latter Act putting such persons on salary states that no fees shall go to the officer. If the counties wish to exercise the prerogative given them in Ga. Code Ann. 58-1021. l and take the money which ordinarily would go to the officers under Ga. Code Ann. 57-207(b), they may do so. But absent such exercise of prerogative, it goes to the officers. OPINION 66-87 309 May 18, 1966 You requested an informal ruling as to whether employees who voluntarily enlist in the armed services are eligible for military leave under the rules and regulations of the State Personnel Board and whether a request must be made, coupled with the presenting of proof, in order for an employee to be placed on military leave. The rules of the State Personnel Board, if read in a literal fashion, might seem to extend military leave only to persons who are "ordered to active duty in the armed services of the United States" or drafted. (See Paragraph B-502.) However, realizing that the distinction between men who are drafted and those who volunteer becomes unclear in time of declared war or de facto state of hostilities, the right to military leave can under certain circumstances equitably be extended to volunteers during a period of military conflict and be equally consistent with the expressed language of the applicable rule. Many of those who enter the military services under these conditions are not making, as is the case in time of peace, an occupational choice, but are in fact being ordered into the armed forces by the virtual certainty of being drafted in conjunction with their own sense of duty. The existence of a military conflict does not automatically grant the right of military leave to all volunteers. It is necessary that the applicant offer substantial proof that he would have been drafted had he not enlisted, and in this regard it must be initially shown that the party's selective service status rendered him subject to being drafted. Both the imminence and the probability of the draft must be established by competent evidence and the Board has discretion in determining whether a leave of this type should be granted to volunteers. As to the second question which you have raised, it is my view that while the language of the relevant rule does not specifically refer to the necessity of making a formal request in writing and presenting written proof before being granted military leave, these requirements are inherently implied by terms of the provision. Ibid. The right to be given military leave, like any other legally determined status, can only be obtained through the use of formal procedure set out in the rules. 310 OPINION 66-88 May 18, 1966 You request my official opinion as to the law that should be considered in the formulation for the University System of a general policy to govern the release to third persons of information about employees of the System, please be advised as follows: In 1959 the General Assembly passed the following Act (Ga. Laws 1959, p. 88; Ga. Code Ann. 40-2701): "All State, county and municipal records, except those, which by order of a court of this State or by law, are prohibited from being open to inspection by the general public, shall be open for a personal inspection of any citizen of Georgia at a reasonable time and place, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse this privilege to any citizen." In my opinion, personnel records of employees of the University System are State records within the meaning of the quoted provision. A search of the laws has disclosed none which prohibit such personnel records from being open to inspection by the general public, and I am aware of no order of a court of this State imposing such a prohibition. You have indicated that it has been your policy in the past, insofar as the Office of the Chancellor is concerned, to make records available for inspection by members of the public who might come in and make such request, but not to give any such information by telephone. That policy is in accord with the above quoted law, in that it states that the records shall be open "for a personal inspection." You have also indicated that disclosure of salary information, on the one hand, serves the convenience of employees in establishing credit, and, on the other hand, might operate to the disadvantage of an employee engaged in litigation. Although the purpose of the law was not to serve the convenience of employees in obtaining credit, it has that effect. As for those few employees who might not desire to have such information disclosed, in accepting employment by the State, they necessarily accepted the conditions imposed by law upon that employment. For your further consideration in the formulation of the above 311 described policy, it should be noted that the General Assembly specified the procedure for disclosure in the 1959 Act, as follows (Ga. Laws 1959, pp. 88, 89; Ga. Code Ann. 40-2702): "In all cases where a member of the public interested has a right to inspect or take extracts or make copies from any public records, instruments or documents, any such person shall hereafter have the right of access to said records, documents or instruments for the purpose of making photographs of the same while in the possession, custody and control of the lawful custodian thereof, or his authorized deputy. Such work shall be done under the supervision of the lawful custodian of the said records, who shall have the right to adopt and enforce reasonable rules governing the said work. Said work shall be done in the room where the said records, documents or instruments are by law kept. While the said work hereinbefore mentioned is in progress, the lawful custodian of said records may charge the person desiring to make the said photographs for the services of a deputy of the lawful custodian of said records, documents or instruments to supervise the same, or for the services of the said lawful custodian of the same in so doing at a rate of compensation to be agreed upon by the person desiring to make the said photographs and the custodian of the said records, documents or instruments." OPINION 66-89 May 18, 1966 You requested my official opinion as to whether or not the State Board of Corrections would be authorized to institute an incentive pay plan for prisoners used in industries in connection with the Georgia Prison Industries Act. That is, you have asked whether or not it would be permissible for the State Board of Corrections to make payment to prisoners pursuant to the aforementioned program. I can find no statutory authorization which would permit a program such as you have outlined. Ga. Code Ann. 77-904(f), provides that the proceeds received from the Prison Industries Program shall be used for capital expansion, and that any surplus over the amount necessary for the efficient operation of the program or for capital expansion, shall be repaid into the State treasury. 312 It is my opmwn that this prov1s10n of law states the correct applicable principle of law, and it is, therefore, my opinion that the State Board of Corrections would not be authorized to make incentive payment to prisoners as outlined in your letter. OPINION 66-90 (Unofficial) May 23, 1966 You request my opinion on a situation concerning commitment to the Milledgeville State Hospital under certain circumstances as stated in your letter and which I understand to be as follows. A person was committed by the Court of Ordinary to the Milledgeville State Hospital and released under conditions other than being restored to mental health; subsequently the person applied for and received a restoration to sanity under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(c); it is your opinion that this person could be returned to the hospital only by a new commitment hearing, but it is the opinion at the hospital that such person is eligible to be returned under the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 88522(d) without the necessity for a new commitment hearing. As you know, the hospitalization of mentally ill persons is covered by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-5, relating to the voluntary and involuntary hospitalization of such persons. Ga. Code Ann. 88522 of said chapter provides procedure for restoration to mental health after an adjudication of "mental illness." Under such provisions, it is therefore my unofficial opinion that when an individual has applied for and received restoration to sanity under the procedure as prescribed by Ga. Code Ann. 88-522(c), such individual can be returned to the hospital only by a new commitment hearing, which is in conformity with your interpretation of the above statute. OPINION 66-91 May 23, 1966 You request my opinion concerning the authority of the Board of Compromises and Settlements to settle or compromise an assessment made under the Employment Security Law. The Board of Compromises and Settlements was created by an 313 amendment to the Act known as "An Act to make comprehensive provision for an integrated tax administration for Georgia;" and the title of the amending Act provided that the purpose was to provide "for the settlement and compromise of any proposed tax assessment, any final tax assessment, or any tax fi. fa." The Act provides that the Board "is hereby authorized to settle and compromise any proposed tax assessment, any final tax assessment, or any tax fi. fa.," under certain conditions. (Ga. Laws 1953, p. 185; Ga. Code Ann. 92-8411.1) The Employment Security Law, as amended, provides for a tax from certain employers. (See Ga. Laws 1937, p. 806, et seq.; Ga. Laws 1941, p. 229; Ga. Laws 1951, p. 512; Ga. Laws 1964, p. 443). Based on the above authorities, it is my opinion that the contributions required by the Employment Security Law are State taxes within the meaning of the Act creating the Board of Compromises and Settlements. It is my opinion that the Board has jurisdiction and authority to settle or compromise such a tax liability according to the authority contained in the Act creating the Board of Compromises and Settlements. OPINION 66-92 May 25, 1966 You request an opinion concerning the taxation of Credit Unions and Credit Bureaus under the Georgia Corporate Franchise Tax Act. Specific reference was made in your request to Federal associations and also to Production Credit Associations. The Georgia Corporate Franchise Tax Law imposes a tax on all but non-profit corporations based on net worth. (Ga. Code Ann. 92-240 I.) This tax is a privilege tax or excise tax and is not a tax on property or an ad valorem tax. Georgia has no authority under our system of government to tax the United States Government or its instrumentalities and, as a result, National Banks are exempt from this tax. The General Assembly of Georgia has provided that so long as National Banks are exempt from corporate franchise taxes State Banks shall also be exempt. (Ga. Code Ann. 92-2402(k) ). All Federal instrumentalities are exempt from State taxation except in those cases where the Federal Government has consented to State taxation. Production Credit Associations are exempt from 314 taxation when organized as Federal instrumentalities under the Farm Credit Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. 1131). However, the Federal Government has consented to State taxation of these associations after the stock held in it by the Production Credit Corporation has been retired. (Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 718). Credit Unions organized under Federal law are likewise immune from State taxation. However, Congress has consented to State taxation of their property under certain crcumstances. (12 U.S.C. 1768; Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 779). Federal chartered credit unions would, therefore, be exempt from Georgia Franchise Tax as this is not a property tax. State chartered credit unions are exempt from the Corporate Franchise Tax where they are chartered under provisions of Georgia Laws 1925, p. 165 (Ga. Code Ann. 25101, 25-123). State and Federal Credit Unions are, in my opinion, exempt under present laws from the taxes imposed under Georgia's Corporate Franchise Tax Act. OPINION 66-93 May 26, 1966 In accordance with your letter requesting my opmwn as to whether or not the Director of the Georgia Forestry Commission has violated any State laws concerning alleged solicitation of insurance from certain State employees of the Georgia Forestry Commission, I submit herewith my findings as follows. "Casualty insurance," as defined by Ga. Code Ann. 56-407 and 56-408, includes automobile insurance of the type herein offered. Ga. Code Ann. 56-713(4) prohibits an insurer from making a preference or distinction in "casualty insurance" based upon a fictitious grouping of persons which would result in unfair discrimination. Whether or not the insurer has violated this section can only be determined after a hearing as provided by Ga. Code Ann. 56-706. A "solicitor," as defined by Section 56-80 Ib(6), "is an individual appointed and authorized by a licensed agent or broker to solicit applications for insurance as a representative of such agent or broker and to collect premiums in connection therewith." 315 Ga. Code Ann. 56-840b(7) provides: "All business transacted by a solicitor . . . shall be in the name of the agent or broker by whom he is employed and the agent or broker shall be responsible for all the acts or omissions of the solicitor within the scope of his employment." It seems doubtful that the Director's acts or omissions could have bound the broker in any manner. Any action taken by him appears to have been on behalf of the employees of the Commission only as a service to them. The Director relied upon the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. 562431 as his authority to make payroll deductions and to enter into negotiations with the insurance company. This section in its pertinent part provides: "Each . . . department . . . of the State of Georgia . . . is hereby authorized and empowered to make deductions periodically from the wages or salaries of its employees with which to pay the premium for ... any kind of insurance ... upon a group insurance plan ... and ... to enter into agreements with insurance companies whereby the kind of group insurance desired by the employees may be furnished to them, and the premiums therefor remitted periodically ..." Although the Director, doubtless misled by the insurance company, was under the impression that the insurance program in question qualified as a "group insurance plan" under Ga. Code Ann. 56-2431, apparently it is not in fact such a plan. Policies are issued on an individual basis to individual employees. The Insurance Code authorizes certain types of group insurance but casualty and vehicle insurance is not among that authorized on a group basis. (See Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 56-27, Group Life; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 56-31, Group Accident and Sickness.) It is to be pointed out, however, that although no specific legislative authority has been granted to allow payroll deductions of premiums for insurance policies issued individually to State employees, neither is there any statute, to my knowledge, prohibiting it. The legislature has granted authority to State departments to make certain payroll deductions from employees' pay checks in several instances other than for group insurance plans 316 under Ga. Code Ann. 56-2431. (See Employees Health Insurance Plan, Ga. Code Ann. 89-1211; U.S. Savings Bonds, Ga. Code Ann. 89-912; Credit Unions, Ga. Laws 1964, p. 255.) I am informed that the only expense borne by the Forestry Commission was in furnishing one thousand (I ,000) blank letterheads to the agent of record. All printing and mailing expenses were borne by the agent and not by the Commission. It might be argued, however, that there is an incidental cost to the State in administering the program and that in the absence of specific legislative authority, it should be discontinued. With reference to the Director's "memorandum" to full-time employees, the only fault I can see is the layman's language used in the next to the last paragraph, a mistake that could be made by anyone not versed in law nor the insurance profession. Since he was acting under the assumption that he had authority to negotiate with the company under Ga. Code Ann. 56-2431, he merely used the memorandum, in my opinion, to advise the employees of the results of the negotiations carried on in their behalf. In my view, it was a simple notification that the plan was available to employees rather than a solicitation that they subscribe. It is my opinion that the sole purpose of the Commission's interest was to provide its employees with a voluntary program whereby they might obtain liability insurance at a reasonable rate while operating State-owned equipment. Summarily, I can find the Director guilty of no infraction of the Insurance Code; and if a violation does exist, it would be on the part of the insurer. OPINION 66-94 (Unofficial) May 27, 1966 You indicate that you are uncertain as to how service can be perfected upon non-residents in adoption proceedings under the recent amendment to the adoption laws set forth in Ga. Laws 1966, p. 212, et seq. Section 5 of the original Act provided, inter alia, that upon the filing of a petition for adoption the court would fix a date upon which the petition would be heard, and that: 317 .. one conformed copy of the petition, together with a copy of the court's order thereon, shall be served on the party or parties whose written consent to the adoption is required . . . , unless service of said petition and notice has been duly waived in writing. Ifany such party or parties be a nonresident of the State, then the clerk shall send to said party or parties by registered mail a conformed copy of said petition and order; but if the address be unknown, then notice shall be given by publication once a week for four weeks in the ojjlcial organ of the county where such proceedings are pending." Ga. Laws 1941, pp. 300, 302 (Ga. Code Ann. 74-408) (Emphasis added.) In repealing this section in its entirety and substituting in lieu thereof a new section 5 in order to eliminate the interlocutory hearing formerly required in adoption proceedings, Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 212, 213, while carrying forth the initial portion of the above quoted language in ipsissimus verbis, has entirely omitted the italicized portion dealing with service upon non-residents. While it might be possible to effect service by publication or such method as the judge might prescribe, under Ga. Code Ann. 81204 if adoption could be deemed to be an equitable proceeding, it appears that adoption is generally treated as special statutory proceeding rather than a child of equity. See 2 C.J.S., Adoptions, I (b), p. 368, 34, 35; Rahn v. Hamilton, 144 Ga. 644 (1915). 1t has long been the rule, of course, that unless some other mode is especially provided for by statute, service of process or legal notice must ordinarily be made personally on the party or individual in question. E.g., Atwood v. Hirsh, 123 Ga. 734 (1905); Baldwin v. Baldwin, 116 Ga. 471 ( 1902). While I can not speculate whether in light of the amendment and legislative oversight in question the courts would hold service upon non-residents by publication in adoption proceedings to be sufficient, it would seem to me that the very uncertainty dictates that the only safe course of action would be to obtain a written acknowledgment or waiver of service from the person or persons required to be served. In closing I might point out that the amendatory act in question was not drawn in this office as you assumed. Most bills are now drafted by the legislative counsel of the General Assembly, but I have no knowledge as to the source of this particular bill. 318 OPINION 66-95 (Unofficial) May27, 1966 This will acknowledge your letter regarding the signing of summons to jurors. The language of Ga. Code Ann. 24-2714 (3) which you refer to in your letter is still a part of that section. I refer you, however, to Ga. Code Ann. 59-70 I which provides that petit jurors shall be summoned in the same manner as is provided in Ga. Code Ann. 59-206 for summoning grand jurors. Ga. Code Ann. 59-206 provides that " ... the clerk of the superior court shall issue and deliver to the sheriff or his deputy, a precept containing the names of the persons drawn ... and upon receipt of the precept, the sheriff or his deputy shall cause the persons whose names are therein written to be served personally. . . ." OPINION 66-96 May 27, 1966 This will acknowledge receipt of a copy of a merger agreement involving the merger of American Central Insurance Company and Central Surety and Insurance Corporation into Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York and a copy of a proposed order for the release of deposits found to be in excess of those required by law as a result of the merger. You have asked that these documents be reviewed and for an opinion as to the justification for release of the deposits under Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108. I have been advised by your office that Commercial Union Insurance Company has satisfied the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 56-309 (b) and that you have on file a certificate from the Superintendent of Insurance of New York certifying that Commercial Union has $600,000.00 on deposit for the benefit of all policyholders of the company. The securities on deposit with the State Treasurer here will satisfy the requirements of Ga. Code Ann. 56-310 as well as Ga. Code Ann. 114-606. I note that the order specifically finds and concludes that Commercial Union Insurance Company of New York as the surviving corporation is entitled to have all of "the foregoing securities" registered in its name as owner and that the present deposits are in excess of the amounts required by law. 319 I have been advised by your office that $50,000 of the securities on deposit in the nam.e of Central Surety and Insurance Corporation are on deposit for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of Ga. Code Ann. 114-606 which requires every insurance company doing a workmen's compensation business in this State to furnish a bond payable to the State in the sum of $50,000, or, in lieu of such bond, to make a deposit in the same amount with the State Treasurer in the form of other security satisfactory to the Insurance Commissioner. Ga. Code Ann. 56-1108 authorizes the Insurance Commissioner to release deposits "made in this State under this Title" to the extent such deposit is in excess of the amount required. (Emphasis added.) In view of the fact that $50,000 of the securities of Central Surety and Insurance Corporation are not deposits made under the Insurance Code ("this Title"), I recommend that your order be revised accordingly. OPINION 66-97 (Unofficial) May 30, 1966 You ask whether military personnel who claim homestead exemption in Georgia are liable for ad valorem taxes on their personal property. Ga. Code Ann. 92-233 provides in part as follows: "The word 'homestead' whenever used in this law . . . , shall mean and is defined to be the following: "(a) The actual permanent place of residence of a person who is the applicant and which constitutes the home of the family. * * * "(h) In all the classes above defined, the homestead exempted must be actually occupied as the permanent residence and place of abode by the person awarded the exemption, and such homestead shall be the legal residence and domicile of such person for all purposes whatsoever." 320 In view of the above provisions, a member of the military service claiming a homestead exemption in Georgia is a legal resident of Georgia and would be liable for personal property taxes. OPINION 66-98 (Unofficial) May 30, 1966 This is in reply to your recent letter in which you have raised many questions relevant to the laws of Georgia governing the hospitalization of mentally ill persons. Your various points can be consolidated into the main inquiries which are as follows: (l) "Does the revised law say one has to be psychotic to be committed or does it say the three nearest of kin can force hospitalization of a relative who is mentally ill and rejects any form oftreatment?" Although the present mental health laws differ in various respects from their predecessors, the rule remains unchanged. A person can still only be involuntarily hospitalized through the legally specified commitment procedures and the nearest of kin still lack the power to force a person's hospitalization solely through their own actions. As to the required judicial procedure for involuntary commitment, you are referred the Ga. Laws 1954, pp. 499, 534. (Ga. Code Ann. 88-506) (2) "Please clarify the part of the law which states that 'one has to be mentally ill to the extent that he is not "functioning normally" '." The term "mentally ill person" is defined as follows: "(a) 'Mentally ill person' shall mean a person who is afflicted with a psychiatric disorder which substantially impairs his mental health; and because of such psychiatric disorder requires care, treatment, training, or detention in the interest of the welfare of such person or the welfare of others of the community in which such person resides and shall include, but not be limited to, any mental retardation, alcoholism, or drug addiction when due to or accompanied by rriental illness or mental disease, or, in the case of any mental retardation, when the mentally retarded person is incapable 321 thereby of making a satisfactory adjustment outside of a psychiatric hospital;" Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 534. (Ga. Code Ann. 88-501) (Emphasis added.) As to the application of the test of "a mentally ill person" contained in the above-cited statutory provisions, that is a discretionary determination which under Georgia law is to be exercised by a judge in conjunction with a court-appointed commission, a majority of whom shall be practicing medical physicians. (See Ga. Code Ann. 88-506.) Accordingly, it is not proper for this office to comment in any fashion on the conclusions to be drawn from certain alleged symptoms relative to the mental health of a particular person. OPINION 66-99 May 30, 1966 You requested my official interpretation of Act No. 569. Specifically, you have asked the following questions: "I. What is the retroactive and termination date (if any) to eligible veterans under the Act?" a. Retroactive Date If by "retroactive" date you mean that period of most remote service which would entitle a veteran to benefits under the Act, the answer lies in the definition of "war period" as set out in Public Law No.2 of the 73rd Congress as amended by Public Law 85-56 of the first Session of the 85th Congress, which provides: "The term 'period of war' means the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, and the period beginning on the date of any future declaration of war by Congress and ending on a date prescribed by Presidential proclamation or concurrent resolution of the Congress." 38 U.S.C.A. 101 (II). Therefore, the date the Spanish-American War commenced, (April21, 1898) would be the "retroactive" date of the Act. The following dates and definitions should be of aid to you in interpreting "war period" as intended under subsection (4) (a) of Section 2 of Article IV of the Act: 322 "(6) The term 'Spanish-American War' (A) means the period beginning on April 21, 1898, and ending on July 4, 1902; (B) includes the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion; and (C) in the case of a veteran who served with the United States Military Forces engaged in hostilities in Moro Province, means the period beginning on April 21, 1898, and ending on July 15, 1903. "(7) The term 'World War I' (A) means the period beginning on April 6, 1917, and ending on November II, 1918; and (B) in the case of a veteran who served with the United States Military Forces in Russia, means the period beginning on April6, 1917, and ending on April 1, 1920. "(8) The term 'World War I I' means ... the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on December 31, 1946. "(9) The term 'Korean Conflict' means the period beginning on June 27, 1950, and ending on January 31, 1955." 38 U.S.C.A. 101 (6)-(9). b. Termination Date. There is no termination date of eligibility under the Act. "2. Must a Veteran serve in the territorial boundaries as specified in the Act in order to qualify for a free veteran's license?" No specific "territorial boundaries" are set out under the Act except under subsections (4) (e) and (f) of Section 2 of Article IV, which require "service in Vietnam or contiguous waters or air space." Subsections (4) (a) through (4) (d) do not require service in a specifically designated area, however. "3. Would 'stateside' duty qualify an honorably discharged veteran who had service during the Viet Nam war?" Since the conflict in Viet Nam is not technically a "period of war," as defined by 38 U.S.C.A. 101 (II) cited above, a veteran with only stateside service therein would not be presently eligible. Should this conflict subsequently be designated as a "period of war," a veteran with such service would be eligible. 323 "4. Would duty aboard a combat ship outside the territorial boundaries qualify for a free veterans license?" The answer to question two is equally suited to question four. "5. Would service in militarized zones such as the Canal Zone, Dominican Republic, the Philippines, etc., be entitled to free veteran's license?" Once again, service in a particular area, except in the case of Viet Nam, does not, in itself, entitle a veteran to a free license. If such service was during a "period of war," as previously mentioned, the issuance of an honorary license would be warranted. Similarly, if such veteran saw service in a "military campaign or operation waged or prosecuted by authority of the United Nations" (subsection (4) (c)), or had a 50% service connected disability "received in any war or armed conflict" (subsection (4) (d)), he would be eligible. "6. Would the holder of the Viet Nam Service Medal or Expeditionary Medal be prima facie evidence for qualification and, if so, what documents would be acceptable to substantiate the validity of its issuance?" The receipt of either of the above medals is insufficient to entitle the holder to an honorary license. The recipient must also be a veteran, "separated from such service under honorable conditions." The document necessary to substantiate the claim is Defense Department Form No. 214, commonly known as a "discharge," the reverse side of which shows all medals and decorations received and the theater of operations in which service was seen. Item 19 of the discharge lists the place of residence at the time of enlistment or induction. Veterans who have lost their discharge can obtain new copies from their County Service Officer. "7.(a) What type of discharges are acceptable? (b) What type discharges are not acceptable?" a. Subsections (4a) through (4e) require that separation from the service be "under honorable conditions." Therefore, the only two acceptable types of discharge would be (I) an "Honorable Discharge" and (2) a "General Discharge," 324 which ever since World War II has been the standard form of discharge. b. Conversely, the unacceptable types are as follows: (I) "Under conditions other than Honorable." (2) "Under Dishonorable Conditions." (3) "Discharge or Dismissal by Reason of the Sentence of a General Court- Martial." (4) "Discharge on the Ground that the Person was a Conscientious Objector Who Refused to Perform Military Duties or Refused to Wear the Uniform or Otherwise to Comply with Lawful Orders." (5) "Discharge by Reason of Desertion." (6) "Resignation of an Officer for the Good of the Service." (7) "Acceptance of Undesirable Discharge to Escape Trial by General Court- Martial." "8. Would a Member of the Armed Forces who has 90 days or more service on active duty, however not discharged, be eligible for free veteran's license?" Unless he had been previously honorably discharged and then re-enlisted, a serviceman on active duty would not be eligible since he would not, as yet, be "separated from the service under honorable conditions." 9. Since the answer to question 8 was negative, no answer to question 9 is required. "I 0. What documents are necessary for free license to veteran's spouse?" In the vast majority of cases, the only two documents necessary will be a formal "Notice of Death," which is sent by the Armed Forces to the individual listed by decedent as his or her spouse, and a verification of residence at time of induction or enlistment. The date of death listed on the notice would indicate whether service had been rendered in a "period of war." A surviving spouse who has lost his or her notice may 325 obtain a duplicate by contacting the appropriate branch of the servtce. In the absence of a discharge, residence and decorations received may be verified by the spouse's obtaining a letter from the Contact Division Officer at the Veterans Administration or the County Service Agent. Similarly, the surviving spouse of a veteran with a 50% disability could obtain proof of this fact from the Veterans Administration. It should be noted that the Act does not require the veteran to have received a formal discharge in order for his or her surviving spouse to be eligible. What is required, however, is a separation from the service under "honorable conditions." Therefore, a veteran who was killed in service should be classified as one honorably separated, and the surviving spouse would be eligible if the other requirements of the Act are met. "II. If veterans spouse is a widowed man and is a nonveteran, how is Department to know if and when he re-marries which would disqualify him for a veterans license?" The Department may, in its discretion, provide space on its application form for an affidavit to read as follows: "I do solemnly swear, that I am the surviving spouse of a lawful marriage not dissolved or annulled prior to the death of the above-named service person, that I have not remarried since such death, and that the foregoing statements are true to the best of my knowledge and belief." The affidavit would be acceptable as prima facie evidence that the applicant has not remarried. "12. What documents are necessary to establish 50% disability?" Subsection (4) (d) requires that the physical disability be 'officially rated" at 50%. This would entail the veteran's filing a claim with the Veterans Administration for disability benefits. An investigation or physical examination would be conducted and the results compared with those of the veteran's induction physical. If a service connected disability 326 is found to exist, the Administration issues a letter reporting the percentage of such disability to the veteran. This letter would be sufficient to prove the disability. "13. Does Section 2A of Article IV cover the dependents of service men?" There is nothing in the section to which you refer indicating that dependents are covered. I conclude, therefore, that they are not. OPINION 66-100 May 30, 1966 This is in reply to your letter of May 23, 1966, wherein you ask whether the state-wide local effort under the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act for the 1966-67 school year (i.e. 17%) is applicable to that portion of said year's allotment for maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses which is to be funded from a surplus accrued during the 1965-66 school year (when the statewide local effort was only 16% ). It is my understanding from our subsequent conversation that the Director of the Budget, pursuant to his authority under the Supplementary Appropriations Act of 1966 (Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 31, 38-39), has authorized this "internal transfer within a budget unit." It is my further understanding that the sum to be transferred pursuant to this authorization (which will amount to about $100.00 per State-allotted teacher) is not an amount "over and above" the sum required to fund the allotment for maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses under the minimum foundation program, but is instead an integral part of the sum which will be required to fully fund this allotment during the 1966-67 school year. Based upon this understanding of the factual situation, my opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION The state-wide local effort required under the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act for 1966-67 (i.e. 17%) is applicable to the Act's allotment for maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses in its entirety, including that portion of the allotment to be funded from a surplus accrued during the 1965-66 school year and transferred forward for this purpose by the Director of the Budget. 327 DISCUSSION Section 13 of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act, Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3, 13 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-613), has recently been amended by Ga. Laws 1966, p. 543, to increase the program's allotment for maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses from $400.00 per State allotted teacher to $600.00 per State-allotted teacher for the 1966-67 school year. Section 13, of course, is one of the eleven allotments which are added together to determine the total cost of providing the minimum foundation program of education. See Ga. Code Ann. 32-610. Under the Act this overall program (including the Section 13 allotment) is required to be funded partially by State and partially by local funds. On a State-wide basis the local share is fixed at 17% for the 1966-67 school year, this percentage reflecting a I% increase over the required local effort for 1965-66 ( 16%). See Section 22 of the Act (Ga. Code Ann. 32-622 (B) (2) )1 In essence your question is whether the ordinary applicability of the 17% figure for local effort during the 1966-67 school year is somehow altered respecting the Section 13 allotment because of the fact and to the extent that this allotment is to be funded in part from a surplus accrued during the 1965-66 school year when the required local effort was only 16%. In my opinion the answer must be in the negative due to the fact that required local effort for 1966-67 of 17% is manifestly applicable to all of the items listed in Section 10 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-610), including the Section 13 allotment. l am aware of no law which would alter this fact merely because the source of the funding of the State's share Section 13 allotment is in part an accrued surplus rather than wholly based upon the General Assembly's appropriation for 1966-67. As I view the matter the 17% matching fund requirement for the 1966-67 school year would apply to all Section 10 disbursements under the Act (this, as already stated, includes the Section 13 allotment) regardless of the source of the sum received by the State Department of Education to fund the same. I. Under Section 22 the local effort, set at 16rYr. for the 1965-66 school year. is increased one per cent. per year until it reaches a level of 20'; commencing with the 1969-70 school year. 328 OPINION 66-101 (Unofficial) May 31, 1966 You requested an interpretation of Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(d). Specifically, you have asked: "Is it mandatory that the Commission examine the alleged mentally ill person in a body when he is under detention, or can the doctors make their examination individually and then attend the hearing as a body and render their findings?" Although there are no decisions specifically interpreting this section of the 1964 Georgia Health Code, decisions interpreting former, but similar, Code provisions indicate that the examination must be by the Commission in a body. In Singer v. Middleton, 135 Ga. 825, which interpreted Civil Code (1895), 2573, the Supreme Court held that a provision requiring an alleged mentally ill person be "examined by inspection" by the Commissioners was mandatory and required a formal examination by the Commissioners in a body. A similar conclusion was also reached in Reagan v. Powell, 125 Ga. 89( 1906). It would seem, therefore, that the present law requires an examination by the Commission in a body at sometime during the proceedings. It would be sufficient if the Commission, in a body, examined such person and then held the hearing without his being present. Similarly, the law would be met even if no prior examination were held, provided, at the time of the hearing the Commission in a body examined the subject for commitment. OPINION 66-102 May 31, 1966 You requested my opmwn as to what constitutes a "motor vehicle" under the "Tag-Tax Act" (Ga. Laws 1966, p. 517), and specifically whether all equipment such as cranes, cement mixers, refrigeration units, etc. that are permanently attached to truck beds and bodies should be returned and assessed as a part of the motor vehicle. Section 2 of the "Tag-Tax Act" defines "motor vehicle" as follows: 329 "For the purposes of this Act, a motor vehicle is defined as any vehicle which is designed primarily for use upon the public roads." "Vehicle" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition, 1945, p. 2824 as: "That in or on which a person or thing is or may be carried from one place to another, especially along the ground ..." The controlling question is whether a vehicle is designed primarily for use upon the public roads. Thus, a farm tractor not being designed primarily for use upon the public roads would not, under this Act, be a motor vehicle, although under rare circumstances a particular use of such tractor may require its licensing. Equipment permanently attached to a truck is returned and assessed as a part of the motor vehicle. The value of such equipment is used in determining the taxable value of the motor vehicle. OPINION 66-103 (Unofficial) June 6, 1966 You inquired as to whether there was a 1966 amendment to Ga. Code Ann. 84-20 providing for the issuance of a free veterans license to a disabled veteran who lacks proof of his disability from the Veterans Administration. While there is no 1966 amendment to this section, it may well be that the individual mentioned is entitled to such a license under our present law as it is not mandatory that the disability be recognized by the V.A. It should be noted that Ga. Code Ann. 84-20 II authorizes the issuance of such licenses for two classes of veterans: I. disabled war veterans (subsection a) and 2. veterans of peacetime service with service-connected disabilities (subsection c). A war-time veteran need have only a ten percent disability, provable by either a letter from V.A., or a letter from the branch of the armed forces in which he served or the written certificate of two physicians. In interpreting a former, but similar, code provision, 330 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a war veteran's physical disability need not be service-connected to entitle him to a license. Holliman v. Mayor, etc. ofHawkinsville, 109 Ga. 107 (1899). However, a veteran of peacetime service must have a twenty-five percent service-connected disability, provable by a letter from the branch of the armed forces in which he served or the V.A. Summarily, if the person to whom you refer is a war veteran and has any ten percent disability, he is entitled to the license upon producing the certificate of two physicians or a letter from his branch of the service which substantiates his claim of disability. Also, a peacetime veteran with a twenty-five percent serviceconnected disability may establish his claim by a letter from his branch of the service, rather than a letter from V.A. I have contacted the Georgia State Department of Veterans Service regarding your letter and have been informed that any veteran who paid State income taxes for the previous year is ineligible for such a license. OPINION 66-104 (Unofficial) June 9, 1966 You have recently requested an unofficial opinion on your right to incarcerate a person, potentially dangerous to himself and others, without first obtaining a medical certificate diagnosing his trouble. It is my unofficial opinion that a summary proceeding for the arrest of such a person exists under Georgia Code Ann. 49-612. As you know, the "Georgia Health Code" (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 65 I) specifically repealed and superseded many provisions in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 49-6, but did not expressly repeal Ga. Code Ann. 49-612. Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(a), however, does require a medical certificate. Accordingly, the two Sections should be read together. Ga. Code Ann. 49-512 states in relevant part that when there shall be no guardian for an insane person (or the guardian, on notice, shall refuse or fail to confine his ward), and any person shall make oath that such insane person, "for public safety or other good 331 and sujjlcient reason, should not longer be left at large, the ordinary . . . shall issue a warrant as in criminal cases for the arrest of such insane person." (Emphasis supplied) Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(a) states that upon the written application of any person, on oath, stating that he believes another person is mentally ill and in need of hospitalization, "such application being accompanied by a certificate of a physician stating that he has examined the alleged patient in person not more than ten days prior to the date of such application and is of the opinion that he is mentally ill and should be hospitalized," the Court of the Ordinary of the county in which the patient is found will take jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Code Ann. 88-506(a) clearly requires both the oath and the physician's certificate as prerequisites to jurisdiction. The tenor of this Section, however, is directed toward the cure and rehabilitation of one mentally ill. Ga. Code Ann. 49-612, on the other hand, is concerned with public safety as well. The two code sections thus are not in conflict. This distinction was recognized by the Supreme Court of Georgia when it considered language identical to that of Ga. Code Ann. 49-612 in the case of Dickson v. Hicks, 160 Ga. 487,493 ( 1925), where the Court said: ... (T)he ordinary still has the right and duty, upon the finding that one is a lunatic and dangerous to be at large, to issue a warrant, and have such lunatic brought before him for investigation. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that you have jurisdiction, without a physician's certificate, to issue a warrant for the arrest of an insane person threatening the public safety. Following such an arrest, it would be advisable to have that person examined by a physician in order to aid you in your subsequent determination of whether such person should be committed. OPINION 66-105 (Unofficial) June 10, 1966 This refers to your inquiry concerning the legality of a Clerk of the Superior Court serving as a member of the General Assembly. 332 OPINION It is my personal opinion that a Clerk of the Superior Court cannot lawfully serve as a member of the General Assembly. DISCUSSION Art. I I I, Sec. IY, Par. VI of the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1945 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1606) provides in pertinent part: "No person holding a ... appointment, or office, having any emolument, or compensation annexed thereto, under this State . . . shall have a seat in either house;" (Emphasis added) On the ground that the office of Clerk of a Superior Court is a county office receiving no emolument from the State, the Attorney General, in 1956, stated in an unofficial opinion: "I know of no statute or constitutional provision prohibiting a county officer [i.e. Clerk of the Superior Court] from serving as a member of the General Assembly." See Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56 p. 81. In 1959, however, the General Assembly enacted its "Honesty in Government" Act, Ga. Laws 1959 pp. 34-44, with Section 7 thereof, as amended, (Ga. Code Ann. 26-5009) providing in the portion relevant to your inquiry: "To the end that the mandate of the Constitution contained in Article I, Section I, Paragraph XXI II ( 2-123), to the effect that "the legislative, judiciary and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct, and no person discharging the duties of one, shall, at the same time, exercise the functions of either of the others ..." be more adequately enforced; it shall be unlawful for (a) members of the General Assembly to accept or hold office or employment in the judicial branch of government; (b) judges of courts of record or their clerks and assistants, to accept or hold office or employment in the . . . legislative branch of government; " While I have strong doubts as to whether (b) would be held applicable to a Clerk of the Superior Court in view of the fact that as used in the phrase "clerks and assistants," the term "clerks" is 333 easily susceptible of being construed as referring to the judge's Ia w clerk or assistant rather than the Clerk of the Superior Court (criminal statutes, of course, are strictly construed against the State), it is my opinion that the broader scope of (a) would clearly apply to a member of the General Assembly who is either a law clerk to the judge or the Clerk of the Superior Court. Both positions would seem to me to be an "office or employment in the judicial branch of government." For this reason, it is my opinion that the prior unofficial opinion of this office that a Clerk of the Superior Court cbuld serve as a member of the General Assembly has been superseded by the 1959 "Honesty in Government" Act. OPINION 66-106 June I0, 1966 You asked the following question: "Is it necessary for an independent candidate for office to file a nomination petition with his notice of candidacy with me if that independent candidate was elected to the office for which he seeks re-election at the last preceding general election?" Ga. Code Ann. 34-100 I(b) provides, inter alia, that: "Each candidate for federal or state office, or his agent, desiring to have his name placed on the ballots, shall file notice of his candidacy, giving his name, residence address and the office he is seeking, in the office of the Secretary of State at least forty-five days prior to the election in the case of a general election and at least fifteen days prior to the election in the case of a special election; except that such filing shall not apply to a candidate for a militia district office (justice of the peace or constable). . . . Any candidate required to accompany his notice of candidacy with a nomination petition as hereafter prescribed shall file his notice at least sixty days prior to the general election." Ga. Code Ann. 34-100 I (c) contains the following provisions: "Each of such candidates shall accompany his notice of candidacy with a nomination petition in the form hereafter prescribed; except that such petition shall not be required if such candidate is: (i) a nominee of a political party for the office of presidential elector when such party has held a 334 national convention and therein nominated candidates for President and Vice President of the United States; (ii) a nominee of a political party for a public office when the prior nominee of such party for such office shall have received at least ten percent of the total votes cast for candidates seeking such office in the last election held to fill sa~; (iv) seeking office in a special election; or (v) seeking, in a general election, a county or militia district office or membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly in a county where no political party has or will hold a primary for the nomination of any candidate for any such office to be filled in such general election." The only exceptions which would relieve a candidate from the necessity of filing a nomination petition are enumerated in the Sections of the Code above quoted. Unless a candidate falls within one of the exceptions provided by law, he clearly must file a nomination petition. Under the provisions of the Georgia Election Code, the fact that a candidate is seeking re-election has no bearing upon the necessity for the candidate to file a nomination petition. OPINION 66-107 (Unofficial) Tune 13, 1966 You requested an unofficial opinion as to whether it would be permissible to use prisoners for the purpose of burying dead animals on private property and also, would it be permissible to use prisoners to spray stagnant streams and low wet places on private property in the control of mosquitoes. It is understood that this work is to be done for the general welfare and health of the public as a whole and not for the improvement of private property. To reiterate in view of the above, the use of convict labor on private property is permissible in situations where the sole benefit flows to the State, and it is the duty of the Board to examine each set of facts and determine whether the State is benefitting in the necessary degree. 335 OPINION 66-108 (Unofficial) June 13, 1966 You ask about the proper procedure for holding a special election to fill a vacancy in the office of Justice of the Peace. Ga. Code Ann. 24-406 provides that the Ordinary shall call an election to fill a vacancy in the office of Justice of the Peace and that the election shall be held within 30 days from the date of the vacancy. The Georgia Election Code (Ga. Code Ann. 34-806) provides that "at least 30 days shall intervene between the call of a special election and the holding of same." Pertaining to the filing of a notice of candidacy, Ga. Code Ann. 34-100 I (b) provides that a candidate for militia district office shall file his notice of candidacy in the Ordinary's office at least 15 days prior to the holding of a special election. There appear to be variances between the provisions Ga. Code Ann. 24-406 and 34-806 and 34-100 I. The provisions of the Election Code being the latest expression of the General Assembly on this subject, it is our opinion that the provisions of the Georgia Election Code are controlling. OPINION 66-109 (Unofficial) June 13, 1966 In your letter you ask the proper method of perfecting security interests in a Caterpillar tractor, a Hyster and a bulldozer used in snaking logs out of swamps. The method of perfecting liens and security interests provided in the "Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act" applies only to vehicles required to be titled and to "previously registered vehicles" as defined in Ga. Code Ann. 68-436a. The perfection of security interests in all other vehicles is controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code. Ga. Code Ann. 68-404a. provides in part that: "No certificate of title need be obtained for 336 (7) Special mobile equipment." The above-mentioned vehicles come within the definition of "special mobile equipment." Ga. Code Ann. 68-402a.(1). Ga. Code Ann. 68-407a. gives the owner of special mobile equipment the option of titling such equipment, but provides that the perfection of a security interest under the Title Certificate Act shall not be effective until compliance with the provisions of applicable law which otherwise relates to the perfection of security interests in personal property other than motor vehicles. Therefore, if a certificate of title has not been obtained on this equipment, the perfection of a security interest should be in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code, and if a certificate of title has been obtained covering this equipment, a security interest must first be perfected in accordance with the Uniform Commercial Code and then in accordance with the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act. OPINION 66-110 June 13, 1966 You requested my official opinion regarding the power of the Board of Regents to extend, after the bid date and the opening of the bids received, the time during which bids may be accepted for the sale of certain property held by the Regents of the University System of Georgia. In your letter and in the accompanying materials, you have indicated the facts to be as follows: The Board of Regents has authorized the sale of the old campus property of Armstrong State College in Savannah, Georgia. The advertisement for bids, setting May 17, 1966, as the date by which all bids must be received, has been published. The advertisement contained a provision that "the owner reserves the right to reject any or all bids and to waive technicalities and informalities." The bids have been opened. You have requested my opinion as to two questions, the second question being contingent upon an affirmative answer to the first, as follows: ( 1) Can the Board of Regents, at this stage of the proceedings, legally extend the time during which bids for the purchase of the subject property may be accepted? 337 (2) Can those persons who have submitted bids legally be advised that it appears possible that none of the bids submitted will be acceptable to the Board of Regents? As can be seen, if the answer to the first question is that the time for bidding cannot be extended, then the second question becomes moot because it would serve no useful purpose to encourage those who have submitted bids to resubmit higher bids if such later bids cannot legally be accepted. As heretofore indicated, the owner has reserved the right to reject any and all bids and to waive technicalities and informalities. In my opinion, an extension of the time during which bids may be accepted after the bid date, and the receipt and opening of bids, is not a "technicality" or an "informality". The owner has the power to reject all bids. The right to reject bids, coupled with the power to sell property, necessarily implies the right to re-advertise for bids. Therefore, it is my opinion that, under the circumstances described, the proper procedure is either (a) to accept the high bid, or (b) to reject all bids. It is my opinion that the Board of Regents should not, at this time, extend the time during which bids may be accepted under the previously published advertisement, i.e., without readvertising for bids. As heretofore indicated, it would serve no useful purpose to advise those persons who have submitted bids that it appears possible that none of the bids will be acceptable to the Board of Regents. OPINION 66-lll June 17, 1966 You request an opinion from the Department of Law concerning what legal action may be taken against an individual or firm that advertises and offers services as a Professional Consultant Forester when neither the individual, nor any member of the firm, is registered by the Georgia State Board of Registration for Foresters. Ga. Code Ann. 43-210a(b), contains the following provision: "Except as hereinafter specifically authorized, no person shall engage in the practice of professional forestry as defined in this Chapter, or in any manner advertise or hold himself out as engaged in such practice, without first being licensed as a registered forester under this Chapter." 338 Ga. Code Ann. 43-9907, provides, inter alia, that "Any person who shall practice or offer to practice the profession of forestry in this State without being registered or exempted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 43-2A, ... or any person, firm, partnership or corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of said Chapter, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500 for each offense. The Board, or such person or persons as may be designated by the Board to act in its stead, is empowered to prefer charges for any of the violations of said Chapter in any court of competent jurisdiction." It is my opinion that any unlicensed person, except those who are exempted from the registration requirements, may be prosecuted for practicing professional forestry as defined in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 43-2A or for holding himself out as being engaged in such practice. OPINION 66-112 June 20, 1966 This will confirm our conversation during which we discussed the authority of the Fulton County Medical Examiner to charge fees for autopsies performed on behalf of counties other than Fulton. The office of Coroner of Fulton County was abolished by virtue of a Constitutional Amendment proposed to the Georgia Legislature in 1964 and found in Ga. Laws 1964, p. 872. The Constitutional Amendment was passed and an enabling statute was subsequently passed by the Legislature in 1965 and found in Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2497. The enabling act abolished the office of Coroner in Fulton County effective January I, 1965, and created in its stead the office of Medical Examiner. The Act also provides that the Medical Examiner shall be compensated as determined by the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Fulton County and that all expenses of the office of Medical Examiner shall be paid by Fulton County. The Act also provides that all of the functions, powers, rights and duties that were previously exercised by the Coroner of Fulton County with reference to postmortem examinations shall be performed and exercised by the Medical Examiner with the exception that the Medical Examiner shall have no authority to summon and empanel a jury to hold inquests. The 339 Medical Examiner of Fulton County is authorized to perform all of the functions prescribed for a Coroner under the provisions of the "Georgia Postmortem Examination Act" (Ga. Laws 1953, January-February Session, p. 602) with the exception of the provisions pertaining to the summoning and empaneling of a jury to hold inquests. When the Constitutional Amendment was voted upon and passed with its subsequent enabling statute, the Coroner viz. medical examiner of Fulton County ceased to come under the provisions of the "Georgia Postmortem Examination Act" and a new position was created subject to the provisions of the enabling act. Inasmuch as the position of Medical Examiner then became a Fulton County position, then that position became subject to the resolutions of the Board of Commissioners. It naturally follows that if the position is subject to the resolutions of the Board of Commissioners, then-the Board of Commissioners can arrange to accept work from other counties at whatever fee arrangement it may set forth. I think there is little question as to the authority of the Commissioners to provide this service if they so see fit. However, the question of to whom the fees are to be paid i.e., the Treasurer of Fulton County or the Medical Examiner and his staff, is a question that must be decided by the governing authorities of Fulton County as this is primarily an internal matter. My conclusions above are based on the premise that the aforementioned Constitutional Amendment and subsequent enabling statute are valid as I have not inquired into the validity of the amendment and enabling statute. OPINION 66-113 (Unofficial) June 20, 1966 You state that a vacancy has occurred on the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Greene County, that the unexpired term of the former Commissioner is for more than one year's duration, and that the Commissioner was elected from a district as opposed to being a county-wide representative. You asked whether the election should be held county-wide, whether there is a closing date upon which candidates must qualify, '340 and whether the election is to be called and held within the time limits prescribed by Ga. Laws 1964, p. 2170. Ga. Laws 1961, pp. 2223, 2228, contains the following provision: "In the event a vacancy occurs, as herein stated, and if the vacancy that has occurred is the office of the commissioner elected from a commissioner district, and the unexpired term be for more than one (I) year, the Ordinary of Greene County, within ten ( 10) days after said vacancy occurs, shall call a special election. At such election, all the qualified voters of the district wherein such vacancy exists shall be eligible to vote, and the person elected shall be from the district wherein the vacancy occurs. Such election shall be held on a day not less than ten (10) nor more than fifteen (15) days from the issuance of the call". Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 2170, 2173, contains the following provision: "Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the five commissioners, as provided in this Act, shall be elected by the qualified voters of the entire county". It appears that there is a variance between the provisions of the two statutes above quoted insofar as who shall be eligible to vote for a commissioner representing a district. It is our opinion that the 1964 legislation supersedes the 1961 Act in this particular, and that the election should be held on a county-wide basis. Neither Ga. Laws 1961, p. 2223 nor Ga. Laws 1964, p. 2170 provides for a terminal date upon which candidates must qualify Ga. Code Ann. 34-IOOI(b) provides that a candidate for county office shall file notice of his candidacy in the office of the Ordinary at least fifteen days prior to the date of the election in the case of a special election. Therefore, a candidate, in order to have his name placed upon the ballots, must file notice of his candidacy at least fifteen days prior to the date designated as the date upon which the election shall be held. With respect to your third question, there appears to be a variance between Ga. Laws 1961, pp. 2223, 2228, and the Georgia Election Code with respect to the date upon which the election shall be held. Ga. Code Ann. 34-806, provides that at least thirty days must intervene between the call of a special election and the holding of the election. It is our opinion that the Georgia Election Code supersedes the 1961 Act, therefore, the election may be held at any date more than thirty days distant from the date of the call of same. OPINION 66-114 341 June 21, 1966 I apologize for the very extended delay in replying to your letter, but it has been necessary to give the questions posed in your letter a great deal of consideration. In your communication, you posed several questions concerning the construction of House Bill No. 60, passed by the last session of the Georgia General Assembly and signed by the Governor, relating to voluntary sterilization (Ga. Laws 1966, p. 453). First, let me say that in my opinion House Bill No. 60 does not contain and does not provide an exhaustive nor exclusive method for voluntary sterilization in the State of Georgia. The provisions of House Bill No. 60 are, at the most, cumulative, providing one express statutory method for the protection of a doctor when a voluntary sterilization procedure is performed. That is, subject to the provisions of House Bill No. 60, a doctor is granted an additional degree of legal immunity, provided the provisions of House Bill No. 60 are complied with. That is not to say, that the doctor would not likewise be legally immune from liability in the event the provisions of House Bill No. 60 are not complied with, or in the event House Bill No. 60 had not become law. In my opinion, and insofar as I have been able to determine, there is no public policy in Georgia that would prohibit or prevent a doctor from performing a voluntary sterilization procedure upon either a male or female provided the consent of the spouse was obtained, and provided that the spouse and the party upon whom the procedure was to be performed were 21 years of age or more, and were of sound mind, and provided further that both parties were aware of the significance of this procedure and it had been fully explained to them. In reply to your specific inquiries, your first question would have to be answered in the negative in that the clear express language of Section 2 of the Bill, "legally married," would necessarily exclude any unwed person. Your third question relates to the authority to perform a sterilization procedure for other than therapeutic reasons on persons under 21. It is my opinion that it would be very dangerous to undertake such a procedure on a person under 21 for other than 342 therapeutic reasons whether they were married or unmarried, and I must, therefore, answer the third question in the negative. Your second question relates to how you should in effect treat a "common-law" marriage for the purposes of voluntary sterilization procedures as provided for in this Act. This is, and will continue to be, a most difficult area. Unfortunately, I do not believe that there is a completely satisfactory solution to this problem. It would be my suggestion that no sterilization procedures be performed on any person unless that person could furnish a certificate of marriage indicating that a formal ceremonial marriage had been performed. I would further suggest that a complete release and a complete consent be obtained, not only from the patient, but from the patient's spouse, and that both the patient and the patient's spouse execute an affidavit to the effect that they are married to one another, presently living with one another, and that neither party has any prior undissolved marriage. There are many cases in Georgia holding and recognizing a legal presumption in favor of ceremonial marriages, which presumption is not present in the case of common-law marriages. In any event, should any special problems and facts arise or should any unusual circumstances be present, it would certainly be advisable to refer the matter to legal counsel for a determination on each individual case. In the event of doubt, I would recommend that the procedure not be performed. In order to come within the protection of the provisions of the 1966 Act, a written request must be made by the patient and by his or her spouse, requesting the sterilization procedure. A full and reasonable explanation should be given by the doctor to the patient and his or her spouse. While it is not absolutely necessary, it would certainly be advisable to put the explanation in writing. A consultation with another physician or surgeon is also provided for. As I have said before, the specific procedures and comments contained herein relate to House Bill No. 60 passed by the last session of the Georgia General Assembly and relate to only one method which has been expressly provided by statute for the limitation of liability of a medical doctor performing a voluntary sterilization procedure. It is my strong feeling and my considered opinion that the 343 provisions of House Bill No. 60, if followed, will most certainly free the medical doctor from any possible liability except in the case of negligence in the performance of said procedures, but I do not think either the public or the doctors generally should consider House Bill No. 60 as the only method for obtaining voluntary sterilization procedures without legal liability. Such procedures can be performed independent of the provisions of House Bill No. 60, in my opinion, without the doctor performing same being overly concerned with the question of his legal liability, provided the reasonable and common sense legal safeguards are complied with. Doctors should not consider nor construe the provisions of House Bill No. 60 as the exclusive method whereby a legally safe voluntary sterilization can be accomplished. Under the proper circumstances it is entirely possible and feasible that a voluntary sterilization procedure can be performed without complying 10 every particular with the provisions of House Bill No. 60. OPINION 66-115 (Unofficial) June 21, 1966 You asked our advice in regard to any statutory provision pertaining to the use of motor vehicles by private citizens in an area where highway construction is in progress. We know of no specific statutes pertaining to the rules of the road applicable to State highways which are under construction. However, there are several general provisions and your attention is called to Ga. Code Ann. 68-1626 (a) "General speed restriction"; 68-1603 (b) "Public officers and employees to obey Ia w; exceptions"; and 68-1643.2, Interference with fences, barriers or barricades on, along, or to limited access highways, streets, and roadways prohibited. There are several administrative provisions pertaining to public convenience and safety, as well as authority relative to the status of flagmen in construction areas. These are contained in the Standard Specifications, Volume I, Sections 7.06 through 7.07. I am happy to enclose a copy of these provisions which have been xeroxed from one of the official volumes. These Standard Specifications are a part of every State Highway Department construction contract. 344 OPINION 66-116 (Unofficial) June 21, 1966 I have examined H. B. 76 and H. B. 77, passed at the last session of the General Assembly (Ga. Laws 1966, p. 249, and Ga. Laws 1966, p. 203), which deal with audits of funds granted to municipalities and counties for the construction and maintenance of streets and public roads. Both Acts were approved on March 7, 1966, and became effective on that date, there being no specific language in either Act providing for another effective date. It is my opinion that both of these Acts would apply to annual fiscal periods of counties and municipalities, which ended on or after March 7, 1966. That is to say, the provisions of these two Acts would be applicable to all counties and municipalities whose annual fiscal period ended on March 7, 1966, or any subsequent date thereafter, but would not apply to any fiscal periods ending on March 6, 1966, or any date prior thereto. It is my opinion that the six month period provided in each Act, commences to run on the day after the end of the respective fiscal year. For example, counties or municipalities on the calendar year would have six months from January I, 1967, in which to file the requisite audit, and counties on a July I - June 30 fiscal period would have six months from July I, 1966, in which to file the requisite audit. Similar computations would also apply as to counties and municipalities with other fiscal periods. I might at this point call your attention to a fact about which I am sure you are aware; that is, the many disparities between the fiscal periods of the local governmental units involved. In this connection I would refer you to the 1965 Statistical Report filed by the Department of Revenue of the State of Georgia, and in particular, to pages 54 thru 64 wherein the fiscal periods of most of Georgia's counties and municipalities are set forth. It is also my understanding that the office of the State Treasurer has a complete list of all counties and municipalities receiving funds for which an audit is required by these two Acts. It is my opinion that the following provision of H. B. 77, to wit, "it shall be the duty of the State Auditor to make such certification when no audit is received or when a delinquent audit is received" is 345 applicable when a delinquent audit is received or upon the expiration of the six month period referred to above. The following language of H. B. 77, to wit, "in the event any county is not now having a regular annual audit made of its funds, the State Treasurer shall not distribute any further funds under this section to such county until an audit has been made and submitted to the State Auditor" would prohibit the State Treasurer from distributing any funds to a county which is not now having a regular annual audit made. It is my opinion that the State Treasurer would be justified in relying upon the legal presumption that public officers are performing the duties imposed upon them by law, and unless he was informed or became aware of facts to the contrary, he could legitimately assume that each county was having a regular annual audit made inasmuch as such an obligation is imposed by law on each and every county of this State. That is to say, it would be my opinion that the State Treasurer would be justified in continuing to make distributions to the respective counties unless and until he received a certificate within the provisions of this Act from you, provided he had no actual notice or reasonable reason to believe that the county involved was not actually having a regular annual audit made. Comments hereinbefore made apply to H. B. 77, and are equally applicable to H.B. 76 which deals with municipalities, with the exception hereinafter mentioned. There is one main difference in the two Bills other than the obvious difference that one applies to counties and the other to municipalities. The Act applying to municipalities (H. B. 76) contains the following language: "In the event any municipality is not now having a regular annual audit made of its funds, the State Treasurer shall not distribute any further funds under this Act to such municipality until ...", and then two alternative procedures are set forth. Inasmuch as I am not aware of any general law of this State requiring all municipalities to have a regular annual audit, we are presented with a somewhat different situation insofar as the presumption that one is being made is concerned. It would seem to me that this particular provision of the law would require the State Treasurer to make 346 some determination as to whether a municipality was now having a regular annual audit of its funds, and if not, whether any of the two specified alternatives have been complied with. It would be relatively easy and simple to determine whether the first alternative had been met. That is, whether an audit had been submitted to you. The second alternative would be equally easy in that (1) it would require the mayor or clerk to submit a statement under oath to you stating that the municipality does not have a regular annual audit, (2) that the funds had been received under this Act had been deposited in and disbursed from a separate account, and (3) that the funds had been expended for the purposes authorized by this Act. I am forced to the conclusion that in the absence of the foregoing, the State Treasurer would not be authorized to distribute any further funds to a municipality, and in all probability any distributions to a municipality not meeting the above stated alternatives would be questionable. Contrary to my oral statement to you, I am having some difficulty in making some generalization of what these funds may be used for. To further complicate the matter, it is my opinion that the standards applicable to counties are different from those applicable to municipalities. The counties would be limited to using the funds "for the construction and maintenance of public roads" as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 92-1404, while the municipalities would be authorized to use the funds "for construction and maintenance of public roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges and appurtenances, and to provide traffic control devices and equipment to control and accommodate the flow of traffic therein." See Ga. Laws 1965, p. 458 at 459, Sec. I. Therefore, in the case of counties, it is my opinion that the funds would be limited to the direct cost involved in the construction or maintenance of public roads. This in itself is a generalization, and I could only say that to be a legitimate and legal expenditure, the item would have to be traceable directly to such construction and maintenance, and would have to be an item that would be customarily associated with the construction and maintenance of roads. In the case of municipalities, the first criterion to be met would 347 be that the municipality must have a responsibility to perform the function. The second criterion would be that the expenditure must be for a road, street, sidewalk, bridge or appurtenance, either the construction and maintenance of same which is a part of a public system; or in the alternative, the expenditure must be for a traffic control device or equipment used to control and accommodate the flow of traffic on one of the aforementioned roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges or appurtenances. It would be impossible and dangerous to attempt to anticipate every possible alternative that could arise, and I could not and would not want to do so. I would, however, point out what this office has already ruled; that is, that the purchase of property for rightof-way purposes is a legitimate purpose, and that the payment of bills for electric current needed and actually used in the operation of traffic control devices, such as stop lights, is permissible; but the electric current used in street lights is not a legitimate expenditure within the purview of this law. We have already ruled unofficially that the expenses incurred in the conducting of a survey of the city limits to determine where city maintenance ends and county responsibility begins was not a legitimate expenditure. This office has also ruled that even if the expenses incurred are within those allowable under one of the Acts, it would not be proper to contract for the accomplishment of these purposes before receiving funds. I have also for the purposes of this letter, assumed that the two Acts in question are constitutional, and therefore, the question of constitutionality is not passed upon. I do not mean to suggest that there is a constitutional problem, but merely to express that I have given no consideration to same at this time. OPINION 66-117 June 21, 1966 You ask whether the Lowndes County Board of Education has authority to borrow against funds held to its credit by the State School Building Authority, as well as against allotments reserved for the county schools by the State Board of Education. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: 348 OPINION By virtue of a constitutional amendment of local application, the Board of Education of Lowndes County may borrow funds for the purpose of constructing school buildings and facilities without regard to the general constitutional provisions regarding debt limitation and voter approval. It is also authorized to secure payment of such debt by a pledge of such building funds as are or may be forthcoming to Lowndes County from the State through the Minimum Foundation Program for Education. DISCUSSION Ordinarily the ability of a county school system to incur debt is restricted by Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6001) which imposes a general limitation of seven per centum of the assessed value of taxable property within the school system and further requires the assent of its voters to the incurring of the debt. However, a 1960 amendment to this provision modifies such restrictions with respect to school building debts in Lowndes County. This local amendment, which is set forth in Ga. Laws 1960, pp. 1223-24, declares: "Any other provisions of this Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, the County Board of Education of Lowndes County is hereby authorized and empowered to borrow funds for the purpose of constructing school buildings and facilities, and pledge the building funds which will or may be forthcoming to Lowndes County from the State through the Minimum Foundation Program for Education as security and payment therefor." While your letter does not expressly so state, I assume that the funds held to the credit of the county board by the State School Building Authority are funds which were allotted for said county and paid over to the Authority under Section 25 of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3, 24 (Ga. Code Ann. 32-625)1 Upon this assumption, I conclude that the Lowndes County Board is authorized to pledge the minimum foundation program funds held to its credit by the State School 1. This same provision appeared in the older Minimum Foundation Program Act. See Ga. Laws 1951, pp. 677,678. 349 Building Authority as well as sums to be received directly from the State Board of Education2 OPINION 66-118 June 22, 1966 In determining appropriate legal procedures for public hearings setting standards for interstate waters, several statutes are applicable and will be considered. The Georgia Water Quality Control Act, the legal basis for the Georgia Water Quality Control Board's existence, empowers it to hold hearings and grants full power to adopt the necessary rules of procedure. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 416, 420 (Ga. Code Ann. 17-505 (8) ). The Water Quality Control Board is also given the specific authority to enter into agreements and compacts with other states and the holding of hearings is a necessary act in fulfillment of this power. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 416,420 (Ga. Code Ann. 17-505 (3) (8) ). In addition, the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are applicable to the Georgia Water Quality Control Board, an agency of the State, when it promulgates rules subject to the regulatory force of this Act. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338, 340; 1965, pp. 283, 284-286 (Ga. Code Ann. 3 A-102). These provisions require that notice of the Board's intention to adopt rules of this type and to hold related hearings be mailed to all persons who have made written request and tendered the actual cost involved in the mailing. There is also the obligation to give groups of twenty-five or more persons the opportunity for an oral hearing. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338, 342; 1965, pp. 283,286. (Ga. Code Ann. 3 A-104 (l) (2) ). 2. While the use of funds to be received in the future as security for a present loan would more accurately be termed an "assignment" than a "pledge," compare old Ga. Code Ann. 1260 I (defining a pledge) with Ga. Code Ann. 85-1804 (assignment of funds), the distinction would, in view of the obvious intendment of authorizing the creation of a security interest in the allotment of Minimum Foundation Program for Education funds, seem to be academic. Accord, Ga. Code Ann. 109-A-9-102(2). 350 The duty to afford interested groups the opportunity to be heard in person is subject to interpretation in light of the circumstances of the particular situation. In this instance, providing a reasonable opportunity to be heard does not require a great number of hearings on each river system, but it will be necessary in the case of an extensive river system to hold a sufficient number of hearings so as to allow groups of interested parties to attend without the necessity of traveling for several hours. A careful effort to fulfill the procedural requirements of this Act is necessary since noncompliance can result in the invalidation of any resulting substantive rules. Ibid. The statutes specifically applicable to the State Department of Public Health, of which the Water Quality Control Board is a part, must also be considered. Public hearings relative to setting standards on interstate waters do not involve quasi-judicial action by a board of the Department of Public Health and hence certain procedural requirements are optional rather than mandatory. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 519 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-304); Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 519 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-307). It may however be advantageous to apply these rules since the notice requirements and significant rules of procedure are clearly spelled out therein. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 519 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-304). Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act requires that its applicable rules always be considered in conjunction with any additional requirements imposed by other statutes. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338, 342; 1965, pp. 283,286 (Ga. Code Ann. 3 A-104 (c)). Combining the relevant provisions of the two above-mentioned statutes in this manner leads to the conclusion that parties making the required prior request are to be notified by mail, and all others can receive sufficient notice through publication or by other means reasonably calculated to afford actual notice. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 338, 342; 1965, pp. 283, 286 (Ga. Code Ann. 3 A-104 (1) ); Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 519 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-304). All notices shall state the time and place of hearing, its nature, the matters of fact and law asserted, and must be given at least five days prior to the date set for hearing unless the agency determines that an immediate threat to the public health exists which requires shorter notice. Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 519 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-304). 351 OPINION 66-119 June 22, 1966 You requested an official opmwn as to whether it would be ,, permissible to use prisoners for the purpose of burying dead animals on private property and also, would it be permissible to use prisoners to spray stagnant streams and low wet places on private property in the control of mosquitoes. It is understood that this work is to be done for the general welfare and health of the public as a whole and not for the improvement of private property. To reiterate in view of the above, the use of convict labor on private property is permissible in situations where the sole benefit flows to the State, and it is the duty of the Board to examine each set of facts and determine whether the State is benefitting in the necessary degree. OPINION 66-120 (Unofficial) June 23, 1966 The Commissioner of Agriculture, State of Georgia, has received and referred to this office a letter from a State Representative in which he states that some of the people of his district "would not pay the one dollar per bale of cotton assessment which is being collected by the Agricultural Commodity Commission for Cotton until they knew the law concerning this fee." The Representative requested the Commissioner to reply direct to you in this matter and the Commissioner has, in turn, requested that this office reply direct to you concerning the legality of these fees. The Agricultural Commodity Commission for Cotton was formed pursuant to the authority contained in the Georgia Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act (Ga. Laws 1961, p. 301; Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 5-29), as amended (Ga. Laws 1964, p. 141), and under and pursuant to the provisions of that act the Commodity Commission for Cotton issued Marketing Order No. 8. That Marketing Order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11, 12, and 13 of the Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act, and the same was approved by the written. assent of the cotton producers affected by the order. 352 At the regularly scheduled meeting of the Cotton Commission on July 29, 1965, Marketing Order No. 8 was officially declared to have received the requisite number of votes as provided by law and an entry was made in the official minutes of that meeting of the Commission which declared Marketing Order No. 8 to be effective as of August 1, 1965. According to the entry made in the official minutes of that meeting, of the 15,917 ballots cast 13,809 voted for and 2, 108 voted against. Therefore, as you can see, the Agricultural Commodity Commission for Cotton having found that the necessary legal requisites for approval of a marketing order were present and after a motion was properly made and seconded, Marketing Order No. 8 was unanimously approved by the Agricultural Commodity Commission for Cotton and an official entry of such action was made in the minutes of that body. Enclosed you will find a copy of Marketing Order No. 8. May I direct your attention to the provisions of Section 9 of that marketing order which provides that the projects or undertakings of the expenses incurred under the order are to be financed by a levy and assessment of one dollar per bale on cotton produced in this State for sale. This provision is in conformity with Section 16 of the Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act which is codified as Ga. Code Ann. 5-2916. In this connection, may I also direct your attention to the provisions of that section which provides that the assessments, fees, and other levys adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act are expressly levied by the General Assembly of the State of Georgia as provided by the Constitution of this State. This provision, in my opinion, makes the assessment a tax levied by the General Assembly the same as any other tax levied by that body. From what has been said above and from my review of the Agricultural Commodities Promotion Act, and my further review of Marketing Order No. 8 and the procedures under which it was adopted, I find no reason to question its validity nor the legality of the assessments made by Marketing Order No.8. OPINION 66-121 (Unofficial) June 24, 1966 This is in reply to your letter written on behalf of the Ordinary of Richmond County, in which you state that pursuant to Ga. Laws 353 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., pp. 2610, et seq., the Ordinary has called an election to be held on June 28, 1966, on the question of the annexation of certain territories to the City of Augusta. You further state that the Ordinary has determined that the election should be postponed until August 9, 1966. You ask whether the Ordinary has the authority to postpone the date of the election from June 28, 1966, to August 9, 1966, and if so, whether or not absentee ballots which have been applied for and submitted to the Board of Registrars could be used in the election on August 9, 1966. We find no authority in this State indicating that the Ordinary has the authority to postpone the election, in the sense that the election would be held on August 9, 1966, pursuant to the original call of the election which specified June 28, 1966, as the date upon which the election would be held. As you know, the validity of the election, if it is postponed would ultimately have to be determined by the courts, if an attack is made. OPINION 66-122 (Unofficial) June 24, 1966 You requested an opinion from the Attorney General as to the constitutionality of House Bill No. 672 (Ga. Laws 1966, p. 2801) entitled "An Act to Amend an Act providing for the Districting of Cobb County into Fire Prevention Districts." This letter will also confirm our telephone conversation of several days ago on the same subject. Ga. Laws 1937, p. 20, indicates a proposed amendment to Article II, Section I of the Georgia Constitution which provided that "The governing authorities of the County of Cobb shall have authority to establish and administer within the bounds of the County of Cobb districts for fire prevention, and to establish and administer in such districts systems of fire prevention . . . .'' A similar amendment was proposed in 1952 (Ga. Laws 1952, p. 516). (For purposes of this opinion, it will be assumed that both Constitutional Amendments were approved by the voters and were valid.) It is clear that the Constitutional Amendment vested in the 354 governing authorities of Cobb County, i.e., the Commissioners of Roads, the authority to "establish and administer." Ga. Laws 1966, p. 2801, states that "The affairs of each fire district created by the governing authority of Cobb County shall be administered by a Board of Fire Commissioners for each such district . . . . " It must be noted that the 1966 Act states that the affairs of the fire districts will be administered by some group other than the governing authority of Cobb County. This obviously contravenes the Constitutional Amendment cited above wherein it was clearly determined that the governing authority shall "establish and administer" the fire district. The apparent conflict in the language of the Constitutional Amendment and the 1966 Act can be analyzed by a review of Humthlett v. Reeves, 212 Ga. 8 (1955). In the Humthlett case, the question was whether or not the Cobb County Planning Commission was the governing authority of Cobb County, within the meaning of that phrase as used in the provision of the Constitution which authorizes the General Assembly to delegate to a county the authority to enact zoning and planning laws. Under certain Acts of the Legislature, the Planning Commission was clothed with the sole power and authority to create and establish restricted zones or districts throughout the territorial limits of Cobb County. The court held that the words "governing authority" were meant to refer to the county authorities who had authority to govern in the usual sense of these words and as had the authority to exercise general and not limited powers. The court further held that the Legislature exceeded its authority when it created a Planning Commission with authority to enact zoning laws and regulations for Cobb County. Applying the proposition set forth in the Humthlett case, it is clear that only the governing authorities, i.e., Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Cobb County, may administer the affairs of each fire district and said affairs may not be administered by a Board of Fire Commissioners. Therefore, it is my unofficial opinion that the aforementioned 1966 Act is void and of no effect. OPINION 66-123 (Unofficial) June 27, 1966 You raised two questions relevant to the election of members of the State Senate of Georgia. Your specific inquiries are as follows: 355 "1. Have there been any election of State Senators in Georgia since 1962?" Yes, elections were held in 19()4 to fill the seats in both houses of the Georgia General Assembly. The Constitution of this State specifically provides for the election of the entire membership of the State Legislature every two years. Art. III, Sec. IV. Par. I of the Canst. of Ga. (Ga. Code Ann. 2-1601) "2. How has the ballot been formulated so as to assure the election of a resident senator in each of the 7 senatorial districts within your Fulton County, while the 7 senators were being voted for on a county-wide basis? Conceivably, despite what the Supreme Court says, the 7 successful candidates, because they are chosen on a county-wide basis, could well all be residents of the same district. How can you prevent that without denying the voters the right to vote for the candidates of their choice?" It should initially be noted that the election procedure described in your question is no longer followed in Georgia. By virtue of a law passed during the 1966 session of the General Assembly, all State Senators, including those from multi-district counties are elected entirely by the voters of the district they wish to represent. Ga. Laws 1966, p. 561. Under the law prior to its modification, the entire electorate of a multi-district county did vote in each of the district contests for the State Senate. However, the various district races were separate from each other, the individual candidate only running against those competing to represent the same district, and each contest was voted on apart from the other races. As a result, it was not possible for two or more residents of an individual district to be elected to the State Senate even though one of the losing candidates may have received a greater number of votes than the winner in another district race. 1962 Extra Sess., Sept. pp. 7, 14 as amended. This system of electing members of the State Senate merely involved the use of an electorate larger than the prospective constituency and each senator represented a district approximately equal in population. Unlike the situation described in your letter involving a county in New York State, this method of election did not guarantee any political subdivision legislative representation 356 not commensurate with its population and hence did not give rise to legislative malapportionment in violation of the Federal Constitution. OPINION 66-124 June 27, 1966 With regard to your letter containing a copy of a letter from Gerald H. Faulkner requesting an official opinion from this Department on the non-profit status of the Georgia Egg Commission, it is our considered opinion as indicated in my letter of June 14 that our opinion would not be worth the paper on which it is written. You should inform Mr. Faulkner that to secure the benefit he desires he must seek a ruling from the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service. Enclosed are the necessary forms and instructions for making the application for exemption. Before going to the trouble of filing his application, however, Mr. Faulkner should consider the I.R.S.'s position with regard to the requirements for exemption. Section 501 (C) (3) lists several types of organizations which are exempt under 501 (A). Section 501 (C) (3) provides: "(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation, and which does not participate in or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." In order for Mr. Faulkner to secure the benefits he desires under the tax-sheltered annuity provided for in Section 403 (b) the ACC for Eggs must be exempt under 501 (c) (3), and the fact that it may be exempt under some other provision of the Code is of no consequence. The regulations issued by the I.R.S. dealing with 501 (c) (3) limit the scope of this provision. The regulations (1.501 (c) (3) -1) require 357 that the organization be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more of the purposes stated in Section 501 (c) (3)- this means the organization will be viewed from both vantage points. There have been three published rulings involving state agencies and wholly owned state organizations. In each case the point focused on by the Internal Revenue Service was "organized and operated exclusively." These rulings all indicated that a state agency could qualify for the exemption under 501 (c) (3) but that it must fit all the requirements of that provision. But in each case this initial statement was qualified by another statement which said that if the agency involved was an integral part of the state government or had powers inconsistent with Section 501 (c) (3), then it would not fit Section 501 (c) (3) because it would not be organized and operated exclusively for one of the specified purposes. The regulations also limit the purposes specified in Section 501 (c) (3) by carefully defining what each purpose includes. These regulations define (1) "Charitable purpose" as including (a) relief of the poor and distn:ssed or underprivileged, (b) advancement of religion, (c) advancement of science of education, (d) erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments or works, (e) lessening the burdens of government, and (f) promotion of social welfare, etc.; (2) "Educational purpose" as either instruction of individuals or the public generally; (3) "Testing for public safety" as testing of consumer products; and (4) "Scientific" as research for a public scientific purpose. My advice to Mr. Faulkner is that he read over the requirements and decide if he thinks the ACC for Eggs can satisfy them. If he decides that it does or if he feels it might, he should file the Form No. 1023 attached hereto. If he desires more information or assistance, we are available. OPINION 66-125 (Unofficial) June 28, 1966 This refers to your letter pertaining to the tenure of a member of the Fayette County Board of Education whose "term of office" 358 expires on December 31, 1966. You ask whether under a constitutional amendment of local application said member will hold over until January 1, 1969, when a successor elected at the general election in 1968 would assume the office. OPINION While the matter is not free from doubt, it is my personal opinion that the successor to the member of the Fayette County Board of Education whose term expires on December 31, 1966, should have been elected at the general November election of 1964 for a fouryear term to commence January 1, 1967. DISCUSSION Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 795-97, sets forth a constitutional amendment of local application to Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. I of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-6801) which provides that the five-member Board of Education of Fayette County shall be elected from five education districts. The amendment specifies that the members of the initial board so chosen are to be elected in a special election called by the Ordinary of Fayette County, shall serve for staggered terms of one, two, and four years, and that: "[a]ll members elected at such election shall take office on January l, 1963, and their term of office shall expire on December 31st of the last year of such term. The successors to such members shall be elected for a term of four years . . ." Up to this point the Amendment presents no problem, it being seemingly quite clear that the intendment is one of establishing a school board which is guaranteed a degree of continuity through the commonly used device of staggering the four years' terms of its members. Unfortunately, however, this clarity is completely obliterated by a clause immediately following the above quoted language. This clause reads: "and shall be elected at the same time County Officers of Fayette County are elected." The county officers of Fayette County, of course, were elected for their constitutional four year terms, see Art. XI, Sec. II, Par. I of the Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-7901) in November 1964, with the next election for county officers in Fayette County being, as you point out in your letter, November 1968. 359 If construed as requiring the election of school board members at the same time as all other county officers of Fayette County for four year terms which all commence on the January 1st immediately following the November election, it is obvious that this final clause would be wholly inconsistent with and repugnant to the prior language of the Amendment. Interpreted in this way the manifest intendment of providing for staggered four year terms would be defeated, with all school board members serving four year terms running concurrent with each other and with all other county officers. The manner in which you state your belief that the member whose term expires on December 31, 1966, will properly hold over until his successor is chosen at the election for county officers in November 1968 suggests that this is the construction which you have adopted, notwithstanding its destruction of the staggered term provisions of the Amendment. It may well be that the courts would uphold your view. It is settled that a public officer elected for a specific term retains such office not only for his statutory term, but also for such period thereafter until his successor is elected, qualified and commissioned. E.g., Stephenson v. Powell, 169 Ga. 406, 408 (2) (1929); Pearson v. Lee, 173 Ga. 496, 498 (1931 ); Accord, Geeslin .v. Opie, 220 Ga. 53, 56 (1964). And it has been said to be a rule of statutory construction that where two parts of a single Act are in conflict, the latest in position stands, as it is presumed to be the last expression of legislative will. E.g., Tyler v. Huiet, 199 Ga. 845, 850 (1945); Darby v. DeLoach, 190 Ga. 499,501 (1940). But although it is with great hesitancy that I predict what the courts might do in this confused situation, I feel constrained to disagree with the view you have expressed. The cardinal or first rule in construing an ambiguous statute is to effectuate the legislative intent and purpose if this can fairly be done. E.g., Lewis v. City of Smyrna, 214 Ga. 323, 326 (1958). As stated by the Georgia Supreme Court in Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., 214 Ga. 240, 242 (1958): "Where there is an apparent conflict between different sections of the same statute, the duty of a court is to reconcile them, if possible, so as to make them consistent and harmonious with one another. If they cannot be so reconciled the one which best conforms to the legislative intent must 360 stand. Where a particular expression in one part of a statute is not so extensive or large in its import as other expressions in the same statute, it must yield to the larger and more extensive expression, where the latter embodies the real intent of the legislature." In light of the foregoing, it is my view that if the clause cannot be reconciled with the staggered term intendment the courts would probably refuse to give it any effect whatsoever, and would apply the Amendment as if the "inconsistent" clause did not exist. In this event the member whose term expires on December 31, 1966, would be held to be properly elected at the general November election in 1966 and should assume office on January 1, 1967. On the other hand, Williams v. Bear's Den, Inc., supra, would clearly seem to say that this result can obtain only where it is not possible to reconcile the clause in question with the staggered term intendment of the provision. Here, notwithstanding the somewhat bizarre result it produces, the clause is quite susceptible of being harmonized with such intendment. While the election of all board members must, pursuant to the clause, be held at the same time as the election of all other county officers, it is not a necessity that their assumption of office for the four year term take place on the January 1st immediately following the election. It is quite possible for the election to be at the same time as other county officers, but for the terms of the school board members to commence two or three years after such election. Applying this construction, which permits the clause and staggered term intendment to be reconciled, it is seen that the election dates and terms of the board members under the constitutional amendment would be as follows: Election District 1&2 3&4 5 Initial Election 1962 Initial Term Jan. '63 Next Election Nov. '64 Next Term Election Jan. '68 Nov. '68 Term Jan. '72 1962 Dec. '63 Dec. '71 Dec. '75 Jan. '63 Nov. '64 Jan. '65 Nov. '68 Jan. '69 1962 Dec. '64 Dec. '68 Dec. '72 Jan. '63 Nov. '64 Jan. '67 Nov. '68 Jan. '71 Dec. '66 Dec. '70 Dec. '74 361 It is fully recognized that the result is to cause the term of office for the board members elected from districts one and two to commence over three years subsequent to their election date and that of the member from district 5 to commence over two years after his election. But, while this "unusual" result may be highly questionable from a viewpoint of wisdom and sound public policy, it is apparently what the Constitution requires if all portions of the Amendment are to be given effect by harmonizing the clause in question with the balance of the Amendment. In reaching this conclusion and assuming that not all of the board members were so elected in November 1964 (as required under the aforesaid interpretation), I do not comment on whether the final sentence of Section l of the Amendment or Ga. Code Ann. 34-1515, might be held applicable to correct the situation. OPINION 66-126 (Unofficial) July 6, 1966 You ask whether persons who sign a nomination petition for a candidate seeking the office of Judge of the Superior Court or Solicitor General must reside in the judicial circuit directly involved. The Constitution provides that 'The successors to the present and subsequent incumbents shall be elected by the electors of the whole State entitled to vote for members of the General Assembly, at the general election held for such members, next preceding the expiration of their respective terms". Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. VI, Sec. II I, Par. II. Ga. Code Ann. 24-2602, dealing specifically with Judges of the Superior Courts, contains a similar provision. Solicitors General are elected by the electors of the entire state. Constitution of the State of Georgia, Art. VI, Sec. XI, Par. I. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1010 (b) makes the following provision: "A nomination petition of a candidate shall be signed by a number of electors of not less than five per cent of the total number of electors eligible to vote in the next election for the filling of the office the candidate is seeking as of the close of the registrars' business on the business day immediately 362 preceding the day on which the nomination petition is filed; except that in the case of a candidate seeking the office of judge of the superior court or solicitor general the five per cent. figure shall be computed only on the total number of such electors of the judicial circuit directly involved.'' It would appear that the names appearing upon a nomination petition for a candidate seeking the office of Judge of the Superior Court or Solicitor General would not be restricted to electors residing in the judicial circuit directly involved. OPINION 66-I27 (Unofficial) July 7, 1966 You request an opinion from the Department of Law concerning the following question: "If a dentist owns a dental laboratory where he makes denture plates, can he act as a practicing dentist with offices in the same location as the dental laboratory?" There is no prohibition against a dentist's fabricating dental plates in a laboratory which is a part of the office which he maintains for the professional practice of dentistry. It is assumed for the purpose of this opinion that the dental laboratory is not a commercial laboratory and that the dentist is himself performing the fabrication of the dental plates. Since we have no knowledge of any particular facts which may have prompted your inquiry, we wish to point out that a dentist may not, without subjecting himself to the discipline of the Board of Dental Examiners, practice dentistry either directly or indirectly under a trade name or a corporate name, nor may a dentist employ either directly or indirectly, any suspended or unlicensed dentists to perform dental operations. OPINION 66-128 July 7, 1966 You request my opinion on the following question relevant to the languageofSection 8 (A) (a) of Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 279,281. "Does the State Personnel Board have the authority to continue health insurance coverage on the spouse of an 363 emeritus employee who died after April30, 1966, and does not receive a monthly benefit from the Employees Retirement System of Georgia?" Under the above-cited statutory provision, the spouse of a deceased employee is only eligible for continued coverage under the Health Insurance Program if the employee in question had twenty years creditable service with the State as determined pursuant to the provisions governing the Retirement System. (Ibid.; Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 138, 140 as amended, Ga. Code Ann. 40-2501). By law, an emeritus employee must have served the State for at least twenty years thereby accumulating the requisite amount of creditable service. (Ga. Laws 1957, pp. 206-209 as amended, Ga. Code Ann. 78-1201 thru 78-1206). However, the Health Insurance System is predicated upon the payment of premiums by employees, active and emeritus, and annuitants through a series of deductions from their salaries and retirement benefits. (Ga. Laws 1963, pp. 277, 278, Ga. Code Ann. 89-1211). The 1966 Amendment to the Health Insurance Law now in question has not by its extension of coverage to the dependents of some deceased employees created an exception to the statutorily-provided means for the payment of premiums. (Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 279, 281). Therefore, in answer to your question, it is my official opinion that Section 8 (A) (a) of Ga. Laws 1966, pp. 279, 281, has not given the State Personnel Board the authority to continue health insurance coverage on the spouse of a deceased emeritus employee who is not receiving monthly benefits from the Employees Retirement System. OPINION 66-129 July 7, 1966 You requested my opinion as to whether or not State or Federal laws or regulations require or permit inclusion in the application forms of the institutions of the University System of Georgia of questions or blank spaces asking the applicant to indicate his race. My review of the applicable statutes has disclosed no law requiring institutions of higher education to include or omit inquiries regarding the race of the applicant in its application forms. 364 Moreover, I am not aware of any Federal regulations relating to higher education, or approval of Federal funds or grants, imposing any such requirement or prohibition. Of course, having obtained information relating to the applicant's race, such information is not to be used for discriminatory purposes. OPINION 66-130 July 7, 1966 You request an opinion as to whether or not a Psychologist who holds a doctorate of philosophy may write prescriptions for medication for patients. Dangerous drugs may be sold only on the prescription of a duly licensed physician. Ga. Code Ann. 42-709. The term ''physician" means any person authorized to practice medicine and any other person authorized to treat sick and injured human beings and to use, mix, prepare, dispense and administer drugs in connection with such treatment. Ga. Code Ann. 42-711. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act permits a physician or a dentist to prescribe narcotic drugs. The same Act permits an osteopath to prescribe certain narcotic drugs for the alleviation of pain only. Ga. Code Ann. 42-808. With respect to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the term "physician" means a person who is authorized to practice medicine in the State of Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. 42-802. The Georgia Code, in defining the term "psychologist," declares that "Nothing in this definition shall be construed as permitting the administration or prescription of drugs or in any way infringing upon the practice of medicine as defined in the laws of this State." Ga. Code Ann. 84-310 l. It is my opinion that a person practicing as a psychologist, and who holds a doctorate of philosophy in Psychology, may not write prescriptions for either dangerous drugs or narcotic drugs. OPINION 66-131 July 7, 1966 You ask advice concerning your duty as the arbitrator appointed by the State in public utility arbitrations to make a finding 365 concerning the fair market value of property and the assessed value of property and whether or not you might consider other matters of law or fact concerning a proper assessment. Ga. Laws 1943, p. 204, provides, inter alia, at p. 207, as follows: "If any such person, corporation or company shall be dissatisfied with the assessment or correction of such returns as made by the State Revenue Commissioner or the Department of Revenue, such taxpayer shall have the privilege, within twenty days after notice of such assessment and correction, to refer the question of true value or amount to arbitration as provided for by Chapter 92-60 ofthe Code of Georgia of 1933 ."(Emphasis added) Ga. Code Ann. 92-6004 provides.ss follows: "(b) Such assumption of jurisdiction would involve power to pass on intricate questions of law (not intended by the statutory law relating to assessment of property, and arbitration of such assessments) altogether different from -assessment of mere value to which the officers under the abovequoted decisions are limited. "(c) An award by the board of arbitrators on such question of law would be without jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and consequently void ...." Ga. Code Ann. 92-6912, referred to by the court in the above decision, relates to arbitration of assessments on property at the county level. While not identical, Ga. Code Ann. 92-8426.5 (Ga. Laws 1943, p. 204, 207) provides for substantially the same procedure for arbitration proceedings with respect to assessments made by the State Revenue Commissioner. All through Ga. Code Ann. 92-8426.5 and 92-6004, it is apparent that the arbitrators deal only with the question of value. The court aptly stated in Allied Mortgage Companies, Inc. v. Gilbert, et a/., Tax-Assessors, 189 Ga. 756, at p. 758 (1940): "The tax laws of this State evince a fixed policy of the legislature to restrict boards of arbitrators provided therein to questions of value . . . ." Your function as an arbitrator is limited to a finding of the true market value of the property assessed for taxation. 366 The State Revenue Commissioner has assessed the property of public utilities at 40% of fair market value, and in view of this fact, I would recommend that you make a separate finding as to whether the assessment is 40% of the fair market value. Your findings should then be returned to the State Revenue Commissioner so that the public utilities digest may be prepared based on your findings. OPINION 66-132 July 8, 1966 You inquired as to the possible effect of a racial restriction in a proposed grant from a private foundation to North Georgia College. As I understand the situation, the foundation has proposed a grant to the college "to be used for scholarships for poor and deserving Christian white girls taking courses leading to Certification in the Allied Health Professions." You ask whether, as a matter of law, the Regents could accept such a grant and comply with its provisions. My opinion and the reasons therefor are as follows: OPINION While acceptance and administration of the grant pursuant to its terms would not appear to be illegal in the sense of being a violation of criminal law, it is my opinion that under the constitutional doctrine currently espoused by the United States Supreme Court, a proper party might be able to maintain an action in the federal courts to enjoin North Georgia College and the Regents from continuing to give effect to the restrictive provision. DISCUSSION In the Girard College case the United States Supreme Court decided that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution prevents a state board or agency from enforcing racial restrictions respecting school admissions even where such action is taken as a trustee in accordance with the terms of a trust estabfished by private individuals rather than in the exercise of its own governmental decision making powers. See Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). While the Supreme Court has noted that the distinction involved in cases of racial discrimination between "private" action (permissible) and "State" action (not permissible) is not e<;tsy to determine, Evans v. Newton, 367 382 U.S. 296, 15 L. Ed. 2d 373, 86 S. Ct. 719 (1966), 1t ts abundantly clear that whenever possible, such as where private individuals or groups are. endowed by the State with powers or functions which are "governmental in nature," the Supreme Court will strain to find the requisite "State action." See Evans v. Newton, supra, (including dissenting opinion). Thus, while the situation you are here concerned with is one step removed from the Girard case (i.e., here the trustees are private individuals and not State officials), there seems a strong possibility that the administering of a scholarship program under the private grant by the Regents could very well constitute sufficient "State action" to make North Georgia College and the Board of Regents vulnerable to an injunctive action to restrain the racially restrictive clause from being effectuated. In view of the above line of decisions, it would be my suggestion that the trustees of the fund be sent a copy of this opinion, and that the Board of Regents could, if they desire, inform them that they would be willing to accept the $1000 from the Foundation, subject, of course, to the fact that you could very likely be enjoined from using same in conformity with the conditions as outlined. OPINION 66-133 July 8, 1966 This is in answer to your recent letter in which you requested my official opinion as to the legality of expending moneys from the Governor's Emergency Fund for a privately sponsored garden and scenic area at Milledgeville State Hospital. The statute specifically governing the operation of the Emergency Fund does not itself bar an expenditure of this type. Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 10, 25 (Ga. Code Ann. 40-408). Moreover, the requirement that an appropriate governmental body request each allocation is fulfilled by the contemplated action on the part of the Georgia Department of Public Health, the agency of the State having supervision and control over the Hospital and empowered in that regard to accept all donations of property. Ibid; Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 499, 509 (Ga. Code Ann. 88-145). In contributing to this proposed garden, the entire project constituting the donation of property to the Hospital in the form of 368 improvements to realty, the gift and gratuity provision of the State Constitution is not violated. Designed to prevent the State from gratuitously conferring benefits on private parties, this prohibitory rule can in no way be interpreted as barring the Department of Public Health from donating to a project which will at fruition be completely owned and controlled by the State of Georgia. Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II of the Constitution of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5402). Therefore, in answer to your question, it is my official opinion that no legal impediments exist to a contribution being made from the Governor's Emergency Fund at the request of the Georgia Department of Public Health to be used to help the Garden Club of Georgia, Inc. establish a garden and scenic area on the grounds at Milledgeville State Hospital. OPINION 66-134 (Unofficial) July 12, 1966 You asked that certain questions be answered in light of Ga. Laws 1957, p. 420 et seq. (Ga. Code Ann., Ch. 69-12.) You expressed the understanding that the powers conferred by the above chapter to municipal, county and joint municipal-county planning commissions are cumulative and in addition all other powers and authority that such commissions may already have or later obtain. For this reason, the following discussion is restricted to the provisions of Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 69-12. Specifically you have asked: "1. Can a city or county enact an ordinance requiring that all mobile homes be located within a designated mobile home park?" The answer to your first question is contingently affirmative. Ga. Code Ann. 69-1208 provides that the appropriate governing body may divide the municipality or county into districts " ... of such number, shape, and size as it may determine, and within such districts it may regulate . . . the uses of land." It is further prescribed that "All such regulations shall be uniform . . . throughout each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts." 369 Therefore, while mobile home sites could be restricted to one district, they could not be restricted to one park within the district unless the park comprised the whole district. Since no prohibition exists as to the size or shape of a district, no reason exists why a district could not be amended so as to include only that area in which the municipality or county desired mobile homes located. Vulcan Materials Company v. Griffith, 215 Ga. 811 (1960). A redistricting and rezoning, as outlined, would avoid all of the difficulties attendant with "spot zoning". "Spot zoning" generally relates to "lifting out" of a zoned area one unit or one particular piece of property. Birdsey eta!. v. Wesleyan College, 211 Ga. 583 (1955). Each district constitutes a separate zone, irrespective of its size or shape. Vulcan Materials, supra. Therefore, by redistricting and then rezoning the area thereby subdivided, a county or municipality could effectively restrict the location of mobile home trailers. This opinion relates only to the powers possessed by the county or municipality. No attempt is here made to discuss the problems of non-conforming use and judicial review of the reasonableness of any such zoning ordinance. "2. Can a city or county enact a mobile home ordinance which regulates the location of mobile home parks and/ or individual mobile homes even if this ordinance is separate and distinct from a zoning ordinance and is not made in accordance with a comprehensive plan as required under the Georgia General Planning Enabling Act of 1957, No. 358 (House Bill No. 400), Section 7?" Under Ga. Code Ann. 69-1207, the governing authorities of municipalities and counties are empowered to regulate the use of land, but only " . . . in accordance with the conditions and the procedure specified . . ." throughout the rest of the chapter. Therefore, any ordinance which did not conform to the requisite conditions and procedures as specified under the above section would be void and of no effect. City Council of Augusta v. Irvin, 109 Ga. App. 598 (1900). Any ordinance which was " . . . separate and distinct from a zoning ordinance..." would have no force in restricting to use of 370 land. The procedures prescribed by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 62-12 must be strictly followed. Unless the ordinance or resolution were adopted with the conditions and directions given, it would be ultra vires since the power to so regulate such use is conferred only ' ... in accordance with the conditions and the procedure specified...." City Council ofAugusta, supra. Some of the mandatory conditions are as follows: a majority of the members of the planning commission may not hold any other public office in the municipality or county (Ga. Code Ann. 691201); regulations must be passed in accordance with a comprehensive plan (Ga. Code Ann. 69-1207); ordinances must be authorized by the planning commission (Ga. Code Ann. 691208), and passed only after a public hearing for which 15 days notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or county (Ga. Code Ann. 69-1209). OPINION 66-135 (Unofficial) July 13, 1966 You requested an opinion from the Department of Law in which you ask whether or not a newspaper, prior to a Primary or a General Election, may print a facsimile ballot without penalty. While the printing or possession of a counterfeit of an official ballot constitutes a felony, it is our opinion that facsimile ballots may be printed in any newspaper generally circulated within the State as an aid to the electors. The facsimile ballot must be at least twenty-five percent larger or smaller than the ballot of which it is a facsimile. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1913. OPINION 66-136 (Unofficial) July 15, 1966 This is in reply to your inquiry asking whether employees of the Georgia Ports Authority may lawfully strike to demand recognition of their labor union from the Authority. As you know, the National Labor Relations Act excludes from its provisions any state or political subdivision thereof (29 371 U.S.C.A., Section 152(2) (3)) and employees of the State of Georgia are prohibited from striking by Ga. Code Ann. 89-130 I et seq. (Ga. Laws 1962, p. 459) Consequently, the decisive factor in the question which you pose is. whether employees of the Georgia Ports Authority are employees of the State. In the case of International Longshoremen's Assn., A FL-C/0 et a!. v. Georgia Ports Authority, 217 Ga. 712 (1962); cert. denied 370 U.S. 922, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the State Port Authority was without authority to enter into an agreement with any third party fixing the terms and conditions of employment and that a strike to force the authority to enter such an agreement was against the public policy of the State and unlawful. Accordingly, it is my unofficial opinion, not binding on anyone, that employees may not lawfully strike to demand recognition from the authority if the purpose of such recognition is to force the Authority to bargain with the Union over the terms and conditions of employment imposed by the Authority. OPINION 66-137 (Unofficial) July 15, 1966 This is in reply to your letter of July 7, 1966, in which you ask for an interpretation of the Georgia Election Code concerning whether or not a County Tax Collector is entitled to compensation for duties performed for the Board of Registrars. You also ask whether it would be legal for the County to pay for the Tax Collector's services to the Board of Registrars if the Board recommended compensation. The County Tax Commissioner is, by statute, a Deputy to the Board of Registrars and unless released, must perform the duties required by Ga. Code Ann. 34-604. The Registrars may appoint additional deputies and hire clerical help if the compensation has been approved by the governing authority of the County. Ga. Code Ann. 34-604. It is our opinion that the Election Code does not authorize the Board of Registrars to "hire" the Tax Commissioner since the Commissioner is by law a Deputy to the Board. Consequently, it appears that the Board of Registrars could not recommend compensation for the Tax Commissioner. We find 372 nothing in the Georgia Election Code authorizing additional compensation to the Tax Commissioner. The answer to your first question renders it unnecessary to explore your second question. OPINION 66-138 July 15, 1966 You requested my opinion as to whether absence due to service with the Federal Public Health Reserve Corps should be considered military leave. Under the applicable statutory provisions and administrative regulations only those State employees ordered to military duty in the Armed Forces are eligible for military leave. (Ga. Laws 1955, pp. 10, 106; 1959, pp. 114, 118; Ga. Code Ann., 86-1109; Merit Sys. Reg., B-500.) It has been definitively determined that exclusive of a declared war or national emergency, the Public Health Service is not a part of the military forces of the United States which consist of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. Waller v. United States, 81 F.Supp. 211 (1948), aff'd. 180 F.2d 194 (1950); 33 Ops. U.S. Att'y Gen. 56 (1921). Therefore, in answer to your question, it is my official opinion that absence due to service with the Federal Public Health Reserve Corps should not be considered as military leave under provisions of State law and the Rules and ReguYations of the State Personnel Board. OPINION 66-139 July 15, 1966 This is in reply to your letter of June 30, 1966, wherein you raised a question regarding two sections of our Inspection, Sale, Etc., of Gasoline, Kerosene and other Petroleum Products Law. Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(c), which is a part of the Inspection Law, provides: "No person shall mix, blend, or compound the liquid fuels, lubricating oils, greases, and/ or similar products of a manufacturer or distributor with the products of any other manufacturer or distributor, or adulterate the same, and/or 373 store, sell, expose or offer for sale such mixed, blended or compounded products under the trade-mark, trade name, and name, symbol, sign or other distinguishing mark or device of either of said manufacturer or distributor, or as adulterated products of such manufacturer or distributor." (Emphasis added) Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(e), which is also a part of the Inspection Law, provides: "Nothing in this section shall prevent the lawful owner thereof from applying his or its own trade-mark, trade name, name, symbol, sign or other distinguishing mark or device to any product or material." (Emphasis added) I am of the opinion, in view of the emphasized portions of these two provisions, that these two sections are not in conflict. Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(c) prohibits the combination, etc., by any person of petroleum products of two or more different manufacturers or distributors under the trade-mark, etc., of one of the manufacturers or distributors. Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(e) allows a person to place his own trade-mark, etc., on any product he owns. I think the compatibility of the two sections can best be illustrated by two examples. Example One. Mr. X, who owns a service station, buys a quantity of gasoline from Manufacturer A and an equal quantity of gasoline from Manufacturer B. Mr. X then combines these two quantities and sells them under the trade-mark of Manufacturer A. This is a violation of Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(c). Example Two. Mr. Y, who owns a service station across the road from the service station owned by Mr. X, also buys a quantity of gasoline from Manufacturer A and an equal quantity of gasoline from Manufacturer B. Mr. Y combines these two quantities but sellS them up.der his own trade-mark. This is permissible under Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(e). From the above discussion and examples it is my opinion that the two Sections (Ga. Code Ann. 73-222(c) and 73-222(e)) are consistent. 374 OPINION 66-140 July 15, 1966 You requested my opmwn as to whether tangible personal property purchased by planning commissions created under Act No. 358, Ga. Laws 1957, p. 420, as amended, are subject to the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act. Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a (A) provides that " 'Person' includes any ... body politic or political subdivision, whether public or private, or quasi-public, and the plural as well as the singular number." Ga. Code Ann. 92-3403a(c)(2)(d) provides that a "retail sale or a sale at retail shall not include sales to the United States of America, the State of Georgia, or any county or municipality of said State." Since the Act of 1957 to which you refer (Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 6912) makes no provision for an exemption from the payment of sales or use taxes, the determining factor is whether the planning commissions created under the 1957 Act are included under the exemptions contained in the Sales and Use Tax Act. Although the courts have not specifically ruled on the question of whether planning commissions are exempt from sales and use taxes, they have so ruled in regard to hospital authorities and housing authorities. See City of Marietta v. Redwine, 87 Ga. App. 629 (1953), decision affirmed in Carroll City-County Hospital Authority v. Oxford, 104 Ga. App. 213 (1961), and Oxford v. Housing Authority of the City of Barnesville, 104 Ga. App. 797 (1961). Notwithstanding the fact that the language creating the authorities provides that the property of the said authorities is declared to be public property used for essential public and governmental purposes and regardless of whether the authority is declared or considered to be a political subdivision or otherwise, purchases of tangible personal property by commissions created pursuant to the 1957 Act are taxable transactions within the meaning of the Sales and Use Tax Act for the following reasons as stated in the above cases: 375 I. The legislature did not intend to give an exemption from the payment of sales and use taxes to any body politic other than those specifically described in Ga. Code. Ann. Section 92-3403a (C)(2) and 2. The recitals from the Journals from the Senate and House indicate that the Act intended to exempt from the sales and use tax only sales made directly to the State, counties and municipalities, and not sales to authorities regardless of the source of their revenue, whether or not such authorities are political subdivisions or instrumentalities of the counties and municipalities. It is therefore my opinion, based on the language included in the foregoing cases, that a planning commission created pursuant to the 1957 Act stands in the same position to a county or municipality as a housing authority or hospital authority (prior to the 1960 amendment, Ga. Code Ann. Section 92-3450a); that is to say, a planning commission is a political subdivision or instrumentality of the particular county or municipality creating it. Sales of tangible personal property to such a planning commission are not sales made directly to the county or municipality creating said planning commission, but rather to an instrumentality or political subdivision thereof, and such sales are therefore taxable. OPINION 66-141 July 18, 1966 You wrote concerning certain advertising practices of the Luck Oil Company, Adel, Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. 73-222, which is a part of the Inspection Law, provides in part: "(a) No person shall store, sell, expose or offer for sale any liquid fuels, lubricating oils, greases, and/ or other similar products: "(3) in any manner whatsoever which may deceive, or have the effect of deceiving the purchaser of such products as to the nature, price, quality or quantity of the products so stored, sold, exposed or offered for sale." The enforcement of this section is within the power of the State 376 Oil Chemist as the duly authorized agent of the State Revenue Commissioner, who is constituted Chief Oil Inspector by Ga. Code Ann. 73-203. I am of the opinion, however, that the owner of the Luck Oil Company has not committed a violation of Ga. Code Ann. 73222. As I understand the facts they are these: the owner advertises his gasoline at one price on billboards, while his pumps list a higher price. He claims, without positive contradiction by your inspector, that he gives a discount to correspond with the advertised price on the billboards. Therefore, the only possible deception within the terms of Ga. Code Ann. 73-222 would be that his pumps show one price and he. sells his product at a lower price. I am of the opinion that this is not the kind of deception proscribed by this section. What purchaser would have standing to complain that he was deceived by the charge of lesser price for his purchase than that shown? Ga. Code Ann. 73-9907, provides: "Any person or association of persons, firm or corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of sections 73-222, 73223 for preventing deception, substitution and misbranding of liquid fuels, oils, grease, and similar products, shall upon conviction thereof be punished as for a misdemeanor." In view of this provision, I would advise you to contact the Cook County Solicitor for prosecution under this section, if further investigation discloses that the owner does sometimes sell gasoline at the pump price rather than the advertised price. Ga. Code Ann. 106-501 provides: "No person, firm or corporation shall offer for sale merchandise, commodities or services by making, publishing, disseminating, circulating or placing before the public within this State in a newspaper, or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, sign, billboard, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, photograph, motion picture, or by radio, loudspeaker, telephone, telegraph or in any other way, or advertise merchandise, commodities or services with intent, design or purpose not to sell the said merchandise, commodities or services so advertised or offered for sale at the price or upon the terms stated therein or otherwise 377 communicated, or with intent not to sell the merchandise, commodities or services so advertised." I am of the opinion that, while there may be a violation of this section, the discussion above concerning Ga. Code Ann. 73-222 is also appropriate here. This section is not as clearly within your duties as State Oil Chemist as is Ga. Code Ann. 73-222. However, should further investigation produce proof that the owner sometimes sells gasoline at the pump price, Ga. Code Ann. 1069908 provides: "A violation of section 106-501, which prohibits advertising without the intention to sell upon the terms stated in the advertisement, is declared to be a misdemeanor, and every person, firm or corporation convicted of a violation of such section shall be punished as for misdemeanor." Therefore, you should contact the Cook County Solicitor for prosecution. If any of the owner's competitors complain to you concerning his advertising, you might inform them that there is a provision for an injunction by any person aggrieved or about to be aggrieved by the advertising which Ga. Code Ann. 106-501 seeks to proscribe (See Ga. Code Ann. 106-502). This provision would not authorize State suit however. From the above discussion, it is my opinion that under the facts as they stand the owner has not violated the law. OPINION 66-142 (Unofficial) July 19, 1966 You wrote concerning license fees for the sale of beer, wine and liquor and also the distance requirements in relation to churches and schools. The General Assembly in 1965 amended the liquor law so as to provide a maximum annual license fee of $5,000 for the sale of distilled spirits. Ga. Laws 1965, p. 451. The annual license fees for the sale of beer and for the sale of wine do not have any statutory limit. See Ga. Code Ann. 58-804, 58-932, 58-716. The municipality under these circumstances can set whatever license fee 378 it deems appropriate subject, however, to the limitation that the fee must be reasonable and not so high as to be a prohibitory tax. Chandler vs. City ofTifion, 206 Ga. 43 (1949). Liquor may not be sold within 100 yards of any church and 200 yards of a school ground. See Ga. Code Ann. 58-1029. Beer may not be sold within 100 yards of any school. Ga. Code Ann. 58724.1. A municipality may not enact an ordinance covering the same subject upon which there is a general statute passed by the State Legislature, but the question of the city's authority to enact such statutes otherwise would depend in part upon the terms of the city charter. You should direct your questions in this area to the city attorney. OPINION 66-143 (Unofficial) July 19, 1966 This is in response to questions raised m our July 13, 1966, conference. Your initial question, as later modified, is as follows: "Are active military personnel, active reservists, and national guard members authorized to receive benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 (Pub. Law 89358 )?" The Act in question has been codified as 38 USCA 1651 et seq. Subsection (a)(2) of Section 1652 provides that " ... any individual who served at least two years in an active duty status for so long as he continues on active duty without a break therein ..." is entitled to all benefits under the Act. Therefore, anyone with two years' continuous active service is eligible until such time as he is removed from active duty status. Active reservists and members of the national guard could, under certain circumstances, become eligible. If called to active duty for two years as outlined above, these individuals would become eligible as active duty personnel. It must be noted, however, that the initial period of active duty for training required of reservists and guardsmen, usually four to six months, is not included in the computation of this two-year period. Such individuals enlist for a 379 term of six years. Aft~r a period of training, as previously mentioned, the remainder of the enlistment is served on a Ready Reserve status. All time spent in training and in the Ready Reserve is specifically excluded from the computation of time served on "active duty." 38 USCA 1652(a)(3)(C). Secondly, you have asked: "What individuals are entitled to receive assistance from the State Department of Veterans' Service?" Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 78-4 enumerates the services to be rendered and persons to be served by the Department. It is incumbent upon the Director " ... to assist veterans, widows and dependents in the preparation and filing of claims for benefits and in acquainting them with all legal rights and privileges." (Ga. Code Ann. 78-417). The term "veteran" has been variously defined as one who has had "much experience," People v. Adams, 18 N.Y.S. 896, and one who has been "honorably discharged," People v. Stratton, 80 N.Y.S. 269. That chapter of the code presently under discussion omits any definition of the term, nor has any Georgia case been found to supply a definition. Perhaps, our legislature in its wisdom purposely declined to define the term in an attempt to give it the broadest generic connotation possible. Since State and Federal statutes often specify the length of service and condition of separation (if any) requisite for eligibility under their provisions, and since these requirements are seldom consistent, the absence of a set definition in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 784 enables the Department to administer to the needs of military personnel entitled to benefits under any law. Consistent therewith is Ga. Code Ann. 78-414, which states: "The Director ... shall exercise a broad discretion in extending to veterans the aid and assistance provided by law, and shall extend the services of the State Department so as to make available to all veterans the aid and services contemplated under provisions of law." Emphasis added. 380 Under Ga. Code Ann. 78-418, it is mandatory that the Director " ... cooperate with information or service agencies and organizations .. . in disseminating and furnishing counsel and assistance of benefit to residents of Georgia who are or have been members of the armed services, their families and dependents ..."in receiving authorized benefits of whatever nature. In light of the above, the Director is required to serve Georgia residents who are or have been on active military duty, their families and dependents. The fact that many of the services authorized to be performed by the Department of Veterans' Service are concurrent with and overlap those offered by the Veterans' Administration or other agencies does not alter the statutory duty of the Department to render such service when requested. OPINION 66-144 (Unofficial) July 19, 1966 You wrote concerning the possible availability of office space for the Vocational Rehabilitation Division in a building owned and operated by the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia. You state that the Board of Regents is willing to furnish such office space at the Medical College of Georgia (where you operate a vocational rehabilitation program) but is not willing to make renovations which would be necessary to set up offices suitable to the needs of the Division. You wish to know whether it would be legal for the Division (assuming that the State Board of Education and State Supervisor of Purchases might otherwise authorize the same) to expend State funds to make the necessary renovations. Ga. Laws 1961, p. 47 (Ga. Code Ann. 91-117) provides in pertinent part: "Any real estate held by the State of Georgia in fee simple . . . may be improved with funds appropriated for a State Department provided..."(Emphasis added.) In fact, the requirement that property be held by the State of Georgia in fee simple has existed as a matter of policy before enactment of the above statute. As stated in an official opinion of the Attorney General in 1961: 381 'The wisdom of the Budget Bureau's policy is compelling when we realize that only through its enforcement can the State avoid the possible loss of substantial funds invested in permanent improvements constructed on realty held under license or reversionary conveyance." (Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, pp.314-15) Numerous other opinions of the Attorney General have expressed the same rule. See e.g. Op. Att'y Gen. 1954-56, p. 573; 1960-61,pp.378,384. It is true, of course, that this restriction does not apply to mere repair and maintenance of leased property, e.g. Op. Att'y Gen. 1948-49 p. 112-113, or to improvements which are not permanent in nature and may be easily removed by the State in a physical sense (and as a matter of right in a legal sense) upon termination of the lease. See e.g. Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61 pp. 314-315; 1952-53 p. 359. Inasmuch as renovations could conceivably go beyond mere repair and maintenance, the answer to your question would depend upon the extent and meaning of renovations. Assuming that in using the term renovations you do not refer to permanent alterations, but instead refer to improvements more in the nature of repair and maintenance in order to make the premises inhabitable and useable for your purposes, it would be my opinion that an expenditure for such purpose would be a legitimate and proper expenditure and you would be authorized to make same. Should there be any substantial doubt as to whether the renovations were within the above stated limits, I might mention that similar problems have in some instances been resolved by the landlord making the improvements desired by the State or State Department as lessee and then defraying his renovation expense in increased rental payments by the State or State Department. OPINION 66-145 July 19, 1966 You requested my official opinion as to whether the Forestry Commission is authorized to employ certain members of the Neighborhood Youth Corps under a subcontractual agreement with an agency of the Federal Government. 382 By virtue of Ga. Code Ann. 43-206, the Forestry Commission is given the " ... power and authority to ... contract with other agencies and instrumentalities of government, both county, city, State and National, and private persons or concerns for the advancement of the forests of this State." It is, therefore, my opinion that the above section of the Code permits the execution of the agreement as proposed. OPINION 66-146 July 20, 1966 You wrote advising that the Board of Regents recently rejected the bids submitted on the old Armstrong College campus property in Savannah and decided to readvertise that property for bids. In the event the bids received in response to this second cycle should, as did the earlier ones, prove to be in amounts less than the appraised value, you have requested my advice upon the following three questions: 1. May the Regents legally sell this property to the highest bidder if that highest bid is in an amount substantially less than the appraised value of the property advertised? 2. Would the fact that the highest bid in such a case was submitted by a nonprofit or charitable organization have any bearing upon the legality of accepting a highest bid which was in an amount less than the appraised value of the property advertised? 3. In the event the Regents could not legally sell the property at a bid less than the appraised value to a highest bidder which either was or was not a nonprofit organization, could the Legislature authorize such a sale? The law (Ga. Code Ann. 32-141) with respect to the disposal of property held by the Regents of the University System of Georgia ~provides in its pertinent part: "All properties owned or held by the Regents of the university system of Georgia . . . may be sold . . . or otherwise disposed of by the said Regents subject to the approval of the Governor, whenever the Board of Regents may deem such sale 383 . or other disposition to the best interests of the university system: Provided, that the Board of Regents shall first determine that such property can no longer be advantageously used in the university system. . . ." It is my opinion that if the Board of Regents shall determine that property may no longer be used advantageously in the university system, it may, with the approval of the Governor, sell the property to the highest bidder even though the highest bid is less than the appraised value of the property, provided the Board of Regents deems such sale to be in the best interests of the university system. In view of the foregoing answer to your first question, your second and third questions become moot. OPINION 66-147 July 21, 1966 You wrote asking if the Regents could legally agree to hold harmless and indemnify the University System Building Authority from claims arising under certain covenants of the Regents to the Authority relating to the site of the proposed Project No. Z-1, Fine Arts Building, Augusta College. As you know, the Regents, as a State agency exercising governmental functions, has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued or made to respond in damages without express statutory consent thereto. Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga. 691 (1939); Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59, p. 393. This immunity can be waived only by the General Assembly. Roberts, supra. Usually, hold harmless and indemnification agreements are sought in instances where there is exposure to tort liability (as opposed to contractual obligation). The General Assembly has seldom, if ever, authorized waiver of tort liability. Thus, as a gt " . . .shall have full authority under their own zoning laws to zone areas for commercial or industrial purposes and the actions of the States in this regard will be accepted for the purposes of this Act. . ." Title II of the Act provides that junkyards, auto graveyards, and scrap metal processing facilities may be operated within 1,000 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way and " ...which are zoned industrial under authority of State Law . . ." (Emphasis added). The language employed in the Act, in my judgment, evidences a clear congressional intent to allow the States to comply with the Act while at the same time reserving to the States the right to zone property within their borders under the authority of their own laws. There is no provision requiring that zoning authority be exercised exclusively by the legislatures. It seems to me that the use by Congress of the words "under authority of State law", shows an intent to allow the States to authorize municipalities and counties to enact zoning ordinances pursuant to and in accordance with legislative authority. Keeping in mind that the purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the State Highway Department to comply with Public Law 89-285, it is my opinion that it will, if passed, authorize the General Assembly to zone property to the extent necessary to so comply. Although it provides that the General Assembly shall have full authority to zone, it does not provide for exclusive authority. "'Full' means ample. . ." 17A Words and Phrases p. 466; Mobile School Commissioners v. Putnam, 44 Ala. 506, 537. The zoning powers now possessed by the municipalities and counties and the ordinances enacted pursuant thereto will, in my judgment, remain in effect. Any future action taken by the General Assembly which is in conflict with any municipal or county zoning ordinance would, 503 of course, prevail over such ordinances. Such ordinances would be repealed where their terms are contrary to enactments by the General Assembly. Likewise, no future ordinances could be legally enacted which are contrary to enactments by the General Assembly on the subject. See Moore v. City of Tifton, 84 Ga. App. 180; Nash, Tag Commissioner v. National Preferred Lzfe Insurance Company, 222 Ga. 14; and Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850. Therefore, I do not feel that the passage of the proposed Constitutional Amendment will have the effect of pre-empting the field of zoning now delegated to municipalities and counties but will merely confer upon the General Assembly full authority to zone to the extent necessary to comply with Public Law 89-285. OPINION 66-240 (Unofficial) October 3 1, 1966 You state the following: "The court has had several residents of Fulton County obtain a marriage license here and then go to another state to be married. A question has arisen as to the validity of this act. Is a marriage license issued by the proper official in the State of Georgia valid if the couple leaves the State and are married in another state by a proper official?" As a general rule, a marriage valid in the state where celebrated is valid in all other states, except if it "involves anything immoral, contrary to the general policy, or violative of the conscience of the State called on to give it effect." Eubanks v. Banks, 34 Ga. 407,416 (1866). A valid marriage consummated in another state, although one of the parties was laboring under a disability in Georgia, would be valid in Georgia, provided the parties acted in good faith and did not go to the foreign state for the purpose of evading provisions of the Georgia law. Ga. Code Ann. 53-214; Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wacht,84Ga.App.602(1951). Therefore, if the alleged marriage were valid where performed, it would be valid in Georgia, regardless of the fact that the license was invalid where the ceremony was performed or that no license at all was taken out. In Georgia, as in most other states, the statutory requirements for a valid ceremonial marriage are held to be 504 directory, rather than mandatory. Lefkoffv. Sicro, 189 Ga. 554; 60 A.L.R. 541 (1939); 55 C.J.S. Marriage 24. I infer from your letter that the persons involved failed to obtain a valid license in the state where the ceremony was subsequently performed. Marriages celebrated between persons fully capable of contracting, although solemnized with no license at all, have been held valid in the following jurisdictions: Ala. Ariz. Ark. Del. D. C. Fla. Ga. Idaho Ill. Ind. Iowa Kan. Ky. La. Md. Mich. Minn. Miss. Mo. Mont. Neb. N.J. N.M. N.Y. N.C. Ohio Okla. Pa. R.I. S.C. S.D. Tenn. Tex. Utah(Dictum) Wash. Wis. (61 A.L.R. 2d 847; 55 C.J.S. Marriage 24; 133 A.L.R. 758) Therefore, a marriage performed in any of the above locations, even though without a license, would be recognized as valid in Georgia subject to the previously discussed conditions that the parties acted in good faith and did not resort to a marriage in a foreign state to avoid disabilities imposed by Georgia law (Bituminous, supra) and, provided further, that the marriage did not contravene the morals, general policy, or conscience of Georgia. t:ubanks, supra. OPINION 66-241 November 2, 1966 You requested an opinion upon the question stated below, based upon the following facts. An Automatic Voting Machine is capable of listing and handling up to forty election races, which means that it can list and handle, in an election, the names of forty Democratic candidates for forty public offices, forty Republican candidates for those same offices, and forty (or more) Independent candidates for these same offices. I am advised that in the forthcoming General Election there are 505 two contested races for the office of Judge of the Superior Court and one contested race for the office of Solicitor. The names of the persons seeking those offices will appear, I am advised, on the voting machine label. I am advised further that there are twentyfour persons seeking election or re-election, without opposition, as Superior Court Judges. Because the placing of the names and offices sought by those twenty-four persons separately on the voting machine label would run the number of offices sought at this Election to in excess of sixty (whereas the voting machine is capable of listing and handling only forty separate races), it has been suggested that the names of these twenty-four persons seeking election, without opposition to the office of Superior Court Judge, and their Judicial Circuits, be listed as a group, under one handle, on the voting machine label. Obviously, such grouping would hinder or prohibit the voter from exercising his right to write-in the name or names of other persons for the office of Superior Court Judge of a particular Judicial Circuit. You have requested an opinion as to whether or not it would be permissible, under the circumstances described above, to list on a separate paper ballot the names and offices sought by those twentyfour persons referred to above, rather than grouping them under one handle of the voting machine, so as to comply with the requirement of the law that a voter be permitted to write-in the name of a candidate of his choice for one or more of those offices. As you know, if Proposed Constitutional Amendment Nos. 18 and 19 which are to be voted on at the forthcoming General Election, pass, this would be the last year in which Superior Court Judges and Solicitors are elected by State-wide vote. Therefore, the above-described situation may not occur in future years. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1214 authorizes the use of paper ballots under the circumstances you have described. See also Ga. Code Ann. 34-1206(g). It is, therefore, my opinion that under the circumstances you have described, separate paper ballots may be used in conjunction with voting machines. 506 OPINION 66-242 November 3, 1966 You requested an official opinion relative to the power of political subdivisions of this State to provide for emergency interim successors for the officers of such political subdivisions in order to preserve constitutional leadership and authority in the event of an enemy attack. In answer to this request, I would like to call your attention to the Georgia Civil Defense Act of 1951 (Ga. Laws 1951, p. 254, as amended), which has been codified in Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 86-18. I call your particular attention to Ga. Code Ann. 86-1823(f) which provides as follows, to wit: "The legislative bodies of all political subdivisions of the State are hereby authorized and directed to provide by ordinance or Resolution for emergency interim successors for the officers of such political subdivisions. Such Resolutions and ordinances shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter." Under the above-cited authority it is my opinion that county commissioners and other county officers have the authority and are directed to designate emergency interim successors for the purpose of continuity of government in the case of an emergency created by a~'n enemy attack. OPINION 66-243 (Unofficial) November 8, 1966 You ask for an opinion on each of several questions, all of which deal with elections. We understand that voting machines are to be extensively used in Lowndes County in the November 8, 1966, General Election. Your first question asks whether or not an elector may write in the name of a candidate when the name of the candidate whose name has been written in has already been printed upon the ballot label affixed to the voting machine. Unless you have a situation in which two or more persons are to be elected to the same office, an elector may not write in the name of a candidate for public office 507 when that candidate's name is printed upon the ballot label for that office. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1315(d). You also asked whether a vote so cast (in the manner under discussion in this paragraph) must be counted. Unless the exception to which I have previously alluded obtains, the vote should not be counted. Ga. Code Ann. 341315(d). In this connection your attention is also called to Ga. Code Ann. 34-1326(d). Your letter states that separate paper ballots will be used in the special election being held to elect a Solicitor General of the Rome Judicial Circuit. Your third question is: "If the name of a gubernatorial candidate is written in on the paper ballot to be used for the race for the Rome Circuit Solicitor General, must the name so written be counted as a vote for that individual written in as Solicitor General, or must it be counted as a vote for the individual written in for the gubernatorial post, or must the written in vote be counted for any race?" There are so many possibilities concerning the manner in which a person may cast a write in ballot, that advice would be somewhat meaningless unless we explored all possibilities and the limitations of time do not permit this. In this connection, however, please see Ga. Code Ann. 34-1315(d), 34-1321, and 34-1103. Your next question asks whether or not a ballot, either blank or printed, must be furnished to the elector if he so requests. With the exceptions contained in Ga. Code Ann. 34-1224, the answer to the preceding question is in the negative. Your letter states that a candidate for the office of member of the County Board of Education wishes to withdraw. You ask whether amended absentee ballots must be mailed out. Assuming that you do not have a substitute nomination problem (Ga. Code Ann. 341105) and the candidate has not properly withdrawn from the race, it is my opinion that there is no requirement for the county to mail out amended absentee ballots. Likewise, I know of no requirement to the effect that the county must reprint ballots already printed, nor any requirement to the effect that the county must reset voting machines which have already been prepared for the election. You also ask whether or not votes for the candidate who has indicated that he wishes to withdraw must be counted. It is my opinion that votes cast for this candidate must be counted. Ga. Code Ann. 34-1326. 508 OPINION 66-244 (Unofficial) November 8, 1966 You inquired whether the State of Georgia would give faith and credit to the legitimations by a German Court of the minor children upon the marriage of their parents. Ga. Code Ann. 74-101, provides, inter alia: "What children are legitimate; presumption; legitimation by marriage ofparents.-. ...The marriage of the mother and reputed father of an illegitimate child, and the recognition of such child as his, shall render the child legitimate; and in such case the child shall immediately take the surname of his father." Conseqttently, upon consummation of a valid marriage between their parents and recognition by the father of the children as his children, the children will be rendered legitimate under Georgia law. OPINION 66-245 November 14, 1966 You ask whether you should refund the qualifying fees you hold pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. 34-1004 in those cases in which you found that the candidate was not entitled to have his name placed upon the general election ballot because of deficiencies in the nominating petition. The sole provisions in the law for the distribution of such funds are as follows: "If the office sought by the candidate is filled by the vote of electors within a single county, the Secretary of State shall transmit such fee to the governing authority of such county for application toward the payment of the cost of holding the election. If the office sought by the candidate is filled by the vote of electors of more than one county then such fee shall be equally divided among the counties involved, and the Secretary of State shall transmit the proper portion of such fee to the governing authority of each county for application toward the payment of the cost of holding the election." There appears to be no judicial determination in this State, or 509 elsewhere, of the point you have raised. Nor have any cases been discovered which are helpful in making a determination in this matter. The qualifying fees which you hold are held, prior to transmittal, on behalf of the governing authority of the county or counties involved. It is clear that the fees are not filing fees in the sense that they are paid to compensate you for examining the petition. Thus, it would appear that these funds are public funds. The Supreme Court has held that "before an officer can be required to pay out public money, or be justified in doing so, those who demand its payment should be able to show a clear provision of the law which entitles them to receive it." Kennedy v. Seamans, 60 Georgia 612 (1878). See also: Howard v. Early County, 104 Georgia 669 (1898), Brunson v. Caskie, 127 Georgia 501 (1906); Freeney v. Geoghegan, 177 Georgia 142 (1933). There is no "clear provision of the law" authorizing the return of qualifying fees to those candidates whose petitions do not meet the requirements of the Election Code. It is therefore my opinion that you should not return such funds to the candidates whose petitions are deficient. OPINION 66-246 (Unofficial) November 16, 1966 You ask whether or not automobiles manufactured by your firm may be sold in this State after January 1, 1967, with the vehicle identification plate affixed to the machine in the engine compartment rather than to the left front door post of the body. As you are already aware of the substantive requirements of Georgia Laws 1966, p. 188, et seq. (Senate Bill #28), I shall address myself directly to Section Six of the Act which provides, inter alia, as follows: "Section Six. Application.-The provisions of this Act requiring identification numbers on certain motor vehicles and parts shall only apply to those motor vehicles or parts manufactured after January 1, 1967, and where the same is designated by the manufacturer as a 1968 model or for installation on a 1968 model, unless the motor vehicle or parts shall presently bear an identification number...." 510 Senate Bill #28 becomes effective January 1, 1967. According to your letter some of the automobiles manufactured by your firm "presently bear an identification number" in the engine compartment. It is my opinion that automobiles manufactured by your firm may not be sold in this State after January 1, 1967, with vehicle identification plates attached solely to the machine in the engine compartment, without subjecting the seller to the possibility of being prosecuted for a misdemeanor offense. Georgia Laws 1966, p. 168, 191. OPINION 66-247 (Unofficial) November 17, 1966 You request an opinion in regard to taxation of property owned by service personnel. You ask whether or not property owned by a Georgia resident would be subject to Georgia ad valorem taxation while the Georgia resident is in the military service stationed elsewhere and where the serviceman takes his property with him. Ga. Code Ann. 92-102 provides: "For the purposes of taxation, 'personal property' shall be construed to include goods, chattels, moneys, credits and effects, whatsoever they may be; ships, boats, and vessels, whether at home or abroad, and capital invested therein; bonds and other securities of corporations of this or of other States; stock of corporations of other States; bonds, notes or other obligations of other States, and of the counties, municipalities or other subdivisions thereof; money due on open account or evidenced by notes, contracts, bonds, or other obligations, secured or unsecured." (Emphasis added.) You also ask whether or not Georgia would impose a sales or use tax on property purchased elsewhere by Georgia residents and later brought into Georgia. I am enclosing a copy of the Sales Tax Regulations concerning this and direct your attention to Regulation No. 560-12-2.140. OPINION 66-248 (Unofficial) November 18, 1966 Recently you posed to this Department the following question: 511 "Where a member of the military is ordered to pay support as a result of a proceeding instituted under the subject Act and the order commanding same is from a commanding officef of the military and not from a superior court, is the Solicitor General entitled to the fee set forth in Georgia Code 99932A?" Ga. Code Ann. 99-932A provides for the payment of a fee to the Solicitor General upon the happening of certain conditions as set forth in the Act. It is significant to note that Ga. Code Ann. 99-932A reads: "The fee of the Solicitor General arising under this chapter shall be paid by the treasurer upon receipt of the order . .." The reference to "arising under this chapter" is to Ga. Code Ann. 99-914A "Costs and Fees" which says that a court of this State may direct that the Solicitor General's fee be paid by this State. It is clear that Ga. Code Ann. 99-914A makes reference to a court of this State and unfortunately does not provide for any other type of "order" It is therefore my unofficial opinion that the fee referred to in Ga. Code Ann. 99-932A can only be paid as a result of a court order as provided in Ga. Code Ann. 99-914A and that the direction of a commanding officer to his subordinate to make payments under the Act does not fall within the purview of Ga. Code Ann. 99-932A nor 99-914A. OPINION 66--:-249 (Unofficial) November 18, 1966 You inquired whether or not Hospital Authorities are subject to the provisions of the "Minimum Wage Law." Prior to enactment of Public Law 89-601, known as the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, the existing provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 exempted employees of hospitals, nursing homes, and homes for the aged from its minimum wage and maximum hours provisions. In addition, the act previously excluded the United States or a State or a political subdivision thereof from the definition of the term "employer," 512 thereby exempting employees of a State or political subdivision from coverage. The provision which formerly exempted hospital employees (29 U.S.C.A., 213 [a] [2]) have been revised by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, and no longer includes employees of hospitals within the exempt category. Also, the term "enterprise," previously defined in 29 United States Code Annotated, 203, has been revised by the 1966 Amendments to include the activities of hospitals and related institutions whether or not these hospitals or institutions are public or private or operated for profit or not for profit. Although Hospital Authorities, created by Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 88-18, may be considered to perform State governmental functions, they are not thereby completely exempted from the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The 1966 Amendments to 29 United States Code Annotated, 203(d), provide that a State or political subdivision thereof shall be considered an employer for purposes of the act with respect to its employees employed in any hospital or related institution, school for physically or mentally handicapped or gifted children or institution of higher learning. It is my unofficial opinion that, as a result of the 1966 Amendments, Hospital Authorities are now subject to the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to the employees engaged in the named areas of employment. OPINION 66-250 (Unofficial) November 21, 1966 Late last summer, your office forwarded me files relating to a $2,239.00 claim of the Department of Family and Children Services against the estate of Rhoda G. Strickland. The claim is based upon the fact that prior to her death in 1959 the decedent had received this sum in old age welfare benefits through failure to disclose certain cash reserves which she possessed in her application form. Such reserves were in excess of the allowable reserve (i.e. $500.00) which the statutes then permitted. Attached to the file was a letter to you from the Douglas County Department of Family and Children Services which seemed to reflect a continued reluctance on 513 the part of the county attorney and/or the county commissioners to pursue the matter on the county level. You asked me for advice as to the next step to take. At the outset, I wish to apologize for my delay in answering. As I mentioned to you some time ago, I felt that the repeal of former Ga. Code Ann. 99-624 (Amount of Assistance as a Claim Against the Estate of Recipient) by Ga. Laws 1965 pp. 385, 394 meant that I would have to spend a significant amount of time researching the problem in order to see what remedy, if any, might continue to exist. Until the last few days, the burden of litigation, with one deadline after the other, has prevented me from giving the matter the consideration it requires. I have noted your reference to Ga. Laws 1937, pp. 311, 318 (Ga. Code Ann. 99-615) as a possible solution. In essence this code section declares: "If at any time during the continuance of assistance the recipient thereof becomes possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in [his] application [for old age assistance], it shall be the duty of the recipient immediately to notify the county department of the receipt or possession of such property or income. . . . Any assistance paid after the recipient has come into possession of such property or income and in excess of his need shall be recoverable by the county as a debt due to the State and the county in proportion to the amount of the assistance paid by each..." (Emphasis added) While the italicized language reflects the basic right of action under this provision to be in the county, however, it goes on to state that for the purpose of enforcing the section the Director of the Board of Social Security shall be: "...empowered with the authority to issue execution against any recipient as defendant therein, returnable in the county of the defendant's residence with the right of such defendant to contest the legality of such execution by affidavit of illegality as in other cases." It may well be that under this latter provision of Ga. Code Ann. 99-615, the Director could proceed to issue execution upon the estate of a deceased recipient as well as upon a living recipient. A 514 problem exists, however, in the question of whether this section extends beyond the case of a recipient coming into possession of property or money "during the continuance of assistance," and includes such situations as the present one where the property or money was possessed (but not revealed) at the time the application for assistance was submitted and prior to the receipt of any assistance [the proof of claim previously filed against the estate alleged a fraud liability of this nature]. And then, even ifthe statute were to be construed broadly enough to permit this hurdle to be overcome, there would still be an uncertainty respecting the meaning of the rather vague clause in this code provision, i.e. "ln excess of his need." What is the criteria to be used to determine whether the unreported savings account of the deceased was "In excess of [her] need" so as to make her liable? Fortunately, however, these substantial problems which would seem to present themselves if the State Department of Family and Children Services should decide to assert a remedy under Ga. Code Ann. 99-615, could probably be avoided by taking the alternative road of an action under the new Public Assistance Act of 1965 [Georgia Laws 1965, pp. 385 et seq.]. Section 13(b) of this Act, which is set forth at Ga. Code Ann. 99-2912(b) states in part: "Any person who obtains any payment of public assistance to which he is not entitled. . .shall be liable to repay such sum. . . .such sum may be collected without interest by civil action brought in the name of the Department of Family and Children Services of the State of Georgia. . . ." It would be my opinion that the liability provided for in this new code section would survive the death of a recipient and constitute a claim against his estate even if considered as a cause of action in tort rather than a cause of action in contract inasmuch as Ga. Code Ann. 3-505 provides that a cause of action in tort shall survive the death of the tort feasor where he received a benefit from the tort. If construed in the nature of a contractual obligation, of course, there would be no problem. Under proper circumstances, Ga. Code Ann. 40-1618 would be applicable and could be used in the event all other possible avenues have been exhausted. I would suggest that every possible effort be made to secure satisfaction of this claim through county facilities before undertaking the above-mentioned procedure. 515 OPINION 66-251 November 22, 1966 I am in receipt of your letter in which you ask two questions in light of the amendment to Ga. Code Ann. 92-2405 which created a new subsection (N). This amendment reads as follows: "(N) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section, every foreign corporation required to make a return of net income under the income tax laws of this State, shall at the time such return is required by law to be filed, file with the State Revenue Commissioner the return as required by the provisions of this Code section; provided, that the taxable period of such corporation for purposes of the license tax imposed by this law shall be the taxable period for which the corporation reports its net income for purposes ofthe Georgia income tax, as provided by law, and the taxable date shall be the first day of such taxable period, and the net worth which measures this tax shall be the net worth as ofthe beginning of business on the taxable date; provided, further, that the first return of any such foreign corporation shall be filed on or before the 15th day of the fourth calendar month after starting to do business in this State (counting the month in which business is begun); and provided, further, that if such first return is for a taxable period of less than six months, the corporation license tax for such taxable period shall be 50 per cent of the tax imposed by this law for an entire year." (Emphasis added.) Your first question was "Is a foreign corporation that is not qualified with the Secretary of State to do business in Georgia liable for occupation and license tax when it is doing business as prescribed by the income tax laws of this State?" Ga. Code Ann. 92-2403 imposes an occupation tax on all foreign corporations incorporated or organized under the laws of any other State, Territory, or Nation, doing business or owning property in this State, except those not operated for pecuniary gain or profit. Such tax liability is not determined by whether a foreign corporation has qualified with the Secretary of State to do business in Georgia under Ga. Code Ann. 22-1506 (Acts 1946, p. 687), but whether a foreign corporation is doing business or owns property in 516 this State. A foreign corporation "doing business" within the State is liable for the occupation tax whether it has qualified with the Secretary of State or otherwise. The question is whether "doing business" within the meaning of the income tax law is "doing business" within the meaning of the occupation tax law. The cases indicate that although the two terms may coincidentally be the same, they are in fact different: "doing business" within the meaning of the income tax law is entirely different than "doing business" within the occupation tax law. "As nearly as can be determined, the Court's notion of a sufficient nexus differs with different kinds of taxes, sometimes is formulated by a mixture of Commerce and Due Process Clause notions and sometimes is based on Due Process principles alone." Beaman, Paying Taxes to Other States 2:23 (1963). Thusly, what might be a sufficient nexus for the purpose of imposing an income tax under the authority of Williams v. Stockham Valves and Fitting, Inc., 358 U. s: 450 (1959) might be insufficient to impose an occupation tax. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U. S. 602, 95 Led 573,71 S. Ct. 508 (1951); Annat. 67 A.L.R.2d 1342 (12). While, under Stockham Valves, a State would be authorized to impose an income tax on a foreign corporation totally engaged in interstate commerce so long as the tax imposed is based upon the income derived from activities within the State (provided the tax is properly apportioned and nondiscriminatory), a State would not be authorized to impose an occupation tax on such a foreign corporation. The decisions indicate that such a tax would be classified as a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce; a power not possessed by the State. Accordingly, the only time such a tax is valid is when it is a tax on the privilege of engaging in intrastate business, and such a foreign corporation must be engaging in intrastate business before it would be subject to an occupation tax. This was not changed by the new subsection (N). This subsection must be construed with the rest of the Chapter and section. When thus construed it is clear that only those foreign corporations previously subject to the occupation tax (i.e., doing intrastate business or owning property within the State) are affected by subsection (N). The effect of the change made in the law by subsection (N) was that the taxable period for such a foreign corporation would be the same taxable period for which the 517 corporation reports its net income for purposes of the Georgia income tax, and the return required to be filed under the occupation tax law shall be filed at the same time as the return of net income required to be filed under the income tax laws of this state. In your second question you ask "If a foreign corporation was not doing business within the meaning of Ga. Code Ann. 92-2403, as amended, would the consignment of inventories to customers in this State make the corporation liable for the occupation or license tax?" Ga. Code Ann. 92-2403 imposes a franchise or occupation tax on all corporations incorporated or organized under the laws of any other State, Territory, or Nation, doing business or owning property in this State, except those not operated for pecuniary gain or profit. This tax is imposed for the privilege of carrying on their businesses within this State. A consignment is a bailment and agency for the sale of goods. See The National Bank of Augusta v. Goodyear Chemical Company, et al, 90 Ga. 711 (1892); Payne v. American Agricultural Chemical Company, 66 Ga. App. 597 (1942). Accordingly, even though a consignment may not be "doing business" within the meaning of City of Atlanta v. York Manufacturing Co., 155 Ga. 33 (1922), it is "owning property" and subject to taxation. See R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Carson, 2 STC 250-006, 187 Tenn. 157, 213 S. W. 2d 45. As might be expected, the question of taxpayers' liability regarding consigned goods has arisen in other areas of taxation. This is especially true in the area of ad valorem taxation (the question being whether the consignor or the consignee was the owner of the goods). The tax in such cases was assessed against the owner who was determined to be the consignor. See Ferry-Morse Seed Co. v. Board of County Commissioners of El Paso County, 250 P. 2d 1003. OPINION 66-252 (Unofficial) November 29, 1966 This is in reply to your recent inquiry as to whether or not the Broad River Soil Conservation District, which has acquired in 518 excess of 90% of the separate property owners easements gratuitously given in writing for the purpose of a small watershed project, may institute condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the remaining necessary easements. Ga. Code Ann. 5-2201 (b) provides whenever the governing board of a soil conservation district finds it impossible to acquire the remaining necessary easements on a voluntary basis it will, upon such showing incorporated in a condemnation proceeding, be granted the power of eminent domain to secure any remaining necessary easements for the completion of the project. Therefore, since the requisite 90% has been acquired it is in order to proceed with the condemnation of the remaining necessary easements under procedures set forth in Ga. Code Ann. 36-1104 thru 36-1116 and other pertinent eminent domain statutes. OPINION 66-253 (Unofficial) November 30, 1966 In answer to your recent request to this office as to whether a Merit System employee can legally serve as a member of a county Democratic Executive Committee when such individual has been elected by the people of his district, I would like to point out to you the following applicable provisions controlling this matter. Ga. Code Ann. Ch. 40-22 establishes the Merit System of Personnel Administration in the State of Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. 40-2207 gives the power and duty of the Merit System Council to promulgate rules and regulations under which this system is to operate. I would like to call your attention to one section of such rules and regulations promulgated under the above-mentioned powers. It is Section 3.100, Prohibition of Political Activity, under Rule 3, General Provisions of the Rules and Regulations of the State Merit System. Paragraph 3.101 of this section reads as follows: "No person shall be appointed to, or demoted or dismissed from, any position under the Merit System, or in any way favored or discriminated against with respect to employment under the Merit System because of his political or religious opinions or affiliations; nor shall there be any discrimination 519 in favor of, or against, any applicant because of race, color, sex, physical handicap, or national origin; except that no employee under the Merit System shall be a member of any national, state or local committee of a political party, or an of~ ficer of a partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any public ofjice, or shall take any part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any political campaign, except to exercise his rights as a citizen privately to express his opinion and to cast his vote." (Emphasis added.) From the above, it is clearly shown that a Merit System employee cannot legally be a member of any State or local committee of a political party. Therefore, a Merit System employee cannot legally serve as a member of a county Executive Committee of the Democratic Party. OPINION 66-254 (Unofficial) December l, 1966 You asked for an opmwn from the Department of Law concerning the removal of a registered voter, upon a challenge received in writing, from the list of qualified electors. While the decision concerning a person's qualification to register or to vote rests with the Board of Registrars, with a right of appeal to the Superior Court, (Ga. Code Ann. 34-628 and 34-627) we doubt that the Jackson County Board of Registrars would be authorized to remove the name of the challenged elector under the facts stated in your letter. OPINION 66-255 (Unofficial) December I, 1966 You inquired whether or not the "Medical Center," a laboratory now operated as a partnership by five (5) physicians in conjunction with their regular practice, may become incorporated. You indicate that the medical practice would remain a partnership while the laboratory became incorporated as a close corporation whose sole shareholders would be the members of the partnership. 520 After studying the relevant statutes and discussing the matter with the Joint Secretary, State Examining Boards, I find nothing to impede incorporation as outlined in your letter. If the proposed incorporation does take place, however, care should be taken to avoid performing those services classified as the practice of medicine by Ga. Code Ann. 84-901. OPINION 66-256 (Unofficial) December 1, 1966 You have posed the following question: "If I am required to hold over beyond the end of my present term, would my eligibility to hold the office of Governor for the term beginning in January of 197 1 be adversely affected?" The applicable provision of the Georgia Constitution reads as follows: "The executive power shall be vested in a Governor, who shall hold his office during the term of four years, and until his successor shall be chosen and qualified. The Governor serving at the time of the adoption of this Constitution and future Governors shalf not be eligible to succeed themselves and shalf not be eligible to hold the ojjice until after the expiration of four years from the conclusion of his term of ojjice . . ." (Emphasis supplied). 1 You are presently serving a term as Governor of Georgia for which you were elected in the General Election in 1962. You took and assumed the duties of your office in January of 1963. It seems clear to me that the language in the first sentence of Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I, which reads as follows: " . . . the term of four years . . ." was intended to and did provide a well-defined and fixed gubernatorial term of four calendar years. The remaining language in said sentence relates to a Governor's "tenure" of office, which might, under given circumstances, exceed a four-year period. The restrictions on eligibility appearing in the second sentence of I. Georgia Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I; (Ga. Code Ann. 2-300 I). 521 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I, of the Constitution, reading as follows: " . . . until after the expiration of four years from the conclusion of his term of office . . ." relates and refers to the stated and fixed term of four years as provided for in the preceding sentence. That is, the four-year period of "ineligibility" provided for in the second sentence dates from the end of the fixed four-year term referred to in the first sentence. Thus, in computing any limitation as applicable to the facts at hand, as I construe these constitutional provisions, the only inhibition that could apply to you would be that you would be ineligible to again be elected as Governor of Georgia prior to the 1970 General Election. You would, however, be qualified and eligible to be a candidate in the 1970 election for Governor and if elected would be qualified and eligible to serve as Governor for the term commencing in January of 1971, insofar as the subject constitutional provisions are concerned. Our Constitution clearly imposes upon an incumbent Governor the obligation of an extended tenure of office until his successor has been chosen and qualified. Any construction of our Constitution which would impose any kind of sanction upon a Governor thus performing and discharging his lawful responsibilities except under or by a clear and express mandate of law would, in my opinion, be a strained and unreasonable construction. The views I have expressed herein seem to be in accord with the prevailing weight of decided authority in other jurisdictions,2 as well as the judicial expressions of our own State Courts.3 Almost seventeen years ago my predecessor in office rendered an opinion which held that both M. E. Thompson and Herman E. Talmadge were qualified and eligible to be candidates for Governor of Georgia in the 1950 elections.4 This opinion has never been overturned and in fact has been accepted and acted upon by all concerned, including the electorate. 2. See annotation at 59 ALR 2d 706 and Ervin v. Collins, 85 So. 2d 852. 3. Crovatt v. Mason, 101 Ga. 246 (1897); Thompson v. Talmadge, 201 Ga. 867 (1947) (In the context of the present problem, the Court in this case uses "term" in the sense of "tenure"); McLendon v. Everett, 205 Ga. 713 (1949); Hooper v. Almand. 196 Ga. 52 (1943). 4. Op. Att'y Gen., 1950-51, p. 6. 522 Mr. Thompson had served as Acting Governor from March of 1947 until November of 1948. In 1948 M. E. Thompson and Herman E. Talmadge were both candidates in a Democratic Gubernatorial Primary which Mr. Talmadge won. Governor Talmadge served as Governor from November of 1948 until January of 1955 (Governor Talmadge having been elected to a full four-year term in 1950 in a contest in which Mr. Thompson was also a candidate). In 195 1 the Georgia General Assembly declared Governor Talmadge elected.5 It would be impossible to avoid an analogy between the facts of the present situation and those occurring in the period between 1948 and 1951. Any such comparison would unquestionably show that any defect in eligibility which might be applicable to the present situation would be at least equally applicable to the situation as it existed in 1948-1951. Therefore, the views and conclusions expressed herein are not only in accord with but are supported by historical precedent and the previous opinion of this office, but even more significantly by the legislative declaration and interpretations referred to herein. I am, therefore, persuaded that should this issue ever reach the Courts for a judicial interpretation, that the present circumstances would not be construed as to create any ineligibility. Therefore, it is my official opinion that you would not be prevented from seeking the office of Governor of the State of Georgia in 1970 because you were compelled to comply with the requirements of the Georgia Constitution. OPINION 66-257 December 5, 1966 You seek an official opinion on whether a probationer who is under supervision in a county or judicial circuit other than that of conviction may be returned for a revocation hearing to the court granting probation, or is it mandatory that the violator's hearing be 5. Georgia Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I, Par. 2, 3 & 4; Ga. Code Ann. 40-101 and 104.1 (Ga. Laws 1949, p. 948); House Journal, 1951, pp. 25, 26; Senate Journal, 1951, p. 14. 523 held in a court of equivalent original criminal jurisdiction within the county wherein the probationer resides for purposes of supervision? Prior to the enactment of Ga. Laws 1966, p. 440, (which amends Ga. Code Ann. 27-2713) the "Statewide Probation Act" (Ga. Laws 1956, p. 27) only provided for the return of a probation violator to the court granting such probation. Now, Ga. Laws 1966, p. 440, allows for the return of a violator to a court of equivalent original criminal jurisdiction within the county wherein the probationer resides for purposes of supervision. However, it is necessary to construe Georgia Laws 1966, p. 440 in its proper context and as it relates to the "Statewide Probation Act" in its entirety. Undercofler v. Capital Automobile Company, 111 Ga. App. 709,716 (1965). Ga. Code Ann. 27-2709 provides that the sentencing judge shall not lose jurisdiction over a probationer and such judge may act upon the probated sentence at any time during the period of time the probated sentence is to run. Ga. Laws 1966, p. 440, is not in any manner inconsistent with Ga. Code Ann. 27-2709 for the former allows the arresting probation officer a choice of returning the violator to the sentencing court or to a court of competent jurisdiction in the county wherein the violator resides for purposes of supervision. If the arresting officer chooses the latter choice, then it becomes incumbent upon the court to comply with the proviso in Georgia Laws 1966, p. 440, which requires ten (10) days written notice to the sentencing court prior to a hearing on the merits. It is my opinion that a probation violator may be returned to the sentencing court for a hearing or he may have a hearing in a court of equivalent original criminal jurisdiction within the county wherein the probationer resides for purposes of supervision upon the giving of ten (10) days written notice to the sentencing court prior to the hearing on the merits. OPINION 66-258 (Unofficial) December 7, 1966 I have received your letter requesting an opinion as to a possible infraction of Ga. Code Ann. 43-20la (b) pertaining to Georgia's 524 registration laws for foresters by a Forestry Consultant, in Leland, Missisippi. Ga. Code Ann. 43~20la (b) prevents an individual from advertising or holding himself out as engaged in the practice of professional forestry without first being licensed as a registered forester under this chapter. Ga. Code Ann. 43~220a provides a remedy to prevent such an infraction. It gives the board the power to file an equitable petition in its own name in the Superior Court in any county of this State having jurisdiction of the parties seeking a temporary restraining order or a permanent injunction against such persons. However, as stated above, this equitable petition must be brought in the Superior Court in a county in this State having jurisdiction over the parties. There is no court in the State of Georgia that would have jurisdiction over the gentleman mentioned in the ad in Southern Lumberman who is a resident of Leland, Mississippi. These provisions of the Georgia Law effect only Georgia Resident Foresters or those doing actual business in this State. Unless he engages in the practice of Forestry personally in the State of Georgia or owns a firm, company, partnership, associa~ tion, or corporation within the State of Georgia, the State Board of Registration for Foresters is, in my opinion, without any preventive procedure in this matter. OPINION 66-259 December 8, 1966 You request an opmwn on whether or not the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 (Public Law 89~60 I) are constitutional insofar as they extend minimum wage and maximum hours coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to State employees, and, if the coverage is constitutional, to what extent State employees are covered. In answer to the first part of your question, there does not, at this time, appear to be any valid constitutional objection to extension of the provisions of the Act to State employees. With respect to your question concerning the extent to which this Act covers State employees, the following brief summary of 525 changes effected by the 1966 Amendments which affect State employees is furnished for information. Prior to enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, the existing provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 exempted employees of hospitals, nursing homes, and homes for the aged from its minimum wage and maximum hours provisions. In addition, the act previously exempted employees of a State or political subdivision from coverage by excluding the United States or a State or a political subdivision thereof from the definition of the term "employer." The 1966 Amendments changed the previous law, referred to above, so as to affect State employees in the following ways: (a) The provision which formerly exempted hospital employees (29 U .S.C., 213 [a] [2] ) has been revised by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, and no longer includes employees of hospitals within the exempt category. Also, the term "enterprise," previously defined in 29 United States Code, Section 203, has been revised by the 1966 Amendments to include the activities of hospitals, related institutions and schools, whether or not these hospitals, institutions or schools are public or private or operated for profit or not for profit. (b) The 1966 Amendments revised 29 United States Code, Section 203 (d) so that the section now provides that a State or political subdivision thereof shall be considered an employer for purposes of the act with respect to its employees employed in any hospital, institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises of such institution, a school for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted children, an elementary or secondary school, or an institution of higher education, or employed in the operation of a local transit system. Reference is also made to 29 United States Code, Section 213 (a) (1), as amended, which exempts any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools. As a result of these two changes effected by the 1966 Amendments, it is my opinion that State employees employed in the areas named in paragraph (b) above, are now covered by both 526 the minimum wage and maximum hours proviswns of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The coverage extends only to State employees in the named areas, since with respect to other employees a State or political subdivision is still not considered an "employer" for purposes of this Act. As provided in the 1966 Amendments, this coverage does not become effective until February 1, 1967, and the minimum wage for newly covered employees will thereafter be determined by the progressive time implementation schedule set out in 29 U. S. C., 206 (d) as amended. There are no particular legal implications of the Act which I feel need to be brought to your attention at this time. However, I shall be most happy to furnish additional assistance as individual problems arise. OPINION 66-260 Decemher 13, 1966 You asked my official opinion as to whether you may proclaim that a proposed constitutional amendment to create a DouglasvilleDouglas County Industrial Authority was properly ratified by an affirmative vote of the electors of Douglas County. The proposed amendment was found to be a local amendment affecting the political subdivisions of Douglas County and the City of Douglasville pursuant to Art. XI I I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Constitution of Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. 2-8101). The above-cited Article of the Constitution provides in relevant part: " . . .The votes of the electors in each political subdivision affected shall be counted separately in determining whether such proposed amendment is ratified, and it must be ratified by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly voting thereon in each such political subdivision before it shall become a part of this Constitution." You have stated that no separate tabulation of the votes cast by electors of the City of Douglas has been submitted to you. Therefore, it is my official opinion that the clear requirements of the Constitution have not yet been met. See, for example, Smith v. State of Georgia, by Hayes, Solicitor General, eta/., 217 Ga. 94, 97 527 (1961 ). Accordingly, you would not be authorized upon the basis of the returns submitted to you, to proclaim the amendment as having been properly ratified. OPINION 66-261 December 13, 1966 You asked my opinion regarding the validity of a hold harmless clause in a lease contract for farm equipment when such clause stands either alone or in conjunction with a severability clause which makes inoperative any part of the agreement invalid under State law without affecting the remainder of the Agreement. The hold harmless clause in question would require the Regents as lessee to hold the lessor harmless from all claims, demands and actions for property damage and personal injury occasioned by the possession or use of the equipment while leased to the lessee. As you know, the Regents has the statutory power to contract insofar as necessary to administer its duties within the scope of its authority and its liability under such contracts is the same as that of any citizen. Regents v. Blanton, 49 Ga. App. 602 (1934) On the other hand, the Regents, as a State agency exercising governmental functions has sovereign immunity and cannot be sued or made to respond in tort damages without statutory consent thereto. Roberts v. Barwick, 187 Ga. 691 (1939); Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59, p. 393. Thus the answer to your question depends upon whether the delegation to the Regents of the power to contract and the consent of the General Assembly for the Regents to be sued, ex contractu, (Ga. Code Ann. 32-114 incorporating 1364 of the Code of 191 0) extends to the contractual assumption of tort liability. Since a statute which authorizes suits against the State is in derogation of the State's sovereignty, such a statute must be strictly construed. Roberts, supra. Consequently, the consent of the General Assembly must be given expressly or by clear implication. Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, Inc. 212 Ga. 617 (1956). The consent of the State cannot be enlarged by implication. Shaffer v. Oxford, 102 Ga. App. 710 (1897). Applying the above-stated principles to the instant case, I believe the judiciary of this State would find that the powers delegated to 528 the Regents do not include by clear implication the power to waive sovereign immunity by the contractual assumption of tort liability. This conclusion is stren'gthened by comparing the language of Ga. Code Ann. 32-121 delegating the power to contract to the Regents w th the express language of Ga. Code Ann. 32-167 and 56-2437, which provide for waiver of sovereign immunity under certain circumstances. Accordingly, it is my official opinion that a hold harmless clause executed by the Regents would be invalid and ultra vires. Since the Regents has no authority to enter into such an indemnity agreement for tort liability, it would not be proper for Regents to knowingly make such an ultra vires agreement. Where, however, as in the instant case, the agreement is an adhesion contract prepared by the lessor for use in a number of states and contains a severability clause, there would be a presumption that the parties know the Georgia law and that the hold harmless clause is contemplated as inoperative by the severability clause. Thus, the Regents may, in my opinion, legally execute such an agreement although the better practice would be to specifically exclude it where possible. Additionally, if and when the clause is not excluded, I would suggest that in the interest of fair play, the lessor be notified that Regents does not consider such a clause binding upon it under Georgia law. In this regard I would like to point out that I or one of my assistants will usually be available to aid you in negotiating such clauses out of proposed contracts. OPINION 66-262 (Unofficial) December 14, 1966 In your letter you ask whether the State Revenue Commissioner may assess a penalty against the owner of a motor vehicle when the owner registered his vehicle before April 2, by purchasing a private truck license plate and was later, upon inspection by the Motor Vehicle Unit, found to be operating the motor vehicle as a contract carrier for hire. The Department of Revenue has adopted Rule No. 560-102.1405 which provides in part: "Where a motor vehicle operator with a current tag is found to be hauling for hire with a private tag . . .the vehicle is improperly classified...." 529 This rule requires the payment of a 20% penalty where an operator is delinquent as to classification. The authority for this rule is Ga. Code Ann. 68-201 as amended. It is apparently the position of the Department of Revenue that to register a vehicle means to properly register such vehicle. The interpretation made by the Department of Revenue is reasonable. The question you posed must be answered in the affirmative. OPINION 66-263 December 14, 1966 Replying to your letter relating to the tabulation of votes cast in an election for the adoption of a proposed constitutional amendment, I find that: The proposed amendment for the creation of a commission to study matters relating to the consolidation of Glynn County and the City of Brunswick was found to be a local amendment pursuant to Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I ofthe Georgia Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 28101 ). The political subdivisions deemed to be directly affected by the amendment were Glynn County and the City of Brunswick, thus necessitating an affirmative vote in each subdivision in order to secure passage of the amendment. It is my official opinion that in tabulating the vote cast by electors residing within Glynn County, the fact that some electors may be residing in another directly affected politicial subdivision within the county would not preclude the vote of such electors from being tabulated in the county vote. Accordingly, the votes cast by the electors of the City of Brunswick should be counted once as such, and also included as votes cast by electors residing within the County of Glynn. See, for example, Smith v. State of Georgia, by Hayes, Solicitor General, eta!, 217 Ga. 94,97 (1961). OPINION 66-264 December 14, 1966 You advised that at the present time a proposal is pending to request the General Assembly to appropriate funds to be allotted to local school systems by the State Board of Education to assist with 530 the cost of operation of school lunch programs, and requesting an official opinion in answer to the following question: Under the Constitution and laws of Georgia, can State funds be legally allotted to local school systems to be used in defraying the cost of operation of school lunchrooms? Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I of the State Constitution (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5501) provides that the power of taxation over the whole State shall be exercised "only" for certain enumerated purposes including "for educational purposes". None of the other enumerated purposes, in my opinion, would authorize the use of public tax funds in support of the school lunch program. The question presented, therefore, is whether "for educational purposes" could be said to be sufficiently broad and flexible so as to authorize disbursements of State funds in support of such program. This is, of course, a question upon which reasonable men could and no doubt would disagree. Many educators would undoubtedly maintain that an adequate school lunch program, especially for those students whose diet at home might be less than adequate, is a necessary part of the learning or educational process. It might well be that the courts, considering the general broadening of what has traditionally been considered to be ordinary school and educational activities, would agree and hold the school lunch program is an "educational purpose". The Supreme Court of Georgia, it may be noted, has held that the term "for educational purposes" is broad enough to cover all things necessary or incidental to the furtherance of education. See Board of Commissioners v. Bond, 203 Ga. 558, 560 (1948). It is my opinion, however, that the courts would be more likely to conclude that no matter how desirable the school lunch program might be, it cannot be said to be "an educational purpose" within the meaning of the Constitution. With respect to the disbursement of public school funds the courts have been right restrictive in their interpretation of what constitutes an "educational purpose", see e.g. Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Company, 54 Ga. App. 81, 85 (1936) (cert. denied), and prior rulings of the Attorney General have also been restrictive in their approach to the problem, e.g. Op. Att'y Gen. 1958-59, pp. 125, 128; 1957, p. 116. To illustrate, in Murphy v. Constitution Indemnity Company, supra, the Court of Appeals of Georgia indicated that school funds 531 could not be used to provide workmen's compensation insurance for its bus drivers, and an opinion of the Attorney General has reached the same conclusion respecting the use of school funds to provide such insurance for teachers. Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, pp. 163-70. I find it somewhat difficult to see how a school lunch program can be considered any more of an "educational program" than providing protection for school employees through workmen's compensation insurance. All previous opinions of the Attorney General, of course, have, in fact, ruled that the term "for educational purposes", as used in the Co~stitution, is not sufficiently broad so as to encompass a school lunch program. Op. Att'y Gen. 1960-61, p. 167; 1958-59, pp. 130. 131. My conclusion as to the probable continued validity of these prior rulings is buttressed by the fact that the General Assembly of Georgia, in order to permit the expenditure of public funds for school lunch purposes, deemed it necessary to amend the Constitution by expressly adding this item as one of the enumerated purposes for which the taxing power of the State would extend, and proposed such an amendment. (Ga. Laws 1958, p. 563). It was, however, defeated by the electorate. An identical amendment was again proposed by the 1962 General Assembly (Ga. Laws 1962, p. 978), which also was defeated. A similar amendment was proposed by the 1958 General Assembly which would have permitted counties to use funds for school lunch purposes (Ga. Laws 1958, p. 428). It, too, was defeated by the electorate. During the 1960 session of the General Assembly, however, an amendment was proposed which would empower the General Assembly to authorize any county to use public funds for this purpose. This amendment was ratified by the electorate in the 1960 general election. See Ga. Laws 1960p. 1213 (Ga. Code Ann. 2-5701(17) ). In view of the foregoing, it is my opinion that until such time as a Constitutional Amendment is adopted authorizing it, State funds may not be legally allotted to local school systems to be used in defraying the cost of operation of school lunchrooms. OPINION 66-265 (Unofficial) December 15, 1966 You ask for an opinion construing the language set out in Ga. Code Ann. 34-1406(a)(i) and 34-1406(a)(v). 532 An elector may execute an absentee ballot in the presence of "A postmaster of the United States or his assistant while within the confines of a post office". Ga. Code Ann. 34-l406(a) (i). You have asked what the words "his assistant" mean. It is our opinion that the words "his assistant" refer to an assistant postmaster. An elector may also execute an absentee ballot in the presence of "the registrar or any authorized deputy registrar of any college or university". Ga. Code Ann. 34-1406(a) (v). It is our opinion that the words "any authorized deputy registrar" refer to a person who is a deputy registrar,. who usually and customarily performs the duties ordinarily incumbent upon a deputy registrar, and who, in addition, has been authorized by the registrar to validate absentee ballots. OPINION 66-266 (Unofficial) December 16, 1966 You ask which official on a college campus may validate absentee ballots. An elector may vote by absentee ballot by appearing before "A registrar or any authorized deputy registrar of any college or university." Ga. Code Ann. 34-l406(a)(v). Certainly, there is no question about the propriety of the registrar's validation of absentee ballots. It is our opinion that the words "authorized deputy registrar" refer to a person who is a deputy registrar, who usually and customarily performs the duties incumbent upon a deputy registrar, and who is, in addition, authorized by the registrar to validate absentee ballots. While the deputy's authority could probably rest upon oral instructions, it is our suggestion that the authority be conferred in writing. OPINION 66-267 (Unofficial) December 20, 1966 You requested my unofficial view as to whether or not the socalled State Impact Law (Ga. Laws 1962, pp. 71-73) was repealed by the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act (Ga. Laws 1964, pp. 3-49). 533 My answer is in the negative for the following reasons. An existing statute is repealed by a newer enactment of the General Assembly in one of two ways. The first method of repeal is by express repealer. As to this method suffice it to say that it is not applicable here for the simple reason that Section 59 of the newer act does not include the State Impact Law among those statutory provisions which are expressly repealed. The other possibility is that of a repeal by implication where the two provisions are in conflict with each other. The courts have frequently stated that such repeals by implication are not favored and will be held to exist only where the inconsistency is clear and where the two statutes cannot be reconciled. In this situation I doubt that it could be said that the two provisions you are concerned with are incapable of standing together. This would seem to be especially true in view of the language of Section 7 of the prior act (i.e. the State Impact Law) which provides in part: "The funds appropriated by virtue of the terms of this Act shall be in addition to any and all other funds or appropriations allotted to the school districts for educational purposes, and the funds or appropriations allotted by this Act shall in no way be construed as to reduce any other funds or appropriations for which the school districts may be entitled by virtue of existing or future law. . ." OPINION 66-268 December 22, 1966 You requested an opinion as to whether or not employees of the Georgia Prison Industries Administration can be placed under the State Merit System under existing statutes by Executive Order. In answer to this question, I would like to point out to you the following applicable provisions. Ga. Code Ann. 40-2201 (a) states in part as follows: "There is authorized to be created and established a Merit System of personnel administration covering the employees of the State and county Departments of Health; . . . .'' (Emphasis added). Ga. Code Ann. 40-2242 states that: "Any department or agency or employees of the State of Georgia which has not been heretofore included under the 534 provisions of Section 40-220 Lto 40-2209, is hereby authorized to come under the provisions of said sections under the following procedure: . . . ." This Section goes on to outline the procedure necessary whereby the Governor may issue an Executive Order proclaiming that such departments or agencies have become subject to the Merit System. In interpreting the entire act which established the Merit System, it is my opinion that before a department or agency can come under the provisions of this act or under the Merit System, the employees must be employees of the State of Georgia. The Georgia Prison Industries Administration is an "instrumentality" of the State. However, it is a "public corporation" and may "sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded and complain and defend in any and all courts." from the above, it appears that the Georgia Prison Industries Administration is not an agency of the State within the meaning of the Act creating the Merit System nor are its employees employees of the State of Georgia under said act, therefore, it is my opinion that the employees of the Georgia Prison Industries Administration cannot be placed under the State Merit System under existing statutes by Executive Order. It would require special legislation to accomplish this. OPINION 66-269 (Unofficial) December 27, 1966 You requested information as to the legality of a Turkey Shoot. As I understand the nature of a Turkey Shoot, a certain number of persons pay a sum of money for the opportunity to test their skill at handling a firearm against that of the others competing with a prize turkey going to the winner. The primary objection to such a contest arises from Ga. Code Ann. 26-6502 which provides that "Any person, who, by himself or with another, shall keep, maintain, employ, or carry on any lottery or other scheme or device for the hazarding of any money or valuable thing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." This statute is directed against lotteries, gift enterprises and other similar schemes such as pinball machines, the "numbers" game, card games, bingo, 535 etc., where the outcome depends primarily on chance. For there to be a violation of the section, there must be a union of the three elements-consideration, chance and prize. Russell v. Equitable Loan and Security Co., 29 Ga. 154, 161 (1907). Therefore, since consideration and prize are present, the importance of the element of chance should be determinative of the legality of a Turkey Shoot. The court in Russell v. Equitable Loan & Security Co., supra, made this distinction between "chance" and "skill": "The chance here referred to is that chance which is employed in connection with lottery schemes, where the attempt is to obtain certain ends, not by skill or any known or fixed rules, but by the happening of a subsequent event, incapable of ascertainment or accomplishment by means of human foresight or ingenuity. If the result in a given transaction could be accomplished or foretold by the exercise ojski/1 or foresight, its ascertainment would not be attributed to chance, but to the exercise of skill or foresight, and consequently to design." (Emphasis added). This does not mean, however, that the mere fact that some skill is involved will protect any particular set of circumstances. For example, in Sparks v. State, 48 Ga. App. 498 ( 1933), it was shown that some skill was involved in the operation of a pinball machine; yet the Court of Appeals held that it was, nevertheless, a game of -chance. The Court of Appeals has also upheld a conviction under Ga. Code Ann. 26-6502, involving the operation of a shooting gallery on grounds that the jury was warranted in finding the degree of chance necessary for a violation of the statute. Lewis v. State, 55 Ga.App.I59(1937). However, assuming that my understanding of the circumstances involved here is correct, I am of the opinion that your Turkey Shoot would not be a violation of Ga. Code Ann. 26-6502. I feel that the situation is analogous to a professional golfing contest where contestants pay qualifying fees for the privilege of competing with a large sum of prize money going to the winner. Such a contest is essentially one of skill, not chance, and I feel that the same is true of the Turkey Shoot. 536 OPINION 66-270 (Unofficial) December 28, 1966 You requested a legal opinion as to whether or not the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Cobb County is entitled to receive, in addition to his regular salary, a salary as Chairman of the Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority as provided by the Act setting up the Authority (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 2762). By statute, as you point out in your letter, the salary of the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners is fixed at $15,000.00 per annum, and it is provided that he "shall not be entitled to any further compensation for serving on any other boards or authorities" by virtue of his office. (Ga. Laws 1964, Extra Session pp. 2075, 2079). Although my views must be accepted as purely personal and unofficial, I am inclined to agree with your conclusion that the 1965 Act, being the last expression of the Legislature intent would control, and that the Chairman may receive the designated salary from the Water Authority. There would seem to be little doubt as to the intent of the Legislature. It is presumed that all statutes are enacted with full know ledge of the existing condition of the law. Spence v. Powe/1, 213 Ga. 145, 150 ( 1957). OPINION 66-271 (Unofficial) December 29, 1966 You requested my advice on the possibility of a conflict in being county attorney and also holding the office of State Representative. I would first like to express my regrets for not being able to give you a more accelerated reply, but due to prior pressing matters this office has been engaged in, a delay has been necessitated. In answer to your request, I would like to call your attention to Ga. Code Ann. 2-1606 and 2-180 I. These code sections set out the qualifications and eligibility for members of the office of State Representative. The pertinent part of the above provisions is set out in part in Ga. Code Ann. 2-1606, which reads as follows: "No person holding a military commission, or other appointment, or office, having any emolument, or 537 compensation annexed thereto, under the State, or the United States, or either ... shall have a seat in either house; ..." From the above it is shown that a person holding an office having any emolument or compensation annexed thereto under this State shall not have a seat in the house. However, it is my belief that the office of county attorney is not an "office" "under this State" within the meaning of the above provision. Such a position does not bestow any governmental functions upon the holder thereof. Therefore, it is my opinion that there is no conflict in being county attorney, and also holding the office of State Representative. OPINION 66-272 December 30, 1966 You have inquired as to whether the Honorable Luther C. Hames, Jr., Solicitor General of the Cobb Judicial Circuit, based on the information furnished by him, is eligible to be appointed Solicitor General Emeritus pursuant to the applicable statutes. The applicable statutory provisions specify that a person must have a total of at least nineteen (19) years' service as Solicitor General in order to qualify for appointment as a Solicitor General Emeritus (Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 780, 781, as amended; Ga. Code Ann. 24-2902(a) ). There is a further provision which states that in computing years of service as a Solicitor General, credit is to be given for wartime military service and a full year's credit is to be given for a fraction of a year's service (Ga. Laws 1965, p. 481; Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909(a) ). In addition, it is required that the requisite payments into the retirement fund are to be made in each year of the entire required period in office (Ga. Laws 1949, pp. 780, 782; Ga. Code Ann. 24-2909(a) ). Taking office on January I, 1953, Mr. Hames will have served as of January I, 1967 as Solicitor General for a period of fourteen (14) years and he has made all necessary payments into the retirement fund through 1965. In addition, he served in the Armed Forces for four and one-half (4-1 /2) years during World War ll. Therefore, in answer to your specific question, it is my official opinion that the Honorable Luther C. Hames, Jr., Solicitor General of the Cobb Judicial Circuit, will be eligible as of January 538 I, 1967, on the basis of his fourteen (14) years of service in that position in conjunction with his wartime military service, to be appointed a Solicitor General Emeritus upon making his 1966 payment into the retirement fund. TABLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, GEORGIA LAWS AND CODE SECTIONS Table 1 United States Constitutional Provisions Table 2 Georgia Constitutional Provisions Table 3 Georgia Laws Table 4 Georgia Code Annotated Sections 539 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 541 TABLE 1 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PAGE Art. 6 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------425 TABLE 2 GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PAGE Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV _______________ -----------------------------------~------------- 5 Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XXIII ---------------------------------------------------- 332, 430 Art. I, Sec. III, Par. I --------------------------------------~----------------------------197 Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I ______ ------------------------------------------------------~-----126 Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. II ---------------------------------------------------------------_437 Art. II, Sec. I ______________ - ___ --------------- ----------------------------------------------353 Art. II, Sec. V, Par. I __ -----------------------------~---------------------------26, 202 Art. II, Sec. VI, Par. I -----------------------------------------------------------------254 Art. III, Sec. IV, Par. I _____________________________________________________________355 Art. III, Sec. IV, Par. VI __________________________________________________________332 Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. VIII _______________________________________________________436 Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. XV ____________ ---------------------------------------------- 9 Art. IV, Sec. II, Par. I __ ---------------------------------------------------------------276 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. I ----------------------------------------------------------- 520, 521 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. II ________________________________________________________ 490, 522 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. III __________________________________________________________491, 522 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. IV _-------------------------- ____________________________491, 522 Art. V, Sec. I, Par. XIII ______________________________________________________________492 Art. VI, Sec. III, Par. II _______________________________________________________________361 Art. VI, Sec. XI, Par. I __________________,_________ . _____________ 361, 443, 459 Art. VI, Sec. XI, Par. II _________________________________________________________443 Art. VI, Sec. XII, Par. I ______________________________________________________________301 Art. VI, Sec. XIV, Par. VI __________________________________________________________ 63 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. II __________ 5, 50, 112, 113, 160, 298, 368,479 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. III ______ ______ ______ _______ _________________________________417 Art. VII, Sec. I, Par. IV ------------------------------------------ ______________ 1, 156 Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. I___ ______________________ 100, 131, 408, 444, 530 Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. I ___________________________ ------------------------------------ 73 Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. IV ---------------------------------------------------------- 6 Art. VII, Sec. III, Par. VI----------------------------------- -------------------------132 Art. VII, Sec. IV ________ ------------------------------------------------------------------- 38 Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I ---------------------------------------- 3, 8, 43, 64, 422 542 GEORGIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS -Continued PAGE Art. Vll, Sec. V --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38 Art. VII, Sec. V, Par. I _______________________________________________________178, 179 Art. VII, Sec. VI, Par. I ----------------------------------------------84, 117, 178 Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. I __________________ 13, 55, 200, 235, 284, 286, 348 Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. IV ______________________________________________53, 54, 71 Art. VII, Sec. VII, Par. V ____________________________________________________________422 Art. VII, Sec. VIII, Par. I -----------------------------------------------------------180 Art. VII, Sec. IX, Par. IV ____________ ------"--- ________________________________66, 67 Art. VIII ------------------------------"----------------------------------------------------------- 64 Art. VIII, Sec. I, Par. IV ------------------------------------------------------------193 Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. I ________________________________________________________16, 358 Art. VIII, Sec. VIII, Par. II ----------------------------------------------------------206 Art. VIII, Sec. VIII, Par. III --------------------------------------------------------206 Art. VIII, Sec~ XII, Par. I _____________ ------------------------- 44, 64, 65, 193 Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. I ___________________________________________________________________422 Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. IV ___ ---------------------------------------------------------------153 Art. XI, Sec. II, Par. I ________________________________________________________________358 Art. XII, Sec. I, Par. I __________________________________________________________________492 Art. XII, Sec. I, Par. U _______________________________________________________________492 Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I ------------------------------------------------193, 526, 529 543 TABLE 3 GEORGIA LAWS YEAR oF AcT PAGE NUMBER OF ACT 1874 PAGE 6 ------------------- ------------. -------------------------------------------------------------------473 1886-87 498 --------------------------------- ------------------------------------"----------------------10, 71 5oo ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1o 1890-91 102 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------147 1893 77 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ____________________257 136 ------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------47 3 1901 477 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------"-41 7 191~ 174 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ________________________ 168 1920 1971 -------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------41 7 1925 165 ---------------------- ------ ... ------------ ---------------------------------------------------314 315 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 31 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 27 1931 7 ---------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------- 27 34 ---------------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 213 --- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 216 ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------- 27 221 --- --------------------------------------------------- --------------------- _______________283 222 ----------------------------------- ----------------------------------- ------------------------283 223 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------__________________283 755 -------------------------------C- _------------------------------------ -----------------------218 762 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------218 1019 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------276 1931, Ex. Sess. 24 ------------------------- ------- --------------------------------------------------------------404 1935 778 -------------------- -----------------------------------------------------_______________________216 1937 20 ---------------------- ---- -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------353 264 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ _________________281 544 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR oF AcT PAGE NuMBER oF AcT PAGE 1937 275 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________________281 311 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------513 318 -------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------513 761 ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------422 800 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------440 806 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 1937-38, Ex. Sess. 77 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------480 85 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------~---------------480 214 --- _______________________________________________________________232, 246, 261' 448 215 ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------246 222 ----------------- -----------------~--------------------------------------------------------------232 245 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------448 1939 144-159 -------------- -------------- ----------------------------------------------------------- 84 224 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 411 -------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------111 1941 229 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 243 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------___________________30 300 -------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------31 7 302 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------317 1943 171 ------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ____________________389' 408 172 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89' 408 173 ----------------" -------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89 180 -------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------281 204 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------365 207 -------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------365 208 ----------------------- ------ ---~--------------------------------------------------------------492 209 --------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------49;2 1945 160 ---- ----------------------------- ------------------ ------------------------------------------------481 267 ----------------------------- ---------------- ------------------- ----------------------------______261 448 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 1023 ------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------_______________208 103 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------208 545 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NUMBER OF ACT PAGE 1946 12 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1' 157 152 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------306 15 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------306 206 -------------------------------------------------------------------"------------------------44, 100 211 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 44 585 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------417 687 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------515 1947 616 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------278 617 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------27 8 618 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------278 1949 13 8 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------363 140 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------363 504 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89 780 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------537 781 ---------------------------- --------------------------------------~----------------------------537 948-- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------522 950 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------261 ' 448 953 ------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------261' 448 959 --------------------------- ----- ---------------------------------------- ________________________257 1032 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------158 1622 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 62 1950 405 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------"-----------241 1951 214 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15 8 215 ------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------15 8 254 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------506 360 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 360-387 ---------------------------------------------------------------196, 208, 235' 477 512 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 565 ---------------------------- --- -------- -----------------.77' 78, 79, 242, 244. 258 567 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------_______________242 568 ----------------------- --------------------------------------------------------242, 244, 25 8 571 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------77' 78, 79 677 ------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------348 678 ------------------------------C--------------------------------------------------------348 726 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------241 546 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF ACT PAGE NUMBER OF ACT 1951 PAGE 788 -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------281 3087 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 1952 55 ------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------- 80 63 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80 516 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------353 1953 128 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 129 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 185 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 366 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 369 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 560 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------498 602 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209' 339 604 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209 2733 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 1953, Nov. Sess. 67 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89 68 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------389 266 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------392 369 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------196 370 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------196 431 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------432 549 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------440 556 ------------------------------------------------------------19' 252, 253' 278, 440 575 ----------------------------------------c--------------------------------------252, 253' 278 605 ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79 2610 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------353 1954 499 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------320 534 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------320' 321 1955 10 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------372 106 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------372 339 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------475 341 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------475 483 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------279 639 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------254 640 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------254 547 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR oF AcT PAGE NuMBER OF AcT PAGE 1955 2840 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------393 3057 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------498 3060 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------498 1956 27 -------------------------------"--------------------------------------------------______________523 60 ----------------------------------------------------110, 111, 243, 295, 495, 496 61 ----------------------------------------------------------------110, 111' 295' 495, 4if6 62 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------49 6 161 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------82, 108, 498 174 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 08 177 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------82' 498 338 -------------------------------- ---------------------------------------______________________109 339 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------109 368 ------------------------------ -----------------------------------------------------------------475 370 ---------------------------- - ----------------------------------------------------------------475 503 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------i 25 543 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------242, 244, 245 545 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________245 547 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------242, 244 1011 --------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------43 1957 197 ---------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------439 206-209 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------363 420 ------------------------------ ---------------------------------------- 292, 368, 374, 497 4 22 ----------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------497 4 77 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------49 8 480 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------498 644 --- ----------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89 645 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 89 1958 82 ------------------------------ .------------------------------------------------------------_______208 86 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_______208 4 2 8 ----------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------531 430-431 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------235 563 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------531 634 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------281 1959 34-44 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------___________332 35 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ________243 548 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NuMBER OF AcT PAGE 1959 88 -----------------~-------------------------------------------------------152, 310' 311 ' 423 89 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------311 423 114 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------372 118 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------372 242 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 244 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 335 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------497 337 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------497 1960 153-158 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------208 245 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 246 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~----------473 289 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------109 6 7 5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 09 763 ------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------------------1 09 1009 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209 1010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209 1150-1152 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------206 1213 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------41 0, 531 1223-24 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------348 1297 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 1961 47 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------281' 380 207 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397 213 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397 3 01 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 51 392 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------301 417-421 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------179 2223 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------340 2228 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------340 2465 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 99 2465-72 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 77 2539 --------------------------------------------------------------------____________________________218 1962 10 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 67 17 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------274 25 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 67 30 --------"----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------274 71-73 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------532 549 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NuMBER OF AcT PAGE 1962 454 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------404 459 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------371 535-537 ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------212 639 ------------------------------------- ------------------------------ _____________________________219 795-97 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------358 978 ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------531 2270 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 2271 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 1962, Ex. Sess. 7 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 55 14 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------355 33 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 1963 45 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------427 56 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42 7 277 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 6 3 2 7 8 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 6 3 441 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 66 2250 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 75 3064 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80 1964 1 -------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------_274 3 --------------------------------------------------------------------------130, 289' 327' 348 3-49 ------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------532 13-14 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------274, 327 24 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 48' 435 45-46 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------130 87 -- ------------------------------- ----------- ------------------ ------------------------------------435 141 ----------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------351 220 -----------------------------. ------------ ------- --------------------------------------------9' 228 221 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------________________228 244 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------445 261 --------------------------------------- ------------------- ________________________________________ 195 263 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------___________________195 328 ----------------------------------- --------- ---------------------------------------------------- 37 338 -------------------------------------------------------------123, 238, 349, 350, 473 338-56 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 0, 11 340 ------------------------------------------------- ------------------- ----- _______________349. 473 342 ------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------_______________349' 350 550 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NuMBER OF AcT PAGE 1964 361 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 386-87 ------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------18, 19, 20 416 -------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------1' 349 420 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------349 443 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 485 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------107' 259 486 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------107' 259 489 --------------------------------------------------------- -- ----------------------------------236 4 9 3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23 6 499 ____28, 32, 133, 134, 280, 302, 304, 321, 330, 350, 367, 407, 422 505 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------407 507 ---------------------------------"-----------------------------------------------------------121 509 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------367 513 --------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------407 519 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------350 53 4 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------280 577 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 599 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 645 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------302 646 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------304 651 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 30 654 ---------------------------- ------------------------------- ----------------------------------- 32 735 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------161 872 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------338 984 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------199 984-86 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------193' 199 1000 --------------------------- --------------------------------- -----------------------------------160 2170 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________340 2173 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------340 2681 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------439 1964, Ex. Sess. 26 -------------------------------------------------------------- - 203' 434, 436' 437' 438 87 ------------------------- -------- ----------------------------------------------------------------434 93 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------437 196 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26, 203 2075 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------536 2079 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------536 1965 42 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8 551 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NuMBER oF AcT 1965 PAGE 44 -----------------------------------------------------------------65, 189' 190, 241' 268 59 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------189' 190 63 -------------------------------------------------------------------- ____________________241 ' 268 64 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------241 ' 268 127-1 74 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~-434 128-133 -------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------435 136 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------435 188 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 195 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 20 196 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------451 208 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------198 217 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------147' 189 21 7-224 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------161 224 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------434, 435 225 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------434' 435 266 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------234 283 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------_349' 350, 473 284-286 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------349' 473 2 86 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------350 292 -----------------------------"----------------------------------------------------------------473 298 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------151 344 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397' 404 345 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397' 404 346 --------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------397' 404 349 ---------------------------------------------------------- ____________________435' 437' 439 349-358 ---------------------------------------------------------------_43 3' 434, 435' 436 351 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------437 352 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------"---434, 435 353 -----------------------------"----------------------------------------------------------434' 435 54 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------43 7 355 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------434 385 ------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------513' 514 394 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------513 435 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 43 8 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------187 442 --- ---------------------------------------------- _______________________________________________187 451 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------377 458 ---------------------------------------58, 59, 65, 68, 240, 346, 482, 497 459 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------346' 482 552 GEORGIA LAWS-Continued YEAR OF AcT PAGE NUMBER OF AcT PAGE 1965 481 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------537 505 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------137 603 --- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------28, 71 612 -------------------------------------------------------------------------____________________28' 71 65 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------114 65 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------114 752-758 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------148, 149 2497 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------33 8 2650 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------194 2663 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------194 2680 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 2762 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------536 2903 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------215 2920 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------417 1966 6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------464 31 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------326 38-39 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________326 168 -----------------------------------------------------------------~------------------------51 0 188 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------509 191 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_51 0 195 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------428 203 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------344, 482 212 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------316 249 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------344, 482 279 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------362-3 281 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------362-3 430-432 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------414' 472 432 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------485 440 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------523 453 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------341 517 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------328 520 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------418 '; 4 3 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 2 7 5 61 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 55 1070 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------487' 500 1073 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------487 2801 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------353' 354 553 TABLE 4 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS CODE SECTIONS PA.GE 2-114 5 2-123 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 32, 4 80 2-301 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------197 2-401 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------126, 149 2-402 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------437 2-1101 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26, 202 2-1601 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------355 2-1606 ----------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------332, 536 2-1908 ------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------------436, 43 8 2-1915 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9 2-1922 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------500 2-2406 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ___________________500 2-2501 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------276 2-3001 --------------------------------------------------------------"-------------------------------520 2-41 02 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 2-4601 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------443' 459 2-4602 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------443 2-4906 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63 2-5401 -------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------178 2-5402 -------------------------- _______________________________________5, 50, 112, 113, 368 2-5403 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------417 2-5404 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------156, 192 2-5501 ----------------------------------------------------------------------131' 408, 444, 530 2-5601 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 73 2-5604 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6 2-5606 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------132 2-5701 _____________________________________________________3, 8, 64, 100, 160, 410, 531 2-5801 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 7 8 2-5901 --------------------------------------------------------------------- __________________84, 117 2-6001 -----------------------------------------------.13, 55, 200, 235, 284, 286, 348 2-6004 ------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------5 3' 71 2-6005 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 2-6204 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 66 2-6801 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________________358 2-6901 ----------------------------------------------. ----------------------__________________________16 2-7501 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------44' 64' 193 2-7801 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 2-7901 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------35 8 2-8101 ---------------------------------------------------------- __________193, 526, 529' 536 554 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 3-505 ----------------------- -------------------------------------------------________________________514 3A-101 ------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------- 11 3A-102 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------11 , 349, 473 3A-1 04 _________________________---------------------------------------"-----------------------------350 3A-105 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------"------------- 11 3A-1 06 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 3A-114 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 3A-123 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 11 5-1 08 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 5-123 -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------473 5-2201 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------518 5-2916 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------352 Title 8 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------217 9~401 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------442 12-601 --------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------349 13-201 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------148 13-204 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21 Ch. 13-9 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------168, 248 13-905 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------169 13-1201 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------168 13~ 1701 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------170 13-2027 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 98 15-101 ----------------------------------------------------------------------________________________254 17-303 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------389 17-505 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------349 20-1 09 -----------------------------------------------------------"~------------------------------3 85 20-206 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------280 21-203 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------209 22-1302 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------261 Ch. 22-17 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397 22-1827 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------232 22-18 81 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------448 Ch. 23-1 0 --------------------------- _______________________________________________________________155 23-1001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------154 23-1 0 16 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15 5 23-1502 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------140 23-2302 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------245 24-1 04 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------103 24-1 05 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------103 24-402 ------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------462 555 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 24-406 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------335 24-601 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 03' 463 24-901 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56 24-902 ------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------56, 57 24-1315 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------455 24-1501 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 24-2401 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 62 24-2403 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------62, 63' 301 24-2602 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 61 24-2607 ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------442, 443 24-2714 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------219' 318 24-2715 ----------------------------C----------------------------------------------218, 219' 413 24-2747 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------218, 219 24-2803 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------130 24-2811 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------466 24-2813 ------------------------------------------------------~---------------------------1 02, 456 24-2818 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------102, 103 24-2823 -------------------------"---------------------------------------------------------------291 24-2903 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------467 24-2909 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------467 24-2902a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------537 24-2909a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ______________537 24-3104 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 24-31 07 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 24-3379 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 99 24-3388 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ______239 24-3413 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------413 24-3 619 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------413 24-4522 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------413 25-101 ----------------------------------- --------------------- ---------------------------------------3,14 25-123 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------314 26-501 --------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------- 46 26-2603 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------307 26-3914 ------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------46, 48 26-4003 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46 26-4004 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 46 26-4005 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46 26-5009 - ----------------------- --------------------------------------------------------_3 32, 430 26-5002a ____________------------------------------_-------------------------------------------------195 26-5101 ------------------------------------------------------------------------34, 36, 83, 452 556 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 26-5102 ----------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------452 26-5103 -------------------------------------------------------------------_35' 36, 83, 452 26-5104 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 26-51 08 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------403' 404 26-6502 ----------------------------------------------------------- ____________________534, 535 27-407 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 89 27-511 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------472 27-513 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------109 27-905 ------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------414 27-906 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------414 27-1401 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------472 27-1403 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------415 27-1901 ------------------------------------------------------------------------114, 116, 117 27-2506 ------------------------------------------------------------------------107' 108' 259 27-2709 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------523 27-2713 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------523 Ch. 27-27a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------241 27-2701 a -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------241 29-109 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 86 30-119 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------280 32-114 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------527 32-121 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------112, 528 32-141 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------382 32-167 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------528 Ch. 32-1A -----------------------------------------------------------------------------3 84 32-408.1 ------------------------------------------------~-----------------------163 32-413 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------457 32-413 .1 ----------------------------------------------------------------~----------164 32-425 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 32-427 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 32-429 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------140 Ch. 32-6 --------------------------------------------------------------- ____________________288, 289 32-603 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------163' 164 32-609 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------141' 289 32-610 --------------------------------------------------------------------------289' 290, 327 32-611 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------91' 289, 290 32-613 -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------106, 327 32-618 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 32-620 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------16, 17 32-622 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------327 557 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 32-625 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------348 32-641 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 32-642 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------402 32-643 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------141 32-645 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------210' 211 32-652 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------130, 457 32-656 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------141 32-705 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------171 32-901 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 32-909 ------------------------------------------------------------------ _______________ 16, 54, 91 32-911 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------463 32-912 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 32-928 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------54, 55 32-937 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15' 243 32-942 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3' 42, 64 32-949 ---------------------------------------------------------------- ____________________________ 132 32-1012 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------234 32-1106 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42-45 32-1107 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45 32-1113 ------------------------------------------------------------------------100, 101 32-1118 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 3 32-1201 --------------------------------------------------------------------______________________ 199 32-1203 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------199 32-1304 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------106 32-1401 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------101 32-1402 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------180, 200 32-1403 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12, 200 32-2303 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------269 32-2305 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------271 32-2309 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------270 32-2904 --------------------------------------------------------------------------188' 277' 301 32-2905 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------272, 302 32-2921 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------273 32-2926 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------112 32-3206 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------212 32-5701 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43 32-6004 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 54 Title 34 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------434 34-102 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26, 203 34-103 --------------------------------13, 88, 285, 296, 431, 455, 459, 460, 462 558 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 34-202 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------462 34-301 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------426, 462 34-402 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 45 34-503 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------431 34-505 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------431 34-603 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41 34-604 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------371 34-610 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------406 34-624 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------_286, 466 34-626 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------285' 288 34-627 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------88' 519 34-628 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------88' 519 34-629 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------250 34-631 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 88 34-632 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 88 32-641 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------497 34-705 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------144 34-706 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------144 34-801 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------296 34-802 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------491 34-806 ---------------------------------------------------------------------13, 14, 335' 340 34-1001 __________________________________333, 335, 400, 416, 423, 426, 434, 435, 436,439,449,456,458,459,460,462 34-1 003 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------_449' 459 34-1004 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 508 34-1006 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------456 34-1010 _________________________________263, 264, 349, 361, 400, 415, 416, 423, 426, 436, 437, 438, 450, 458, 460, 461 34-1011 --------------------------------------------------263, 400, 401, 438, 450, 461 34-1102 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------489 34-1103 --------------------------------------------------------------_479, 480, 489, 507 34-1105 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------507 34-1206 ---------------------------------------------------------------------455' 489' 505 34-1220 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------489 34-1222 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------479' 480 34-1224 -------------------------------------------------------------------------_489' 490' 507 34-1305 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40 34-1310 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------88, 250, 431 34-1314 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------505 34-1315 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------489' 507 559 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 34-1316 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------489 34-1317 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------_430, 490 34-1321 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------474, 507 34-1322 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------474, 479 34-1326 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- _____________________507 Ch. 34-14 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------431 34-1402 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------296 34-1405 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------296 34-1406 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------474 34-1407 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------296, 474 34-1406a ______________________ ----------------------------------------------------------531, 532 34-1505 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------489 34-1514 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------466, 490, 491 34-1913 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------370 34-1919 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------431 34-2601 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------130 34A-1 04 ( 11 ) ________________ ------------------------------------------------------------------265 36-1 01 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------276 36-1 03 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------276 36-1104-36-1116 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------518 36-1201 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------265 38-1 705 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------239 39-1311 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 40-10 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------522 40-1 04.1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------522 40-301 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------492 40-302 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------493 40-305 --------------------------. ----- .------------------------------------------------------------190 40-314 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------492, 493 40-408 ------------------------------------------------------------------------______205' 206' 367 40-413 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------_206 40-809 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------144 40-810 ----------------------------------------------------------- __________________________________ 144 40-811 a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------72, 73 40-1615 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21 40-1618 -------------------------------------------------------------------- ________________________514 40-2001 ------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------166 Ch. 40-22 ------------------------------------------------------------______________________________518 40-2201 ------------------------------------------------------ _____________3 89' 408, 533' 534 40-2207 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------389' 51 8 560 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 40-2209 ---------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------"534 40-2210 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------389 40-2242 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------533 40-2501 ------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------------------363 40-25 23 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------499 40-2701 ------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------15 2, 310, 424 40-2702 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------311 42-554 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80 42-709 ___----------------------- __z ____________----------------------------------------------------364 42-711 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------364 42-802 ------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------364 42-808 ------------------- --------------------------------------------------________________________364 43-124 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------73' 281 43-206 ------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ----------------------------3 82 Ch. 43-2A --------------------------------------------------------------------------________________338 43-201a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------523, 524 43-21 Oa -----------------------------------------------------------------------_______________________337 43-220a ----------------------------------------------------------------------________________________524 43-9907 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------338 Ch. 44-4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------241 45-114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------________________________297 45-702 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------464 Title 46 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------217 46-105 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228, 229 46-208 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------21 7 Ch. 49-6 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------330 49-612 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------330, 331 Title 53 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------420 53-1 01 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------394, 395 53-102 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------172, 280 53-105 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------172 Ch. 53-2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------_394, 395 53-201 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------420 53-214 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------503 56-11 0 -------------------------------------------------------------------____________________________257 56-203 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------424 56-301 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------222 56-309 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------_221' 224, 318 56-310 ----------------------------------------------------------------------220, 221' 224, 318 56-407 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------314 561 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 56-408 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------314 56-504a ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------424 56-504b -------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------424 56-704 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------469' 470 56-706 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------314 56-708 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------469 56-713 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------_314, 469j 470 56-801 b -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ___________________314 56-840b --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------315 56-11 02 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------224 56-11 08 ---------------------------------------------------------221' 223' 225' 318' 319 56-1501 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------257 56-1502 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------128 56-1504 --------------------------------------------------- 246, 247' 248, 249' 447' 452 56-1505 -------------------------------------------------------------------247' 249' 447' 45 2 56-1506 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------447' 452 56-1509 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------127' 128, 129 56-1520 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------41 0, 411' 412 56-1521 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------256, 257 56-1543 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------118' 119 Ch. 56-1 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ________________447 56-1 71 0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------448 Ch. 56-18 _________________________________________________________________________447, 452, 453 56-1821 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------453 56-2431 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------315' 316 5.6-2437 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------528 56-2438 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 09 Ch . 56-27 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------315, 43 3 56-270 1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------433 Ch. 56-31 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------315 Ch. 56-33 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------43 3 56-3307 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------43 3 56-3308 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------433 58-207 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------307' 308 58-609 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------202, 203 58-612 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 125 58-716 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 77 58-718 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61 58-724.1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------378 58-726 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 562 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 58-804 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------377 58-807 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61 58-932 ------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 77 Ch. 58-10 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 60 58-1021.1 --------------------------------------------------------------- ___________________________ 308 58-1 029 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------378 58-1061 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------125 58-1065 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 58-1 071 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------475 58-1073 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 58-1077 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------228 59-1io -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ____________________ 99 59-206 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------318 59-70 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------318 59-705 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------158 59-806 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------158 64-101 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------79 Ch. 65-2 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------240 65-225 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------240 65-3 40 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------125' 126 66-103 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------464 68-1 0 1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 86 Ch. 68-2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------26, 27 68-201 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------27' 386, 529 68-228 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------484 68-235 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------255 68-236 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------255 68-237 ------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------255 68-246 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------439 68-405 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------477' 478 68-402a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------336 68-404a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------335 68-407a -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------336 68-408a ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------453 68-429a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------478 68-436a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------335 68-1 001 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------484 68-1502 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------387 68-1603 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------343 68-1625 -----------------------------------------------------------181' 252, 253, 278, 284 563 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 68-1626 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------343 68-1643.2 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------343 68-1648 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 87 Ch. 68-1 7 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 87 68-1701 ----------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------387 68-1 702 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 87 68-1707 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 79 68-1 708 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------387 68-1 715 -------------------------- ---------- -------------------------------------------------------3 87 68-1 724 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------45 1 68-1 725 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------451 68-1 72 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------451 68-9902 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 68-9904 ------------------------------------------------ -------------------------------------------- 26 68-9905 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 68-9906 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26 68-9921 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------477 68-9928 -------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------255 69-20 1 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------430 69-202 ----------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- 70 69-204 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------195 Ch. 69-6 __-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------306 69-603 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------306 Ch. 69-8 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------500 Ch. 69-12 __________________________________________________________________________225, 374, 500 69-1201 --------------------------------------------------------------------104, 226, 227' 370 69-1202 9 7 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 69-1207 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------370 69-1208 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 68, 370 69-1209 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------370 69-1212 --------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------225 69-1215 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- __________225' 227 69-1217 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------226, 227 73-203 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------376 73-222 ------------------------------------------------------------372, 373, 375' 376, 377 73-223 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------376 73-9907 ------------------ --------------------------------------------------------------------------376 74-101 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------508 74-1 04 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 74-105 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________245 564 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 74-403 74-407 74-408 77-201 77-310 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------143 --------------------- --- -- ----- --- -------------------- -- --- ------------------- -- ---- ---- ______ 143 -- ---------- -- --- --- -- ------ ------ ---- --- -- --- -------- ---- ----- -------- --- ---- --- -- ------ --- -- 3 17 -------------------------------------. --------------------------------------------------------236 71 ----------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 77-312 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------108 77-318 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------41' 82, 498 77-904 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------311 77-9902 ---------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------499 77-9910 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41 Ch. 7 8-4 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------379 78-410 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------204 78-414 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------379 78-41 7 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------379 78-418 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------___________________380 78-909 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------477' 478 78-1001 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------179 78-1 005 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------476 78-1 015 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------475' 476 78-1101 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------204, 205' 206 78-1106 --------------------------------------------------------------------203' 204, 205' 206 78-1201-78--1206 --------------------------------------------------------------------------363 79-403 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33 79-404 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------_251' 421' 444 79-406 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------443 81-202 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------291 81-204 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------317 Title 84 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------299 84-102 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------165' 299 Ch. 84-4 ___________--------------------------------------------------------------------------------427 84-401 ----------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------427 84-402 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28 84-410 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 71 Ch. 84-5 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------165 84-507 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------165 84-508 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------165 84-510 ---------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------165 84-803 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------429 84-818 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 71 84-901 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------396' 520 565 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 84-1028 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------174 84-1031 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------174 Ch. 84-20 ------"-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------329 84-2011 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------329' 432 84-2012 -------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------432 84-2013 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------432 84-2019 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------432 84-2901 -------------------------------------------------------------------- _______________________ 157 84-2905 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------158 84-310 1 ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------364 Ch. 84-44 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------427 84-4401 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------427 85-115 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------121 85-1 001 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------232, 385 85-1404 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------388 85-1601 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17 3 85-1602 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------173 85-1603 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 73 85-1605 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 73 85-1804 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------~------------3.49 86-11 09 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------372 Ch. 86-18 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------506 86-1823 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------506 Ch. 87-2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 87-201 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 87-202 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 87-80 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 88-108 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------134, 407' 494 88-110 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------135 88-115 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------121' 122 88-145 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------367 88-203 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20 88-204 ------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------407 88-214 ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------- 32 88-207a -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 Ch. 88-3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------419, 420 88-304 -----------------------------------------------------------------------_______________350' 420 88-305 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------420 88-306 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 88-307 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------350 566 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 88-41 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------463 Ch. 88-5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------312 88-50 1 --------------------------~-------------------------------------------------------------~-----3 21 88-506 ----------------------------------94, 95, 280, 320, 321, 328, 330, 331, 506 88-508 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------94' 95 88-511 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------93' 94 88-512 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------92, 93' 94 88-522 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- __92, 93' 94, 312 88-601 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------122 88-602 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------122, 123 88-801 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 Ch. 88-15 ____________________________________________________________________________________31, 32 88-1501 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31 Ch. 88-1 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------420 88-1723 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19 88-1 726 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------420 Ch. 88-18 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------512 88-1803 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------_28, 30, 31 88-1805 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 88-1806 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------422 Ch. 88-19 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------419 88-1901 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------419 88-1906 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------419 88-2501 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------134 88-2603 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 96 88-2701 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------302 88-2702 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------302 88-2704 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------304 89-1 01 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------430 89-103 --------------------------------------------------------------------129' 130, 147' 430 89-285 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------500 89-309 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------466' 467 89-31 0 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------467 89-811 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 89-816.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------_58, 59' 60 Ch. 89-9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------495 89-903 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 89-914 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------495 89-.915 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------495 89-916 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------495 567 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 89-91 7 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------496 89-918 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------496 89-1211 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------316, 363 89-1301 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------371 89-9901 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------467 89-9916 --------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------496 91-104 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- _____________________ 192 91-117 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------281' 380, 385 Ch. 91-1 A ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------494 91-1 04a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------494 91-109a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------494 Ch. 91-5A -------------------------------------------------------------------.------------------------300 Ch. 91-7 _______________________ -----------------------------------------------------------------------235 91-804 ----------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------- 51 91-805 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52 92-102 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------177' 510 92-201 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 260' 449 92-219.1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 86 92-23 3 9' 175' 319 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------_3 92-605 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------412' 413 92-1402 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------390' 391 92-1403 ----------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------390, 391 92-1404 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------346, 440, 482 92-1506 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------515 Ch. 92-24 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------398, 405 92-2401 ------------------------------------------------------------313, 397' 398, 404, 405 92-2402 ------------------------------------------------------------313, 397' 398, 404, 405 92-2403 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------515' 51 7 92-2405 --------------------------------------------------------------_______________________________515 Ch. 92-27 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 36 92-2701 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 6, 37 92-2704 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------36' 37 92-2901 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------259 92-2902 -------------------------------------------------------------------"-----------------------260 92-2950-92-2960 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 69 92-2952 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 69 92-2954 70 92-2961 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70 Ch. 92-30 ______________--------------------------------------------------------------------------__404 92-3002 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------398' 405 568 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 92-321 0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------267 92-3216 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------480 Ch. 92-34 _______________---------------------------------------------------------------------------405 Ch. 92-34a ----------------------------------------------------------------196, 208, 235, 477 92-3402a ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------275, 27(, 92-3403a --------------------------------------------------------------------- __209, 374, 375 92-3412a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------196 92-3440a ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------275 92-3446a _______--------------------------------------------------------------------------_________ 151 92-5403 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 00 92-570 1 ------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------200, 21 7 92-5702 ----------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________201 92-5902 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 92-6001 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------202 92-6004 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------365 92-6202 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------170, 465 92-6402 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37 92-6912 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------39' 40, 365 92-6913 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------481 92-7602 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------22, 23 92-81 0 1 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------470 92-81 02 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------470 92-8103 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 92-8305 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24 92-8411.1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 92-8414 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------138' 481 92-8426.5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------365 Ch. 92A-1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 92A-43 4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------181, 182 Ch. 92A-5 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------27, 88 92A-501 -------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 92A-502 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------27, 88, 89 92A-506 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------88, 89 92A-509 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------456 92A-511 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------87, 88 Ch. 92A-6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------242, 244 92A-601 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------242, 244 92A-604 ----------------------------------------------------------.----------------------------------244 92A-605 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------242, 258 92A-688 .--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------182 569 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CoDE SEcTioNs PAGE 92A-9913 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------182 94-301 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------265 Ch. 94-24 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------404 95~ 1001 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------196 95-1505 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------167 95-1634 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------265 Ch. 95-1 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 88 95-1710 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------167' 196, 197 95-1809 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 Ch. 95-20 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 95-2002 --------------------------------------------------------------------------__________________283 95-2002a ____________________----------------------------------------------------------__________.283 95-2304 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------265 95-2605 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------265 95-9914 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------283 95A-607 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------77, 78, 79 99-503 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------146 Ch. 99-6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-605 -- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-6I 5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------513, 514 99-624 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------513 Ch. 99-7 _______________---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-706 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 Ch. 99-9 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-905 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-911 a ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------76, 77 99-914a --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------511 99-932a ---------------------------------------------------------------------~----------------------511 Ch. 99-14 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------207 Ch. 99-15 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30 Ch. 99-20 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 99-2004 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 99-2912 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------514 102-1 02 -------------------------------------------_59' 111' 211' 222, 248' 43 8' 461 106-401 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------440 106-41 0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------440 106-501 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------376, 377 106-502 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------377 106-9908 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------377 Ch. 108-6 ________________________________________________________________________397, 398, 405 570 GEORGIA CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS -Continued CODE SECTIONS PAGE 108-608 -------------------------------------------------------------------------_397' 404, 405 109A-9-1 02 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------349 110-312 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------234 110-313 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------234 110-314 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------234 113-101 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------305 113-206 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------305 113-208 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 305 113-801 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------464 114-403 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------213 114-606 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------_318, 319 114-703 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 291 571 INDEX PAGE AD VALOREM TAXES. Eggs owned by producer and hatched in own incubator ________________________________________________________448 Military service, where owners in ________________________________________319, 510 Public utilities, determining fair market value of ------------------------------------------------------------------------200 Situs of motor vehicle ____________ --------------------------------------------------------465 ADOPTION. Family and Children Services Department, procedures of ________ ----------------------------------------------142 Service upon nonresidents in adoption proceedings ________________________________________________________________316 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. Farmers Market, State, procedures in barring persons from ------------------------------------------------------------472 Hearings, conduct of, generally ____________________________________________________23 8 License revocation where licensee momentarily complying with lawful requirements -----------------------------------------------------------------119 Water Quality Control Board, applicability to --------------------------------------------------------------------------349 ADVERTISEMENTS. Petroleum products ___ -----------------------------------------------------------------_3 75 AGE OF PERSONS. Minority ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 AGED PERSONS. Homestead exemption ------------------------------------------------------------------ 25 AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY COMMISSION FOR COTTON. Assessments ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------351 AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF. Deceased employee, dispersing back wages owed to ------------------------------------------------------------------464 AMBULANCE SERVICE. County or hospital authority operating -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------421 AMMONIA. Vehicles carrying anhydrous ammonia __________________________________________386 ANHYDROUS AMMONIA. Vehicles carrying --------------------------------------------------------------------------3 86 572 INDEX PAGE ANIMALS. Prisoners burying dead animals ___________________________________________334, 351 APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION. State's contributions to ------------------------------------------------------------------444 APPEARANCE BONDS. Date of forfeiture _________________------------------------------------- ____________ ______2 34 APPLING COUNTY. Tax commissioner, fees in connection with sale of motor vehicle license plates ----------------------------------------------------------------------------43 9 ARBITRATION. Public utility arbitrations --------------------------------------------------------------3 64 AREA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONS. Plats, subdivision, approval ----------------------------------------------------------225 ARMSTRONG COLLEGE. Sale of property _________________________________ -------------------------------------------382 ARRAIGNMENT NOTICE. Cash bond traffic cases -----------------------------------------------------------------_472 ARREST. Potentially dangerous person, of 30 -------------------------------------------------3 ARREST BONDS. Acceptance of ------------------------------------------------------------------------------109 ATHENS FARMERS' MARKET. Property transfer --------------------------------------------------------------------------125 ATTORNEYS AT LAW. Georgia Bar Association, necessity of joining 78 -----------------------------------------------------------------_2 AUDITS. Highways and street construction and maintenance funds granted municipalities and counties ------------------------------------------------------344 AUGUSTA, CITY OF. Annexation of territory, postponement of election as to -----------------------------------------------352 AUGUSTA MUSEUM. Tax exemption -------------------------------------------------------------------------------156 AUTOMOBILE AUCTION HOUSES. Sale without first obtaining inspection .certificates ---------------------------------------------------------------- 20 BACON COUNTY. Superior court clerk using micro equipment ----------------------------------------------------------------------218 INDEX 573 PAGE BANKS AND BANKING. Conversion of private bank into an incorporated ban~ ________________________________________________________________ 168 Higher Education Assistance Corporation, private banks making loans guaranteed by ______________________________________________________________ 147 Private banks, registration ------------------------------------------------------------ 21 Tax collectors, checks to, exchange charges by local banks ------------------------------------------------------------ 98 BAR ASSOCIATION, GEORGIA. Necessity of attorney joining -------------------------------------------------------_278 BARBER SCHOOLS. Residence requirements of students ---------------------------------------------- 71 BARBER SHOPS. Cosmetology Act, persons under __________________________________________________427 BEAUTY SHOPS. Cosmetology Act, persons under __________________________________________________427 BEER. Licenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60 BIBLE. Schools, required reading in --------------------------------------------------------171 BLIND PERSONS. Register --------------------------------------------- _______----------------------------------- 17 BLOOD. Withdrawing by technologist as practicing medicine without a license 96 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 BLOOD ALCOHOL TESTS. Generally ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------252 Payment for _----------------------------------------------------------------------------------277 Procedure, generally ____________________________________________________________________284 BONDS. Appearance bonds, date of forfeiture ____________________________________________234 Arrest bonds, acceptance of --------------------------------------------------------1 09 Elections, registration to vote ______________________________________________________284 Forfeitures ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------414 School bond surplus, transfer ______________ ------------------------------------------180 BOUNDARIES. Determining where original corners lost or obliterated _____________________ ----------------------------------------------1 73 Tidewater lands, ownership ----------------------------------------------------------25 3 BROAD RIVER SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICT. Condemnation by ____________________ ----------------------------------------------------5 17 574 INDEX PAGE BROOKS COUNTY. Schools, publication of condition of ----------------- --------------------- _____402 BRUNSWICK, CITY OF. Consolidation with Glynn County, tabulation of votes on constitutional amendment for ----------------------------------------------------529 BRUNSWICK PORT AUTHORITY. Tax exemptions ------------------------------------- ------------------------------------- 207 CANTON, CITY OF. Street resurfacing, contracts for ----------------------------------------------------240 CHARLTON COUNTY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Folkston, City of, contribution from ____________________________________________ 178 CHECKS. Tax collectors, exchange charges by local banks ----------------------------------------------------------------------____ 98 CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS, GEORGIA BOARD OF. Certificate from National Board of Chiropractic Examiners in lieu of giving written examination ________________________________________________________ 165 CHURCHES. Intoxicating liquors establishments' distance from ----------------------------------------------------------------------------377 CLARKE COUNTY. School system, budget requirements ______________________________________________497 CLAYTON COUNTY. Schoo1 bonds -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 235 Treasurer, abolishing office, delegation of duties, resignation ------------------------------------------------153 COBB COUNTY. Ad valorem taxes due by railroads and other public service corporations to ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 36 Chairman of Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues receiving additional salary as Chairman of Cobb County-Marietta Water Authority ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------53 6 Fire prevention districts --------------------------------------------------------------_353 Sidewalks, building maintenance, bond money expended for -------------------------------------------------------- 7 COFFEE COuNTY. Sale of surplus State property in ---------------------------------------------------- 50 INDEX 575 PAGE COMPROMISES AND SETTLEMENTS, BOARD OF. Employment Security Law, settling or compromising assessment made under _____________________________ .________________ ------------------------------- 312 CONDEMNATION. Broad River Soil Conservation District, by ____________________________________ ------------------------------------------- 51 7 Motor vehicles transporting intoxicating liquors ______________________--------------------------------------------307 Municipality, by, outside city limits ______________________________________________276 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST. Consulting engineer on State board doing business with State __________________________________________________________495 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Home rule amendment ________________________________________________________________ 148 CONTRACT CARRIER FOR HIRE. Motor vehicle improperly registered ____________________________________________528 CONTRACTS. Municipal officials, by, beyond terms of office _________________________------------------------------------------------- 70 CORPORATIONS. Dissolution by vote of stockholders ______________________________________________260 Foreign, taxation and licenses -----------------------------------------------------515 Physicians, of ------------------------------- _________________________________________________519 CORRECTIONS, STATE BOARD OF. Consultant to, compensation of ---------------------------------------------------- 74 Incentive pay plan for prisoners __________________________________________________311 Plasmapheresis program ______________________------------------------------------------398 COSMETOLOGY ACT. Persons coming under ________________________________________________________________427 COSTS. Reciprocal support cases ______ -------------------------------------------------------- 76 COTTON. Agricultural Commodity Commission for Cotton, assessments ____________________________________________________________351 COUNTIES. Administration expense alloc&ted to road work --------------------------------------------------- ________________________440 Ambulance service, operating ______________________________________________________421 Driveways, funds expended in construction of ______________________________________________________________________416 576 INDEX COUNTIES-Cont'd. PAGE Highway and street construction and maintenance funds granted to, audits __ _____________ ------------------------------------------------- 344 Interim successors for officers where enemy attack ____________________________ ----------------------------------- 506 Joint Area Planning and Development Commissions, resolutions and ordinances as to _________ ___ ________________________________ 104 COUNTY ATTORNEYS. State Representative, also holding office as ______________ -------------------------------------------------------------------- 536 COUNTY COMMISSIONERS. School funds, specifying depository for -----------,------------------------------------------------------------ __ 24 Vocational-technical schools, assistance to ___________ ______________________________________________________________ ___ 63 CREDIT BUREAUS. Taxation of ________________________________________________________________________________313 CREDIT LIFE INSURANCE. Motor vehicle dealers ____________________ ------------------------------------ __________43 3 CREDIT UNIONS. Taxation of ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------313 CRIME LABORATORY, STATE. Blood alcoho1 tests ______________________________________________________________________252 CRIMINAL LAW. Flight to avoid prosecution __________________________________________________________485 Misdemeanors, punishment ----------------------------------------------------------107 DECEASED PERSONS. Prisoners, delivery of bodies to Medical College of Georgia ______________________________________________________302 DEKAI:.B COUNTY. Ad valorem taxes due by railroads and other public service corporations to -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 DEMANDS. Trial, for, where serving another sentence -----------------------------------------------------------------------114 DENTISTS. Dental laboratory, act as a practicing dentist with offices in same location as his ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -362 INDEX 577 PAGE DEPENDENTS SUPPORT LAW. Costs in reciprocal support cases --------------------------------------------------- 76 DOMICILE. Generally --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------443 DOUGLASVILLE-DOUGLAS COUNTY INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY. Constitutional amendment, ratification by voters _______ -- ------------------------------------------------- 526 DRIVERS' LICENSES. Revocation of license where owner's vehicle but not owner involved in accident ________________________________________________________________25 8 Suspension of revocation __________________________________________________77, 181 DRIVEWAYS. County tax funds expended in construction of ---------------------------------------------- ____________________________416 DRUGS. Psychologists writing prescriptions _____ ----------------------------------------- 364 DUBLIN-LAURENS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION. Superintendent paying teachers in old Dublin Independent School System amount equal to accumulated sick leave credit --------------------------------------------------105 ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZATIONS, INC Sales and use taxes ________________________________________________________________________235 EDUCATION, COUNTY BOARDS OF. Bible reading, requiring ____________________________________________________________ 171 Bond elections, time -------------------------------------------------------------------- 12 Bonded indebtedness as affected by property being annexed to independent school system ________________________________________________________ 139 Bonds, surplus, transfer --------------------------------------------------------------180 Borrowing against funds held to its credit by State School Building Authority ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ____3 47 Budgets of, requirements as to __________ _______________________________________497 Deputy sheriffs serving on ____________________________________________________________ 129 "Headstart" programs, involvement in -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 Insurance sold to, by member of board ----------------------------------------------------------------------131 578 INDEX EDUCATION, COUNTY BOARDS OF-Cont'd PAGE Pledge of allegiance to American flag, requiring ------------------------------ ______ ---------------------------------------1 71 Publication of condition of schools ________________________________________________402 School bus, injuries to pupil riding, liability as to ___________________________________________________________________________ 139 School busses, lease of ------------------------------------------------------------------ 53 Tax collection expenses, rebating funds to help defray __ __ ____________________________________________________2, 42 Tenure of member 57 ------------------------------------------------------------------------3 Vocational-technical schools, assistance from county commissioners -------------------------------------------------- _______________________ 63 EDUCATION, STATE BOARD OF. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, administering state plan pursuant to _________ -------------------------------------- ______________________ 4 In-service training for teachers, grants for ---------------------------------------------------------------___________________130 National Center for School and College Television, proposed agreement with ---------------------------------------------------------- _____________ 162 EDUCATION, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Allotment of additional funds of excess nature for local systems ---------------------------------------------- ___274 Contracts and leases, signatures ____________________________________________________457 Deprived children, salaries where teachers teaching ______________________________________________________________________ 288 EGG COMMISSION, GEORGIA. Nonprofit status of ____________________________ 56 -------------------------------------------3 EGGS. Ad valorem taxes __________________--------------------------------------------------------448 ELECTIONS. Absentee ballots- Citizens in armed forces ---------------------------------------------------- ______ 295 College officials executing --------------------------------------------------------53 2 Counting and tabulating 7 -----------------------------------------------------------4 4 Postmasters and assistants, execution by --------------------------------------------------------------------------5 31 Assistance to voters __ 30 -------------------------------------------------------------------4 Ballots, newspapers printing facsimile _________________________________________ -----------------------------------------_370 Bond elections, registration to vote ________________________________________________284 INDEX 579 ELECTIONS-Cont'd. Intoxicating beverages sold on PAGE election day ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 26 Justices of the peace, special election to fill vacancy 5 --------------------------------------------------------------3 3 Malt beverage sales on election days ____________________________________________202 Moving away, effect of voter _____________________________ __________________________ 87 Municipal annexations, as to, postponement __________________________________________________________________________352 Nomination by party executive committee ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------449 Nomination petitions- Accountants and others hired to assist in checking ------------------------------------------------------------ ______400 Approval by Party ______________________ ---------------------------------------------426 Form not requested of ordinary, where ___ ------------------------------- --------------------------------450 Generally ------------------------------------------------------------------------------415, 43 3 Independent candidates ----------------------------------- _______________________333 Primary held, in event of ________________________________________________________423 Requirements -----------------------------------------------------------------------------263 Superior court judge or solicitor general, residence of signers --------------------------------------------------~61 Notice of candidacy --------------------------------------------------- __________________43 3 Paper ballots used in conjunction with voting machines ___________ ---------------------------------------------------504 Party executive committee, nomination by ___________________________-----------------------------------------------449 Party rules, protest that candidate has not complied with ______________________________________________________________457 Poll officers, assistance by ____________________________________________________________430 Primary runoff, entitlement to vote in ________________----------------------------------------------------------------------466 Qualifying fee refund where candidate not entitled to have name on general election ballot ________________________________________________508 RegistrarsPresence in office during primary election -------------------------------------------------------------------- 39 Tax collector compensated fvr services to _______________ 71 --------------------------------------------------------3 Registration- Door-to-door -----------------------------------------------------------------------------406 580 INDEX ELECTIONS-Cont'd. Registration-Cont'd. PAGE Residence reqmrements ____________ ---------------------------------------------- 250 Removal of registered voter upon challenge ________ -------------------------------------------------------___________519 Senators, State ------------------------------------------------------------------------------354 Straight party vote and also vote for candidate of other party, counting where ____________ ___________ ---------------------------------------- ____4 79 Voting machinesPaper ballot used in conjunction with ------------------------------------------------------ _____________ 504 Write-in candidates ------------------------------------------------------------------- 455 Write-in candidates, voting machines ___________________________________________455 Write-in vote, stickers used for ---------------------------------------------------489 EMERITUS POSITIONS. Health insurance coverage on spouse of deceased emeritus employee ________________________________________________362 Solicitors general ------------------------------ __________________________________467, 537 EMORY UNIVERSITY. Vodka for scientific experimentation, purchase of ___________------------------------------------------------------------------ _474 ENGINEERING BOARD. Hearings, lengthiness of time spent at ___________________________________________ 238 ETOWAH INDIAN MOUNDS. Erosion taking place at --------------------------------------------------------------- 71 EUGENE TALMADGE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL. Honesty in Government Law, application of ______________ ---------------------------------------------------------- 9 ----2 4 Out-patients, employee furnishing room and board to ------------------------------------------------------------------- 294 EXAMINING BOARDS, STATE. Place of meetings --------------------------------------------------------------------------299 FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT. Constitutionality as to minimum wage and maximum hours ------------------------------------------------------- 524 FAIR TRADE LAWS. Generally --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------440 FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Adoption procedures --------------------------------------------------------------------142 Assistance programs, filing of regulations __________________________________ -------------------------------------------- 10 INDEX 581 FAMILY AND CHILDREN SERVICES, STATE DEPARTMENT OF-Cont'd. PAGE Failure to disclose cash reserves, recovery of money paid where _______________________________________________ 512 FARM BUREAU ASSOCIATION, GEORGIA. Municipal license fees _______________________________________________________________240 FARMERS MARKET, STATE. Barring persons from, administrative procedures applicable in __ __ __ __ ________________________________________472 FAYETTE COUNTY. Education board, tenure of member ______________________________________________ 357 FIREARMS. Sales to minors ------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND, GEORGIA. Application for reinstatement to membership in 75 --------------------------------------------------------------------------4 Volunteer fireman's entitlement to benefits -----------------------------------------------------------------------_________ 179 FISH AND FISHING. Club, licenses for members of _________ ---------------------------------------------464 Shrimp, commercial fishing 79 ----------------------------------------------------------2 FLIGHT. Criminal prosecution, to avoid ____________________________________________________485 FLOYD COUNTY. School consolidation with Floyd County, assumption of bonded indebtedness ------------------------------------------------------------------------------199 FLOYD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. Solicitor general, emeritus position ________________________________________________467 FLUORIDATION. Health, State Board of, authority to order fluoridation of city water supply _______________ _______________________________________________ ____________ 96 FOLKSTON, CITY OF. Charlton County Development Authority, contribution to 78 --------------------------------------------------------1 Mayor introducing motions and voting at council meetings ----------------------------------- ____________________21 7 FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. Taxation and licenses ------------------------------------------------------------------515 FORESTERS. Action against unregistered consultant forester 37 -------------------------------------------------------------------_3 Registration __________________________________________________________________________________523 582 INDEX PAGE FORESTRY COMMISSION, GEORGIA. Neighborhood Youth Corps, employing members of _____ ________ ----------------------------------------------3 81 FORFEITURES. Appearance bonds, date ------------------------------------------------------------- 234 Bonds --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------414 FORT VALLEY, CITY OF. Investment of funds _____ ____ __ __ __ __________________ _______________________________ 57 FULTON COUNTY. Ad valorem taxes due by railroads and other public service corporations to __________________________________________________ ------------------------ 36 Medical examiner, fees for autopsies performed for counties other than Fulton __________________________________-------------------------------------------- 338 FUNERAL DIRECTORS. Narne appearing in trade name ----------------------------------------------------170 GAME AND FISH. Family, definition of as related to fishing license Iaw ___________________ ____ -------------------------------------------229 GAME AND FISH COMMISSION. Boat launching ramps, construction of _________________________________________296 GARNISHMENT. General!y _____________________ __________________ _--------------------------------------------- 21 7 GENERAL ASSEMBLY. County attorney as member of _____ ------------------------------------------------53 6 Election of State Senators ____________________ ----------------------------------------354 Gubernatorial appointments approved by Senate ------------------------------------------------------------------491 Superior court clerk serving as member of ______ ----------------------------------------------------______________________3 31 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY. Homestead exemption for occupants of lots leased from -------------------------------------------------------------------- 38 GLYNN COUNTY. Consolidation with Brunswick, tabulation of votes on constitutional amendment for --------------------------------------------------529 GOVERNOR. Appointments by, approval by Senate _______________ -------------------------------------------------------------------------491 INDEX 583 GOVERNOR-Cont'd. PAGE Eligibility --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------520 Emergency fund, fees charged for county and municipal police attending Police Academy ________________________________________________________212 Milledgeville State Hospital garden and scenic area, money from emergency fund for ------------------------------------------------------------------367 Prisoner rehabilitation counselor, emergency fund used for ____________________________________________________________392 GREENE COUNTY. Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, election to fill unexpired term ----------------------~--------------------------------------------------- 339 University System of Georgia, !unds from income of land owned by ------------------------------------------------- 1 GUARANTEED ARREST BONDS. Acceptance of ------------------------------------------------------------------------------109 HEALTH, COUNTY DEPARTMENTS OF. Salaries, increase --------------------------------------------------------------------------407 HEALTH, STATE BOARD OF. Fluoridation of city water supply, authority to order ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 96 Infants tested for inborn errors of metabolism, authority as to --------------------------------------------------133 Mental Health Institute, statement of policy for operation of ________________________________________________________ 121 HEALTH, STATE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC. Lease of land, authority to make __________________________________________________494 Mental Retardation Center, interest in --------------------------------------------------------~---------------------- 84 Records, inspection of __________________________________________________________________ 151 Withdrawing funds from county departments refusing to approve budget --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------407 HIGHER EDUCATION ASSISTANCE CORPORATION. Agency of State, funds ________________________________________________________________159 Executive order creating, legislation ratifying -------------------------------------------_______________________ 189 Funds --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------189 Private banks making loans guaranteed by __ ---------------------------------------------------- _____________________ 147 584 INDEX PAGE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT, STATE. Liability for injuries caused by nonuniform or improper signs _______ ____ ________________ --------------- ___ 196 Size and weight violations, amount of fines and forfeitures to Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund ________________________________________4 77 Southern Railway Company, transaction with ____________________________________________________________________ 388 HIGHWAYS. Audit of funds granted municipalities and counties _____________ ___________________---------------------------------------------343 Construction in progress, use of vehicles where _____________________________ --------------------------------------------3 43 Convict labor on federal-aid highways ------------------------------~----- _____________________ ----------------------- 82 Grants from State, expenditures under _____________________ --------------------------------------------------_________________482 Junk yard control _______________________________________________________________486, 500 Person carrying sign saying "Speed Trap Ahead" _______________________________________________________________28 3 Scenic enhancement ------------------------------------------------------------486, 500 Sheriff or deputies patroling or making cases on interstate highways ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------456 Telephone and telegraph companies maintaining lines upon, under, along and over __________________________________________________________________________264 HISTORICAL COMMISSION. Etowah Indian Mounds, erosion taking place at ------------------------------------------ ------------------------------- 71 HOLDING COMPANIES. Insurance company shares, shares exchanged for _________________________________________________________________________ 118 HOME RULE. Constitutional amendment ____________________________________________________________ 148 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION. Abolishing ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------192 Aged persons ____ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 Eligibility for __________________________ ---------------------------------------------------1 75 Increased exemption ___________________________________________________________________ 176 Georgia Power Company, occupants of lots leased from ---------------------------------------------------- 38 INDEX 585 PAGE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION-Cont'd. Military personnel claiming __________________________________________________________319 Taxpayer and/or daughter, on property held by virtue of conveyance to ____________________ ________ _____________________________________________385 Value of property arrived at by using percentage of fair market value, where ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 39 HOSPITAL AUTHORITIES. Ambulance service, operating __________ -------------------------------------------421 Minimum wage law, subject to ___________________________________________________511 Vacancies, filling ____________________________ --------------------------------------------- 28 HOSPITALS. Licenses -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------418 HULL, CITY OF. Street light rental, stop or caution lights, funds for ____________ ------------------------------------------------------------ 65 IMMUNITY. Georgia, sovereign immunity _______________________________________________________ 167 IMMUNIZATIONS. School children, compulsory --------------------------------------------------------463 INCOME TAXES. Assessors for county and city furnished information from income tax files -----------------------------------------------------------------------.480 Foreign corporations -------------------------------------------------------------------.515 Returns, failure to file, penalties and interest _________ ---------------------------------------------------- 267 INDUSTRY AND TRADE, DEPARTMENT OF. City or county officers or party executive committee, member of board of commissioners holding office as ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------429 INFANCY. Age of ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------403 INFANTS. Intoxicating liquors sales to ----------------------------------------------------------124 Metabolism, tested for inborn errors of, authority of State Board of Health as to ------------------------------------------------------------------------------133 Residence -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------___443 586 INDEX PAGE INSANE PERSONS. See Mentally mPersons. Commitments -------------------------------- _____________________________________312, 320 Examination of _________________ ______________ _____ 28 --------------------------------------_3 Potentially dangerous persons, 'incarceration of ______ -----------------------------------------------------------------330 INSPECTIONS. Petroleum products ----------------------------------------------------------------------372 INSURANCE. Credit life insurance, motor vehicle dealers -------------------~-----------------------------------------------------43 3 Education boards, sold to, by board member ------------------------------------------------- ______________________ 131 Emeritus employee, health insurance coverage on spouse of deceased ------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 62 Participating policies --------------------------------------------------------------------25 6 Rating procedure manuals, copies of .-------------------------------------------423 School busses, covering injuries to pupils riding ______________________ ---------------------------------------------------13 9 State employees, solicitation from -------------------------------------------~---314 INSURANCE COMPANIES. See Insurers. INSURERS. Agency using information about expiration dates of policies and amounts of premiums as basis for wholesale solicitation of insurance from mortgagors ----------------------------------------------------------------------468 Dummy incorporators used to meet requirements of persons forming companies --------------------------------------------------------------------------------246 Holding company shares exchanged for shares of _________________________________ ---------------------------------------------118 Impairment of capital ------------------------------------------------------------------410 Merger ---------------------------------------------------------------:-----------------447, 452 Release of deposits ------------------------------------------------------------------318 Participating policies ____________________________________________________________________256 Promisory notes impairing capital ___ --------------------------------------------410 Release of deposits --------------------------------------------------------------220, 318 State employees, solicitation from ------------------------------------------------314 INDEX 587 PAGE INTOXICATING LIQUORS. Election day, sale on ___________ --------------------------------------------------------- 26 Licenses --------------------------------------------------------------------------------60, 377 Malt beverage sales on election days ____________________________________________202 Minors, sales to ----------------------------------------------------------------------------124 Motor vehicles transporting 07 ----------------------------------------------------------3 Municipal business licenses revoked for possession of ----------------------------------------------------------------------227 Scientific experimentation, purchase for ------------------------------------------------------------------------------474 JENKINS COUNTY. Group life and hospitalization insurance for employees, funds for ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38 JOINT AREA PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONS. Municipal and county resolutions and ordinances as to ----------------------------------------------------------------104 JUNK YARD CONTROL. Generally ___________________ __ --------------------------------------------------------486, 500 JURORS. Summons --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------318 Voir dire examination 8 -----------------------------------------------------------------15 JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Court day, changing --------------------------------------------------------------------- 56 Criminal warrants, issuing ----------------"------------------------------------------- 1 Sheriffs' duties as to courts of ------------------------------------------------------1 01 Special elections to fill vacancy ----------------------------------------------------3 35 Traffic offense, warrant for ---------------------------------------------------------- 88 JUVENILE COURTS. Superior court judges sitting as juvenile court judges- Jurisdiction as to out-of-county children ____________________ -------------------------------------------------------------- 62 Salary supplement --------------------------------------------------------------------300 LABOR. Ports Authority employees, strikes by ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------370 LAGRANGE, CITY OF. Motor vehicle tax millage rate ------------------------------------------------------41 7 LEE COUNTY. Tax executions, surplus ---------------------------------------------------------------- 22 588 INDEX PAGE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN. General!y _______________________________________________________ -------------------------------508 LICENSES. Beer ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 60 Business trusts ------------------------------------------------------------------------------404 Drivers' licenses, see Drivers' Licenses. Fishing licenses for members of fishing club __________________------------------------------------------------------------464 Foreign corporations ___________________________________________________________________515 Hospitals _________________________________________ ---------------------------------------------418 Intoxicating liquors ___________________________ ------------------------------------ 60, 377 Marriage, validity in other States ----------------------------------------------- 503 Municipal business licenses, see Municipal Corpor~tions Revocation under Administrative Procedure Act where licensee momentarily complying with lawful requirements ________________________________________________________________ 119 Trusts --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------397 Veterans, free --------------------------------- -------------------------------------321, 329 Wine --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60 LOWNDES COUNTY. Education Board borrowing against funds held to its credit by State School Building Authority _______________________________________________________347 Election procedures ---------------------------------------- _____________________________506 Tax commissioner, fi. fas. __________________________ --------------------------------- 80 MALT BEVERAGES. Election days, sales on -----------------------------------------------------------------202 MARRIAGE. First cousins, between ------------------------------------------------------------------172 Formalities of __________________________________--------------------------------------------420 Legitimation of children ---------------------------------------------------------------508 License, validity in other States ---------------------------------------------------503 Mentally incompetents entering into ___________________________________________279 Proxy marriage ----------------------------------------------------------------------------393 MARRIED STUDENTS. Public schools, treatment in ----------------------------------------------------------243 MEDICAL EXAMINER. Appointment, period of ________________________________________________________________209 INDEX 589 PAGE MEDICAL LABORATORIES. Incorporating where operated by physicians --------------------------------------------------------------------------------519 MENTAL HEALTH INSTITUTE, GEORGIA. Statement of policy for operation of ___________________________________________ 121 MENTAL RETARDATION CENTER, GEORGIA. Health Department's interest in _____ ---------------------------------------------- 84 MENTALLY ILL PERSONS. Commitments --------------------------------------------- _________________________312, 320 Examination of ----------------------------------------------------------------------------3 28 Potentially dangerous persons, incarceration of _____________________________ -------------------------------------------330 Readmissions to hospital _____ -------------------------------------------------------- 91 MERIT SYSTEM, STATE. Prison Industries Administration employees under ______________ ------------------------------------------------------533 Waterways Commission, employees for ______________________________________________________________________389 METABOLISM. Infants tested for inborn errors of, authority of State Board of Health as to ------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 3 MIDDLE GEORGIA COLISEUM AUTHORITY. Sales and use taxes on purchases of tangible personal property -------------------------------------------------------- 75 MILITARY SERVICE. Ad valorem taxes of persons in ___________________________________________319, 51 0 Federal Public Health Reserve Corps, State employees with ___________________________________________________372 Personnel Board, State, military leave for volunteers _________________-----------------------------------------------__ 309 Proxy marriage with one in __________________________________________________________393 Residence of one in ______________________________________________________________________443 Support money ordered paid by military superior ____________________________________________________________________51 0 Taxation of property owned by those in ____________________________________________________________________________319, 51 0 Veterans benefits to those in active service ----------------------------------------------------------------------------378 MILLEDGEVILLE STATE HOSPITAL. Commitment for other than first time _______________ ------------------------------------- _____________________________ 312 590 INDEX MILLEDGEVILLE STATE HOSPITAL-Cont'd. PAGE Garden and scenic area, money for, from Governor's Emergency Fund ___________________________________________367 MINIMUM FOUNDATION PROGRAM OF EDUCATION ACT. Allotment for maintenance, operation and sick leave expenses funded from surplus __________----------------------------------------------- _____________________326 Budgets of local school systems, requirements as to ____________________________________________________________________497 Impact Law as not repealed by _______ --------------------------------------------532 Local funds, withholding State funds where failure to provide --------------------------------- -------------------- ____ 210 MINORITY. Age of _________________________________ ----------------------------------------------------------403 MINORS. Intoxicating liquors sales to ----------------------------------------------------------124 Residence --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------443 MISDEMEANORS. Punishment ________________ ____________________ _--------------------------------------------107 MITCHELL COUNTY. Small claims court, answering date of summons of garnishment _________________________________________________________ 228 MOBILE HOMES. Municipal requirements as to location of 68 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 MORGAN COUNTY. Golf course, assisting Department of State Parks in construction of __________________________________________________191 MOSQUITO CONTROL. Prisoners used for purposes of ____________________________________________334, 351 MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT. Claim for damage resulting from act or omission in administration of -----------------------------------------------_478 Manufacturer's certificate of origin ______________________________________________453 Method of perfecting security interests in tractors, hysters and bulldozers used in snaking logs out of swamps 5 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 3 MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS. Credit life insurance --------------------------------------------------------------------433 MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT. Minor suing under ___________________________________________________________________412 INDEX 591 PAGE MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT-Cont'd. Private property, applicability to accidents on ------------------------------------------------------------------------------244 Security requirements _______________ --------------------------------------------------- 242 MOTOR VEHICLES. Anhydrous ammonia, carrying 86 ------------------------------------------------------3 Construction of roads in progress, use where ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------343 Drivers' licenses, see Drivers' Licenses. Identification plate, place of affixing -------------------------------------------509 Intoxicating liquors, transporting __ -------------------------------------------- 307 License plates- Back taxes not paid, issuance where ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 254 Egg production, vehicle used by corporation in ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 259 License plates- Interstate and intrastate commerce, where vehicle used in ----------------------------------------------------------- 219 Reciprocal agreements --------------------------------------------------------------484 What constitutes "motor vehicle" under "Tag-Tax Act" 28 ---------------------------------------------------------_3 Official vehicles, marking of -------------------------------------------------------- 79 Registration improper _______ ----------------------------------------------------------528 Rolling stores, taxation _____________ --------------------------------------------------- 69 Sales without first obtaining inspection certificates --------------------------------- ______________________________ 20 Situs for ad valorem tax purposes ----------------------------------------177, 465 Tag registration, jurisdiction of offenses involving improper ------------------------------------------------------ 26 Tax situs ----------------------------------------- ------------------------------------177, 465 Weapons carried in pocket of ------------------------------------------------------_451 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Annexation of territory, postponement of election as to --------------------------------------------352 Farm Bureau Association ________________________________________________________240 Limitations and restrictions upon ____________________________________________23 7 Revoked where owner or operator in possession of intoxicating beverages Condemnation outside city limits ________________________________________________276 Contracts beyond terms of office of contracting officials -------------------------------------------------------------- 70 592 INDEX MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Cont'd. PAGE Fluoridation of water supply, authority of State Board of Health to order ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 96 Highway and street construction and maintenance funds granted to, audits -------------------------------- __ ------------------------------------------------3 44 Joint Area Planning and Development Commissions, resolutions and ordinances as to ______________________________________________ ! 04 Mobile homes, requirements as to location of --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 368 Officers of city selling to city ________________________________________________________194 Recreation department sponsoring teenage dances with admission fee ___________________________________________306 Street widening, use of State funds in _________________________________________268 Streets, etc., expenditure of State funds received for -------------------------------------------------------------------_496 Taxing power as affected by Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------15 0 NATUROPATHIC PHYSICIANS. Obstetrical work by ----------------------------------------------------------------------15 7 NEWSPAPERS. Election ballots, printing facsimile ______________________________________________370 NOMINATION PETITIONS. Accountants and others hired to assist in checking ______________________________________________________________________400 Approval by Party --------"--------------------------------------------------------------_426 Form not requested of ordinary, where ------------------------------------------------------------------------450 Generally ________ ---------------------------------------------------------------------415, 43 3 Independent .candidates ----------------------------------------------------------- _____333 Primary held, in event __________________________________________________________________423 Requirements --------------------------------------------------------------------------------263 Superior court judge or solicitor general, residence of signers ______________________ _____________________________361 NONRESIDENTS. Adoption proceedings, service in ________________________________________________316 Equity jurisdiction of superior courts as to ------------------------------------------------------------------------------190 INDEX 593 PAGE NORTH GEORGIA COLLEGE. Racial restrictions in proposed grant to 66 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 NOTARIES PUBLIC EX-OFFICIO JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. Serving only in district of residence ___________________________________________462 NURSES. Board of Examiners of Practical Nurses, increasing class hours and reducing practical experience required in training program ____________________________________________________ 174 NURSES, BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR. Questionnaire provided by American Nurses Association, distribution of ------------------------------------------ 48 NURSING HOMES. Veterans, for --------------------------------------------------------------- _________________203 OFFICE BUILDING AUTHORITY, STATE. Grants __________________________ _________ ______ ____ 00 --------------------------------------------3 OPEN RECORDS LAW. Generally ----------------------------------------- _____________________________________________ 151 ORDINARIES. Tag registration, offenses involving ---------------------------------------------- 26 Traffic offenses, warrants for -------------------------------------------------------- 88 PARENT AND CHILD. Support for incapacitated children over age of twenty-one --------------------------------------------------------------245 PARKS DEPARTMENT, STATE. Lease of private property ------------------------------------------------------------281 PAROLES. Out-of-State supervision ----------------------------------------------------------------241 PAUPER'S AFFIDAVIT. Credit investigation revealing employment or income, where ______ --------------------------------------------413 PEACE OFFICERS' ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND. Size and weight of motor vehicle violations, amount due to fund for _ 77 -----------------------------------------_4 PEDDLING. Veteran's license --------------------------------------------------------------------------432 PERSONNEL BOARD, STATE. Appeals to -------------------------------------------------------- ____________________________ 85 594 INDEX PAGE PERSONNEL BOARD, STATE-Cont'd. Health insurance coverage on spouse of deceased emeritus employee ----------------------------------------------- 362 Military leaveFederal Public Health Reserve Corps Service ------------------------------------------------------------------------372 Vo1unteers _________________________________________________________________________________309 PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. Advertisements ____________________ ------------------------------------------------------_375 Delivery to carrier as sale ------------------------------------------------------------390 Inspections ___________________________________ --------------------------------------------------3 72 PHENYLKETONURIA. Infants tested for inborn errors, authority of State Board of Health ___________________________________________133 PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. Corporations of ------------------------------------------------------------------------------519 Withdrawing blood as practice of medicine _______________________ ------------------------------- ______________________396 PISTOLS. Motor vehicle pocket, carried in _________________________________________________451 PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSIONS. Appointees, who are public officers -------------------------------------------292 Mobile homes, requirements as to location of ___________ ____ ________________________________________________________________3 68 Monthly meetings _____________ ---------------------------------------- ____________________497 Plats, subdivision, approval _______ -----------------------------------------------225 Sales and use taxes on property purchased by ________ ----------------------------------------- _________________________374 PLASMAPHERESIS PROGRAM. Corrections, B9ard of __________________________________________________________________]9 8 POLICE OFFICERS. Governor's emergency fund used for county and municipal police attending Police Academy --------------------------------------------------------212 POPULATION ACTS. Effect of changes in population ---------------------------------------------------- 61 PORTS AUTHORITY, GEORGIA. Strikes by employees --------------------------------------------------------------------3 70 PRACTICAL NURSES, BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF. Increasing class hours and reducing practical experience required in training program _---------------------------------------------------------------------174 INDEX 595 PRISON INDUSTRIES ADMINISTRATION. PAGE Merit system, employees under _______ ---------------------------------------------53 3 Motor vehicle, purchase of _______________ __________________________________________ 166 PRISONS AND PRISONERS. Alteration of misdemeanor sentences ____________________________________________25 8 Dead animals, prisoners used to bury ----------------------------------3 34, 351 Deceased prisoners, delivery of bodies to Medical College of Georgia _________________________________________________302 Federal-aid highways, convict labor on -----------------------------------------------------------------------------"------ 82 Good-time allowance ________________________ --------------------------------------------23 6 Incentive pay plan ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 311 Mosquito control, prisoners used for labor in ----------------------------------------------------------------------3 34, 351 Out-of-State supervision of parolees --------------------------------------------241 Plasmapheresis program --------------------------------------------------------------3 9 8 Rehabilitation counselor, Governor's emergency fund used for __________________________________________________________392 Sales of prison-made goods outside State ----------------------------------------------------------------------------498 Shock treatment given minor convicted felons --------------------------------------------------______________________4 70 Vegetables canned by prison labor, sale of ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ____ 41 PROBATION. Revocation- Jurisdiction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------522 Service of petition for ___ ----------~---------------------------------------------_406 PSYCHOLOGISTS. Prescriptions for medication of patients, writing ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 364 RABIES. Control ---------------------------------------------------------------- __________________________ 31 RACE. North Georgia College, grants to, containing restrictions as to race ______________________________________________366 University System forms containing questions or blanks as to __________________________________________________________363 RANDOLPH COUNTY. Sheriff's automobile expenses, reimbursement __________________________________________________________________________215 RECORDS. Open Records Law ----------------------------------------------------------------------151 596 INDEX PAGE RESIDENCE. Generally ---------------------------------------------------------------_______________________443 REVENUE, STATE DEPARTMENT OF. Liability for injury to employees _______________________________________________445 Local governments, powers of taxation as related to _____ ________________________________________________________ 137 ROLLING STORES. Taxation _________ _________________ _______________ ------------ -------------------------- 69 ROME. School consolidation with Floyd County, assumption of bonded indebtedness __________________________ ------------------------------------------------- 199 SAFETY. Anhydrous ammonia, vehicles carrying ---------------------------------------------- ------ -------------------------------3 86 SALES. Prison-made goods, outside of State sales 98 --------------------------------------------------------------------------4 Tax sales, purchases at ---------------------------------------------------------------_470 Vegetables canned by prison labor ________________________ ___________________ 41 SALES AND USE TAXES. Brunswick Port Authority, purchases by ______________________________________________________________________________ 207 Economic Opportunity Organizations, Inc., purchases or use by ______________________________________________________235 Gift purchased in Georgia and sent by seller to another State ------------------------------------------- __________________ 176 Motor vehicle purchased in another State ----------------------------------------------------------------------------195 Planning commissions, on property purchased by 74 ------------------------------------------------------------3 Property purchased out of State _______________________________________________51 0 Rates _________________________________________________ -------------------------------------------275 Woman's College of Georgia, Foundation of, the, purchases by 76 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------4 SCHOLARSHIPS. Residence ---------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------- 32 SCHOOL BUILDING AUTHORITY, STATE. Lowdnes County Board of Education borrowing against funds held to its credit by ____________________________________________________________________________347 INDEX 597 SCHOOL BUSSES. PAGE Lease of ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53 SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS, COUNTY. Compensation for work as to programs for disadvantaged pupils -----------------------------------------182 Location of office ------------------------------------------------------------------------234 SCHOOLS. Intoxicating liquors establishments' distance from ------------------------------------------------------------~---------------3 77 SCHOOLS, PUBLIC. See Education, County Boards of; Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act. Bible reading, requiring -------------------------------------------------------------171 Bond surplus, transfer ------------------------------------------------------------------180 Consolidation, assumption of bonded indebtedness ------------------------------------------------------------199 Depository for funds, county commissioners specifying -------------------------------------------------------- 24 Lunch programs, State funds for ________________________________________408, 529 Married pupils ------------------------------------------------------------------------------243 Pledge of allegiance to American flag --------------------------------------------------------------------------1 71 Polling places, buildings used as ___________ ----------------------------------------144 Records, destruction of old ----------------------------------------------------------143 Responsibility of principal toward pupils after they leave school grounds at end of school day -------------------------------------------------- 90 Transfers from colored to white school, application improperly made ___________________________ ------------------------------------------ 45 Tuition, where property held by parents within district -------------------------------------------------------------251 Vaccinations or immunizations, compulsory ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------463 Vocational-technical schools, county commissioners assisting ______ ----------------------------------------- 63 SENTENCE. Alteration of misdemeanor sentences ------------------------------------------258 SERVICE OF PROCESS. Adoption proceedings, upon nonresidents in ----------------------------------------------------------------316 Probation, petition for revocation of ___________________________________________406 598 INDEX PAGE SHERIFFS. Automobile expenses, reimbursement __________________________________________ 215 DeputiesProcedure for appointment of ______ ---"--------------------------------------_466 Serving on county board of education __________ -------------------------------- _____________________129 Interstate highways, patroling or making cases on __________________________________________________________________45 6 Justices of the peace courts, duties as to ------------------------------------------------------------------------------101 Workmen's Compensation Board, summons for witnesses before, fees ------------------------ ---------------- 290 SHRIMP. Commercial fishing for 279 -------------------------------------------------------c--------SOIL CONSERVATION DISTRICTS. Condemnation by --------------------------------------------------------------------------517 SOLICITORS GENERAL. Emeritus positions ________________________________________________________________467, 537 Judge, candidate for, appearing before grand jury ______________________________________________________________________442 SOUTH GEORGIA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. Court reporter, constitutionality of law providing supplement for ---------------------------------------------------- 8 SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY. Transaction with Highway Department _________________________________ -----------------------------------------------3 88 SPEED TRAP AHEAD. Person carrying sign saying _________________________________________________________ 283 STATE OF GEORGIA. Board member doing business with State, conflict of interest ----------------------------------------------------------495 Deceased employee, dispersing back wages owed to __________________________________________________________________464 Employees, see Personnel Board, State. Insurance solicitation from ------------------------------------------------------314 Serving as member of party executive committee ____________________ --------------------------------------- 518 Federal-aid highways, convict labor on ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 82 Injury to employees, liability for _________________________________________________445 Sovereign immunity ----------------------------------------------------------------------167 Surplus property, sale of -------------------------------------------------------------- 50 Survivors benefits for employees _________________________________________________499 INDEX 599 PAGE STATUTES. Population acts, effect of changes in population ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61 STERILIZATION. Voluntary sterilization, generally -------------------------------- __________________341 STRIKES. Ports Authority employees, by ____________________________________________________370 SUPERIOR COURT CLERKS. General Assembly, serving as member of 33 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------C----- ___________ Micro equipment used for recording ------------------------------------------- 218 Pauper's affidavit where credit investigation reveals employment or income ___________________________________________----------------------------------------413 SUPERIOR COURTS. Judges sitting as juvenile court judgesJurisdiction as to out-of-county children ---------------------------------- 62 Supplement to salary --------------------------------------------------------------- 300 Nonresident defendants, equity jurisdiction as to ------------------------------------------------------------------------190 Tag registration, offenses involving ___ ------------------------------------------ 26 SUPPORT MONEY.. Military superior, ordered paid by -----------------------------------------------510 TAX ASSESSORS. Changes in returns ------------------------------------------------- ______________________ 39 Information furnished from income tax files ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------480 TAX COLLECTORS, COUNTY Exchange charges by local banks on checks to _________________________ ----------------------------------------------------- 98 Registrars, county board of, compensation for services to ____________________________________________________ 371 TAX COMMISSIONERS. Fees in connection. with sale of motor vehicle license plates ______________________________________________________439 TAX SALES. Purchases at ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------470 TAXATION. See Sales and Use Taxes. Ad valorem, see Ad Valorem Taxes. 600 INDEX PAGE TAXATION-Cont'd. Arbitration, public utility ____________________________________________________________364 Credit unions and credit bureaus _________________________________________________ 313 Motor vehicles, tax situs of -------------------------~-----------------------177, 465 Rolling stores --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 69 Wages reached by legal process for collecting ____________________________________________________________________________21 7 Where property taxable ____________ ---------------------------------------------------170 TEACHERS. See Education, County Boards of; Education, State Board of; School, Public. Racial Sasis, payment of supplements on ------------------------------------~-----------------------------------141 Salaries, where teaching deprived children _____________________________ ------------------------------------------------------- 288 TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM. Age for retirement reduction, increase in contributions ----------------------------------------------------~-----197 Air University, credit for service as an instructor at ___________________________________________________________________ 187 Average compensation, determination of __------------------------------------------- _________________________ 30 1 Inclusion of salary received after age 65 72 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------2 Out-of-State service 71 ---------------------------------------------------------------------_2 TEAR GAS GUNS. Concealed weapons ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. Highways, maintaining lines upon, under, along and over ________________________________________________________________264 THOMAS COUNTY. Fire districts __________ -----------------------------------------------_________________________ 6 TIDEWATER LANDS. Title ______________________________________________________________________________________________253 TRAFFIC CASES. Arraignment notice ________________ ------------------------------------------------------472 TRIAL. Demand for, where serving another sentence ______________________________________________________________________ 114 TRUSTS. Business trust, license for ______________________________________________________________404 Licenses _______________________________________________-----------------------------------------397 INDEX 601 PAGE TURKEY SHOOT. Legality of ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------53 4 UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA. BidsBoard of Regents extending bid time -------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 3 6 Milk -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 80 Employees participating in tax-sheltered annuity plan ________________________________________________________ 112 Green County receiving funds from income from land owed by -------------------------------------------------------- 1 Hold harmless clause in contracts ----------------------------------------------- 527 Immunity of Board of Regents, waiver of ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 83 Information about employees released to third persons ____________________________________________________________31 0 Paving contract with county or city _____________________________________________ 117 Race, application forms containing questions or blank spaces as to _________________________________________________ 363 Real estate owned by employee of University system, procedure in acquiring _____ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------110 Sale of property ---------------------------------------------------------------------------_3 82 Scholarships, residence --------------------------------------------- __________________ 32 Vocational rehabilitation use of building owned by 80 --------------------------------------------------------------------3 UNION POINT, CITY OF. Condemnation outside city limits ________ ----------------------------------------276 VACCINATIONS. School children, compulsory --------------------------------------------------------463 VEGETABLES. Canned by prison labor, sales _______ ----------------------------------------------- 41 VETERANS. Free licenses ______________________________________________________________________321, 329 Nursing homes for -------------------------------------- _________________________________203 Peddling, disabled veteran's license ______________________________________________432 VETERANS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. Amendment of corporate charter ________________________________________________ 127 VETERANS' READJUSTMENT BENEFITS ACT. Active military personnel, etc. receiving benefits under 78 ------------------------------------------------------------3 602 INDEX PAGE VETERANS SERVICE BOARD. Appointments, "honesty acts" ______________________________________________________243 VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION. Federal funds, agreements to obtain ------------------------------------------- 269 University System building, use of space in ______________ -----------------------------------------------------------------3 80 VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION, DIVISION OF. Blind persons register _______________________________________ -------------------------- 17 VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION. Law generally _____________________-----------------------------------------------------------3 41 WARE COUNTY. Tax receiver, pay for preparation of school digest _________________________________________ ------------------------------ 99 WARNER ROBINS. City court, jurisdiction prior to first term --------------------------------------- _________________________________________ 193 WARRANTS. Justices of the peace issuing criminal warrants _____________ --------------------------------------------------------- 1 Traffic offenses, for ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 88 WATER QUALITY CONTROL BOARD. Hearings --.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 49 WATERWAYS COMMISSION. Employees ------------------------------------------------------------- ______________________389 WAYCROSS AND WARE COUNTY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY. Junior Museum construction by ------------------------~-~------------------------392 WEAPONS. Motor vehicle pocket, carried in --------------------------------------------83, 451 Purse, hand gun carried in ------------------------------------------------------------ 83 Sale of firearms to minors ___________________________________________________________403 Tear gas guns, concealed weapons ------------------------------------------------ 34 WELFARE, COUNTY BOARDS OF. Candidates, members of boards as ------------------------------------------------145 WHITFIELD COUNTY. School buildings used as polling places ------------------------------------------------ ____________________________144 WINE. Licenses ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 60 WOMAN'S COLLEGE OF GEORGIA, FOUNDATION OF THE. Purchases by, sales and use taxes 76 -------------------------------------------------_4 INDEX 603 PAGE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Sheriff's fee for serving of summons for witnesses before State Board of Workmen's Compensation --------------------------------------------------- 290 Subrogation where third person liab1e _________________________________. ________________________________________________________213 ZONING. Highways ______________________________--------------------------------- ______________486, 500