REPORT AND OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY -GENERAL OF GEORGIA FROM JUNE 15, 1915, TO DECEMBER 31, 1916 CLIFFORD WALKER ' Attorney-General 1917 INDEX PRINTING Co., STATE PRINTERS ATLANTA, GA. STATE OF GEORGIA ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE ATLANTA Han. Nat E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol. DEAR GoVERNOR :-Pursu~nt to the terms of the law, 1 present herewith the Report of the Attorney-General covering the period from June 26th, 1915, to December 31, 1916. Publication of this report has been delayed by the litigation involving the State printing. I herewith furnish a report of the present status of the civil cases to which the State is a party. A list of the criminal cases before the Supreme Court and a list of petitions for receiver for banks filed during the period is also presented. The report is concluded by written opinions rendered by this Department. The increase of the number of .such opinions is notable. Along with the progress of the State in all other lines its legal business has kept pace. I~ach session of the Legislature has created one or more boards or commissions which are advised by the legal Department. Many oral opinions are rendered to the Department heads; the press of official business being such that it was impossible to reduce them to writing The work has grown beyond the physical limitations of any one lawyer. I count myself and the State most fortunate in securing the services of Hon. Mark Bolding to January 1st~ 1916, and of Hon. l\L C. Bennet after that time as Assistant to the Attorney-General. These gentlemen are law- yers of character and rare ability and deserve highest co~mendation for their faithful services to the State. I particularly call attention to the fact that the steadily-increasing number of matters of a legal nature has brought about the employment of special counsel from time to time. In my judgment this employment should_ be correlated under the legal Department. The dignity of the Department, the proper relation of such matters to the office, as well as considerations of economy and efficiency suggest that all legal matters be referred to the office of the Attorney-General with suitable provision for the necessary assistance. Lawyers who are experts upon matters handled by the important departments of government, as, for instance, taxes, insurance and banking, should be employed. designated to such departments, their surplus tim(' to be devoted to other work of the legal department. Such an organization would result in a large saving to the State and a' more efficient and satis- factory accomplishment of its legal work. The Act of August 8th, 1916, placed upon this Departmentment the duties of enforcing the collection of inheritance taxes. I have associated in each county local counsel who are now engaged in checking over all estates administered since the passage of the Inheritance r:J~ax Act four years ago. All estates liable to payment of the tax will be forced to pay the same. Developments up to this writing indicate that the income to the State through these taxes will be largely increased. The Act last referred to also made it the duty of the Attorney-General to supervise the books and records of the County Officers of the State looking to their uniformity and general efficiency. The friends of this bill urged &s the most pressing need a modern system of indexing the deed. and mortg~ge records of the Counties. After 4 weeks of investigation and study of the various systems, including personal conferences with the Clerks of Superior Courts who had tested these systems, I adopted the Cott Family Index and through Deputy Supervisors have succeeded in having it installed in over one hundred of the Counties of the State. This is a wonderful improvement over the old index enabling the location of E.ny deed or mortgage in from one to three minutes. The &pirit of the Act will be extended to other records as op- portunity permits and in my judgment vast improvements in the County records will result. Respectfully submitted, . CLIFFORD '\VALKER, Attorney-General. The State of Georgia vs. The Tennessee Copper Company, and The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Ltd. A report of this case is found on Page 16 of the Report of Attorney-General Grice for the year 1915. 'l'he, defendant, The Ducktown Company, filed a motion to have the decree theretofore entered against it discharged and vacated. On this motion the Supreme Court ordered evidence submitted by both sides, and after a large amount of testimony was taken and argument had the court handed down the decree found in the report referred to. Subsequently the said defendant filed its further motion that this decree be modified so as to conform, as it contended, to the report of the Special Inspector appointed by the Supreme Court in that decree. And the State of Tennessee filed its motion, at the same time, for leave to intervene and ask the same modification on behalf of said defendant. After further argument before the Court the said motions were denied and the decree remained as formerly. The Court handed down a decree in which they granted to the State the 5 injunction sought and on these terms insisted upon by the State in the following decree: "This cause coming on to be heard on the report of the Inspector heretofore appointed to observe operations of the plant and works of defendant The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited, and upon consideration thereof "It is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed (and all former decrees are accordingly modified) as follows: "I. That defendant The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited, hereafter shall not permit escape into the air from its works of fumes carrying more than 45 per cent. of the sulphur contained in green ores subjected to smelting. "2. That it shall not hereafter from April 10 to October 1 in any year permit escape into the air of gases the total sulphur content of which shall exceed 25 tons- during one day and not more than 50 tons per day shall be permitted to escape at other times. "3. That it shall keep a daily record of the amount of green ores smelted, sulphur in green ore, acid made, sulphur in acid, and per centum of sulphur escaping so that statements may be compiled therefrom substantially the same as Table 3, page 19, printed report of the Inspector. It shall also keep a weather record showing direction and velocity of wind, humidity, temperature and pressure at intervals of six hours. These records, verified by the oath of a responsible officer or employee of the defendant, shall be reported to the Clerk of this Court immediately after the end of .each calendar month. "4. That it shall deposit with the Clerk of this Court an additional sum of $125.40 to cover expenses and compensation of Inspector. "5. That the Clerk shall pay to Dr. John T. McGill, Inspector heretofore appointed, the sum of $3,375.40-$3,000 being compensation for services, and $375.40 to meet expenses incurred in ex cess of payments heretofore made to him. "6. The costs of the proceedings in the cause from February 24, 1914, to this date will be charged to defendant The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited; costs accruing prior to February 24, 1914, will be divided equally between Tl1e Ten nessee Copper Company and The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper and Iron Company, Limited. "7. The cause will be retained on the docket until further order of the court." APRIL 3, 1916. Subsequent to this time the State of Tennessee by its Attorney-General filed a motion for modification of this decree, 6 which motion was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States. The State has prosecuted this cause against this defendant to a successful conclusion and this phase of the case is prac- tically ended. As to the other defendant, the Tennessee Copper Company, I found on coming into office, that the State of Georgia had entered into an agreement with said defendant covering a period from October, 1913, to October, 1916, which stipulation is found in the Acts of 1913, page 1295. At the last regular Hession of the Legislature by Resolution, the Governor was directed to enter into practically the same stipulation with this defendant, said stipulation and agreement being found in the Acts of 1916, page 1056. I consider it unfortunate that whereas this matter is pending in the Courts in a case wherein both Copper Companies are parties defendants, in actual practice the case is being handled as to one of the defendants in the Judicial branch of the Government and as to the other in the Legislative Department. I respectfully suggest that the case cannot so proceed in fairness and equity to all,parties. The entire matter should be in the control of the Legislature or left to the decree of the Courts. On assuming office I found that my predecessor has associated Hon. J. A. Drake and Hon. Lamar Hill of Atlanta as Special Counsel in the taking of testimony and assisting the Attorney-General in representing the State in this cause in -the Supreme Court of the United States. These gentlemen having been of counsel in other cases involving similar questions had peculiar advantage and opportunities and have rendered invaluable services to the State through the present administration. Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, etc., vs. Harvey Granger et al., and Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah, etc., vs. J. S. Balmer et al. . In these cases Granger and others filed a petition in the Superior Court of Chatham County, seeking to injoin the City of 7 Savannah, by its proper officers, from enforcing an ordinance of the City of Savannah, adopted under the Act of the Legislature of 1910 as amended by the Act of 1913, requiring the registration in that city of automobiles and like vehicles, and providing that persons convicted of a violation of the ordinance should be fined in the police court of the City of Savannah. It was claimed that the Acts of the Legislature above referred to, as well as the ordinance adopted thereunder, were unconstitutional for various reasons. The injunction was granted by the Judge of the Chatham Superior Court. The 1\Iayor and Aldermen of Savannah brought the case to the Supreme Court. At the direction of the Governor, I appeared with the able Attorney for the City of ,Savannah before the Supreme Court in behalf of the Mayor and Aldermen, and filed a brief therein as the qu~stions raised involved the constitutionality of the Acts of the Legislature above referred to. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court below. J. B. Elwell et al. vs. Peter F. Bahnsen, John F. Fahey et al. The petitioners in this case brought their petition in the Superior Court of Thomas County against Peter F. Bahnsen, as State Veterinarian, and John F. Fahey, D. 1\I. Adams, R. L. Braswell, and others, as cattle inspectors under the Acts of the Legislature of 1909 and 1910, seeking to enjoin the defendants from carrying into effect or establishing or maintaining any quarantine of the cattle belonging to them in Thomas County and from carrying into effect in any wise the Acts of 1909 and 1910 relating to the eradication of cattle tick in the State of Georgia. Under the Act of 1909 any duly authorized live-stock inspector, acting under the authority of th~ Commissioner of Agriculture, is authorized and required to quarantine any stall, lot, yard, pasture, field, farm, town, city, militia district, county, or any part or the whole of the State of Georgia, when he shall determine the .fact that live stock in such place or places are affected or infected with a cpntagious disease or the cause of the same. Under the Act of 1910 it is provided that it is the duty of the State Veterinarian to investigate and take proper measures a for the control and suppression of all contagious and infectious diseases among the domestic animals within the State, under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by him and approved by the Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia, and that he shall assume charge of the work of cattle tick eradication i~ co-operation with the Federal authorities. Mr. John F. Fahey, one of the defendants, is an agent of the Department of Agriculture of the United States in the work carried on by the Department of Agricu_Iture for the suppression of contagious and infectious diseases among the domestic animals in the United States. He was also acting under the authority of the Act of the Legislature above referred to. The Department of Justice of the United St!ltes assisted the State authorities in defending this suit. Hon. Chas.. D. Russell, an able Assistant District Attorney for the Southern district of Georgia, appeared in the case as Attorney for the defendant, John F. Fahey, as a Federal officer. The petitioners claim in this case that the Acts of the Legislature of 1909 and 1910 providing for the eradication of cattle ticks in this State are unconstitutional and that the enforcement of the same as against the petitioners was unconstitutional on the ground that there was no necessity for the quarantine and that the quarantine was established without any hearing and that the enforcement of the quarantine deprived the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law and that the quarantine laws were in conflict with the Interstate commerce clause of the Federal Constitution and that compulsory dipping is unconstitutional. This case came on to be heard before his Honor Judge W. E. Thomas on the fourth day of December, 1916. A great deal of evidence was introduced. After argument the court held that the Acts were constitutional and the injunction was, therefore, denied. This was an important case as it involved the work of tick eradication in the State. On this subject the General Assembly in 1912 said : "The annual losses from tick-infestation of our cattle are proven . to be in excess of $6,000,000 annually. "It has been proven that this pest can be exterminated from any farm, county or State by systematic inspection and disin- 9 fection of all the cattle, and at a cost not exceeding. twenty-five per cent. of the actual annual death losses from tick fever. "An area greater than four times the size of the State of Georgia has been permanently freed of this pest since 1906, and not a single county having become re-infested after it had. been freed. "The eradication of the cattle tick is absolutely essential to the development of a profitable cattle industry. "The development of a profitable and progressive live sto~k industry, the key-stone of intensified and diversified farming, has proven the only successful solution of fighting the boll weevil." Georgia Railway & Power Company vs. Wright, ComptrollerGeneral. This suit was brought for the purpo~e of restraining and enjoining the Comptroller-General from seeking to collect taxes on a dam across the Savannah river belonging to the Georgia Railway & Power Company and located in the County of Elbert. The Comptroller-General contended that practically all of this dam was located in Georgia and subject to taxation in Georgia. The Power Company contended that only about 160 feet of the dam, measuring from the Georgia shore, is within the jurisdiction of this State, and that the rest of the dam is within the jurisdiction of South Carolina. The suit, therefore, called for a decision locating the boundary line between the States of Georgia and South Carolina at this point. This. question required a construction of the Convention of Beaufort, adopted April 28th, 1787. This Convention provided: "The most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah from the sea or mouth of such stream to the fork or confluence of the rivers now called Tugaloo and Keowee, and from thence the most northern branch or stream of the said river Tugaloo till it intersects the northern boundary line of South Carolina, reserving all the islands in the said river Savannah and Tugaloo to Georgia, shall forever hereafter form the separation limit and boundary between the States of South Carolina and Georgia." At the particular point in question in the Savannah river the dam. belonging to the Power Company extends from the Georgia shore to a small island which lies in the river and is 35 or 40 feet from the South Carolina :;;hore. The Power Com- 10 . ,_ . : "' ~: pany contended that the true boundary line between the States of Georgia and South Carolina was the thread or middle channel of the Savannah river regardless of islands, and that, therefore, only 160 feet of the dam was located in Georgia. It further contended that the expression, ''The most northern branch or stream of the Savannah river'' refers to what is now called the Chattooga river, which is the most northerly branch of the Savannah and Tugaloo rivers, the Tugaloo becoming the Savannah river after its intersection with the Keowee river. On the. other hand, the Comptroller-General contended that the expression "the most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah" refers to any branch or stream flowing around the north side or South Carolina side of an island lying in the Savannah river, and that, therefore, practically all of the dam in question is located in the State of Georgia, and subject to taxation therein. The case was tried in the Fulton Superior Court and the injunction was denied. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court it was held that the contention of the Comptroller-General is correct and that all islands in the Savannah and Tugaloo are in Georgia, and that "the most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah,'' as used in the Convention of Beaufort, means a stream passing around the northerly side of any island lying in the river. This is a very important decision to the State of Georgia. The Savannah is a noble river nearly 300 miles long, and averaging a thousand feet wide from the locality here in question to the sea. There are many islands in the Savannah river, and every island was invoived in this question. A great many of them, perhaps a majority of them, are located in shoaly parts of the river and near falls adapted for water power development. They are constantly growing in importance and value. This decision will eventually. result in adding millions of dollars in value to the taxable property located in this State, as the water power development along this river increases in importance. . Heimer vs. State of Georgia. Heimer was convicted of the offense of violating the prohibition law. He appealed from the decision of the City Court of 11 J\1acon to the Court of .Appeals. The Court of .Appeals affirmed the judgment. Heimer then obtained a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States complaining that his rights under the Federal Constitution were violated in that the evidence upon which he was convicted was obtained by an unlawful search and seizure. He failed to docket the case in the Supreme Court of the United States and to file the record thereof with the Clerk of this Court on or by the return day for said case. I appeared before the Supreme Court and moved to have the case - docketed and dismissed, which motion was granted and the case dismissed. Sumter County vs. Cook, Secretary of State of Georgia. This was a suit brought by the County of Sumter through its proper officers to compel by mandamus the Secretary of State to allow to Sumter County its pro rata part of the automobile tax funds for the year 1915. The. Secretary of State claimed that more than ten per cent. of the automobiles in Sumter County were not returned for taxation for that year, and that for this reason, under the .Act of 1914, Sumter County could receive no part of the automobile tax fund for that year. The County of Sumter contended that the .Act of 1914 was unconstitutional on account of the provision above referred to, the same being contained in Section 6 of the .Act. In this case a new automobile law having been passed, an agreement was reached by which the County of Sumter agreed to accept and the Secretary of State agreed to pay fifty per cent. of the amount of the automobile tax fund claimed by the County upon the basis of rural route mileage. This appears to be an equitable adjustment of the matter in view of the fact that the amount received is less than the amount paid in by the County under the automobile registration .Act. Full justice was done the county by this payment, but at the same time the county was penalized for its failure to comply with the law. Wright, Comptroller-General, vs. Union Tank Line Company. This case involved the constitutionality of Sections 989 and 990 of the Code of 1910 which provide a method for determining 12 the number and value of the cars of equipment companies operated in this State. 'l'his method or scheme of the Statute is what is sometimes called the track-mileage basis of apportionment, or what in a general way is termed the unit rule. The Union Tank Line Company is a foreign corporation and owns and rents to the various railroads tank cars to be used in the transportation of oils, etc. It contended that the Unit rule p.rovided in the Statute was illegal and unconstitutional as applied to it for the reason that it claimed that it did not habitually employ in this State the number of cars ascertained by the rule. The Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County enjoined the enforcement of the tax assessment. Upon appeal by the Comptroller-General the judgment of the lower Court was reversed, my distinguished predecessor, Hon. \Varren Grice, representing the State. Later the Supreme Court granted a rehearing to the defendant in error. Representing the ComptrollerGeneral, I filed a brief and argument upon the rehearing. Later ,the Supreme Court re-affirmed its former judgment. The case was then sent back to the Fulton Superior Court for final judgment. Final judgment refusing the injunction was rendered in the lower court and the 'tank Line Company again brought the case to the Supreme Court. The case has again been heard in that Court but no decision has been rendered therein. State of Georgia vs. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. et al. In December, 1915, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Atlanta, Knoxville and Northern Railway Company began the publication in the official newspapers of Cobb, Cherokee and Bartow Counties certain notices of an intention _ on the part of these companies to build a branch railroad through these counties from a point on the line of the Atlanta, Knoxville and Northern Railway Company at or near l\Iarietta to a point on the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company near Cartersville in Bartow County. These notices were being published in pursuance of the provisions of Section 2587 of the Code of 1910. Prior to this time and on October 5th 1914 William J. Morrison and others had filed in th~ office of' Secre~ tary of State an application for a charter for a railroad com- pany under the name of North Georgia Mineral Railway. This company, when chartered, proposed to build a railroad estimated to be about fifty miles in length and running from the City of Atlanta in a northerly direction through Fulton, Cobb, Cherokee, and Bartow Counties and to a point on the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company at or near Cartersville. It was conceived that the purpose of obtaining a charter for the North Georgia 1\Iineral Railway Company and of the effort to build the branch road above referred to was to build a line of railway parallel with the Western & Atlantic Railway in violation of the Act of the Legislature approved August 11th, 1915. This Act provides among other things : "No corporate power or privilege shall ever be granted by the Secretary of State, to any private company to build a line of railway parallel with the track of the Western & Atlantic Railway, or that will depreciate the value of said Western & Atlantic Railway, so long as the same remains the property of this State." After conferences with the Governor on this subject and with my associate counsel in the matter, Judge Horace l\1. Holden, and Hon. John C. Hart, it was decided to file a petition to enjoin the further proceedings looking to the building of this branch line as well as the further publication of the notices. On December 28th, by direction of the Governor, a petition was filed in the Superior Court of Bartow County on behalf of the State of Georgia against the Railroad Companies referred to and all the newspapers in which the notices were being published in which~ it was prayed that the publication of the notices be enjoined and that the building of the railroad as proposed be likewise. enjoined. Upon the presentation of this petition Ron. . A. W. Fite, Judge of the Superior Courts of the Cherokee circuit, granted a temporary restraining order. The interlocutory hearing was had on the thirty-first day of January, 1916. Upon this hearing the Court granted an injunction as prayed. This injunction is still in force. No exception was taken to the order of the court granting this injunction and the case is now pending in the Superior Court of Bartow County. The defendants in this case contend that the Act of.the Legislature of 1915 prohibiting the building of a railroad parallel to the tracks of .the Western & Atlantic Railroad is unconstitutional on many grounds. Another case, to wit: W. J. Morrison et al. vs. Philip 14 Cook, Secretary of State, involves all the constitutional questions raised in this case. The Morrison case has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court but a decision in that case will determine all the constitutional questions involved in the case of the State vs. the Louisville and Nashville Railway et al. W. J. Morrison et al. vs. Philip Cook, Secretary of State. On October 5th, 19H, W. J. Morrison, A. C. King, and others filed in the office of the Secretary of State their petition praying to be incorporated under the name of North Georgia Mineral Railway. The length of the railroad proposed to be built by the corporation whose charter was sought was estimated to be fifty miles and to extend from the City of Atlanta in Fulton County in a northerly direction through the counties of Fulton, Cobb, -Cherokee and Bartow to \Varfords Cross Roads in Bartow County. When it became known to the public that a charter was being sought for the proposed railroad company for the purpose of building the road above referred to, there were many protests by citizens of the State against the granting of the charter sought in the petition and the building of the railroad. Several conferences were held between his Excellency, John M. Slaton, then Governor of Georgia, and the Attorneys representing the petitioners for the charter. The result of these conferences was that an agreement was entered into between the Governor and the petitioners for charter whereby the Secretary of State was to postpone any action upon the petition for charter filed with him until after the General Assembly had met' in regular session in the Summer of 1915, in order that the Legis:' lature might consider the questions involved in the application for a charter. When the Legislature met in the Summer of 1915 an Act was passed which provides, among other things, that no corporate power or privilege shall ever be granted by the Secretary of State to any private company to build a line of railway parallel with the track of the Western & Atlantic Railway or that will depreciate the value of said Western & Atlantic Railway so long as the same remains the property of this Stat6. ( . t r 15 ! Upon the passage of this law the Secretary of State, the Hon. Philip Cook, passed the following order on the petition for charter of the North Georgia l\Iineral Railway Company: "The within' petition denied, this the 12th day of August, 1915, in pursuance of an Act of the General Assembly approved August 11th, 1915. Philip Cook, Secretary of State." This action upon the part of the Secretary of State was taken upon the belief by him and others that the proposed charter was sought for the purpose of building a railway parallel to the track of the Western & Atlantic Railway and which would result in depreciating the value of the Western & Atlantic Railway. It was claimed that the charter for the North Georgia :Mineral Railway Company was sought at the instance of and for the benefit of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, and that if said charter should be granted it was intended by the petitioners therefor and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company that the latter company would be the real builder and owner and operator of said railroad. It was further contended that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company was the owner and operator of a railroad extending from Cartersville by the way of Etowah, Tennessee, to Knoxville, Tennessee, and that this Railroad at Knoxville, Tennessee, connected with the general system of railways owned and operated by the Louisville & Nashville Railway Company, and that this system of railways extends to Nashville, Tennessee; Cincinnati, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; Evansville, Indiana, and New Orleans, Louisiana, and covers a large part of the West and Northwest. It was further contended that the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company owns a majority of the stock of the Nashville, Chattanooga -and St. Louis Railway Company, the present lessee of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. For these reasons it was contended that the building of the proposed railroad from Atlanta, Georgia, to W arfords Cross Roads in Bartow County, which is a point on the line of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad from Cartersville to Knoxville, Tennessee, would completely parallel the tracks of the Western & Atlantic Railroad through its entire length and seriously impair and depreciate, if not practically destroy the value of the Western & Atlanti; Railroad. It was therefore contended that the granting of the proposed charter 16 would be in direct violation of both the letter and the spirit of the Act of the General Assembly of 1915 above referred to. On the 31st day of December, 1915, the petitioners for a charter for the North Georgia :Mineral Railway Company tiled in the Superior Court of Fulton County, Georgia, a petition for mandamus to compel Philip Cook, as Secretary of State, to issue a charter to the North Georgia l\fineral Railway Company. In this petition it was claimed that the Act of the General Assembly of 1915 was unconstitutional upon a number of grounds. Owing to the very great importance of the case to the interests of the State his Excellency, Nat. E. Harris, Governor, employed Judge Horace l\L Holden and Hon. John C. Hart to assist me in the defense of the case.. The State also had the very valuable aid of Ron. 1\iark Bolding, the able and efficient Assistant to the Attorney-General. His honor, Judge John T. Pendleton, Judge of the Superior Courts of the Atlanta Circuit, after hearing extended arguments of counsel held the Act constitutional and refused to make absolute the mandamus rule nisi. The petitioners for charter excepted to the ruling of the court in refusing to grant a mandamus absolute and the case was carried to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Extensive briefs have been filed, both by the Attorneys for the State and the Attorneys representing the petitioners and the case has been argued before that court. At the present time the Supreme Court has not handed down its decision in the case. Robert Kitchens, appellant, vs. J. 0. Hamilton, Sheriff of Washington County, Georgia: Robert Kitchens, a negro and a resident of the County of Washington, was tried on the tenth day of September, 1914, upon a bill of indictment charging him with the offense of murder for the killing of one H. A. Brantley. He was convicted of murder without any recommendation. He carried the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court below on the fifteenth day of March, 1915. On May 14th, 1915, Kitchens applied to the District Court of 17 the United States for the Southern District of Georgia for a writ of habeas corpus. The grounds of the petition were based upon the following allegations. That the jury commissioners of Washii:tgton County failed to select and did exclude all colored persons of African descent from the list of petit jurors and grand jurors for said county, and that this was done on account of their race and color, although there were a number of colored men in the county who were well qualified to serve either as grand jurors or petit jurors. He further alleged that the jury impanelled to try him upon the bill of indictment was made up exclusively of the white race and all negroes were ex- cluded because of their color from serving on the jury. He fur- ther claimed that his counsel was deterred from pleading the above stated facts or challenging the array on the ground of fear and danger of mob violence, and on account of the great prejudice that existed at the time of the trial between the two races. After a consideration of the petition, his honor, Judge Emory Speer, denied the writ of habeas corpus, but allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. This case came on to be heard by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 17~h, 1916. By direction of the Governor I filed a brief in this case in the Supreme Court of the United States,_ and also appeared and argued the case before that tribunal. After a consideration of the case, the Supreme Court handed down its decision affirming the decision of Judge Speer in denying th.e writ of habeas corpus, upon the authority of Andrews vs. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272, and Frank vs. 1\Iangum, 237 u. s. 309. William A. Wright, Insurance Commissioner, vs. Farmers Mutual Insurance Association. 'l'he Farmers l\futual Insurance Association is an assessment mutual fire insurance association and each of the members thereof is ony of the insurers as well as one of the insured, and each of the members of the association is liable for its con- 18 tracts of insurance after the assets of the association have become exhausted. The principal office of this association was in the County of Gordon and its members included several hundred residents of the Counties of Bartow, Gordon, Murray, Whitfield and Catoosa. On the 6th day of May, 1916, certain creditors of this association filed in the office of the Insurance Commissioner their petition under the provisions of the Act of the Legislature approved August 14th, 1914, and praying that the Insurance Commissioner be directed to institute proper proceedings for the appointment of a Receiver for the association. Upon the hearing of this petition by the Insurance Commissioner sitting in connection with the Governor and Attorney-General, all parties consenting, it was ordered that the Insurance Commissioner be authorized and directed to make application for the appointment of the Receiver for the Association. Accordingly I presented to the Superior Court of Gordon County a petition for Receiver, and upon the hearing a permanent Receiver was appointed. The assets of the Company are now being administered under the direction of the Gordon Superior Court and an effort is being made to require the various members of the association to pay to the Receiver the amounts due by them under their insurance contracts. 0. P. Byrd vs. Philip Cook et al. On August 2nd, 1916, C. P. Byrd filed a petition for injunction against Philip Cook, Secretary of State, William A. Wright, Comptroller-General, and W. J. Speer, Treasurer, such officers constituting the Board of Commissioners of Public Printing of the State of Georgia. Byrd claimed that such Board of Commissioners had published advertisements inviting bids to do the public printing for the State of Georgia for two years beginning August 1st, 1916;. that several persons had submitted bids, including _Byrd, and the Index Printing Company. He further alleged that the Board of Commissioners was about to let the public printing to the Index Printing Company upon the bid submitted by it, and he prayed for an injunction to 19 prevent the awarding of the contract for the public printing to the Index Printing Company. The grounds upon which the injunction was asked were that at the time the bid of the Index Printing Company was submitted, Hon. 1\1. L. Brittain, the State Superintendent of Schools, was a stockholder, director and recording secretary of that corporation, and also that Clifford Walker, the Attorney-General, was a stockholder and dircetor of the company, and that R. C. Norman, Solicitor-General of the Toombs Circuit, was a stockholder in the company. It was further claimed that for the reasons above stated the bid of the Index Printing Company was illegal and void and that no contract for the public printing could be lawfully made with this company,'on account of the following provisions of the Constitution of the State: "The General Assembly shall provide by law for letting the public printing to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders who will give adequate and satisfactory security for the faithful performance thereof. No member of the General Assembly or other public officer shaH be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any such contract." This case came on for trial before his honor, Benjamin H. Hill, Judge of the Superior Courts of the Atlanta Circuit, on the 11th day of August, 1916. Upon the trial it was shown that each of the parties above named, prior to the consideration of the bids by the Printing Commissioners, had sold and disposed of all of his stock in the Index Printing Company and was not at that time either directly or indirectly interested in the Index Printing Company. It was further shown that the sale of stock on the part of the parties above named was bona fide and intended to permit the State to receive the advantages of the contract to be made on the part of the State with the Index Printing Company. It was further shown that none of the parties above named had any knowledge that the Index Printing Company had even submitted a bid for the public printing until after the bid had already been submitted and the time had arrived for awarding the contract. It was further shown by undisputed evidence that the cost to the State of doing the public printing under the bid submitted by the Index Printing Company was seven thousand dollars per year less than the cost of doing the same work under the bid submitted by Byrd. !0 It was further shown that both the Index Printing Company and Byrd had all the equipment and qualifications necessary ior doing the public printing of the State. Upon the hearing of the case his honor Judge Hill refused the injunction sought by Byrd and he excepted and carried the case by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Briefs have been filed in the Supreme Court and the case has been argued but at the present time the Supreme Court has not handed down its decision in the case. State of Georgia, by Clifford Walker, Attorney-General, vs. Georgia Railway & . Power Company, Fulton Superior Court. In August, 1916, F. T. Mason and others, who are dealers in crushed stone and similar commodities, filed a sworn relation with the Attorney-General, alleging that the Georgia Railway & Power Company was customarily exceeding its charter powers, by e:ggaging in the business of selling crushed stone and other paving materials in competition with the relators; that owing to the fact that the street railway company could haul the stone, etc., on its own cars without freight charges, it was about to crush out competition and to create a monopoly to itself. The relators represented that since only the State could move in such matters, they would be remediless unless the AttorneyGeneral filed an information asking for an injunction. Upon this sworn relation, in order that these citizens might have their day in court, the Attorney-General filed an information against the Georgia Railway & Power Company. At the hearing the defendant made the point that in this State the Attorney-General did not have the common law power attaching to the office of filing informations in civil matters on the relation of private citizens or on his own motion, but could act in such matters only when directed to do so by the Governor. The trial judge sustained the point and dismissed the petition. The question being one of general importance, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, where the matter is now pending. 21 The State vs. The Yaryan Naval Stores Company. This is a claim for fees for inspecting naphtha used in its manufacturing plant in Brunswick. My predecessor effected a settlement whereby the company agreed to pay $100.00 per month. This agreement was continued for the current year. In re Macon 'Terminal Company. This was a case involving the tax for one year upon $1,600,000, the proceeds of bonds issued to construct the new Terminal Station in Macon. This money was deposited in a bank in the City of New York pending the erection of the Terminal properties, a clause in the mortgage making the money available only as the purchase of lands and the erection of buildings was consummated. Mter several conferences, an adjustment of the matter was made which was satisfactory to the Comptroller-General and to the Company. In re Holcombe. The audit of the books of the departments of the State Government disclosed a shortage of $4421.78 in the Department of _Keeper of Public Buildings and Grounds. The keeper charged the default to his Assistant E. E. Holcombe and there was evidence of such defalcation. All of the amount due has been collected and covered into the State Treasury except the sum of $1,403.11 represented by checks on the Fulton National Bank alleged to be forgeries. The Keeper filed suit against the Bank to recover this sum and by agreement the State consented to the suit and is to assist in its maintenance although it has not waived its claim upon the Keeper or his bondsmen as to this balance due. The suit is pending in Fulton Superior Court. Pursuant to the terms of the Banking Laws of Georgia, at the request of the State Treasurer, petitions for Receiver were , , filed by direction of the Governor for the Banks listed below I:)' it~ ,. 22 - and the affairs of these institutions are now being administered by the Superior Courts. In conference with State Treasurer Speer, a plan has been worked out whereby insolvent banks are in some instances liquidated by those most interested. This plan has proved remarkably successful and it is believed that many receiverships with attendant costs and large losses will be eliminated. Bank of Blakely, Blakely, Ga. Bank of Alamo, Alamo, Ga. Bank of Colbert, Colbert, Ga. Bank of Georgetown, Georgetown, Ga. Bank of Toccoa, Toccoa, Ga. (intervention). Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Lyons, Lyons, Ga. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of Byromville, Byromville, Ga. Citizens Banking Company of Baxley, Baxley, Ga. Bank of West Point, West Point, Ga. Citizens and Screven County Bank, Sylvania, Ga. -, .,- - - - ,, .. ?';<:t"'T "'!: .,.,.,..- j Wm. A. Wright, Comptroller-General, vs. The Georgia R. R. & Banking Company. In December, 1915, Ron. Wm. A. Wright, as Comptroller- General of the State, issued fi. fas. against the Georgia Rail- road & Banking Company for back taxes for eight years on the following property : 15,000 shares of the capital stock of the Western Railroad of Alabama, valued at $1,250,000, $31,000.00 worth of bonds of l\Ionroe Railroad, valued at $20,000.00. . . $84,000.00 worth of bonds of the Union Point & White 'Flains Railroad, valued at $25,000.00, and forwarded the same to the Sheriff of Richmond County for enforcement. The Comptroller-General, prior to issuing these fi. fas., had notified the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company to make returns of this property and they had re- turned the same_ under protest, fixing the values as above set out. 23 J On the first day of January, 1916, the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company filed its bill in equity in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Wm. A. Wright, Comptroller-General, seeking to enjoin the collection of these fi. fas., and procured an order from the court requiring the defendant to show cause why the injunction should not be granted. In this bill the contention was made that this stock in the Western Railroad of Alabama was not taxable because the same had been transferred to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company as part of the lease which was made to William A. Wadley by the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company in 1881, and by successive transfers had reached the two Railroads above named. When this bill was served the Governor designated Pierce Bros., of Augusta, Ga., and Geo. vVestmoreland, of Atlanta, Ga., as associate counsel, to assist the Attorney-General in defending said suit. An answer was duly filed and the case was argued at length, the AttorneyGeneral and his associates, at the request of the presiding Judge, submitting a printed brief of eighty-four pages, ana the Judge held up his decision until November, 1916, when he filed his opinion, holding that the property was taxable, refusing the injunction and afterward making a decree in accordance therewith, dismissing the plaintiff's bill. So far the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company has not filed any exceptions to the decree of the court, nor applied for any writ of error, but has some months yet in which to do so, if it decides to carry the case to the higher court. The AttorneyGeneral and his associates feel quite confident that the higher court will affirm the judgment below in the event the case is carried to the higher court. At the same time Wm. A. wright, as Comptroller-General, issued the foregoing fi. fas. against the Georgia Railroad & Banking Company, he issued fi. fas, against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for taxes on $1,075,000.00 of bo,nds deposited by said Railroad Companies as security for the performance of the covenants contained in the lease held by said Railroads for the years 1908 to 1915, inclusive, and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and Atlantic Coast Line Railroad filed their bill 24 on the equity side of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Wm. A. Wright, as Comptroller-General, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the collection of the taxes on these bonds, and procured an order from said court on the first day of January, 1916, to ~how cause why the injunction should riot be granted, and the Governor designated Pierce Bros., of Augusta, Ga., and Geo. Westmoreland, of Atlanta, Ga., as associate counsel with the AttorneyGeneral, to reprel'l'ent the State in this suit. An answer was duly filed and the case was argued, ap.d in October, 1916, the United States District Judge filed his opinion, holding that this property was not taxable, as the same was on deposit to the Farmers Loan & Trust Company, of New York, and was not within the jurisdiction of the taxing power of this State, and entered a decree in accordance with this opinion. So it will be seen that the State won the case which the Georgia Railroad & .Banking Company brought, and lost the case brought by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. The time to appeal these cases has not expired, and it has not yet been determined whether the State will carry the case which was decided adversely to the higher court. Capital Cases in Supreme Court. Pursuant to the terms of the Constitution, I have represented the State before the Supreme Court in the following cases: Jeffers vs. State. From Douglas. Reversed. Small vs. State. From Chatham. Affirmed. Ashford vs. State. From Berrien. Affirmed. Brown vs. State. From Rabun. Affirmed. Campbell vs. State. From Mitchell. Reversed. Davis vs. State. From Washington. Affirmed. Gibbs vs. State. From Chatham. Reversed. Head vs. State. From Butts. Affirmed. Holden vs. State. From Gilmer. Reversed. Howard vs. State. From Oglethorpe. Reversed. Ingram vs. State. From Randolph. Affirmed. Lee vs. State. From Wilcox. Affirmed. 25 Lundy vs. State. From Meriwether. Affirmed. McKinney vs. State. From Miller. Affirmed. Montford vs. State. From Laurens. Reversed. Newnan vs. State. From Walker. Affirmed. Pollard vs. State. From Glynn. Affirmed. Rhodes vs. State. From Richmond. Affirmed. Richardson vs. State. From Floyd. Affirmed. Sheppard, alias Roberson. From Montgomery. Affirmed. Slappey vs. State. From Macon. Affirmed. Stewart vs. State. From Lee. Reversed. Thomas vs. State. From Wheeler. Affirmed. 'l'homas vs. State. From Mitchell. Affirmed. Westbrook vs. State. From Carroll. Affirmed. Willis vs. State. From Hancock. Affirmed. Andrews vs. State. From Miller. Reversed. Boone vs. State. From Carroll. Affirmed. Chancey vs. State. From Decatur. Affirmed. Higgs vs. State. From Ware. Affirmed. Hurst vs. State. From Jenkins. Writ error dismissed. Jeffers vs. State. From Douglas. Affirmed. Kelly vs. State. From Chatham. Reversed.. Kettles vs. State. From Whitfield. Reversed. Lampkin vs. State. From Decatur. Affirmed.' Lindsey vs. State. From Clay. Affirmed. Milling vs. State. From Meriwether. Writ error dismissed. Moose vs. State. From Decatur. Reversed. , Roberts vs. State. From Lowndes. Reversed. Storey vs. State. From Harris. Affirmed. Tanner vs. State. From Barrow. Reversed. Vincent vs. State. From Oconee. Reversed. Williams vs. State. From Glynn. Affirmed. Williams vs. State. From Turner. Affirmed. Shirley vs. State. From Franklin. Affirmed. Peterson vs. State. From Calhoun. Reversed. McLendon vs. State. From Glynn. Affirmed. Jones vs. State. From Elbert. Writ error dismissed. Hendrix vs. State. From Bulloch. Affirmed. Cotton v,s. State. From Meriwether. Affirmed. Graham vs. State. From Irwin. Affirmed. Smith vs. State. From Jenkins. Affirmed. 26 Franklin vs. State. From Laurens. Reversed. Smith vs. State. From Fulton. Reversed. l\Iathis vs. State. From Dooly. Affirmed. Smith vs. State. From Chatham. Affirmed. Smoot vs. State. From Spalding. Reversed. Waters vs. State. From Laurens. Reversed. Underwood vs. State. From Pike. Reversed. Glawson vs. State. From Bibb. Affirmed. Lott vs. State. From Coffee. Affirmed. Anderson vs. State. From Terrell. Affirmed. Dennis vs. State. From Pike. Affirmed. Scrutchens vs. State. From Bartow. Reversed. Johnson vs. State. From Bibb. Affirmed. Hicks vs. State. From Paulding. Affirmed. Lucas vs. State. From Bibb. Affirmed. Hill vs. State. From Fulton. Affirmed. Mallory vs. State. From Greene. Affirmed. Vincent vs. State. From Oconee. Affirmed. Graham vs. State. From Irwin. Affirmed. Maxwell vs. State. From Berrien. Affirmed. Bell vs. State. From Baker. Dismissed. Patterson vs. State. From \Vare. Affirmed. Vernon vs. State. From Cobb. Reversed. 27 OPINIONS TO THE GOVERNOR Where there is a vacancy in the office of County Treasurer, it is the duty of the Ordinary to appoint some qualified person to act as .Treasurer, until a special election can be held. for the purpose of filling such vacancy. June 30, 1915. Hon. C. A. West, Secretary Executive Department; State Capitol. DEAR SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your request for opinion as follows: "I am sending you herewith a letter which the Governor has just received from Ron. John A. Cobb, Ordinary of Sumter County, wherein he advises he bas appointed Mr. J. C. Bynum, Treasurer of Sumter County to succeed Mr. P. H. 'Villiams, deceased. "It is my understanding that the Ordinary is not authorized to make the appointment of a County Treasurer, hut should call a special election for the purpose of filling such vacancy. I would appreciate your opinion at your earliest convenience." I respectfully submit the following: Investigation discloses the peculiar status of our law on filling vacancies in the county offices. - Section 4796 of the Code provides that the Ordinary when sitting for county purposes has exclusive jurisdiction over the following subject-matters, naming, among others: "In supplying, by appointment, all vacancies in county offices, and in ordering elections to fill them." Section 567 of the Code provides: "Vacancies (in the office of Treasurer) are filled as vacancies in other county offices are filled." Pursuing the inquiry ip.to the methods of filling the vacancies in other county offices we find in the case of the Ordinary that it is the duty of the Clerk of the Superior Court to order an election to take place within 20 days on the fact of the vacancy being made known to him. Code Sec. 4782. In case a vacancy occurs (in .the office of County Surveyor) 28 the Ordinary must appoint such surveyor until the vacancy is fiiled according to law. Code Sec. 592. If a County Surveyor ' ~ derives his authority from appointment he needs no commission beyona the order of such Ordinary entered on his minutes, of f which appointment the Governor of the State must ,be infor~ed without delay. Code Sec. 593. As t~ County Coroners Section 610 of the Code provides that Coroners are elected, commissioned and qualified and removed in the same manner as County Surveyors, and that vacancies in the office of Coroner are filled as they are in the office of Surveyors. In the case of the Clerk of the Superior Court, when a va- cancy occurs in his office, the Ordinary of the County is required to call a special election to fill the vacancy. Code Sec. 4881. The person elected holds the office for the unexpired term. Sec. 4881-2. As soon as the vacancy occurs, or in anticipation of it, the Ordinary must appoint some qualified person to fill the office of Clerk until the vacancy is filled by an election. Sec. 4884. visions: But Sec. 4886 of the C, ode makes the following pro- "When a vacancy (in the office of Clerk) occurs and it is not more than six months from the time the election can be appointed by the Ordinary and held until the existing term will expire, the person or persons appointed shall discharge the duties of the office for the balance of the term and there shall be no special election." Section 1194 qf the Code provides that vacancies in the office of Tax Receivers are filled as vacancies in the office of Clerk of the Superior Court. Section 1205 of the Code provides that vacancies in the office of Tax Collector are filled in the same manner as are vacancies in the office of Tax Receiver. Vacancies in the office of Sheriff are filled as in cases of vacancies in the office of Clerk of the Superior Court, except when there is a failure to appoint as set forth in Code Sec. 4884, the Coroner of the county shall act as Sheriff; and if there is no Coroner the Ordinary shall make a temporary appointment. Code Sec. 4904. While vacancies in the office of Ordinary are never filled by appointment and while the provisions for the filling of vacan- 29 cies in the offices of Coroner and Surveyor are not so clear1 I a~ of the opinion that in providing that vacancies in the office of Treasurer are filled as vacancies in other county offices are filled_ (Sec. 567) it was intended that the method clearly prescribed in the cases of the Clerk of the Superior Court, Sheriff, Tax Collector and Tax Receiver should be followed, to-wit: a temporary appointment by the Ordinary pending an election to be called by him in case more than six months will elapse from the time the election can be appointed by the Ordinary until the existing term will expire, the appointee to hold office until the expiration of the term in case less than six months will elapse from the time the election can be appointed by the Ordinary until the existing term will expire. Since it appears that more than six months will elapse from the time of an election can be appointed by Ordinary Cobb until the existing term of Mr. Williams will expire, it is my opinion that it is the duty of Ordinary Cobb to call a special election at once to fill the vacancy in the office of Treasurer of Sumtel County and that under the law it can not be filled in any other way. It is my opinion further that until the special election can M' called and held for the purpose of filling said vacancy, it is the duty of the Ordinary to appoint some qualified person to discharge the duties of the office. But such person needs no commissioll from the Governor, the or9-er of the Ordinary duly entered upon the minutes being sufficient authority for the performance of his temporary duties. Howev~r, the Governor should be notified of the appointment without delay. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The buildings of the Georgia Industrial School for Colored Youths should be covered by what may be their pro rata part of insurance which the appropriation for insuring public buildings may purchase. July 2, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have yours of the 20th ultimo requesting an 30 opinion as to whether or not the Georgia industrial Schooi for Colored Youths should be included in the list of public buildings insured under the appropriation for that purpose. The Act providing appropriations for the insurance of public buildings, approved August 19th, 1913, declares "that the following sums of money be and they are hereby appropriated for each of the fiscal years 1914 and 1915 for the following purposes." It names, among others, "For insurance on public buildings, the sum of One Thousand Dollars, or so much thereof as may be necessary." Section 147 of the Code requires the Governor to keep insured the public buildings of the State with certain exceptions. The intention of the law is to provide insurance for all buildings owned by the State and not specially excepted. The buildings under consideration are not excepted from the operation of the law. The only question is whether or not these buildings are owned by the State. Section XI of the Act approved November 26th, 1890, establishing the Georgia Industrial School for Colored Youths provides that ''all property purchased under the authority of this Act shall be free from liens or incumbrances, and title to the same as well as to any donations that said Commission shall receive shall be taken in the name of the Trustees of the University of Georgia in their corporate capacity, and said property shall become the property of the State of Georgia, and the same shall not be alienated by any one, nor shall any valid lien be created thereon, neither in the erection of any building thereon, nor by the act of any person, nor by the operation of law.'' Under the above quoted Section of the Act, the Trustees of the University of Georgia hold the legal title to the property of this school as trustees for the State for the purposes named in 'the Act, but the property is the absolute property of the State. It therefore follows that under the law as it now stands the buildings of this school should be covered by what may be their pro rata part of insurance which the appropriation for insuring public buildings may purchase. Of course the Legislature could provide that the insurance on these buildings should be purchased solely from the appropriation made for the support of this school and not from the gen- 31 eral appropriation for the purpose of insuring the public build- ings of the State. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Where the grand jury of a county, in their resolutions, pass an order stating that whereas there is dispute relative to the county line between that county and another county and that they recommend "that the necessary steps be taken at once for the permanent establishment of said county line," this is a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law as stated in Code Section 472, and the Governor would be authorized to name a surveyor to define the county lines as provided by said Section of the Code. July 7, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have yours of the 7th inst. requesting my opinion as to whether or not you are authorized under the law to name a surveyor to define the lines between the counties of Candler, Tattnall, and Evans, under the provisions of Sections 472 et seq. of the Code under the following state of facts: The Clerk of the Superior Court of Candler County having furnished your office with a certified copy of the General Presentments of that county, containing among other things the following: "Whereas, a dispute has arisen as to the county line between Candler, Tattnall, and Evans counties, we recommend that the necessary steps be taken at once for the permanent establishment of said county lines.'' The Clerk of said court now requests that you appoint a surveyor under the above presentments to define the county lines under the sections above mentioned. The question is whether or not the above presentments comply with the provisions of Section 472 of the Code. The section mentioned provides that whenever the boundary line between two or more counties in this State shall be in dispute, and the Grand Jury of either county shall present that the 32 same requires to be marked out and defined, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of the court to certify such presentments to the Governor who shall appoint some suitable and competent sur- veyor for the purposes mentioned. While the presentments under consideration do not exactly and strictly comply with the said section of the Code, in my opinion they are a substantial compliance wit~ said section. They set forth that there is a dispute as to the county line be- tween the counties mentioned, and recommend that "steps be taken at once for the permanent establishment of said county line." I think that this is substantially equivalent to saying that the disputed line ''requires to be marked out and defined.'' Altogether they could mean nothing but that an original boun- dary line between certain counties had become obscure or uncer- tain, and that the same should be discovered and re-established according to the met~od provided by law. This is the intent and purpose of the sections mentioned. I think, therefore, that under the said presentments you are authorized to name a surveyor to define the county lines as provided by said section of the Code. - Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER1 Attorney-General. A member of the State Board of Education who temporarily absents himself from the State is entitled to receive his salary during such absence. Han. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, July 12, 1915. State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: In reply to your request for an opmwn as to whether or not Professor T. J. Woofter is entitled to receive his salary as a member of the State Board of Education for the first and second quarter of the year 1915; when it appears that during. the said quarters he has been in Europe and has not at- tended any of the meetings of the said board, as provided by law, I beg to say: It does not appear from the facts in the case as furnished me that Professor Woofter lias abandoned the said office, or that the same has been declared vacant. 33 "The right to receive or recover the salary or other compensation attached to an office being vested in him only who i&- by law the duly chosen and qualified incumbent of it, it follows necessarily that when the right of the officer to the office ceases, either through his resignation, removal, misconduct, or abandonment, his right to longer receive the compensation thereupon ceases also." Mechem's Public Offices and Officers, page 870. Under Section 264 of the Code of 1910, an office may become vacant by death, resignation, judgment of court, incapacity which shall operate from the time the fact is ascertained and declared by the proper tribunal and removal; that is to say, by the incumbent ceasing to be a resident of the State, or of the county, circuit, or district for which he was elected; in the last case, the removal from the State, the office becoming vacated immediately. It does not appear that Professor Woofter has ceased to be a resident of the State, but that he is only temporarily sojourning in Europe. His office could not therefore be considered as vacant unless he has ceased to be a resident of the State or has abandoned his office. Vol. 29 of Cyc., page 1'423, states the law to be that "the fact that officers have not performed the duties of the office does not deprive them of the right to legal compensation, provided their conduct does not amount to an abandonment of the office.'' See also: Cote vs. Biddeford, 06 1\Ie., page 491. Phillips vs. Boston, 150 Mass., 491. Wardlaw vs. New York, 137 N. Y., page 194. Emmitt vs. New York, 128 N.Y., page 117. It is my opinion, therefore, that, unless it appears that Professor Woofter has ceased to be a resident of this State, or has abandoned his office, he would be entitled to the legal compensation attached thereto. The above cited Section of the Code, to wit: Section 264, further provides that an office may become vacant by the incumbent abandoning the office and ceasing to perform its duties, or either. I think this Section means that to render the office vacant by abandonment, the incumbent must permanently leave the same and cease to perform the duties thereof with the intention to permanently abandon the same and cease to perform its duties. 34 If Professor woofter is in fact only temporarily sojourning in Europe, probably engaged in study the better to fulfill his duties, with the intention of returning and performing the duties of the office, and with no intention of abandoning the office, or if he is involuntarily detained in that country, the bare fact that for the first two quarters of the present year he has not discharged the duties of the office which he holds would not deprive him of the right under the law to receive the compensation attaching to the office. I think this would certainly be true in view of the fact that no action has been taken by the proper auth~rities- to declare the office vacant, and to appoint his successor. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. L. W. Scoville, and McLane Tilton, Jr., and L. W. Scoville as executors of the estate of G. W. Scoville, are the persons entitled under the law to a renewal of the lease of what is known as the "ln. dian Spring Reserve," the former lease expiring July 15th, 1915, and the contract and lease submitted with this opinion is in proper legal form. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Govern~r, July 13, 1915. State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: In response to your request that I look into the matter of your making, on behalf of the State, a renewal of the lease of what is known as the ''Indian Spring Reserve,'' to the present holders of the original lease, I beg to say that I have made an investigation of the matter and find that the present lease was authorized by an Act of the Legislature, approved November 11, 1889, and that said lease was duly executed by his excellency, J. B. Gordon, Governor of Georgia, on the 15th day of July, 1890. This lease expires on the 15th day of July, 1915. The Act of the Legislature authorizing this lease provided that the person, or persons, holding such lease, at the expiration thereof, should have the right to re-lease the same for a like term on conditions of the lease herein provided for. I also find that J.J. W. Scoville, and McLane Tilton, Jr., and 35 / L. W. Scoville as executors of the estate of G. W. Scoville, are the persons now holding the said lease, the same having been transferred and assigned to L. W. Scoville and G. W. Scoville, the last named party being deceased. ' I further find that under the law, the persons above named are now entitled to have a renewal of the said lease under the term on conditions of the lease therein provided for. I have examined the contract and lease submitted with this report, and in my opinion the same is in proper legal form for the purpose of making the lease or re-newal thereof as pr.ovided by the said Act of the Legislature, and that it is legal for your excellency to execute the same as prayed for by the petitioners. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Aliens, the subjects of governments at peace with the United States, shall have the privilege of purchasing, holding, and conveying real estate in this State. July 20, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have yours of recent date inclosing a letter from the Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, wherein he requests information concerning the laws of this State with regard to the right of aliens to hold and inherit real estate in this State. In reply, I will say that I do not find any constitutional provision on the subject. Section 2173 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides: "Rights of Aliens as to Realty. Aliens, the subjects of govern- ments at peace with the United States and this State so long as their governments remain at peace, shall be entitled to all the rights of citizens of other States resident in this State, and shall have the privilege of purchasing, holding, and conveying real estate in this State." , The above quoted Section of the Code was enacted in the years 1785 and 1849'. 36 Section 2174 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides: "Rights to Sue- and Testify. The citizens of other States of the United States, or of foreign States at peace with this State, and friendly Indians, shall by comity be allowed the privilege of suing in our courts or giving evidence therein, so long as the same comity is extended in their courts to the citizens of this State." The above quoted Section of the Code was enacted in the year 1785. Section ~175 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides: "Liens. Aliens may receive and enforce liens by mortgage or otherwise on real estate in this State." The above quoted Section of the Code was enacted in the year 1785. Section 2171 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides: "Aliens. Aliens are the subjects of foreign governments, not naturalized under the laws of the United States." The above quoted Sections of our Code cover all of the provisions of our law relating to the matter inquired of in the letter of the Secretary of State of the United States. Trusting that I have given you the information desired, I am, Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. As the law now stands, the bond of the Treasurer of Lowndes County should be made payable to the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of said County and should be approved by them. Atlanta, Ga., July 21, 1915. Gov. Nat E. Harris, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm : I have yours of July 14th, requesting my opinion as to whether the bond of the Treasurer of Lowndes County should be made payable to the Ordinary of that County or to the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, and also whether such bond should be approved by the said Ordinary or the said Commissioners of Roads and Revenues. Section 292 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides that 37 the bond of County Treasurers "must be approved by the Ortlinary and filed in his office, and by him recorded.'' Section 571 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides that County Treasurers shall ''give a bond payable to the Ordinary of the County,'' etc. Section 569 of the Code of this State of 1910 provides that the oath of Treasurers must be entered on the Minutes of and filed in the office of the Ordinary, and that his official bond must be filed and recorded in said office. From the above quoted Sections of the Code it would appear that the Treasurer's official bond of Lowndes County should be made payable to and approved by the Ordinary of said County. This is unquestionably true unless it appears that other provisions have been made legally and constitutionally. It appears that by an Act approved December 11, 187J, a Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues was establi~'led by the Legislature for the County of Lowndes. It does not appear that this Act has ever been repealed. See Acts 1871-7:3, page 227. Section 5 of this Act, among other things, provides: ''The said Board of Commissioners shall have the authority and jurisdiction defined in Section 345 and Section 346 of Irwin's Re~ised Code. They shall have authority to approve all official bonds formally required by law of the Justices of the inferior courts, and sent them by the Governor with the dedimus; to qualify such officers and to deliver them their commissions.'' By reference to Section 346 of Irwin's Revised Code of this State, it will be seen that the inferior courts had practically the same authority and jurisdiction as the Ordinaries now have in counties where no Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues has been established, except as to lunacy matters and the administration of estates. Section 587 of the same Code provides that County Treasurers shall "give a bond payable to the Justices of the inferior court of the county, with securities to be by them approved, in a sum which, in their judgment, will bedouble the amount of the county taxes for the ensuing year, receipts from other sources, and cash on hand.'' Section 585 of the same Code provides that the Treasurer's oath of office "must be entered on the minutes of the inferior court and filed in the office of the Ordinary and his official bond must be filed and recorded in said office." 38 It will be seen that under Sections 346 of Irwin;s Revised Code that the inferior courts had original and exclusive jurisdiction, among other things, ''in directing and controlling all the property of the county, as they may deem expedient according to law, and also in levying the taxes of the county." From the above quoted Sections of Irwin's Code it would appear- that if the Commissioners of this county, under the Act of 1871, have the authority "to approve all official bonds formerly required by law of the Justices of the inferior courts, and sent them by the Governor with the dedimus; to qualify such officers and to deliver to them their commissions,'' to direct and control the county property and levy the county taxes, they would have the authority to approve a Treasurer's bond, and such bonds should be made payable to them; provided Section 5 of said Act is now valid and constitutional. This would further appear to be true for the reason that the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, under the Act of 1871, were invested with practically the same powers and duties as the Justices of the inferior courts and under the law the Justices of the inferior courts were required to approve these bonds, and the bonds were required to be made payable to the Justices of the inferior courts. This brings us to the_ question as to whether or not the Act of 1872 is now valid and constitutional. It appears that this Act has been amended several times, ,but that none of the amendments change the provision of the Act relating to official bonds. It has been suggested that the Section of the Act of 1871 relating to the approval of official- bonds is in violation of Article two, Section four, Paragraph one, of the Constitution of this State providing: "Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law." This provision of the Constitution is a part of the .Constitution of 18~7. The law under consideration was enacted prior to the adoptwn of the present Constitution and under the Constitution of 1868. The provision of the Constitution under consideration 39 has reference to laws which might be enacted after the adoption thereof, for it says no special law shall be enacted, etc. This provision does not affect laws which had already been enacted provided they were constitutional at the time they were enacted. In this connection, see the case of Thorpe vs. Butt, Ordinary, et al., 106 Ga. 52, where it is said: "When the .Act of 1872 was passed, the Constitution of 1868 was in force. That Constitution did not contain the same provision as to special legislation as does the Constitution of 1877. It was competent for the Legislature, at that time, to pass a sp"ecial law giving jurisdiction over county matters to the comity judges, and thereby change the general law which gave it to the Ordinary in eve county where no Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues had been created.'' In this connection, see also the case of Moore vs. Houston County, 128 Ga. 187. See also the case of Massey vs. Bowles, Sheriff, 99 Ga. 216. See also the case of Burks vs. Morgan, 84 Ga. 627. The law of 1871, under consideration, was not affected by the provision of .Article 2, Section 3, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1877, relating t~ uniformity in county officers. This provision in the Constitution relates solely to "whatever officers may hereafter be created by the General .Assembly," etc. See in this connection the case of Thorpe vs. Butt, 106 Ga. 52, hereinbefore cited. It will be seen at a glance that this provision applies to officers "hereafter" created, that is, created subsequently to the adoption of the Constitution of 1877. It could not apply to officers created and jurisdiction conferred before this provision became part of the State Constitution. It is my opinion under the authorities above cited that Section 5 of the .Act of 1871 was valid and constitutional when it was passed and approved, and that it was not affected by either of the provisions of the Constitution above referred to. If it was valid when passed and approved, it is valid now, since it appears that there is no amendment to the .Act changing this Section. In view of the authority, powers and duties conferred by the said .Act upon the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of Lowndes County, construed in connection with the provision of 41 Irwin's Revised Code referred to in the Act relating to the powers and duties of the Justices of the Inferior Courts, I think, that as the law now stands, the bond of the Treasurer of Lowndes County should be made payable to the Commissioners of Roads and Revenues of said County and should be approved by them. See Art. 12, Sec. 1, Par. 4 of the Constitution. Clark v. Reynolds, 136 Ga. 817 (3, 6, 7, 8). Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The word "freeholders," as used In Section 2040 of the Code of this State of 1910, means freeholders who are qualified to vote. July 23, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of July 16th, enclosing a communication from Hon. W. M. Wynne, Ordinary of Bleckley County, in which you request an opinion from me as to the meaning of the word "freeholders" as used in Section 2040 of the Code of this State of 1910. Your question is whether the word freeholders as use(! in this Section includes women, minors, and non-resident landowners or whether it includes only male residents of the district who are freeholders, and are entitled to vote. I do not find that this word has been construed by any decision of our Supreme Court. As will appear from many adjudicated cases outside of this State, when used in a political sense the word freeholder has a different meaning from what it has when used in contracts, deeds, etc. As used in the Section of the Code under consideration, it has a political signification, and should not be construed by itself, but in the light of proper and relevant circumstances, and in conne~tion with the public policy of the State. The whole policy of this State, so far as established by constitutional and legislative enactment to this time, has been to exclude women from participation in governmental affairs, and from exercising . 41 any influence, by their action or inaction, as of legal right, in controlling any one of its political subdivisions, or the State itself. Under our statutes the word "freeholder," as describing qualifications of appraisers, commissioners, and especial class of jurors, excludes females. In view of the fact that neither minors nor women would be permitted to vote in the election which might be called under the Section of the Code under consideration, I am of the opinion that both of these classes are to be excluded in construing the word "freeholders," as used in this Section. In this connection see the case of Wray vs. Harrison, 116 Ga. 93. There are many cases in other States, holding that the word citizen should be con!)trued to mean, one who is recognized by law, as competent to exercise political rights, including particularly the sovereign right _of voting. See Abrigo vs. State, 29 Texas App., 149. School District vs. School District, 63 Ark., 543. Blanch vs. Pansch, 113 Ill., 60. Thomason vs. State, 15 Ind., 449. Blair vs. Kilpatrick, 40 Ind., 312. These decisions, of course, refer to cases in which the word freeholders is used in a political sense. In view of the fact that non-resident landowners could not participate in an election held under the provisions of -Section 2040 of the Code, it is my opinion that they also should be excluded in construing the word as used in this Section. In other words, in my opinion, before the Ordinary of any county would be a.uthorized to call an election under the provisions of this Section, it wouid be necessary that a majority of the male resident freeholders who are qualified to vote should file a petition with the Ordinary, asking for such an election. All minors, females and non-resident freeholders should be excluded in determining whether or not a majority of the freeholders have filed such a petition. As stated before, I find no decision of our Supreme Court on the subject herein considered. However, almost the identical question was before the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in the c&se of Gill vs. Commissioners, 160 N. C., 176. In this case, the meaning of the word freeholders, as used in a statute providing .for the laying off of special school districts, upon the petition of a certain number of freeholders, was construed to mean freehold~rs of the district who were qualified to vote. The opinion in this 42 case is a very elaborate and well considered one, and cites numerous authorities to sustain the view therein set forth. In addition to the above cited case, there are other cases decide_d by other States of the Union, sustaining in general the principles announced in the Gill case. See 174 Ind., 620; 84 Neb., 230; 27 S. D., 37; 29 Wis., 419; 57 Wis., 147. Yours very truly, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Vacancies in the office of County Surveyor are filled as in the case of Clerk of the Superior Court. Section quoted as to filling vacancies in the office of Clerk of Superior Court. Gov. N. E. Harris, State Capitol, Atlanta. Cordele, Ga., July 29, 1915. DEAR SIR: The man elected for Surveyor of Crisp County moved off and did not qualify. The Grand Jury have recommended that I appoint one. Have I the authority His umixpired term is OV!Jr a year. Which is my duty, to appoint or call an election? Please advise me and oblige. Very truly yours, S. W. OoNEY, Ordinary, Crisp County, Ga. Governor N. E. Harris, State Capitol, Atlanta. July 29, 191?. DEAR SIR: In response to your favor of even date, transmit- ting a letter from Hon. S. W. Coney, Ordinary of Crisp County, wherein he raises the question whether he has authority to ap- point a County Surveyor, the Surveyor-elect having removed from the county before he qualified, I beg to submit the follow- ~g: . The question was ruled on in a thoroughly considered opinion rendered to you June 30, 1915. I quote from this opinion: 43 "In case a vacancy occurs in the office of County Surveyor the Ordinary must appoint such Surveyor until the vacancy is filled according to law. Code Section 592. If a County Surveyor derives his authority from appointment he needs no commission beyond the order of such_ Ordinary entered on his minutes, of which appointment the Governor of the State must be informed w!tl;wut delay. Code Section .~93." Vacancies in the office of County Surveyor are filled as in the case of Clerk of the Superior Court. Such office is filled as follows: ".A temporary appointment by the Ordinary pending an elec tion to be called by him in case more than six months will elapse from the time the election can be appointed by the Ordinary until the existing term will expire, the appointee to hold office until the expiration of the term in case less than six months will elapse from the time the election can be appointed by the Ordinary until the existing term will expire." Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. When a bona fide resident pensioner of this State dies beyond the limits of the State during a temporary absence from the State the estate of such pensioner is due the amount of such pensions as had accrued and were payable at the time of the death of such pensioner. July 31, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: Yours of July 29th with enclosures in the matter of an appeal to your excellency from a ruling of the Commissioner of Pensions in the cases of Mrs. Valeria Ann Toole and Mrs. Ann M. Douglas has been received. The following facts appear from the papers transmitted to me: Mrs. Toole, the widow of Jasper Toole, was on the pension roll for the year 1915, and had been on this roll for a number of years. She had been a resident of Georgia since 1881, and was such at the time of her death. On April 12th, 1915, she left her home in Augusta, Ga., to pay a visit to her sister who lives in Aiken County, S_outh. Carolina. She was taken sick during 44 her visit and died at the ho;-ue of her sister in South Carolina on the 21st day of April, 1915. She was buried in South Carolina where she died. Her funeral expenses amounted to fiftynine dollars. Mrs. Douglas, the widow of James S. Douglas, was on the pension roll for the year 1915, and had been a resident of this State since 1883, living at Augusta, Ga. While on a visit to one of her sons in Aiken County, South Carolina, she took sick and died on the 23rd day of February, 1915. At the time of her death she was a resident of the State of Georgia. She was buried in Augusta, Ga. Her funeral expenses and the expenses of her last illness amounted to one hundred and sixty-four dollars. It further appears that these ladies died after the pensions became due, but before the same was paid to them. The funds for the payment of these pensions has not reverted to the State Treasury. The question presented is whether or not under the above stated facts the funeral expenses and the expenses of the last illness of these ladies can be paid legally out of the pension funds that had accrued to them for the year 1915, or rather applied to such payment so far as such funds will go. Section 1504 of the Code of this State, Vol. II, provides: "In all cases under the pension laws of this State whenever a pension has accrued to any pensioner who dies before the pay ment of the same, the pension commissioner is authorized, and it shall be his duty, to pay the same over to the ordinary of the county of such deceased pensioner; Provided, the pensioner dies in this State and leaves no widow or dependent child or children, or any estate of any kind or value, to be by him paid to his widow, and, if no such widow, applied to the payment of his or her funeral expenses and to such expenses of last sickness as may be shown by sworn statement of such, etc." It does not appear distinctly that these pensioners had no estate of any kind or value, but as they are said to have been on the indigent pension roll, it may be assumed that they left no such estate. It will be noted that this Section says that such payment shall be made, "provided the pensioner dies in this state." The question, therefore, is, -should this language be construed to mean "provided the pensioner dies resident in this State." 45 This question is not free from doubt and is one that allows ample room for a difference of opinion. I do not find that this question has ever been presented to the .Attorney-General or that he has ever given an opinion on it. The Commissioner of Pensions has ruled that the payments could not be made unless the pensioners were actually in this State at the time of their deaths. This ruling is unquestionably in accordance with the strict letter of the law. It is possible that this strict interpretation of the letter of the law gives the true intention of the Legislature in enacting the law, and that the law was written as it stands for the purpose of preventing the commission of frauds on the State. On the other hand, it seems to me that this constructionof the law is not necessarily required under the terms of the .Act taken in connection with all the provisions of our pension laws and that in most cases it would be hardly fair and just, certainly not in accordance with the ,spirit and intention of the pension laws. All that is required of a person who is entitled to a pension under the law and whose name is on the roll is that he remain a bona fide citizen of the State of Georgia, and a resident of this State. He is not required to remain actually in the State all the time, provided he continues to be a resident of the State. Certainly his pension would not be stopped because he might make a temporary visit to his children or friends in another 'State or might attend one of the Confederate Reunions in another State. The whole spirit and intention of the law seems to be to provide these pensions so long as the pensioner remains a bona fide resident of the State. The very next Section of the Code after the one under consideration, to wit: Section 1505, provides that when a pensioner has been enrolled for the following year and is alive at the date of closing up the pension rolls for such year, but dies before the time the pension becomes payable, his pension shall be paid to his widow, etc. It does not say that he must die actually within this State. Section 1483 of the Code provides for the payment of pensions to pensioners who had left the State, but had returned and become a bona fide citizen of the State. Frequent reference is made all through the pension laws to the matter of citizenship and residence in the State. All other provisions of the laws 46 \_ \ in this respect refer to actual residence in the State and not to the matter of where the pensioner may be actually stopping at any certain time. Under the. law the actual residence of the pensioner is the main consideration and he is permitted to exercise some personal liberty without forfeiting the allowance the State gives him. A careful reading of the various p~nsion laws as found in our Code will show that for years the lawmaking power has been becoming more and more liberal with these old soldiers. The whole spirit and intention of the enactments seems to be that they shall be dealt with as fairly and as bountifully as the circumstances will permit. It can not be supposed that the Legislature deliberately intended to enact a law that would work an injustice to any of them or their poverty-stricken widows. I can not bring myself to the conclusion that the Legislature ever intended that these indigent widows of Confederate soldiers should be required to stay every minute within the limits of the State and actually die within the State or else lose the funds already provided for them and to which they are entitled in the payment of their funeral expenses and expenses of last illness, and possibly suffer for lack of medical a~tention in their last illness and die and be buried by public charity. This would certainly result in some cases, and I do not think the Legislature ever intended to treat the widows of Confederate soldiers in such manner. Such a construction of the law would mean that if one of these pensioners should stray one foot beyond the boundary of the State to attend to some trifling matter and should be stricken and die just over the line, he would have to be buried in the Potter's field unless his relatives or friends or public charity should provide the funds for his funeral expenses. I think the purpose and intention of the law was to give these pensioner~ a decent burial and provide medical attention in their last illness in case they were at the time of their deaths bona fide residents of the State and otherwise entitled to the same under the law. .1\frs. Toole and l\Irs. Douglas were bona fide residents of the State at the time of their deaths. Their pensions had accrued and were payable. I assume from the record that they left no estate. They were on a temporary visit to the homes of their children in the State of South Carolina and happell(id to die 47 there. Possibly they were too sick to be brought back to their homes in Georgia. When they left Georgia they expected to return. If all the other necessary facts are shown to exist, I am of the opinion that their pensions may lawfully be applied to the payment of their funeral expenses and expenses of last illness. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-General. The General Assembly has no power to either create private corporations of any kind or to amend or renew their charters. August 6, 1915. Han. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request for an opinion as to the constitutionality of a recent Bill passed by the General Assembly entitled, ''An Act to amend an Act entitled an Act to incor-. porate the Trustees of The Oconee Hill Cemetery; and for Other Purposes." It appears that this bill seeks to amend an Act approved December 7th, 1860, which Act created & corporation under the name and style as that above set forth. It is sought in the bill to amend the said Act to confer certain corporate powers and privileges and duties on the corporation created by the Act of 1860. The question is whether or not the General Assembly has the power under the Constitution to amend the said Act creating the corporation by conferring on the corporation certain powers, privileges, and duties, or in other words whether or not the said bill is constitutional. Under the Constitution of the State of Georgia of 1798 the Legislature of the State had the power to grant corporate powers and privileges to private and public corporations. See Constitution of 1798, Sec. 22. The Act of 1860, therefore; was constitutional at the time it was passed. Under the Constitution of 1861 and 1865 and 1868 the General Assembly had no power to grant corporate powers and privileges to private corporations except to banking, insurance, railroad, canal, navigation, mining, express, lumber, manufacturing, and telegraph companies. 48 The Constitution of 1877, Art. 3, Sec. 7, Par. 18, (Sec. 6446 of the Code), provides : The General Assembly shall have no power to grant corporate powers and privileges to private companies, but it shall prescribe by law the manner in which such powers shall . be exercised by the courts. * * All corporate powers and privileges to banking, insurance, railroad, canal, navigation, express, and telegraph companies shall be issued and granted by the Secretary of State in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. The corporation involved in this case is a private corporation. See Sections 2190 and 2191 of the Code of 1910. The bill under consideration certainly seeks to grant corporate powers and privileges to a private company. Under the Constitution of this State the General Assembly has no such power. It only has power "to prescribe by law the manner in which such powers shall be exercised by the courts.'' In Section 2823 of the Code, the General Assembly has prescribed the manner in which this power shall be exercised by the courts. In Section 2823 (6), it is provided : ''The powers conferred in this Section shall extend to the amendment and renewal of all charters contemplated in the Section, within the jurisdiction of said courts, whether the original charter sought to be amended or renewed was originally granted by the General Assembly of the State or by a SuperioL' Court of this State." It will be noted that under the above quoted paragraph of the Constitution, the General Assembly has no power to grant corporate powers and privileges to banking, insurance, railroad, canal, navigation, express and telegraph companies, but thr.t charters to such companies shall be ''issued and granted by the Secretary of State in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.'' The General Assembly has provided that charters to such companies shall be amended or renewed by the Secretary of .State upon proper application therefor. See Sections 2193, 2194, 2197, 2798, 2201. These Sections of the Code refer tJ corporations that had been created by the General Assembly. It will thus be seen that under the present Constitution, the General Assembly has no power to either create private corpc.rations of any kind .or to amend or renew their charters. Its 49 powers in that respect are limited exclusively to public corpora- tions. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the bill under considera- tion is unconstitutional and that the General Assembly has no power to enact such a law. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. An Act of the General Assembly which provides for the abolishment of the office of County Treasurer of a county, but does not provide any means of any kind for the handIing of the cQunty funds, is constitutional. August 9, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request of today for an opinion on the question whether or not an Act of the Legislature is constitutional which merely provides that the office of County Treasurer of any county shall be abolished but does not provide any means of any kind for the handling of the county funds, or in other words, provides no person by whom, nor any machinery by which the county funds are to be received from the tax-dollector and disbursed as the law requires. Under the Act of the Legislature approved August 14th, 1914, ana subsequently ratified by the people as an amendment to the Constitution of this State, the General Assembly has the power to abolish the office of County Treasurer in any county. The Act of the Legislature which undertakes to abolish the office should pro~ide some method of handling the county funds unless some other method has been provided by law. This is true for the reason that Section 574 of the Code of 1910 provides: "All county funds are to be paid to, and disbursed by, the County Treasurer except such as may be specially excepted by law, and then to be collected and disbursed as specially directed." I know of no other officer or officers of the county who are authorized by law to receive or disburse county funds in any 50 county where the office of 'l'reasU:rer has been abolished unless provision is made therefor at the time the office is abolished. Where no such provision is made, the probable result would be that the tax-collector would not be authorized to pay the funds collected by him to any one, endless confusion might result, the business of the county might be paralyzed, and the p'ublic interest suffer. However, I know of nothing in the Constitution which renders a statute void for any of the above reasons. Before a statute can be held unconstitutional it must appear that it contravenes some express provision of the Constitution, or the public policy of the State deducible from the constitutional guarantees and prohibitions. The wisdom, expediency, reasonableness, or justice of a statutory enactment are matters addressed solely to the judgment and discretion of the lawmaking power and the executive power in approving or disapproving suc}l legislation. So far as the Legislature has gone in passing the bills under consic;ieration, it is clearly within its powers under the Constitution. The fact that the laws are incomplete and defective 'does :p.ot render them void or unconstitutional. Under the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Puckett vs. Young, 112 Ga. Rep., page 578 (2), I am of the opinion that the bills under consideration are constitutional. As before stated the fact that they are incomplete and defective, I think, is a matter properly addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the executive power when its approval is sought. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. There is no law authorizing the Governor to appoint or provide a physician or specialist, to be sent by the State to any county in the State, to testify before a commission or jury in a lunacy trial in _such county. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, August 13th, 1915. State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have before me your favor of even date enclos- ing a communication from Hon. C. C. Lane, Ordinary of Early County, requesting that your excellency send a specialist to that county to testify in the lunacy trial of H. Lee Strickland. It appears that Strickland has been arrested on five warrants charging him with the offense of arson and five warrants charging him with the offense of assault with intent to murder, and that a commission to enquire into his sanity has been issued and set for hearing on the 14th of this month. The Ordinary requests that a specialist be sent by the State to testify before the commission or jury trying the case. There is no law, so far as I have been able to find, authorizing the Governor to appoint or provide a physician or specialist for the purpose indicated. 'rhat is a matter solely fol' the county authorities of Early County. They have authority to provide such assistance in the hearing if they deem it necessary. See 135 Ga. 259. Yours very truly, w CLIFFORD .A.LKER, Attorney-General. An act of the General Assembly which endeavors to extend the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation beyond the incorporated limits of such city over certain specified territory for the purpose of preserving and protecting the water supply of such city, and for no other purposes, is unconstitutional. Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol. DEAR Srn: I have your request of August 14th for an opinion as to the constitutionality of certain provisions of an Act lately passed by the General Assembly to amend the Charter of the City of Athens. It appears that Section 6 of the said Act provides that from and after the passage of the same "in order to preserve and protect the water supply of the City of Athens, and to prevent its. contamination and pollution, 'the corporate limits of the City of Athens are hereby extended for police and sanitary purposes so as to embrace that portion of the water shed, etc,'' describing the territory to be included. By Section 7 of the said Act it is provided that the Mayor and Council and the Board of Health of the City shall have power and authority to pass such ordinances in relation to and over said 52 territory as they may deem necessary and proper to _protect the water supply, and to prevent its contamination, and to secure the sanitary quality thereof, and to punish violators of the said ordinances by fine and imprisonment, and further providing ''that the Mayor and Council shall have no authority to levy taxes upon the persons and property in the said territory." It is provided in Section 8 of the said Act that the Mayor and Council shall have the power to regulate and prohibit the dis- charge of sewage and other waste matter in the waters of the said territory, and to abate nuisances, and to prohibit the con- duct in said territory of any business which may endanger the public health. The first question is whether the provisions contained in Sec- tions 6, 7, and 8- of the Act, as set out above, constitute the territory mentioned therein a part of the City of Athens, and the residents thereof citizens of said City with the right to vote and subject to all the duties and liabilities of such citizens and entitled to all the benefits thereof, and if stl, whether such pro- visions of the charter as provide that no tax shall be levied upon the persons or property of said territory are unconstitutional and void on account of such exemption from taxation. If the residents of the territory mentioned are citizens of the City of Athens under _this Act with all the benefits and liabili- ties attaching thereto, the said exemption from taxation is un- constitutional and void. Tarver vs. Dalton, 134 Ga., -page 462 (1). . So far as 1 have been able to find the question as to whether or not the Legislature can confer on municipalities police powers beyond their limits or boundaries has not been decided by the Supreme Court of this State. They are creatures of the State, however, and it seems to be universally recognized that the Legislature can confer upon them any powers it may see proper, provided they are not in conflict with the Constitution. It has been held in many States that the Legislature can confer on municipal corporations the authority to exercise beyond their corporate limits just such powers as are granted in this Act. The general rule is well stated in vol. 28, page 703 (5) of Cyc. as follows: "The corporation boundaries usually mark tbe limit for the exercise of the police power by the municipality; but in many 63 instances because essential to the statutory performance of police functions, and especially for the preservation of the public health, the municipality is granted police power beyond its boundaries. Thus it has been held that the grant of power to acquire territory for water supply beyond the _limits of the municipality is within the competency of the Legislature, and that the municipality may exercise police power in the protection of the territory thus acquired to insure cleanliness, and prevent any business and conduct likely to corrupt the fountain of water supply for the city. So, likewise, it may acquire outside territory for sewerage purposes, and exercise police power over the same; and also, it would seem, establish quarantine beyond the municipal boundaries and thus protect its citizens from epidemic or "any contagious or infectious disease, as well as locate and regulate houses of detention and hospitals for infectious and contagion~ diseases beyond the city limits." See also, Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Vol. 1, Sections 352 (n), 354 (n); Vol. 11. 662 (n), 776 (n), 684 (n). Since the Act under consideration only extends the city limits for police and sanitary purposes and in order to prevent-the contamination and pollution of the water supply, and expressly for these purposes only, it is clear that the intention of the General Assembly was not to extend them for all, or any other, municipal purposes. As residence within the corporate limits confers rights and imposes duties upon the residents thereof, and since the Legislature has the power to confer just such powers on the City in relation to the ''water shed'' as it has undertaken to confer, and since it expressly says that these powers are conferred for police and sanitary purposes, and since the naming of these particular purposes would ordinarily exclude others of a different character, and since the Legislature does not expressly confer any other powers on the City in relation to this territory, I am of the opinion, that no other powers than those necessary for police and sanitary purposes are conferred by the Act, and that residents of this territory are not citizens of the City of Athens and have no right to vote in its elections and are not liable to taxation under its authority. The next question is whether or not Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Act are constitutional for the reason that they contain matter. not expressed in the title thereof. It will be noted that the title of the Act sets out that the Act is for the purpose of amending an Act creating the City of 54 Athens by providing for a registration of voters and for other purposes. Nothing is said about extending the police power beyond the original limits of the said City. If the Act made provisions only for matters relating to the City as then constituted and within its proper corporate limits as then existing, I think the title of the Act would be sufficient. But the Act goes beyond matters ordinarily germane to an amendment to the charter to a city where no notice is given in the title of the amending Act that the corporate powers are to be extended beyond the corporate limits. In such cases, I think, under the law such notice should be given in the title of the Act. Under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Blair vs. State, 90 Ga., page 326 (1), I am of the opinion that the Sections of the Act above referred to in relation to the extension of the powers of the City beyond the corporate limits for the purposes named are unconstitutional and void. If the powers of the City can be extended for one mile, they can be ext~nded one hundred miles, and I think under the law, the persons who are to be affected by this extension of the power of the City should be put on notice of the intention to extend such powers. I have not overlooked the case of Richardson vs. l\fayor, etc., of l\facon, 132 Ga., page 122, and the cases therein cited. None of these cases involve the extension of the police power beyond the corporate limits of the City so as to affect persons living outside of such limits. In all the cases where the limits of the municipalities have been extended by Acts amending their charters, notice of such extension has been given in the title of the amending Act. I, therefore, think the Sections of the Act mentioned are unconstitutional and void. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A provision in a municipal charter for woman suffrage in municipal elections is unconstitutional and void. . Atlanta, Ga., August 16, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol. DEAR SIR: I have your request of today for an opinion on 55 the question whether or not a provision in a 1\Iunicipal Charter granted by the General Assembly providing for woman suffrage in municipal elections is valid and constitutional. In reply I will say that in my opinion such a provision in a 1\Iunicipal Charter is unconstitutional and void. It is directly in conflict with the provisions of Art. 2, Sec. 1, and Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Constitution of this State. It is also in conflict with the provisions of Section 2167 of the Code of 1910 of this State. It is also in conflict with the settled public policy of this State as deduced from the Constitution and laws of the State. See the case of Wray vs. Harrison, 116 Ga., page 93 (1). The qualifications of electors in municipalities must conform to such qualifications as are required by the Cons,titution and laws of the State in State and county elections.. See l\fcl\Iahony vs. Savannah, 66 Ga., page 217 (1). See also Howell et al:vs. Pate et al., '119 Ga., page 537 (1, 2) and authorities therein cited. However, this invalid provision would not necessarily render the whole charter void. White vs. Forsyth, 138 Ga. 753 (6a). Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. There is no fatal variance between the Statement of the crime charged in the requisition proper and that in the affidavit attached to the requisition, when the crime stated in the requisition is that of "obtaining personal property by false pretense" and the crime stated in the affidavit is that of fraudulently obtaining lodging on the faith of a certain check therein described without at the time having funds in the bank on which the same was drawn, said check being worthless. Atlanta, Sept. 16th, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request for an opinion in the matter of requisition by the Governor of the State of Florida for Chas. G. Groover, claimed to be a fugitive from justice from that State. You wish to know whether or not there is a fatal variance between the statement of the crime charged in the requisition proper and that in the affidavit attached to the requisition. 56 The crime stated in the requisition is that of ''obtaining personal property by false pretense.'' The crime stated in the affidavit is that of fraudulently obtaining lodging on the faith of a certain check therein described without at the time having funds in the bank on which the same was drawn, said check being worthless. All the circumstances are set out in the affidavit. I know of no law which requires the mere representations of the Executive of the demanding State in the matter of naming or designating the crime to comply with all the technical exactness of an indictment. The duly authenticated copy of the affidavit setting out the facts of the alleged crime is controlling regardless of the mere technical name that may be given to the offense in the requisition proper. In Hawley on Inter-State Extradition, page 75, it is said: ''The representations of the Executive of the demanding State are of no effect unless supported by a duly authenticated copy of the indictment found or the affidavit made.'' In the same work, pages 34 and 35, it is said: ''Whether in fact the act is a crime is often one of the questions to be tried, and it can only be finally and conclusively determined in the courts of the demanding State. It is consequently held that the accusation on which the requisition is based will not be scrutinized with technical accuracy. If it charges a crime substantially, the determination of its technical sufficiency as a pleading must be referred to the courts of the demanding State." A number of cases are cited including 69 Ind. 15; 24 Fed. 132; 116 U. S. 80; 33 Hun. 9'9. In the same work, pages 106 and 107, it is said: "The Supreme Court of the United States has said: 'It must appear, therefore, to the Governor of the State to whom such a demand is presented, before he can lawfully comply with it, first, that the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the State from whose justice he is .alleged to have fled, by an indictment or an affidavit, certified as authentic by the Governor of the State making the demand and second that the person demanded is a fugitive from the ju'stice' of the 'State the Executive authority of which makes the demand.' " The above statement of the law is supported by what is said in Cyc., Vol. 19, pages 89 and 90. On page 90 of this vol. it is said: ''The affidavit must set out the alleged crime with 57 sufficient expiicitness to appri~>e the Governor who receives it of the facts which constitute the offense. It is not insufficient, however, merely because it is defective in form or has not the technical exactness of an indictment.'' To induce one to cash a check on a bank in which the maker has no funds has been held to be obtaining money under false pretenses, although the maker did not expressly say that the check was good. See State vs. Hammesley, 52 Or. 156; People vs. Wasservogle, 77 Cal. 173; Com. vs. Drey, 19' Pick (.l\Iass.) 179. In view of the fact that it is stated in the affidavit upon which the requisition is based that the defendant had fraudulently obtained lodging from the prosecutor by means of the worthless check, it appears to me that the crime committed, if any, is that of obtaining goods under false pretenses. I do not think, therefore, that there is any fatal variance between the statement of the crime charged in the requisition proper and that contained in the affidavit or copy thereof attached to the requisition. I have not scrutinized the papers in the case to see whether all the other requirements of the law have been strictly complied with as the above point was the o~ly question raised in your request for an opinion. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD "\VALKER, Attorney-General. Services rendered the State on special employment of the Governor in the reading of Acts of the Legislature after passage but within the time allowed the Governor to approve or disapprove the same, when it was physically impossible for the Governor and his Secretaries to do the work within the, time limit, is a legal charge upon the State payable out of the contingent funds. September 20, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have before me your inquiry as to the legality of the payment out of the Contingent Fund of a bill for services rendered the State on special employment of the Governor in 58 the reading of Acts of the Legislature after passage but within the time allowed the Governor to approve or disapprove the same when it was physically impossible for the Governor and his Secretaries to .do the work within the time limit. I respectfully submit the following .opinion: Section 318 of the Code provides as follows: "All persons employed by the Governor for whom no compensation is prescribed are paid, according to his discretion, out of the money appropriated therefor. If no money is thus appropriated, and the employment is indispensable, he has the privilege to pay them out of the contingent funds." Section 159 of the Code likewise provides: "And he (The Governor) has power to engage the services of any competent person for the discharge of any duty required hy the laws, and essential to the interests of the State, or necessary, in an emergency, to preserve the property or funds of the State." It will, of course, be granted that the reading and passing upo~ Acts of the Legislature is not only essential to the interests of the State, but required by the laws of the State. It follows, then, that under the circumstances stated, the employment was indispensable and the bill for such services was and is a proper charge against the State. A question is raised by the provisions of Code Section 6488 (Article 5, Section 1, Paragraph 19 of the Constitution of the State): "The Governor shall have power to appoint his own secretaries, not exceeding two in number, and to provide such other clerical force as may be required in his office; but the total cost for secretaries and clerical force in his office shall not exceed six thousand dollars per annum." Granted that the regular routine work of the Governor's office absolutely requires secretaries and clerical help whose salaries fully exhaust this fixed sum of six thousand dollars per annum, has the Governor the power to employ additional assist~ ance when, in his discretion, such employment is indispe~sable? From a reading of the Constitutional provision above set out it will be seen that the answer to the question turns upon a construction of the world clerical. In other words it seems clear .that all clerical work of the office must be cared for within the 59 limits fixed by the Constitution, to wit: six thousand dollars per annum. The Legislature has a right to pass any law not inhibited by the Constitution. The Constitutionality of every Bill passed by the Legislature is, therefore, to be considered by the Governor before he gives his approval thereto. Is the determination of the Constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature a matter of clerical work? While !t seems to me that the putting of the question serves as a sufficient answer I have interested myself in an examination of definitions of the word ''clerical'' and find the following: "Of or pertaining to a clerk or penmanship, as 'the clerical force.' "-Standard Dictionary. - "Of or pertaining to a clerk, writer or copyist, as 'clerical error.' "_c.Jnternational Encyclopedia. "Of or relating to a clerk or copyist-consisting of clerks, 'the clerical force,' 'clerical work,' etc."-Webster's Dictionary. We further inquired into the definitions of the word "clerk" and find the following : "A person employed in an office for keeping records or accounts. His business is to write or register the transactions of the tribu nal or body to whicf1 he belongs."-Bouvier, 505. Adopted by N. Y. Supreme Court.-73 N. Y. 442. "A person employed to keep accounts or do writing; a hired assistant in an office. "-Standard Dictionary. "In modern times clerk indicates any one who makes and keeps records, public or private, or one employed in some subordinate position in a ~tore, an office, etc. "-International Encyclopedia. "One who is employed in an office, public or private, to keep records or accounts." "One employed to keep records or accounts, to have charge of correspondence or the like, with or without administrative, P.X ecutive or other authority; a scribe, an accountant."-Webster's Dictionary. "One who attends to correspondence, keeps records or does other writings for others, now often a stenographer. "-Standard Dictionary. While the term "clerk" has wider significance, it will be seen that running through all the definitions the prevailing and generally accepted meaning of ''clerical'' is the writing of correspondence and the keeping of records and accounts. As hereinbefore indi~ated the principal object of reading o.f 60 Acts of the Legislature by and for the Governor is to see that the inhibition against the passage of laws contravening the Constitution is respected. Such work is not the work of a clerk; in no sense is it clerical. It is legal work and only a trained, legal mind can do it properly. The interests of the State demand that it be done by one competent to do it and I "am clearly of opinion that a bill for such services is a legal charge upon the State payable out of the contingent funds. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. In a' capital felony case, Governor has the right to offer reward of $500.00. The State vs. Nick Johnson. Request for Offer of Reward. September 30, 1915. Gov. Nat E. Harris, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your request for an opinion as to your authority to offer a reward of $500.00 in the above stated case. I have to say: The law as stated in Section 902, as follows: . "The Governor shall, in his discretion, offer and cause to be paid, rewards for the detection and apprehension of the perpe trator of any felony committed within this State, such reward not to exceed the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars in case of felonies not capital and not to exceed the sum of five hundred dollars in capital felonies." This case being a capital felony it will be perfectly proper and legal for you to offer a reward of $500.00. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Ill reference to this bond and no power to relieve the sureties thereon. It is a municipal bond with which the State has nothing to do. The Sections of the Code referred to relate to State and County officers and their bonds. In fact, Section 300 of the Code, which is a part of Chapter three, provides: "All the provisions of this chapter apply to the oaths of office and the official bonds of all public officers of this State, or those whose office may be established hereafter, unless the contrary is expressly provided." I do not think Chapter 3, entitled Official Bonds and Sureties Thereon, has any reference to municipal bonds. These are matter for the regulation of the municipal authorities. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General The Governor has authority to employ all the employees used in looking after the Capitol Buildings and Grounds and the Mansion and fix their salaries, except the salaries of the Keeper of Public Buildings and Grounds and the operator of the elevator in the Capitol building. Atlanta, Ga., October 6, 1915. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have your communication of the 5th inst. requesting an opinion as to authority under the law to employ porters and other help in the Capitol Building and Mansiqn, and also authority to fix the compensation of porters and other help in the Capitol and 1\fansion. In reply I will say that under Section 146 of the Code the Governor has general supervision over all the property of the State, with power to make all necessary regulations for its protection. Under Section 159 of the Code he has authority to employ persons for the discharge of any duty required by the laws. Under Section 157 of the Code he has authority to employ or appoint a person to keep the Capitol grounds and other property of the State at the seat of government. Such person holds only during the pleasure of the Governor. Under Section 170 of the Code it is the duty of the Governor to appoint the Capitol guard. Under Section 62 167 of the Code, he has authority to appoint a messenger for the executive departme'ut. It will be noted that on page 12 of the Acts of 1913, that the elevator operator is to be ap- pointed by the Keeper of Public Buildings, and his salary is fixed by this Act. Section 8 of the Appropriation Bill of the year 1913, page 24 Acts of 1913, provides ''for ordinary repairs of public buildings; to purchase coal, wood, lights, furniture for the executive mansion, and the various,departments of the State Government; to pay the hire of engineers, guards, watchmen, servants at the Mansion and such porters for the various de- partments as the Governor may employ, and for general ex- penses incident to the keeping in proper condition the public buildings and grounds and to hire such other labor as may be necessary, the sum of $26,800.00; out of this appropriation the sum of $1,800.00 per annum shall be paid to the Keeper of Public Buildings and Grounds.'' This same Section ~urther p_rovides: ''The Governor shall require itemized accounts of all payments out of this fund before drawing warrants therefor." Taking all of the above cited provisions of the law together, I am of the opinion that it is the intention of the law that the Governor shall have supervision and contr.ol over all porters and other help employed in and about the Capitol Building and Mansion, and also supervision and control over the com~ pensation of these employees, except where their compensation is fixed by law, as in the case of the Keeper of Public Buildings and Grounds, and the operator of the elevator. While it is probably true that the Legislature did not contemplate that the Governor would actnally employ all such persons, but that they would be employed by the Keeper of Public Buildings and Grounds, under the supervision and direction of the Governor, I am of the opinion that the Governor has the authority to em- ploy any or all of them, and to fix their compensation, except where otherwise specially provided by law. Of course, the com- pensation so fixed by him would be limited by the Gener~l Ap- propriation Act. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 63 Chapter three of our Code, entitled "Official Bonds and Sureties thereon," has reference to State and county officers, and their bonds, and has no reference to bonds of municipal officers. Atlanta, Ga., November 16, 1915. Hon. Raymonde Stapleton, Secretary, State Capitol. DEAR SIR: I have your communication of this date containing a request from the Governor for an opinion on the question of the authority of the Governor to relieve the sureties on the bond of the sexton of Rome, Ga. The application is made under Sections 301 and 302 of the Code of this State, and it appears that the bond is a municipal bond given by the sexton of thP City of Rome to the proper authorities of the City .of Rome f9r the faithful performance of his duties as such sexton. In reply, . I will say that_in my opinion the Governor has no authority with reference to this bond and no power to relieve the sureties thereon. It is a municipal bond with which the State has nothing to do. The Sections of the Code referred to relate to State and County officers and their bonds. In fact, Section 300 of the Code, which is a part of Chapter three, provides: "All the provisions of this chapter apply to the oaths of office and the official bonds of all public officers of this State, or those whose office may be established hereafter, unless the contrary is expressly provided." .I do not think Chapter 3, entitled Official Bonds and Sureties Thereon, has any reference to municipal bonds. These are matter for the regulation of the municipal authorities. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Foreign Consuls, Vice-Consuls, and their secretaries are subject to the license tax and other requirements of the law regulating the operation of motor vehicles. Atlanta, Ga., January 4, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harr~s, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request for an opinion as to whether or not under the provisions of Article 111 of the Consular Con- 64 vention concluded on December 11th, 1871, between the United States and the German Empire, the Secretary of the German Imperial Consul stationed in Atlanta, Ga., is subject to the license tax and other requirements of the Act of the General Assembly approved November 30th, 1915, providing for the regulation of motor vehicles in this State. Said Article 111 reads as follows: Art. Ill. The representative, Consuls general, Consuls, ViceConsuls, Consular-Agents, as well as their chancellors and secretaries, shall enjoy in the .two countries all privileges, exemptions and immunities which have been granted or may in the future be granted, to the agents of the same rank of the most favored nation. Consular officers not being citizens of the country where they are accredited, shall enjoy in the country of their residence, personal immunity from arrest or imprisonment except in the cases of crime, exemption from military billetings and contributions, from military service of every sort, and other public duties, and from all direct or personal or sumptuary taxes, duties and contributions, whether Federal, State or municipal. If, however, the said consular officer,; are, or become, owners of property in the country in which they reside, or engage in commerce, they shall be subject to the same taxes and imposts, and to the same jurisdiction as citizens of the country, property holders, or merchants. But under no circumstances shall their personal income be subject to any tax. Consular officers who engage in commerce shall not plead their consular privileges to avoid their commercial liabilities. Consular officers of either character shall not in any event be interfered with in the exercise of their official functions further than is indispensable for the administration of the laws of the country. In reply to your inquiry, I will s~y that in my opinion the said Secretary is liable to all the requirements of the motorvehicle law, including the license fee provided for therein, for the following reasons : The motor-vehicle law is merely a police regulation. Its purpose is the regulation of the operation of such vehicles in this State. The caption of the law is as follows: An Act providing for the annual registration and identification of motor-vehicles and motorcycles; regulating their use upon the public streets and highways of this State; requiring chauffeurs to obtain a license to operate such vehicles; to provide for the distribution of the fees collected hereunder among the counties of this State; to make the Secretary of State Commissioner of motorvehicles; to provide expenses for operation and enforcement of 65 law; to prescribe penalties for the violation of the provisions of this Act; -to provide for the employment of a clerk and inspector of motor-vehicles; and repealing all laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act, and for other purposes. The purpose of this law is not to provide revenue, but to regulate the operation of these vehicles. The act makes the violation of any of its provisions a misdemeanor. See Section 23 of the Act. Its purpose is to protect the citizens, streets and highways of this State from the dangers incident to the operation of such instrumentalities. The license fee is merely incidental and a part of the general scheme of police regulation. Certainly the Consuls, Vice-Consuls and their Secretaries are subject to the criminal laws and police regulations of the State. Under the provisions of the convention they are subject to ar.rest for violations of the criminal laws. If it costs the Secretary some small amount to secure a tag and number for his car, this license fee is not a tax and stands upon the same footing as the cost of other accessories for his car required under the law, as for instance, certain kinds of lights, mufflers, horns, etc. He is required under the law to provide these things as a condition precedent to the right to .operate his car, and a failure to do so is a violation of the criminal laws of this State. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD A.LKER, Attorney-General. The Governor is empowered to grant _reprieves and pardons as a matter of grace, subject to no limitation except as to the manner of applying therefor, except in cases of treason and lm peachment. January 29, 1916. Hon. Raymonde Stapleton, Exec1~tive Secretary, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your favor of even date and asking my opinion in the matter of application for pardon. I note you advise that the Prison Commission has recommended that the applicant's sentence be commuted to present service and upon conditions named by the Commission. In response thereto I beg to say that it is my opinion that the Constitution of Georgia empowers the Governor to grant 66 reprieves and pardons as a matter of grace, subject to no limitation except as to the manner of applying therefor, and except in cases of treason and impeachment. Since the Governor may grant an absolute pardon it follows by the terms of the Constitution (Article 5, Section 1, Paragraph 12) that he may "commute penalties," "remit any part . of a sentence," or grant a conditional pardon upon such terms as may appear to be to the best interest of the State and of society. The Courts have gone so far as to hold that although the Governor cannot banish a citizen from his State against his will, the Governor may grant a pardon on condition that the convict voluntarily leave the State and remain outside the State. Under the law of Georgia, the Legislature, under the authority of the clause ''subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying for pardons," has providedthat the applications should be filed through the Prison Commission upon such reasonable terms as may be prescribed by that Commission. This law is constitutional and valid and the application for pardon must be presented through the Prison Board to be acted upon by that body in its capacity as advisory to the Governor. While it is inconceivable that such conditions should arise, if the Prison Board s!wuld see fit not to act upon an application or delay the hearing upon the same for an unre11sonable time, the Governor could take the application in hand and act thereon because the constitutional provision granting to the Legislature the authority to prescribe rules relative to the manner of applying for pardons cannot be employed to deprive the Governor of the superior power of granting pardons. While it is the right if not the duty of the Prison Commission to make any recommendations as to pardons, reprieves, commutations or conditional pardons, and while the Commission is well within its authority in suggesting the conditions upon which the commutation in the case now before the Governor should be granted, the Governor is not strictly bound thereby. He may grant an absolute pardon; he may grant the pardon upon the terms suggested by the Prison Commission; he may alter or change the terms; or add conditions thereto. As stated before, the basis of pardons coming down from the time of our English forefathers is the grace of the Governor 67 who takes the place of the Crown in the old English laws, and that power cannot legally be abridged with the one exception hereinbefore referred to. I trust the foregoing fully an~nvers your inquiry. I have not taken the time to cite authorities because of the extremely exacting stress of public business before this office, but must be con- tent to say that in my opinion the principles herein announced are supported by legal authority. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General.- If a prisoner is serving a sentence for a term less than life for either of the offenses of treason, arson, rape, or assault with intent to rape the Governor of the State may grant him a parole or conditional pardon if the other requirements of the law have been complied with by him. Atlanta, Ga., February 11, 1916. Hon. Raymonde Stapleton, Executive Secretary, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your communication of the lOth inst. containing a request from the Governor for an opinion on the following question: Can a parole or conditional pardon be granted under Section 1224, Article 2, of the Code of t_his State to a person serving a sentence for treason, arson, rape, or assault with intent to rape, although the sentence be one for less than life? In reply I will say that according to the express terms of the section referred to, no parole or conditional pardon can be g~anted to a person serving a life sentence for any of the offenses mentioned above. If the prisoner is serving a sentence less than a life sentence for any of the said offenses there is no inhibition in the statute against allowing him a parole or conditional pardon if the other requirements of the law have been comJ.>lied with by him. The statute says ''no parole shall be granted to any one serving a life sentence" for certain offenses. It does not say that no parole shall be granted' to one serving a sentence less than a life sentence for these offenses. The sentence above quoted as well as the sentence immediately following that in Section 1224 of the Code is dealing only with "life sentences," and the letter thereof provides that persons serving life sentences 68 for crimes other than treason, arson, rape, or assault with intent to rape, may be granted paroles when they have served at least ten years under said life sentence. These two provisions ol the Code mean, in my opinion, that persons serving life sentences may be granted paroles when they have served at least ten years under the sentence, except that no person who is serving a life sentence for treason, arson, rape, or attempt to rape shall receive a parole at all. The mere fact that as the law now stands there is no "life senten.ce" for the crimes of rape or attempt to commit rape would not change this construction of the law where the law itself is not ambiguous. The most that can be said of that is that it is merely an oversight of the Legislature. There may be "life sentences" imposed by the courts for the crimes of treason and arson. In. fact the degree of punishment to be inflicted for the crime of rape is left very largely to the discretion of the jury trying the case and to the court. See Sections 94 and 98 of the Penal Code. Under certain circumstances a person convicted of this crime may be punished by imprisonment for 'not more than a year. Where such broad discretion is given to the judge and jury in such cases, it is hardly to be supposed that persons convicted of this crime were intended by the Legislature to be entirely excluded from all executive clemency and especially where they have not so provided in clear and unmistakable terms. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General.- The State is not liable for the expenses of judges of the Superior Court where, for any reason, one such judge exchanges services with another. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, February 18, 1916. State Capi(ol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your request for opmwn in reference to the payment of expenses of judges of the Superior Court who relieves other judges. Replying thereto I beg to ad- vise that the law covering such cases is found in Sections 4842 and 4844. The language of 4842 is as follows: "Whenever it shall be made satisfactorily to appear to the 69 Governor that any regular term of the Superior Court, as fixed ' by law in any county of this State, will not be holden or con- tinued in session because of the bodily or mental sickness or other disability of the Judge . . . then and in that event it shall be the duty of the Governor to name and assign a Judge, etc." Section 4844 reads as follows: "The actual expenses of the Judge thus holding the court outside of his circuit by direction of the Governor, including costs of transportation and hotel bills, shall be by the Governor paid to such Judge out of the contingent fund." Interpreting the words italicized, to wit, "bodily, or mental sickness or other disability," I am of the opmion that only providential causes were intended to be recognized. Illness (physical or mental) of the Judge or members of his family or death in the family compelling him to remain af home, should be recognized. It is true that the words "other disabilities" are somewhat general, and I would not undertake to limit the instances which might possibly arise, but I am quite clear that the Section was not intended to cover instances where for any reason one judge exchanges services with another judge. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. It is the Governor's duty to supervise the bond& given by Tax-Col, lectors, pursuant to Sections 1207 and 1208 of the Civil Code, and to require additional security whenever he deems it necessary, and also to pass upon all applications for relief from such bonds. March 2, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your f~vor of even date asking my opinion as to whether Sections 301 and 302 of the Civil Code of 1910 apply to bonds given by Tax-Collectors pursuant to Sections 1207 and 1208 of the Code. In response thereto I beg to say: Section 1208 provides as follows : "Such bond for county taxes when given must be approved by the Ordinary, filed in his, office,-and in all respects is an official bond." 70 Section 30l contains the foiiowing provision: . "When the surety to any bond, given by any officer for the performance of any public duiy''-he shall proceed for relief in the manner prescribed. I am aware of the apparent conflict in reason; it would seem that the Ordinary should act in such cases; moreover, the Executive Office is overwhelmed with work necessary to the carrying on of the business of the State. However, the language of the Section 301 is plain. I have been unable to find any provision of the law authorizing the Ordinary or any authority other than the Governor to grant such relief. I am 'strongly of the opinion that the law should be amended, but finding it as it is written it is my opinion that the Governor should act upon such applications. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The prohibition law passed by the Extraordinary Session in 1915 makes no provision for the disposal of the stock of near beer or other prohibited liquors on hand immediately after the passage of the law. April 3, 1916. Hon. Nat E. Harris, Governor, State OapitoE. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of March 31st, enclosing a letter from Hon. John A. Cobb, Ordinary of Sumter County, Georgia, in which the Ordinary has requested my opinion on the rollowing questions: Immediately after May 1, 1916, will the near beer dealers in this State be allowed to ship out of the State any near beer they may have on hand on that date? In reply will say that there is no law of this State which prohibits these near beer dealers from shipping near beer out of the State. However, the further question arises whether or not near beer dealers who have in their possession near beer on May 1, 1916, above the quantity allo~ed by the law will be guilty of a violation of the law. In answer to this question I will say 71 that Section seven of the Act number three approved November 17, 1915 (Acts Special Session, page 82), and Section sixteen of Act number four approved November 18, 1915, (Acts Special Session, page. 100) prohibits absolutely any person having in his possession more than one gallon of vinous liquor, six gallons of beer or one-half gallon of whiskey at any one time or during a period of thirty days. This amount can only be kept in places used exclusively for residential purposes. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if these near beer dealers have in their possession after twelve o'clock p. m. April 30, 1916, near beer in amounts greater than that indicated above they would be guilty of a violation of the laws above referred to. These laws make no provision for the disposal of the stock of near beer or other prohibited liquors Qn hand after twelve o'clock, April 30, 1916. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. No convict can be restored to the rights of citizenship, including the right to vote and hold office, except by full and complete pardon granted by the Chief Executive of the State. April 4, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Go.vernor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request of recent date for an opinion on the following matter, to-wit: Heretofore in certain cases -the Governor has issued orders in regard to certain convicts serving sentences in the penitentiary in this State, providing, among other things that the term of service of the named convict "is hereby commuted to present service and it is further ordered that he be discharged from custody." The question is whether or not under such an order the person receiving the same has had his rights of citizenship restored to him, including the right to vote, or whether it is necessary in order to entitle him to vote that a formal pardon be granted to him. In reply I will say that in my opinion where it is ordered by the Governor that a sentence be commuted to present service and that the person is discharged from custody, such order 72 is nothing more than a ''commutation of sentence.'' A ''commutation of sentence" is defined to be "the change of a punishment to which a person has been condemned to a less severe one." See Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, Volume 29, page 1561, citing many authorities. The Governor of this State under the Constitution- has the authority to ''commute penalties, and to remit any part of the sentence for offences against the State." See Article 5, Section 1, Paragraph 12 of the Constitution. Article 2, Section 2, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of this State provides, among other things, that the following classes of persons shall not be permitted to register, vote, or hold any office or appointment; (1) Those who have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, punishable by the laws of this State with imprisonment in the penitentiary, unless such persons shall have been pardoned; (2) Idiots and insane persons._ It therefore appears that persons convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary cannot vote or hold office unless they have been pardoned of this offence. In the case of United States vs. Athens Armory, 35 Ga. 362, the Supreme Court of Georgia says: "A pardon is an act of mercy, flowing from the fountain of bounty and grace; its effect, when it is a full pardon, is to obliterate every stain which the law attached to the offender, to place him where he stood before he committed the pardoned offence, and to free him from the penalties and forfeitures to which the law had subjected his person and property; to acquit him, says Sir William Blackstone, of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to the offence for which he obtained his pardon."- See also in this connection the case of Diminick vs. Bowden, 44 Ga. 357. The same doctrine is laid down in the case of Cook vs. Freeholders, 26 N. J. (Law) 326. See also Edwards vs. Common~ wealth, 78 Va. 39. It appears therefore from these authorities that an act of the Governor which only remits a part of the penalty imposed upon one who has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude is sufficient for that purpose only, but that such an order does not free such a person from ''the stain which the 73 law attaches to the offender." The offender may be relieved by such an act of the Governor by suffering the penalty imposed upon him by the court, but still, in the eyes of the law, he is attainted, and carries with him the stain of having offended against the law in a serious matter. While this stain remains upon him, and until his offence against the law is blotted out he is not permitted to enjoy the privileges of citizenship. Only a full and free pardon at the hands of the Chief Executive can blot out this stain and restore him to the rights of citizenship. In the case of Miller vs. the State, 149 Ind. 607, it is said: "Pardon is remission of guilt, amnesty, oblivion, or forgetfulness. The ~ct of a board of managers, under the authority given them by the statutes, in shortening the term prescribed by a sentence, and leaving the conviction of guilt unaffected, is not a pardon." It is my opinion, therefore, that in the cases of the persons above mentioned, none of them can be restored to the rights 9f citizenship, including the right to vote and hold office, except by full and complete pardon granted by the Chief Executive of the State. A mere commutation of sentence or a remission of part of a sentence, or anything less than a formal pardon is insufficient for this purpose. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Under the terms of the contracts and stipulations in the matter of State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. et al., executed September 15th, 1913, it is p_roper for the Governor to make appointments of Arbitrators and Inspectors for the ensuing year. May 2, 1916 Hon. Nat_, E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your favor in which you ask my opinion as to the term of office of Arbitrators and Inspectors provided under the term of contracts and stipulations in the matter of State of Georgia vs. Tennessee Copper Company et al, executed in September 15, 1913. Replying thereto, I beg to say that this agreement was negotiated through Governor John 1\f. Slaton. The minutes of the Executive Department show that on October 74 I I ! 8th the Governor made the appointments provided for under said contract in the following language, to wit: J. J. Brown is designated Inspector. "The life of this appoint ment being subject to the pleasure of the Governor who reserves the right to make a change when thought advisable." . E. S. Griffith is designated .Arbitrator "until further ordered." J. J. Brown is designated Referee, "said designation being only the remainder of the present year." The minutes further show. that J. J. Brown was thereafter appointed Referee for the term of one year for and during the succeeding year. The last order bearing date May 26, 1915, reads as follows: "That by virtue of contract entered into between the State of Georgia and the Tennessee Copper Company under authority of resolution of the General .Assembly approved .August 6, 1913, the appointment of E. S. Griffith, of Buchanan, Ga., as Arbitrator for the State, that of J. J. Brown as Inspector, and that of J. J. Brown as Umpire in the matter of arbitrations be and the same are hereby -continued for the year 1915, the appointments to date from .April 1, 1915, each of the appointees having performed the duties of their respective positions since that time; these appoint ments being under the same terms and conditions as to compensa tions as for 1914." It appears therefore that the Governor who entered into thE stipulation was of the opinion that the appointments were not made during the life of the contract but by the year. It further appears that the appointees have themselves requested their re-appointment and that they have considered the matter in the same light. I find nothing in the contract to the contrary and am therefore of the opinion that it is proper for you to make the appointments at present for the ensuing year. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. It is the duty of the Governor to keep the Capitol Building Insured for one-half of its value. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. May 31, 1916. DEAR Sm: I have before me your request for an opinion 75 wherein you state that it has been brought to your attention that the State does ~ot carry fire insurance upon the Capi- tol Building, and you raise the question as to your duty in the premises under the law. ' Section 147 of the Code reads as follows: "The Governor shall keep insured, at one-half their value, all of the public buildings of the State and Library, except the State Arsenals at Milledgeville and Savannah, the Penitentiary at Milledgeville, and the building of the Western & Atlantic Railroad." It is perfectly clear that the legislative intent is here expressed that the State Capitol Building should be insured at one-half its value. It appearing, however, that former administrations have not kept the Capitol insured the wording of the appropriation providing funds to cover insurance is brought into question, and properly so. This paragraph reads as follows: "For insurance on public buildings, the sum of $75,000.00 (seventy-five thousand dollars) or so much thereof as may be necessary, to be paid out when the present insurance expires." The question is whether or not the duty of the Governor is affected by the last clause of the paragraph of the appropriation: "to be paid out when the present insurance expires." On reflection I am satisfied that the Legislature did not intend to limit the buildings to be insured or the amounts thereon, but intended that the money so appropriated should be available in ..case of each policy now in existence as and when the said policy expired. The direction to the Governor to insure the public buildings is plain and positive, and I feel sure that the Legislature had no intention to restrict him in complying with that direction by its appropriation Act referred to. I therefore ha~e to advise that.the Governor has ample authority, if indeed it is not mandatory upon him, to insure the Capitol Building at one-half its value. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD A.LKER, Attorney-General. 76 Where a reward is offered by the Governor for the apprehension and delivery of a fugitive criminal to the sheriff of the county where the crime was committed with evidence to convict after such fugitive had already been arrested, bt,~t, upon his trial, he was convicted upon the evidence furnished by the person who had so arrested him, who is seeking the reward, such applicant would be entitled to one-half of the reward so offered. July 28, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have your request of recent date f9r an opinion on the matter of the application of l\1r. C. J. wheeler, for a reward of $250.00 for the apprehension and delivery to the Sheriff of Berrien County of the unknown party claimed to have been guilty of setting fire to and burning the gin house of A. E. Rampey. It appears that on the 20th day of 1\Iarch, 1915, the Governor of this State offered a reward for the ''apprehension and delivery of the said unknown parties to the Sheriff of Berrien County with evidence sufficient to convict.'' The reward was $250.00. It further appears from the record in this case, that A. E. Rampey and Virge Curry were arrested on the 18th day of l\Iarch, 1915, by the Sheriff of Berrien County. It further appears by the affidavits attached to the application that 1\'Ir. Wheeler furnished the information upon which the arrest of these parties was made. It further appears that both of these parties were convicted of arson in the burning of the said gin house and sentenced to terms in the penitentiary which they are now serving. It appears that no motion for a new trial is now pending. It further appears from the affidavits attached to the application for the reward that 1\:Ir. Wheeler furnished the evidence upon which both of these parties were convicted and that without the information and evidence furni~hed by him it would have been impossible to secure a conviction. The only difficulty about the case arises from the fact that the said parties were arrested on the 18th day of March, 1915, whereas, the reward was not offered until the 20th day of March, 1915. However, it appears that Mr. Wheeler furnished the information upon which the arrests were made and later furnished the evidence which resulted in a conviction of both parties. Under the law of this State as found in Section 902 of the Penal Code of 1910, and under the terms of the offer of a reward as published in this case, 'fT two things are required to be done to entitle a person to receive the reward: First, the apprehension of the incendiary, and second, the furnishing or proof sufficient to convict. According to the rulings of various courts on this subject it is generally necessary that these conditions must be met and these acts performed after the publication of the reward. In this case, one of these things, to-wit, the apprehension of the incendiary was made before the publication of the reward, but the other, to wit, the furnishing of evidence sufficient to convict was performed after the publication of the reward and evidently with a view of claiming the reward. Some of the courts have held that a reward in such cases can not be apportioned, but I am inclined to think the sounder rule in a case like the one under consideration would be to apportion the reward and pay to the applicant onehalf of the amount offered. In this case I am of the opinion that in justice and equity the reward should be apportioned and at least half thereof paid to the applicant. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. An Act of the General Assembly authorizing a county to issue bonds for the purpose of erecting a school building is not in conflict with the general law on the manner of issuing such bonds, and is therefore not unconstitutional. Atlanta, Ga., July 29, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR : In reply to your request for an opinion as to the validity of the Act -of the General Assembly authorizing the County of Richmond to issue bonds for the purpose of erecting a school building, I beg to say: Under the decision of the Supreme Court of this State in the case of Smith et al. vs. Bohler et al., 72 Ga. 546, the Board of Education has the authority to levy a tax for the purpose indicated. If this were not true, under Section 6562, Paragraph 2, of the Code (Constitution) the county authorities have the power to levy a tax for such purpose. Under Sections 6563 and 78 6564 of the Code (Constitution) counties have the authority to incur bonded debts rrovided the total amount of indebtedness does not exceed '' sev~n per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein.'' This means, of course, that the bonds could be issued for any purpose for which taxes could be levied. Sections 440 et seq. of the Code of 1910 provide the way and manner in which such bonds may be issued; for the election to be held to determine whether or not the.bonds are to be issued, etc. These sections refer to any county, municipality or division of the State. The only question, as I see it, that can arise in the case is whether or not the Act in question is' a special law in conflict with the provisions of a general law on the same subject. Sec- tions 440 et seq. constitute a general law. The Act in question is, of course, a special law. In the case of Farmer vs. 1\Iayor, etc. of Thomson, 133 Ga., page 94, the Supreme Court says that the Legislature can make a special law on this very subject in relation to municipal cor- porations for the reason that they are creations of the law and may be changed at will by the lawmaking power. The ob- jection mentioned, therefore, could not apply to a municipal cor- poration. However, in the cases of the County of Dougherty et al. vs. Boyt et al., 71 Ga., page 484, and Elliott vs. Gammon et al., Commissioners, 76 Ga., page 766, the Supreme Court holds that the issuance of bonds by a county must be made as provided by the general law as set forth in the sections of the Code above mentioned. A reading of the bill under consideration will disclose that it is substantially in conformity with the general law as to the election and the issuance of the bonds with one exception which will be discussed later. This would not render the Act void or the issue of bonds illegal. See the case of Farmer vs. Thomson, aLove cited, where it is said: "It is a special law which con- flicts with a general existing law which is obnoxious, not one in harmony with the general law and prescribing certain additional matters in regard to a municipal election not in conflict with the grneral law." . As to the portion of the Act not exactly in harmony with the 79 general law. Section 6564 of the Code (Constitution) provides that at or before the issuance of the bonds provision must be made for the levy of a tax sufficient to pay them. This would ordinarily be done by the Commissioners where there are commissioners, for they are the county authorities exercising the power of levying taxes. Section 442 of the Code, a general law, p~ovides that when the Constitutional provisions have been met, the authority to issue bonds is given to the proper officers of said county. This would ordinarily be the commissioners where ther'3 are commiSSIOners. The Act under consideration provides that the Board of Education is to issue the bonds and to provide for the payment of the principal and interest on the same as it may mature by the levy of a tax in the same manner as other taxes for the support of the schools are levied. Under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smith vs. Bohler, above cited, the Board of Education of the County_ of Richmond has the power to levy taxes for the support of the schools of that county. Under the Act of 1872 such board is tl1e county authority- for the purpose of levying taxes for the schools. This Act was passed under the Constitution of 1868 and being constitution~! when p;{ssed, it is now GOnstitutional. For the reasons above stated, I think there is very little doubt that the Act under consideration is constitutional. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 1. The election of a Justice of the Peace and Constables for a newly created militia district, as called for in Section 380 of the Civil Code, shall be held- immediately after the things required under Section 379 thereof, requiring the transmission of certified proceedings from the Ordinary's minutes and publication, have been complied with. 2. An election precinct can be established in any such newly created militia district at any regular term of the Court of Ordinary after the report of the Commissioners appointed by the Ordinary to pay out such district. July 31, 1916. Hon. Nat E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date inclosing a 80 communication from Hon. A. F. Byrd, Ordinary of Appling. County. Mr. Byrd states that an application for laying out a new militia district ~n said county has been filed with him and that he has appointed the Commissioners to lay out the district, that the said Commissioners have filed their report; that the same has been approved by him and the proceedings trans- . mitted to the Governor, and that the same are now being published as required by law in the public gazette of the county. He wishes a construction of Section 380 of the Code relative to the time when an election must be called in the new district for the purposes of electing a Justice of the Peace and Constables for the said district. In reply to this question I will say that Section 380 provides that this election must be called "immediately," as soon as such is done. The words in said Section, ''as soon as such is done,'' in my judgment refer to all the things required to be done under Section 379 of the Code; that is to say, that after the proceedings have been transmitted to the Governor and after they have been published for thirty days at the door of the court house and in the public gazette, then the election is to be called immediately. I think the thirty day publication must be completed before the election is ordered. Judge Byrd wishes to know further whether or not after the completion of the advertisement or publication for thirty days,. he can defer calling the election. In reply to this question I will say that the Statute says that the election must be called "immediately" after the requirements of Section 379 have been complied with. For this reason I do not think the ordering of the election could be deferred. Judge Byrd further desires to know whether or not the political party in power has the right to order the primary on September 12th of this year held where they may see fit, or in uther words, if the Ordinary can not get the new district fully established in time, said party can order the election held in the new district after the publication which will be complete in thirty days. In reply I will say that the rule and regulations of the State Democratic Executive Committee adopted May 3rd, 1916, require that said primary election shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of this State. The primary election therefore_will have to be held at the precinct established by law 81 . at the time of holding the primary. Under Section 79 of the Code election precincts are established by the Ordinaries at a regular term of their court, description of which must be entered on the minutes at the time. Under Section 378 of. the Code, as soon as the Ordinary approves the report of the Commissioners, and records the- proceedings on his minutes, the new district "shall be known and regarded accordingly." In my opinion under the provisions of this last mentioned Section, and under said Section 79 the Ordinary is authorized to establish an election precinct for the new district at the next regular term of his court. I do not think the establishment of the election precinct is regulated in any way by the requirements for the publication for thirty days of the proceedings to establish the new district. It seems to be the intention of the law that the new district legally exists from the date the report of the Commissioners is approved by the Ordinary. The purpose of the publication of the proceedings is to inform the people that the new district has been created, and its boundaries defined. I think that the election precinct may be established at any regular term of the Court of Ordinary after the approval of such report. Very truly yours, .. CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A Resolution of the General Assembly providing for the exemption of a citizen from taxation is unconstitutional. August, 18, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have before me your favor of recent date transmitting House Resolution Number 102, being a Resolution for the relief of T. A. Baldwin and the Catoossa Springs Company with your request for an opinion as to its constitutionality. In response thereto I beg to say that Article 7, Section 2, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution of the State of Georgia reads as follows: "All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property herein enumerated, shall be void." Article 7, Section 16, Paragraph 1, reads as follows: "The General Assembly shall not, by vote, resolution or order, grant any donation or gratuity in favor of any person, corporation, or association." Resolution Number 102 provides for the relief of two taxpayers in exempting them from certain taxes. I am of the opinion therefore that the Resolution is unconstitutional and should be vetoed. However appealing to the individuals at interest it may be, it would be a dangerous precedent, leading to untold complications, if such a resolution were placed upon the statute books of this State. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. , __ Where a defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and carried his case to the Court of Appeals for review, and the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for decision on certain constitutional questions involved therein, the Solicitor-General of the circuit is entitled to a fee for his appearance and services rendered in the Court of Appeals, but he is not entitled to another fee in the same case for his appearance in the Supreme Court. August 18, 1916. Hon. Nat. E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have your request of today for an op1ruon on the following matter: A defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and carried his case to the Court of Appeals for review. The Court _of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court for decision on certain constitutional questions involved therein. The Solicitor-General of the circuit has received the fee provided by law for his appearance and services rendered in the Court of Appeals. He now requests another fee in this case for his services rendered in the Supreme Court. You wish my opinion as to whether or not the Solicitor-General is entitled to both fees in the case, one for the Court of Appeals and the other 83 for the Supreme Court. In reply I will say that in my opinion the fee for the services in the Court of Appeals was properly and legally paid. However, I do not think that under the law the Solicitor-General is entitled to another fee in the same case for his appearance in the Supreme Court. Section 1126 of the Criminal Code provides, in part, as follows: ''For services in the Supreme Court his fees are: In capital cases $50.00, other felonies $30.00." This Section was enacted prior to the time at which the Court of Appeals was created, and the fees formerly payable for services in the Supreme Court are now payable for services rendered in the Court of Appeals in cases which, according to law, now go to the Court of Appeals. The Solicitor has already received the only fee allowed by, law under this Section. The provision contained in the same Section to wit, "For services in cases not mentioned, where the State is an interested party, at the discretion of the Governor, not exceeding $50.00, '' in my opinion is not applicable. This Section refers to the fees of the Solicitor-General rendered in the Superior Courts in cases not mentioned in said Section. The first part of Section 1126 provides for fees to be paid to the Solicitor-General for his services in the lower courts, and the latter part of the Section beginning ''for services in the Supreme Court, etc.'' refer to the fees to be paid to- the Solicitor-General for services rendered in the Appellate Courts. ~ours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 84 Where, as provided in Sections 472 et seq. of the Civil Code, the Gov. ernor, upon the recommendation of the Grand Jury, appointed a Surveyor to mark out and define the county lines between certain counties, such a Surveyor is subject to be removed by the Governor, but only after there has been a charge formu- lated against such Surveyor, and notice to him of the. accusation, and a hearing of the evidence in support of the charge, and an opportunity given him of making a defense. In such a proceeding the Governor has the right to act upon the ap- plication of the grand jury, or the county authorities, or a citi- zen and taxpayer of either of the counties interested. " August 23, 1916. Hon. Nat: E. Harris, Governor, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of August 23, 1916, in which you request an opinion on the following matter: Under Sections 472 et seq. of the Civil Code the Governor, upon the recommendation of the Grand Jury, appointed a Surveyor to mark out and define the county lines between Pulaski and Bleckley counties, and Pulaski and Houston counties. A portion of this survey has been made. It is now claimed by some of the parties at interest that the said Surveyor is conducting the survey in such a manner, by delaying the work, or making it extend over too long a period or otherwise, so as to become unsatisfactory to the county authorities. You wish to know whether or not the Governor has the authority to revoke the appointment of the .Surveyor and to remove him from office, and if so, upon whose recommendation would he have to act. In reply I will say that Section 155 of the Code declares as follows: ''All appointments to discharge a public duty, by the General Assembly, or by the Governor under its authority, are declared to be offices within the meaning of the Constitution.'' It will be noted that the provisions of the Code relating to the appointment of a Surveyor in cases of disputed county lines do not provide for the removal of such Surveyor, nor do they provide any certain or fixed length of time within which the Surveyor is to hold his office or perform the work. It seems now to be the universally accepted rule that, where the tenure of the office is not prescribed by law, the power' to remove is an incident to the power to appoint. In such a case no formalities such as the preferring of charges against, or the 85 granting of a hearing to, the incumbent, are necessary to the Iawful exercise of the discretionary power of removal. See, Wright vs. Ganble, 136 Ga. 376. 29 Cyc. 371, 1408. 23 A. & E. Enc. Law, 405, Mechem, Pub. Off. 445. Throop, Pub. Off. 304 et seq. Coleman vs. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458. Gray vs. McLendon, 134 Ga. 224. Where, therefore the tenure of the office is not fixed by law, and no other provision is made for removals, either by the Constitution or by Statute, it is said to "be a sound and necessary rule to consider the power of removal as incident to the power of appointment.'' But this power of arbitrary removal is to be limited to those circumstances, and if the tenure is fixed by law, or if the officer is appointed to hold during the pleasure of some other officer or board than that appointing him, the appointing power can not arbitrarily remove him. See Mechem's Public Officers, 445. While it is true that one who holds an office during the pleasure of the appointing power is removable without notice and without a hearing, this rule is not applicable when the office is held during good behavior or for a fixed term. Where an officer holds his office for a certain number of years, if he shall so long behave himself well, he can not be removed, even for misbehavior, without notice and a hearing. So where he is appointed for a fixed term, and removable only for cause, he can be removed only upon charges, notice, and an opportunity to be heard: See Coleman vs. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458. Throop on Pub. Off., Section 364. - It will be noted from the above authorities that if a public officer is appointed for a fixed term or if the tenure of his office is certain and fixed, he can not be removed arbitrarily without notice and an opportunity to be heard. The duty of a Surveyor appointed under Section 472 of the Code, and the purpose for which he is appointed, is to survey, mark out, and define the boundary line in dispute, and return such survey with plat to the Secretary of State's office to be recorded in a book to be 86 kept for that purpose. While it is true that no definite and fixed time is prescribed within which the Surveyor is to finish the work for which he is appointed, yet the tenure of his office is fixed in that he is to continue until one specific job or piece of work is finished. This, in my judgment, makes his tenure of office definite and fixed. In my judgment, therefore, such a Surveyor is subject to be removed by the Governor, but only after there has been a charge formulated against him, and notice to him of the accusation, and a hearing of the evidence in support of the charge, and an opportunity given to the party of making a defense. In reply to your question as to who w~uld be authorized to seek the removal of such a surveyor, I will say that, in my judgment, the Governor has the right to act upon the application of the grand jury, or the county authorities, or a citizen and taxpayer, of either of the counties interested. I am inclined to think that the Governor would be authorized to act on his own motion, if the proper notice and hearing were given. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Provisions of the Act, as to when the appropriation for the use .of the Resaca Confederate Cemetery Is available. t.iovernor Nat. E. Harris, October 14, 1916. -State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your favor of recent date, trans- mitting letter from Hon. A. L. Henson, Secretary of the Board of Trustees of the Resaca Confederate Cemetery, in which he inquires if the appropriation carried by the Act of the General Assembly approved August 19, 1916, for the use of the Resaca Confederate Cemetery is now available. In response thereto, I beg to say that the Act referred to contains the following proviso: "Provided no funds appropriated under this Bill shall be available until all appropriations made by the Legislature last November for maintenance purposes for 1916 and 1917, and 87 especially the public schools and pensions appropriations for those years, have been paid." It follows, therefore, that the fund will be available only after the appropriations referred to have been paid. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Where a bank has been appointed as a State Depository but does not - qualify as such for a length of time, the Governor may, in his discretion, treat the failure to qualify as resulting in a vacancy and proceed to fill the same either for the unexpired term or for a new term of four years, or he may now accept the bond of such bank and allow the bank to qualify for the unexpired term. October 16, 1916. Hon. Raymonde Stapleton, Executive Secretary, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have before me your favor of 13th instant in which you say: "Governor Harris directs me to enclose you attached proceedings in reference to the Peoples Bank of Gordon. This Bank was appointed on January 22, 1915, as a State Depository for a term of four years, but they did not qualify. In June, 1916, the Board of Directors passed resolutions accepting the appointment. "The Bank then filed a bond and have asked the Governor to approve the same and to order the Tax-Collector to depo~it with said bank. Governor Harris desires to know if this order did not lapse during the time, and if he woulubmitted has not been determined by our courts, I am of the opinion that the Commission would have authority to grant a parole at the expiration of the minimum term of sentence fixed by law for the offense for which the longest of the concurrent sentences was imposed. However, the Commission has express authority to promulgate regulations to cover such cases and in its discretion it can consider the plurality of sentences and act accordingly. In other words, the fact that the court had seen fit to impose more than one sentence, especially as in this case the extreme penalty in each case had been imposed, should be weighed by the Commission in passing upon the matter on its merit. I trust the above gives you the information you desire. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 183 OPINIONS TO THE BOARD OF HEALTH The State Board of Health has no power to purchase diphtheria antitoxin under Sec. 7, p. 62, Acts of 1915 (Extraordinary Session), making appropriations for the manufacture and distribution of such antitoxin. Dr. H. F. Harris, Secretary, State Capitol, Atlanta. July 27, 1916. DEAR Srn: I have received your favor of even date in which you ask: "Can the language used in Section 7, page 62, of the Acts of the Legislature of 1915, where the expression occurs 'for the manufacture and distribution of diphtheria antitoxin' be construed as the purchase from manufacturing concerns of antitoxin and its subsequent distribution?" I note you say further : "When first appropriated in 1908, money for this purpose was asked for the reason that manufacturers charged exorbitant prices, and I went to the Legislature and told them I could manu facture much cheaper and thus save the people much money. Though there had never been any money appropriated for buying antitoxin before, the first' Act was distinctly passed with a view of saving the people of the State the necessity of buying." Replying to your favor, I beg to say I am clearly o the opinion the authority under the Act of 19'15 to manufacture and distribute antitoxin can not be construed as granting authority to purchase antitoxin. If the Board desires such authority an amendment could be secured from the Legislature. lrours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 184 1. Where a county has adopted the provisions of the Health Laws, as provided in the Acts of 1914 (Acts 1914, p. 124), by the recommendations of two grand juries and the selection of a County Board of Health such County Board can be compelled to appoint the Health Officer required under Section 6 of said Act. 2. Where the Grand Jury fails to complete the Board by the election of a physician as a member thereof there is no provision in said law for forcing them to so complete it. 3. Where the Grand Jury fails to elect a third member of such County Board of Health the Superintendent of Schools and the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners, or the Ordi~ nary, as the case may be, may exercise the powers of such County Board. August 15, 1916. Dr. W. F. Harris, Sec1etary State Board of Health, . State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your communication of recent date in which you state that the Board of Health of this State desires my opinion on the following matters: First. Under the Act approved August 14th, 1914 (Acts 1914, page 124) a certain county adopted the provisions of this Act by the recommendation of two successive grand juries of the county. Also, the Board of Health of the County was completed by the election by the Grand Jury of a physician as a member of this Board. After the completion of the Board as set out above, the Board decided that the county was not able to provide a_ Health Officer as required under the provisions of the Act named, and refused to appoint such an officer, and further refused to carry out the provisions of the law as contained in this Act. You wish to know whether or not there is any way by which said Board can be forced to appoint the Health Officer and otherwise put into execution the provisions o'f the Act. In reply I will say that in my opinion the Board could be forced by Mandamus to appoint the Health Officer as required under Section 6 of the Act above mentioned. See Section 5440 of the Code. Also, 14 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, Art. Mandamus, 104. However, the Board would still have the right to fix the compensation of this officer, in any amount not less than twelve hundred dollars per annum. I do not think that there is any provision of law by which the 185 Board can be forced to put into execution the other provisions of the Act. The usual remedy in such oases is that of mandamus but this remedy is not available to compel a general course of , official conduct for a long series of continuous acts to be performed under varying conditions. See Jackson vs. Cochran, 1M Ga. 396. . It is possible that the members of this Board may be subject to indictment and removal from office for failure to perform their dutie~ under the law as provided in Section 295 of the Criminal Code' of this State. This Section has not been construed by the Supreme Court and it is doubtful whether or not it applies to the case under consideration. Second. Your next question is whether or not in a case where the Grand Jury fails to complete the Board as required by law by failing to elect a physician a member thereof there is any method by which the Grand Jury may be forced to comply with the law and complete tpe Board. In reply to this question I will say that under the Act of 1914 there is no way provided by law by which the Grand Jury can be forced to make the election, and complete the Board. .Third. Yo~r next question is whether or not the Superintendent of Schools and the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners or the Ordinary, as the case may be, may exercise the powers of a County Board of Health in a case where the Grand Jury fails or refuses to elect a third member. In reply to this question I will say that in my opinion in such a case the officers mentioned could exercise all the powers of the Board of Health for the County. Section 2 of the Act provides: ''All the powers and authority now vested in the county authorities by Chapter 7, governing sanitary regulations by county authorities embraced in Sections 1670 (2), 1676, inclusive, of the Code of 1910, are hereby conferred upon and vested in the County Boards of Health created and established under the provisions of this Act.'" After the passage of this Act the county authorities were deprived of the powers vested in them prior to that time so far as the same related to the execution of the health laws and regulations. If the two members of the Board above referred to can not act for the reason that the third member , has not been appointed or elected, then the county would be deprived of the services of any health officer having authority 186 to carry out the health laws and regulations. I do not think the Legislature intended that such a condition should exist, and as the two members mentioned above constitute a quorum of the Board, I am of the opinion that they have the authority to exercise the powers vested in this Board. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The State Board of Health is authorized to report and publish facts officially determined by the Board concerning any medicine or drug or alleged patent medicine to be injurious to the health. of the people. October 14, 1916. Dr. H. F. Harris, Secretary, State Board of Health, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I have before me your favor of recent date in which you ask me to give you an opinion as to the right of the State Board of Health to publish, for the information and the protection of the people of the State, information concerning certain largely advertised alleged patent medicines considered to be by the Board of Health, injurious to the health of the State. In response thereto, I beg to say that the authority of the Board is based upon Section 1662 of the Code of Georgia: "The State Board of Health shall have supervision of all matters relating to the preservation of the life and health of the people of the State." In my judgment, the authority here quoted authorizes the State Board of Health to report and publish the facts officially determined by the Board concerning any medicine or drug, or alleged patent medicine, to be injurious to the health of the people. In ascertaining the fact and reporting thereon the State Board of Health would be acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Statements so made and published with the bona fide intent and purpose of preserving the public health would be made in the performance of a public duty. 187 Section 4436 of the Code of Georgia reads as follows: "The following are deemed privileged communications; I. Statements made bona fide in the performance of a public duty." As to such statements the following principles of law apply: 1. I suit should be brought against the members of the Board for damages they could relieve themselves from any liability by proving the truth of the statements made. "The truth of the charge made may always be proved in justification of the libel or slander." Section 4435 of the Code of Georgia. 2. I the members of the Board, in such a suit, were unable to sustain the truth of the charges made, they would still not -be liable for damages if they could satisfy the jury that they were acting with no wrong motive and with no malice, but in a bona fide purpose and fntent of protecting the public health. On the other hand, if the Board were unable to sustain the truth of the charges made, and the jury believed that they were acting with wrong motive and with malice, they would be liable for damages. However, in either case, the burden of proof would be upon the plaintiff bringing the suit, to show both that the charges were false and that the statements were made with wrong motive and with-malice. In other words, if the Board be acting in line with its duty to the people under the law they can not be made liable for damages until the plaintiff satisfies the jury that the statements made were false and that they were made with wrong motive and with malice. The principles hereinbefore announced were before the court in the case of Beeks vs. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa, 247. This case involved the liability of the individual members of the Board of Health for enforcing a quarantine of the plaintiff's family on account of a supposed case of small-pox in such family. It appeared that no small-pox existed in the family. The court says: "The statute makes it the duty of health officers to quarantine against 'all infectious or contagious diseases dangerous to the public' and it can not well be qnPstioned that the defendants were acting within the scope of their duty as such officers, and that in establishing the quarantine they were acting in a quasijudicial character. They were vested with the power to determine whether an infectious or contagions disease existed in the appel- 188 !ant's family, and if found to exist their duty under the statute required them to take the proper steps to prevent ite spread, and had they neglected to do so they would have been culpable in a high degree. They were therefore acting judicially, and it is the general rule that officers so acting are not liable for injuries which may result from such acts performed in the honest exercise of" their judgment, however erroneous or mistaken th.e action may be, provided there be no malice or wrong motive present. Raymond vs. Fish, 51 Conn., 80, (50 .Am. Rep., 3); Lowe vs. Conroy, 120 Wis., 151, (97 N. W. 942, 66 L. R. .A. 907); see, also, Paekard vs. Voltz, supra. In some cases an exception jo this general rule has been recognized, and the individual officers had been held liable because of the maxim that where there is a wrong there is a remedy. See Lowe vs. Conroy, supra, and cases cited therein, _and McCord vs. High, 24 Iowa, 336, where Judge Dillon, in a concurring opinion, recognizes and applies the rule. We are of the opinion, however, that where the public health is involved, this rule should not be applied, notwithstanding the fact that courts of great ability have so held. It is the modern tendency of judicial opinion to hold that the public health is the highest law of the land and 'whenever a police regulation is reasonably demonstrated to be a promoter of public health all constitutionally guaranteed rights must give way to be sacrificed without compensation to the owner.' 2 Tiedeman on State and Federal Control, Section 169. "Nor does this doctrine necessarily conflict with the maxim to which we have referred. As we have already said, this board of health was a creation of the statute and its paramount duty was to protect the public health; its duty, then, was to the public and not to any individual member thereof, except to act honestly and without design to injure him. If a health officer fails to do his duty no individual may complain, for the duty is public and the officer is not charged with any individual duty to any particular person. Cooley on Torts, 382. If there be no liability for an omission of public duty, it would seem to follow without question that an erronf'ous performance should not subject the officer to personal liability. It may, it is true, cause an injury to the individual, but it is not a wrong because the officer owes the individual no duty beyond what we have already stated. Cooley on Torts, 379, 380. In volume five of his work on Negligence, Judge Thompson says: 'So a board of health may establish quarantine regulations and thereby cut off the entire trade of one section of the country with another. This measure may break up the business of a particular person and drive him into insolvency, and yet he would have n<, action for damages against the members of the board, although it might turn out that the regulation was in point of fact wholly unnecessary.' It is 'darn- 189 num absque injuris.' Benden vs. Nashua, 17 N. H. 477. See, also, Section 6376, Thompson on Negligence. Beeks vs. Dickinson County, 131 Iowa 247. Spe also, Atlanta News Publishing Company vs. l\Iedlock, 123 Georgia Reports, 714.'' Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 190 OPINIONS I TO THE COMMISSIONER OF FISH AND GAME Section 2154 of the Co.de of this State of 1910 was repealed by the Act of the General Assembly approved August 21st, 1911. Atlanta, Ga., August 11, 1915. Hon. Chas. E. Davis, Commissioner of Game and Fish, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your request of the lOth inst. for an opinion as to whether Section 2154 of the Code of this State of 1910 is now in force, or whether the same was repealed by the Act of the General Assembly approved August 21st, 1911. In reply I will say that while it is true that the subject matter contained in the Section of the Code mentioned is not referred to in the Act above cited, yet it is clearly apparent that in the passage of this Act the Legislature intended to make a general revision of the whole subject-matter contained in Sections 2143-2158 inclusive of the Code. Also, it is manifest that Section 2154 of the Code is inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act so far as the said Section relates to the commissioner of agriculture for the reason that said commissioner under the Act of 1911 has nothing to do with the Department of Game and Fish. Said Section is also inconsistent with Sections 594 (d), (f), (g), (m), of Park's Code of 1911. (Penal Code.) 'fhese last mentioned Sections were codified from the said Act of l911. For the reasons above stated I am of the opinion that the Section asked about in your request is not now of force for the reason that the same was repealed by the Act of the Legislature, approved August 21st, 1911. In this ~onnection see the case of Hammond vs. The State, lOth Court of Appeals Reports, page 143, in which the whole matter is discussed and said Section is held to have been repealed by the said Act of 1911. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 191 There is no prov1s1on of law by which the Game and Fish Commissioner can legally suspend the operation of Criminal Code Section 612 so far as it refers to taking fish during the months of February, March, and April. September 1, 1915. Hon. Chas. S. Arnow, Commissioner of Game and Fish, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your favor of the 20th inst., in which you ask an official opinion as to whether or not you may legally suspend the operation of Code Section 612 Criminal Code in so far as it refers to the taking of fish during the months of February, March and .April in the conduct of the business of the taking of shrimp and prawn for canning and other purposes. I am advised that this industry has developed into very large proportions in the last year or two, and that the strict enforcement of the law will result in great harm to the coast section of the State. rio In reply I beg to say that I know of suggestion that could come from this department in the premises. We must take the law as we find it. The suspension of one law but invites disregard of other laws. While statutes should be given reasonable construction this section is plain, and I find difficulty in seeing how its terms could be legally modified. Of course the enforcement of the game and fish law are largely in your hands through your Wardens and Deputy Wardens, and a word from you to them would probably result in the suspension of prosecution for violations of this .Act. It is just as probable that the net result would be a failure to prosecute under other laws, and a consequent disregard of all laws to that extent. In other words, it seems unadvisable for a head of a department to be suggesting a suspension of any law. I have considered the suggestion that in the taking of prawn, fish should be returned to the water. In this connection I am advised that fish so taken are always dead, and therefore this suggestion is of no value. I conclude that this department is powerless to suggest a means of suspension of the law, unless you see fit to direct your Wardens to overlook such violations as may be incident to 192 the prawn business, which as indicated hereinbefore 1s to say the least a dangerous practice. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorn~y -General. Discussion as to the time of expiration of commissions of the County_ Game Wardens under the present game and fish laws. Cannot hold office longer than the expiratibn of the term of the Commissioner who appointed them. September 3, 1915. Hon. Chas. S. Arnow, State Game and Fish Commissioner, State Capitol. DEAR Sm: I acknowledge receipt of your favor of 1st inst. wherein you raise the question of the time of expiration of commissions of County Game Wardens under the present game and fish laws, and in response I beg to say: The department of game and fish was reorganized under the Act of 1911 (See Acts of 1911, page 137, or Park's Code, 2158 et seq). The terms of this reorganizing Act provide that the State Game and Fish Commissioner ''shall appoint game and fish wardens and deputy wardens in each county of this State, such appointees to hold their office for the term of two years, unless sooner removed for cause by the Commissioner.'' Park's Code, 2158 (e). Inasmuch as the department was organized under this Act and County \Vardens and Deputy Wardens appointed for two years from the first day of September, 1911, it appears that not only under the expressed terms of their appointment but under the terms of the law creating those offices the terms of . the original appointees expired by operation of law on the first day of September, 1913, and it likewise follows that the terms of those appointed to succeed the original appointees, that is to say those whose t~rms began September 1, 1913, expired on the first day of September, 1915, by operation of law. Park's Code, 2158 (d). This department has heretofore rendered an opinion which I 193 now specially concur in to the effect that a retiring officer having authority to make appointments cannot make such appoint- ments iii. cases where the terms expire after his retirement from office.. Nor can he do by indirection what the law inhibits directly. The equity of such ruling is readily apparent. If the contrary were true untold mischief might result. Carried to its final analysis such a system would result as follows : The retiring official with the co-operation of his original appointees would secure the resignation of all his appointees a day before his retirement, make appointments -for two years in every case and thereby fatally embarrass the incoming official by forcing on him subordinates unfriendly or offensive to the administra- tion, leaving it practically helpless throughout the entire term of office. It is clear that no such situation was ever contemplated by the law. It is repugnant to the policy of the State. A conscientious official is entitled to assistants and subordinates in thorough sympathy with his policies and this the law guaran- tees to him. In no department is this more important than in the case of the Department of Game and Fish. The law expressly makes it his duty "to see that the laws now or hereafter enacted for the protection, propagation and preservation of game animals, game birds or other birds, and fish in this State are observed and that violations of said laws are promptly and speedily prosecuted.'' The very nature of the duties here placed upon him require the most loyal support of his deputies as indeed he is powerless to act save through them. I have not overlooked the fact that vacancies will naturally occur in these offices in cases other than hereiJ?.before contemplated. In such cases the authority of the Commissioner is clear to fill the vacancies. But they are to be filled only for the unexpired term, which ends on the first o~ September every two years. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 194 Wardens and Deputy Wardens, under the Game and Fish Commissioner of the State, have a right to remove or break any dams, nets, traps, etc., placed across the streams of this State is violation of Section 603 of the Penal Code of 1910. May'3, 1916. Hon. Chas. S. Arnow, Commissioner of Game and Fish, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of the 2nd in wllich you ask my opinion as to whether or not the Wardens and Deputy Wardens of your department have the right to remove or break any dams, nets, traps, etc., placed across the streams of this State in violation of Section 603 of the Penal Code for 19'10. This Section was passed before the establishment of your department and gave the Sheriff of the County the right to remove the said obstacles referred to in the above mentioned Section. In reply I will say that Section 5 of the Act approved August 21, 19'11 (Georgia Laws, Acts of 1911, page 139), says: ". . . Such Wardens and Deputy Wardens shall enforce all the provisions of this Act and all other lau:s in reference to game and fish in their respective counties. . . . " The Wardens and Deputy Wardens were given the right to enforce all the laws in force relative to Game and Fish and it is therefore my opinion that they would have the right to re- move the nets, and traps, etc., in any of the streams of this State in violation of the Section above mentioned. Trusting that this is the information you desire, I am, Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The State had no authority to prohibit fishing within a limit of three miles from the low water mark on her coast in May, 1916. This defect in our law was remedied at the session of the General Assembly of 1916. May, 9, 1916. Hon. Chas. S. Arnow, Commissioner of Game and Fish, State Capitol, Atlanta. . DEAR SIR: I have your favor of May 4th together with a communication addressed to you by Mr. R. T. Bunkley, of 195 Brunswick, Georgia. You wish to know whether or not the State of Georgia has the right during certain seasons of the year known as ''closed seasons'' to prohibit persons from fishing in the waters along the coast of this State and within what is known as the ''Three-mile limit'' from the shore. This question involves the jurisdiction of this State over what is usually called the "1\iaritine Belt." According to international law every independent State has the right to assume and exercise jurisdiction , over the territory in the ocean extending from low water mark on the shore three miles into the ocean. This right is recognized by the nations of the world. The only question that can arise in this case is whether or not it is necessary for such State to define her limits or boundaries so as to include the "]\l[aritine Belt" either in her Constitution or in her Statute. Laws. On this subject, in volume 12 of the Cyclqpedia of Law and Procedure, page 214 (B), it issaid: "It has been said that the jurisdiction of a nation to punish offenses extends into the ocean to the distance of a cannon shot, which is estimated as one marine league from low water mark on the shore; but it is doubtful whether there is any jurisdiction to punish for offenses committed within this marine league limit, if the place or the offense is not an arm of the sea and within the body of a county, unless the jurisdiction is expressly conferred by the statute. Such jurisdiction, however, can undoubtedly be expressly conferred by statute, and such statutes have been enacted both in England and in the United States." This question was before the District Court of the Northern District of California in 1894 in the case of Hombolt Lumber Manufacturing Association, 60 Fed. 428. This case involved an action for damages sustained within the three-mile limit on the coast of California. It was held that the courts of the State of California had jurisdiction of this case for the reason that the Constitution and the political code of that State fixed the western boundary of the State and of its counties on the Pacific Ocean three miles west of the shore line. In the case of Commonwealth vs. 1\'lanchestcr, 152 ]\![ass. 230, the Supreme Court of that State held that the Courts of ]\l[assachusetts had jurisdiction to punish persons engaged in fishing in the waters of Buzzards Bay for the reason that the Legislature of that State had passed laws fixing the boundaries of the State so as to include this bay. The court held that under international law the State of l\Iassachusetts had the authority to so fix her. boundaries as to assume jurisdiction over the waters of said bay. The last mentioned case was carried to the Supreme Court of the United States and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. was affirmed. See 139 U. S. 240. In the case of McCready vs. Virginia, 94 U." S. 391, the Supreme Court of the United States held: "That each State owns the beds of all tide waters within its jurisdiction, and may appropriate them, to be used by its citizens as a common for taking and cultivating fish, if navigation be not thereby obstructed." It will be noted that the State of Virginia had "appropriated" the waters involved in the last mentioned case by an Act of the Legislature, and had by such legislation extended her jurisdiction over them. The State of Georgia by an act of the Legislature has fixed her boundaries so far as the coast is concerned in the following language: "Thence along this line east, to a point designated thirty-seven links north of Ellicotts' l\Iound on the St. :Marys River; thence along the middle of said river to the Atlantic Ocean, and from thence to the mouth or inlet of said Savannah River." See Sec tion 16, Code. Section 21 of the Code of this State reads as follows: "The sovereignty and jurisdiction of this State extend to all places within the limits of her boundaries, except so far as she has voluntarily ceded the same to the United States, or adjacent States, over particular localities." . Section 22nd of the Code reads as follows : "The jurisdiction of this State and its laws extend to all per sons while within its limits, whether as citizens, denizens, or temporary sojourners." It thus appears that the State of Georgia has never fixed or defined her limits or boundaries so as to include the "Maritime Belt," although she undoubtedly has the right to do so. I have been able to find no case holding that the jurisdiction of a State would extend three miles into the Ocean unless the State 197 had declared her purpose either in her Constitution or in her Statute Laws to include this territory within her boundaries. All the cases I have been able to find place the right of the State to exercise jurisdiction over such territory upon the fact that the State either in her Constitution or her Statute Laws has fixed and defined her territory or the limits thereof in such way as to include the three-mile limit. The Supreme Court of this State has not passed on the question. It therefore appears that there is some doubt as to the authority of the State of Georgia to enforce her laws within this limit on her coast, but in the light of the authorities herein cited I am inclined to the opinion that this State has no authority to prohibit fishing within a limit of three miles from low water mark on her coast. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. NoTE.-The Legislature defined the limits of the State accordingly at its 1916 session. The recent law, amending the game and fish laws, wherein it is provided that woodcock and summer or wood-duck may be killed from September 1st to January 1st following, contains a typographical error, in that It should read "December 1st" instead of "September 1st." Section 10 of said Act, providing that it shall be lawful to kill buz. zards at any and all times. of the year, is not valid. September 1, 1916. Hon. Chas. S. Arnow, Commissioner of Game and Fish. State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date requesting some information on the recent law amending the game and fish laws of this State. You wish to know whether or not Section 7 of this Bill changes the law as it previously existed. In reply to this question I will say that Section 7 of the recent Bill amends Section 18 of the Act of 1911, by providing that persons following hounds in pursuant of foxes or deer or other animals not mentioned in the Act may go in or upon or through the uninclosed or unculti- 198 vated lands of another. You refer to the fact that the Bill-went to conference on this Section 7, and that the result of the conference does not appear in the Bill. Of course it is not necessary that anything that was done in conference appear in the Bill further than the amendments that may have been agreed to. Whatever the conference might have done the law stands as it appears now in Section 7. With respect to Section 4 of the Act it appears in that portion thereof which sets forth the way in which the Act shall read when amended that woodcock and summer or wood-duck may be killed from September 1st to January 1st following. An inspection of the Bill will show that it does not provide for any amendment changing the season from December 1st to September 1st following. This change only appears as stated in the portion of the Act setting forth how the Bill shall read when amended. I am of the opinion that the word September in the Act is a typographical error and should be December. I do not think the Legislature intended to change the season, or rather the beginning of the season from December to September. For this reason I think that this part of the Act is invalid and that the law in this respect is the same as it was before the amendment and that this part of the law should read as follows: "Woodcock and summer or wood-duck from December 1st to January 1st following.'' See in. this connection case of Gilbert vs. Georgia, etc. R. R. Co., 104 Ga., page 412. You ask about Section 10 of the Act. This Section provides ''That it shall be lawful to kill buzzards at any and all times of the year.'' In my judgment this Section is not valid for the following reasons to wit: Buzzards are non-game birds and are not referred to in the caption of this Act. This Section is .not in the form of an amendment either to the Act of 1911 or the Act of 1912. It does not purport to amend said laws referred to in said Bill nor any Section thereof. The Act of 1916 purports only to amend the Acts of 1911 and 1912 in respect to game birds, and Section 10 relates to a non-game bird and is not in the form of an amendment to any Act. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 199 OPINIONS TO GEOLOGICAL DEPARTMENT The Advisory Board having approved the suggestion that the State Geologist be permitted to expend not over $500.00 in purchasing show cases and in collecting mineral specimens for the pur- pose of exhibiting at the Georgia State Fair and other like fairs in the State, the expenditures out of the funds of the Geological Department would be legal. "';, - '~~~litt~~~~m~.Y" !J C[ -,:j :;- ~ 1 ~ ' Atlanta, Ga., December 13, 1916. Hon. F. R. Jones, Secretary, Advisory Board of the Geological Survey, Atlanta, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have before me your favor of even date in which you advise that at a meeting of the Board held this day it was ordered that the State Geologist be permitted to expend not over $500.00 in purchasing show cases and in collecting mineral specimens for the purpose of exhibiting at the Georgia State Fair and other like fairs in the State; this action taken subject to the approval of its legality by this Department. Section 1965 of the Political Code fixes the duties of the State Geologist, enumerating certain duties and declares that he shall "perform such other duties as properly pertain to his office." Among the duties provided for in said Section and the following Section he is directed "to cause to be preserved in a museum specimens illustrating the geology, mineralogy, soils and wh~tever else may be discovered in the minerals or geological resources of Georgia, having scientific or economic value.'' Section 1971 provides that ''the Advisory Board shall have the supervision of the money expenditures in the prosecution of the work contemplated. The Board shall audit such accounts, item by item, and approve or reject the same, as in their judgment may be right.'' Not only the general conception of the sphere of th~ work of the Geological Department but the specific and express authority of the law indicates that the work now suggested fairly and reasonably comes within the purview of the Department., The 200 discretion as to such matters, within reasonable bounds, is placed in the Advisory Board. This Board, in its judgment, having approved the suggestion, believing it wise and beneficial, I am clearly of the opinion that the proposed expenditures out of the funds of the Geological Department would be legal. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General 201 OPINIONS TO STATE ENTOMOLOGIST No provision is made for the payment of a per diem to the members of the State Board of Entomology while actually engaged in official duties. Hon. Lee Worsham, State Entomologist, State Capitol, Atlanta. October 2, 1916. DEAR Sm : I have before me your request for an opinion pre- ferred by the State Board of Entomology as to whether or not a per diem may be paid the members of the Board while actually engaged in official duties. In response thereto, I regret to advise that I have been unable to find any legal authority for such payment. Under our Con- stitution no money may: be drawn from the Treasury without a legal appropriation therefor. No money can be paid from the Governor's contingent fund to cover expenses which could have been anticipated by the Legislature. The appropriations to your Department do not authorize the payment of salaries or per diem to members of the Board. I am sure that this matter will receive proper consideration when brought to the attention of the Legislature. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, _ Attorney-General. 202 OPINIONS TO STATE LIBRARIAN The State Librarian is authorized to go outside of the endorsements , in ascertaining the qualificati9ns of an applicant for appointment of notary public for the State at large. Mrs. Maud B. Cobb, State Librarian, November 3, 1916. State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR l\iADAM : I have before me your request for an opinion in which you ask if the State Librarian is authorized to go back of the endorsement as to character accompanying application for appointment. In other words, you desire to know if you are bound by such endorsements, or if the law permits you to make other and further investigations as to the character and fitness of the applicant.. Replying thereto, I beg to say that in my judgment you have the same authority as the Judge of the Superior Court touching the matter in g_1:estion. Discretion is yested in you as in the Judge of the Superior Court, and I am clearly of the opinion that if your investigation satisfies you that the applicant is un- fitted for appointment you have the power and authority to so hold and to decline to make the appointment. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. MISCELLANEOUS OPINIONS A branch bank can not be a State Depository. June 5, 1915. Hon. Grover C. Edmondson, Attorney-at-Law, Alma, Ga. DEAR Sm : Yours of the 30th of June received. You ask whether or not, in the event the Town of Alma is added to the list of towns and cities in which the Governor can designate State Depositories, by a pending Bill in the Legislature, a branch business of a bank located and having its home office in another county,. be named by the Governor as a State Depository for Bacon County in which the Town of Alma is located Y In my opinion such a branch bank is only an agent of the parent bank. See :Morse on Banks and Banking, Vol.l, Fourth Edition, Section 46. Section 1249 of the Code provides that the Governor shall name a solvent chartered bank of good standing and credit in the towns named. I do not think this means .that he can name the agent of a bank located in some other town or county. Sections 1251 and 1252 of the Code provides that such banks thus named as State Depositories are to give bond and enter into contracts with the State through the Governor. I think the intention of the Code Sections mentioned is that the State shall deal with the chartered bank at its home office and not its branch or agent at some other place, or in some other town or county. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. 204 A disabled or indigent Confederate -soldier, a resident of this State, has the right to carry on a plumbing business in any city or town without paying a license for the privilege of so doing and also to employ a servant to assist him. June .30, 1915. Hon. lV. L. Stansell, Ordinary Walker County, LaFayette, Ga. DEAR Sm: Yours of June 26th, requesting an opinion as to whether an old Confederate soldier is entitled to a license or certificate from the Ordinary of Walker County to carry on the business of "plumbing" in the Town of LaFayette, in which business he expects to employ one hand to assist him, has been received. In reply I will say that under Section 1886 of the Code of this State, any disabled or indigent Confederate soldier, if he is a resident of this State, has the right to carry on the business of plumbing in any Town or City without paying license for the privilege of so doing. This exemption would also apply to and cover any agent, servant, or employee of the Confederate soldier who may be acting for such soldier and in his name and merely employed by him. See the case of Hartfield et al. vs. City of Columbus, 109 Ga. Rep., page 112, and also, Anglin vs. State, 12 Ga. Apps., page 159. Upon the compliance by such soldier with the requirements of Section 1890 of the Code, it would become your duty under Section 1891 of the Code to issue the certificate therein provided for. But while such soldier is entitled to the above exemption as to "paying license" for the privilege of conducting the business, he would still be subject to all reasonable police regulations which cities and towns have the right to enact. See Campbell vs. Thomasville, 6 Ga. Apps. 237 (16). Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 205 Confederate Veterans are not exempt from the tax on dealing in cigarettes. July 2, 1915. fl. M. Fletcher, Jackson, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your inquiry of this morning in reference to tax demanded of l\Ir. R. W. 1\Iays, I find on examination that this office has formerly construed the cigarette tax along with the pistol tax and like taxes as police regulations and therefore not covered by the exemption allowed to Confederate Veterans. I believe this ruling is backed by authority and l\Ir. Mays will have to pay it unless he cares to test it in the courts. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The State, or any county, cannot tax bonds, issued by a municipality to raise money to build a school building,_ where the charter of such city or town authorizes such bonds and where the same are held by residents of this State. July 5, 1915. Mr. A. A. Arrington, Ellaville, Ga. DEAR Sm : Your letter of June 29th, asking whether bonds sold by a city for the purpose of erecting a school building are subject to taxation by the State and county, has been received. In reply, I will say that if the charter of the city authorizes and contemplates the exercise of the power by the municipality to raise funds- for the purpose of erecting a school building, either by taxation or by the issue of bonds, or both, such bonds of a municipal corporation of this State in the hands of a resident of this State are not taxable by the State or any_ county thereof. See the case of Penick vs. Foster, 129th Ga. Rep., page 217. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 206 The purchaser of an automobile should immediately register the sam' and pay the full amount of the license tax before operating the same. July 5th, 1915. Mr. E. L. Meadows, Vidalia, Ga. DEAR SIR : Your letter of June 25th, addressed to Ron. Warren Grice, Attorney-General, has been turned over to me for reply. You ask whether a man who purchases an automobile now is required under the law to immediately register said machine with the Secretary of State and pay the tax of five dollars, and whether or not he would be required to pay only a proportionate part thereof, or whether or not his license would be good for twelve months from the date of said payment. Answering your first question, I think the purchaser of the machine would be required to register as required by law before running, driving, or operating the same. See Section 1 of the Act approved August 13, 1910, and also, Section 15 of the same Act. Also see Section 11 of the same Act as amended by an Act approved August 19, 1913. As to your second question, there is no provision in any of the Acts providing for the payment of any proportionate part of the tax. The Act simply provides for the payment of a fee for the calendar year during which the machine is registered, and for which the same is registered. It does not provide for any registration beyond the year, nor is there anything in any of the several Acts to indicate that any amount less than five dollars is to be received by the Secretary of State for the said registration. 1\Iy opinion, therefore, is that the purchaser could not pay a proportionate part of such tax for a part of the year, and that his license could not extend beyond the year of such registry. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 207 Law regarding the Alternative Four Day Road duty. Sections 704, 723 (a). July 6th, 1915. Hon. W_. B. Townsend, Dahlonega, Ga. DEAR SIR : I am in receipt of your letter of the 29th of June in which yon ask my opinion as to whether or not it is necessary in order to secure the Alternative Four Day Road law in your county that the present road law be abolished or suspended by recommendation of the Grand Jury. You say that your county, Lumpkin, at present has the Alternative Road law. In reply I will say that Section 704 of the Code of this State provides that the operation of this law, Alternative Road law, shall be suspended in any county of this State upon the recommendation of the Grand Jury, made at any term of the court, after a lapse of three years from the time it goes into effect. In order to secure the Four Day law it is necessary that the present law be suspended as provided in the above mentioned Section of the Code before an election could be had on the adoption of the former law. In the event your county has a population of between 9150 and 9950, Section 723 (a) of the Code will apply, and in that event, I think the operation of the said law would have to be suspended by an Act of the Legislature. However, this latter Section of the Code would not affect your county unless it has the population above indicated. You will understand that the law does not permit me to furnish an official opinion except on the request of the Governor, but, I am very glad to give you the above information. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Every citizen is authorized to give bond except in extreme cases. July 7, 1915. Jfr. W. H. Hardie, Ivey, Ga. DEAR SIR: The law allows the Attorney-General to furnish 208 official opinions only on request of the Governor, Code Section 254. However, I am glad to give you my opinion privately, and beg to say that the Constitution allows every citizen the right to give bond, except in extreme cases. If the officer has no extreme charge against your friend and he is ready to tender good and sufficient bond. in the county and this is refused your remedy would be to sue out a habeas corpus. This would insure every legal right. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, A ttorJ!ey-General. The voters within any district in a county who have voted In stock law and fenced themselves can vote in a county election on the stock law. July 7, 1915. Hon. A. J. Ledford, Blairsville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date in which you ask if in a county where two or three districts have voted in stock law and fenced themselves the voters within those districts would be allowed to vote in a County election, I beg to say that Section 2049 of the Code provides as follows: "Nothing herein contained shall prevent any district which has adopted this law from voting at any county election on the stock law." Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. All commercial corporations are subject to the occupation tax. July 9, 1915. Mr. R. L. Saville, Dawson, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your recent letter in regard to tax of the Dawson Compress & Storage Co. received. You state that you have been called on to pay the occupation tax provided for in Section 950 of the Code of Georgia for 1910. You also state _in your letter 209 that the Dawson Compress & Storage Co. has leased all of its property to the Atlantic Compress Co., and that your company is doing no business further than making proper distribution among the stockholders of the rental on its property. You wish to know whether under these facts your company is liable for the aforesaid tax. Under the Section above mentioned, to wit: Section 950 of the Code, ''All corporations incorporated under the laws of Georgia, shall, except those that are not organized for pecuniary gain or profit, and those that neither charge nor contemplate charging the public for services rendered,'' are required to pay each year an annual license or occupation tax. The wording of the Act is somewhat peculiar, and there is no provision with .reference to the doing of business as a condition upon which the corporations referred to become liable for said tax. The question you ask has not been passed upon by the Supreme Court, as- far as I have been able to find, and, of course, I do not know what view the Supreme Court might take of it. Under the wording of the Act all corporations are liable for the tax except those not organized for pecuniary profit and gain or, in other words, commercial corporations. I assume, of course, that the Dawson Compress & Storage Co. was organized for pecuniary profit and gain to its stockholders. The provisions of the Act under consideration ~ake no exception in the case of such a corporation which has ceased to do business in the ordinary sense of the word. Such a corporation still maintains its corporate existence, and its franchise and its right to perform all the acts of a body corporate. The law also provides for the surrender by a corporation of its charter and franchise, but. so long as it retains its corporate existence and franchise, I think it is liable for the payment of this occupation tax. In order to escape the tax, it would be necessary for the corporation to surrender its charter and corporate franchise. Of course, you will understand that the law does not permit me to furnish an official opinion unless upon the request of the Governor, and in relation to some matter in which the State is interested, but as a lawyer, I am glad to give you the above information. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 210 Law regarding witness' fees in a disbarment proceedings. Atlanta, Ga., July 9, 1915. Hon. J. H. Gaskins, Nashville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have yours, of the 2nd instant in regard to the matter of witness' fees in a disbarment proceeding. You ask whether or not a county should be taxed with the fees of a non-resident witness in such a proceeding. I take it from your letter that in this case the proceeding was in the name of the State on the information of some person. You say that- the subpoenas were properly endorsed and that the fees were paid by the Treasurer before the rendition of .the verdict. The verdict was in favor of the defendant. In my opinion, under Section 4980 of the Code, it is only when the proceedings are instituted by the court of its own motion and are conducted in the name of the Stat~, that the costs are paid as in criminal cases. When the proceedings are instituted on the information of some relator, the costs would be paid as in civil cases. Under the Section of the Code above cited, I think it would be proper to take a judgment of the court against the relator for the amount of the costs in the case including the fees of the witnesses, and when the judgment has been satisfied, the proper amounts could be paid over to the Treasurer of the county to reimburse the county for the money paid out as fees to the witnesses. In no event, do I think, the county would be liable for the fees of these witnesses. You will understand that the law does not permit me to give an official _opinion except on t?-e request of the Governor and in relation to some matter in which the State is interested, but I am glad to furnish you my opinion as a lawyer. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 211 / Where the express authority is given in the Charter, an officer of the municipality may proceed beyond the limits of the town or city and arrest persons who have violated the ordinances of such town or city. Such officer has also the right to go beyond the limits of the city and arrest an escaped convict from the city chain gang. July 9, 1915. Hon. W. G. Park, C. A., Blakely, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have yours on the 3rd inst. in which you request my opinion on the following legal question : If a city convict escapes from the city chain-gang after conviction of the violation of a city law or ordinance, are the city officials authorized to go out of the corporate limits of the city and retake him, and if this can not be done how is he to be taken into custody again? I think that Section 319 of the Penal Code of Georgia of 1910 answers your question. See also in that connection Collins vs. the State, 120 Ga. Rep., page 849. A great many of the Acts of the Legislature providing for the incorporation of towns and cities provide that the marshals, policemen, or other peace officers of the municipality shall have the power and authority to make arrests for violations of the ordinances of such towns or cities outside of and beyond the corporate limits of the same. If, however, there is no such express authority given in the charter of the municipality, the officers of the town or city would not have the legal right to go beyond the limits of the town or city and make an arrest for the violation of its laws or to re-arrest an offender who had been convicted of the violation of such laws. This is true for the rea~on that where the charter power above mentioned is not given to the municipality, or its officers, such persons would cease to be officers as soon as they crossed the limits of the town or city. They would, therefore, outside of such town or city have no more authority to arrest than any other citizen of the State. You will, of course, understand that the law does not permit me to furnish an official opinion except on the request of the Governor and in relation to some matter connected with the interest of the State. However, I am glad to give you the 212 information asked for in your letter, hot officially, but as a lawyer. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD ALRER, Attorn.ey-General. The Act establishing the city of Douglasville gives the town authorities the right to require every male resident thereof not under sixteen nor over fifty years of age to either work streets or pay a street tax. July 10, 19'15. Mr. R. N. Kirby, Douglasville, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have yours of recent date asking whether under the law a boy sixteen years of age can be compelled to pay street tax: You do not say what city or town you have reference to, but I presume you are asking with reference to the City of Douglasville, Ga. If you will examine the Act of the Legislature establishing the City of Douglasville, approved August 26th, 1891,, Section fourteen, you will find that the council of this city have the authority to require every male . resident thereof not under sixteen nor over fifty years of age to either work or pay a street tax. Of course, I do not know whether the council have ever passed such an ordinance, but they certainly have the authority to do so~ and to enforce the same, when passed. You will understand that under the law I am not permitted to furnish an official opinion except on request of the Governor in relation to some matter in which the State is interested, but, as a lawyer, I am glad to give you the information requested. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 213 Opinion relative to criminal cases in City Court of Quitman. Hon. W. R. Knight, a. a. a., July 10, 1915. Quitman, Ga. DEAR SIR: In response to the favor dated July 1, 1915, signed by Judge Long and other officials of the City Court of Quitman, in which I am requested to give through you my opinion relative to criminal cases in said court as established by the Act of 1912, page 287, Acts of the General Assembly, the time when the court obtains jurisdiction, the costs to which the officers are entitled, etc., I beg to submit the following: The law permits the Attorney-General to render an official opinion only on request of the Governor. Code Section 254. However, it will be my pleasure to assist the county officers whenever I can though my opinion could hardly be considered official. I find very little law touching the questions submitted and I have concluded that the proper determination thereof should largely follow the analogies to the Superior Court practice. In fact this seems to be contemplated in Flint vs. State, 12 Ga. App. 173. While the issuance of a warrant by a Justice of the Peace may be the beginning of a prosecution and in a sense the court may be held to have jurisdiction for certain purposes, it is clear to my mind that the position of the Solicitor is analogous to that of the Grand Jury. For argument, consider this case: A hotel proprietor, in the utmost good faith, presents to the Solicitor an affidavit in proper form charging a defendant therein named with violating the recently adopted law punishing one "beating a board bill." The first question asked .by the Solicitor would be : ''Did you have the proper notice posted~'' The prosecutor answering in the negative, it would clearly be the duty of the Solicitor to ignore the warrant. If in such case, the prosecutor had gone to a Justice of the Peace and the Justice of the Peace had committed the defendant to the City Court, the Solicitor would act in the same way. In this latter case the Court would probably be said to have had jurisdiction. The warrant and commitment would be returnable to the Clerk of the Court and the Solicitor 214 would be bound to consider it though as indicated above he has the clear right and in such cases it is his duty to disregard or ignore the same so far as entering an accusation where he is satisfied that a case could not be made out. In this connection it is interesting to note that the J~stice of the Peace himself, in case he is satisfied that the prosecution is malicious, may tax the costs on the prosecutor. Sec. 950. In the case indicated first above, it seems clear that the costs would have to be charged to insolvent costs; the prosecutor acted in good faith and would hardly ,be chargeable. It is my opinion as a lawyer that whenever the Solicitor is satisfied that a case has been stated through affidavit or commitment, it is his duty instanter to prefer an accusation, file the same with the Clerk and have the case docketed. It then becomes in every respect in the jurisdiction of the Court and can be disposed of legally only by an order of the court. The costs must follow this order of court. The prosecutor could pay the costs by agreement in a settlement if approved of by the court; I recall no method by which he couid be made to pay the costs unwillingly except by a verdict of a jury on the trial of the case declaring the prosecution malicious and unfounded or a like judgment of the judge if he should act as judge and jury by agreement. .Answering your questions more specifically, I am of the opinion that the Solicitor of the City Court of Quitman under the Act of 1912 is required under his oath of office to consider any misdemeanor alleged to have been committed in your county within the limitations fixed by law in whatever manner it may have been brought to his attention; if he conscientiously believes no crime has been committed it would be his duty to ignore it, acting as a Grand Jury acts when an alleged crime is presented to it. If he conscientiously believes a crime has been committed it is equally his duty on presentation of an affidavit to prefer an accusation instanter, have the defendant arrested and. the papers transmitted to the Clerk of the Court. In the first case the prosecutor should probably pay the officer issuing the warrant or attesting .the affidavit though I know of no law requiring him to do so except in case of a preliminary hearing before a Justice as contemplated by Sec: 950. In the 215 latter case the costs, as stated, will follow the order of the judge in his discretion, except on trial and verdict declaring the prosecution malicious and unfounded. While I have been Solicitor-General, I have never acted as Solicitor of a City Court and am not an expert in the practice in such matters. It is probable that some angle appearing to your officers may not have occurred to me, but I trust with what I have said, in connection with the observations of the Court in the Flint case (12 Ga. A.pp. 169-173) and the citations found in Park's Penal Code (Vol. 6), you may work out your difficulties satisfactorily. If, however, I can be of further service to you or any of the officers in this matter I shall be pleased to have you write me further. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. Discussion as to whether a "purely Farm Corporation'' is liable to the tax required under Section 950 of the Code. July 10. 1915. Hon. lV. H. Cone, Ordinary, Statesboro, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have received your favor of 5th instant in which you ask my opinion on the question therein raised, to wit: Is a "purely Farm Corporation" liable to the tax required under Section 950 of the Code 1'' I respectfully submit the following: The law permits the .Attorney-General to render opinions only on request of the -Governor (Code Section 254) so my opinion can hardly be considered official. The language of the Section of the Code referred to is as follows: - "All corporations incorporated under the laws of Georgia shall, except those that are not organized for pecuniary gain or profit and those that neither charge nor contemplate charging the public for services rendered, be and they are hereby required to pay each year an annual license or occupation tax, etc." I understand your question to be : ''Is a purely Farm Corporation one not organized for pecuniary gain or profit or 216 one that neither charges nor contemplates charging for services rendered.?" The courts in construing the clause "those not organized for pecuniary gain or profit" apply the test of strict literal meaning of the words. For instance they hold that of the property of churches, the church-house itself, which has no income, neither charging admission to its services nor for any services rendered by its pastor or other employees, would not be considered as property held for "pecuniary gain or profit," while a brick store-house h-eld for renting purposes under the same title by the same church corporation would be held property for ''pecuniary gain or profit.'' Applying the same ruling to your question I am of the opinion that if the farm you refer to is held as an experiment farm or a show-farm of any kind whose object is the advancement of the agricultural education and information of the people, having no income which is not applied to the improvement of its facilities and the widening of its. sphere of influence as stated, charging no fees for services rendered and not organized for the purpose or with the intention of making money, in other words if its object is the same as a public library or a public art gallery, then the corporation would be exempt, otherwise it would not be exempt. If its prime object and purpose is unselfishly and patriotically to instruct and inspire and elevate the people it would be exempt; if to make money for its stockholders it would not be exempt. The clause ''such as do not charge or contemplate charging the public for services rendered" refers to such institutions as orphans' homes, public libraries and art ga:lleries and would hardly exempt a farm unless it were a show farm or an experiment farm maintained not for profit but for instruction and example to other farmers, its income being applied to such maintenance. If the farm carries on regular farming operations, making all the income it can, charging full prices for its products and applying its income and profits to 'its stockholders, the corporation would not be exempt. Trusting this will give you the information you desire, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Z17 Law governing the authority of a county to condemn private lands for the purpose of improving, widening, grading, etc., a public road. July 13, 1915. Hon. D. B. Bullard, State Capitol. DEAR SIR: Replying to your request for information as to the authority of a county to condemn private lands in this State for the purpose of improving, widening, grading, etc., of a public road, I beg to say that the information you seek will be found in Section 5243 of the Code of 1910. This Section reads as follows : "In all cases when it shall become necessary to condemn land in any county of this State, for the purpose of grading, improving, turnpiking, paving, widening, or macadamizing public roads, for the use and convenience of the public, the county authorities, consisting of the Ordinary or County Commissioners, as the case may be, shall have power and authority to condemn the lands of private persons or corporations so as to increase the width of said roads to a width, as in the judgment of such county authorities shall be proper, not to exceed a width of fifty feet at the_base of said road." You will notice that this Section has reference only to the - widening, etc., of roads already established, and not to the establishing of new roads. The proceeding for condemnation of property for the purposes set- out in the above quoted Section is the ordinary condemnation proceeding as set out in Sections 5206 and 5246, inclusive, of the Code of 1910. The only exception to the usual proceeding is found in Sections 5244, 5245 and 5246 of the Code. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The Act providing for the prompt payment of the Teachers of Georgia is constitutional. July 16, 1915. Hon. John D. Walker, State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR SIR: Replying to your ,request for my opinion as to 218 the Constitutionality of the Act providing for the prompt payment of the Teachers of Georgia, I beg to say that the Act was prepared after repeated conferences participated in by Governor Harris, himself one of Georgia's greatest lawyers, Former Attorney-General Hart, Col. Hollins Randolph, Attorney for the Federal Reserve Bank, and myself as, lawyers, together with yourself as a Banker and Business man and Mr. Brittain as an Educator. We had the Constitutional inhibition against the creation of additional debt by the State constantly in view and we considered that the Act referred to sought to pay existing debts of the State to the Teachers after maturity and not to make any new debts. I am clearly of opinion that the Governor can be given authority to issue his warrants on the Treasury at the end of each month in payment of Teachers for work done during that month and that the Teachers are entitled to the warrants. The Teachers can then keep the warrants in their pockets till Fall if they prefer; they can deposit them in a safe for protection or they can sell them if they see fit. In no event would this be creating a new debt on the State; the debt had already been incurred and your Act simply provides a prompt payment thereof. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Assuming that all legal requirements have been complied with, It is not illegal for a local school district to levy and collect school taxes on a railroad running through the district, if the county tax had not been levied by the county authorities prior to the time of the election for such taxes. July 23, 1915. Mr. .A. S. Rainey, Tax-Receiver, Ellaville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of July 17, addressed to Hon. John c. Hart, Atlanta, Ga., has been turned over to me for reply. You wish to know whether or not the Trustees of the Ellaville local school district have the authority to levy a school tax on a railroad passing through this district, for the year 1915. It appears from your letter that this local school district voted on a local 219 school tax on July lOth, 1915. It does not appear from your letter whether at that time the county tax had been levied by the county authorities. Assuming that all the legal requirements have been complied with in the matter of laying out the county into local school districts and in calling the election, and that the election is legal, if the county tax had not been levied by the county authorities prior to the time of the election, or if the day for so doing had not arrived, it would not be illegal for the district school tax to be levied and collected for the year 1915. See the case of Cairo Banking Co. vs. Ponder, TaxCollector, et al., 131 Ga. 708. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The tax exemptions mentioned in Sec. 994 of the Code apply only to blind persons, persons with one arm or one leg, and all other persons having lost a limb or limbs, or deformed by nature. July 23, 1915. Judge W. L. Stansell, Ordinary, LaFayette, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of 21st instant I beg to say that your interpretation of the law is correct. However, much we might wish to. stretch it, exemptions from taxations are like criminal laws-they must be construed strictly and no person or class of persons can legally be exempted unless the statute clearly includes them. In this instance only "Blind persons, persons with one arm or one leg, and all other persons having lost a limb or limbs, or deformed by nature" are exempted. The Legislature now in session has the power to add to these exemptions. If you think wise you might refer the parties to your member of the Legislature. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 220 The Act regulating the occupation of barbers does not apply in cities or towns having less than 5,000 inhabitants. July 23, 1915. Mr. Fred S. Walton, 305 W. Pine St., Milledgeville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter to Hon. W. A. Wright has been turned over to me for r'eply. You wish to know whether the Act of the Legislature approved August 17, 1914, regulating the occupation of barbers, applies to persons following that business in cities or towns in excess of 5,000 inhabitants. In reply I will say that this Act by its terms only applies to persons following that occupation in cities and towns in excess of 5,000 inhabitants, and does not apply to cities and towns having a smaller population than that above stated. If the city of Milledgeville has a population smaller than 5,000, as stated in your letter, the Act would not apply to persons carrying on this occupation therein. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The fact that there is an incorporated town within a local school tax district does not prevent the establishment of such a district. July 23, 1915. Mr. C. R. Strange, Bridgeboro, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of June 29th, requesting my opinion as to the legality of your local district school tax. I assume that your county has been properly and legally laid off into school districts, that is to say, that the entire county has been so laid off. Also, I do not find that the town of Bridgeboro, at the time the election was held, was levying any local school tax. If your county is properly laid off into school districts, and the town of Bridgeboro was not levying any local school tax, under the facts and circumstances as presented in your letter, I am of the opinion that there is no illegality in your local school district, nor in the tax. The fact that there is any incorporated town in this district does not prevent the ~2l establishment of the district, according to law, nor the en forcement of your local school tax. See Code, Section 1532. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Taxes must be levied on all property of like class equally and uniformly. All businesses of like character should be given In at a uniform rate of valuation. July 28, 1915. Mr. A. P. Johnson, President, Blue Ridge, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have received your favor of recent date. Replying thereto, I beg to say that the law allows the AttorneyGeneral to render official opinions only on request of the Governor in matters touching the interests of the State directly. It must be understood that this opinion is only as an individual lawyer and not officially. The basis of taxation is equality and uniformity. All taxes must be levied on all classes of property, or rather on all property of like class equally and uniformly. I understand that it is not the policy of any of the taxing powers to tax property at its full value. Of course, its full value is the proper basis, but there should be no discrimination. In other words, if your business is taxed at its full value then all businesses of like class should be so taxed. If other such businesses are taxed upon a basis of 50 or 60 or 75 per cent. of its value, then your business should be so t~xed. Equality is equity and equity is right, and such should be the legal basis. From this statement it must appear whether you are being legally taxed or not. If the same rule is applied to all other businesses of like character it is legal; otherwise, it is not legal. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 222 Where a tax fi. fa. is issued against a mule, but before the levy can be made, the owner of the mule carries it to another state and sells it to a,third party, the mule can be levied upon if it returns to the original county, Mr. A. B. Robertson, Tax-Collector, July. 29, 1!:!15. Ringgold, .Ga. DEAR Sm: I have yours of the 19th inst. asking for some information in regard to the levy of a tax fi. fa. The facts as I gather them from your letter are that a Gypsy trader engaged in business in your county, and failing to pay the tax provided for in Section 948 of the Code, you as Tax-Col- lector issued an execution for this tax. The trader, however, got away before any levy was made, and carried his mules with him into the State of Tennessee, where the mule in question was sold by him to some third party. Afterwards, the mule got away and returned to your county. You wish to know whether or not this mule can now be held for the tax. Under Section 977 and 978 and 1152 of the Code of 1910 you certainly had the right to issue the fi. fa. This fi. fa. could have been levied on any property belonging to the trader. Under Sections 977 and 978 this tax becomes due under the law as S\~~~~ September 28, 1915. Hun. H. H. Dean, llfe11tber Board of Trustees, State ~anitarittm, Gainesville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of the 25th inst., requesting an opinion as to the authority of the Trustees of the State Sanitarium to fix the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician of this institution. I note what you say as to a conflict between Sections 320 and 1573 of the Code as to this matter. Also note what you say in reference to the valuable services now being rendered by Doctor Jones as the Superintendent and Principal Physician of the Sanitarium, and your desire to retain him in this position. You say that the salary of $2,500.00 is inadequate and that he has been offered a larger salary in other institutions. I am sure you are right in wishing to keep Dr. Jones in this position, and have sought to find some authority to authorize the Trustees to increase his salary. I have made considerable investigations to ascertain the origin of Sections 320 and 1573 of the Code. If Section 1573 should appear to be the last expression of the Legislative will on the subject matter thereof, it might be construed to supersede Section 320 and authorize the Trustees of the institution to fix the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician. I find that the Georgia State Sanitarium, formerly known as the Lunatic Asylum, was established by an Act of the Legislature assented to December 10, 1841 (Acts 1841, page 153). This Act in Section 4 provides: ''And the Salaries of all the officers of the Asylum shall be determined by the Trustees, subject to the approval of the Governor.'' This Act makes no provision further than that stated as to the salary of the Superintendent. The Act of 1841 was amended by an Act approved February 21, 1850 (Cobb's Digest, page 732). This latter Act provided that the Superintendent and Principal Physician should receive for his services a salary of $1,500.00 per annum. The Act further provides in Section 4: ''The other officers of the institution shall consist of an Assistant Physician, a Treasurer, etc., etc., whose salaries should be fixed by the Board of Trustees." It 255 further provided in the same Section that the Trustees shall, "In their by-laws, determine the salaries and tenure of the office of their officers.'' The next legislation I find on this subject is contained in the Code of 1891, Section 1287, in which the Trustees have authority "to appoint all the officers, point out their duties, and fix their salaries." Section 1576 of the same Code provides "that the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician of the Lunatic Asylum shall be $2,500.00, and the Assistant Physician . $1,250.00." Just when the Act codified in Section 1576 was passed, I have not been able to find, but it appears in the Code of 1861, as stated above. The same provisions of the Code of 1861 as to the authority of the Trustees and the salary of the Superintendent are found in Sections 1638 and 1368. The same provisions of the Code of 1861 as to the authority of the Trustees and the salary of the Superintendent are found in Sections 1344 and 1644 of the Code of 1882. The same provisions of the Code of 1861 are found in Sections 285 and 1411 of the Code of 1895. The same provisions as stated above are found in the same form in the Code of 1910 as Sections 320 and 1753. It will be noted that in all of the Codes above mentioned the provision fixing the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician is cortained in Sections entitled: ''Salaries and fees of officers" and not in the chapters relating generally to the State Sanitarium. It seems therefore that since the Act of 1850 the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician has been treated separately by the Legislature from the other provisions relating to salaries of the Officers of the Sanitarium. Why this is true I, of course, do not know, but such appears to be the fact. Both Sections of the Code, to wit: 320 and 1573, must therefore be considered of force, and it is necessary to construe them in such way as to reconcile the apparent conflict and give force and effect to both of them. This can only be done by construing Section 1573 to mean that it was the intention of the Legislature to provide that the Trustees were to fix all the salaries of the officers of the Institution except that of the Superintendent and Principal Physician, and that his salary was to be fixed by the Legislature as provided in Section 320 of the Code. 256 For some reason, the Legislature, since the establishment of the Sanitarium, has kept the provisions of law fixing the salary of the Superintendent and those of the other officers separate and apart. I am, therefore, of the opinion that th.e Trustees, under the law, have no authority to increase the salary of the Superintendent and Principal Physician to more than that provided by Section 320. It seems that this is a matter which ought to be brought to the attention of the General Assembly. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The General Assembly has power to abolish an office that is not a constitutional office. Atlanta, Ga., October 1, 1915. Mr. G. W. McCall, Treasurer, Jesup, Ga. DEAR Bm : Your lette'r of the 24th of September received. It appears from your letter that at the last general election you were elected County Treasurer of Wayne County, and that your term of-office expires on December 31, 19'16. It further appears that at the 1915 session of the General Assembly an Act was passed abolishing the office of County Treasurer in Wayne County from and after January 1st, 1916. You wish to know. whether or not the Act abolishing the office at the time stated and legislating you out of office is valid. You will recall that by an Act approved August 14, 1914, a Constitutional Amendment was proposed, giving the General Assembly authority to abolish the office of County Treasurer in any county. This amendment was adopted by the people at the general election of 1914. Since the adoption of this amendment the Legislature has the power to abolish the office of County Treasurer. Whether or not prior to the adoption of this amendment the office of County Treasurer was a Constitutional office, since the adoption of the amendment the Legislature unquestionably has control over it. In the case of Gray vs. McLendon, 134 Ga., page 249, the Supreme Court says: "If the office be created by Legislative enactment, the Legislature may abolish it; and if it be created by municipal authority, 257 that same authority may abolish it." ln the case of Wessolowski v. Gilbert, 51 Ga., 224, 227, it was said: "If the office be the creation of the Legislature, it may be abolished by Legislation." In the case of Dallis v. Griffin, 117 Ga. 408 (43 S. E. 738), it was ruled: "No man has a vested right to an office created by the Legislature. That body may 'legislate him out' of such office at its will;" and on page 410 it was said: "It is well-settled law that no man has a vested right to an office created by the Legislature. That body may abolish or modify an office which it has established, may shorten or lengthen the term prescribed for officer who is to hold it, or may decrease or increase the salary attached thereto. So firmly fixed is this principle that extended discussion of it is unnecessary." (Citing many cases.) It appears that the Constitutional amendment was adopted on the very day and in the same election at which you were elected to the office of Treasurer. Of course, if the office to which you were elected is a Constitutional office you could not be removed therefrom by legislation, but since from the very time your election took place the office has been under the con- trol of the General Assembly it is my opinion that the Act abolishing the office on January 1, 1916, is valid and binding. It does seem somewhat unjust to you to deprive you of part of your term of office, and there may be some doubt as to the validity of the Act, but I am inclined to think the courts would sustain it. - You will understand that this is not an official opinion, as I . can not furnish an official opinion under the law, except on the request of the Governor, but I am glad to give you my views of the law involved. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. When an Ordinary resigns, to take effect at a later date, the Clerk of the Superior Court cannot order an election to fill the unexpired term until after. the date such resignation takes effect. Atlanta, Ga., Oct. 1, 1915. Flon. J.P. Chambers, Clerk Superior Court, Dawsonville, Ga. DEAR Sm: Your letter of recent date stating that the Ordinary of Dawson County has resigned his office to take effect on the 31st day of December, 1915, and asking my opinion as to 258 the method of filling the vacancy has been received. You request my opinion as to whether or not you, as Clerk of the Superior Court of said county, can order an election to fill the vacancy during the month of December, 1915, so that the elec-' tion can be had during this month and the persoh elected be ready to assume the duties of the office on the first of January, 1916. Your authority to call this election is found in Section 4782 of the Code of 1910. This Section provides that when a vacancy occurs in the office of Ordinary, it is the duty of the Clerk of the Superior Court, "on the fact of said vacancy being made known to him,'' to order an election to fill the vacancy. It is only when the vacancy occurs and is made known to the Clerk that he can order the election. There can be no vacancy in the office until the resignation takes effect. Therefore, I do not think you are authorized to order or advertise this election until the 1st of January, 19'16, since the Ordinary will act and receive compensation until his successor is qualified. He might resign December lst or lOth. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, ' Attorney-General. Sections relating to Tax-Receiver's commissions. October 1, 1915. Mr. Fred B. Heaton, Tax-Receiver, Hart County, Bowersville, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of September 28th in which you ask whether or not the Tax-Receiver is entitled to receive commissions on county taxes. Your question is answered by Sections 519 and 1202 and 1234 and 1235 (3) of the Code of 1910. These Sections ,provide that the Tax-Collector's commissions are the same on State and county taxes. They further provide that the county shall. pay the Tax Receiver one-half of what the Collector gets for collecting the county tax. They further provide the per cent. allowed the Receiver and Collector as compensation for their services. I hope the above gives you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 259 A person giving people medical treatment with the medicine he makes from herbs that he gathers out of the woods must comply with the laws of this State regarding the practice of medicine. Mr. Ellis Bradley, Columbus, Ga. October 4, 1915. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of September 26, asking whether a person is permitted under the law to give people medical treatment with the medicin!J which he makes from herbs that he gathers out of the woods. In reply, I will say that Section 462 of the Criminal Code of this State provides as follows: ''Any person who shall fail to register, or who shall practice medicine or surgery, in violation of the provisions of tke Civil Code shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 1683 of the Civil Code provides as follows: " 'Practice Medicine' defined. For the purpose of this chapter, the words 'Practice l\Iedicine' shall mean, to suggest, recom- mend, prescribe or direct, for the use of any person, any drug, medicine, appliance, apparatus, or other agency, whether ma- terial or not material, for the cure, relief or palliation of any ailment or disease of the mind or body, or for the cure or relief of any wound, fracture, or other bodily injury or defor:mlcy, after having received or with the intent of receiving therefor, either directly or indirectly, any bonus, gift, or compensation ,. Section 168~ of the Civil Code provides as follows: "WHO J\IAY PRACTICE. No person shall practice medicine within this State, unless he has been heretofore legally authorized so to do, or shall be hereafter authorized so to do by a diploma from an incorporated medical college, medical school, or university, or has, after attending one or more full terms at a regularly chartered medical college, been in active practice ,of medicine since the year 1866, or who was by law . authorized to practice medicine in 1866, or shall have been licensed by the medical board." It appears from the statements in your letter that the giving of medical treatment as stated therein, would be "practicing medicine" under the above quoted Sections of the Code, and a violation of the law, unless you were authorized to practice medi- cine under the laws of this State. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 260 Otherwise qualified, a person is not disqualified to vote pending his trial for a crime involving moral turpitude. January 24, 1916. Mr. P. 0. Herrington, Esq., Mount Vernon, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of recent date, I am of the opinion that a person is qualified to vote pending his .trial for a crime involving moral turpitude. A man is considered innocent until he is proven guilty, and he can not be said to be finally adjudged to be guilty until the cas~ is disposed of. I regret that this can not be taken as an official opinion as the law allows me to render such opinion only on request of the Governor, but I am glad. to give you the benefit of my' idea on the subject. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. No State tax is imposed on professional phrenologists. Atlanta, Ga., October 5, 1915. Mr. J. A. Hunt, Attorney-at-Law, Atlanta, Ga. DEAR Srn: I have your letter of the 4th inst., requesting my opinion as to whether or not there is any State tax imposed on professional phrenologists doing business in this State. I know of no State tax on this business. There is a tax on the business of fortune telling, but as I understand this latter is not embraced in phrenology. Phrenology, as I understand, is the reading of the mental characteristics and powers as indicated by developments of the brain upward, forward, and backward from the medulla oblongata. For these reasons I do not think there is any State tax on a professional phrenologist. If, however, he is also a fortune teller and is carrying on this business, he would be liable for the tax imposed by Section 948 of the Civil Code of this State. I am also assuming that he does not treat people for any disease of the mind or body. If he does treat people for diseases of the mind or body, he would be subject to the tax provided in Section 960 of the Code of this State. You will understand that this is not an official opinion, as, 261 under the law, I am not permitted to furnish an official opinion except on the request of the Governor. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A resident of a municipality operating a school system not directly under the supervision of the County School Superintendent is eligible for said office. October 5, 1915. Hon. Roland Bower, Bainbridge, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of 2nd instant in which you say that the question has been raised in your county whether .or not a person residing in and being a citizen of the municipality of Bainbridge is thereby disqualified to hold the position of Superintendent of County Schools, it being granted that the schools of the City of Bainbridge are not directly under the supervision of said Superintendent, but receives its quota of the State funds directly from the State Treasurer. In reply thereto I beg to say that the only reference to the citizenship of the Superintendent of County Schools is contained in Section 1491 of the Code wherein it is provided: "The Commissioner (now Superintendent) must be a citizen of the county for which he is elected." Sections 1489-1493 as well as Acts of 1911, pages 165, 102, and 103, refer to the duties and qualifications of County Super- intendents of Schools, but nowhere does it appear that the resi- dents of any municipality or school district under any conditions are disqualified. To the contrary, this new and amendatory Act of 1911 directly and expressly provides what the qualifica- tions as to residence shall be and defines them in the following language-: "and be a resident of the county in which he offers for election." The question evidently arose in confusing the qualifications of a County Superintendent of Schools with those of members of the Board of Education of a county. As to this la_tter office Code Section 1479 provides, among other things, as follows: "provided further, that whenever there is a portion of any_ county 262 a 1ocai schooi system having a board of education of its own and receiving its pro rata of the public school fund directly from the State School Commissioner and having no dealings whatever with the County Board of Education, then the members of the County Board of Education of such county shall be- selected from that portion of the county not embraced within the territory covered by such local system."' It will be noted that the Code here limits the qualifications of the members of the County Board of Education and not those of a County Superintendent of Schools. As stated, I have made a careful examination of the. law and find no such inhibition applying to a resident of any portion of a county. I, therefore, conclude that a person residing within and being a citizen of the municipality of Bainbridge is clearly qualified to hold the position of Superintendent of County Schools so far as l1is residence is concerned. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A person is not eligible for the office of Chairman of the County Board of Education and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of a local school district at the same time. October 8, 1915. Mr. M. Edwards, Guyton, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of the 3d inst. requesting an opinion as to whether or not the same person is eligible to hold the office of chairman of the County Board of Education and at the same time hold the office of Chairman of the Board of Trustees of local school district in the same county. Under Section 1479 of the Code, if this local school system ,receives its pro rata share of the public school fund directly _from the State School Commissioner and has no dealings whatever with the County Board, the District Chairman would be ineligible to hold a position on the County Board. If this District School Board acts under the County Board, and not directly with the State Commissioner, a different question arises. To answer this question would involve a construction of Section 258 of the Code. 263 "The following persons are held and deemed ineligible to hold any civil office in this State, and the existence of either of the following states of facts is a sufficient reason for vacating any office held by such person, but tp.e aci;a of such person, while hold ing a commission, are 'valid as the acts of an officer de facto, viz: 4. HOLDING OTHER OFFICES. Persons holding any office of profit or trust under the Government of the United States (other than that of postmaster), or either of the several States, or of any foreign State." Whether or not under the above quoted Section of the Code, athe same person could hold both offices under consideration is very doubtful question. There is no decision of the Supreme Court directly .in point, and no decision that throws much light upon the question. The Supreme Court in the case of Coleman v. Glenn, 103 Ga. 458, held that the members of a County Board of Education are public officers. In Mechem on Public Officers, page 19, Section 55, it is said: "School directors, treasurers and trustees are public officers.'' From this decision I conclude that both the members of the District Board and also the members of the County Board are public officers under the law. While there is considerable doubt on the question, I am inclined to think that the Section of the Code above quoted applies and that the same p,erson is not eligible to hold both offices. Each of them, it seems to me, are civil offices in this State, and each of them are offices of trust, and may be offices of profit. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Constitutional homestead must be advertised. Statutory homestead does not have to be advertised. (Sections 3416-3417.) October 8, 1915. Hon. William Redd, Jr., Ordinary, Colttmbus, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking my opinion as to whether or not in setting apart an ''exemption'' under Section 3417 of the Code it is necessary to publish notice of the same in a gazette. In reply, I will say that Section 3417 of the Code provides for setting aside the statutory homestead. The 264 constitutional homestead of $1,600.00 must be advertised, but the statutory homestead provided for in Sections 3416 et seq. of the Code does not have to be advertised in a gazette. The Sec- tion itself declares "it shall not be necessary to publish the same in a gazette. " Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A person has the right to sell pistol cartridges by paying the State license tax of $25.00. Whether the city or town can also tax such business would depend upon the charter of such city or town. If the charter of the city or town authorizes such license tax to be levied, the tax can be collected, if reasonable. October 8, 1915. The 0. S. Bryant Oo., Bartow, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of October 5, asking whethe! or not you have the right to sell pistol cartridges by paying only a State license, and whether or not the town of Bartow, which is incorporated, has the right to levy a business tax on this business. In reply I will say that from Section 961 of the Code, an occupation tax of $25.00 is levied by the State upon this business. As to whether or not the town of Bartow can also levy an occupation tax on this business would depend upon the charter of the town. As I do not have the charter of the town before me, of course I could not answer this question. However, I will say that the town would not have the right to collect such a tax unless the power to -do so has been delegated to it itt its charter in plain and unmistakable terms. See the case of Albany Bottling Co..v. Watson, 103 Ga., p. 503. If the charter of your town is broad enough to convey such power to the town, then under the ruling of the Supreme Court of this State the town could levy an occupation tax on this business provided the tax was a reasonable one. See Mayor and Aldermen of Savannah vs. Cooper, 131 Ga. 670. If the terms of the charter are broad enough to cover the tax mentioned, it is very likely that the tax would be upheld by the (Jo~rt~. 265 You will understand that this is not an official opinion, as I am not permitted to give an official opinion except on re- quest of the Governor, but I am glad to give you my personal views on the matter. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Fraudulent Trade-Marks. October 8, 1915. Empire State Chemical Co., Athens, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of recent date with reference to the trade-mark claimed by you to have been registered under the laws of Georgia. It also appears that this same trade~mark has been registered under the laws of the United States, and that the person so registering the same under the laws of the United States is seeking to prevent its use by you. You ask whether this can be done. In reply will say that it is impossible to answer this question, for the reasun that it possibly involves a lawsuit with many matters of fact to be decided by the court or jury, and I, of course, not knowing what the history and facts surrounding the use of this trade-mark by both parties are, could not possibly say what the court might find the facts to be. The laws of the United States, of course, take precedence over the State laws on the subject of patents and trade-marks. The prior use of a trade-mark would be a large factor ip the case. Very likely the matter of registration would not enter very largely into the determination of the case. The case would most probably be 9.ecided on the principle of "unfair competition.'' This is set out in Section 4632 of the Code, which reads as follows: "FRAUDULENT TRADE-MARKS, etc. Any attempt to .encroach upon the business of a trader, or other person, by the use of similar trade-marks, names, or devices, with the intention of deceiving and misleading the public, is a fraud for which equity grants relief." Whether or not either party is attempting to encroach upon 266 the business of the other, by the use of a similar trade-mark, and if so, which is the guilty party, are matters of fact depending very largely upon the history of the trade-mark and the circumstances surrounding its use. The court would enjoin the party seeking to deceive or mislead the public by the use of a trade-mark similar to that of the other party. For the reasons above stated, you can clearly see that I could not predict what the findings of the court would be on this question. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. County Commissioners are not authorized by law to pay the Ordi nary for calling, passing upon and declaring the results of the various school election of the county under the McMichael Jaw. October 8, 1915. Mr. William D. Buie, Nashville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of the 5th inst., asking my opinion as to whether or not the County Commissioners of your county have authority to pay the Ordinary for calling, passing upon and declaring the resu~ts of the various school elections of the county under the McMichael law. It appears that there is no express authority for the payment of this claim. Section 82 (13) provides for the payment of managers and clerks. Section 513 of the Code provides for the purposes for which county taxes may be assessed. No claim against the county can be paid for any other purpose than that for which taxes may be levied. See case of Albany Bottling Co. v. Watson, 103 Ga., p. 502. Also Houston County v. Kersh & Wynne, 82 Ga., p. 252. In looking over the subsections one to nine of Paragraph 513, I do not find any authority which seems broad enough to cover the expenses under consideration. Unless it is the last subsection, to wit, subsection 9, which reads as follows: ''To pay any other lawful charge against the county." . From the decisions cited above,. I do not think these sections would authorize the payment of the charges. No money can 267 be drawn from a county unless there is express authority for paying the same, or the authority is necessarily implied from other powers expressly granted. This implication of authority relates to the payment of the money for the services, and not as to the services themselves. See the cases above cited. While it seems that the Ordinary in this case ought in justice to be paid for his services, yet when asked for a strictly legal opinion as to the authority of the county to pay for ~he same, I must conclude that I do not think under the law the county i_s author. ized to pay the chargeil mentioned in your letter. You will understand that this is not an official opinion, as under the law I can not furnish an official opinion except on request of the Governor, but I am glad to give you my views on the subject. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Road laws of Georgia. October 8, 1915. Hon. W. B. James, Oak Hill, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your favor of the 4th instant. You wish a copy of the road laws of Georgia. lam very sorry to say that in this particular instance I am unable to serve you for the reason that the road laws of Georgia are not published except in the Code of the State. Some ten or fifteen years ago Col. Goetchius, of Columbus, Ga., printed road laws of the State, and some five or six years ago they were published by Marshall Bruce & Co., of Nashville, Tenn. These publications are now out of print. and there have been so many amendments to the road laws that they would be of no value at the present time. You state in your letter that your county is operating under the old system. The only place to get this law is in the Code of 1910, which you can find in the office of the Ordinary of your county. You will find the law on this subject embraced in Sections 647 to 693 inclusive, and in Sections 724 to 757 inclusive. You will find the alternative road law in Sections 694 to 704 Miclusive, and the four days law in Sections 705 to 723 inclusive. 268 If you have any question relating to the road laws which you wish to have answered, if you will write me I will gladly give you my views. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD w A~KER, Attorney~General. Patients who leave their bills unpaid at a sanatorium, are not guilty of violating the criminal laws of this State passed for the protection of hotel keepers, etc. Sanatorium is not a hotel, inn, tavern, etc. October 8, 1915. Davis-Fischer Sanatorium, Atlanta, Ga. GENTLEMEN: Your letter addressed to Hon. Warren Gnce, former Attorney-General of Georgia, has been received. You ask for an opinion as to whether or not patients who leave their bills at the Sanatorium unpaid, and who fail and refuse to pay them, are subject to prosecut,ion for a violation of the criminal laws of the State. Replying thereto, I beg to say that the law allows the Attorney-General to furnish official opinions only on request of the Governor. However, it will be my pleasure to indicate to you what my personal .views on the question suggested are. Under a recent Act of the Legislature, codified as Section 718 of Park's new Code of Georgia, a person who obtains food, lodging or other accommodation at any hotel, inn, boarding house or lodging house in the State with intent to defraud the owner or keeper of the same, is, under certain conditions, guilty of misdemeanor. However, the criminal law .is to be strictly construed, and I do not think this law would appy to a sanatorium. An ''inn'' is defined in law as including ''All taverns, hotels, and houses of public general entertainment for guests.'' I do not think that a sanatorium could be called ''a house for public general entertainment for guests." For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion that a sanatorium is not embraced within the terms of the Act mentioned. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 269 A municipality has the legal right to prescribe reasonable regulations for the operations of automobiles. October 18, 1915. Dr. W. R. Brigham, Dublin, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your favor of October 6, addressed to my predecessor, reached me only to-day. Replying, I beg to say that it is within the law authorizing police regulation of a municipality to prescribe reasonable regulations for the operations of automobiles. As indicated, these regulations must be reasonab!.J. If, in the judgment of the higher courts, the ordinance is unreasonable and unjust it can be set aside. It occurs to me that the facts stateu by you constitute no ground of attack on the law, but make powerful evidence which should affect the discretion of the trial under the law. That which is unlawful under ordinary circumstances becomes lawful under extraordinary circumstances. In a case of life and death a greater speed would be permitted than in ordinary circumstances. However. all this is directed to the sound discretion of the Court or jury. These are my personal views. Indeed the law does not permit this department to render official opinions except on request of the Governor. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Law governing the subject of reckless driving of automobiles. October 18, 1915. Rev. Mr. William S. Branham, Calhoun, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 13th inst., the Acts of the Legislature of 1910, page 90, contain the general statute law on the subject of reckless driving of automobiles. You can find these also in Park's new Code. The City Ordi~ nances in the hand of the City Clerk are subject to your inspection as a citizen and taxpayer. These laws simply protect you from the excesses suggested, and it is the duty of every officer of the law to enforce these laws. When some innocent child 270 is killed, there will be a great revulsion of opinion, but alas! it will be too late. Personally I deem the man whose efforts place a check upon reckless driving to be the best friend of the drivers. Three persons were killed in Atlanta in one week recently. Another man was killed yesterday. If the drivers do not hold themselves within due bounds, they will find the reaction against them most embarrassing. These are my personal views. Indeed the law does not permit me to render a~ official opinion except on request of the - Governor. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. City of Buford has authority to collect street tax of persons under 21 years of age. Sections cited. October 19, 1915. Messrs. Harry D. Power, T. G. Haynes, Buford, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have before me your favors of recent date. They would have had earlier attention but I was out of the State on business connected with the office. You raise the question of the legal right of the City of Buford to collect street tax of persons under 21 years of age who are deprived of the right to vote. Replying thereto, I beg to advise that in the police regulation of a city the city has such authority when granted to it by the Legislature. Code of Georgia, Section 1015, lOth Court of Appeals, 337. 5th Appeals 299. Acts of 1910 54. On investigation of the question of the Legislative authority I find that the charter of the City of. Buford grants such. authority to the city. See Acts of 1896, Section 22, page 141. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 271 The County Board of Education of a county has the right to order a new schoC)Ihouse built if they consider it for the best interest of the people. October 19, 1915. Mr. Geo. P .. Warren, Hoboken, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of yesterday I beg to say that the authority of a County Board of Education in the matter of discretion in the expenditure of the county's share of school money is wide and the courts would not interfere with this discretion unless it was plainly and manifestly abused. Under the law they would have a right to order a new schoolhouse bui"lt if they considered it for the best interest of the people. If they abuse their discretion your best remedy would be to have others elected in their place. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Without the consent of the municipality, the County Commissioners_ can not work the roads or streets within the incorporate limits. October 19, 1915. Hon. W. T. Moring, Clerk, Reidsville, Ga. DEAR Sm : I have before me your request for an opinion on the question of the authority of County Commissioners to work the original public roads that run through towns and villages that are now incorporated towns and cities and beg to say: The question has not been definitely decided by our courts of last resort. However, their expressions have been such that we are left in little doubt as to what they would hold on a proper case. In the case of the Commissioners of Polk County vs. l\fayor and Council of Cedartown (110 Ga. 824) it was held: "When the corporate limits of a city are so extended as to embrace therein a portion of a public highway and bridge over a stream crossing the same, the municipal authorities at once acquire the right to exercise jurisdiction over the bridge and are 272 chargeable with the duty of keeping it in repair after the county authorities have expressly relinquished such jurisdiction, which they may do with or without the assent of the municipal authorities." "The moment that the Charter of the City of Cedartown was so amended as to embrace within the limits of that corporation that portion of the public road of which the bridge in question formed a part, the jurisdiction of the county over this part of the highway ceased, and the same became subject to the control and jurisdiction of the municipal authorities." 110 Ga. 825; 108 Ga. 417. "The county was no longer under any duty in respect thereof." 110 Ga. 825. - "The obligation on the part of the county to keep such road or bridge in repair immediately ceases." 110 Ga. 826. "It is obvious that the officers having control of county affairs can not justly be permitted to control the streets of a city and for this conclusion there are at least two satisfactory reasons." 141 Ga. 550. 1 Elliott on Roads & Streets, Section 503. The conclusion is that jurisdiction over streets within an incorporated town or city is in the town or city. The county authorities can neither be forced to work these streets nor can they work or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over them or any part of them without the consent of the town or city. However, in the case of Daniels vs. Athens, 54 Ga. 79, 55 Ga. 609, it was held that where county authorities, with the consent of the municipal authorities, built a bridge within the city limits, which was treated both by the comity and the municipal authorities as a county bridge, the city was under no duty to keep the same in repair. Having voluntarily built the bridge, with the consent of the municipal authorities, it was under a duty to keep the same in repair, and that this duty did not rest upon the municipal authorities. County authorities have wide discretion as to where ro_ad work is to be done. They can not be forced to work any street in a municipality. If, in their discretion, they see fit to work any such street by and with the consent of that municipality, they have authority to do so. See authorities above named and cases therein cited. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 273 The Tax-Receiver's comm1ss1ons on the State taxes are paid by the Tax-Collector upon the production of the Comptroller-General's receipt for his digest. The Tax-Receiver's commissions on county taxes are paid on county orders just as other claims against the county are paid. l'~'J1Ll~Iilih;;1LLJJ.c~~i~r.~-~" 'L~j j~J I -'; : ,i -~ October 20, 1915. Mr. Fred B. Heaton, Tax-Receiver, Bowersville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of the 11th inst. in which you ask whether your commissions as Tax-Receiver on county taxes are paid by the Tax-Collector or are paid by the county on a county warrant. In reply I will say that your commissions O:Q. the State taxes are paid by the Tax-Collector, upon the production of the Comptroller-General's receipt for his digest. See Section 1211 (8) of the Code. There is no authority of law for the Tax-Collector to pay your commissions on county taxes. These are paid by the county on county orders just as other claims against the county are paid. See Section 1202 of the Code. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney~General. Discussion as to whether or not the Treasurer and his bondsmen would be liable for paying certain 9ounty order in excess of the amount authorized by law. Atlanta, Ga., October 21, 1915. Mr. J. A. Space, Darien, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, asking my opinion whether or not the Treasurer and his bondsmen would be liable for paying certain county orders. You say in your letter that the County Commissioners are authorized to spend forty per cent. of the revenues of the county for roads, but that they have been spending more than that amount, and you wish to know whether or not the Treasurer is liable in the event he has paid this excess over the amount stated to be authorized 274 by law. In reply, I will say that from the facts stated in your letter it is impossible to. give any very definite answer to your inquiry. In the first place you do not state under what system of road WQrking your county is operating. As you know there are three systems employed by the different countie~; the alternative road law, the four days law, and the old system sometimes termed the "stick and dirt plan." Under the first system . a tax of not more than four-tenths of one per cent. may be levied on all of the taxable property of the county for use on the roads. Under the second system a tax of not less than ten, and not more than twenty-five cents per hundred of taxable property may be levied. Under the third system mentioned above, no road tax at all can be levied for road purposes. See Haisten vs. Glover, 114 Ga., page 992. For the reasons stated above, I do not know where you find the authority. that the Commissioners are not permitted to spend more than ''forty per cent. of the revenue of the county on roads." Assuming that the Commissioners are spending more than they are authorized to spend, I could not answer your question without knowing under what system they are working, the manner in which it is being spent, the fund from which it is being paid, and whether or not the county is receiving the benefit thereof. The determination of the question would turn very largely on the particular .facts .of the case. I presume that the payments you refer to were made upon county orders drawn by the Commissioners upon the Treasurer for the payment of debts apparently due by the county. I presume, also, that the county must have received the benefit of the money so paid out and expended. No case like that presented in your letter has ever been before the Supreme Court of this State so far as I can find. However, from some expressions used by the court in cases similar in some respects, I judge that it would take a pretty strong case to render the Treasurer and his bondsmen liable in a case of this sort. Of course, if there was a total absence of authority to authorize the expenditure on the part of the Commissioners, the Treasurer would have the right to refuse to pay the county orders. In the case of Shannon vs. Reynolds, 78 Ga., page _760, the Supreme Court says: 275 "Unless this Treasurer, who is the executive officer of the Ordinary, could show that the order on him was fraudulent, or that a mistake existed as to the amount found to be due, he could not go behind the judgment of the Ordinary, acting as County Commissioner, directing the payment of this stLm." The same principle is announced in the case of Neal Loan & Banking Co. vs. Chastain, 121 Ga., page 500. The general rule seems to be that the Ordinary or Commissioners in auditing the claims against the county and drawing orders on the Treasurer for their payment act as a sort of court and their judgments in these matters have the same effect as ordinary judgments of other courts. The Treasurer can not go behind them except in the cases mentioned in the cases above cited and in the event there is a total lack of authority in the Commissioners to make the payments. In just what cases the Treasurer would be held personally liable for the payment of orders drawn by the proper officers has not been decided by our courts. For this reason, I could not give a definite opinion without having all of the facts of the case before me. In any event it is pretty hard to tell just what the courts are going to decide on the peculiar facts of any case where you have no previous decision to guide you. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General.- 1. Discussion as to whether or not a County School Superintendent is a State or County officer. 2. Whether it is necessary for this officer to be a resident of the county in which he offers for election two years prior to the election. 3. Citizenship depends upon the intention of the person. Atlanta, Ga., October 29, 1915. lllr. J. C. Upshaw, Covington, Ga. DEAR Sm : I have your letter of recent date asking for an opinion on the following questions: 1. Is the Comity Superintendent of Schools a State or County officer? 271 2. Is it necessary for this officer to be a resident of the county in which he offers for election two years prior to the election? 3. \Vhen is a man a resident of a county so as to render him qualified to hold a public office? The first question you ask is a very difficult one to answer. There is no decision of our Supreme Court clearly defining just what is a county officer. The constitutional county officers are those which were in existence at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1877. See the case of J\Iorris vs. Glover, 121 Ga., page 751. These were the officers provided for by law for the transaction of county matters before the adoption of the Constitution of 1877, and included the Clerk of the Superior Court, the Sheriff, Tax Collector, Tax Receiver, Treasurer, Coroner, and Surveyor and possibly the Ordinary. These officers were recognized by the present Consti~ution. Constitution, Art. XL., Sec. 11. All these officers are required to be elected by the people, and must have been residents of the county for two years prior to their election, and hold their offices for four years. By Art. XI, Sec. 111 of the Constitution it was provided that whatever tribunal or officers were created after the adoption of the Constitution ''for the transaction of county matters," except Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, should be uniform throughout the State. Thus it appears that county officers are those, (1) who are elected by the people, (2) who are elected for "the transaction of county matters," (3) who hold their offices for four years, (4) who have been residents of the county for two years and are qualified voters. All of the above mentioned officers are county officers and must have the qualifications set out above. Now, it appears that the General Assembly has provided that the Superintendent of County Schools is to be elected by the people of the county for a term of four years, and at the same election as that in which the State and County officers are elected, that the office shall be uniform throughout the State, and for the transaction of county matters. See Sec. 12 of the Act of the Legislature approved August 21, 1911. It looks, therefore, very much as if the intention of the Legislature was to make this office a county office. In the !lase of McLain vs. State, 71 Ga., page 284, the Supreme Court held that the County 277 School Commissioners were not county officers. The reason given by the Court for this holding was that these officers at that time were elected by the grand jury and held their offices for a term of four years. (It will be noted that at that time all county officers held their offices for a term of two years.) The views above expressed are strengthened by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the case of Rose vs. State, 107 Ga., pages 702 and 703, in which it was held that a constable is a county officer. In this case it was strongly intimated that Ordinaries, Justices of the Peace, and Members of the Board of Education where elected by the people are county officers. On the other hand, it is claimed that the Superintendent of County Schools is a State officer for the reason that he is a part of the State school system. Under the Act of the General Assembly approved August 21, 1913, the State is divided into school districts, each county being a district. (Section 4 of the Act.) The State Superintendent of Schools has the authority to suspend a County Superintendent. (Sec. 9.) The State Superintendent has charge of the administration of the State school fund, general superintendence of the schools, and the County Superintendent is responsible to the State Superintendent. (Sees. 5, 9, 10, 11.) It is the duty of the former t~ enforce all the regulations, rules, and instructions of the latter. (Sec. 12.) The County Superintendent is partly paid from the State school fund, but the county board has the authority to supplement his salary. (Sec. 15.) The State provides what is known as a school fund. See Section "1515 of the Code of 1910. It is claimed that the County School Superintendent is only a district agent or instrumentality used by the State in administering this State school fund. There is some force in this argument, and some lawyers are inclined to take this view of the matter. However, I must say that there is a very plausible reply to the above argument in this: (1) Neither the particular duties of an officer nor the character of the office necessarily determine the class in which it should be designated. See Collins vs. Russell, 107 Ga., page 427 and 428. (2) The fact that the officer is concerned with the administration of the State laws within his particular county or district does not necessarily make the officer a State officer. All the county officers, and especially the Sheriffs, Clerks of the Superior Courts, .and Tax- 278 Collectors and Tax-Receivers are vitally concerned with the administration of the State laws in their particular counties. Rose vs. State, 107 Ga., 702-3. The Tax Collector deals directly with the State in the collection of the State taxes and is responsible directly to the State, yet he is certainly a county officer. The Clerk of the Superior Court has many duties to perform for and on behalf of the State, and yet he is a county officer. The same may be said of the Coroner. So it appears that the arguments are pretty evenly balanced on the question as to whether the County School Superintendent is a Stat"e or county officer. There is yet another view of the matter which may be correct. That view is, that the County School Superintendent is both a State and county officer, but is neither a Constitutional county or State officer. If he be a county officer, that is to say a statutory county officer and not a constitutional county officer, then Section 258 (7) of the Code of 1910 may apply. This Section provides as follows: "No person shall be eligible to hold any county office in any county of this State, unless he shall have been bona fide a citizen of the county in which he shall have been elected or appointed at least two years prior to his election or appointment, and is a qualified voter entitled to vote." This Section in my opinion applies to any officer whose duties are of a county nature, or who is elected or appointed "for the transaction of county matters," although he is not a Constitutional county officer. See Section 113 of the Code. This is true for the reason that the Constitution provides that "County officers'' must be elected by the people, and the Section quoted includes those officers who are either elected or appointed. The reply to the last argument abov:e alluded to is, That the Section quoted is only an Act of the Legislature, and that the Act of the Legislature passed in 1911 in Section 14 provides thatthe County Superintendent of Schools must "be a resident of the county in which he offers for election.'' It may be said that the last mentioned Act supersedes the first for the reason that it is the last expression of the legislative will on the subject and in a matter dealing directly with the qualifications of the County Superintendent of Schools. You will doubtless think that I have extended this opinion to great length without coming to any conclusion in the matter. 279 This is true. The whole matter is involved in so much obscurity and uncertainity that the best lawyers differ widely on it. The opinion of a lawyer is not worth very much on the subject. It will require a ruling of. the Supreme Court to clear up the whole matter and let us know "where we are at." I have given you all the law and decisions of the courts so far as I can find throwing any light on the subject. The answer to your second question depends entirely on the answer to the first, and I have done my best in answering that. In reply to the third question, I will say that under Art. 2, Sec. 1, Par. 3, of the Constitution of this State, to entitle a person to register and vote, he must have been a resident of the State one year, and must have resided in the county for six months neit,preceding the election at which he offers to vote. In order to hold a public office he must have the same qualifications unless there is an exception in the case of the County Superintendent of Schools, and the answer to that question would depend upon the answer to the first question propounded by you. A person is a resident of a county when he has taken up his abode in that county with his family with the intention of permanently remaining or abiding there with his family. If he goes to such county only for a certain purpose and with no intention of permanently abiding there, or if he has the slightest intention of removing therefrom, he is not legally a resident of the county. This intention must in all cases be bona fide. No certain length of time is required to establish domicile or residence, but a certain length of residence or domicile is required to entitle one to exercise the privilege of voting or holding office. Code Sections 2181 and 2186. There must be a bona fide intention to abandon the former residence before residence in the latter county is acquired. Bush vs.. State, 10 App. 544 (2). Daniel vs. Sullivan, 46 Ga. 277.. Peacock vs. Collins, llO Ga. 281 (1, 2). You will understand that this is not an official opinion, as this office is not permitted to furnish an official opinion except on the request of the Governor. However, I am very glad to 280 give you the benefit of my personal views on the questions submit1ed in your letter. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney~General. Confederate veterans may peddle without a license. November 5, 1915. Mr. M. R. Peacock, Pavo, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of recent date, Section 1889 of the Code provides that all Confederate veterans may peddle without a license. The Ordinary should permit you to peddle under this Section. It is true that Sections 1888 and 1892 refer to a disabled soldier, but the Section first named authorizes your exemption. If the Ordinary is not clear in the matter, have him write to me and I will gladly take the matter up with him. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Lien on tourist's automobile for work done. November 5, 1915. Pate Garage, Montezuma, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have yours of recent date asking some ques~ tions with reference to 'the lien laws of the State. In reply I will say that if a tourist from Fulton County passes through your county and engages you to repair his automobileyou have a special lien for such services which may be asserted by holding the property. See Section 3354 of the Code. If you surrender possession of the car to the debtor, in order to assert your lien against it, you are required to record your claim or lien within ten days. This claim must be recorded in the office 281 of the Clerk of the Supedor Court of the county where the owner resides. See. Section above cited. If you foreclose the claim for lien it would be necessary that the proceedings should be instituted in the county where the debtor resides, that is to say in Fulton County if the tourist lives there. See Section 3366, 1, 2, 3, and 4 and 5 of the Code. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. No State or county tax on selling Bibles or spelling books. When authorized by charter, municipality may impose tax. November 5, 1915. Mr. A. Murphy, Quitman, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date there is no State or county tax on selling Bibles or spelling books. The city can impose a municipal business tax provided they pass an ordinance to that effect, and further provided they are so authorized by their city charter. You can get this information from the City Clerk. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER,. Attorney-General. A county can not offer rewards to be paid from county funds. November 9, 1915. Hon. L. R. Wiggins, Ringgold, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 8th inst., you will find that the Section of the Code limiting the' objects for which the Ordinary can levy taxes does not include a levy for the purpose named. For this reason any such appropria- tion as suggested by you would be illegal. The county cannot offer rewards. There is a special provision made therefor 282 through the Governor, and I suggest that application be made to him. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney~General. Assessment of property in contemplation of the Inheritance Tax Law should be based on the actual or market value of the property. November 19, 1915. Hon. W. A. Mallory, Tax-Collector, Athens, Ga. DEAR Sm: I am iri receipt of your favor of recent date requesting an official opinion upon the construction of the Inheritance Tax Act and in response beg to say that the language of. the Act on the question submitted is as follows: "They (the appraisers) shall appraise such property at its actual or market value at the time of the death of the decedent." -Acts of 19l3, page 96. This law was passed in 1913, when the custom of assessing taxes on a percentage of its actual or market value was recognized; in spite of this fact the Legislature expressly and clearly registered its will that in assessing Inheritance Tax the act1wl or market value should be adopted. It will be recalled that this Inheritance Tax is not a tax on the property directly, but on the right to inherit; therefore, the rules applying to direct property taxation do not apply exactly. It is my opinion that assessment of property in contemplation of the Inheritance Tax Law should be based on the "actual or market value" of the property. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 283 There is no general law directing the payment of rewards to sheriffs arresting 'escaped felony convicts. November 20, 1915. Hon. L. E. Gibbs, Sheriff, Abbeville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have received your favor. and regret to say that I know of no general law directing the payment of rewards to sheriffs arresting escaped felony convicts. The Governor sometimes offers rewards in special cases, but I believe the rules of his department prevent the payment of rewards to Sheriffs. You might look into the matter and see if a reward was offered by others. Perhaps the county authorities offered such a reward. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, . .Attorney-GeneraL Law regarding working on the Sabbath. Section 416. November 20, 1915. JJir. 0. M. Hayward, President, Reeves, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 12th instant I beg to say that the only law against Sunday work is the general statute making it a misdemeanor to engage in the regular and usual work of the week day on Sunday,-the work of ordinary calling. You will find this in Criminal Code of Georgia, Section 416. Your Justice of the Peace will furni~h this to you. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. Legal method of paying out money derived from the taxes collected. .Atlanta, Ga., November 20, 1915. Hon. G. H. Gilreath, Treasurer, Cartersville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your favor of recent date regarding the tax levy for your county and requesting an opinion as to the J84 legal method of paying out money derived from the taxes for 1915. It appears from your letter that the County of Bartow has a considerable outstanding indebtedness for the year 1914. It further appears that this indebtedness is in the form of county warrants or orders issued by the County Commissioners upon you as Treasurer. I assume that this indebtedness was legally contracted by the county and that the same is a lawful claim upon the county. You do not state in your letter for what purposes the aforesaid indebtedness was created. I assume, however, that the claims against the county were properly audited and allowed and registered, and that each of the orders . representing this indebtedness specifically designates upon what particular fund such order is drawn. This is required by Section -410 of the Civil Code. I suppose that all of these orders have been properly presented as required by Section 411 of the Code. You say in your letter that there were not sufficient funds raised by taxation during the year 1914 from the tax levies of that year to pay these county orders. Therefore, if these debts are legal and legally incurred, not having been paid at the time when they fell due, they remain a legal debt against the county and rank as an accumulated debt. You send me in your letter a copy of the tax levies for the year 1915. I assume that this levy was properly and lawfully made, and therefore, I do not stop to consider whether or not the total per cent. levied is in excess of the 50 per cent. of the State tax for this year as required by Section 508 of the Code. I might say, however, in passing, that items one, two, six, and seven of the levy, as well as the levy of the special school tax, are not to be considered in ascertaining whether or not the levy exceeds the 50 per cent. on the State tax for the year. See Section 508 of the Code. Also see Waller v. Perkins, 52 Ga. Reports, page 234. Also, I might say that the county authorities have the right under the law to levy the_ per cent. of tax for the purposes mentioned in item one of the levy without the recommendation of the Grand Jury, and, if necessary, to make this per cent. equal to the difference between the current expenses; that is to say for those matters mentioned in items three, four, five, and eight of the tax levy, and one hundred per cent. upon 285 the State tax for the year. See Section 507 of the Code. Also see case of Sheffield v. Chancy, 138 Ga., page 677. Section 513, of the Code prescribes the objects for which a county tax may be levied. The purposes herein enumerated do not include the special road tax under the alternative road law, nor the local school tax under the l\Icl\fichael law. It appears that the tax levy followed the language of the Code in the Sec- tion mentioned, except that no tax is levied to pay the coroner's fees for holding inquests. I assume, therefore, as stated above, that this tax levy was lawfully made. Section 516 of the Code provides that taxes raised for educa- tional purposes, or for the support of the poor, or any other specific purpose,. must be used for such purpose respectively, and none other. - Item one of you~ tax levy is as follows: "Thirty cents on the $100.00 to pay the legal indebtedness of the county due or to become due during the year 1915, or past due." This levy fol- lows the exact language of Paragraph 1, Section 513 of the Code. Of course you will understand that the money raised by taxes for the year 1915 under each and all of the other items in the levy, with the exception of the first, m~st be applied to the purposes designated therein and for expenses incurred by the county for the year 1915 only. If any of these expenses last mentioned remain unpaid at the end of the year 1915 for the lack of funds in the hands of the Treasurer, then such ex- penses or charges become accumulated debts of the county after the year 1915. The question you ask therefore relates to item one in the tax levy. The purpose of this item as stated above is to pay the legal indebtedness due or to become due during the year 1915, or past due. You wish to know whether the fund arising from taxation for the year 1915 under item one of the levy is to be applied by you to the payment of debts becoming due during the year 1915, or whether if this fund if not suffi- cient to pay the debts becoming due during the year 1915, and also prior debts -for the year 1914, is to be applied first to the payment of the debts for the year 1914. I think there can be no question that the funds arising under item one of the levy may be lawfully applied to the payment of accumulated debts for the year 1911. The question therefore is, whether the accumulated debts for the year 1914 are to be paid first if the 286 funds are insufficient to pay the indebtedness for both years 1914 and 1915. Section 576, Paragraph 3, of the Code provides as follows: "It is the duty of the County Treasurer to pay without delay, when in funds, all orders, according to their date (or other debts due); and when not in funds as hereinafter prescribed." Section 579 of the Code provides as follows: "\Vhen there are funds enough to pay all outstanding orders and other forms of indebtedness due, which the Treasurer may be authorized to pay, they may be paid indiscriminately without regard to their date; when there is enough to pay all dated anterior to some particular dates, all such may be likewise paid indiscriminately; when there is not enough to pay all of equal degree, they shall be paid ratably; under all other circumstances they shall be paid in the order of their dates." - Section 582 of the Code provides that on the first day of December of each year the Treasurer shall make an entry of the order in which the county orders are to be paid. Since the funds raised under item one of the levy are to be used under the law for the payment of the legal indebtedness of the county due, or to become due, or past due, I am of the opinion that Section 579 of the Code above mentioned regulates the order in which the county warrants are to be paid. If this fund is insufficient to pay the indebtedness for the years 1914 and 1915, then the lawful warrants or orders which have been duly presented and registered are to be paid out of this fund first. Section 579 of the Code clearly provides that under such circumstances these orders are to be paid in the order of their dates. If the fund is not ,sufficient to pay all the outstanding orders for the year 1914, then it would have to be applied to the payment of the oldest orders as far as the same will go. If there are several orders bearing the same dates, then the fund would have to be paid out on them ratably. If the fund is sufficient only to pay all orders dated anterior to some particular date, then the entire fund would have to be applied to the payment of such orders. If the fund is sufficient only to pay the legal orders for the year 1914, no part of the same under the Section above quoted could be paid on the 19'15 orders. I hope this will give you the information you wish. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 287 Notes and loan deeds held by a non-resident in an,other State are not subject to taxation by a county in this State. (See cases sited.) November 23, 1915. Mr. R. W. Edwards, Louisville, Ky. DEAR SIR: In reply to your request for an opm10n on the Schley County tax matter I will say that I have looked into the facts set out in your letter to Hon. W. A. Wright, ComptrollerGeneral, of date November 13th, 1915, and am of the opinion that you are not liable for the tax assessed against you in this county, under the facts stated in your letter. It appears from your letter that you are a resident of the State of Kentucky and have been such a resident all your life: You have never lived in the State of Georgia. It appears that you have loaned various sums of money to different parties living in Schley County. It also appears that you have never had an agent in the State of Georgia, but that applications for loans were made by parties reP.resenting the borrowers. It further appears that the notes and loan deeds given to secure the pay~ent of the money loaned by you to parties in Schley County are held by you at your home in Kentucky and are not kept by you in Georgia. Under the facts above stated I am sure that you would not be subject to taxation in the State of Georgia and that you are not liable for the taxes assessed against you in Schley County. This matter has been before the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States. On this subject see. Armour Packing Co. v. Clark, 124 Ga. 307. City of New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S., page 30!!, 44 Law Edition, page 175, and notes. Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vermont, page 152. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S., page 4!!1, 25 Law Edition, page 6!!8. The above cases, together with the cases cited therein and the notes appended to the Stempel case, supre, will give you a full discussion of the legal points involved in the case as presented by your letter. The holding in these c3;ses clearly shows 188 that you are not liable for the taxes assessed against you under the circumstances detailed in your letter. I hope the above will give you the information -you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. County authorities can not be forced to work any street in a municipality, but they have authority, in their discretion, to do so by and with the consent of the municipality. November 23, 1915. Hon. R. W. Wiggins, Ordinary, Ringgold, Ga. DEAR SIR : when you were in this office last week you requested an opinion as to the authority of the County Commissioners to work the public roads that run through towns and villages now incorporated as such. In reply I will say that the question you ask has not been decided definitely by our Courts of last resort. However, the expressions used by the Supreme Court in certain cases are such that we are left in little doubt as to what they would hold on a proper occasion. In the case of the Commissioners of Polk County vs. 1\Iayor and Council of Cedartown, 110 Ga., page 824, it was held: "\Vhen the corporate limits of a city are so extended as to embrace therein a portion of a public highway and bridge over a stream crossing the same, the municipal authorities at once acquire the right to exercise jurisdiction over the bridge and. are chargeable with the duty of keeping it in repair after the County authorities have expressly relinquished such jurisdiction, which they may do with or without the assent of the municipal authorities. "The moment that the Charter of the City of Cedartown was so amended as to embrace within the limits of that corporation that portion of the public road of which the bridge in question formed a part, the jurisdiction of the county over this part of the highway ceased, and the same became subject to the control and jurisdiction of the municipal authorities." "The county was no longer under any duty in respect thereof." llO Ga. 825. "The obligation on the part of the county to keep such road or bridge in repair immediately ceases." 110 Ga. 826. .289 In the same case it was also said : "\Ve do not mean to hold that the county authorities may not, if they see proper to do so, build bridges within the corporate limits of cities and towns or improve the streets of towns and cities embraced within the limits of the county." In the case of Commissioners of Sumter County vs. The -Mayor and Council of Americus it was_ held that a special Act of the Legislature authorizing and requiring the Commissioners to work the county chain-gang npon the streets of the City of Americus for not exceeding three months of each year is unconstitutional and void because it was a special law enacted in a case for which provision had been made in the alternative road law. However in this case the Court says: "It is unnecessary to discuss whether county authorities could, if they saw proper, do work upon the streets of Americus with the approval .of the municipal authorities, or whether that would be beyond the contemplation of the general law. (See Commissioners of Sumter County v. Americus, 141 Ga., page 542.) The conclusion is that jurisdiction over streets within an incorporated town or city is in the town. or city. The county authorities can neither be forced to work these streets nor can they work or otherwise exercise jurisdiction over them or any part of them without the consent of the town or city. However, in the cas~ of Daniels vs. Athens, 54 Ga. 79, 55 Ga. 609, it was held that where county authorities, with the consent of the municipal authorities, built a bridge within the cny limits, which was treated both by the county and the municipal authorities as a county bridge, the city was under no duty to keep the same in repair. Having voluntarily built the bndge, with the consent of the municipal authorities, it was under a duty to keep the same in repair, and that this duty did not rest upon the municipal authorities. County authorities have wide discretion as to where road work is to be done. They can not be forced to work any street in a municipality. If in their discretion they see fit to work any such street by and with the consent of that municipality, it seems from the expression used by the Supreme Court in the cases above cited, that they have authority to do so. However, 290 I have been unable to find any decisions of the Supreme Court directly in point on the question you have asked. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorhey-General. A teacher has no right to whip a child for something the child does on Saturday or Sunday, no school being held on these days. A teacher has the right to lay down reasonable rules and regula tions concerning the conduct of pupils going to and fromschool. December 1, 1915. Hon. B. C. Head, Chairman, Griffin, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have before me your favor of November 30th, in which you requ~st an opinion upon the following questions : l. What right has a school teacher to whip a child for what he or she does on the road home or from home to school ? 2. Has a teacher a right to whip a child for what he does on Saturday or Sunday, when there is no school? I answer the second question first by saying that the teacher has no such right. The parents have absolute control of the child on Saturday and Sunday when there is no school. As a matter of proper discipline the teacher probably has a right to lay down reasonable rules for the conduct of school children on their way to and from school, especially when they congregate or get together on the way or pass public or dan-gerous places. This, in contemplation of the parents relinquishing, voluntarily, their right to control to the supervision of the teacher for the safety and good of the child, but, of course, such right can not be arbitrarily or unreasonably exercised. Trusting I have given you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD w AL.KER, Attorney-General. 291 The word "supervision,". in Code Sec. 1565 (q), means "over-seeing" of schools; the managing and direction of schools in some school unit, either county or city system of schools. December 1, 1915. Prof. E. 111. Pofford, Waycross, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have before me your request for an interpretation of the clause "Five years' experience in actual supervision of schools'' as contained in Code Section 1565 (q). Replying thereto, I beg to say that the author of the Act advises that the intention of this expression involving the definition of the word ''supervision'' is expressed in the literal meaning of the word; that is to say, the "over-seeing" of schools: the managing and direction of schools in some school unit, either county or city system of schools. I have investigated the records of the State School Department and find that this Department has uniformly so construed the law. while custom and precedent are not binding in legal construction they are weighty and when sustained with probable correctness are controlling. That the prineipalship of a single school was not contemplated in this construction is borne out by the context, other expression in the body of the Statute referred to. The word "teaching" implies the occupation ()f such a Principal or the more common ~xpression "Teacher." It is cl~ar that something more than acting as a "Teacher" as commonly understood was contemplated. I conclude that the interpretations given the law here by the school authorities of the State are correct and binding in law. I am appending a succinct statement of the qualifications required which I trust will simplify the difficulties in determining just what the law does mean. County School Superintendent must possess at least one of the following qualifications: I. Three years' experience in teaching, one year of which has been in Georgia, and the possession of a first grade license. 2. A diploma from a reputable college or normal school. 3. Five years' experience in actual school supervision. 292 4. An approved examination before the State Board of Education as to qualification. 5. And, residence in the county for two years before the election. Trusting that this is the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The law regarding the County's right to borrow money. Art. 7, Par. 7, Section 1, Constitution of Georgia. Cases cited. December 6, 1915. Mr. R. K. Hopkins, Meridian, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking for some information as to the issuance of bonds by counties for the purpose of raising money to be used in working the public roads of the county. You state in your letter that the county has already spent on the roads more than the entire income of the county for the year 1916, and that this money has been borrowed by the county. You ask whether or not bonds of the county are good and valid where they are issued against the total income of the county for the said year. I suppose the bonds you refer to are to be issued in addition to the bonds already issued as stated in your letter. I think the question you ask will depend upon the provisions of Art. 7, Par. 7, and Section 1 of the Constitution of this State. This Section provides as follows: "The debt hereafter incurred by any county, municipal cor poration or political division of this State, except as in this Constitution provided for, shall never exceed seven per centum of the assessed value of all the taxable property therein; and no such county, municipality, or division shall incur any new debt, except for a temporary loan or loans to supply casual deficiencies of revenue not to exceed one-fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of taxable property therein, without the assent of twothirds of the qualified voters thereof at an election for that purpose, to be held as may be prescribed by law." You will see from the above provision of the Constitution that 293 no county is authorized to borrow money, except to supply by a temporary loan or loans casual deficiencies of revenue not to exceed one-fifth of one per centum of the assessed value of the taxable property therein, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters at an election held for that purpose. See also the case of Butts County, et al. vs. Jackson Banking Co. et al., 129th Ga., page 801, and the case of Dawson Water Works vs. City of Dawson, 106 Ga., page 713. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. No law provided for protest on the disposition of County's funds. December 7, 1915. Hon. W. B. Townsend, Dahlonega, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday I beg to say that the only legislation on the subject you will find in the Act submitting the Constitutional Amendment which simply gives the Legislature authority to abolish the office of County Treasurer. No provision is made whatever for the disposition of the County funds and the bills have been severely criticised for this reason but the law is so written. I am of the opinion that proper safeguards should have been provided directing tp.e placing of the funds under safe conditions. For the reason indicated I can find no legal basis for protest on the disposition of your own county's funds as you inquire. Trusting this is the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-Gen~ral. 294 Citizenship is determined from the intent of the party. December 9, 1915. Mr. W. A. Payne, Young Cane, Ga. DEAR Srn: Replying to your favor of the 8th inst., it will be impossible for me to give you the opinion as to citizenship, as it is a matter of evidence. It will be determined by the intent of the party largely. If he intended to lose his citizenship in Georgia and gain citizenship in Tennessee, he would probably be disqualified. If, however, he was simply making a trip to decide one way or the other and finally decided to remain in Georgia he would not lose his citizenship here, and therefore would not be disqualified. I am sorry that I cannot be more definite, but this is one of the cases where it is impossible to be thoroughly so. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Authority of Justice of Peace to issue fl. fas. Section 3293. December 14, 1915. lllr. J. W. Colley, Chipley, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking for some information in regard to the foreclosure of some mortgages against parties residing in Troup County. It appears from your letter that five affidavits were made before the Justice of the Peace of the 565 District of Troup County for the purpose of foreclosing certain mortgages on personal property. It further appears that the fi. fas. were issued by the Justice of this district, and that they were made returnable to the Justice Court of the 1689th District of Troup County. You state in your letter that the propery sought to be levied on was located in the last named district, and that the parties against whom the fi. fas. were issued at that time resided in the 1689th district~ You wish to know whether or not. under the law the Justice of the 565 district had the authority under the circumstances above named to issue the fi. fas. making them ' 295 returnable to the Justice Court of the 1689 district of said County. In reply I will say that in my opinion the Justice of the 565th District had the authority to issue the fi. fas. as stated in your letter. See Code of Georgia, Section 3293, which gives him this authority. See also, 122 Ga., page 576. I hope I have given you the information you desire. V cry truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 1. One who is not a lawyer is not authorized to engage in the business of drawing deeds, etc., for other persons and make charges for the same. 2. Such a person could represent another in making collections and receive compensation therefor provided he did not have to go into the courts. 3. A commercial notary public can administer oaths and attest papers in a general way. 4. A commercial notary public, otherwise qualified, is authorized to assist in holding a primary election. Atlanta, Ga., December 14, 1915. Mr. J. L: Dent, Roberta, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date in which you ask the following questions: First. Is a male citizen of the State, who is not a lawyer, authorized to draw deeds, mortgages, contracts, notes, wills, bills of sale, and similar papers, for other persons, and make charges of fees for this work 1 Second. Is such a person, under the law, authorized to make collections for other persons and charge for his services 1 Third. Is a commercial notary public authorized by law to administer oaths and attest papers in a general way where the same is not required to be done by some special officer 1 Fo~rth. Is a commercial notary public authorized to assist in holding a primary election 1 In reply to the above question number one, I will say that Section 4930 of the Code provides that only certain persons who have been admitted to the bar are authorized to practice law in the courts. Section 918 requires such persons to pay a license 296 before engaging in the business of practicing law. Just what constitutes the practice of law has never been defined by the higher courts of this State so far as I can learn. Section 1696 of the Code sets forth what constitutes the practice .of medicine. The Court of Appeals has held that the making of one sale as a real estate agent constitutes "engaging in the business" of a real estate agent so as to render him liable for the tax on such business. Some of the courts of other States have held that the drawing of deeds, wills, etc., is the practicing of law. I am inclined to think, therefore, that if one carries on the business indicated in your first question, that is, engages in it as a business, it would be necessary for him to be admitted to the bar and pay the tax required of lawyers. Of course, it would be no violation of the law for him to draw a deed, will, etc., occasionally, but not as a business, and receive compensation therefor if the person for whom such work was done paid the charges voluntarily. But in no event would the law furnish him any means to enforce payment of such charges unless he were admitted to the bar and had paid the professional tax required of lawyers. In answer to your second question, I think such person has the right to make collections for others and receive compensation therefore, but he could not represent others in the courts in making such collections. In answer to your third question, I will say that a commercial 'notary public can administer oaths and attest papers in a general way where the sall'l:e is not required to be done by some special officer. In answer to your fourth question, I will say that a commercial notary public is authorized to assist in holding a primary election provided he has been properly chosen for this purpose according to the rules of the political party holding the same and takes the manager's oath as required by law. In this connection see Sections 127 and 131 of the Code of 1910. This does not apply where a Justice of the Peace is expressly required. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Yours very truly, ' CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 297 Tax-collectors are required to pay amounts collected by them into tho State Treasury and State Depositories on the first Monday in each month at the time they make their monthly statements. December 15, 1915. Howard Ashburn, Esq., Cashier, Moultrie, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your favor of the lOth inst., directed to the Governor has been by him referred to me for answer. Replying thereto, I beg to say that under Section 1213 of the Code of this State of 1910, it is the duty of the County Tax-Collector to make monthly statements under oath of all taxes, both State and county, collected by him. Under the provisions of Section 1214 of the Code, the TaxCollectors are required to make this monthly statement on the first Monday of each and every month. Section 1215 of the Code provides as follows: "The Tax-Collectors when they make their monthly statements as provided for in the foregoing Sections, after deducting their commissions on the amount included in their monthly statements, shall pay into the State Treasury, or such banks as are designated by the. Governor as State depositories, the hundreds of dollars of the State's part of the amount in said statement, leaving the fractions of hundred dollars on hand, and which will constitute the first item in the next month's statement; they shall also, at the same time, after deducting their commissions for collecting the county's part of the taxes, pay into the county treasury, the hundreds of dollars of the county's part of the amount in said statement, leaving the fraction of hundred dollars on hand, and which will constitute the second item in the next statement." See also, Sections 1213 and 1216. Construing the above quoted Sections together, it appears that the Tax-Collectors are directed to pay the amounts collected by them as State taxes into the State Treasury or such banks as are designated as State depositories at the .time they make their monthly statements, which time is the first Monday in each and every month. The amounts so deposited in the State depositories on the first Monday of each month are amounts collected by the Tax-Collectors since the last monthly statement made by them and since making the last depCn:!it with the State depositories. For this reason it appears that the law does not re- 298 quire Tax-Collectors to pay the amounts collected by them as State taxes into the State depositories as these taxes _are collected, but they are only required to pay the same into the State depository or tlie State Treasury once each month, and on the same time they make their monthly statements. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. ' A municipality may pass reasonable ordinances in regard to where a person may cross its streets. Mr. Geo. W. Mttller, December 18, 1915. City. DEAR SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of 15th instant, in which you inquire if the City of Atlanta has the right to pass an ordinance preventing a man from walking across the street at any point whatsoever when he has been a voter, taxpayer and resident of that city for thirty-five years. In response, I beg to say that the only legal inhibition against the enactment of ordinances for the police regulation of a municipality is that the ordinances must not be unreasonable. Whether or not the traffic and dangers incident to travel on the streets are such as to make the new regulations reasonable would be a matter to be finally determined by the courts. I regret that I can not give you a more definite reply. V.ery truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. It' is the duty of the Tax-Collector to always keep open a registration book. December 29, 1~15. Bon. J. A. Tyler, Box Spring, Ga. DEAR SIR : General Wright has given me your favor of the 25th inst. to answer and I beg to say that the General Assembly 299 did pass a law making all registrations permanent unless they are stricken for non-payment of taxes. In other words, no man who has registered and paid his taxes need register again. However, it is the duty of the Tax-Collector to keep open a registration book always. It was the Collector's duty to keep this book this Fall. He can arrange with you to keep it open during the Spring and I would advise this as he may be unfavorably criticised if any one is deprived of voting on his account. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-General. If there are no eye-witnesses to the death, it is the duty of the Coroner to hold an inquest. December 29, 1915. Mr. 0. F. Allen, Newnan, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 25th inst., addressed to the Governor, has been submitted to me for reply. In reply I beg to say that if there were no eye-witnesses to the death it is the duty of tlie Coroner to hold an inquest. If you desire it, I suggest that you write insisting that this be done. The facts will not justify the offer of reward, but it is the duty of the Coroner to bring out all facts in the case, and I feel sure that this will give you the relief that you desire. If we can be of further service command us. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-GeneraL Sections cited relative to abolishing -or discontinuing an existing public road. Atlanta, Ga., December 31, 1915. Mr. H. B. McCollttm, Hapeville, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking what arethe steps necessary under the law in order to abolish or dis- 300 continue an existing public road. In reply, I will say that you will find the law on this subject in Sections 640 to 644 inclusive of the Code of this State of 1910. In the case of Jones vs. Williams et al., Commis~oners, 70 Ga., .page 704, the Supreme Court says: "An existing public road can not be discontinued without the order of the Ordinary or County Commissioners, where there are such Commissioners, passed upon application and notice, and duly registered in the proper office." Section 644 of the Code provides : "Applications for the discontinuance of an old road, in whole or in part, must likewise be made to such Ordinaries (or Com missioners, where there- are Commissioners) in writing, and like wise published, before it shall take effect." This Section was not abolished by the alternative road law. See 118 Ga., page 639. The law requires that the application be filed in the proper office, that notice and citation be published for thirty days at the door of the courthouse, and in a public gazette, if there is one published in the county, and that persons residing on land which such road touches be notified, said notice stating that on a certain day the application will be heard and granted if no good cause be shown to the contrary. Persons interested have a right to object to the order discontinuing the road, and the Ordinaries or Commissioners hear evidence and decide the matter. This is not an official opinion as the law does not permit the Attorney-General to furnish an official opinion except on the request of the Governor, but I am glad to give you the above information.. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 301 A series of auction. sales would be carrying on the business of auctioneer and as such be subject to the license tax. Atlanta, Ga., December 31, 1915. Mr. M. D. Maloof, Clayton, Ga. DEAR Sm: Your letter of recent date received and would have answered sooner but for the rush of business in the office. It appears from your letter that on certain days in each week you auction off a portion of your goods in the store where you carry on your mercantile business, and that you auction off your own goods. You wish to know whether or not under this State of affairs you are liable for the tax required by Section 923 of the Code of this State. In reply, I will say that the answer to this question depends on a definition of the term ''carry on business." Under the rulings of the courts a single auction sale would not constitute the carrying on the business of an auctioneer. 160 U. S. 149; 118 Fed. 239; 26 Fed. Cas. 556; 47 Ala. 533; 55 Ala. 118-119. However, the conducting of a series of such sales would be carrying on such business according to the rulip.gs of the courts. This would not be changed by the fact that you conduct the auction sales in your own place of business. In this connection see: Horsely vs. Woodley, 12 App. 456; Ford vs. Thomaston, 11 App. 359; Abel vs. State, 90 Ala. 631; Napier vs. State, 63 S. C. 60; U. S. vs. Wittig, 28 Fed. Cas. 744. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. A person can not hold the office of postmaster and justice of the Peace at the same time. (Section 160, Postal Laws and Regulations.) Atlanta, Ga., January 4, 1915. Mr. J. H. Crisp, Fender, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date enclosing a copy of a letter from the Assistant Postmaster-General of the United State. It appears that you are postmaster at the office at Fender, Ga., and while holding the same have been elected or appointed Justice of the Peace. You wish to know whether in ~02 my opinion under Section 160 of the Postal Laws and Regulations of the United States you are qualified to hold the position as postmaster if you continue to hold the office of Justice of the Peace. Section 160 of the Postal Laws and Regulatl.ons is as follows: "No person holding an office under the Post Office Department shall accept or hold any elective office under any State, territorial or municipal government (including the offices of alderman, coun cilman, etc.) even though no compensation may attach thereto, and no such person shall accept or hold such office by appointment." It thus appea~s that the inhibition is against holding an office that is elective. The office of Justice of the Peace is an elective office. Sections 115, 116, 117, 118 of the Code of 1910. The fact that Justices of the Peace are commissioned by the Governor . does not prevent the office from being elective. Most of the State and County officers are commissioned by the Governor, but they are still elective officers. I judge from the letter from the Assistant Postmaster-General and from your letter that you were appointed Justice of the Peace to fill an unexpired term under the provisions 4662 of the Code. If this be true, the .office itself is still an elective office even though the present incumbent is filling an unexpired term by appointment. The Section of the Postal Laws and Regulations referred to prohibits the postmaster accepting or holding any elective office. It is the character of the office itself, as to whether or not it is elective, that controls in this matter. The very words of the law itself makes this very plain. They are ''and no such person shall hold or accept such office by appointment." That is, no such person shall accept or hold any elective office by appointment evidently referring to cases in which a person may be appointed to fill an unexpired term in an elective office. You will understand that this is not an official opinion as I could not furnish an official opinion on matters relating to the administration of the Federal Government. . Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. 303 No money can be paid out of the Treasury except upon appropriation .Atlanta, Ga., January 8, 1916. Hon. J. M. Warren, Ordinary, Abbeville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date addressed to the Governor, asking for information as to the failure of the State to pay to the Ordinary the fee of one dollar for each pensioner on the rolls has been turned over to me for reply. It is true that the General .Assembly passed the .Act of 1914 referred to in your letter, but upon investigation I find that no appropriation has ever been made to make these payments. No money can be paid out of the Treasury without an appropriation therefor. The Treasurer could not pay the money and the Governor has no authority to draw the warrants. For this reason the payments have not been made. It may be that the next General .Assembly will make this appropriation, and in that event the fees will be paid. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Vcry truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. The law gives one a right to work in another county and maintain his citizenship in his home county. January 25, 1916. Hon. J. W. Cole, Americus, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your inquiry of recent date, I beg to advise that under the conditions named in your letter, it is clear that you are still a citizen of Paulding County, and are entitled to vote and enjoy all other privileges of a citizen. The law gives one the right to work in another county a part of the year, and still retain his citizenship in the county of his choice if he registers, pays his taxes, maintains a bona fide intention to retain his citizenship and claim his home in the latter county, making that intention known when he leaves the county to do the work, and while he is away-and on his return. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. 304 Church property bearing an income is taxable. w: Mr. H. Venable, February 1, 1916. Commerce, Ga., R. F. D. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date, I under- stand the rule to be that any church property bearing an in- come is taxable. The church building, grounds, cemetery and parsonage, when owned and occupied by the pastor and bring- ing no rent income, should not be taxed. After all the basis of taxation is uniformity. Certainly some of the parsonages should not be taxed and others taxed. You will not have so much right to complain if all parsonages are taxed. However, the rule stated above is my understanding of the law. Trusting this will give you the information you desire, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD 'WALKER, Attorney-General. Where there is a plantation on the line between two or more counties taxes are paid where the improvements or most of the improve. ments are. Atlanta, Ga., 'February 1, 1915. Mr. Stanford Bland, Clerk Commissioners Roads and Revenues, Metter, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking whether or not persons who own tracts of land on a county line be. tween Candler and Tattnall Counties can refuse to pay taxes on their property located in Candler County to the latter county. In reply I will say that according to the provisions of Section 1065 of the Code of 1910, if the land is all eontained in one plantation, the returns are to be made and the tax paid in the county ''where the improvements or most of the improvements are.'' In this connection see the case of Robson vs. DuBose, 79 Ga. Rep., page 721. If the land is not embraced in one "plantation," then the returns thereon are 305 to be made and the taxes paid in that county in which the land lies. See Section 1068 of the Code. Your letter would have been answered earlier but for the fact for the last month I have been busily engaged in the litigation to prevent the paralleling of the Western & Atlantic Railroad, the property of the State. -Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Where there is a dispute as to the boundary line between two coun ties and taxes are paid to the wrong county, such taxes rna)' be recovered back through proper proceedings. Atlanta, Ga., February 1, 1916. Mr. Stanford Bland, Clerk Commissioners Roads and Revenues, Metter, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking my opinion as to the proper method of proceeding to recover certain taxes belonging to Candler County which have been paid to Tattnall County on account of the fact that there was a dispute between these counties as to the location of the boundary line. In reply I will say that in my opinion the best method would be to .proceed against Tattnall County or its officers to recover these taxes. You are doubtless aware that Candler County could not recover and would not be entitled to the taxes for the year in which Candler County was created. Tn t:Q.is connection see the case of Tift County vs. Berrien County, 131 Ga. Rep., page 259. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 306 Judgments of Justice Courts rendered, in any civil cause, anywhere else than at the place for the holding their courts lawfully appointed are void. Atlanta, Ga., February 1, 1916. Mr. W. B. Ingram, Justice of the Peace. DEAR Sm : I have your letter of a few days ago requesting my opinion on the question as to whether or not a judgment rendered by a Justice of the Peace is valid and legal if the same is not rendered at some place in the district previously fixed and established according to law. In reply I will say that Section 4705 of the Code of 1910 provides as follows: "All judgments of such justices rendered, in any civil cause, anywhere else thart at the place for the holding their courts lawfully appointed are void." It appears from your letter that the Justice Court has been held in the Town of Ellenton, but that it is held at no fixed place in the town, but that it is held at different houses in the town. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hilson vs. Kitchens judgments rendered under the circumstances above stated would be void. In that case it was said: '~As there was no authority for holding court in the Town of Mitchell at any other place than in the house in which the court was first held, a judgment rendered at any other place is absolutely void." The case above cited appears to be very much like your case, and it might help you to get the case and read it. It will be found in Vol. 107, Ga. Rep., page 230. I would have answered earlier but for the press of business in this office. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, A ttorneY:-General. 307 Question as to whether or not the School Superintendent is a State or County officer. February 1, 1916. Hon. J. H. Hall, Newton, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday, the question you submit has given us more trouble than any question yet before us. You can understand this when I tell you that the printed reports of the .Attorneys-General show that one of my predecessors has held the School Superintendent to be a State officer and another has held that he is a county officer. The matter turns upon this question, and the authorities are so confusing that to be perfectly frank our office and that of the State School Superintendent believe that only a decision of the Supreme Court will determine the matter. The question is so well balanced that I am advising my friends who inquire to take the chance and run the risk of the question being legally raised and determined in the courts. I regret that I could not give you a clear-cut reply, but the conditions. are as stated herein. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. A suit in a Justice Court must be tried in the district of the defendant's residence unless he waives jurisdiction. February 1, 1916. lllr. W. H. Weaver, Justice of the Peace, Marion, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking my opinion as to whether or not you are disqualified to try a certain case now pending in your court. As I understand from your letter the defendant does not reside in your district. The Justice of the Peace in the District in which the defendant resides is disqualified. .As the Justice of the Peace is not a party to the proceedings, I am inclined to- think that the case will have to be brought and tried in the district of the defendant's residence. If there is no other Justice of the Peace in the district of the defendant's residence, you would be authorized 308 and qualified to issue all process and preside in that district in the case stated in your letter, but not in your own district if the defendant raises proper objection thereto. In this connection see Code of 1910, Section 4669. Also, see the case of Dozier vs. Allen, 65 Ga. Rep., page 254. Your letter would have been answered earlier but for the fact that for the last month I have been engaged in litigation trying to prevent the paralleling of the State Road. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-Gel!-eral. An Ordinary cannot refuse t'o issue license for a retail dealer in near beer if the amount of the tax is paid or tendered. Atlanta, Ga., February 1, 1916. Han. J. R. TVllams, Solicitor-General, Americus, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, asking my opinion on the following question: The Ordinary of your county has _issued an execution against one Petripole for failure to pay the tax imposed on wholesale dealers in "near-beer" under Section 983 of the Code of 1910. Petripole is contesting the validity of this execution and during the pendency of the proceedings, he has made application for a license as a retail dealer in ''near beer'' under Section 984 of the Code. The question is whether or not the Ordinary can refuse to issue this license for a retail dealer in near beer if the amount of the tax is paid or tendered? I have looked into the matter and can not find any valid reason or law authorizing the Ordinary to refuse to issue this license if the tax is paid and the law otherwise complied with. I do not think the Ordinary has any discretion in the matter. I am sorry that my answer to your letter has been delayed, but for the last month I have been at work very hard in the litigation to prevent the paralleling of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Vcry truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 309 A foreign corporation engaged in the business of buying wages is not subject to a professional tax. February 2, 1916. Messrs. Parker, Walker & Parker, W ayoross, Ga. GENTLEMEN: Your favor of 25th ult., was not answered promptly because I was engaged in court on the L. & N. litigation. Replying thereto, I beg to say that the tax on loan agents is required under Section 2, Paragraph 18, of the Tax Act. The tax on the President is a personal occupation tax required under Section 3 of the Act and is legal. The third (professional) tax sought to be collected seems not to be authorized. If it is predicated on Paragraph 32, it is not legal as the taxes 'on foreign corporations are paid through the Comptroller-General's office and the records of that office show that this corporation has registered and paid the tax for several years. I can find no basis for the charge in the law. The Comptroller-General agrees with me and the Tax-Collector will be authorized to relieve the payment of the tax unless he can cite us to other authority in which case I will be pleased to confer with General Wright and advise him promptly. With an expression of the writer's high regard. Very truly yours; CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Residents of a territory recently withdrawn from the limits of the city by an Act reducing the size of the city are liable for the city taxes, if they were within the limits of the city at the time fixed for the return of taxes for the year. February 5, 1916. H. L. Causey, Esq., Attorney, Alma, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of the 2d inst., I am of the opinion that- the residents of territory recently withdrawn from the limits of your city by an Act reducing the size -of the city will be subject to city taxes if they were within the 310 corporate limits of the city at the time fixed by the city for return of taxes for the year. You can ascertain just what time this was, and determine the matter accordingly. You will recall that the Code permits the Atto.rney-General to render official opinions only on request of the Governor. However, I give you this as my personal opinion on the matter. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD "\V.ALKER, Attorney-General. School district could legally issue bonds to purchase and build a school building. February 5, 1916. Ohas. Pigue, Esq., Statesboro, Ga. DEAR Sm: I deeply regret that my connection with the L. & N. litigation has been such that I could not possibly give attention promptly to my mail for the last few days. Responding to your favor of January 28th, you will note that the law does not permit me to give official opinions except on request of the Governor. However, I am glad to give you my personal views on the question submitted by you. I am of the opinion that the school district could legally issue bonds to purchase as well as to build a school building. The school district could proceed under the law as for the building of a new school building. See Acts _of 1912, page 176. Having so proceeded and collected the money on the bonds, they could purchase from the City the present building. I believe the above to be within the substance of the law and that it will be sustained. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A citizen is not automatically dropped from the registration Jist if he does not pay his taxes on or before December 20th, but will be given until the registration books are closed the following year. A person who has not paid his 1915 taxes cannot vote in the primary of 1916. A person must reside six months in a county before he can vote. A person registered on the "Per manent Registration Book" remains registered until disquafi fied for non-payment of taxes or otherwise. February 5, 1916. Hon. 0. 111. Davis, Tax-Collector, Renfroes, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of yesterday I beg to say: 1. The Courts have not interpreted the permanent registration law as yet, but it is my opinion that they will hold that a citizen is not automatically dropped from the registration list if he does not pay his taxes on or before December 20th. I am inclined to think he will be given to the time of closing the registration list the following year before striking him from the permanent registration book. Of course, if he has not paid his tax at that time he will automatically be stricken from the permanent book and he will then have to pay his tax and register again before he can vote. 2. ' Those who have not paid their 1915 taxes can not, in my opinion, vote in the Primary for 1916. 3. If a man moves his family out of a county and carries his citizenship, on returning, he must reside in the county six months and register again before he can legally vote. 4. The law requires you to keep open a "Permanent Regis- tration Book.'' Since the passage of the law a citizen once regis- tered remains registered until disqualified from non-payment of taxes or otherwise. He is then stricken from this permanent book and can not legally vote till he has removed his disqualification and registered again. For this registration you will be entitled to collect the usual fee. Trusting this is the information you desire, with kind personal regards. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 312 Ordinaries' fees cited. February 6. 1916. Judge Frank B. Jones, Ordinary, Jesup, Ga. DEAR SIR: Only today have I had a moment's relaxation since I received your letter. I regret the delay and trust you have not been embarrassed thereby. I have checked over the Code with considerable care and find that compensation for Ordinaries is fixed in the following Sections: 73, 125, 776, 827, 1201, 1728, 1787, 3101, 5328, 5330, 3447. I would suggest that you go over all of these Sections as you may not have been collecting fees due you. Of course, the main Section is 4827. The following items seem to apply to Guardianship : For receiving application and granting citation ........... $1.25 For taking and recording administrators' or guardian's bond 1.00 For issuing letters of guardianship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.00 For recording the same. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 These seem to be the only items which touch directly on guardianship. The fee bill (Section 4827) also provides: "For every service required and performed, for which no fees are specified by law, the same fees as are allowed Clerks of the Superior Courts. for similar services, or for a like amount of labor." This contemplates such payment where no fee is fixed in the present fee bill. will If you have any specific item or question write me in detail and I try to give you a more definite reply. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 313 A person relieved of tax under Section 994 of the Code could legally cond~ct a family grocery or a jeweler's repair shop. February 7, 1916. Judge J. A. Drewry, Ordinary, Griffin, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your favor of 1st instant would have been answered earlier but I was engaged in court trying the L. & N. R. R. case. Replying thereto, I beg to say that, in my judgment, -a person relieved of tax under Section 9'94 of the Code could legally conduct a family grocery or a jeweler's repair shop. Indeed, they may conduct any business not expressly excepted. (All taxes imposed under the police powers like licenses to run a pool table, carry a pistol, etc., are excepted.) Neither a Confederate soldier nor a maimed or blind man may be exempted from license taxes on such businesses. They are exempted under the law from all other taxes. If I have not covered what is in your mind I will be gtad if you will write me again. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Under the prov1s1ons of the Permanent Registration Act a citizen once registered is always registered unless disqualified In some manner as prescribed by Jaw. February 16, 1916. Hon. RobertS. Cook, Tax-Collector, Cusseta, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the .4th inst., I beg to say that the law permits the Attorney-General to give official opinions only on request of the Governor. However, I do not mind giving you my personal views on the question submitted by you. Any citizen who has registered since the passage of the permanent registration Act is permanently registered unless disqualified, in some manner known to the law. When disquali. tied he must remove his disqualification and register anew. I 314 believe the intention of the registration law was that within a reasonable time for each election the Tax-Collector should present to the registrars a list of those names appearing on the permanent registration book. The registrars then should, within a reasonable time, purge this list of disqualified voters and make up a registration list for the use of the managers of the election. Very truly yours, CLIPFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Section 920 prohibits a municipality from levying an additional tax on doctors, dentists and other professional men, enumerated therein. February 23, 1916. Hon. A. H. Graham, Clerk of Council, Dublin, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, asking whether or not a municipality is authorized to levy a special tax; upon doctors, lawyers, and other professional men. In reply thereto, I will say that your question is answered by Section 920 of the Code, which provides among other things, to wit: "No municipal corporation or county authorities shall levy an additional tax on the profession and officials enumerated in this and the two preceding Sections, either as a license tax or fee otherwise.'' The two preceding Sections referred to impose a tax upon lawyers, doctors, dentists and other professional men. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFPORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 315 1. In an election called to be held before the date set for the registrars to purge the registration Jist the Jist used at the last previous regular election should be used in such election provided it be purged by the registrars before so using it. 2. In such an election duly registered voters on such list, who have failed to pay their taxes before the list is so purged, may prevent their names being stricken from such list by paying such taxes at any time before the list is so purged. Atlanta, Ga., February 23, 1916. Han. A. F. Byrd, Ordinary, Baxley, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking my opinion in the matter of your county primary. It appears from your letter that the Executive Committee of your county has called the primary for the nomination of candidates for the county offices for the 3rd day of 1\fay, 1916. As this date is prior to the date fixed by law for the registrars to purge the registration list and to make out a new list for the years 1916 and 1917, you wish to know whether or not the persons whose names are on the list for 1914 are entitled to vote in this election and whether or not the said registration list for the years 1914 and 1915 can be used in this election? You will note that Section 59 of the Code provides that the list prepared for the general election for 1914 can be used for all elections for that year held after the making and purging of the list and for all elections held during the year 1915. However the Act of the Legislature of 1913 (Acts 1913, page 115) provides for a permanent registration list. This law further provides that this permanent registration list as well as the supplemental registration lists that may be furnished by the Tax-Collector for each year shall be purged by the Registrars. Now, I am of the opinion that the registration list for the year 1914 considered as a permanent registration list may be used in the election you refer to, but that before it can be used for this election to be held in 1916 it is necessary that it be purged as required by law by the County Registrars. You also ask my opinion as to whether or not those persons whose names are on the old list, but who have not paid their taxes for the year 1915, are entitled to vote in this election? As you know, the law requires that taxes be paid by the 20th of December of each year, and that after that date if the taxes are not paid the Tax-Collector is authorized 316 to issue executions. Under Article 2, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of this State, I am of the opinion that it is the duty of the Registrars to strike from the said registration list the names of the persons who have not paid their taxes for the year 1915. However, I am of the opinion these 'persons can now pay their taxes and prevent the striking of their names from the said list and thus preserve their right to vote in the said primary, since said election is to be held "within six months from the expiration of the time fixed by law for the payment of the taxes.'' See paragraph of the Constitution above referred to. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-General. The Ordinary must call an election for the purpose of voting on the question of suspending the operation of the four days' road law whenever a petition is filed with him, signed by 150 or more voters of the county asking for such election. February 23, 1916. Hon. T. 111. Boaz, Calhoun, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date in which you say that Gordon County is now operating under what is known as the four days' road law, and that recently an election was held for the purpose of suspending the operation of this law and that by a small majority the effort to suspend the law was defeated. You wish to know how soon another election may be called and held on this question. I have examined this law very carefully and I do not find any provision in the same regulating the length of time that must intervene between elections for this purpose. Section 711 of the Code provides ''On the filing of a petition with any Ordinary in this State, signed by 150 or more voters, of the said county, asking for an election to be held to determine whether the plan provided by this Article for working the public roads shall be suspended or not, the said Ordinary shall make an order providing for an election and shall appoint a day for the same, etc." In the 317 absence of any other provision on this subject relating to the time of holding such election, I am of the opinion that such an election may be called and that it is the duty of the Ordinary to call such election at any time a petition is filed with the Ordinary signed by 150 or more voters of the said county ask- ing for such an election. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The Registrars should purge list before being used. February 23, 1916. Hon. Jno. L. Barrett, Tax-Collector, Gainesville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking for some information with reference to your county primary. You wish to know whether or not the primary to nominate candidates for county offices can be called and held prior to the time fixed by law for the closing of the vote~:'s books and the purging of the registration list for the year 1916. In reply I will say that in my opinion it was the intention of the Legislature that these elections should be held after the registration list has been made up by the Tax-Collector and the list purged and perfected by the Registrars. However, I am not willing to say that these county primaries can not be legally held before this time. The Act of the Legislature of 1913 (Acts 1913, page 115) provides for a permanent registration list. If the election is held before the time indicated above, it is necessary to use the registration list for the years 1914 and 1915. Considering this list as a permanent registration list, I am of the opinion that it can be used in the primary election referred to above. However, I think that if this list is to be used, it will be necessary for the registrars to purge the same before it can be used in the said election. Very .truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 318 A citizen temporarily out of the State cannot register by proxy. February 24, 1916. Hon. F. R. Longstreet, Gainesville, Ga. DEAR Srn: Replying to your favor of the 9th inst. we regret to advise that we are unable to find any authority for a citizen temporarily out of the State registering by proxy. This seems particularly hard on a citizen. in the employ of the Government at Washipgton. However, we can find no authority to the contrary. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. No State law forbids the operation of pool and billiard rooms in cities and towns having a population of fifteen hundred or less. State license is $50.00 per year on each table. February 24, 1916. Mr. L. A. Broeks, Lithonia, Ga. DEAR Srn: Your letter of recent date regarding the State laws on the subject of pool and billiard rooms has been received. In reply, I 'will say that I know of no State law which forbids the operation of pool and billiard rooms in cities and towns having a population of fifteen hundred or less. The State license is fifty dollars per year on each table. - Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Where judgment has been entered of record and the Court adjourned, the Court has no power to reduce or suspend the sentence. February 24, 1916. Hon. Joe M. Moon, Cartersville, Ga. DEAR Srn: Your favor of the lOth inst., addressed to the Governor, has been handed to me for reply. In response there- 319 to I beg to say that the Courts have held in cases involving a suspension of sentence that where judgment has boon entered of record and the Court adjourned, the Court has no power to reduce or suspend the sentence. It is probably true that the sentence is in the breast of the Court before adjournment and the sentence entered on the records. It is clear that after ad- journment the sentence cannot be reduced. This matter was passed upon in the case of Leopard v. State from Clarke County. If I can be of any further service I will be pleased to have you write me. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A citizen who is otherwise entitled to vote would not be ineligible to hold a county office because of his failure to register. Atlanta, Ga., February 26, 1916. Hon. W. E. Guerard, Savannah, Ga. DEAR SIR; I have your letter of the 21st inst. regarding the matter of the registration of candidates for office, and the same would have been answered sooner but for the fact that I have been absent from the city on legal business for the State. The matter you ask about has been passed upon by one of the former Attorney-Generals of the State and as he cites the authorities in his opinion I will quote a part of that opinion in answer to your question. He says : "The Constitution of this State provides in Section 5929 that all county officers must be bona fide residents of the county two years, and qualified voters. In conformity with this provision of the Constitution the Legislature passed an Act, embodied in Civil Code of 1910, Section 258 (7), which substantially conforms to the terms of the Constitution above referred to. In 1900, the Legislature amended Section 258 (7) and added at the end of said paragraph the words 'entitled to vote.' This amendment contained in the Acts of 1900 might have confused the question and rendered it doubtful if the very words which were added .by the ~said amendment had not been construed by our Supreme Court." 320 In the case of Mayor and Council of Madison vs. Waae, 88 Ga. 699, the Supreme Court of this State declares: "Registration adds no qualification to voters, but only serves to identify them as persons qualified to vote." So that it is clear that a person may be a qualified voter and, though not registered, be eligible to holU a county office. Likewise in the case of McMahon et al. vs. The :Mayor etc. of Savannah, 66 Ga. 224, the court used the following language: "The new requirement of a registration has been held not to be the addition of a qualification to an elector." Citing authorities. "It is but a means of carrying out the registration law and strictly in unison with the purpose, which are io provide for the proper designation and ascertainment of a voter in municipal elections. While it may not be, and is not, in the province of the Legislature to prescribe a new qualifi~'ltion for an elector, it certainly is within the scope of their authority to regulate the mode and manner of conducting elections." In the case of Davison vs. City Cour;dl of Dawson, 99 Ga. 817, the Supreme Court of this State declares: "The word 'entitled' as used in the phrase 'entitled to vote for members of the Gen era] Assembly' should be construed as meaning 'Qualified,' and registration adds no qualification to voters, but only serves to identify them as persons qualified to vote." In view of the interpretation which our Supreme Court has placed on the words "entitled to vote"-construing them to mean "qualified to vote"-! am of the opinion that a citizen who is otherwise qualified to vote would not be rendered ineligible to hold a county office because of his failure to register." I think the above opinion sets forth the law on the subject as declared by the Supreme Court of this State, and I there- fore adopt the same as my own in reply to the question pre- sented in your letter. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Laws regarding the keeping of permanent qualification book for voters. March 1, 1916. Hon. H. J. Read, Brunswick, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 27th ult., a reading of the Act of August, 1913 (Acts of 1913, Page 116), will make it clear that you are right in your contentions. 321 That .Act requires ''Tax-Collectors to keep a Book to be called the permanent qualification book.'' It further requires that Board of Registrars ''~hall be charged with the duty of examining each two years the qualifications of each elector entered thereon.'' It further requires that the Tax-Collector shall make up a list of voters appearing on such permanent books who have paid all taxes required of them at least six months prior to the election. (Section 2.) Section 3 provides that the voters who have qualified and signed the Permanent Qualification Book shall not thereafter be required to register again unless they have been disqualified and stricken from the permanent book by the Board of Registrars. In other words six months before the election the Registrar shall strike from the permanent book all electors who have not paid all taxes required of them. All others are. entitled to vote. I hope I make myself plain. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. The Collection of poll tax Is not necessarily incident to a right to vote. Mr. J. R. Allen, March 1, 1916. Riverdale, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 24th ult., I regret that I have to advise that the collection of Poll Tax is not necessarily incident to a right to vote. The language of the law is that a Poll Tax of $1.00 is levied "Upon each and every male inhabjtant of the State between twenty-one and sixty." Only the blind and those who have lost a limb are excepted. Section 917 Code of 1910. If I can serve you further at any time call on me. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 322 Municipalities In this State are not authorized to levy and collect an occupation tax upon commercial railroads doing business in such municipalities. March 1, 1916. Hon. R. M. Dennard, Pineview, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of 26th ult., in the case of Arlington vs. Central of Georgia, 127th Georgia, page 721, the Supreme Court made the following ruling : "Following the ruling in Augusta vs. Central Railroad, 78 Ga. 119, there is no authority vested in any municipality in this State to levy and collect an occupatiop tax upon a commercial railroad doing business in such municipalities." This ruling does not seem to apply to express or telegraph companies. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. In order to qualify as a voter a man must register and pay all taxes required of him six months prior to an election. March 1, 1916. Hon. P. J. Pughsley, Jr., Tax-Collector, Lyons, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of recent date, in order to qualify as a voter a man must have paid all taxes which the law imposes upon him six months prior to an election. The young men should pay all Poll Taxes due in the past. Also Ad valorem Tax, if they own any property. Newcomers should register anew in the new county. Once registered they remain permanently registered unless stricken by registrars for some disqualification. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The Solicitor of a City Court is a State Officer and his term of office is not altered by the recent Act of the Legislature. March 10, 1916. Hon. W. Woodrum, Millen, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 3rd instant, the courts have ruled that the Solicitor of a City Court is a State Officer and in my judgment, the term of office of such Solicitors has not been altered by the recent Act of the Legislature. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A County Treasurer is not entitled to commissions on money not pass ing through his hands. Atlanta, Ga., March 13, 1916. Messrs. Daniel & Daniel, County Attorneys, Claxton, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of recent date, in which you ask my opinion on the f~llowing questions : The office of County Treasurer was abolished by the Legislature, to take effect on the 1st day of January, 1916. The Tax-Collector is required, under the law, to make his monthly statements on the first Monday in each month, beginning on the first Monday in October in each year. Code Section 1214. At the time the Tax- Collector makes his monthly statements, to wit: on the first Monday in each month, he is required, under the law, to pay over to the Treasurer the amounts in his hands, leaving th fractions of hundred dollars in his hands. Code Section 1215. As the Tax-Collector in this case did not pay over to the Treasurer the amounts in his hands which were collected during the month of December until the first Monday in January, 1916, and at that time the office of Treasurer had ceased to exist, the question is: Should the Treasurer be paid his commissions on the taxes collected during the month of December but not paid over by the Tax-Collector until the term of office of the Treas- .:>24 urer had expired, i. e., on the first Monday in January, 19161 Section 588 of the Code provides that the Treasurer shall be paid certain commissions on all sums received by him and cer- tain commissions on all sums paid out by him. In the case presented by you, none of the money involved had been either received or paid out by the Treasurer. While in this case it seems hardly fair and just to the Treasurer that he should receive no commissions on this money, still you have . asked me for a strictly legal opinion on the matter, and I am obliged to say that under the law, as it is written, I do not think he is legally entitled to any commissions on this money. It is simply the misfortune of the Treasurer in a peculiar situa- tion. In this connection see the case of Taylor vs. Lee, 107.Ga. Rep., page 362. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A municipality may levy a reasonable business tax on a telephone company doing business in such a municipality. Atlanta, Ga., March 13, 1916. Mr. 0. R. Sikes, Glennville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, in which you ask whether or not a telephone company operating under the regulation of the Railroad Commission of the State is subject to an occupation tax imposed by a municipality in which it is carrying on business. In reply, I will say that such a company is subject to such a tax on business done in a municipality pro- vided the tax imposed is reasonable. In this connection see the case of Postal Telegraph Company vs. City of Savannah, 133 Ga. Rep., page 66. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 325 In the valuation of a life estate under the Inheritance Tax Law it is proper for the Ordinary to take into consideration the physical condition of the person entitled to such estate. Atlanta, Ga., l\farch 13, 1916. Hon. Raiford Falligant, Attorney-at-Law, Savannah, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date requesting my opinion on the question as to whether or not in fixing the value of a life estate for the purpose of taxation under the inheritance law, it is proper and legal for the Ordinary to take into consideration the ill health, disease, or physical infirmity of the person entitled to such estate, if such exists, or whether the expectancy is to be determined solely by the mortality tables without regard to the physical. infirmity of such person. In reply I will say that in my opinion, the mortality tables are to be used in all cases as provided by Section 4 of the Act approved August l::l, 19'13 (Acts 1913, page 93). However, I think that these tables would be absolutely binding only in the case of a person of normal health and strength. The purpose of this provision of the Act is to determine the expectancy of life of the person holding the estate. All the circumstances of the case are to be taken into consideration by the Ordinary and the expectancy of life determined by the mortality tables in the light of all the circumstances relating to the health, etc., of the holder of the life estate. The Supreme Court of this State has frequently held that in cases of permanent injuries and death by wrongful act the mortality tables are not binding on the jury in fixing the amount of damages, but where the jury desires to use these tables they may do so, and in that event it is the duty of the jury in estimating the probable length of a given man's life to take into consideration his health, occupation, habits and surroundings just as they are disclosed by the evidence. Fla. Central R. R. Co. vs. Burney, 98 Ga. 1 (Ia.). Savannah, Florida and Western Ry. Co. vs. Austin, 104 Ga., page 614. Merchants and Miners Trans. Co. vs. Corcoran, 4 Ga. Apps., page 654. To make these tables absolutely binding in all cases without regard to the circumstances above alluded to would in many 326 cases be unjust and unfair, where the health and strength of the person is below normal. In fact the expectancy of a man in a dying condition .would thus be held to be the number of years set out in the table, whereas, the real expectancy of the life would be a matter of only a few days. I do not"think that it was ever the intention of the Legislature in passing this .Act that any such rule should be applied. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. Automobiles owned by a county must bear the regular State license tags. March 18, 1916. Han. Geo. T. Oann, Savannah, Ga. _ DEAR SIR: Re Tags County .Automobiles. Replying to your favor of- recent date, March 9, 1916, I have not been able to find any law which will exempt the counties from the tax. I have advised with the Secretary of State and he states that the Counties of Fulton, Bibb, Richmond, etc., uniformly pay the tax and he is of opinion that the counties should continue to pay. It would have an unwholesome effect if they were ex- empted, as casual observers would not know of the ownership and be led to believe that the law was not being enforced. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. Interpretation of the Act requiring public officials to report and file statement of the fees collected by them. Citizen is entitled to' inspect such records in the Comptroller-General office. March 18, 1916. Han. Ben J. Fowler, Macon, Ga. DEAR SIR: I regret that absence from the ~ity on official business has delayed my reply to your favor of recent date. While the Code directs the .Attorney-General to render offi.- 327 cial opinions only on request of the Governor, it is my pleasure to respond to such requests as yours; My interpretation of the Act requiring public officials to report and file a statement of the fees collected by them (Acts of 1912) is that the Act was passed for the purpose of pro. viding information from which the people could determine whether the fee system should be abolished; in other words whether in any case an official was receiving more compensation than the work of his office justified. I understand that you desire certain information from such reports to use in informing yourself and the voters on this very question and I am clear that you are entitled to inspect the records and obtain a transcript of the same. The Comptroller_ would probably have the right to direct the preparation of such a transcript and make usual charges therefor, but there is nothing illegal in his allowing you to make such a copy and then certify to its correctness if he wishes so to do. Trusting this is the information you desire, Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. A member of a County Board of Tax-Assessors is ineligible to hold any other office during such time as he is a member of such Board and for twelve months thereafter. Atlanta, Ga., March 21, 1916. Mr. J. W. Montgomery, Preston, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date asking how long a member of a County Board of Tax-Assessors is ineligible after the expiration of his term of office to hold a State, county or municipal office in this State. In reply, I will say that the law on this subject reads as.follows (Acts of 1913, page 125). "The members of said board during the time they hold their office and for one year thereafter shall be ineligible to hold any State, county, or muncipal offi~e, but they may be re-appointed to succeed themselves as members of said board." You will note that under the law, as above quoted, the mem- 328 bers of this board are rendered ineligible to hold a State, county or municipal office during the time they are members of the board and for one year after they cease to be members of the board. If a person ceased to be a member of the. board on January 1st, 1916, so far as this law is concerned, h~ would be eligible to hold a. State, county or municipal office, whose term begins January 1st, 1917. If the person continues in office until his successor is duly elected and qualified, then he would be ineligible for one year from the time he ceased to hold the office of Tax-Assessor. The period in all cases runs from the time the person ceases, in fact and in law, to hold the said office. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A municipality can not collect a specific tax from a national bank. Atlanta, Ga., March 22, 1916. Hon. S. J. Crouch, Mayor, Statesboro, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking my opin- ion as to whether or not the First National Bank of Statesboro is liable for a special municipal tax. You also enclose a copy of the ordinance Jmposing the tax. The bank is a national bank and the tax is an occupation tax, or a tax not upon the property of the bank, but upon its business. In reply, I am obliged to say that under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Supreme Court of the United States the city can not impose or collect this tax. The question has been before the Supreme Court of Georgia at least twice. In the case of Mayor etc. of Macon vs. First National Bank of Macon, 59 Ga., page 648, it was said : "Whilst the property owned by the bank may be taxed by State authority, and the shares owned by the stockholders may also be taxed, the business of the bank-its right to operate and do banking business-ean not be taxed by the States. The distinction between the right to tax property and that to tax business in case of agencies working under Federal authority is well settled, we think." 329 In the case of Johnston vs. Mayor etc. of Macon, 62 Ga., page 650, the Court says : "It (the municipality) could not tax the business of the national bank, because it was chartered by Congress, and the Government of the United States used its business for their fiscal operations, or could use it, and any interference by State taxation might, if allowed at all, amount to prohibition-by making the tax so high as to be prohibitory." See also, the case of Linton vs. Childs, 105 Ga., page 567. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney~General. 1. Tax-collectors are entitled to receive the specified commissions on all digests 2. A pardoned convict must pay a poll tax for each year between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years in order to entitle him to register and vote. Atlanta, Ga., JI.Iarch 23, 1916. Mr. J. H. Hollingsworth, Georgetown, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date, asking whether you, As Tax-Collecto.r of Quitman County, are entitled to commissions on certain taxes under the following circmp.stances: In 1914, certain taxes amounting to $1,068 for the County of Quitman were assessed against the Central of Georgia Railroad. The railroad refused to pay this amount and carried the matter to court. Later the case was settled and the railroad paid to the county $356.16. The money was not actually paid to you as Tax-Collector. The question is: Are you entitled to your commissions on this latter a:rp.ount? In reply, I will say that in my opinion you are entitled to your commissions on the amount collected. Section 1234 of the Code provides that the Tax-Collector is to receive certain specified commissions on "all digests." The taxes mentioned certainly form part of the digest mentioned in this Section. Under Section 1039 of the Code it is provided that all taxes on railroads due a county are to be paid to the TaxCollector of the county. These taxes should have been paid to you, and the mere fact that they were paid in some other way 830 is not sufficient in lliw to defeat your right to the commissions provided by law. The second question asked in your letter is whether or not it is necessary for a person who has. been convicted of a felony and served in the Penitentiary for a number of years i.n the State of Georgia, and later was released or served out his term, and has received a pardon from the Governor of the State, to pay his poll tax for the time he was incarcerated, before he is authorized to register and vote. As to this question, I will say that Section 917 of the Code of this State imposes a poll tax upon each and every male inhabitant of the State, between the ages of twenty-one and sixty years, except persons who have lost a limb or limbs or the use of the same in the military service of the Confederate States. There are no other exceptions. The tax, therefore, se!)ms under the law to be required of persons serving a term of service in the Penitentiary. Par. 3 of Section 34 of the Code provides, among other things, that to entitle a person to register and vote at any election; he ''shall have paid all taxes which may have been required of him since the adoption of the Constitution of Georgia of 1877 that he may have had an opportunity of payi~g agreeably to law." Under the above stated Sections of the Code, I am of the opinion that it would be necessary for the person to pay the poll taxes from the time he became twenty-one years of age, including the time he spent in the Penitentiary, in order to register and vote. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truiy yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Where a deed is made to a county to a piece of property on which to build a court house and jail and the county decides to build elsewhere, the original site will not revert back to the grantor of such property, unless the deed contains, such provisions. Atlanta, Ga., March 25, 1916. Hon. George R. Trapnell, Ordinary Candler County, l'rletter, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date enclosing copy of deed made and executed by Josiah Bird to the Commission- 331 ers of Roads and Revenues of Candler County to be used for the purpose of building thereon a court house and jail for said county. You wish to know whether or not in the event this location for the court house and jail is abandoned and the same buili elsewhere, the property conveyed in this deed would revert to the grantor. In reply I will say that in my opinion, under the authorities hereafter cited, I do not think the terms of the deed as they appear from the copy furnished me are sufficient to constitute a condition in the deed either precedent or subsequent. Therefore, I do not think that in case the location is abandoned the property would revert to the grantor. The grantor may have such an interest in the property that he would be entitled to have the county enjoined from using the, property for any .other purpose than that expressed in the deed, or he might have a right of action for damages. I cite the authorities upon which my opinion is based. Code Sections 3716, 3717, 4568, 4224. Thompson et al. vs. Hart, 133 Ga. Rep., page 540. Thornton vs. Trammell, 39 Ga. Rep., page 202. City of Atlanta vs. Jones et al., 135 Ga. Rep., page 376. .Jones vs. Williams, 132 Ga. Rep., page 782. I hope the above opinion and authorities will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. After August, 1913, a registration ls permanent provided the tax payer does not become disqualified. March 25, 1916. Hon. J. A. Grant, Alto, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date, I beg to say that after August, 1913, a- registration is permanent provided the taxpayer does not become disqualified in some manner known to the law. If he removes his citizenship from the county he will of course become disqualified to vote in the 332 county from which he removes and on his subsequent return to that county would have to re-register. I trust that this is the information you desire. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Section of the prohibition law passed by Extraordinary Session in 1915, cited. March 29, 1916. Columbia Drug Co., Savannah, Ga. DEAR Sm : Press of official business has delayed my reply to your favor of recent date. The law permits me to render official opinions only on request of the Governor. However, I am pleased to give you my views on the. matter suggested. The prohibition law is contained in Section 1 of the new prohibition law and can be found in the Acts of the General Assembly of 1915, Extraordinary Sessio~. The book may be obtained from the State Librarian, Mrs. Maude B. Cobb, State Capitol, Atlanta, Ga. The law prohibits the sale of "any drink, liquor or beverage containing one-half of one per cent. of alcohol or more by volume at 60 degrees Fahrenheit; any intoxicating bitters or beverages by whatever name called; all malted, fermented or brewed liquors of any name or description, manufactured from malt, wholly or in part, such as beer, lager-beer, near-beer, porter, ale, or any substitute for or imitation of said drinks." Other definitions are made also, but the above is probably what you wish. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. &31 If a person in good faith simply leaves his county to see the country, with no thought of giving up his residence, he does not lose his citizenship in such county, though he may do some passing work of a temporary nature to pay his expenses on the trip and though his trip should be extended over a wide territory or a considerable period of time. Eligibility of county officers as to residence. March 29, 1916. Hon. George D. Rucker, Alpharetta, Georgia. DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of the 27th instant, in which you inquire as to the legality of the citizenship of Mr. Claude V. Rainwater and of his el~gibility to hold the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of your county. In reply thereto I beg to say that as a legal proposition it is not only difficult but practically impossible to define the limitations as to citizenship under circumstances similar to those outlined in your letter. The difficulty arises from the fact that in such cases the intention of the person in question largely determines his legal status. For instance, if Mr. Rainwater, in good faith, intended simply to make a visit to see the country with no thought of giving up his residence or citizenship he would remain a citizen of your county, even though he should do some passing work of a temporary nature to pay his expenses on the trip, and though his trip should be extended over a wide territory or a considerable period of time. On the other hand if he in good faith decided to move away from your county and take up an occupation in some other county or State he would on leaving your county lose his citizenship even though after a short time he should change his mind and decide to return to his former home and again take up his residence and citizenship. You will see that to determine the question at issue finally it will be necessary from facts and circumstances and statements of Mr. Rainwater to apply the facts in his case to the general rules necessarily imperfectly stated herein. Your second question is answered by a reference to .Article 11, Section 2, Paragraph one, of the Constitution of the State of Georgia, which provides, among other things, that "no person shall be eligible to any of the offices referred to in 334 this paragraph (county officers) unless he shall have been a resident of the county, for two years and is a qualified voter." Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Att?rney-General. Possession of liquors under prohibition law of 1915. (Laws Extraordinary Session, 1915, Section 16, page 99.) March 30, 1916. C. J. Montgomery, M. D., 918 John's Road, Augusta, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have been overwhelmed with official business and have been unable to take up your favor of recent date earlier. The law permits me to render official opinions only on the request of the Governor, but I will be pleased to give you personally any information in my possession. The law you inquire of is contained in Section 16 of the Prohibition Act (Acts of Extraordinary Session, 19'15, page 99) and is quoted below. The Act further provides that affidavits must be made before the Ordinary; that officers may inspect the same, the books of the express companies and otherwise ascertain if the law is being enforced. It will be impractical for me to quote the law in full but any Justice of the Peace or county officer will :furnish you with a copy of the book referred to. The Section referred to above reads as follows: "Section 16. Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That it shall be unlawful for any person to receive, accept delivery of, possess or have in possession at one time, or within any period of thirty consecutive days, whether in one or more places, (1) more than one gallon of vinous liquor, or (2) more than six gallons (48 pints) of malted liquors or fermented liquors such as beer, lager beer, ale, porter or other similar fermented or intoxicating or spirituous liquors, either in bottles or other receptacles, or (3) more than two quarts of spirituous liquors or other intoxicating liquors, or other prohibited liquors beyond those named in subdivisions one and two, above." Trusting that the above will be what you wish and with best wishes, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 335 All county officers are required to file statements of campaign expenses within twenty days after the election. March 30, 1916. Mr. J. H. Gross, Alamo, Ga. . DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 27th instant, in which you ask me to give you the law with reference to the filing of expense accounts by candidates, I beg to say that the law is contained in Section 92 of the Code and among other things provides as follows : "All county officers, including county and city judges and solicitors elected by the people, shall, within twenty days from the date of holding said elections or primary elections, file with the clerk of the Superior Court of such county a statement itemized under oath, of all campaign expenses incurred by them, showing the amount of money expended in such campaign, the purpose for which it was used and the source of whence it was derived, but said county officers shall not be required to publish in any paper, said expenses. No person who shall violate any of the provisions of the preceding Section shall be declared the nomineeof his party." Section 671 of the Criminal Code reads as follows: "Whoever shall violate any of the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Code, on the subject of publishing campaign expenses shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." - The foregoing law was enacted in 1908. Upon examination I find that it has not been interpreted by the court. I am therefore unable to say just what the courts will hold in the event that a statement of expenses should be filed under the terms of the law after the expiration of the twenty days allowed by the law. However, I am of the opinion that if it should appear that the filing of the statement was unintentionally overlooked that the same was duly filed as soon as the matter was brought to the attention of the successful candidate, the extreme penalty would not be visited upon him. I trust that the above gives you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-GeneraL 336 A resident of a local school system, operated independent of the County Board of Education, cannot be a member of such Board. April 1, 1916. L. D. McGregor, Attorney, Warrenton, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking my opinion on the following question, to wit: Can a citizen of a town working under a special legislative enactment with reference to its public schools or a resident of a local school district established by legislative enactment be eligible to membership on the County Board of Education 1 In reply, will say that your question is answered by Section 1479 of the Code, which provides, among other things, as follows: "Provided further, that whenever there is in a portion of any comity a local school system having a board of educatiop of its own, and receiving its pro rata of the public funds directly from the State School Commissioner, and having no dealings whatever with the County Board of Education, then the members of the County Board of Education of such county shall be selected from that portion of the county not embraced within the territory covered by such local system." See- also in this connection Section 16 of the Acts of the Legislature approved August 31, 1911 (Acts 1911, page 94). This Section, in part, reads as follows : "Nor shall they (the Grand Jury) select any person who resides within the limits of a local school system operated independent of the County Board of Education for membership on the County Board of Education." Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. In a primary election for county officers electors are required to vote in the city ward or militia district in which they reside and are registered unless it should happen that a voting precinct Is not estab~ished and opened In such ward or district. April 1, 1916. Mr. IIJ. A. McRainey, Elmodel, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date asking my opin- 337 ion on the question as to whether or not in a primary election for the nomination of candidates for county offices, electors are permitted by law to vote at the court house at the county site instead of in the ward or militia district in which they reside and are registered. In reply will say that under Section 127 of the Code all primary elections are to be held in accordance with the laws of the State governing regular elections. Under Section 110 of the Code the elections for county officers are to be held in the same manner as elections f~r members of the General Assembly and State House officers. Under the provisions of Sections 68 and 69 of the Code the electors are required to vote in the city ward or militia district . in which they are registered unless it should happen that a voting precinct is not established and opened in any city ward or militia district. In that event and in that event only can electors cast their ballots at the county site. Section 130 of the Code provides as follows : "No elector shall vote in any such primary election in a militia district other than the one in which he resides, or if he resides in a city, in a ward other than the one in which he resides, if an election precint be located in such ward." I am of the opinion that the above quoted Section refers to an election either for State House officers, members of the General Assembly, or county officers. Under Section 668 of the Penal Code a violation of any of the above provisions of the law is declared to be a misdemeanor. Hoping the above is the information that you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Laws governing duplication of lost bonds. April.4, 1916. H. B. Garrett, Esq., Augusta, Ga. DEAR" Sm: Your letter of March 31st, addressed to the Governor, has been referred to me for reply. I beg to advise that 338 the law governing duplication of lost bonds is contained in Sections 1270, 1272 of the Code. These Sections read as follows:' "When any bond and coupon, or coupon, shall be lost, muti lated or destroyed, the Governor may issue to the holder a new bond, with proper coupons attached; or if coupon a_lone be lost, mutilated or destroyed, he may direct the Treasurer to issue new coupons in lieu of such coupons as may be lost, mutilated or destroyed." "When mutilated, the mutilated bond, or coupon, must be surrendered; when lost or destroyed, the holder must make affi- . davit of such fact, that they. were his, in his own or some other right, at the time of the loss or destruction; if lost, that he has made diligent search without avail and despairs of ever finding them." "Having made such affidavit, he shall then, before receiving the new bond, or coupon, give bond and surety to the Governor in a sum double the amount of the bond and coupon, or coupons alone so issued, as the case m~_ty be, conditioned to save the State harmless on account of issuing such new bond and coupon, or coupons only, as the case may be." I am sure that this is clear and that you can easily comply with the terms of the law as stated. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Unless garnishee earns money on Sunday, such day is not counted in exemption from garnishment. .April 5, 1916. Hon. Tom Jones, City Clerk, Austell, Georgia. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of April 1st in which you .ask my opinion on the following question: Under the present garnishment laws of this State all persons are exempt from the process and liabilities of garnishment on $1.25 per day of their wages. You wish to know whether or not in computing the amount exempt Sundays are to be included, or whether the amount exempt is to be computed on the working days in the month or week. In reply will say that Section 5298 of the Code exempts $1.25 per day of the daily, weekly or monthly 339 wages. (See Parks Code, Section 5298.) I construe the language used in the Act of 1914 as codified in the above stated Section to mean that the computation of $1.25 per day is to be made upon the working days in the week or month and that Sundays are to be excluded, unless garnishee earns money on Sunday. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Solicitor of City Court is a State. officer and his term of office is therefore unchanged by the Act of 1914. April 5, 1916. Hon. John E. Morris, Jr., Quitman, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of yesterday, the courts have held the Solicitor of the City Courts to be a State officer. I am therefore advising such officers that in view of the Act of 1914 their term of office remains unchanged. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. Section 128 of 'the Code pr-ovides for the closing of election, counting the ballots and announcing the results at each precinct. April 5, 1916. Judge E. N. Smith, Greensboro, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday I beg to say that the law on the subject of closing elections, counting the ballots and announcing the results at each precinct is contained in $ection 128 of the Code. Among other things it is provided: "At the close of the election the managers shall proceed publicly to count the votes and declare the result. They shall certify 340 the result of the election and transmit the certificate with thli' tally sheet or poll list together with the ballots cast~ and all other papers relating to such primary election, within the time and in the manner prescribed in this Chapter." .From a consideration of this Section it appears that the law contemplates that the ballots be counted and the result declared ''at the close of the election.'' Of course, the same rule applies to the town precincts, the managers of which must under the law follow the same regulations and exercise the same honesty and fairness in counting as is expected from the country precincts. If there be any fraud committed the proper course would be to give notice immediately of a contest and proceed according to the law of contests. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-GeneraL A county warrant, which appears on its face to be legally drawn and signed by the County Commissioners, payable out of a certain fund, and the Treasurer has a balance to the credit of that fund, when presented to the Treasurer must be paid by him. April 5, 1916. Hon. T. R. Whitley, Douglasville, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have received your favor of the 31st of March, in which you say : "Will you be so kind as to give me a legal opinion as to the responsibility of a County Commissioner or Treasurer where a sinking fund has been levied and placed in the Treasury and diverted from its proper course and used, perhaps, for other county purposes, anyway, it is not in the Treasury. The specific case referred to there was levied in 1913 and 1914, a sinking fund to pay off the county bonds, due in 1918, January first. When the former Treasurer turned over the office to the present Treasurer, there should have been $1,600 in the sinking fund in the Treasury and there was only $500. The Treasurer claims that while this money was levied and collected and put in the Treasury it was not specially put apart by the County Commissioners and was drawn out on ~ccount of warrants on the General or Road fund for the county. I ask the opinion as to tbe 341 liability for this inoney and how it should be collected or whether the County Commissioners are liable entirely or whether the Treasurer. Thanking 'you in advance for this kindness, I am, Yours very respectively, (Signed) T. R. WHITLEY. In reply, I beg to say that the law on the subject is contained in Sections 514 and 516 of the Civil Code. These Sections read as follows: "514. As soon as the county tax is assessed for the year, it shall be done by order of such ordinaries and entered on their minutes, which must specify the per cent. levied for each specific purpose. The assessment applies to every species of value or specfics which is taxed .by the State.'~ "516. Taxes raised foi: educational-purposes, or the support of the poor, or any other specific purpose, must be used for such purpose, respectively, and none other." These Sections are, of course, based upon Section 513 which sets out in detail the purposes for which county taxes may be assessed. In construing these Sections the Supreme Court in. the case of Mitchell vs. Speer, 39 Ga. 59, decided as follows: "It is clearly the intent of the Code, Sections 548, 549 and 550, that the county taxes shall be assessed specifically for the several purposes authorized by law. Section 550 says that the order of the court assessing the tax:, shall specify the per cent. levied for each specific purpose, and this just after Section 548 has specified, in detail, the several purposes for which county taxes may be laid. "We think this is a wise provision. Every order assessing a tax should specify the per cent. laid for each of the nine specific purposes mentioned in Section 548. And if there be a tax laid for any purpose not there included by virtue of some other law, the per cent. laid for that purpose should be stated in the order. The funds, when collected, should be dealt with in the same manner. The Treasurer should keep a separate account of each fund, and eaah county-order should specify the fund on which it is drawn and no order ought to be drawn on any fund not properly raised for the payment of the claim. "It is intended that the order of the Court, assessing the tax, shall be a sort of appropriation bill, and that the Ordinary shall draw it intelligently, in view of the peculiar state of the pecuniary condition of the county. "Such a cause will conduce to economy, to a full understanding of county matters, and each person dealing with the county can 342 then know the s~curity he has for the payment of the promise made him. "We deem this provision of the _Code of great importance anr not the same rules of law governing regular elections so far .as the same .relate to the managers thereof is applicable to the selection of managers for primary elections. In reply I will say that Section 127 of the Code provides as follows: "Every political primary election held by any political party, organization, or association, for the purpose of choosing or select ing candidates for office, or the election of delegates to conven tions in this State, shall be presided over and conducted in the manner and form prescribed by the rules of the political party, organization or association holding such primary elections, by managers selected in the manner prescribed by such rules. Such managers shall, before entering upon the discharge of their duties, each take and subscribe an oath that he 'Will fairly, impartially, and honestly conduct the same according to the provisions of the law providing how primary elections shall be held in this State, and in accordance tcith the laws of this State governing regular elections for the offices of t]],is State.'" Paragraph 2, on page 5 of the Rules and Regulations of the State Democratic Committee of this State adopted l\Iay 3, 1916, provides as follows: "The Primary election shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of this State and the customs of the party in so far as those customs do not conflict with existing laws." Section 76 of the Code provides that Ordinaries, Justices of the Peace and Freeholders are the persons qualified to hold elections. In my opinion only Ordinaries or Justices of the Peace <>r Freeholders are qualified to act as managers of primary elections in this State. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 410 It is now too late to carry a case to the Supreme Court, tried in the Superior Court in 1912. July 20, 1916. lllr. Chester A. H olzendorf, Kingsland, Georgia. DEAR Sm: Your letter of the 13th instant addressed to Honorable \Villiam A. \Vright has been turned over to me for reply. You wish to know whether or not it is now too late to carry a case to the Supreme Court for review, which was tried at the fall term of the Superior Court in 1912. In reply I will say that it appears that a trial was had in this caee at the fall term of the Superior Court of Camden County in 1912. A judgment was rendered partly in your favor and partly against you. If you had desired to carry this case to the Supreme Court it was necessary that a motion for a neyv trial be filed dmi.ng the term of the court at which the judgment was rendered. If the term of court lasted longer than thirty days the motion must have been made within thirty days. From the facts stated in your letter I judge that it is now too late to file a motion for a new trial and carry the case to the Supreme Court for review. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-GeneraL Whether a municipal corporation would have a right to levy an occupation tax upon a soft drink bottler of another municipality, who sent out and delivered bottled drinks to regular customerso in such first named municipality would depend upon the charter powers and ordinances of such municipality. July 21, 1916. Chero-Cola Company, Vidalia, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of recent date, requesting my opinion on the following matter: It appears that your company is engaged in the business of bottling soft-drinks. You maintain a bottling plant, I suppose, in the town of Vidalia, Ga. From this point you send out to the various towns and cities 411 bottled soft-drinks and deliver them to your regular patrons or customers in these towns. I assume from your letter that you have regular patrons in these cities and towns and that you habitually sell and deliver to them the goods mentioned, and that the delivery is made in trucks or vehicles owned by your company and by your agent or employees. You wish to know whether or not you are subject to an occupation or business tax imposed by the various towns and cities in which these regular -sales and deliveries are made. In reply, I will say that in the first place, this will depend on whether or not the particular , town or city imposing the tax has charter power to impose such .a tax. In the second place, an answer to your question would depend upon whether or not the tax ordinance of any particular town or city is broad. enough to cover the kind of business you .are carrying on in the city. However, if the town or city has the charter power to levy such a tax, and the ordinance imposing the same is broad enough to. cover the business you are .engaged in, I am of the opinion that the municipal corporation could enforce the tax. In this connection see the case of Davis vs. 1\iayor, etc., of 1\facon, 64 Ga., page 128, also see the case of Gunn vs. 1\fayor, etc., of 1\:'facon, 84 Ga., page 365. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 1. Where there is a school district, portions of which are in two counties, one of the counties having county wide tax for school purposes, and the other county having local school district tax system, the portion of such district in such latter county could not hold an election for the purpose of adopting a local tax for school purposes. :2. An election could be called by the Ordinaries of both counties, covering the entire district, to vote on the question as to whether or not a tax system for school purposes should bei adopted by the district. July 21, 1916. llfr. H. J. Parker, Su'[Jerintendent of Schools, Baxley, Georgia. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of recent date requesting my -opinion on the following matter: The Counties of Appling and 412 Wayne have a county line School District, which was established by the concurrent action of the County Boards of Educa. tion of the respective Counties. The County of Wayne has local taxation !or the support of schools on the county wide plan. Appling County has not adopted the plan of local taxation for the support of the schools. A portion of the school district referred to is in Wayne County where a local tax is collected, and a portion of the district is in Appling County, where no such local tax is levied. The schoolhouse for this district is located in that part of the district which is in Wayne County. It now appears that the people living in that part of the district which is in Appling County desire to vote on the question of local taxation for this district or for the part of the district which is in Appling County. You wish to know whether the Ordinary of Wayne County or the Ordinary of Appling County should call the election for the portion of the district lying in Appling County. In reply I will say that your request presents a very difficult question, and one which involves a case not covered by the provisions of the law. In the first place there is no provision of law for holding an election in only a part of a school district and I do not think such an election can be held, legally. Next questio.n is, whether or not a district election can now be held for the entire district including that part thereof which is in Wayne County and which is already operating under the county wide plan. The law makes no provision for a case of this kind, and there is considerable doubt as to whether or not such an election can be held. However, I am inclined to the opinion that it would be legal to call and hold an election for the entire district, including the portion thereof lying in Wayne County. The only provision of the law relating to the question is found in the Act of the Legislature approved August 15th, 1910 (Acts 1910, pages 34 and 35). This Section provides that the Ordinary of the county in which the schoolhouse is located shall order the election. From this it appears that the Ordinary of Wayne County is authorized to call the elec.tion for the entire district. There is no other provision of law which applies to the case. However, I would suggest that as a matter of caution you have the Ordinaries of both counties to issue an order calling the election for the entire district and let the election be held under the concurrent orders 413 of the Ordinaries of both counties. This could do no harm and it would serve to meet any objection that might be urged to the calling of the election on the ground that the same was not called by the proper authorities. Your next question is whether or not an election can be held now and be in time to have the tax levied and collected for this year in the event the election for the local tax is carried. In reply I will say that if the election is held in time for the County Commissioners to receive the rate and include it in the regular tax levy for the county, the tax may be collected for this year. In this connection see Section 1537 of the Code. I hope the above >vill give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-GeneraL Holding an election for local taxation. Section 1537. Cairo Banking Company vs. Ponder, Tax-Collector, et al.,- 131 Ga. 708. July 22, 1916. Mr. T. N. H1trst, Luthersville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date, addressed to Ron. Warren G'rice, has been turned over to me for reply. You say: "In September, 1914, I wrote you, asking you how late in the year 1915 we could hold an election for local taxation (1\Icl\Iichael School Law) and collect tax for the year 1915. Your reply was this : '' 'Provided you hold your election in time for the County Commissioners to receive notice and include it in fixing the rate for. 1915.' " You request some authorities on the question of the legality of a local school tax where the election for the same was held and the rate fixed at or before the fixing of the rate of taxation for the county for the year, although the complaining parties had previously made their tax returns for State and County purposes. In reply, I will say that Section 1537 of the Code seems to cover the case. Also the 414 ease of Cairo Banking Company vs. Ponder, Tax-Collector, et al. 131 Ga., page 708, seems to be directly in point. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorne):-General. Question of taxes upon ten thousand doll~rs bequeathed in a will to a person. Honorable William Galt, Canton, Ga. July 24:, 19'16. DEAR SIR: In response to your request for an opm10n in the matter of taxes upon the ten thousand dollars bequeathed to Mrs. l\Iary R. Brown, under the first item of the codicil to a will of James R. Brown, who died ::\larch 2. 1915, and whose will was probated June 7, 1915, I beg to say that I have care- fully considered the matter and am of the opinion that the state is liable for the taxes. Under tlw new tax equalization law, taxes are made ,to mature and be due on property and valuations are fixed thereon as of January 1st of each year. The will in effect directed that on ::\Iarch 2, 1915, the sum of ten thousand dollars be paid to Mrs. Brown. It appears clear to me that that sum and not the sum less the taxes should be made available. Of course this is only the opinion of a lawyer and it may be incorrect though I have considered the matter carefully. Very truly yours, . CLIFFORD W.-\LKER, Attorney-General. The fact that there is a State tax on dealers in cigarettes would not prevent a municipality from levying a business tax on the same business. July 26, 1916. Dent's Pharmacy, Glennville, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of recent date, requesting my opinion on the question as to whether or not the City of Glenn- ville has the authority to levy a business tax of $25.00 on your company for engaging in the business of selling cigarettes, although you have already paid State Tax of $25.00 on this bu~i ness. In reply, I will say that the fact that you are required to pay the State Tax on the business of dealing in cigarettes would not prevent the city from levying a business tax on the same business. In this connection see the case of l\fayor and Aldermen of Savannah vs. Cooper, 131 Ga., page 670. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. House Bill No. 756 is constitutional. July 27,1916. Hon. D. B. Bullard, Chairman, House of Representatives. DEAR Srn: I am returning herewith House Bill No. 756 and beg ~o advise that in my judgment the bill is constitutional. The Court of Appeals in the case of First District Agricultural and Mechanical School et al. vs. Reynolds, decided that a contract made by the Trustees of said school for the purchase of furniture to equip the school was within the scope of the authority delegated to them and is enforceable against the school and trustees thereof in their official capacity. It is further held that such schools are not such public institutions of the State as would be exempt from suit on contract made by their Trustees within the scope of the authority delegated to thein by the terms of the Act of 1906, page 72. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A municipality is authori_zed to exact a license on pool rooms. Mr. A. L. Mallary, July 31, 1916. Thomaston, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of Saturday, I regret to 416 advise that you have been misinformed at: tl' the law. It is legal for a city to exact a license upon pool rooms. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, -Attorney-Gen~ral. If a person in good faith intends to retain his citizenship in a certain county, he does not forfeit such citizenship while temporarily out of such county. July 31, 1916. Hon. James R. Grant, Toccoa, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of 28th instant I beg to say that in my opinion you are entitled to receive your salary under the facts set out in your letter. While temporarily attending his wife, who is under the care of physicians, a man may remain out of his county for weeks or months and still retain all rights of citizenship. The sole question is whether or not you are in good faith retaining your citizenship in Jeff Davis County. If you are you have a right to retain your position and to receive your salary. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. In order for one to be qualified to the office of County Superintendent of Schools he must have had three years' practical experience in teaching (one year in Georgia) holding a first grade license, or shall have a diploma from a reputable college or normal school, or. have had five years' experience in actual supervision of schools, or shall stand an approved examination before the State Board. August 1, 1916. Hon. John M. Johnson, Hiawassee, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 29th instant the qualifications for County Superintendent of Schools are set out-in Acts 417 of 1911, pages 94 and 102. See also, Park's Code, Section 1565 (q). Three years' practical experience in teaching (one year in Georgia), holding a first grade license, a diploma from a college or normal school, or five years' experience in actual ' super- vision of schools, standing an approved examination before the State Board qualifies one for holding this office-any one of the qualifications stated being sufficient. . Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A person once registered on the permanent qualification book does not have to register again unless he becomes disqualified for some reason known to the law. August 4, 1916. Hon. Charles Vosberg, Chairman, Board of Registrars, Catoosa County, Ringgold, Ga. DEAR SIR: On August 19, 1913, the Legislature passed an Act known as the Permanent Registration Act. It is the opinion of this office that any citizen who registered after this date is permanently registered and cannot be required to register again unless disqualified for some reason known to the law. Such persons are entitled to vote and the Tax-Collector should include the names of such persons in his list furnished to the Registrars and the Registrars should place their names on the voters' list, provided, as indicated, that subsequent to their registration they have failed to pay their taxes or otherwise disqualified themselves. In this case, they must qualify by removing their disabilities and then register anew. This is not intended as a full opinion but a copy of the full opinion will be furnished if necessary. The effect of this opinion is to hold that the book itself is not vital. The permanency of the registration after the date stated is the important thing. The Tax-Collector should have been provided with a permanent registration book immediately. 418 Failure should not and did not penalize citizens who regis~ tered before such a book was furnished. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. , 1. There Is no law which would prevent a deputy sheriff from being also a member of the County Board of Education. 2. A sheriff's sale on the Fourth of July is legal. August 4, 1916. Hon. A. J. Walker, Oobbville, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of recent date, I ean find no law which makes it unlawful for a inan to act as DC>puty Sheriff and at the same time serve on the County Bn:H'd of Education. Likewise I have not been able to find any lnw IYh;l'h makes it unlawful for a Sheriff to sell property on the f,Jnrth day of July. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. / The law does not provide rewards for the arrest of criminals unless the reward be specifically and specially offered and advertised by the Governor. August 4, 1916. Mr. R. F. Salter, Smithville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday the law provides no rewards for the arrests of criminals unless the reward be specifically and specially offered and advertised by the Governor. I presume no such reward was offered or you would' have heard of it. If there was you would be entitled to it. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 419 A citizen who has served in the United States Army during his full term of enlistment is not exempted thereby from the payment of street tax. Calhoun & Askew, Attorneys, Arlington, Georgia. August 7, 1916. GENTLEMEN: Replying to your favor of recent date asking whether or not a citizen who has served in the United States Army during his full term of enlistment is exempt from the payment of street tax I beg to say that I have been unable to find any law exempting such a person. The only law concern- ing .exemptions from street tax is found in the Penal Code rela- tive to men in the National Guard of the State, and then only while actually enlisted. ' Hoping the above is the information you desire, and with kind personal regards, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General: A Bill to abolish the Board of Roads and Revenues of Murray County and a Bill introduced to create a Board of Supervisor's of Roads and Revenues for Murray County. Constitutionality discussed. August 7. 1916. Hon. E. H. Beck, . State Capitol, Atlanta. DEAR Sm: I am in receipt of your request of the 4th instant for an opinion on the following matter : A Bill has been introduced in the General Assembly providing that the Board of Roads and Revenues of 1\furray County be abolished. It is provided in this Bill that the repeal of the law creating said Board shall not go into effect unless. the same is approved by a majority of the voters. of the said county at an election to be held on this question. If a majority of the voters at said election favor the repeal of the Board, the said Board is to be abolished as provided in the Bill. A subsequent Bill has been introduced providing that a Board of Supervisors of Roads and Revenues for this same county, and further providing that said 420 Act creating said Board of Supervisors shall not become effective in said county until the same has been submitted to and approved by the qualified voters of said county at an election to be held for that purpose. You wish to know whether these Bills or either of them, if they are both enacted into law; will be invalid or unconstitutional solely on the ground that it may result that they are in conflict with each other, or repugnant to each other. In reply, I will say that I confine my answer strictly to the question asked and do not consider whether or not either of these Bills will be invalid upon any other grounds. I understand the law on this subject to be as follows: Where an Act contains certain Sections that inay be considered in conflict with a following Section, or where two Acts contain Sections that may be considered in conflict with each other, but the intent of the Legislature can be arrived at, and its real purpose carried out, by giving effect to the later Section and others in harmony with it, the Act does not become inoperative because of the conflict. Hand et al. vs. Stapleton et al, 135 Alabama Rep., page 156. A Legislative Act incapable of interpretation and enforcement because of irreconcilable conflict of meaning between its principal provision will be held inoperative and void. See the case of In re Ed Hendricks, 60 Kansas Report, page 796. The only conflictthat could arise in the two Bills under consideration would result from the following contingency: That the people at the election should vote against the repeal of the old Commission and at the other election vote to adopt the law providing for the Board of Supervisors. This, of course, is not at all likely to happen, but still it is a possibility. However, in the event such a contingency should arise I am of the opinion that no real conflict would exist for the reason that under numerous rulings of the Supreme Court of this State the expression of the Legislative will is held to prevail. The law, therefore, would be construed as repealing. the former Act by implication and would constitute the law on the subject. In the case of l\Iacon & Birmingham R. R. Co. vs. Gibson, 85 Ga., page 20, the Supreme Court held: "The rule, so far as w~ know, is universal that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between 421 two statutes, the later of the two must prevail and the former give way." For these reasons I am of the opinion that the statutes m question would not be invalid or unconstitutional because of any inconsistency or repugnancy between them. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Filing of campaign expenses by candidates for Congress. August 8, 1916. Mr. Thomas A. Lang, Atty., Calhoun, Ga. DEAR Sm: Your letter of recent date asking for information relative to the filing of campaign expenses by candidates for Congress, was duly received. In reply, I will say, that the law on this subject is contained in an Act of Congress of August 19th, 19il, and another Act of August 23rd, 1912. The first of these Acts provides in part as follows : "Every person who shall be a candidate for nomination at any primary election or nominating convention, or for election at any general or special election, as Representative in the Congress of the United States, shall, not less than ten. or more than fifteen days before the day for holding such primary election or nominating convention, and not less than ten or more than fifteen days before the day of the General or specia1 election at which candidates for Representatives are to_ be elected file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives at Washington, District of Columbia, a full, correct, and itemized statement of all monies, and things of value received by him or by any one for him with his knowledge and consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy, together with the names of all tho~e who have furnished the same in whole or in part; and such statement shall contain a true and itemized account of all monies and things of value ~iven, contributed, expended, used, or promised by such candidate, or by his agent, representative, or other per son for and in his behalf with his knowledge and consent, together with the names of all those to whom any and all such gifts, con tributions, payments, or promises were made, for the purpose of procuring his nomination or election." "Every such candidate for nomination at any primary election or nominating convention, or for endorsement or election at any general or special election, or for election by the Legislature 422 of any State, shall, within fifteen days after such primary elec tion or nominating convention, and within thirty days after any such general or special election, and within thirty days after the day upon which the Legislature shall have elected a Senator, file with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or with the Secretary of the Senate, as the case may be, a full, correct, and itemized statement of all monies and things of value received by him or by any one for him with his knowledge and consent, from any source, in aid or support of his candidacy, together with the names of all those who hav~ furnished the same in whole or in part; and such statement shall contain a true and itemized account of all monies and things of value given, contributed, expended, used, or promised by such candidate, or hy his agent, representative, or other person for and in his behalf with his knowledge and consent, up to, on, and after the day of such primary election, nominating convention, general or speci~l election, or election by the Legislature, together with the names of all those to whom any and all such gifts, contributions, payments, or promises were made for the purpose of procuring his nomination, endorsement, or election." The said Act of 1912. provides as follows: "Every statement herein required shall be verified by the oath _ or affirmation of the candidate, taken before an officer authorized to administer oaths; and the depositing of any such statement in a regular postoffice, directed to the Clerk of the House of Representatives or to the Secretary of the Senate, as the case may be, duly stamped and registered, within the time required herein, shall be deemed a sufficient filing of any such statement under any of the provisions of this Act." I have not quoted all of the provisions of these Acts as they are very long and it would be well for the person making the statement to read the Acts carefully before making up their statement. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 423 A sheriff does not have to pUblish report of his inspection of the books of the United States Internal Revenue Collector unless there are persons from his county having secured liquor Ji. censes. The sheriff is entitled to his fee of $25.00 for the year's work regardless of whether there are any people from his county who have secured U. S. licenses. August 15, 1916. Hon. S. C. O'Kelley, Clerk, Da-nielsville, Georgia. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of the 14th instant asking my opinion as to whether or not the Sheriff is required to publish report of inspection of the books of the United States Internal Revenue Collector containing the names of the persons, firms, or corporations, thereon from his county who may have secured liquor licenses, will say that unless there are names on the said books from his county he is not required to publish report, stating that there are no names on the said books. You wish to know further if the Sheriffis to be paid $25.00 for the year if no names from his county are on said books. Replying to this question will say that the law directs that each Sheriff must inspect the books on the first of each month and directs that he be paid $25.00 for the year and therefore it is my opinion that the Sheriffs have earn~d their fee of $25.00 when they inspect the books each month for the year, regardless oi how many or how few names may be thereon. Trusting that the above is the information you desire, and with best wishes, I remain, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. . Wholesale and retail druggists are allowed to sell "pure alcohol" under certain conditions. Unlawful for them to sell whiskey, etc. Sheriffs do not have to publish names of such dr,uggists who procure license from the United States to sell "pure alcohol." August 15, 1916. Baohrnan & Sirnrnons, Attorneys, Hurt Building, Atlanta, Ga. GENTLEMEN: Replying to your favor of recent date, asking my 'opinion as to whether or not retail and wholesale druggists 424 are exempted from the operation of the last prohibition law relative to selling whiskey, etc., will say that they are allowed to sell ''pure alcohol'' the same as they could before the last prohibition law was passed. See Acts of Extraordinary Session, 1915, page 83, Section 10, bottom of page. This refers to the Acts of the Legislature of 1907, page 82. Also, the repealing clause of the last prohibition law, on page 89 of the Acts, Extraordinary Session, Section 24. As to whether or not it is the duty of the Sheriff of. any county to procure and have published the names of wholesale and retail druggists who may have obtained a license to sell pure alcohol as provided by law, I will say that, in my opinion, it is not the intention of the Legislature, in the Act of 1916, to require such names to be obtained and published. Section 10 of the Act, page 83, provides that "nothing in this Act shall apply to regularly licensed retail or wholesale druggists, who, under the prohibition Act of August 6, 1907, are allowed to sell alcohol, etc.'' Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 1. The Superintendent of Schools of a county in which a local tax is levied by districts is not required to notify all the corporations owning property in such district, which are required to make their tax returns to the Comptroller-General of the levy of the tax, annually, giving them informations as to the bound-aries of the district, etc. 2. It is the duty of the County School Superintendent to notify the tax rate assessing authority of a county of the rate fixed for a local school tax in any such district which has adopt('d the same before the time such tax rate is assessed. 3. Such a tax could not be collected out of a part of the people of such a district unless if could be collected from all persons and corporations. August 16, 1916. Han. S. J. Hale, County School Superintendent, Trenton, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date requesting my 425 OpllliOn as to the interpretation of certain provisions of the School Laws of this State. You wish to know whether or not it is necessary for the Superintimdent of Schools of a county in which a local tax is levied by districts. to notify, each and every year, all the corporations which are required to make their tax returns to the ComptrollerGeneral of the levy of the tax, and to give them information as to the boundaries of the district, etc., to enable them to make returns of their property located in such districts. In reply I will say that the only provision on this subject is found in Section 1541 of the Code. This Section provides in part as follows: ''It is hereby made the duty of the County Superintendent of Schools of each county to ~urnish on or before January 1; 1907, to each such corporation, information as to the boundaries of each school district in which such corporation may have property, such as will enable such corporation to determine the amount of its property in such district, and he shall also furnish similar information whenever the boundaries of any school district may be changed.'' In my opinion this Section means that the information referred to therein is to be furnished corporations referred to on or before January 1, 1907, and that when such information has been furnished as required by law, it is not necessary that such information be furnished at any other time, unless the lines of the district have been changed. In the latter event it is his duty to give such information as soon as the change has been made, but it is not necessary that such information be given more than once. I do not think that elections for local school tax have anything to do with the matter of giving this information: The information is to be given at the time stated for all districts regardless of whether any or all of these districts at the time were levying a local tax. After an election has been called and held and has resulted in favor of a local tax, it is not necessary that such information be given again, pro- vided it was given in the first instance as required by law, and provided that no change has been made in the boundaries of the district. The corporations referred to under the law are entitled to information one time as to the establishment of the district and its boundaries, but are not entitled to any further notice on this subject after the first notice unless the lines have been changed. 426 You wish to know further where the local taxes for the support of schools can be collected for the present year in certain districts where the election favoring such a tax was recently held. In reply to this question I will say that Section 1537 of the Code provides in part as follows : ''The County School Commissioner of each county, at or before the time for fixing the rate of said county by the Ordinary thereof, or the County Board of Commissioners, as the case may be, shall certify to the said Ordinary, or said Board of Commissioners, as the case may be, and to the Comptroller-General of the State the rate of taxation fixed for each school district in the county, and said taxing authority of said county shall levy such special tax at the same time and in the same manner as is now prescribed for levying taxes for county purposes.'' Sections 1036 to 1041 of the Code provide that the Comptroller-General shall assess the . tax for school purposes against the property of the corporations located in such district and notify the president and treasurer of such companies of the tax assessed against them. They. ~re then required to pay said tax to the Tax-Collector of the county. It will thus be seen that if the County School Commissioners notify the taxing authorities of the county of the rate of tax fixed in the districts at or before the time for fixing the rate of tax for the county, so that the special tax may be included in the general tax levy for the county, the tax for the local districts may be collected for that year. Your next question is whether or not such a local tax could be collected in such a district in the event it was found that the corporations which make their returns to the Comptroller-General could not be forced to pay the same. In reply I wilL say that a tax could not be collected out of a part of the people in the district if for any reason other persons or corporations could not be forced to pay the same. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 427 Where the county authorities have committed a person to the State Insane Asylum in accordance with the provisions of the law the Superintendent cannot refuse admission of such person on the ground that he is not a resident of the State. August 18, 1916. lion. J. R. Horton, Ordinary, . Fitzgerald, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your favor of recent date requesting my opinion on the following matter: It seems that one Rollins was tried for lunacy in your Court and adjudged insane and duly committed to the State Sanitarium. Dr. Jones, the Super- intendent of the Sanitarium, now refuses to admit Rollins into this institution on the ground that Rollins, as Dr. Jones con- tends, is not a resident of this State: You wish to know whether or not Dr. Jones has the authority to refuse to accept Rollins. into this institution on the ground stated. In reply I will say that Sections 1574 to 1577 of the Code of 1910 provide "lunatics, epileptics, idiots, and demented ine- brates shall be admitted to and discharged from the Sanitarium under such rules and regulations as the Trustees shall pre- scribe." They further provide that such rules and regulations when thus established shall be executed and carried into effect by the Superintendent and other officers of said asylum. Also it is provided that it shall be the duty of said Trustees to cause to be furnished to the different Ordinaries of the State copies of said rules and regulatioU:s. However, I do 'not understand that it is the purpose of these Sections to confer upon the Trustees power to prescribe rules for the commitment of patients to the Sanitarium not harmonious with Section 3092 of the Code of thi~ State, providing for commitment to the asylum of per- sons non compus mentis. . Sections 1574 to 1577, inclusive, of the Code havetio applica- tion as to the method of commitment. They apply only after commitment in conformity with Section 3092 of the Code. The Board may prescribe rules and regulations for the patient after legally committed to the asylum, but not relative to the pro- cedure anticipating commitment to the asylum. Section 1600 of the Code provides "every one sent to the Sanitarium from any county in Georgia must be shown, in the exemplification of proceeding, to be at the time strictly a citizen . 00 4.00 _of this State, in terms of the law relating to citizens. For the reason above stated it is my opinion that where the provisions of said Section 1600 of the Code have been complied with and a patient has been duly and legally adjudged a subject to be committed to the State Sanitarium, and has been cop1mitted as provided by Section 3092 of the Code, the Superintendent could not refuse to admit him into the Institution on the ground that he is not a resident of the State. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-General. Ordinary's cost in cases of opening up private ways discussed. ,. ,.August 23, 1916. Hon. W. D. Whelchel, Ordinary, Gainesville, Ga. 1 DEAR SIR: I have your letter of August 22nd asking for information in reference to the Ordinary's cost in cases of opening up private ways. In reply I will say that Section 827 of the Code provides ''the fees of the Ordinary in such case shall be $3.00, to be paid by the losing party." Section 4827 provides generally for fees of the Ordinary. In the case of Fortson vs. :Mattox, 67 Ga., page 282, it was held that in a case of this kind the Ordinary sits, not as the Court of Ordinary, but as the Ordinary. See also Sections 4796 and 4797 of the . Code.. The Ordinary in such case "sits fqr. 440 should be each year contracts made for t:lC exrenses of the year, and these were to be paid out of moneys arising from taxes levied during the year, that is, that each year's expense s:wuld be paid by taxes levied during the year, and no item of expense was to be paid. except out of the taxes levied during the year in which the contract for such expense was made. Any liability which was not to be discharged by money already in the Treasury, or by taxes to be levied during the year in which the contract under which the liability arose was made, is a debt within the meaning of the Constitution, and can not be incurred without the preliininary sanction of a popular vote, unless it be for a temporary loan to supply casual deficiencies of revenue." However, the case above referred to held that the county might be liable for money borrowed and for which it received the benefit. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-GeneraL 1. Property located beyond the jurisdiction of the State is not sub- ject to the Inheritance Tax Law. . 2. -Each heir, who is a father, mother, husband, wife, child, brother, sister, wife or widow of a son, or any child or children adopted as such, of the descendant, or by any lineal descendant of such decedent, Is entitled to an exemption of $5,000. Atlanta, Ga., September 9, 1916. Hon. Henry McAlpin, Ordinary, Savannah, Ga. DEAR Sm :. Referring again to the matter of the inheritance tax on the Gans estate I wil_l say that if it is shown that only $11,250.00 of this estate is located in the State of Georgia, then only that amount is subject to the inheritance tax laws of this State. The State of Georgia can not tax property or the transfers thereof when the same is not within the jurisdiction of this State. If the property is not located in the State it is not within the jurisdiction of the State, and is not subject to the tax. It appears that there are four heirs to this estate. You wish to _know whether or not each of these heirs is entitled to the exemption of five thousand dollars. In reply I will say that in the case of Martin vs. Pollock, 144 Ga., page 605, the Su- 441 preme Court of this State held that each of the heirs, if he is one of those enumerated in Section 1 and Paragraph 1 of the Act, is entitled to an exemption of five thousand dollars. Therefore, if any one of the heirs receives property in excess of five thousand dollars from the portion of the estate located in Georgia, he would be subject to the tax on such excess. If none of the heirs receives property in excess of five thousand dollars, then no tax can be collected. Each heir is entitled to an exemption. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. One sale does not constitute carrying on a business. September 9, 1916. McKenney & Powell Bros., Woodbury, Ga. GENTLEMEN : Replying to your favor of the 8th instant will say that a t?wn has no right to collect a tax if you maintain no business and carry on no business in the town. One sale does not constitute carrying on a business. See the case of Gunn vs. The Mayor and Council of Macon, 84 Ga., page 365, and also the case of Williams vs. City of Tifton, 3 Ga. App., page 445. Trusting that the above is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A person who has served a sentence in the chain-gang is not exempt from tiie payment_ of taxes. September 9, 1916. Hon. Tom Jones, Austell, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of recent date the law is clear that a man who has served a sentence in the chaingang is not exempt from the payment of any kind of tax. In fact the law does not generally exempt folks from paying taxes, .442 and I suggest that you make anybody show you the law before you hear anything about exemptions. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. It is necessary to have two appraisements of an estate that is subject to the lnherita"ce Tax Law; one under the Jaws relating to the administration of estates, and one under the Inheritance Tax Act. Hon S.D. Fanning, Ordinary, Washington, Ga. September 9, 1916. DEAR Sm : I have your favor of the 7th inst. in which you ask whether or not it is necessary to have two appraisements of an estate that is subject to the inheritance tax, one under laws relating to the administration of estates, and the other under the provisions of the Inheritance Tax Act. In reply, I will say that in my opinion the law contemplates that there shall be two appraisements. One is required under the general law. relating to the administration of estates. The other is had under the Inheritance Law. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The owner .of an automobile or a friend or a member of the owner's family may drive the car withou:t. a chauffeur's license. September 9, 1916. Hon. Fred W. Gilbe1t, Washington, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying t; your favor of 4th instant, we interpret the law providing a tax on chauffeurs to mean that the owner of a car or a friend or a member of the owner's family may drive a car without the license. If the owner has in his employ a driver on a salary and any part of his employment is the driv- 443 ing the car we think he should obtain the chauffeur's license. We know of no other reasonable line of demarcation to fix. With my kind personal regards. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. No fund is provided from which can be paid the cost of the stenographic work of the Special Committee appointed by the Legisla- ___ ture to consider the tax question. ~F'/T -~?;]: _ ~:;;-:If,~';-' ~~-:-:::r rT:J~--JJ-:'l~~VifJ -- 'September 14, 1916. Hon. Jno. D.. Walker, ~parta, Ga. DEAR Sm: Your letter of recent date addressed to the Governor and relating to the matter of the payment of the cost of the stenographic work of the Special Committee appointed by the Legislature to consider the tax question has been turned over to me for reply. You wish to know whether or not there is any fund out of which this cost could be paid. In reply I will say that I regret that there is no fund from which this money can be legally paid. Such matters are usually provided for by a Special Resolution authorizing the payment of the ~arne. I do not think this money could be paid out of the con- tingent fund for the following reasons, as well stated by one of the former Attorney-Generals: "The purpose of the contingent fund, which is appropriated each year to be expended under the direction of the Governor, is to pay those expenses and obligations of the State which are liable but not certain to occur, and which can not well be foreseen by the General Assembly. This debt was made by a branch of the General Assembly and, of course, was well known while that body was in session, and it could not very well come within the definition of a contingent debt or liability of the State. I do not think that the expenses of the Legislature are chargeable anyway, against the contingent fund." I regret that I am not able to find any way by which the Xpenses referred to can be legally paid. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 444 Discussion as to whether or not under the recent Act of the Legislature the Ordinaries are required to make monthly reports and payments to the State Treasurer <>f the fund received by them from the tax on whiskey shipments. September _18, 1916. H on. J. A. Wills, Ordinary, Jefferson, Ga. DEAR SIR: I haye yo~r letter of recent date requesting my opinion as to whether or not under the recent Act of the Legislature the Ordinaries are required to make monthly reports and payments to the State Treasurer of the fund received by them from the tax on whiskey shipments. In reply I will say that the Act provides that the first $600 received by the Ordinary for each fiscal year from the date of the passage of the Act from said tax paid to them by the transportation companies shall go to the Ordinary. After $600.00 has been received by him during each year, the Ordinary is to receive ten per cent. of the amount in excess of $600.00. It will, therefore, be seen that the Ordinary is not required to make any payments to the State Treasurer until he has received $600.00, and has on hand some ainount in excess of $600.00, ninety per cent. of which he is required to pay to the State Treasurer. After he has received his $600.00, he is then required ta pay whatever. amount he has on hand after that time, less ten per cent. to the State Treasurer at the end of every thirty days. The Act provides in this respect as follows: ''And at the end of each thirty days of each fiscal year, from the date of the approval of this Act he shall make payment to the State Treasurer of such amount as he may be due to pay into the Trc:osmy under the provisions of this Act." It thus nppears that the Ordinary is not required to make any report to the Treasurer or make any payments to him until such Ordinary has received the amount of $600.00. After that time he is required to make monthly payments to the State Treasurer, at the end of each month, of whatever amounts he may at the end of the month be due to pay into the Treasury under the provisions of this Act. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 445 The Act appi'Oved August 19th, 1916 (Regulating the practice of Ophthalmology), requires all those now practicing any other non-drug giving school of medical practice within the meaning of the Act to appear before the Board and stand an examination on certain subjects. Must stand such examination within sixty days. September 18, 1916. Dr. E. L. McCraney, Blairsville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date asking for some information in regard to the recent law relating to practitioners of ophthalmology has been received. You state that you hold a diploma from the Northern Illinois College of Ophthalmology, and you desire to know whether or uot under the Act of the last Legislature you will be required to go before the State Board and stand. an examination. In reply I will say that said Act provides as follows : "Be it further enacted, That within sixty days after the pas sage of this Act, all of those now practicing within this State any other non-drug giving school of medical practice within the meaning of this Act shall appear before. said Board provided in this Act on a date fixed by said Board and stand an examination on those subjects required in Section 7 of the original Act as amended by this Act." This Act was approved August 19th, 1916. I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. In the absence of a contract c.itizens .of a municipality would have no recourse against a person who had been furnishing light and water service and who refused to continue such service. September 18, 1916. Hon. W. T. Dickerson, Attorney-at-Law, .Homerville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date regarding the matter of the franchise for lights and water granted to individuals by a municipality. In reply I will say that I have given 446 this matter considerable thought and attention and have arrived at the following conclusions: A corporation or person furnishing electric light or power service to the public is under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. See Sections 2662 and 2663. A corporation or person furnishing water to a city is not under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. However, a person furnishing electric light service to the public is under the jurisdiction of the Commission to the extent that the Commission may regulate rates and otherwise regulate in the interests of the public the manner of conducting the business. Where such a corporation or person absolutely refuses to continue te furnish such service, I do not think the Railroad Commission has jurisdiction to force such person or company to continue to do so. This is true for the reason that the law seems to refer to the regulation of the operation of such business, and also for the reason that there is no way by which the Commission could enforce an order requiring the person or corporation to continue in business. If the municipality has a contract with the individuals by which such individuals have agreed to furnish light and water, it might institute a suit for aamages for a breach of contract. If citizens of the town have contracts- with such persons to furnish light and water, they might institute suits for damages for breach of the contracts. However, in the absence of a contract either with the city or with the citizens of the town, I do not see how either the citizens of the town or the city can have any recourse against the persons who refuse to continue to furnish the light and water. Of course, the city can revoke the franchise. It may b!l possible that either the city or the citizens, if they have expended money and sustained loss on faith of any understanding or agreement ~ith the persons agreeing to furnish light and power, might recover damages to the extent of such loss. This would depend upon the facts of each individual case. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 447 New Optical law requires certificate of examination to be filed by applicant with Clerk of the Superior Court in each county he intends to practice in. Clerk's fee is $1.00. September 21, 1916. Mr. Hugh B. Jones, Calhoun, Ga. DE.AR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday, I have just been down to the office of the Secretary of State and thoroughly examined the new optical law as requested by you. 1 find that it requires you to have the certificate. issued by the Examiners after an examination recorded in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of each county in which you have an office or do any practice. The Bill provides that the Clerk of the Court may charge a fee for this registration of one dollar for each county. This is only regulation on the subject inquired about by_ you. Trusting that this gives you the information you desire, I am. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD w .ALKER, Attorney-General. Commissioners can require Overseer to do his duty before the expiration of twelve months. Section 690. Mr. C. N. Walker, September 21, 1916. Ellijay, Ga. DE.AR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date I beg to advise after studying Section 690 of the Code that I am en- tirely at sea as to just what the Section really means. In other words, it is capable of two constructions, either one of which could be justified by strong arguments. I regret that I have been unable to find any decision of the court on the subject. It is my judgment that the court when they do interpret the .Section will hold that the Commissioners can require the Overseer to do his duty before the expiration of twelve months. However, he must be given due notice of his neglect and time in which to do the work and after this he would be entitled to a hearing if he desired before he could be fined. Trusting this is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD w .ALKER, Attorney-General. 448 of A Judge of a City Court can be elected Solicitor-Gen~ral the Circuit while holding such judicial position. September 21, 1916. Hon. Alvin V. Sellers, Baxley, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have received your favor of 16th instant in which you say you were elected Soli~itor-General in the recent primary and being Judge of the City Court are in some doubt as to your right to retain the Judgeship until January 1st, when your term expires and also when the term of your predecessor, the present Solicitor-General, expires. In other words you submit the question whether you can be legally elected in the November election while holding the judgeship. In response to your request I beg to say that the exact question seems not to have been before our Court. However, I am clearly of the opinion yqu can retain the judgeship and legally be elected Solicitor-General. In hundreds of cases county officers holding one office are elected to fill other offices while still in office. The present TaxCollector of my own county was nominated for Ordinary and will retain his place as Tax-Collector until January 1st, when he will qualify as Ordinary. A number of the candidates for the Court of Appeals are at present members of the Legislature. Not only so, but if you will refer to the Statutes inhibiting the holding of more than one office you will see that in every case the inhibition is against the holding of two offices and nowhere have I been able to find any provision against the election to one office while holding another. Inasmuch as the law generally provides that an office holder shall retain his office until his successor is qualified I would suggest that you be careful to see that your successor qualifies as Judge of the Oity Court before you qualify as SolicitorGeneral. l\Iy conclusion is that you will be safe in retaining the office as Judge of the City Court as suggested herein. very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 44.9 A person holding himself out as an expert and tests eyes and fits glasses is liable for the tax prescribed by the Optometry Bill. Punch board is violation of the law. September 22, 1916. Americus, Ga. Han. F. L. Thomas, DEAR SIR: I regret that the law does not allow the AttorneyGeneral to render official opinion except upon the request of the Governor. However, I do not mind saying to you that my understanding is that the Optometry Bill permits the simple sale of glasses without an examination or license. However, any one examining or testing eyes or fitting glasses or prescribing or holding himself out as an expert on such matter is liable to pay the license. In answer to your second question the courts have held that such schemes as the punch board you describe is a violation of the law, even though the full money's worth is always obtained. Trusting that this gives you the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER,. Attorney-General. There is no law to prevent the county executive committee of a party from adopting a majority rule in the holding of primary elec' tions for nominating county officers. September 27, 1916. Hon. A: F. Byrd, Ordinary, Baxley, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favors of September 22nd and 23rd I am of the opinion that the county executive committee can legally adopt the majority rule in the holding of primaries for .the nomination of county officers. Having complied substantially with the material requirements.of the primary laws they may prescribe such rules and regulations as are not directly in conflict .with the letter and spirit of the primary law. I am of the o.pin,ion that the majority rule is not so in conflict with that law. Aside from the strict legality of that action if all parties accepted these regulations and acquiesced in the action of the <150 c?mmittee and submitted their cause to th~ second prima:r;y they would be bound thereby and I know of no legal authority for setting aside the action of the people in the last election. Trusting that this is the information you desire, I. am Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Where authorized, a city or town may collect street taxes on males between the ages of 16 and 21 years of age. September 27, 1916. Hon. Tom Jones, Austell, Ga. DEAR SIR :. Replying to your favor of 26th instant I know of no law or decision of the Supreme Court which exempts a male between the ages of 16 years and 21 years from paying street tax legally imposed by a city or town. As suggested to you heretofore; I would listen to no claim of exemption not accompanied by a citation of the law itself to authorize it. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Medicines, tonics and extracts, containing more than one-half of one per cent. alcohol can be legally sold when intended for use as a medicine, but unlawful when sold and used as a beverage. September 29, 1916. Andrews, the Druggist, Brunswick, Ga. DEAR SIR : Replying to your unsigned letter of September 27th, I regret to say that the law permits the Attorney-General to render opinions only on official :request of the Governor. However, I have no hesitancy in favoring my friends with my personal views. The question you submit has not been passed upon by the courts and until so passed upon it will remain: more or less an open question. Inasmuch as many bona fide drugs contain more than one-half of one per cent. of alcohol; 451 to the attention of this. office the matter of the Inheritance 'J'a.:'_ due under the will of said deceased and particularly under i~mn three of said will. The same reads as follows : "I' give and bequeath to Right Reverend M. J. Curley, Bishop of St. Augustine, :Florida, and to his successors in such office forever the sum of about fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000.00), in trust, the same to be invested by him or his successor in office in .interest-bearing securities and the income therefrom to be used in the perpetual upkeep and care and maintenance, of the family- burying grown .. in Florida." . \ The specifi question submitted is whether or not this fund of $15,000.000 in trust is exempted under the. Inher!tance Act of 1913. Able counsel for the Executrix points out the fact that there has been no adjudication by the courts of Georgia on the ques- tion involved and looking to the decisions of other States cites. with confidence decisions rendered by the New York Courts. To this it may be said: _ 1. The New York Statute differs materially from the Georgia Statute, and particularly so as to exemptions of the nature of the one now under consideration. The New York Statute ex-. pressly exempts property devised or bequeathed for religious ceremonies, observances or commemorative services, of or for the deceased donor or to any person who is a Bishop, or to any religious, educational, charitable, missionary, benevolent, hospital or infirmary, corporation wherever incorporated, including cor- porations organized exclusively for Bible or Tract purposes. Personal property other than money or securities bequeathed to: a corporation or association wherever incorporated or located,: organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men or women or for scientific, literary, library, patriotic, ceme- tery or historical purposes are also exempted. Ross on Inherit- ance Taxation, 613. No such provisions or exemptions are al- lowed under the Georgia Act. Acts of 1913, page 91.. 2. Not only so, but the New Yo~k authorities are .them- selves in conflict even as to the New York law. "A bequest to a cemetery corporation of another State, the in- terest to be used for the purpose of keeping the testator's 'lot in .good condition forever,' has recently been held subject to the New York Transfer Tax."-Ro~s on Inheritance Taxation, page 207, note .62. , .. , . 4!?4 The court in the case of Estate of Fay, 62 l\Iisc. Rep. 154, 116 N. Y. Supp. 423, said: "In matter of Vinot's Estate, 7 N. Y. Supp. 517. Surrogate Ransom held that a bequest of one thousand dollars to an asso ciation, the income of which was to be applied to the care and preservation of the burial plot of a decedent, was not taxable. As this decision has not been overruled by a higher court,'it might be considered as a controlling authority in this case. In view, however, of the language of the Court of Appeals in the Gould case, 156 N. Y. 423, 51 N. E. 287, and of the appellate division in the ~IcAvoy case, 122 App. Div. 377, 98 N. Y. Supp. 437, it would appear that the decision in the matter of Vinot would scarcely meet with the approval of the appellate courts at the. present time. In the Gould case it was held that the property was taxable, although bequeathed for the purpose of satisfying a contractual obligation existing at the time of decedent's death; . and in the McAvoy case it was held that the bequest was tax able, although the beneficiary received it in payment of services to be rendered thereafter. While it has been held that a sum spent by an executor in the erection of a monument to decedent i's exempt (~latter of Edgerton's Estate, 35 App. Div. 125, 54 N. Y. Supp. 700), and that a reasonabie sum spent in the purchase. of a burial plot for decedent may be regarded as a part of the funeral. expenses and therefore a proper deduction (Matter of Liss' Estate, 39 "!'.lise. Rep .. l23, 78 K Y. Supp. 969), there is a manifest distinction between such expenditures made by an executor in his discretion and a bequest made by decedent in his last will to a certain benefici.ary and for a certain specific purpose. In the latter case the property passes to the beneficiary, by virtue of the provisions in decedent's will, and as the statute provides that all property passing by will (if not going to parties specifically mentioned as being exempt), is taxable, the bequest to the Mt. Auburn Cemetery Association would seem to be taxable." The Court in the l\Iavcrick case relied upon by counsel were divided in opinion, two of the five judges rendering a strong dissenting opinion. In re l\faverick's estate, 119 N. Y, S. 914. . The Georgia Act containing uo specific exemption, I am of the opinion that the transfer is taxable and that the judgment of the Court of Ordinary was correct. Having so concluded, I do not discuss the reasonableness of the sum fixed for the maintenance of the cemetery. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. 455 A public school teacher is not exempt from road tax; elected for a longer term than one year would be removable for cause. October 9, 1916. Professor J. B. King, Richland, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 4th instant, I can find ;no law which exempts a public school teacher from road tax. I presume that there was a clerical error in quoting Senator Smith. He probably stated that public school teachers should be exempt. I doubt the legality of the election of a teacher for a longer period than one year. Certainly he 1vould be removable for cause if he were elected for a longer term. Trusting that this is the information.you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. The amended garnishment laws, as far as it relates to the liability of laborers to garnishment. October 13, 1916. Mr. 0. 0. Newsome, Summerville, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your favor of recent date requesting information as to the recent garnishment law, as far as it relates to the liability of laborers to garnishment. In reply I will say that the law, as amended, reads as follows: "All persons shall be exempt from the process and liabilities of garnishment on one dollar and twenty-five cents per day of their daily, weekly or monthly wages, and on fifty per cent. of the excess thereof, whether in the hands of their employers or others. All wages above the exemptions herein provided for shall be subject to garnishment, and the garnishee in making answer shall state specifically when the wages therein referred to were earned by defendant and whether the same were earnd as daily, weekly or month!~ wages." I hope the above will give you the information you desire. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 456 The law authorizing common carriers to charge certain fees for shipments of alcohol. , October 13, 1916. Valdosta Drug Company, Valdosta, Ga: GENTLEMEN: Replying to your favor of recent date asking my opinion as to whether or not common-carriers can charge fifty cents for each shipment of alcohol, will say, that the law does not permit the Attorney-General to render official opinion, except upon the official request of the Governor. However, I take pleasure in giving you my views upon the subject; being, of course, worth no more than those of any other lawyer. Section 24, page 103, of the Acts of 1915, Extraordinary Session, provides as follows : "That nothing in this Act shall make it unlawful for any per son, firm or corporation to have shipped, and have delivered alcohol for any purpose permitted by the laws of this State; and nothing herein shall be construed to. prevent wholesale druggists from furnishing or selling alcohol according to law to licensed retail druggists, or from furnishing or selling alcohol to public or charity hospitals or to medical or pharmaceutical colleges, nor shall this Act prohibit the sale by licensed druggists c:if wood or denatured alcohol for art, scientific or mechanical purposes, or grain alcohol to bacteriologists who are actually engaged in that class of work for scientific purposes only." Section 430 of the Penal Code of 1910, provides: "Nothing in the preceding Sections of this Article shall be so construed as to prevent wholesale druggists from selling or fur nishing alcohol in wholesale quantities to regular licensed retail druggists, or to public or charity hospitals, or to medical or pharmaceutical colleges. All wholesale druggists shall be re quired to keep a complete record of all their sales of alcohol, which record shall at all times be open for inspection to the regular authorities of such counties or cities in which such wholesale stores are located." Section 426 of the Code provides the manner in which licensed retail druggists may sell or furnish alcohol for medici- , nal purposes only upon the prescription of a regular practicing physician of this State. The Act of the Legislature approved August 19, 1916 (Acts 457 l.n6, page 72), .provides}or the bringing of alcohol into the State of Georgia for the purpose of its wse in manufacturing articles of commerce. This law prohibits railroad companies or other common-carriers from delivering alcohol when brought into this State except for use only in manufacturing articles of commerce, and also prohibits said companies from delivering such alcohol except in cases where the consignee makes affidavit as provided by said laws. The affidavit provided is that. appearing in the circular enclosed 'vith your letter. It thus appears that wholesale druggists are permitted to sell or furnish alcohol to licensed retail druggists, or to public or charity hospitals, or to medical or pharmaceutical colleges~ without making the affidavit referred to by the consignee or the payment by him of the fee of fifty cents provided in the Act of 1916. However, if the alcohol is to be delivered to any person for use only in manufacturing articles of commerce, the affidavit referred to must be made and the fee provided must be paid before the transportation companies are permitted to make a delivery of the alcohol. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-GeneraL Justice of Peace has power to punish as for a contempt of court any person refusing to obey his summons to appear in his court. October 13, 1916. Air. L. A. Free, N. P. and Ex-Officio J. P., Colquitt, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have you letter of recent- date in which you request my opinion on the following matter: In a case where a person has been duly summonded as a juro1 in a Justice's Court and he refuses to obey the summons and appear in court, haS' the Justice of the Peace the authority to fine him, or to imprison him for contempt of court? In reply I will say that under Section 4746 of the Code the Justice can fine the defaulting juror not exceeding $5.00. Under Section 4679 (2) and. Section 4643 I think the Justice of the Peace has the authority 458 to 'imprison a: defaulting. juror not exceeding five hours .for contempt of court In the. case. of Ormond, Justice,. vs. Ball, 120 Ga. 9l6 {8; 9) the Supreme Court says: :''When~ver a "Justice of tlie Peace is holding court he. has all the powers usually incident to courts, such as to preser.ve and enforce. order, 'to compel 'obedience to judgments, orders, and process, and to ~eontroi the conduct of -officers and other persons connected, with 'the judicial proceeding before it in every .matter .pertaining thereto, and the like.'' Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD ALRER, Attorney-General. . \' , Mandamus against City to enforce collection of taxes. October 13, 1916. Mr. W; P. Aiken, .. G-odfrey, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, in which you state that the municipal recorusof .the Town of Godfrey were .destroyed by fire in July, 1915. Some of the citizens have. paid their taxes for 1915. Other citizens refuse to pay such taxes. You state further that the municipal authorities now in office refuse to enforce collection of these taxes. You wish to know what remedy citizens have in such a case. In reply, I wilf say that if the amounts due as taxes can be ascertained, a mandamus .might be brought against the city authorities for the purpose of forcing them to take proper steps to enforce collection of the taxes due the city. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Justice of the Peace may change his place of holding court by complying with the law. Section 4701 provides manner of changing. October 14, 1916. Hon. J. B. Mitchell, J. P., Kenwood, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of even date, I beg to say 459 that you have the authority to change the place of holding Justice's Court to some other place, naming it, by written order, a majority of the qualified voters of your district having petitioned for such a change. See Section 4701 of the Code. The Ordinary can act only after the Justice of the Peace has refused to make the change. The law fixes thirty days' notice when the _ordinary acts, but it seems to provide that when the Justice of the Peace acts, sixty days' notice, and the notice should be published or posted in the district for sixty days. In other words, I suggest that you sign the written order changing the place of holding the court from the present place to the new place, describing the new place, and post this written order at the old courthouse and make a copy of the order ancl post it at the new place designated. If you will do this there _ can be no question as to the legality. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, A.ttorney-General. Under the Acts of 1915 and 1916 an express company is not author. ized to collect 25 cents a quart for the delivery-of alcohol. October 16, 1916. J. E. Bozeman, Sumner, Ga., R. F. D. No.2. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date, addressed to Hon. Frank Park, Sylvester, Ga., has been turned over to this office for reply. You wish to know whether an Express Company has the right to charge 25c on a quart of alcohol for delivering it when the express is prepaid. In reply, I will say that if the delivery is made to a licensed retail druggist, or public or charity hospital, or a pharmaceutical college, the express company would not charge any fee beyond express. If the alcohol is delivered to the consignee for the use in the manufacture of articles of commerce alone, a fee of fifty cents may be charged, one-half of which goes to the express company and the other half to the Ordinary of the County. See Acts of the Legislature of 1916, page 72. If the alcohol is delivered under the 16th Section of the A.ct of 1915, Special Session, page 99, which provides that 460 any person may accept delivery of and possess, within any period of thirty consecutive days, not more than two quarts of spirituous liquors or other intoxicating liquors or other prohibited liquors, the express company would be authorized to charge only ten cents on each separate delivery. Trusting that the above is the information you desire; I am Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The manufacture .of wine is absolutely prohibited. October 16, 1916. Mr. Joseph R. Moody, Screven, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date, addressed to the Governor, has been turned over to me for reply. You wish to know whether or not the law of this State prohibits the manufacture of wine for medical or Church use. In reply, I will say that the law of this State prohibits absolutely the manufacture of wine for any purpose. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The fees allowed Ordinaries "For receiving application and granting letters dismissory" and "For services in making settlement of accounts of any executor, administrator, or guardian" are for two separate and distinct services. October 16, 1916. Him. .A. H. Riley, Ordinary, Butler, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have your letter of recent date, asking my opinion on the construction of Section 4827 of the Code. One provision in this .Section is that the Ordinary is entitled ~o a fee of $5.00 ''for receiving application and granting letters dismissory, whole service.'' Another provision is that the Ordinary is en- 461 titled to'a .fee:.of $10.00 ''for.services in.making settlemept of gccouuts of any executor, administrator, or. guardian; as prescribed in thi's Code." You wish to know whether the Ordinary is entitled to charge both fees. In reply, I will say that the receiving of the application and granting letters dismissory, 'and the services in making settlement of accounts of any executor, etc., are entirely diffcrrnt transactions. The making of settlements involves the examination of the final' returns and all the vouchers attached thereto. The matter of receiving the application and granting letters dismissory is separate from the making of settlements. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the Ordinary is entitled to inclnde both items in his b1Ii .{)f"cosfs..,. . . . . Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A Sheriff is not required by law to go after a fugitive from justice, Held in another State, where his County Commissioners refuse to pay his expenses for the trip; October 16, 1916. Mr. R. E.Battle, Sheriff, Ell-aville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date, addressed to the Governor, has been turned over to me for reply. It seems that a party charged with embezzlement in your county is being held in 'Oregon for the purpose of being returned to Georgia for trial, but th~t"the County Commissioners of your County refuse to appropriate money to bring this .man back to Georgia. You ask what your duty is in the matter. In reply, I will say that if the County Authorities refuse to pay the expenses of bringing this man back, there is nothing further that you can do. The law does not require you to go into another State a:t your own expense for the purpose -of bringing back for trial to this State a fugitive from justice. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. .4,62 A town or city may levy and collect a license or occupation tax for:carrying on a business, though the stat~ aiso levies anil collect~ a tax on the same business, except in cases where sp-ecifically excepted. Atlanta, Ga., October 19, 1916. DeCamp Glass Casket Co., .Atlanta, Ga. GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of recent date, in which you ask for some information in regard to Municipal Taxation. In reply, I will say that the fact that you have complied with a State law authorizing you to carry on the business of selling stock in the State, _and have even paid a tax to the State for the privilege of carrying on the business, would not prevent a Town or City from also levying a license or occupation tax for carrying on the business in such Town or City. In this connec:. tion see the case of l\Iartin vs. Town of Statesboro, lOOth Georgia Report, page 419. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD. wALKER, Attorney-General. Under the Act of the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly of 1915, Section 1, page 91, a common carrier would be guilty criminally if more than the quantity of intoxicating. liquors allowed to one person were delivered to such a person within the period stated with the knowledge of the agent of such a carrier. October 20, 1916. Jllr. B. C. C1tllens, Southern Express Co., lVaycross, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 19th instant, addressed to the Governor, asking for some information regarding the last prohibition law, has been turned over to this Department for reply. Replyin'g thereto I will say that Section 1, page 91, Acts Extraor.,. dinary Session 1915, makes it a misdemeanor for any transportation company to deliver to one person more than the quantity of liquors allowed therein per month. The company would, therefore, be liable if the agent knew the consignee was 463 violating the law in receiving more liquors than are permitted, as the law makes it the duty of the transportation company to keep a record of the shipments and to see that no person receive more than the quantity allowed per month. I trust that the above is the information you desire. Very truly you.rs, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The election held for the purpose of passing upon the establishment of a municipal court for the city of Augusta is held in the same manner as all other general elections. October 21, 1916: Mr. Loyd T. Hall, Clerk, Augusta, Ga. DEAR Sm: I have your letter of October 14th, requesting information on the matter of the election to be held on November 7th, 1916, for the purpose of passing on the question of establishing a municipal court for the City of Augusta. In reply, I will say that this election, will be held in the same manner as all other general elections are held. See Section 38 of the Act approved August 19th, 1916. Section 76 of the Code of this State provides: "The persons qualified to hold such elections are: Ordinaries, Justices of the Peace, and freeholders. There must be three Superintendents, and one must be either an Ordinary or a Justice of the Peace, except in a certain contingency herein after to be set forth." The contingency referred to is where no proper officer is present to hold the election, or where there is one present but he refuses to act. In that event three freeholders may superintend the election. See Code Section 81. The persons above referred to are the only persons qualified to hold any election, and it is necessary under the law that such persons superintend the election referred to. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 464 Governor cannot appoint detectives. October 21, 1916. D. A. Barlow, Esq., Cochran, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of recent date addressed to the Governor has been turned over to this department for reply. In reply I will say that the Governor of this State has no authority under the law to appoint detectives. It will be well for you to see the local county authorities or the municipal authori ties in regard to this matter. Very truly yours, ' CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. A person who has had three fingers amputated is subject to road duty or street tax. October 24, 1916. Mr. Alonzo Daughtry, R. F. D. No.6, Box 7, Tifton, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 22nd inst. came to hand and I have referred same to the Attorney-General. These matters do not come within my jurisdiction, but I have. asked the Attorney-General, Mr. Clifford Walker, to take the matter up for you so that he may write you concerning the law that troubles you, if he can do anything for you. Sorry I can not do more than this. Very truly yours, NAT. E. HARRIS, Governor. ***** October 24, 1916. Mr. Alonzo Daughtry, R. F. D. No.6, Box 7, Tifton, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your letter of October 22nd; addressed to the Governor, has been turned over to this Department for reply. It appears that you have had three of your fingers amputated, and you wish to kllow whether or not this fact relieves you from road 465 duty or street tax. In reply, I will say that Section 647 of the Code of this State, provides as follows: "All male iNhabitants in this State, between the ages of sixteen ami fifty years, shall be subject to work on the public roads,. except ordained ministers of the gospel, who are in the regular discharge of ministerial duty, and in charge of one or more churches; and all men who have lost one arn1 or one leg." It thus appears that since you, have not lost one arm or one: leg you are not exempt from road duty. Persons who are not exempt from road duty under the l~ws nf the State are subject to street tax where they resid() in incorporated towns or villages, or cities. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General.. In order to entitle a person to vote he must have been a citizen of the ~tate eighteen months before the general election. October 24, 1916. E. G. Carroll, Esq., Rossville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of recent date I beg to advise that a man must be a citizen of this State twelve months: before he can even register. In other words, he must have been in the State eighteen months before the general election to register and vote in as much as the registration books close six months before the election. If a man moves out of the State and becomes a citizen of imother State the above rule will apply to him, even though he remain a citizen of the foreign State only a short time. If he wishes to vote in Georgia he must remain a citizen of this State. Trusting this is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-GeneraL 466 _,. , ;.,. , """ ,,~; ,, .. ,~,... , " ~'Oetober 24, l916 . w. 1 .H~n. L:'st~1~~~u; Y'' "., .,. ~: !,-.:~,-~ ~ .:~- ~,.. : :,.'' , '.'., LaFayette, Ga. - ' DK~R :Sm; ,. i ~- ,qeeply regret that absence from the office prevented an earlier reply to your fav~r.,o.f..lB.tlf ,ipstan~....\ , L\ The law requires the Governor to send 0;ut .11lanks for election tally sheets; etvill note.that the Section refers to any disabled or indigent Confederate soldier. Such soldier is also required to obtain a certificate from the Ordinary of the County, stating the facts of his being such disabled or indigent Confederate soldier. However, such soldier stating he is exempt from the payment of the license tax is still su.bject to reasonable regulations in the conduct of his business by the municipality. See Campbell vs. Thomas, 6 Ga. App. 212. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Managers of National election should count all the tickets that are voted. November 3, 1916. Hon. J. E. V. Lyon, Ball Ground, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of November 2d, managers of National election should count all the tickets that are voted. The consolidated return should show the. sum total of votes counted. This can be interlined in the event a name voted for does not appear on the printed consolidated sheet. Trusting that this is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, .Attorney-General. 473 County Tax:collector's commissions. November 3, 1916. Hon. Chas. L. Davis, Commissioner, lVarm Springs, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have before me your request for an opm10n as to the right of a County Tax-Collector to retain commissions from taxes paid by corporations. I beg to advise that the Tax-Collector collects all taxes and retains the usual commission on amounts appearing on the tax digest. This applies to ad valorem taxes. I presume you referred to specialoccupation taxes. These are reported to the Ordinary and collected by the Tax-Collector under special Section of the Tax Act and the Tax-Collector is entitled to retain ten per cent. for collecting. Occupation taxes for foreign corporations are paid through the Comptroller-General and the Tax-Collector is entitled to no commission on the same. If I have not answered the specific question in your mind I will be pleased if you will write me again. -Very truly yours, CLIFFORD \VALKER, Attorney-General. No fee provided for the Ordinary for services rendered in making up election blanks and getting them out to the various precincts for an election. November 3, 1916. Hon. H,. B. Smith, Dah?onega, Georgia. . . DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday I regret t? say that I know of no law. providing for the ,payment to an Ordinary for services re~dered in making up election blanks and getting t~em out to the various precincts for an election. . . R~gretting thi.s, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. '474 In a regular election the candrdate for a county office receiving the highest .number of votes is elected. November' 8,. 1916. Hon. Joe McHancock, Ashburn; Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of yesterday the man who receives the highest number of votes at the election held yesterday should be declared duly elected, whether he was nominated in a primary or not. The primary is only a nomination; it binds only the participants in that primary and they are bound only morally. They themselves can vote for another if their consciences will permit them to do so. In law it does not matter how a candidate is nominated or if he is not nominated at all. The people have a strictly legal right to vote for wliomever they please and the candidate receiving the highest number of votes of the people is entitled to have his votes canvassed and returned and to have his election certified to. Very truly yours, . CLIFFORD "\VALKER, Attorney-General. Law governing admission to the bar of Georgia. November 9, 1B16. Mr. S. 11!. Dinkins, Bullard, Ga. . DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 8th instant inquir.ing as to the admission to practice law in Georgia, will say, that if the State wherein you were admitted to practice allows lawyers from Georgia to be admitted without examination, then Georgia admits lawyers from that State without examination. See Section 4942 Code 1910. As to examination, Section 4935 of the Code 1910 provide$ as follows: "The applicant must be examined touching his knowledge: "l. Of the princ,iples of the common and statute law of Eng land, of force in this State. 475 "2. Of the law of pleading and evidence. "3. The principles of equity, and equity pleading and practice. "4. The Revised Code of this State, the Constitution of the United States and of this State, and the rules of practice in the Superior Court." I trust the above will give you the information you desire. .Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Compensation of Tax-Collector on list furnished by Comptroller-General. Read, Tax-Collector, vs. Glynn County, 90 Southeastern Reporter, page 60 (5). November 16, 1916. Hon. Ohas. L. Davis, Commissioner, Warm Springs, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your last letter I beg to say that the question you submit has been before the Supreme Court and they have ruled as follows: "The compensation of a Tax-Collector is fixed by Civil Code of 1910, Paragraph 1234, which provides that: 'On all digests for the first one thousand dollars, six per cent.,' and on greater amounts he is allowed by this Section smaller percentages as commissiOns. This Section does not authorize the Collector to treat as a separate and distinct digest from all others the state ment or list furnished him by the Comptroller-General, setting forth the names of the public service corporation and amounts of taxes due by them to the county on property owned by them in the county. Instead of computing full commission on the statement or list furnished him by the Comptroller-General, the Tax-Collector must compute his commissions according to the percentages fixed by Section 1234 of the Code on the aggregate amount of taxes under the digest furnished him by the TaxReceiver and the statement or list furnished him by the Comp troller-General." Read, .Tax-Collector vs. Glynn County, 90 SouthPastern Reporter, page 60 (5). This case has just been decided by the court and can only be found in the Advance Sheets referred to above. It will be pub- lished in the next volume of the Georgia Reports. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 476 Constables are county officers and as such their terms of office have been extended from two to four years. November 16, 1916. Judge L. A. Perdue, Newnan, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your inquiry of the 13th inst., as to whether constables are included in the law passed in 1914 amending the Constitution so as to make the term of office of county officers four years, instead of two, I beg to advise that our courts have never passed on the question, definitely, as to whether constables were county officers. In the case of Rose v. State, 107 Ga., page 703, however, the question is discussed at some length, and, while that particular question was not the matter under direct decision at that time, yet the entire argument of the court is to the effect that constables are comity officers, and there is an intimation that if the matter were before the Supreme Court that that would be their conclusion. It would seem, therefore, that, as our law stanrls at present, constables should be treated as county officers, and as such county officers that their term of office would come under this constitutional amendment, making it four years instead of two. Yours very truly, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A person cannot legally hold the office of Justice of Peace and be- a member of the Board of Education at the 'same time. November 18, 1916. JJlr. I. 111. Barksdale, JJlayfield, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your letter of the 9th inst., wherein you request my ideas as to whether you can hold the office- of Justice of the Peace and also be a member of the Board of Education at the same time, I beg to advise that while I do not see how the holding of one of these offices would be, in any way, inconsistent with holding the other, yet there is a provision of our law, contained in Section 258 (4) of our Code, which 477 says that a person holding any office of profit or trust under the government of the United' States (other than that of postmaster), or of either of the seyeral States, or .any foreign State, is held and deemed ineligible to hold any civil office in this State. This would seem to preclude the holding of two State offices at the same time by any one, except that a Justice of the Peace 'may be'a Legislator. In the case of McWilliams v. Neal, 130 Ga. 735, it is held that a member of the Board of Education is a State officer, and therefore ineligible to election as a member of the Legislature. And in the case of Long v. State, 127 Ga~ 286, it is said that a Justice of the Peace is an officer .of'the State, although that was not the point at issue in the trial of that case. The trend of the opinions seems to be, however, that both of these offices ilre State offices, and that, therefore, it does not seem that one person could hold both at the same time. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Law regulating the time of opening and closing the books to receive taxes. Bond of Tax-Receiver. November 21, 1916. Hon. J. M. ![night, Tax-Receiver, Valdosta, Georgia. . DEAR Sm: Your letter of the 20th received. Replying thereto, will say that Section 1116(f) of Park's Annotated Code (Acts 1913, page f23) regulates the time of opening and closing. the books to receive taxes, and is as follows: "The several Tax-Receivers of this State 'shall open their books for returns of taxes on the first day of February and shall close the same on the first day of May of each year, and within ten days thereafter it shall be the duty of the Tax-Receiver of each county to present the tax returns of the county for the current year to the County Board of Tax-Assessors created by this 4rticle, for the purpose herein contemplated and provided. The Tax-Receiver .shall not transmit .copies of this tax digest to the. Tax-Collector and the ordinary of the county until after the same shall have been finally received and corrected to conform to the final finqings of the State l'a_x-Commissioner under the pro- VISIOns of Section lll6(t) and lll6(u). When the tax returns of any county are finally adjusted and fixed as provided by said Sections lll6(t) and lll6(u) the Tax-Receiver shall forthwith send one copy of the revised and corrected county tax digest to the Comptroller~General and one copy each to the Tax-Collector and Ordinary of the county as now provided by law. The in dividual returns made by taxpayers to the Tax-Receiver, shall be for property held and subject to taxation on the first day of January, previously." As to the bond of Tax-Receiver, Section 292is as follows: "The official bonds of the Clerk of the Superior Court, of Sheriffs, Coroners, County Surveyors, County Treasurers, TaxCollectors, and Tax-Receivers, given for county taxes, must be approved by the Ordinary and filed in his office, and by him recorded. The bonds of Tax-Collectors and Tax-Receivers for State taxes, after being likewise approved, must be recorded by the Ordinary, and the original bond must be by him transmitted to the Governor for deposit in the Comptroller-General's office." Also Section 1195 : "Such Receiver, whether elected or appointed, before, entering on the duties vf his office, besides the oath required of all civil officers, must take and subscribe th.e following oath: _'I swear that I .will truly and faithfully perform the duties o( Receiver of returns of taxable property, or of persons or things specially taxed in the county to which I am appointed, as required of me by the laws, and will not receive any return but on oath or affirmation, and will, before receiving rethrns, carefully e:xa'mine each, and will to the best of my ability carry .out all the re quirements made upon me by the tax law, so help me God.' He shall also, at the same. time, give bond and security in a sum equal to one-fourth of the amount, of the State tax supposed to be due from the county for the year in which he shall give bond;. provided, however, that no T~x-Receiver 'shall be required to give a bond exceeding tne 'sum of ten thousand dollars; ti1e amount of said ,bond to ;be filled by the Comptroller-General before being l3ent out to tbe several counties from the executive offices." Very truly, yours, " CLIFFORD WALKER, , , ... , . Attorney-General: 479 No law prohibiting bank officers from charging a commission for themselves for making loans of the bank's funds, unless resorted to in order to evade the usury laws of the State. Such conduct violates every moral law. November 23, 1916. Hon. A. M. Smith, Brunswick, Georgia. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 19th instant, I know of no law prohipiting bank officers from charging a commission for themselves for making loans of the bank's funds. Such conduct violates every moral law and in my personal judgment would be reason sufficient to require a resignation if I were a stockholder or an officer of the bank. If the scheme is resorted to not for the personal interest of the officer but in order to evade the usury law in the interest of the bank, then the usury penalties would be involved. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Under Section 4879, Clerk of Superior Court is disqualified to practice law in any of the courts. Clerk may abstract titles to lands. November 24, 1916. Hon. John R. Powell, Jr., - Swainsboro, Ga. DEAR SIR : Further referring to your favor of 21st instant, I am of the opinion that under Section 4879 the Clerk of the Superior Court is disqualified from practicing law in any of the courts. However, I think that he can abstract titles to land without offending the law. At first I was somewhat in doubt about the matter, as I recall that this question was before me some time ago. On reflection it now occurs to me that that question turned upon whether or not abstracting title was practicing law; whereas the law in this case says that the Clerk shall not practice in any court. It is clear that abstracting title is not practicing in any court, and I feel sure, therefore, that you will be safe in so doing. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 480 The Act approved August 16th, 1915, creating the Haralson Board of Commissioners is constitutional. November 24, 1916. Dr. E. B. Hutcheson, Buchanan, Ga. DEAR SIR: I regret that l have been unable to find time to reply sooner to your favor of 13th instant. The law permits the Attorney-General to render opinions only upon official request of the Governor. However, I am glad to give you the benefit of my personal views and beg to advise that the courts have distinctly held the constitutional provision that no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law and the further constitutional provision. with reference to the uniformity of laws pertaining to county offices do not apply to County Commissioners. The Constitution, Article 6, Section 19, Paragraph 1 (Civil Code, No. 6548), provides "the General Assembly shall have power to provide for the creation of County Commissioners in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties." "The Legislature has the power to pass separate and distinct Acts for any county which require County Commissioners; and it is not necessary that these Acts shall be uniform in their operation in all such counties.'' County of Pulaski vs. Thompson, 83 Ga. 270. See also, Sayer vs. Brown, 119 Ga. 545. l\fy conclusion is the Act approved August 16th, 1915, creating the Haralson Board of Commissioners is not unconstitutional upon the grounds stated. The Legislature may provide any method for electing the Commissioners as it may see fit. Trusting that this is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. 481 No Jaw prohibiting bank officers from charging a commission for themselves for making loans of the bank's funds, unless resorted to in order to evade the usury laws of the State. Such conduct violates every moral Jaw. November 23, 1916. Hon. A.M. Smith, Brunswick, Georgia. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 19th instant, I know of no law prohi~iting bank officers from charging a commission for themselves for making loans of the bank's funds. Such conduct violates every moral law and in my personal judgment would be reason sufficient to require a resignation if I were a stockholder or an officer of the bank. If the scheme is resorted to not for the personal interest of the officer but in order to evade the usury law in the interest of the bank, then the usury penalties would be involved. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. Under Section 4879, Clerk of Superior Court iS disqualified to practice law in any of the courts. Clerk may abstract titles to lands. November 24, 1916. Hon. John R. Powell, Jr., - Swainsboro, Ga. DEAR SIR: Further referring to your favor of 21st instant, I am of the opinion that under Section 4879 the Clerk of the Superior Court is disqualified from practicing law in any of the courts. However, I think that he can abstract titles to land without offending the law. At first I was somewhat in doubt about the matter, as I recall that this question was before me some time ago. On reflection it now occurs to me that that question turned upon whether or not abstracting title was practicing law; whereas the law in this case says that the Clerk shall not practice in any court. It is clear that abstracting title is not practicing in any court, and I feel sure, therefore, that you will be safe in so doing. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 480 The Act approved August 16th, 1915, creating the Haralson Board of Commissioners is constitutional. November 24, 1916. Dr. E. B. Hutcheson, Buchanan, Ga. DEAR SIR: I regret that .I have been unable to find time to reply sooner to your favor of 13th instant. The law permits the .Attorney-General to render opinions only upon official request of the Governor. However, I am glad to give you the benefit of my personal views and beg to advise that the courts have distinctly held the constitutional provision that no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law and the further constitutional provision. with reference to the uniformity of laws pertaining to county offices do not apply to County Commissioners. The Constitution, .Article 6, Section 19, Paragraph 1 (Civil Code, No. 6548), provides "the General .Assembly shall have power to provide for the creation of County Commissioners in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties." "The Legislature has the power to pass separate and distinct .Acts for any county which require County Commissioners; and it is not necessary that these .Acts shall be uniform in their operation in all such counties.'' County of Pulaski vs. Thompson, 83 Ga. 270. See also, Sayer vs. Brown, 119 Ga. 545. J'vfy conclusion is the .Act approved .August 16th, 1915, creating the Haralson Board of Commissioners is not unconstitutional upon the grounds stated. The Legislature may provide any method for electing the Commissioners as it may see fit. Trusting that this is the information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. 481 The regulation of the railroad requiring consignees to sign receipts for alcohol personally is entirely legal and reasonable. J. B. Ryals Drug Company, November 24, 1916. Cordele, Ga. GENTLEMEN: Replying to your favor of yesterday it is my opinion that the regulation of the railroad requiring consignees to sign receipts for alcohol personally is entirely legal and rea- sonable. You will recall that a special concession was made to druggists in this matter. Large hotels, hospitals and other such institutions are appealing to me daily for relief from the prohibit_ion laws, but we can find no authority for concessions to them. The railroads would violate the law if they were to de- liver alcohol to other than those favored by the exceptions on the prohibition law, and it is necessary in order to protect themselves that reasonable safeguards be thrown around the delivery. There will be all conceivable efforts to get around these prohibition laws and on reflection I believe you will conclude that efforts to enforce the law should be encouraged. It has never been given a fair trial in Georgia. If we can try it for three or 1our years we can. then determine once and for all whether the law is a good one or not. In the meantime, all of us should be willing to lend our aid even if we are placed to inconvenience at times. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. Section 4782 expressly provides that the Ordinary shall not hold office until his successor is qualified as is true in some other offices, but there is provision for the Clerk of the Superior Court to perform the duties of the office ad interim. November 25, 1916. Hon. S.D. Harn, Clyde, Georgia. DEAR Sm : Replying to your favor of 22nd instant I beg to advise that Section 4782 of the Code applies to question submitted. 4~2 . It appears that in the regular election held on the 7th day of November, 1916, 1\Ir. W. E. Butler was elected Ordinary of Bryan County; that on the 15th day of November, before being qualified as Ordinary, and before the expiration of the present term, Mr. Butler departed this life. The present term expires on the 31st day of December, 1916. On the 1st day of January1 1917, there will be a vacancy in the office of the Ordinary and under the provisions of Section 4782 it will be the duty of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Bryan County on said day of January, 1917, to order an election to take place within twenty ~ays from the date of said order giving notice thereof by publication and until the vacancy is filled the law directs that the Clerk of the Superior Court shall perform all the duties which the Ordinary could perform as Clerk. It will be seen, therefore, that this Section expressly provides that the Ordinary shall not hold office until his successor is qualified as is true in some other offices, but there is provision for the Clerk of the Superior Court to perform the duties of the office ad interim. Trusting this is the _information you desire, and with an expression of my high personal regards, I am Very truly yours, CLIFFORD .W,ALKER, Attorney-General. County Treasurer can not calculate commissions on his commissions. November 27, 1916. Hon. J. J. Paulk, Ocilla, Georgia. DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of 25th instant I have been unable to find any law which authorizes the Treasurer to calculate commissions on his commissions and retain both sums. Such calculations have been held illegal in cases of Executors and Administrators and I find no authority for it as to County Treasurers. If you can cite any authority to me I will be pleased. to consider it as it is an interesting question. very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 483 It is the duty of the county authorities to pay the managers and clerks regular compensation for holding elections for Justices of the Peace and Constables. December 6, 1916. Hon. Z. B. Rogers, Elberton, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your favor of 4th instant I am of opinion that it is not only the right but the duty of the county authoritiE;s to pay managers and clerks for election of Justices of the Peace and Constables regular compensation for holding such election. Section 118 provides that such election shall be governed by the law regulating a general election. I am clear in the opinion that it was the purpose of the law to provide such compensation and such interpretation is in accord with equity and justice. Trusting that this is t~e information you desire, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. The death of a tax collector, who has been reelected, before his new term begins, creates a vacancy in the office which can be filled by an election duly called by the Ordinary. ~:-:~-- --~-- ~~~~--~ :.s-~-~~1:-~l ~'.~' '!~~-,._ ... '~ . ---- ;- ~~ ' 'December 7, 1916. Judge W. H. Stembridge, Milledgeville, Ga. DEAR SIR : Replying to your letter of the 1st inst., I beg to advise that, as you state that the old Tax-Collector of the county, Mr. K. P. Hawkins, who died on November 17th last, had been re-elected for the term beginning January 1st next, his death, in my opinion, creates a vacancy in the office necessitating an election to fill the same. Park's Code of Georgia, Vol. 1, Sec. 1205, prevides that vacancies in the office of Tax-Collectors "are filled as they are in the office of Receiver." Section 1194 provides that " "" "" "" '"' Vacancies (in the .- !I 484 office of Tax-Receiver) are filled as vacancies for such clerks." Section 4881 to 4886, Vol 4, provide for filling vacancies in the office of Clerk. Section 4881 provides that ''If a vacancy occurs *. * * the Ordinary of the county where it happens shall give notice in one or more of the public gazette"s of said county and at the court house and at three or more of the most public places of said county twenty days previously to the day of election, which shall be appointed by him.'' I think, therefore, that you can call an election to fill the office of Tax-Collector at any time, provided it is called at such a time as that you can give, and do give, at least twenty days' notice before the day of holding such election; treating the vacancy just as though it were an unexpired term. It is also my opinion that you can advertise for the election now and that you will not have to wait until the appointee's time is out. With best wishes I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The tax-collector must eompute his commrssrons on the aggregate amount of taxes under the digest furnished him by the tax receiver and the statement furnished him by the ComptrollerGeneral. December 8, 1916. Mr. C. A. Duggan, Tax-Collector, Oconee County, Watkinsville, Ga. DEAR SIR : Replying to your letter of the 1st, I beg to advise that the case of Read, Tax-Collector, v. Glynn County will be found on page 60 of Volume 90, No. 1, of the Advance Sheets of the Southeastern Reporter, issued October 28th, 1916. These Advance Sheets of this publication are taken by a great many lawyers in Georgia, and I have no doubt but that you can easily locate it in some good lawyer's office. The fifth headnote of that decision reads as follows : "Fifth Taxation-Tax-Collector-Compensation. "The compensation of a Tax-Collector is fixed by the Civil Code 485 of 1910, Section 1234, which provides that: 'On all digests for the first one thousand dollars, six per cent.,' and on greater amounts he is allowed by this Section smaller percentages as commissions. This Section does not authorize the collector to treat as a separate and distinct digest from all others the statement or list furnished him .by the Comptroller-General setting forth the names of the public service corporations and amounts of taxes due by them to the county on property owned by them in the county.. Instead of computing full commissions on the statement or list furnished him by the Comptroller-General, the TaxCollector must compute his commissions according to the percentages fixed by Section 1234 of the Code on the aggregate amount of taxes under the digest furnished him by the taxreceiver and the statement or list furnished him by the Comp troller-General." With best wishes and regards, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. There is no "failure of the Superior Court" (Section 880 Penal Code) where the judge opens court and grants certain orders, etc. Therefore, the grand and traverse jurors do not hold over until the next term. December 8, 1916.. JudgeR. Eve, Tifton, Ga. DEAR Sm: I. have before me your favor of yesterday and hasten to reply as requested. It appears that you have been elected Judge of the newly created Tifton Circuit, your commission dating from January 1st, 1917; that a former Judge at the July Term, 1916, drew grand and traverse juries for the December Term, 1916; that on the 1st Monday in December the Judge of the Court appeared in the County and opened Court, granting certain orders and then adjourned until the 1st Monday in January in 1917; he had previously by proper order given notice that the juries would not be required to appear and serve at said December Term; the new Act creating the Tifton Circuit fixes the first term of the court in Tift County on the 2nd 1\ionday in January, 1917. You ask if there is any legal 486 reason why the grand and traverse juries drawn at the July Term, 1916, could not be used at the regular term of Tift Court to be held on the 2nd Monday in January, 1917. In my opinion Section 880 of the Penal Code does not apply. This Section reads as follows: "\Vhenever there shall be a failure of the Superior Court, in consequence of the non-attendance of the Judge, or other cause, the jurors summoned for such court shall stand over to the next succeeding term, in the same manner as suitors and witnesses do." There was no ''failure of the Superior Court'' at the December Term. The Court was held and for this reason, in my judgment, said Section docs not apply and the jurors summoned for such court will not stand over to the next succeeding term. It is true that the present Judge could order the jurors so drawn to appear for service at the adjourned term of the court on the 1st l\Ionday in January, 1917, or it may be that he has already done so. A court held at said time by you as presiding Judge with said jurors serving would be entirely legal. However, it appears that on the said 1st l\Ionday in January, 1917, you will be engaged in holding court in the County of Turner. You can not, therefore, hold the court at the time -fixed. That term of the court will expire by limitation and a new 'term will begin on the 2nd Monday in Ja:imary. Having arrived at the conclusion that the jurors drawn for the December Term will not stand over to the new term it occurs to me that Section 8-75 will apply. This Section provides that whenever any session of a court of record from any oause is about to convene and there have been no juries drawn for the same, the Judge shall, in the manner prescribed for d~awing juries at the close of the regular term, draw such juries as may be necessary, and cause them to be summoned. I can appreciate the practical difficulty involved. It is possible that you can draw the jury early l\Ionday morning and I hope that in this manner you may solve the problem. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 487 The County Tax-Receiver is not entitled to a commission on amounts collected as local tax for public school funds. December 9, 1916. Mr. G. A. Taylor, 0. S. S. Bacon Oounty, Alma, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your inquiry of the 4th instant as to whether the Comity Tax-!Wceiver is entitled to a commission on the amount collected as local tax for public school funds I beg to advise that there seems to be no duties imposed on such Receiver by law in relation to such tax and no provision made for the payment to the Receiver of a commission for the collection of such tax. There are duties. imposed on the TaxCollector and the Legislature has made provision for the payment to the Collector of a commission of 21j2 per cent. of amount collected. See Code Section 1538. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-GeneraL There is no provision for an appeal from. the decision of the Secretary of State in county line disputes. December 13, 1916. Mr. J. S. Daniel, Oottnty Attorney, . Olaxton, Ga. DEAR Sm: Replying to your letter of the 8th inst;, I beg to advise that the law makes no provision for an appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Sta.te in the case of county line disputes. Our Code (Park's Civil Code of Georgia, Section 476) contains the provision that upon such a decision being made by the Secretary of State, he shall cause the survey and plat to be recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, whereupon the same shall be final and conclusive as to the boundary line in dispute. No provision whatever is made for any appeal from such a decision. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, Attorney-General. 488 The label or brand must state the truth as to the contents of the bottle. December 14, 1916. Messrs. J. B. Davenpmt & Co., Augusta, Ga. GENTLEMEN: Replying to your letter of the 8th inst., relative to the matter of the complaint of the Agricultural Department against you for misbranding an imitation of lemon extract. You request me to advise yqu "if we change our label instead of reading Ext. Lemon U. S. P. it shall read Ext. Lemon, con- taining 84% Alcohol, 3%% Oil Lemon artificially colored, would this comply with the law.'' As I understand this matter this suggested change would not comply with the law; that under the ruling of the Department of Agriculture lemon extract is defined to be the flavoring ex- tract prepared from oil of lemon, or from lemon peel, or both, and containing not less than five (5) per cent. by volume of oil of lem';>n (see Bulletin No. 66, pp. 103-4, item 9 and 9a), and that the State Chemist's analysis of your product shows it to be an imitation of lemon extract containing only 2.67% oil of lemon and colored with tumeric. In order for you to comply with the law I think it would be necessary for your label, or brand, to state the truth as to the contents of the bottle. You also ask me if the ruling of the Department contained in this same Bulletin, page 65, item 2, covers food products same as drugs. This ruling seems to have been intended to apply to drugs alone. - Trusting that this is the information desired by you from me, I am, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. A Tax-Receiver must give a bond to the county and one to the State. Sections 1195, 1197. December 18, 1916. Mr. A. S. Rainey, Ellaville, Ga. DEAR SIR: Replying to your letter of the 6th inst., in- which 489 you ask me if you, as Tax-Receiver, will be required to make bond to county and State, I beg to advise that it is my understanding that you will have to make two separate bonds, one to the county and the other to the Governor, and that all necessary blanks and information will be furnished you. Section 119'7 of the Code, in enumerating your duties, says that it is your duty_ to conform to such rules as you may be furnished with, and to obey such orders as may be given you by the Comptroller-General. Section 1195 states the provisions relative to your oath and bond. Trusting that this is the information desired by you. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, Attorney-General. The Ordinaries are to receive the first $600 accruing to them for keeping a record of the consignees of liquor shipments, as provided in the Act approved August 19th, 1916, for each year beginning with the date of the approval of the Act. December 18, 1916. Judge C. M. Wiley, Macon, Ga. DEAR SIR: Your favor of 14th inst., addressed to Ron. W m. A. Wright, Comptroller-General, in which you ask for a construction of the Act approved August 19th, 1916, so far as the same fixes compensation for Ordinaries, has been referred to me for reply. You raise the question as to the beginning of the year referred to in Section 4 of said Act. This Section provides as follows: "Each Ordinary shall retain the first $600.00 for each fiscal year from the passage and approval of this Act out of the amount thus paid in to him under the provisions of this Act and etc." It will be noted that there seems to be conflict in the language of the Act itself. The fis1.ml year for the State of Georgia commences on the first day of January and ends on the thirty-first day of December of each year unless otherwise provided. The Act referred to went into effect upon its approval (August 19th, 1916). Collections were begun at that time and the Ordinaries 490 I I I began to retain compensation for work done by them. The maximum fixed by law for such compensation was $600.00 a year. I am clearly of the opinion that it was the intention of the Legislature, though unfortunately expressed, for the year fixed by this .Act to begin on .August 19th, 1916, and end on .August 18t_h, 1917. This construction is borne out by several other expressions in the .Act itself, all of which provide that compensation shall be for fiscal year from the passage and approval of this Act. No one will contend that the Legislature intended double pay for the first year's work, and I am satisfied that all parties will agree that under the law a year should begin in .August and end in .August. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. Constables and Justices of the Peace are commissioned for a term of four years. December 19, 1916. Hon. Walter Mathews, Buchanan, Ga. DEAR SIR: I have before me your favor of 15th instant in which you raise the question whether or not a Constable is a County Officer in contemplation of the .Act of the General .Assembly, approved .August 14th, 1914, amending the Constitution of the State of Georgia by providing for election of County Officers for four years instead of two years, as heretofore. It appears that our courts have not passed upon this question directly. However, in Rose vs. State, 107 Ga., page 697, the Supreme Court practically decided that a Constable is a County . Officer. Judge Little, speaking for the court, says: "By our law it would seem that a Constable is recognized as a County Officer. Our Constitution, in Article 11, Section 2, Paragraph 1, declares that County Officers shall be elected by the qualified voters of their respective counties or districts, and shall 491 nold office for two years. By Section 35 of the Civil Code it is provided, that unless an otherwise qualified voter shall register as prescribed, he shall not be permitted to vote in any election for presidential elector, for members of Congress, or Governor, or State House officers, or members of the General Assembly, or County Officers, or County ComJ?issioners, or Justice of the Peace, for Constables, for members of the County Board of Education, where chosen by the people, nor in any other popular election to fill any other 'State or county office. This Section unmistakably treats a Constable, by express reference, as either a State or County Officer. Section 4192 of the Code prescribes the oath of office. which each Constable must take and subscribe before he enters on the duties of his office, as follows: 'I swear that I will duly and faithfully perform all the duties required of me as a Constable of the county of .......... , according to the best of my ability and understanding.' By other provisions of our Code, we find that the Constable is an officer charged by the law with the performance of imp~rtant duties, entitled to emoluments fixed by the Statute, his tenur~ of office prescribed, that he is elected by the people of the county who reside within the district where he is required to exercise the functions of his office, under rules prescribed for the election of other officers of the State, and must take an oath before he can lawfully discharge any of such duties. Certainly, therefore, a Constable is a public officer (Mech on Officers and Offices, Section 9), and it would seem that, both by our Constitution and statute law, recognitio'n to him as a County Officer." Moreover, public convenience would argue strongly for the interpretation herein made. Practically all of the officers are now elected for a term of four years. If the Constable must be elected for a term of two years only the State would be driven to the expense and worry incident to a State-wide election every four years for Constable alone. I am clear that the Legislature and the people have declared as pubiic policy otherwise and I am therefore advising that Constables as well as Justice of the Peace be commissioned for a full term of four years. Very truly yours, w CLIFFORD .ALKER, Attorney-General. 492 A Justice of the Peace of the militia district in which a municipality is located may preside at a municipal election of such municipality. Mr. G. 0. Kaigler, December..29, 1916. Georgetown, Ga. DEAR Srn: Replying to your favor of 20th instant in which you say that at a city election recently held in Georgetown the managers were a Justice of the Peace residing out of the in- corporate limits of the city, and two freeholders, there being no Justice of the Peace residing in the city, but the Justice who did hold the election had jurisdiction in the militia district in which Georgetown is located, I beg to advise that in my judg- ment the election was legal. The law provides that ''such elec- tions shall be conducted under the management of a Justice of the Peace and two freeholders who are electors in said town and not candidates in said election.'' The law further provides that no election shall be held to be void for technical errors unless fraud and material harm result. .As stated, if the election was actually honestly held by the Justice of the Peace it is my opinion that the election is valid. Very truly yours, CLIFFORD wALKER, .Attorney-General. A Tax-Collector can not be compelled to pay over money collected by him during any month before the first day of the succeeding month. December 29, 1916. Charles Emory Smith, Esq., Metter, Ga. DEAR Srn: Replying to your favor of 20th inst., I beg to say that the law permits the .Attorney-General to render official opinions only on the request of the Governor. I am pleased, of course, to give you my views on the question submitted, though it will be only personal and not official. The law requires the tax-collector to make monthly statements and settlements. Sections 1213-1216. The Supreme Court 493 has held that mandamus will not lie to compel County Tax Collectors to pay money collected during a certain month to the County Treasurer before the first day of the month succeeding - its collection, or to compel him after that time to pay such money to one whose term of office as. Treasurer hal? expired and whose successor has been elected and qualified. See 107 Ga. 362. I think the moral and right thing to do is for the TaxCollector to pay over to the Treasurer all the funds collected in regular course of business up to the last day of December. It is certainly legal for him to do so if he so desires. You will see that this precedent in other counties would be harmless, as the same rule would apply to the incoming Treasurer at the end of his term. Of course in your county this state of affairs will not exist inasmuch as you have abolished the office, but this last iwt does not alter the equity of the case, and I always be- lieve in doing the right thing whomsoever it may help or harm. With kind personal regards, Very truly yours, CLIFFORD WALKER, A ttorncy-OPneral. 494 INDEX A ABSTRACT TITLES, Clerk of SuperiQr Court may ................. 480 AD}.liNISTRATION, etc., Ordinaries' fees in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 ADMISSION" TO BAR .......................... ........_......... 475 ADULTS, School funds cannot be used for ......................... 175 AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT- Chemical Department of, Appropriation for annual. ............. 147 Live Stock, infected, may compel dipping of ................... 388 ALCOHOLCommon C~rriers, fees of ................................ 457; 460 Druggist may sell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 Medicine, containing, may be sold ..... ~ . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . 375; 451 Receipts for, signing, law reasonable .......................... 482 Two Quarts (Acts 1915) could be received ..................... 453 ALIENS, Right to own real estate ...... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 ALTERNATIVE ROAD LAWElection for called when ...................................... 317 Grand Jury may suspend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 ANTITOXIN, Diphtheria, State Board of Health may purchase. . . . . . . 184 APPRAISEMENT, Estates, Inheritance tax ........................ 442 APPROPRIATIONSApplication for in eighteen months sufficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 cattle Tick eradication, annual. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Chemical Department, Agricultural Department, annual. ........ 147 Resaca Confederate Cemetery, for, when available............... 87 Schools, for, State Superintendent cannot anticipate misuse of.. . . 166 Treasurer must have before payment ..................... 304; 402 ASSESSMENT, Property, for tax purposes ........................ 437 ASSESSORS, County Board of should assess unreturned property. . . 385 ASYLUM, Insane, State Superintendent of must receive insane person 428 ATTORNEYS, Factory employees, violation of ten hour law, can re- cover compensation for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 AUGUSTA- Fire Department, retirement of ............................... 225 Municipal Court, election for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464 AUCTION SALES, Series, Auctioneer, and subject to license ......... 302 495 .AUTmiOBILESChauffeur's license unnecessary for friend, etc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . 390; 443 Fund, Error in mileage, may be corrected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Municipality may regulate ................................... 270 Purchaser must register. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Reckless driving of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 Tax: County Treasurer handles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Municipality subject to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 B B.AHSON, Peter F., et al., v. Elwell, et al.. ..................... . 8 BALMER, J. S., et al., v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah, etc.............. . 7 BANKS- i Branch, cannot be State depository ........................... . 204 -~ Examiner cannot compel solvent bank to pay certificate of deposit 143 Failure to qualify as State depository ........................ . 88 Impairment of capital stock must be made good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 National, occupation tax, municipality cannot collect ........... . 329 Officer : Commissions on loans, may charge .................... . 480 Loans to ............................................. . 139 Private, not subject to examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Solvency question, examiner should preserve present status ..... . 136 Solvent, State examiner cannot compel payment of certificate of deposit ............................................... . 143 State depository, bond of, for what time ...................... . 90 B.AR, .Admission to ..... ............................... 475 BARBERsExaminers, Funds of Board not State funds .................. . 142 Regulation of in cities of less than five thousand ............... . 221 BENZINE, for use, subject to inspection ......................... . 152 REQUEST to executor less than commissions not subject to Inheri tance tax ............................................. . 127 BIBLES and books, no tax on selling ........................ ..... . 282 BICYCLES, Tax on dealers in ................................... . 471 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, Clerk of Superior Court, costs in ......... . 392 BOARDBarber Examiners, funds not State funds ..................... . 142 Education, State, member of temporarily absent entitled to salary 33 Health, State, may purchase diphtheria antitoxin .............. . 184 BONDSAppearance, Citizens may give ............................... . 208 Criminal, forfeited, garnishment may issue on ................. . 344 Lost, Duplication of...................... , ................. . 338 Lowndffi County, Treasurer of, payable to whom ............... . 37 496 Municipal, cannot be .tax ..................................... 206 School buildings, for, Act constitutional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 District in County on county-wide plan ................... 470 Tax-Collector, Governor's supervision of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 BOTTLER, Soft drink, Municipality, license of non-resident ......... 411 BUFORD, City of, may collect street tax on minors ...... , ......... 271 BUILDINGS, of Georgia Industrial School for Colored Youths..... . 30 BURIAL GROUND, Bequest for, Inheritance Tax, subject to ......... 433 BUSINESS, "Carrying on," defined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 BUZZARDS, Killing illegal ..................................... 199 BYRD, C. P., v. Cook, et al...................................... 19 c CAMPAIGN 'EXPENSESCandidates for Congress ..................... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 County officers must file ................................ .". . . . . 336 CANDIDATES, Congress,' campaign expenses of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 CAPITALCases in the Supreme Court................................... 25 Felonies, Governor's power as to rewards....................... 61 CAPITOLDefacement of, law relative to void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360 Insurance of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Employees, Governor appoints and controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 CARRIERS, COMMONAlcohol, fees in ........................................ 457; 460 Prohibition Act, 1915, violation of ............................ 463 "CARRYING ON BUSINESS" defined. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 CARTRIDGES, Pistol, License tax on ............................. 265 CATTLE TICK- Appropriation for, annual. ................... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 State may eradicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT, Bank solvent, Examiner cannot com- pel payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 CHARITY, Legacy to, Subject to inheritance tax ................... 127 CHARTER, Private corporation, expires in thirty years ............ 451 CHAUFFEUR, MOTOR-VEHICLE- Incidental to employment, must have license. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 License not necessary for friend, etc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 Must procure license. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 CHECKS, Drawing, etc., without funds ............................ 226 CHEMICAL DEPARTMENT, Appropriation to, annual. ............ 147 497 CHURCHProperty bearing. income taxable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 School, using, illegal ......... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 CIDER, Intoxicating, Sale of illegal. ............................. 431 CIGARETTESConfederate Soldier may sell ................................. 472 Dealers in, Municipality may tax ........................ 415; 468 State tax on ............................................... 244 CITIZEN, Unregistered, may' hold county office ..................... 320 CITIZENSHIP- Absence, long, may be lost ............................... , . . . . 334 Citizen may work in another county ........................... 304 Determined by intention and presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276; 295; 417 Convict, how restored. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 CITY COURTQuitman, Criminal cases in ................. ,,,, . , !14: Judge, Solicitor-General, may be elected ....................... 449 Solicitor; Ineligible for General Assembly ..' .................. 359 State officer .................................. 231; 324; 340 CLERKHouse of Representatives, May be R. R. Commissioner, how. . . . . 93 Optometry, Practitioner, Registry, fee of. ..................... 448 Superior Court: Abstract titles, may prepare.................. 480 Bill of Exceptions, costs in .. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392 Deed, improperly witnessed, not record ............., ....... 348 Duty when Ordinary resigns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 Law, cannot practice.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 Wild land, may deal in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380 CONDITIONAL PARDON, Governor can grant ............. ....... 179 COLLECTIONS; Agent for, anyone may be, unless necessary to go into court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Occupation tax, must pay ......... 209 COMMERCE AND LABORCommissioner of, Not required to bring suit for violations of ten hour labor factory law .............................. 174 Not to use funds for attorneys fees for violations ten hour labor factory law ................................. :. 174 Department of, may procure and use pictures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 COMMISSIONERS, COUNTYOverseer, May compel to do duty ............................. 448 Streets, cannot work without consent ......................... 272 Terms of ................. . ', . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 ; 372 COMMISSIONSOn commissions, Treasurer cannot collect ...................... 483 498 Tax-Collectors ........................................ 330; 474 Forfeiture of ........................................... 408 Treasurer; Cannot collect, on commissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483 On money handled only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 COMMON CARRIERSAlcohol, fees of .................................... : .. : . 457; 460 Prohibition, Acts 1915, violation of. .......................... 463 CONFEDERATE SOLDIERSCigarettes: Tax on, must pay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 ~lay sell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 472 Peddle, may ................................................ 281 Plumbing business, may carry on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 CONGRESS, Candidates for, campaign expenses of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422 COOK, et al., v. C. P. Byrd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 COOK, SECRETARY OF STATE, v. Morrison, W. J., et al.. . . . . . . . . 15 v. Sumter County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 CONTINGENT FUND, Available for special services in Governor's office ............................. -................ 58 CONSTABLESCounty officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 Terms of office of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491 CONSTITUTIONALITY, County Treasurer, Act abolishing office..... 50 CONVICTCitizenship, restored how. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Poll tax, pardoned, must pay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 Taxes, must pay ..................................... . . . . . . 442 CORONER'S INQUEST, held when ................. ; ............. 300 COSTS, Clerk Superior Court, Bill of Exceptions ................... 392 CORPORATIONSPrivate: Charter expires in thirty yearR ..................... 451 General Assembly, Amendment by, void .................. 469 Cannot create . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 School tax counties, notice not required. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 COUNTYAutomobile tax, must pay............................. , . . . . . . 327 Board: Health, Physician, grand jury elect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Tax-Assessor, member of, cannot hold other office. . . . . . . . . . . . 328 Bonds, Insurance Commissioner may accept ............. -. . . . . . . 125 Commissioners: General Assembly may name. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 Tax-Collector, may suspend ............................... 408 'Terms of .......................... : .. ............. 362; 372 Terms of, General Assembly may fix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409 Condemnation power for road purposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Debt, above annual income ................................... .438 499 ~. Deed to, does not revert on failure to build on land ............. 331 Funds, no provision for disposition of. ........................ 294 Liability for expenses for fugitive from justice................ 96 Line: Dispute; Grand jury, sufficiency of order of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Secretary of State's decision final. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 Surveyor removed how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Liquor licenses, must pay for publication of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434 Officers: Campaign expenses, must file ......................-... 336 Citizen, unregistered, can be .............................. 320 Constables are ......................................... 477 Election; Plurality of votes elect .......................... 475 Primary, executive committee may fix rules for ......... 450 Residence of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 Terms of, begin when. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 Orders, General Assembly may regulate issuance of ............. 252 Taxation, for school purposes, election for ...................... 376 Taxes, indebtedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 438 Treasurer: Automobile tax, handles........................... llO Constitutional office, is not ............................... 239 Constitutionality Act abolishing office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Office may be abolished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Vacancy in, Ordinary fills................................ 28 Schools: Superintendent: Funds in insolvent bank not liable for .. 161 Nominated at any time .................................. 155 Surveyor, Vacancy filled how. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 . -Warrants: County bankrupt, mandamus not lie against Treasurer 438 Treasurer must pay ...................................... 341 Undated, due whell'.. : . ............ ; ..................... 438 COURT HOUSE, Voting at illegal, no election held there ............ 156 CRIMINALSApprehension of, Governor may offer reward ................... 400 Bond forfeited, garnishment may issue........................ 344 Fugitive, non-resident, sheriff not compelled to go after ......... 462 CRUDE OIL, Subject to inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 D DAJ\fS, etc., illegal, game wardens may break .........._............ 195 DEBTCounty: Above annual income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Giving note for ....................................... 247 How incurred : ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 How paid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Tax levy to pay .................................... 238 Teachers,_ executive warrant for pay of, is not. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 500 DEEDSDrawing, lawyer only authorized to charge for ................. 296 ~ecurity, foreclosure of advertised where ...................... 352 To county, does not revert on failure to build on land . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Witnesse!l improperly, clerk should not record .................. 348 DEPOSITORY, State, branch bank cannot be .............. : . . . . . . . . 204 DEPOSITORIES, State, Governor names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 DEFACEMENT, Capitol, law relative to void ....................... 360 DEFAULTERS, Tax: Assessment, service of notice on. . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 Definition of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 DIPHTHERIA, Antitoxin, State Board of Heal~h may purchase. . . . . . 184 DEPUTY-SHERIFF, County Board of Education, may be member of 419 DETECTIVES, Governor cannot employ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400; 465 DOGS- Domestic animal, taxable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 Sheep-killing, may be killed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378 DOMESTIC CORPORATION, Stock in, Owned by deceased non-resi- dent, subject to inheritance tax ...................... US DIPPING, Infected live stock, may be compelled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS, Witness fees in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 DOUGLASVILLE, Street work, authority relative to ............... 213 DISTRICT SCHOOL, Unconstitutional, not entitled to funds ........ 172 DUCKTOWN, Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. State.................. 5 E EAST LAKEAtlanta Athletic Club, cannot collect taxes from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436 School system of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 EDUCATIONCounty Board: Controls schools, etc.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Deputy Sheriff may be member of ......................... 419 Justice of Peace cannot be member of. .................... 477 May build school houses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 Premuim on bond of Superintendent may pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Resident. local district member of cannot be. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 School trustee, member of, cannot be. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Legacy to, subject to inheritance tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 State Board, member of, temporarily absent entitled to salary. . . 33 Taxation for, countywide plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 ELECTIONSClosing, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 340 County officer, by plurality of votes ........................... 475 Illegal, persons voting at court house, no election being held there 156 501 Irregularities in, not necessarily void ........................ 357 Justice of the Peace; Managers of, pay of. ................... 484 Tie vote, void ......................................... 94 Managers: Kinsman of candidate will not void .............. : . . 348 Primary, qualification of ................................. 410 Qualification of ................................... ; . . . 406 Municipal, Justice of Peace may manage ....................... 493 National, Tickets should be counted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 473 No fence, publication of notice .. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 Ordinaries' fees in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 Primary, Executive committee may fix rules for ...._............ 450 Precinct in new militia district, how established. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Protest, must be filed before twelve o'clock ..................... 357 Registration books open, last registration list used .............. 316 Registrars, Managers, l.ist must be furnished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 Taxation, for school purposes, county-wide plan, who can vote in 384 School Tax: Portion of district cannot hold ................... 412 When it goes into effect ................................. 414 "Single-shot" voting will not void ............................ 348 Special, Member of General Assembly, at same time as primary election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346 Stock law, who can vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Tickets for, Governor does not furnish .......................... 467 Voter; must vote in own precinct if open. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Who is qualified ... : ........... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396 ELECTOR, Presidential, Justice of the Peace cannot be ............. 355 ELWELL, J. B., et al., v. Peter F. Bahnson, et al.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 EM.AJ\'DEL COUNTY, Commissioners of, lay out militia districts. . . . . 350 ENTOMOLOGY, State Board of, no provision for pay oL ........... 202 ESTATES, Appraisement of, inheritance tax ..................... .. 443 EXAMINER, Bank, should preserve present status of bank where solvency being investigated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 . EXECUTIVE WARRANT for payment of school teachers constitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 . EXEMPTIONS- Inheritance tax 441 Applies to those mentioned in Act only. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 Road duty, National guard ......... - ........................ 399 Tax: Confederate veteran, etc., for grocery store, etc............ 314 Blind person, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220; 227 EXPERIENCE, Five years in supervision of school explained ......... 158 F FACTORY EMPLOYEES- Not limited to ten days in making up lost time .............. 174 502 Violation ten hour Jaw: Attorneys can recover fees ............ 174 Enforcement of ......................................... 174 Remedy civil suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 Suit brought by any person ............................ ~. 174 FALSE PRETENSE, Obtaining goods by, sufficiency of requisition.. . 56 FARM CORPORATION, Occupation tax .................. ~ ...... 216 FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, Insurance company for fraternal order .... 134 FARMERS MUTUAL INS. Co. v. Wright Ins. Com................. 18 FEESInspection of oil, possessor subject to ......................... 151 Ordinaries: Administration, etc............ : .................. 461 Intoxicating liquors .......................... 366; 371; 394 Liquor shipments .<. .. 490 Pension rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 Public officials, statements must be made ...................... 327 Solicitor-General: Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. . . . . . . . 83 Court of Appeals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Witness, in disbarment proceedings ........................... 211. FERTILIZER, "High grade" defined ........... :.: ............... 1411 -FINGERS, Road duty, maimed person subject to ................... 465 "FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE in actual supervision of schools" explained .. -............... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 FISHBeyond three mile-limit, State formerly had no jurisdiction ..... 195 Game and Fish Commissioner cannot suspend laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 Poison, running stream, criminal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 FOREIGN CONSULS, Motor-vehicles, must pay license tax on .... :. 64 "FREEHOLDER" defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 FRATERNAL ORDER, Insurance company for federal employees is.; 134 FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICEExpenses of returning, payable how. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 - Non-resident, sheriff not compelled to go after .................. 462 When county liable for expenses for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 FUNDS, School, misuse of should be prevented by State Superintendent of Schools if within his knowledge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 G GAME AND FISH COMMISSIONER, Cannot suspend 612 of Criminal Code ................................... ; . . 192 GAME WARDENS, Terms of office expires when ........... :.. .... 193 GARNISHMENT- Issued on forfeited criminal bond. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 503 Laborers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 Sunday not counted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 GASOLINE, for use, subject to inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 GENERAL ASSEMBLYCannot create private corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Corporations, Private, charter amendment void ............... . 469 County Commissioners, may name and fix term of office . . . . . . . , . 409 Has no power to relieve citizen from taxation ................. . 82 Solicitor City Court ineligible for ............................ . 359 Statutory office, may abolish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 GEOLOGIST, State, may make exhibits .......................... . 200 GEORGIA INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL for colored youths, buildings, insurance on ...................................... . 30 GEORGIA R. R. & Banking Co. v. Wright, Comp.-Gen.............. . 10 GEORGIA R. R. & Power Co.- v. State .................................................. . 21 v. Wright, Comp.-Gen. 10 GOVERNORCannot send specialist to lunacy trial. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Conditional pardons, can grant ............................... 179 Controls employees of Capitol-Building........................ 62 Detectives, cannot employ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400; 465 Farm buildings, State, must insure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 Office of, special services in, payable from contingent fund. . . . . . . 58 Parole Law, iimiting power of to pardon, unconstitutional.. . . . . . 181 Power: Paroles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Reprieves and pardons, to grant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Rewards, in capital felonies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Where bank fails to qualify as State depository .. :.. . . . . . . . . 88 public officer, unfaithful, cannot suspend. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 Tax Collector's bond, supervision of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Tickets for election, not to furnish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 GRAND JURYMember of may be Tax Assessor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . 243 No "Failure of court," do not hold over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486 Not compelled to complete Board of Health ..................... 185 Sufficiency of order in county line dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 GRANGER, Harvey, et al. v. Mayor, etc., of Savannah. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 H HALL of House of Representatives, use of ....... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 HAMILTON, Sheriff, v. Kitehene................................. 17 HARALSON, Commissioners, Act constitutional. .................. 481 HARNESS OIL, etc., Peddler of must pay license tax ............... 347 504 HART COUNTY, Commissioners of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 HEALTH- And sanitation, city may regulate ..................., .......... 366 Board: Grand jury not compelled to complete. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Not complete majority act ...................... :. . . . . . . . 185 Organization, etc. . ..................................... 230 Physician, elected by grand jury. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Laws: Adovted, county must appoint Health Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 1914, constitutional ................. : . .................. 481 State Board of: May publish facts relative to injurfous medi- cines, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 May purchase diphtheria antitoxin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 HEIMER v. State .................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 "HIGH GRADE" Fertilizer defined ............................... 149 HOLC01fBE, in re. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 HOMESTEAD, Constitutional and statutory, advertisement of. . . . . . . 264 "HOP ALE," Law governing sale of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 HOTEL, Protection of, not apply to sanitarium .................... 269 HOUSEBill No. 756 unconstitutional. ............................... 416 Representatives, of, Hall, use of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 IMPAIRMENT OF CAPITAL STOCK of bank, must be made good ... 141 INDEBTEDNESS, County, Tax levy to pay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 INDIAN SPRINGS, Reserve, Lease of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 INHERITANCE TAXApplies to all property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Appraisement under . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 Bequest, subject to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415 Burial Ground, Bequest for, subject to ......................... 453 Charity, Education, and Religion, legacies to, subject . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Debts; applies on property beyond ........................... 249 Domestic corporation, stock in, owned by deceased non-resident, subject to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Executor, Bequest to, less than commission, not subject. ..... 127 Exemptions: Appli-es to those mentioned in Act only. . . . . . . . . . . . 389 Specified . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 Life estate, physical condition of owner considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 Market value, property must be assessed at. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 Municipal bonds, subject to .................................. 127 Property outside of State not subject to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 INTERNAL REVENUE COLLECTOR, Intoxicating liquor, list of, not to furnish ............................... . . . . . . . . . . 371 505 INSANE PERSON, State Sanitarium Superintendent must receive ... 424 INSPECTION FEES, Oil, possessor of, subject to ................... 151 INSURANCECapitol Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Commissioner: County and ~Iunicipal bonds, may accept. . . . . . . . 125 Illegal company, may withhold license from ............... , 123 Company, Federal employees, fraternal order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 Georgia. Industrial School for Colored Youths, Buildings. . . . . . . . 30 Policy, Companies difl'erent, not interchangeable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II7 State Farm building, Governor must carry on .................. 178 INTOXICATING LIQUORSContraband, may be destroyed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 Index to receipts, Ordinaries not required to keep. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3GG Internal Rev:enue Collector, not' to furnish list of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 Ordinaries fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366; 371; 394 Sale of prohibited .................... .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323; 432 Search \Varrant for, City marshal may secure .................. 370 Sheriffs fees, Ordinaries not responsible for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 Statements of; No specific form required ....................... 366 Ordinaries must demand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 Transportation companies, furnishing statements of. . . . . . . . . . . . 369 Undelivered, may be returned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380; 388 !~REGULARITIES, Election, not necessarily void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 ITINERAKT DOCTORS, etc., License tax on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 J JUDGECannot suspend sentence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 City Court, Solicitor General, may be elected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449 Superior Court, exchange service, State not liable for expenses. . 69 JUSTICE COURTSDefendants in, must be in district. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 Place of holding, how changed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 Judgments in void unless in court room ........................ 307 JUSTICE OF THE PEACEBoard of Education, member of, cannot be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 Election: Etc., Managers, pay of........... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48' Tie vote, void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Fi. Fas., may iBeue ..................................... 29.'> Manager of election may be elected...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Municipal election, may manage ............................... 493 New militia district, hold how.................... . . . . . . . . . . . SO Postmaster, cannot be ................................... 302 Presidential e!Pctor, cannot be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 506 Summons, failure to obey, may punish for contempt. . . . . . . . . . . . 458 Terms of office of ............................................ 491 JUVENILE COURT, State Reformatory may commit to ............ 403 K KITCHENS v. Hamilton, Sheriff................................. 17 L. LABELImitation or duplicate not recorded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Or brand, must state truth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 489 LABORERS, Garnishment of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 456 LAW, Practice, Clerk of Superior Court cannot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 LEASE, of Indian Springs Reserve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 LEGACIES, Charity, etc., subject to inheritance tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 LEGISLATURE- Member of, special election at same time of primary election. . . . 346 Solicitor City Court, not eligible for. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 LIBRARIAN, State, may investigate character of notaries public. . . . 203 LICENSEIllegal Insurance company, Commissioner may withhold ........ 123 Liquor, County must publish. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434 Motor Vehicles, Chauffeur, when necessary to procure ........... 390 Tax: Automobile, purchaser must procure ...................... 368 Motor vehicles, foreign consuls must pay on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 LIEN, Automobile, for work done ......................... ....... 281 LIFE ESTATE, Owner of, physical condition may be considered in inheritance tax on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 LIQUOR- Intoxicating, sale of prohibited. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323; 432 Possession of, Acts 1915 .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Prohibited defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 Quantity of, Law of 1915 .................................... 375 Reshipment to original consignor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380; 388 Shipments, Ordinaries, fees of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490 LIVE STOCKInfected, Agricultural Department may compel dipping. . . . . . . . . 388 Municipality may sell in no fence county. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY, Secretary of State has jurisdiction of 113 LOCAL SCHOOL TAX, incorporated town, within............... 221 LOUISVIJ:LE & NASHVILLE R. R. CO v. State ................... 13 LOWNDES COUNTY, Treasurer of, bond payable to whom. . . . . . . . . . 37 507 LUNACY TRIAL, Governor cannot send specialist to............... 51 M l\IACOK TERMINAL COl\IPANY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 MAILS, State has no control of .................................. 467 MALT LIQUORS, Sale of prohibited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432 MANAGERS-ELECTIONS- Justice of Peace, etc., pay of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4S4 Kinsman of candidate, not void ............................... 34S Qualification of; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406 In primary 410 MANDAMUSMunicipality, to collect tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 Treasurer, cannot be when no funds to pay county warrants ..... 43S MANSLAUGHTER CASES, Solicitor General, fees in.............. 95 MARRIAGE, by minister without authority, valid ................. 397 MEDICIN~ Alcohol, containing, may be sold ......................... 375; 451 Injurious, State Board of Health may publish facts. . . . . . . . . . . . 1S7 Practice of, who subject to regulation of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 MILITIA DISTRICTSLaying off illegal, void ...................................... 430 New: Election precinct, how established....................... SO Justice of the Peace, how elected.......................... SO MINISTER, Marriage by, without authority, valid ................ 397 MORRISON, W. J., et a!., v. Cook, Secy. of State.................. 15 MOTOR-CYCLES, Special tax, subject to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 MOTOR VEHICLESBicycle, motor attached. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 Chauffeur: Incidental to employment, must be licensed. . . . . . . . . 390 Friend, license unnecessary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 License, must be procured.. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . . .. . .. . .. .. .. .. 390 License tax on, foreign consul must pay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONSAutomobile tax, liable for ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Bonds of: Cannot be taxed ................ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 Inheritance tax, subject to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Insurance commissioner may accept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Bottler, soft drink, non-resident, license of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 Cigarettes, dealer in, may tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415; 46S Election in, Justice of the Peace may manage .................. 493 Health and sanitation, may regulate .......................... 366 Limits, Act extending jurisdiction beyond unconstitutional.. . . . . 52 508 Live-stock, may sell in no fence county . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 National banks, occupation tax from, cannot collect. . . . . . . . . . . . 329 Occupation tax: May levy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 National banks, cannot collect from ...................... 329 Railroads, cannot collect from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 State licensee, may collect from ................ .".... 463; 468 Telephone companies, may collect from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 Pool rooms, may tax ........................................ 416 Police officer of, jurisdiction to arrest ......................... 212 Professions, cannot tax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Railroads, occupation tax, cannot collect from ................. 323 School buildings, may rent ..................... ; . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 Street tax, minors, may collect from .............. .'. . . . . . . . . . . . 451 Tax, mandamus to collect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 Teachers, school, tax on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 Telephone companies, occupation tax from, may collect. . . . . . . . . . 325 Water and light service discontinued citizens without recourse .. 446 Woman suffrage, provision for i'n charter void. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 MURRAY COUNTY, Commissioners of ............................ 420 N N APTHA, Inspection of, when for use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 NATIONAL- Banks, occupation tax from, municipality cannot collect ........ 329 Guard, Road duty, exempt from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 NAVIGATION COMPANY, Railroad Commission controls ........ 111 NEAR BEERLicense, tax paid, must be issued 309 00 00 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 00 . . . . . . . . Prohibition Law of 1915..................................... 71 NO FENCE ELECTION, Publication of notice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 NOTARIES PUBLIC- Commercial: Character of, State Librarianmay investigate ...... 203 Election, may hold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 Oaths, may administer, and attest deeds ...................... 296 NOTES AND LOAN DEEDS, Non-resident owner of, not taxable .... 288 0 OCCUPATION TAXCommercial corporation must pay. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 Farm corporation .......................................... 216 Municipality may levy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 National Bank, municipality cannot collect from ............... 329 Railroads, municipality cannot collect from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 509 State licensee, municipality can collect from. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463; 46S: Telephone companies, municipality can. collect from .............. 325 OFFICERS- Bank, and directors, of, loans to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 County: Election of, by plurality of votes ..................... 475 Statutory, except Ordinaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Municipal police, jurisdiction to arrest ........................ 212 Public, unfaithful, Governor cannot suspend ................... 395 OFFICIALBonds for State and County officers, Chapter 3 of Code relates to 64 Organ, defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382. OFFICEConstables and Justices of the Peace, terms of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 491 County, unregistered citizen may hold ......................... 320 Removal of holder not necessarily vacate ...................... 257 Statutory, General Assembly may abolish ...................... 257 OILCrude, subject to inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 Inspection fees, possessor of, subject to...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Signal, subject to inspection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 OPTHALMOLOGY, Practice of ............................~ . . . . . . 446 OPTOMETRY, f'ractitioner of: Must register and pay Clerk's fee. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 \Vho is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450 ORDINARIESFees of: Administration, etc., of estates ........................ 461 Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 Guardianship, etc. . .................................... 313 Intoxicating liquors ...................... 336; 371; 394; 491 Pensions rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 School election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 'Vays, private, opening.................................. 429 Intoxicating liquors: Fees in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366; 371; 394; 491 Index of not required .................................... 366 Sheriff's fees, not responsible for ........................ 366 Shipments, payments to State Treasurer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 Statements of, must demand.: ............................ 366 Office of: Constitutional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 Vacanacy in, how filled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258; 482 Treasurer's office, vacancy in, fills. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 OVERSEER, Commissioners may compel to do duty . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . 448 p PARDONSGovernor's power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 510 Conditional: ............................... ; . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Can grant ..... : ................................... 179 PAROLES- Governor: Pardoning Power, law limiting unconstitutional.. 181 Pow~r ..................................... :. . ... . . . . . 68 PEDDLE, Confederate veteran may . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 PEDDLER, Harness oil, etc., must pay license tax 347 PENSIONSDeath outside State pension payable how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Rolls, Ordinary's fees ........................ ; . . . . . . . . . . . . 407 PHRENOLOGIST, No state tax on . : ........................... 261 PLANTATION, on line of counties, taxes paid where improvements are ............................................. 305 POISON, Fish, running stream, criminal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 POLL TAXConvict, pardoned, must pay ............................... 330 Voters, allnot necessarily pay .............................. 322 POOL ROOMSMunicipality may tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 Not forbidden in cities, etc.... ............................. 319 POLICE, Jurisdiction to arrest ................................. 212 POSTMASTER, Justice of the Peace cannot be ................. 302 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, Independent, charter amendment void .............. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR, Justice of the Peace cannot be . . . . 355 PRIMARY ELECTION, Executive Committee may fix rules for. . . . 450 PRISON COMlVi:ISSION, Parole prisoner, may, expiration of minimum sentence .................................... 183 PRIVATEBanks, examination, not subject to ......................... 138 Corporation, General Assembly cannot create . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 PROFESSIONSMunicipality cannot tax .................................... 315 State may prescribe regulations for ........ : .............. .- .237 PROHIBITIONAct, 1915 ..................................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 Common carrier, violation of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 Consignee, slight error in name, shipment delivered ...... 472 Near beer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Possession of liquor ............ ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335 Quantity of liquors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375 Liquors enumerated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323; 432 PROPERTY, All subject to inh_eritance tax ...................... 127 511 PROTEST, Election, must be filed before twelve o'clock 357 PUBLIC- Gazette, defined .................................... , . . 382 Official: Fees of, Statement of; Must make . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 Citizen may inspect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 Unfaithful, Governor can not suspend ......... .'. . . . . . . . . 395 PUNCH BOARD, Unlawful .............................. 450 PURE FOOD FUNDS, State funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Q QUITMAN, City Court of, Criminal cases in . .-... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 R RAILROADSCommission: Member of, Clerk of House of Representatives may qualify how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Navigation Company, has control of ................... 111 Local school tax on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Occupa,tion tax, municipality cannot collect from . . . . . . . . . . . 323 RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP, of convict, restored how . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 REAL ESTATE, Aliens, right to own . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 REFORMATORIES, State Committee on, expenses of ........... 245 REGISTRARS, Voters, list of, must furnish managers . . . . . . . . . . . . 433 REGISTRATIONBook: Closes six months prior to election .............. 354; 395 Kept how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Tax Collector must keep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 List: Revised to May 7th .................................. 383 Tax Collector must make every two years ............... 354 Permanent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332; 398; 403; 418 RELIGION, Legacy to, subject to inheritance tax ............. 127 REMOVAL, Office holder, not necessarily vacate office. . . . . . . . . . 353 REPRESENTATIVES, Clerk of House of, may be Railroad Com missioner, how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 REPRIEVES, Governor's power to grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 REQUISITIONSExpenses of, when county liable for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Language of, sufficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 RESACA, Confederate Cemetery, appropriation for, available when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 RESIDENCE- Absence, long, not necessarily change 334 512 County officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334 Voter ................................................ 396; 398 Length of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 REWARDS- Dapital felonies, Governor's power as to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 County cannot pay ................................. .'........ 282 Governor may offer-cannot employ detectives .............. 400 Offered after arrest, divided how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Payable when ............................................. 419 ROADSAlternative Law: Grand jury may suspend ................. 208 Election called when . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 Condemnation, county's power for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Duty: Exemption from ............................ : . . . . . . . 231 Maimed person, not necessarily exempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 465 National Guard, exempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Soldier, discharged, subject to ......................... 420 Laws ..................................................... 268 Public, abolished how ...................................... 300 Tax, school teacher, subje-ct to .........-.................... 456 s SABBATH, Working on, unlawful. .............................. 284 ST. MARYS RIVER, Boundary between the StaJes, ferry on ...... 229 SANITARIUM:.._ Hotel, is not a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 State: Lunatic, cannot be forced to receive .................. 251 Superintendent of: Must receive insane person .......... 428 Salary of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25f' SAVANNAH, Mayor, etc., of v. Balmer, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 v. Granger, et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 SCHOOLSBoard, Mayor or Councilmen may be members of . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 Buildings: Bonds for, Act constitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Church, using, illegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 Defects in causing injury management nor patrons liable for damages ..........................._. . . . . . . . . . . . 159 District, bonds, may issue for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 Municipality may rent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404 County: Superintendent: Bond of, Board of Education may pay premium on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 Corporation, need not notify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 Citizen of municipality may be ......................... 262 Funds in Insolvent bank, not liable for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Nominated at any time ................................ 155 513 Qualification of . ; . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 Residential eligibility ................................. 276 State or county officer ............................. 276; 308 Taxing authority, must notify when ... , ............ 425 Church, use of building, illegal ........................ ..... 166 District: Election in ....................................... 435 Portion of, election for, cannot hold ................. ... 412 Unconstitutional, not "entitled to funds ................. 172 Election, Ordinary's fees in .................... , . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Funds of, cannot be used for adults .................... 173 Houses: Bonds for, District in county on county-wide plan. . . 470 County Board of Education may build . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 Local system, Resident of District cannot be member of Board of Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 Superintendent, qualification of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 "Supervision of for five years" explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158; 292 Tax: Collection of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 County-wide plan: Election for ........................ 376 Who can vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 Property subject to ................................ 384 Defeated after levy ................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 Election for, when it goes into _'"effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414 Local: Incorporated towns, in .......................... 221 Railroads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Tax-Receiver, commissions, not entitled to ............... 488 Teachers: Executive warrants for payment of constitutional 98 Municipal tax on ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 Road tax, subject to ................................... 456 Removable for cause ............................... :. . 456 SEARCH WARRANT, Intoxicating Liquors, City Marshal may secure ............................................ 370 SECRETARY OF STATECounty line controversy, decision final ..................... 488 Loan and Trust Company, hal? jurisdiction of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 SECURITY DEED, Foreclosure of, may be advertised in any newspaper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352 SENATOR, State, municipal officer, may be .................... 246 SENTENCE- - Court cannot suspend after adjournment ................... 319 Judge cannot suspend 179 SERVICE-Acknowledgement before filing in civil suit ................. 241 Tax-Assessors, County Board of, notice, how made . . . . . . . . . . 385 SHERIFFSCriminal, fugitive, non-resident, not compelled to go after .... 462 514 1ntoxicating liquors: Deaiers in, U. S. license, duties of ...... 424 Fees, Ordinary not responsible for ..................... 366 SIGNAL OIL, Subject to inspection ............................ 152 SOLDIER, Discharged, road duty, subject to ...................... 420 SOLICITORCity Court, State officer .............. ~ ........... 231; 324; 340 General: Fees of: In Court of Appeals .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 95 In Court of Appeals and Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Indictments, fees for drawing ...................... 240 Judge of City Court, may be elected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 SOUTH GEORGIA NORMAL AND INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE, Treasurer of, may collect salary .................. 160 STANDARD TIME, "Sun time" ................................ 357 STATEBank Examiner, certificate of deposit, solvent bank, cannot compel to pay ..................................... 143 Board of Barber Examiners, funds of not State funds ........ 142 Board of Education, member of, temporarily absent, entitled to draw salary ............................. :. . . . . . . 33 Board of Health, diptheria antitoxin, may purchase . . . . . . . . . 184 Depositories: Bank's failure to qualify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Bond of, for what time ... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Branch bank cannot be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 Governor names ............... _.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Farm buildings, Governor must insure ...................... 178 Funds, pure food funds are ............................... 147-8 Geologist, may make exhibits ............................. 200 Librarian, may investigate character of commercial Notaries Public .................................... ., . . . . . . 203 Reformatory, Juvenile, court may commit to ................ 403 Superinte)ldent of schools: Misuse of funds by Board of Education, cannot anticipate ................... : ...... 166 Misuse of funds within knowledge, should prevent ...... 166 v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., Ltd............. . . . 5 v. Georgia Railway & Power Co............................. 21 v. Heimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 v. L. & N. R. R. Co., et al............. .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13 v. Tennessee Copper Co. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appointment of arbitrators, etc..................... , . . 74 v. Yaryan Naval Stores Co.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 STOCK LAW, Election, who can vote .......................... 209 STOCK, (Live-Stock) municipality may sell in no-fence county ... 387 STREAM, Running, fish, poison, criminal 401 STREETSCounty, authorities may work .................... ; . . . . . . . . . 289 515 Commissioners cannot work without consent ................ 272 Crossing, municipality may regulate ......................... 299 Tax, minor, municipality may collect from .................. 451 SUFFRAGE, Women, provision for in municipal charter void . . . . 55 SUMMONS, Justice Court, failure to obey contempt ............. 458 SUMTER COUNTY v. Cook, Secretary of State.................. 12 SUNDAY, Garnishment does not apply to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 "S.UN TIME," Standard time 357 SUPERIOR COURTS"Failure of," defined ..... : . ................................ 486 Four terms in county general law .......................... 404 Judges exchange service State not liable for expenses . . . . . . 69 Plea of guilty in, in vacation ............................... 243 SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS.:_ County, not liable for funds in insolvent bank ............... 161 State, cannot anticipate misuse of funds by Board of Educa- tion .............................................. 166 SUPERVISION OF SCHOOLS for five years explained ...... 158; 292 SUPREME COURT, case barred from .......................... 411 SURVEYOR: County line dispute, how removed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 County, vacancy in, how filled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 T TAXAssessment, defaulters, notice, service on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 Assessors: County Board of: Complaints of dissatisfied taxpayers ............................................ 385 Member of, cannot hold other office .................... 328 Property, unreturned, should be assessed by ............ 385 Service on .................................. , . . . . . . . . . 385 Grand jurors, may be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Automobile: County must pay ............................. 327 County Treasurer handles ................................ 110 Bicycles, Dealers in ....................................... 471 Books, opened when ....................................... 478 Collector: Bond of, Governor's supervision of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 Commissions of ........................ 330; 474; 476; 485 Forfeiture of ...................................... 408 County Commissioners, may suspend when . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 Depository; uses one named by Governor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Payments, made when ............................ 298; 493 Refund of taxes paid in by mistake ..................... 126 Registration book, must keep .......................... 299 Suspension of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 516 Vacancy in office, filled how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 County, levy of, to pay debt ................................ 438 Defaulter: Definition of .................................... 361 Double-taxed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Exemptions, blind persons, etc. . ................. ' . . . . 220; 227 Fi. Fa., third party, property sold to, may be levied on ....... 223 Itinerant doctors, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350 License, peddler of harness oil, etc., must pay .............. 347 Local school; in incorporated town ......................... 221 On Railroads ........................ , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 Municipality, mandamus to collect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 459 National bitnk, occupation, municipality cannot collect ...... 329 Occupation: Commercial corporation, must pay ............. 209 Railroads, municipality cannot collect from ............. _323 State licensee, municipality may levy on ........... ; . . . . 463 Telephone company, municipality may collect . . . . . . . . . . 325 Poll: All voters not necessarily pay ..... ................... 322 Convict, pardoned, must pay ........................... 330 Payer, refund of taxes improperly made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Professions, municipality cannot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 Question, Special Committee, pay of stenographer of . . . . . . . . 444 Receiver: Bonds of ................................... 478; 489 Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Paid how and when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 Defaulter, should double-tax property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 School tax, commissions, not entitled to on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 School: Collection of .................................... ~ . 425 Defeated after levy .................................... 468 Telephone company, occupation tax, municipality may collect from .............................................. 325 TAXATIONChurch property bearing interest subject to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 Citizen, General Assembly cannot relieve from . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 School purposes: County wide plan: Election for . . . . . . . . . . 376 Election, who can vote in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 Property subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 TAXESCity, territory withdrawn, residents must pay ..... , ......... 310 Convict must pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442 May be refunded Tax-Collector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126Plantation on county line paid where improvements are ..... 305 Paid out, how ............................... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 Received when . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478 Uniform, must be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222 Voter, must pay six months before election ................. 323 Wrong county, paid in, mistake may be corrected . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 517 TEACHERSExecutive warrant for payment of constitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 l\lunicipal tax on ................ ,',, ........................ : 238 Payment, law constitutional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218 Road tax, subject to ....................................... 456 Removable for cause .................................. 456 Vacation, cannot punish pupil for what he does during ...... 291 TEMPORARILY ABSENT, State Board of Education, member of, entitled to draw salary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 TERMS OF OFFICE, Constables and Justices of the Peace ...... 491 TELEPHONE COMPANY, occupation tax, municipality may collect .............................................. 325 TENNESSEE COPPER COMPANYFunds of, left on hand, refunded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 v. State ..................... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appointment of arbitrators, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 TICKETS, Election, Governor not to furnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467 TIE VOTE, Election of Justice of the Peace, void .............. . 94 TIME, Standard, "Sun time" 357 TRADE MARKS, Fraudulent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 TREASURER (COUNTY)Commissions; On Coimnissions cannot collect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483 On money handled only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 County; Warrants: Must pay .......... : . .................. 341 Not paid, mandamus will not lie against . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 Funds, liability for illegally spent .......................... 274 Lowndes County, bond of, payable to whom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 May be abolished . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 Office of: Act abolishing, constitutionality of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Constitutional, is not . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Vacancy in, filled how . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 TREASURY, Appropriation, money in, paid out on, only 304,; 402 u UNION TANK LINE v. Wright. Comp.-General 12 v VACANCY IN OFF'ICE, HOW FILLEDOrdinary's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 Surveyor's, County ...................... ,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Tax-Collector's . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484 Treasurer's, County . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 VOTINGAt Court House, no election being held there, illegal. . . . . . . . . 156 518 "Single-shot" will not void election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 VOTE, Who is entitled to .................................... 396 VOTERS- Absent, cannot vote by proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319 Dropped from list must reregister ............... ;........... 235 List, purged before using .................................. , 318 Poll tax, all not necessarily pay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 Registration book of, permanent, how kept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 Registration of, permanent ................................. 332 Registration of, until registration book closes ............... 31~ Registered: Remain registered until disqualified ........ 312; 314 Taxes, may pay until list purged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 Residence of ............................... 396; 398 Length of ..... : .. -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 Taxes, must pay six months before election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 Unconvicted, may vote .................................. : . 261 Vote in own precinct, must, if open ......................... 337 w WAGES, Buying, foreign corporation, professional tax, not subject to ................................................ 310 .WARDENS (GAME)Dams, illegal, may break ................................... 195 Terms of office, expiration of ............................... 193 WARRANTS (COUNTY)Must be paid ......................... ~ ................ :. . . . 341 No funds to pay, mandamus not lie against 'I;reaslirer. . . . . . . . 438 Undated, due when .......................... _.............. 438 WARRANTS, Executive, for payment of teachers, constitutional.. 98 WATER AND LIGHT SERVICE Discontinued, citizens of munci- pality without recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . :. 446 WAYS, Private, opening, Ordinary's cost in .............. ~....... 429 WHISKEY, Double-proof, two quarts could be received (Acts 1915) ................................................. 453 WILD LAND, Clerk of Superior. Court may .deal in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380 WINE, Manufacture of prohibited ............................... 461 WITNESS FEES, in disbarment proceedings .................... 211 WOMAN SUFF'RAGE, Provision for in municipal charter void.... 55 WOODCOCK, etc., Law should read "December" instead of "Sep- tember" ............. .................................. 198 WRIGHT, COMPTROLLER-GENERAL- v. Ga. Ry. & Banking Co.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 v. Ga. Ry. & Power Co.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 519 v. Union Tank Line Co.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 WRIGHT, Wm. A., Inse. Com. v. Farm~rs Mutual Inse Co.. . . . . . . 18 y YARYAN NAVAL STORES CO v. State......................... 22 520