THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 
OF 
JOHN C. HART, 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF GEORGIA. 
WITH AN APPENDIX 
CONTAINING OPINIONS. 
For Six Months Ending December 31st, 1903. 
ATLANTA, GA. GEo. W. HARRISoN, STATE PRINTER. 
190-!. 
 
  STATE OF GEORGIA. 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, CAPITOL BUILDING. 
ATTORNEY-GENERAL, 
JOHN C. HART. 
STENOGRAPHER, 
LOUIS R. WAD DEY. 
 
  REPORT. 
ATTORXEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE. ATr,ANTA) GA., December 31, 1903. 
To His Excellency) Joseph M. Terrell) Governor: Sm: This repm't is made pursuant to an Acrt of t:he 
General Ass>embly, approved August 17, 1903. It is provided by said Ac:t that offici,al reports 1are to be coincident with the fiscal year, and the duty is imposed upon public officers of this State to make ~and publish annually their reports, covering a period commencing on the first day of January, and ending on the 31st day of December, of each year, inclus,ive. 
In view of the f>act that my fimt annu~al report covered the period up to June 1, 1903, this report is referred to, and thereby embodied in this report, so fm as necessa:rJ' It is therefore unimportlant to again c1all attent1ion s,pee:ifieally to the maUCl'S ~and t1hings' there embraced, and only necessary now to file a report covering t:he pm~iod from June 1 to December 1, 1903. As this report: h'as been unavoidably de1ayed, and as some ntatJters have tl'anspired since the 31's't dlay of December, which I deem of impor tance to make public announcement, in so far as such matters are concerned, I will deal wit:h them here, mther than make speci>a1 reports here~after. A martJter of such character 
lS 
THE DUCKTOWN COPPER COMPANY LITIGATION. In pursuance of a resolution passed by the General Assembly, approved August 17, 1903, reciting ih1at great aml irreparable d:amage has been, and is being, done to the 
 
 6 
fores.ts, fruit1s and agricultural interests in tihe counties of Murray, Gilmer, Fannin, Union and Towns, in this 8t1ate, tihrough and on <aecount of tihe smoke and fumes produced by the smelting of copper ores at the copper mines in Ducktown, Polk count:y, Tennessee, and providing that a commissvon composed of five members, consisting of the Commissioner of Agriculture, State O!hemist, Srtll!te Geolo.gist and two private cit:izens, to he named by your Excellency, cih:arged with the duty of eX'amining and reporting fully uptm the damage done, 'and making such other sugge,stions as they might deem proper in the premises, and directing, on tihe receipt of such report, that your Excellency should take such steps, as in your judgment might be deemed proper and nece,sS~ary, to prevent the evil and to prevent future damage. Your Excellency, as you will rec1all, appointed a!S Buch private citizens in the locality affectJed, Hon. J. H. Witzell and Hon. W. E. Onandler, which committee, on the 20th day of November, 190~~. made tJheir o:fficia1 report. The report of the committee sHowed that grell!t and irreparable damage waB being done in the counties of Murray, Gilmer, Fannin, Union and TD'Wlls, of this State, by the smelting and roasting of copper ores in Ducktown, Tennessee, which repol"lt it is unneces,s,ary to set out here in detail, as the S'ame is of file in tihe exooutive office. 
Your Excellency conceived it to be your duty, in view of the 'alarming st!lite of affairs made manifest by tihe report of the c~tttee, to direct 1ihwt I should take steps looking to ilie suppl"lesBion and abatement of the nuisance; The case 'at once suggests exceedingly novel and intensely interesting questi0011S. The injury was caused: by citizens, denizens ,and corporwtions in the 8t1ate of Tennessee, and the sufferers were the citizens of Georgia, and indirectly 
1Jhe oommonrwealtb'. Your Excellency complained to the 
Governor of Tennessee allld requested th1at he should abate 
 
 7 
the nRisance. He replied thereto in suhst,ance that he regretted the injury, hut waiS powerless to abate it. Being una:ble to get Tennessee to move in the mat1ter, counsel for tihe State .of Georgia conceived the remedy to be an origin'al 'ltction lodged with the Supreme Ooul'lt of the United States a;t W'ashington, and so, on the 20th day of January, 1904, the State of Georgia filed her leave to sue the State of Tennessee, The Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. (Ltd.), the Pittsburg & Tennessee Copper Co., and The Tennes1see Oopper Oo., looking t1o the aha:tement and suppress,ion of the method tihen employed by said copper companies in treaJting and smelting the copper ores, insisting under the provision of the Constitution, 'article 2, seetion 2, that jurisdiction rested exchmively in that court. The Surpreme Oourt gl'anted an order permitting the State of Georgia to file its suit, and directed that the State of Tennessee nnd defendant copper companies should file their ans:wers on the 20th day of April tiheredter. N egot1iations were at once begun by the defendant copper companies looking to a settlement and 1abatement od: the suits, which neg()tia:tions fin1ally culminated in an agreement reciting the abandonment of the offensive method of smelting their ores, and an agreement not to return theret:o. This agreement W1aS signed by the defendant copper oompianies, their counsel and the proper officers on the part of tihe State of Georgi'a, 'and having first been entered upon the records of tihe Supveme Court, the State dismissed its case. 
It. was not the pui"pose of the State of Georgia to suppvesB and dvive out of businem this enterprise, representing an investment of over a million doUars, hut the object of the State was to require the oopper companies to so con- 
duct their busines's 1a:s nnt ro cause damage to the prorperty 
of the oomm:onwealtih of Georgi'a and the eitizens thereof. The process compl'll;ined of waiS what is known as the "open 
e., roast heaps," i. the ore was taken from the mines, piled 
 
 8 
on the roa.s,t,ing yards and "Were lighted by the use of wood, 'and after becoming thoroughly heated the sulphur in the ore bec:ame ignited and \Vou1d burn for four months, emitting dense smoke, gases and :sulphur fumes:, and being blown by the wind to tihe Georgia side, affected dis:astrously all vegebtion over a large area, the injury being appreciable for a dist:an:ce of thirty miles. It was to suppress ~his method of roasting the ore tha,t the suit was filed. The officers of the copper companies and tlheir respective counsel realized that the comp1aint of the State of Georgia was not without cause, and seemed regretul of the injury done. I learn that at great expense a new and diffe~ent sys,tem :or treating the ores has been adopted, whereby the sulphuric acid, heretofore emitted ~and lost, is to be concentrated, and ~already the companies have realized til:mt it is possible under the new proces:s, that these gases may be reduced, concentrated and made into sulphuric acid, a commodity in great demand in thi-s coun1try, thereby converting the nuisance complained of into an article of great oommercial value. The only feature of the case to be la. ment:ed is the fa.ct that it temporarily throws out of employment a thous,and or more men, but it is to be hoped ilhis enforced idleness will be of only short duration. In the management and control of t:his ca:se I had 'aSBociated witlh me Ligon Johnson, Esq., of t:he Atlanta bar, and to his energy, tact and good judgnrent the successful termination of t:he complica,ted litigation is largely attribu~tnble. 
SCHOOL LANDS. 
I had hoped by this time to have been able to report th1at all ea:ses in which the Sta:te lmd brought suit for the recovery of lot1s of land X os. 10 and 100, in e:ach surveyor's district reserved by the State, and set apart for the education of poor cllrildren, evidenced by the Act of 1818, page 305, would have been satisfactorily adjus,ted. There are, 
 
 9 
however, a number of cases still pending, mos,t of them resting under ~submi1ssion, in conformity with ~an Act pa:ssed by the Legislature at its last session, viz.: the Act approved August 17, 1903, page 86, Acts of 1903. This Act was prussed! in view of tihe suggestion made in my first annual report, calling 1a:ttent>ion to the fact that legislation was needed by whicih claimants mig1ht set up equitable rig-hts nort allowable by 'Strict legal pleading. Prior to this recommendation the litigation insti,tuted had developed that a number of persons in pos,ges1sion of these lands had in good faith purcha,sed and erected valuable improvements thereon, yet, they did not, in point of fact, have a good title against the State. A number of litigants took rudvantagA of fihis lrust Act providing for submission to arbitration, and the arbitrators ihave heard the evidence and argument of counsel, though bJave m)t yet rendered their award. Your Excellency 'appointed Ron. U. V. Whipple, of Oorde1e, ~rus ~arbitrat{)r in oohiali of the State. In the Coffee county cases defencl'antls named Ron. W. M. Toomer, of Waycross, and! these two named rus a tihird arbitrator. Ron. W. H. Griffin, of Valdosta. 
Since the 1rust report the special a;ttorneys, to wit: JYLes:srs. Haygood, Cheney 'and Curtts, have made t~he following collectiooo, to wit: As the result of compromise with Mi,ss Belle Grah1am for lot of 1and No. 10, in the 4th district of Coffee county, for $500.00, 25 per cent of this ~a:mount was paid :special attorneys for fees, the State receiving a net balance of $375.00. 
Lot No. 10, in the 8th district of Ware county, was compromised with Thos. Cole for $50.00, and lot No. 10 ~. the 2d di,strict of Appling county, with The Southern Pme Oo., for $100.00, after paying S!J8Ci'al,attorneys' fees, the State received a balance 'Of $111.97 on the above two l()(f:s. 
From sale of lot No. 10, in the 7th district orf Coffee county, to FrankL. Sweat, for $175.00, and sale of lots 
 
 10 
Nos. 10 and 100, in the 7th dis,trict of Worth oounty, tu C. A. Alford, for $1,400.00, the SblJte paid special attorneys' fees of 25 per cent., and received a net balance of $1,181.25. 
The money thus collected has been paid into the treasury of this State, and this office holds receipts therefor. 
FRANCHISE TAX. 
As st,ated in my last report, I was of the opinion that the Act passed by the Le~is1a,ture, approved on the 17th of December, 1902, kno1wn rus the Fronchise T1ax Act, was constitutional. The Act was successfully put in operation and a return of franchis-es ~approxima,ting in value thirteen millions of dollars was levied and collected las't; ear. I have represented the State in a number of cases of appeal to the board of arbitration from the assessments of the Clomptroller-General. In tihis way I have grown quite familiar with the law and ius pnactical enforcement, and as a result, I deem it appropriate to make the suggestion t1hat the Legislature should provide a system, having for its object uniformity in the assesrsment of franchise valuations. The present method of creating a board of as,sessors after diffel'enoo between the corporation and the Comptroller-General, is not altogether S'atisfactory. The ,a,wards made by the different boards ha.ve bmught forth criticism, in that it produces inequalities in the ~assessment of values. This is due to the fact the personnel of the boards differ and the values placed upon the different franchises are frequently inconsistent. The V'alue of 'a franchise is largely one of "opinion. Approximate accuracy and apparent equality would be rea1Sionably attainable' if the board, ws such, was skilled in 1ihe matter to be considered. It is the purpose of the la:w that co,rporations and individuals should bear alike the burden of taX'ation, me1asured by the property owned by eaCJh. It is difficult to obtain from either a 
 
 11 
V!oluntary return fairly meeting this duty. That both should do so all fair-minded men must admit iJS an act of simple justice born of a duty which each owes to the State in return for fihe pmtootion of property given. To the end, therefore, that all citizens, both natural and artifici,al, should justly bear the burden of taxation, boards of appeal should be established in the counties of the St1ate to pass upon the VJalues of the property required to be returned there for taxation, and a S:t1at<e Board of Appeal should be created to pass upon the values of property required t.{' be returned to the Comptroller-General. In my judgment this may be lawfully as well as profitably done. 
THE GEORGIA RAILROAD & BANKING COMPANY TAX CASE. 
'Dhis case hia:s been heard in the circuit court of the United States for theNor:thern District of Georgia, though not yet decided by Judge Newman. It arose on an injunction issuing from the Circuit Court of the United States, seeking to restrain the Comptroller-General from collecting a tax on the franchise of this company, as well as to restrain him from collecting an ad valorem tax on the excesiS of the valuation of the company's propert}' over and above the amount invested at the time orf the creation of the corporation. The original capitaliza,tion of this company was $4,256,000, ~and the return of the value orf the road and outfit was $6,201,506.04, or appl'oximately, $2,000,000 in excess orf the original capitalization. The contention orf the corporation is t,hat at the time it was chartered there was a tax limit fixed, represerutled by a certain per cent. on the net income of the company'8 investment, and tha1t this included all of the propel'ty of the compan.y, including the rfranchise. The company contends rfurther thia:t the Franchise Act is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the State insisted that the charter exemption related purely to the stock of said company, and >Vas a limit 
 
 12 
of the tax rate on rthe shares of stock in the hands of thG shareholder, and did not embrace the property of the railroad COIJllpany, and fuat the company was li>able to be taxed both on its franchise 'and property. 
This is the only case that has arisen in the practical enforcement of the law that brings into question the constitutionality of the Act. The railroad company wrus represented in the 'argument before Judge Newman by ajo::. Jos. B. Cumming, of Augusta, and Ron. Alex C. King, of the Atlanta bar: I can n:ot, of cou11se, anticipate the opinion of the judge, nor would it be proper for me to do so. 
PENDING LITIGATION. 
The case of Wm. A. Wright, Comptroller-General, v. The Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., and The Atlantic Ooast Line Ry. Co., is still pending in the United States Supreme Court. 
Oases also that will, in a measure, be affected by the above case are pending in the Circuit Court of the Northern District of Goorgi,a. One is known as the debenture case, in which it is the insistence of the St!aJte that ilhe Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. irs liable to the State for taxes on $388,900 on debentures or certificates of indebtedness of the Atlanta & West Point R. R. Co., owned by the Georgia R. R. & Banking Co. The other is the case known aa' the Centml of Ga. Ry. Co. cruse, in which tih:e Sta:te insists that the Central of Georgia is liable to a tax on 15,000 shares of ~stock of the Western Ry. of Alabama. Th~se last two cases have not been pressed for trial, hoping that the. result of the firs,t mentioned cJrus,e, when iheard and determined in the Supreme Court in Washington, will aid in the proper solution of the 1asrt two. 
There is now pending in Fulton superior couflt an action of ejectment against the less,ees of the Western & Atlantic R. R., involving 1Jhe title to 'a portion of the old Monroe 
 
 13 
right of way, to which company the Centml is the successor in title. Tlhis property is now in the possession of the less1ee company. 
Since the filing of my last report I have, in obedienCA to the constitutional requirement, represented the State in the following ca.pital cases in our Supreme Cou11t: 
John Perry v. The State. Whitfield county. Judgment affirmed. 
Jim Dunwoody v. Tlhe State. Houston county. Judgment affirmed. 
J. G. Johnslton v. The State. Dade county. Judgment 
reversed. Lee Cribb v. The State. Coffee county. Judgment af- 
firmed. Milton OwelllS v. The 8t1ate. Stewart county. Jude; 
ment reversed. Robt. :Middlebrooks v. The State. Bartow county. J udg- 
ment affirmed. Wm. Grant v. The State. Decatur county. Judg- 
ment affirmed. Pink Walker v. The State. J effemon county. J udg- 
ment affirmed. R. D. Oawthorn v. The State. Dodge county. J udg- 
ment reversed. Tom Dunham v. The State. Meriwether r-ounty. J udg- 
ment affirmed. Jim Rountree v. The State. Emanuel county. Judg- 
ment aflirmed. James Wb.He v. The S:tate.' OatJo.oisa county. Judg- 
ment aflirm:ed. Ernest Cook v. The State. Wilcox county. Judg- 
ment aflirm:ed. John Harris v. The Sta,te. Fulton county. Judg- 
ment affirmed. 
 
 14 
WESTERN AND ATLANTIC RAILROAD. 
I made a personal inspection of this property in September last, ~and was gratified ~at the present excellent condition of the road~bed, depots, and other buildings connected therewith. The lighrter rails have been dis,placed by heavier steel rails, and the track has been ballasted with rock. Superintendent J\IcOollum made this tour of inspection with me. The work of improvement has been very largely under his direct srupervision, and the progress in evidence everywihere impressed me with the conviction that the State ihas cause for congratulation that her property has fallen in the hands of a company whose evident purpose it is to make it one of the best properties in Georgia, and to maintain it at th1at high standard. 
The duties of this office are oons.t1antly increasing, occupying practically all of my time. I have been very ably assisted by my stenographer, Louis R. Waddey, who, by application and diligence, has acquired quite a knowledge of the law, and I realize hi<s rutminments are such as to authorize the Legisl&ture in increrusing the very meagre salary now paid him. Thi1s would be but an act of simple justice to place him upon an eqll'ality wiifu. the other stenographers employed in the V'arious offices of the capitol. 
I herewith submit with this report such official opinions rendered by this department '00 the seveml departments o the State fuS are of general interest. 
 
 15 
OcTOBER 15, 1903. 
Governor J os. M. Terrell) Atlanta) Ga.: 
DEAR Sm: In reply to the inquiries submitted by you several days ago, viz.: 
First, whether a public officer charged with the duty of collecting the public moneys may depos.it such in either one of two State depositories located in a city having a population of sixty-five hundred and over, at his option, or 
Secondly, whether it is the duty of the Governor, where there are tvV'O de,positories located in a city of sixty-five hundred population and over, to specifically designate into which State depository tihe public officer shall deposit the public money ? 
These questions, I take it., are pertinent in the light of the amendment touching State depositories passed by tho last General Assembly, and to be found on pnge 28 of th9 Acts of 1903. An analysis of tlra.t Act will show that it contemplated but one thing, viz.: tihe es.tabli.shment of two State depos.it:ories in certain named cities having a porpulation of sixty-five hundred and over, and tha,t it in no other" wise affected the la-w embodied in s:ections 982 et seq of the Code of 1895. In fact, by the second section uf the amendment jus.t referred to, it is expressly provided "That all laws and regulations now of force and rebtive to and governing the depositories heretofore establisheu shall apply to all additional depositories that may be des,ignated and established by the provisions of this amendment." 
The law of force touching depositories herEtofore established and embraced in section 993 of the Code of 1895 is as follows: 
"The Gov:emor shall, at the time of appointing the State deposit:ories, make a list of the counties whose tax collectoTS shall be im;tructed to pay said funds into each depository, and said tax collectors shall pay into no other depository 
 
 16 
 
than the one named by t:he Governor ; and the Governor 
 
shall also make known the apportionment oi counties by 
 
a proclamation duly published in the city where such de- 
 
pository is loca,ted, giving the name of the depository, and 
 
the names of the counties whose tax collectors ~hall be in- 
 
structed to pay into sa:id depository all moneys collected 
 
by them for and on account of State taxes." 
 
Another law and regulation touching S>t,ate depositories 
 
and to be found in section 989 o the Code o 1895, is as 
 
foHorws: 
 
"The Trem>ul'er o tihis State shall not deposit at any 
 
one time, or have on deposit at any one time, in any one o 
 
the dep:ositories of tihis State, for a longer time tlhan ten 
 
days, a sum of money belonging to this StatB, tha.t exceeds 
 
the bond given by .said depository to the State." 
 
It is manifest, tfuerefore, if the public officer is allowed 
 
to deposit indiscriminately in any one or the other of the 
 
State depositories, these rules and regulations just quoted 
 
would be violated and would be incapable of enforcement, 
 
and hence would run counter to t!he very provisions incor- 
 
porated in the amendment under review. 
 
I think, thel'e:fore, it is still the duty of the Governor 
 
under the law to specifically designate the depository in 
 
which tax collectors s:hall deposit the public moneys, an.d 
 
that it is still the law that the "said tax collectom sthall pay 
 
into no other depository than the one named by the Gov- 
 
ernor." 
 
Respectfully, 
J NO. c. HART,' 
 
Attorney-General. 
 
To the Governor: 
 
AuGUST 28, 1903. 
 
Sm: In response to your inquiry whether under an Act Cl'eating the "Confederate Memorial Board of Georgia," 
 
 17 
approved August 15, 1903, women are eligible to appointment thereon, I beg to say in my opinion they arc not. 
By section 1810, volume 2 of the Civil Code of Georgia, it is provided "Females ~are not entitled to the privileges of t!he elective franchise; nor can they hold any civil office or perform 'any civil function, unloss1 srpeciaHy authorizen by law; nor are they required to discharge any military, jury, police, patro1, or mad duty." JI.Iembcrsh~p on the Board >v'ould be a civil office, 'and the duties pre,scribed in tho Ac>t creating the Board provide for the performanee of civil functions. This Board is created by a public Act; it provides for t:ho tenure of the officers thereof; it requires that they shall perform duties of a public nature, and while there is no s1alary atbaehed to the ruppointment, it is provided that t'he expollSies of the Board are to be paid by the St,ate. 
Office is an employment on behalf of the government in any station of public trust, :ruo>t merely transient, oroa:sional or incidental. 20 Johns, page 493. 
Any man is a public officer vv'ho hath any duty concerning i!he public, 'and he is not the loss a public offi~er where his autho6ty is confined to narrow limits, for it is the duty of his office and the nature of that duty which makes him an officer, ~and not the extent of his authority. Meechem's Public Officers, page 7. 
Whether we look into the dictiona,ry of our language, the terms of politics, or tho diction of common life, we find that whoever has a public charge or employment, or even a ~articular employment affecting the public, is s1aid to hold or be in office. 83 N. Y., 376. 
Our own Supreme Oourt in the 33 Ga., page 332, says: ""Where an individual has been appointed or elected in '1. manner prescribed by law has a distinction or title given him by law, and exorcises functions concerning the public assigned to him by law, he must be regarded as a public 
 
 18 
 
officer, it ean make no difference whether ho be commis- 
 
sioned by the Executive or not." 
 
In the light of the foregoing authorities there can be no 
 
question that a wmnan would be ineligible for appointment 
 
to membership on the Confederate :Memorial Board of 
 
Georgia. Permit me to add that I have most reluctantly 
 
reached the above eonclusion, and do so only because the 
 
law in my opinion eompelled it, for I recognize not only 
 
the fitneSis and appropriatenes,s of having represented on the 
 
Board charged with the duty of caring for the cemeteries 
 
of our Confedemt.e soldiers, the women who played the 
 
parts of conspicuous loy.alty and devotion to the eause that 
 
wa,s lost, but for the further reason the energies of one 
 
woman would amount to more in accomplishing the worthy 
 
purposes of the Act than the carnhined efforts of a dozen 
 
men. It is competent for tho Legisbtnre to make her eli- 
 
gible to appointment, and it is, duo both the woman anii 
 
the cause that &he be made eligible. 
 
Respeetfully submitted. 
 
c. JNO. 
 
HART, 
 
Attorney-General. 
 
Governor Terrell : 
 
JUNE 2), 1903. 
 
Sm: \Vith reference to the question oubmitted whether it is tho duty of the Executive to return a bill presented 
 
to him on the last day of tho S'eSis,ion of the Legislature, or wi.tihin five days theroafter, and vetoed by him within fiyo days, to the same Gene11al Assembly at its next session, I 
 
beg to say, tho question when first submitted seemed hardly to admit of doubt that it was the duty of the Executive to return the bill. After a very full and thorough inve8tigation of tihe question I am convinced that it is rrot the duty of the Governor to return the bill vetoed, and to do so mig-ht load to serious consequences. 
 
 19 
The veto po'wer is given to the Governor in article 5, section 1, paragraph 16 of the Cons;titution. It reads as follows: "The Governor shall have the revision of all bills pasSied by tho General Assembly, before the same shall become laws, but t>vo-thirds of each House may pass a law notwiths,t,anding his dissent; and if any bill Rhould not b(~ retnrned by the Gnvernor within five days (Sunday excepted) after it has been presented to him, the same shall be a law, unless the General Assembly, by their adjournment, shall prevent its return. He may approve any appropriation or diSiappmve any other appropriation, in the Slame bill, and the latter shall n'ot be e:ffiectual unless by two-thirds of e'ach House." An analysis of this provisio"1 loads to i:lhe conclusion that the Governor as a legislative factor is the eqnivalent in povver of the difference between a majority of the mvo Hous.es and two-third's of both Houses. \Vhen a bill has pas,sed each liouse of the Geneml Assembly, receiving a majority of tho votes e>f the respecttive members thereof, and is presented to the Governor, upon his approval it becomes a law; or upon his keeping it in his office five days without ac'tion, when the General Assembly is in sestSion, it becomes a law. He must, though, if he wishes to disa,pprovo the bill, within five d1ays, writ0 his disapproval thereon and return it t:o the Legislature, if In sesswn. 
In the inquiry, h'O'wever, submitted, and under the statement of fact, it is' impossible to return the bill within tho five days because of the adjournment of the General Assembly. It is the duty of the Governor to return the bill, is plain, if the J,egi,slatnre is in session, and it is equally plain, if the Leg-islature is not in sossion, to do so would  be impossible. Th:e ques,tion, therefore, is pertinent, iu what sentSe is the ~word "adjournment" used in the C:ons,titut,ional provision quoted~ Our Oonstitntion provides t:hat there shall be annual sessions of the General Assembly, 
 
 20 
and that "no sosSiion of the General Assembly shall eon tinue longer than fifty days'; provided, that if an impeachment t1rial is pending at the end of the fifty days the session may be prolonged to the completion of said trial." F'ifty days, therefore, is the limit ordinarily of the legis~ lative scss,ion. At the expiration of that time the session must end. When it ends in this way it may be fairly said to have adjourned. The last sess,ion of the L,egislature was in fact adjourned on a formal resolution, sine die. The ses1sion of 1902 finally adjourned on the - - day of December, 1902. 
The argument in favor of returning the bill to the next session of the Legislature is, tlrat it should be returned, first, in order that the record of the two Houses sh:ould Shmv the final disposition o the bill. Secondly, that, notwithstanding the veto by the Governor, it is the right o:f the Legislature to override it by a two-thirds vote and make the hill a law no1twithst1anding tho Governor's disapproval, and to not return tho bill dis.aprproved, would be a denial to the IJegislature of one of its Oonstitutional rights. T'hese reasons exhaust tho argument 1vhy the bill should be returned, so f'ar as I ean eonceive. This argument is plausible, but not sound. It is not eSisential th<at the bill should he returned to perfect the record. When the Governor vetoes 'a hill under the condit,ions we are discussing he should return it to the Seeret!ary of State. That office, by law, is made the 11eceptacle of the bills pas:sed, as well as those not passed. It becomes a part, therefore, of the record of tho legislat,ive department of the St1ate. Again, suppose the bill had not been formally vetoed, and five days had elapsed after the adjournment of the Legislature without action, the records of the legislative department would be as incomplete in the ease of an unsigned bill as in case of a bill whi,ch the Governor had vetoed. In the 41 Ga. it is laid down by our Supreme Court th'at if a bill is returned to the 
 
 21 
Governor a,t the adjournment of the Legislature and remains' unacted upon for five days, in that 0ase its legislative existence dies and the hill is, an abortiJn. There the failure by the Governor to approve within five days leaved tho bill to perish for want of legislative life. 
What is a veto? At most it is but tho dissent of the 
Governor. He may or he may not give his reasons, for 
dissent;ing. In other words, it is but an expression of disapproval on the part of the executive branch of the government. Dis,approV'al in this ease is the equivalent of nonaction. If the Governor ha.d failed to approve the bill it would have died by lapse of time. If he seeks to perpetuate his re'asons for letting it die, how can it be said that expressed disapproval adds vitality to the bill? If it would die anyY>'ay by neglect without the aid of a phys,ician, upon what principle can it be said that the physician'S! condemnation of it in its dying hour breathes into it new lease of life? The bill, therefore, s.tands in no bettor fix, and has no more lifo than it would have, had the Governor failed to treat it 'at all. If he had done nothing it would have died. Sinee he did nothing, except to express the reason why it should die, I fail to see why such a'ction could save its life, or work its resurrection. 
In the 41 Ga., page 157, supra, our Court uses this language in speaking of the action of the Governor after the adjournment of the Legislature touching bills: "If this was an original qnetstion independent of ~any construction heretofore given by the executive department of the St1ate government, this Oourt would be inclined to hold that tho Governor, under the Constitution, could not approve and sign any hill after the adjournment of the General Assembly." Legis1ati...-e and executive practice has supplied the law for the approval of bills within five days after the adjournment of the Legislature. A bill therefore which would die for the want of executive approval would leave 
 
 22 
the records of the legislative department as incomplete, in that no provision is made for its return to the legislative department. It is no argument, therefore, in tho light of this authority, to s;ay that the bill should be returned in order to complete the record. 
The other argument in favor of the return, viz.: that the Legislature slhould have tho right to override the yoto, and not to return it would deprive t:hom of a Constitutional right, is only fair upon itrs face. If the Governor did nothing with the bill that was sent him at the adjournment of tho Legislature, except to let it lie in his office, it wonld die as a result. There is no la.w that reqniros him to sign it, nor to disapprove it. It would die under circumstances familiarly lmo1vn in parliamentary law, by virtue of the "pocket veto." The Constitution provides no remedy for non-action by the Executive after adjournmettt. The Legislature has no redmss. It would bo as much deprived of the right claimed to oYerride the nto, as in tho case of nonaction; yet nobody will insist that the Governor should return to tho Legislature a bill that has died for want of ex ecutive approvaL 
Again, it is not a denial of the right of the Legislature to pass the bill. It has the right at this, the subsequent session of the Legislature, to reintroduce tho bill and pass it. If the Legislature could not pass the bill, of coume it could not override t:hc veto. 
The requirement of the proYisrion of the Constitution we are discussing, is iJhat the Executive shall approve or disapprove tho bill within five days after received by him, provided the LegisLature is in seS'sion. If the I.~egislature, by adjournment,, makes it imposrHible to comply with tht3 law, it ean not be said that the Exem1tive, by failure to return, has denied the Legislature its Constitutional right to override the veto. If any rights have been denied the Legislature, it did it by the act of adjournment; not a volnn- 
 
 23 
 
tary adjonrnmont, it is true, but by reason of the expir:-t- 
 
tion of the legislative session. The Executive, at least, is 
 
free from the C'l'iticism that he has denied the Legislature 
 
any right ''"hich it possesses. If any denial of a right to 
 
it has resultecl, or will result, from a failure to transmit a 
 
hill, vet:ood ulHlor the eonditions named, it is because of the 
 
Constitution and the laws, in pursuance thereof. 
 
Legislative pra.ctice, in the lang<mge of our Supreme 
 
Court, has made inroads upon tho Constitutional provision 
 
we are cliscusiSing. Th,at provision, when originally put 
 
into the Oons,titution, never contemplated that the Legi3- 
 
lature 1vonld adjourn leaving a bill nmEsposed of. It 
 
would have boon wiser to have lived squarely up. to that 
 
Constitution. In my opinion, 'any further inroads on that 
 
provision of tho Constitution should not be made. 
 
There is nothing in the law that requires your Excel- 
 
lency to return a bill, received after the adjournment of the 
 
Legislature, and vetoed, to a subsequent session of th8 
 
Legislature, and to do so, in my judgment, would be with-- 
 
out warrant or authority of law, and might he produc- 
 
tive of tho greatest confusion. 
 
Respectfnl1y submitted. 
 
J NO. 0. HART, 
 
. Attorney-General. 
 
STATE OF GEOIWL\, TREASl~RY DEP.~RT:\IENT, ATLANTA, GA., ]\fay 24, Hl04. 
Ilon. John C. Ilart, Attomey-Gencral of Georgia, Atlanta, Ga. 
DEAR JUDGE: I am informed that the constitution'ality of the Act changing tho meeting of the Gencml Ass1embly from the fourth ~Wednesday in October to the fourt~1 \YeJnesday in Juno has bce:n questimred. It has been s:ng- 
 
 24 
gested that inasmuch as the Constitution provides for biennial elections and annual sessions 'of not exceeding fift.r days, :ruo Geneml Assembly can hold more than two regular sessions, each of fi:fity days, 'and that the present General Assembly having held tw1o such sessions, it is without power to hold anotl.Jier regular soss1ion. 
Otherwise it is insisted tihat tho General Assembly at its J nne session may cbange the day of election from October to May, aml 1:lw meeting of the Legislature from Juno to January, and thus en'ahle itself to hold four regular sessions, and ,at its .T'anuary session could again change the date of election ~and the date of meeting, and thus by sucees,sivce changes continuo itself indefinitely in office, because, though elected for only two years, its members arc continued in office until ttheir successors are elected. 
Dooo the Constitution confer any such po~wer on the General .AJs,slembly? 
The question is vital and important, and should be speedily determined by competent 'authority. 
As Treasurer of the State and the bonded custodian of its funds, I respectfully ask for your official opinion as to whether or not any expenSie ineident to a scss.ion of the General Assembly in Juno, HJ0-1, can be la.wfully paid. 
Very truly yours, R. E. PARK, 
Treasurer of Georgia. 
ATTOR~EY-GENERAL's OFFICE, 
ATLANTA, GA., J\fay 30, 1904. 
Hon. R. E. Park, State Treasurer, Atlanta, Ga. DEAR Sm: I am in receipt of your letter of J\Iay 24th, 
in which you ask for an official opinion on the question ym< therein raise, viz. : ""\Vhffiher you as Treasurer of the 
 
 25 
State and the bonded custodi-an of its funds, may lawfully pay 1Jhe eX'penses incidtent to the ses,si:on of the General Assembly 1Jo be held in June, 1904." In reply thereto, I beg to say wlmther or not y;ou may 1ruwfp.lly pay the pe1 diem of the legislators and other expenses incident to this session depends upon whether or not the session is a legal and constitutional one. Whether or not it is a constitutional assembling of the Legis1alture, the amwer should be found in tJhe Oonstitution itself. 
The present Legislature was elected in October, 190:~} and on the fourth Wednesday thereafter held its first session, lrusting fifty days. At tlla:t sess.1on of the Legislature the time of meeting of the General Assembly was change{l from the :fourth Wednesday in October to the fourth Wednesday in June. In pursuance of that Act the Legi:;lature 'assembled in the capitol om rthe fourth vVednesday in June, 1903, which session 1rusted fif,ty days. This same Legislature will meet again in 'annual ses,sion on the fourth Wednesday in June, 1904, 'and it is1 this last. sess:ion the constitutionalit~y of which is questioned by your inquiry. 
Article 3, 'Section 4, paragrruph 3 of the O~nstitutiorn provides that the General Assembly "shall meet on the fourth Wednesd,ay in October, 1878, an:d annually tihercafter on the Sanle day until the dJay shall be changed b.Y law. No session of the General Assembly shall continue longer than fifty d.ays," etc. Thi,s provisio!l of the Constitution clearly gives to the Legislalture the right to chang3 the time of meeting. The language "until the day shall be ch!anged by law" means t.hJat the Legislature is giveu the power to ch!ange the da.y of mooting. The dlate has been changed by law from the ou11th Wednesday in October to the :fourth Wednesd'ay in June. See Acts of the General Assembly 1902, page 66. The annual session now and hereafter, until db'anged by law, begins on the :fourth Wednesday in June. The present Legislature has not 
 
 '26 
therefore transcended its authorit~ by changing the timeof meeting and have done so within the constitutional limits. This authority is cle:ar. 
It is true t:his Legislature will serve more than an hundred diays, but I take it will not violate the Oonstitllltion by serving more thian :fifty days rut any particuh,r annual session. The provision in the Oornsrtitution Ie1a.tive to the session, that it shall not last longer than :fifty days, refers to the annual session. This Legisl1ature will not meet t"\\o".ice in any p:articular yea:r. The meetings are annual, con:6orming to the Constitution. The third stssion is only incident t:o the change of the date of meeting- of the General Assenrbly. The presoot I.egis1ature has not lengthened it:s term beyond two years.. The present Legis.la.tun~ was elecrt:ed in October, 1902, and their successors. will be elected in October, 1904. The chang-e of meeting from October to June neeteSsita!ted three sess.ions of the LegislaTure. It '""as impossible to have changed the time of meeting without the necessity of having three ses-sions, unleo;,s the time of election of the members of the General A~ sembly had also been changed. This ch:ange does not lengthen the tenure of the present members of the General ABsembly, nor shorten tihe term of the succeeding Legi.slature, nor in any wise involve the State in an ad:d:itionai expenditure .of money. The Oonstitution requires that the sessions shall be annual. Unless this Legis:la.ture meet & it would be incumbent upcm the Governor to eall an extrt session either of this or of the succeeding I.egishrt;urer which last Legislature will be elected on the :first Wednesday in October, to make the necessary appropriations for the support 'Of tihe government and its ins,t.itutions. In the latter event it would give the next I.egislat.ure three sessions. It is apparent, therefore, since the Legis1ature changed the time of meeting, which they had tJhe right to do, the three sessions are necessary to conform to the oon- 
 
 27 
 
stitutional requirement of annual sessions. The Constitu- 
 
tion requires biennial elootions and annual s.essions of 
 
the General Assembly, and this requirement answers the 
 
suggestion in your letter that "at its. June session (the 
 
Legisla,ture) may cl:Jiange the day of election from Octo- 
 
ber to 1Iay :and the meeting of the Legislature from June 
 
to January . 
 
. and thus by successrive changes 
 
continue ili:self indefinitely in office." The Legis.bture, as 
 
'_you see, could not do this: because of the const,itutional 
 
limitation of biennial elect:io;ns. 
 
The app11oaching session ofthe Legislature therefore be- 
 
ing cle.arly CJon:stitutJional, you would incur no financial 
 
risk in paying from the S:tate Treasury the expenses m 
 
cident thereto. 
 
Yours very truly, 
 
JoHN C. HART, 
 
Attorney-General. 
 
)fovember 19, 1903. 
Hem. Philip Cook, Secretary of State, Capitol: 
DEAR Sm : I beg to acknowledge your letter of recent da;te, as follows: "Section 2150 of volume 2 of the Code of 1895 fixes the fee for a eiharter for a navigation compan:;r at $50.00, while section 981 "of volume 1 of the Code of 1895 prescribes a fee of $100.00. In view of this discrepancy, I beg that you will givce me your written opinion as to which of these is the proper charge." 
In reply thereto I beg to :say that by reference to the Acts codified and above referred to, I note that they were pa:s.sed by the same Legi:slature and at tihe same sesaion. They are of course irreconcilable and borth cannot therefore be the 1aw. The Act codified a:s section 981, volume 1.of iili.e Code of 1895, providing for a fee of $100.00 to be eharged by the Secretary of State, was approved December 
 
 28 
 
17, 1894. The Act codified as section 2150, volume 2 o 
 
the Code, was app11ov;ed December 6, 1894. The Act :first 
 
named, whioo was the last Act passed by the Legis,lature, 
 
provided for a repeal of conflicting laws. The Act last 
 
passed changed the fee from $50.00 for incorporating nav- 
 
igation C<mlV'anies and made it $100.00. It follows, there- 
 
fore, that the Act codified as section 981, being the Act of 
 
December 17, 1894, and providing a fee of $100.00, is the 
 
1aw. You will therefore charge $100.00 as provided by 
 
section 981 :for granting a charter to a navi~ation com- 
 
pany. 
 
Yours very truly, 
JNO. c. HART, 
 
Attoruey-GeilleraL 
 
Auguat 26, 1903. 
Han. W. B. Merritt, State School Commissioner, Atlanta, Ga.: 
DEAR SIR: I have given considerable thought and s.tu.iy to your inquiry: "How the puhlric school fund shall be divided between a 'local system' and the county wherein the system is established ~" 
There are many local sys,tems in the several counties in Georgia supported by the public school fund, suprplementetl by local taxation. The several Acts creating these local systems differ in the method of payment as well as the manner of computing the amount of money each iB entitled. to receive from the common school fund; some of the Acts provide "that the money shall he paid directly by the State School Oommis,s,ioner to the local system," while others provide "that the money shall be paid to tihe looal system through the county commissioner," etc. These sever~tl Acts also differ in the method of computing the amount of money the local system is to receive, and very frequent.l.7 we find such loose expressiorn a;ppearing in the Acts ere- 
 
 29 
ating such systems as theoo: "The sum of money to be paid to the local system shall he according to the number of children attending the school," and again: "That the amount o m~:>ney to be paid to the local s~ystem shall be in proportion to the number of children in the school di;, trict," and similar expressions. To attempt to divide 11ho3 money under Buch directions would often be impossible, nor do I think Uhiat the money should be divided in so many different ways. The manner in which thi;; money shall be divided between an established city or town system has been fixed by ,a general law and embodied in section 1394, volume 1 of the Code. These special Acts, therefore, directing a different metrrod to be adopted for the di,sbursement of this money would conflict with the general la;v just announced, and hence would be inoperative as violating that provision of the Oonstitution inhibiting special legislaticm where there is a general law of force. Seetion 1394 of the Oode just quoted provides~ that the amount of money to be paid such looal system shall be "its pro ratJ. share of tJhe educational funds raised by the St,ate." Manifestly, therefore, one system c'an not have one rule fm determining its p110 rata share, and another system a different rule. The law does not determine in so many words what is the "pro rata share" to be given the local system, but the law doos furnish a rule for determining the pro rah sh<are of the 'Several counties in the Sbate. Volume 1, se.~ tion 1403 of the Code provides that this apportionment shall be made "upon the propo,rtion which the school popu lation in eacn county bears to tihle school population in the State as shown by the last school census." The law distrib utes its school fund among the counties, tihorefore on the equitable basis of the school population in each county bears to the school population in the State. In this way each county's pro rata share is determined. 
The fund raised by the State for the education of th(:'l 
 
 30 
children thereof is in a sense a trust fund and belongs to the children of the State. The fund shoulJ be adminis~ tered wirth the single purpose of benefiting the children of the State. This fund ra~sed is within itself insufficient to mainta;in the public schools of the State beyond a limited portion of i:lhe year, and it is the policy of the State to encourage local systmns, where the citizens in a given locality submit to looal taxation as a 'fmpplemental fund to maintain for a longer period such looal system. The State does this by turning over to ftnd entrusting with local systems the fund which said local system is, entitled to have under a just distribution. Bearing in mind, as ~sta,ted, that this fund i's in ,a sense a trust fund, and that the children in the State 'are equal benefic,i~aries, it would follow that the distribution which gave to a child in a local system an advantage over a child who lived in a rural community woulcl violate equality in its enjoyment. T'o divide it between the county and the city on the bas,is of attendance on the public s1chools would be manifestly unfair in that it would give to cities an advantage by reason of the fact that attendance upon the public schools there is much larger. This is due to the fact of proximity of the children to the school building, to the better equipment of school houses and comforts incident thereto. The child, by reason 'oi the fact that he is a resident of the city, by this apportionment would get greater benefHs, for the simple reason th!at his loeality gave him an admntage over the child in the count1ry. Our rural district i'S sparsely settled and the public schools are maintained solely by the public school fund. The terms are often fixed only to the time when the child can best leave the work on the farm. These conditions which make him mos1t conveniently spared from the farm, that he may attend school, makes his attendance, by reason of the season of the year, more difficult. He is kept at home on account of inclement weather, cold and rain, 
 
 31 
and booause of the dist,ance in going to school. The advantages with which the city child may acquire his education are not due to his making, nor are the dis.advantagee under which the country child la!b)r, due to his fault, and therefore this would furnish no sufficient reason why the one should recei,-e gl'eater advantages than the other in the enjoyment of this fund. .Attendance upon school is of course the first essential toward's the beneficent use of this fund, but it would be manifestly unfair to make it the basis of discrimination in favor of one child over another. 
A division of the fund wthich comes nearest to giving to each child his interest in it, guarded under proper restriction, is the best and only legal system for its distribution. A division of the public school fund between a county and the local system on the baBis of s:chool popnlation in the local system, that is to say, the proportion which the s:chool population in the local system hear'S to the school population in the county, is the lawful and just distribution. This would be its pro rata share. Tlhe law which divides the fund between the several counties in the State recognizes this as the pi'oper bas,is. The county is treated as a unit, and the local system should be treated as but another unit in a unit. It is greatly to be desired that the local systems should be encour'aged and their terms of school lengthened, but it should not be done at the expense o shortening the terms of the schools in the country. Each should receive its pro rata share, neither to receive more or less. 
I therefore advise, irres,pective of any directions to the contrary in the Acts creating the loeal systems, that you adopt the rule of apport:ionment betw:een th'" local system and the county, using as a basis "the proportion which the sehool population of the local system bears to the school population in the county." To illustrate, "\vhere the State has set apart $2,000 to a county as i,ts pro rata part of the 
 
 32 
prublic school fund, and the county has in it school population of 2,000 people, and: within tlhe county is a looal system having :a oohoo1 population of 500, the pro rata o money in that case due to the local system is the proportio'l Which 500 bears to 2,000. 
Yours very truly, J NO. 0. HART' Attorney-General. 
July 1, 1903. 
Hon. W. B. Merritt) State School Commissioner) Atlanta) Ga.: DEAR Sm: In reply to your inquiry whether it i'S in the 
power of the county board of education to give to a school an additional appropri:ation of money or permit it to be taught an additional length of time, where for providential reasons the year before it was hindered from teaching the time allowed, I beg to say that the appropriation o money for the manitenance and ,support of the public school contemplates an annual eXJpenditure, and in my opinion such action would not be authorized by the law. I can conceive of cases where a very strong appeal could be made for the allowance of money that would nave been paid the school had it not been for unavoidable suspension, but, on the other hand, I can conceive where to 'adopt a rule of carrying balances forward from one year to another would be productive of the greatest amount of confusion. That rule which is univers,a1ly accepted as the true one, that laws should be fmmed having 'in view the greatest good to the greatest number, should be invoked in the distribution of the public school fund. The appr*>priation which the State makes yearly is in a sense a contribution b,y the people of the S:tate to assist in the education of the children thereof, and the limit.ation of time and age is placed upon each benefici'ary. I recognize that i,t is the policy of the law- 
 
 33 
maker's to clothe the several bomrds of education of this State with almost supreme power in the administration of the public 'B'chool fund, 'and that to lodge with the board such discretion is wise, but I mn persuaded for a board to exercise the discretio,n to the extent of using money appropriated one year for another would run counter to the legishtiYe S'cheme and be an abuse of discretion. 
Yours very truly,, JNO. 0. HART, Attorney-General. 
J,UJnuary 10, 1903. 
Han. W. B. MerTitt, State School Commissioner, Atlanta, Ga.: 
DEAR Sm: I beg to ackn:owledge your communication of January 5th, in \Yhich you make inquiry, and ask an official opinion, on the propos,ition whether the cjounty boards of education can legally borrmv money to pay the past duel salaries of teachers of public schools. 
I UJm of the opinion that county boards of education may, to a limited extent, arrange to secure mone,y for the payment of the past due s,alaries of public: school teachers. 
The conditions, as I underst,and, are, viz.: Georgia is just one year behind in lwr obligatimrs to her teachers. To illustrate: The fund to go to a named county, say :Morgan county, is determined on the fim1t Tuesday in December, 1902, and is paid ornt in 1903, payments ranging frmn January to December, inclusive, of the last named yea::-. Tn other words, it is ascertained by you, as the State School Commissioner, in December, 1902, the amount of sc1hool fund to which :Morgan county is entitled for that year, an1 it is disbur&ed by JOn, and through the county commissioner of that count~, during the year 1903. Tlhe amount of money, therefore, which J\iorgan county is to get in 1903 is ascertained in 1902. Through you the county commis- 
 
 34 
si'oner of :Morgan county is informed of iJhe specific amount of money that oounty is to receive, and he in turn knows definitely_ (as the result of a mailiematrical calculation based upon the average 'attendance of the pupils in the public schools of that county, or by contmc.t), wha.t each school is entitled to receive. The county board of education of J\iorgan county knows, therefore, to a cent, the amount of money the county of J\iorgan is to receive, and the amount due as salaries to the teachers of that county. The board of education knows what it iB to receive, knows whom it is to pay, and the ~amount to be paid. The debts are past due, the teachers need and want their money, the board recognizes the duty and necessity of prompt payment, but is unable to do so, because the fund is not in hand to pay with. 
The proposition is, whether the board may go to tilw bank, or other persons having money to lend, arrange with the bank, or ~sudh person, to advance, at a reasonable discount, the money whrich the State, later on, is to pay the board to pay the teachers. 
I understand you ask, whether the board can borro.w the money under these conditions, and for this purpose. The legal question,whether the board can bo~rrow m'oney to pay teachers, is. hardly involved in this transaction. It is not borrowing money in the 'Seil'f\8 of creating a debt. It is a practical quest~on and relates purely to the wise administvation of the public school fund. I am as clear in my mind the boa~rd of education has the right to make this arrangement, as I am clear in the opinion that the board has the right to do anything else thrat would add to the e:fl:leient operation of the sdhlools. Under section 1363 of the Code, the county boards of education have the right to "make all arrangements necessa,ry to the efficient operation of the schools." Tlhe teachers of our public schoois of right ought to be paid promptly, as other officials of the State are paid. 
 
 35 
 
But, aside from that, their prompt payment would result. 
 
in better, more zealous teachers, an:d, in co,nsequence, un- 
 
told good to the children generally. I believe, therefore, 
 
that it is not only the right of the county board of educ!i.- 
 
tion to arrange for an advance of this money, pledging for 
 
repayment thereof tihe fund to be paid the county boaxd of 
 
education later on by the S:bate, >and pay the teachers 
 
promptly, but tJhe policy of doing so has much in it to corm- 
 
mend. 
 
Where this is done I do not see who could complain. I 
 
assume, of course, the county board of educrution would 
 
faithfully 'and honestly expend the surm thus borrowed. 
 
Were they to do otherw:ise, thej would be personally re- 
 
sponsible for an improper conversion of the fund. Where 
 
the fund is aitihfully expended no taxpayer would have 
 
the right to complain, ,and no beneficiRry could possibly be 
 
injured tlhereby. Soo in thiB connection 98 Ga. pages 696 
 
and 697. 
 
Grant, for the 'sake of argument., that the quot;ation from 
 
section 1363 of the Code, referred to, does not in terms, 
 
and of its own vigor, carry the right to borrow money, yet 
 
it is a sound proposition of the law that where the money 
 
of a lender was Mtually applied to legitimate use:s, the 
 
county could not, mrd would nort, be heard to plead as a 
 
defense the want of authority in its officers to borrow. 
 
Such a defense would not only be contmry to law, but good 
 
mol'la1s rus well. See 94 Ga. page 488. 
 
I 'am, therefocre, of the opinion that the county boards of 
 
education have the right to arTange for an advanoo witJh 
 
the lender of money, not in excess of the deferred payment 
 
due the county, and to pledge therefor, orr to assign, or 
 
transfer, the amount to be rpaid by the State, as security, 
 
for the money thus adVJanced. 
 
Resrpectfull y, 
 
c. J NO. 
 
HART, 
 
At.torney-General. 
 
 36 
October 15, 1903. Hon. Wm. A. Wright, Comptroller-Genera.l, Atlanta, Ga.: 
DEAR SIR: I beg to acknowledge your recent communication in whi<fu you request my opinion 'as to your duty in the as,sessment of t1axes for municipalities and counties through which the Atlantic Co,ast LineR. R. runs. I un- ' derst1and the direct question which you desire me to rule upon is >vhether or not the returns as originally made by the Atlantic Coast I.ine R. R. is to be the basis of apportionment between the counties and municipalities traversed by that road in Georgia, or whether the amount fixed by the board of arbitrators is the true value for distribution and. apportionment. 
'iViJ.wther or not, as a mattor of law, you have a right to reject the returns of a railmad company made for county and municipal taxation, that ques.tion is not involved in this case, for the fact rema:ins. tha.t you did reject the returns made by the Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., and that the State and the railroad selected arbitrators and without protest on the pa.rt of the railmad, submitterl the question to the board of arbitrators as to what waB the true value of this property for taxation. The value of the properrty was fixed by this board and for t1axation for all purposes, as I understand it. I think, thereforre, that the RWard is the basis of value for apportionment bebveen eounties and municipalities. 
Yours very truly, J NO. C. HART, Attorney-General. 
June 9, 1903. Hon. Wm. A. Wright, Comptroller-General, Atlanta, Ga.: 
DEAR SIR: I beg to acb:mwledge your recent eommunication enclosing a letter from Messrs. King, Spalding & 
 
 37 
Little, in which they ask for ins:tJ"Uctions as to the return of property of the Standard Oil Co. :for taxation. Tho point., as I understand, in the case, is, the wmpany has some forty add agencies in various counties in the State where oils are kept for sale and delivery. T'he precise question is whether the monies and notes in the countie~ of the several agencies, on the date orf return, shall be macre to the county whel'e located, for the pul'pos3 of taxation, or whetJher the Atlanta office, where all records of accounts are kept, shall return tbs personalty to Fulton county for taxation. 
In my judgment the 'a:ooount1s due the company, as well as monies that they have on hand, should be returned in the respective counties for taxation where the same may be. That is to say, where, for instance, tJhe agency in DeKalb county is due it certain monies for oil sold, the agency for DeKalb county Hhould return for taxation in DeKalb county, and .so on wherever the agency may be looated, the idea being that the situs for perSJ(mal property for taxation i its location. 
Yours very truly, JNo. C. HART, Attorney-General.